Ways of thinking of Eastern peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan by Nakamura, Hajime, 1912-1999


WAYS OF THINKING OF EASTERN PEOPLES
India. China, Tibet, Japan

AYS OF
THINKING OF
EASTERN PEOPLES:
INDIA~CHINA~
TIBET-JAPAN
Hajime NAKAMURA
REVISED ENGLISH TRANSLATION
EDITED BY PHILIP P. WIENER
EAST-WEST CENTER PRESS
HONOLULU, HAWAII
Copyright © 1964 by East-West Center Press
Third Printing 1968
All Rights Reserved
L.C. Card: 64-63438
Printed in the United States of America
I1
FOREWORD
The appearance of a revised English edition of Professor Nakamura's
work will be warmly welcomed by scholars and by laymen who seek to
understand the complex societies of Asia with whose destinies the West
is ever more intimately involved It is surely appropriate that this should
be the first major publication of the East-West Center at the University
of Hawaii, for Mr. Nakamura is concerned with two problems that are
crucial for the development of better mutual understanding between East
and West.
The first of these problems is the identification in some meaningful
way of the "East" and the 'West." How may one define such entities, and
how may systematic comparisons be made that will bring into bold relief
basic differences and similarities? In the four and a half centuries from
the European "discovery" of Asia to the present period of intensified
culture contact, Europeans and Asians alike have learned all too little
about each other. False antitheses and monolithic comparisons have per-
sisted from one generation to the next; knowledge is difficult to attain,
understanding is more so, and resort to cliche generalization proves irre-
sistible. In recent times some of these cliches have been dressed up in new
jargons so that thousands of unwary readers have been led to believe that
they were being given new magic keys that would open the door to the
"Oriental mind," "Oriental logic" or what-not. But the keys opened doors
into dream worlds inhabited only by cliches and phantasies.
Professor Nakamura sweeps aside this flotsam and sets out to analyze,
with rigor and objectivity, the characteristic thought-patterns of four Asian
peoples as these are revealed in their languages, their logic, and their
cultural products. In this analysis he speaks neither of an "Oriental mind"
nor of an undifferentiated 'West." Rather he speaks of the Indians, the
Chinese, the Tibetans, and the Japanese out of solid understanding of
their distinctive cultures and histories. And when he speaks of the West,
it is with full awareness of the mutiplicity of traditions that have con-
tributed to Western civilization. He seems to me to demonstrate the level of
understanding that can be reached once we transcend the ancient myth
of the "East" and the 'West" as monoliths.
The second major problem dealt with in this study is equally relevant
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to the need for mutual understanding between the peoples of Asia and
the West. Mr. Nakamura poses it this way: It is clear that no people in
the world today is isolated from those world-wide movements of thought
and belief that everywhere tend to transform men's lives and the values
they live by. Yet each people is engaged, consciously and unconsciously,
in selecting among the manifold influences which reach them and then
of adapting and modifying those elements which they select. What governs
this process and how does it come about that out of it cultures emerge
which are amalgams-certain elements of them being native and dis-
tinctive, others clearly derived from one or another world-wide movement?
Mr. Nakamura believes that there are clues to this process in the long
history of Buddhism which began and evolved in India and then invaded,
one by one, all the historic societies of Central, East, and Southeast Asia.
Indians, Chinese, Tibetans, and Japanese were continuously engaged in
selecting and adapting elements from the evolving tradition of Buddhism.
The ways in which they did this reveal certain long-continuing and dis-
tinctive modes of thought, certain key values and attitudes which governed
the scope of the borrowing and the process of adapting Buddhist ideas.
These peoples' experience with Buddhism, when properly understood, in
turn helps to explain their differences one from another and their widely
variant responses to Western culture in our time. This is the great theme
to which Mr. Nakamura addresses himself in this volume.
The magnitude of this study, involving as it does four civilizations,
four literary traditions, two and a half millenia of history, and a host of
analytical problems, inevitably directs attention to its author. What sort of
man is he and under what circumstances did' he conceive and carry
through this impressive work? Mr. Nakamura completed the original
Japanese version of his study in 1947 when he was in his middle thirties.
Portions of the work in its early stages were developed as part of a broader
project on language and culture headed by Professor Kichinosuke Ito,
but the scope and method of the book are distinctively Mr. Nakamura's
own. He graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1936 and received
the degree of Doctor of Letters (Bungaku Hakase) in 1943. In 1957 he
was awarded the Imperial Prize of the Academy of Japan for his four-
volume history of early Vedanta philosophy. Since 1954 he has been
Professor of Indian and Buddhist Philosophy at the University of Tokyo.
Professor Nakamura was trained at Tokyo University in Indian and
Buddhist studies-fields which necessarily involved him in the study of
the cultures and the Buddhist traditions of China, Tibet, and Japan. In
the course of this training he acquired the broad knowledge of languages
and cultures requisite for such a study as this. From the beginning of
his career, however, his intellectual interests carried him beyond the
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traditional confines of Indology and Buddhology. He emerged as a major
force in the modernization of Indian studies in Japan, and his publications
have ranged over a wide field: studies of ancient Indian history, studies
on the character of primitive Buddhism, studies of Indian philosophic
traditions, notably Vedanta, articles on the living traditions of modern
India, a book on the nature of religion in modern Japan, and numerous
publications on problems of language and culture and on East-West cul-
tural relations.
The catastrophe which befell Japan in 1945 ushered in a period of
great intellectual and spiritual ferment. Japanese intellectuals asked them-
selves fundamental questions about their nation and their culture, about
the potential of a new Japan in a new world order. One facet of this great
effort of reappraisal and projection was comparative study which, it was
hoped, would give the Japanese a fresh view of their culture and society,
their myths and their values. Mr. Nakamura, as the preface to the Japa-
nese edition indicates, was drawn to this new effort at national self-
knowledge through intercultural comparisons. His training in Indian and
Buddhist studies led him to examine four societies (including his own)
which had been affected in different ways by their experience with Bud-
dhism. Other intellectual inRuences dictated the methods he was to use.
Western philosophy has long been one of Mr. Nakamura's major
interests, and the approaches used in this volume were shaped by these
interests. Mr. Nakamura was first introduced to the thought of such
British and American philosophers as Russell and Dewey. At this stage
he also read widely in the writings of Deussen, Keyserling, and Schopen-
hauer. After reading Professor Shinkichi Sudo's Logic, he went on to
study the German logicians. He has long been deeply interested in
Windelband's "problem approach" to the history of philosophy.
Like many scholars throughout the world, Mr. Nakamura has been
greatly inRuenced by the general breakdown of absolutist philosophies.
He was impelled to ask the question, not, are these views in accord with
some absolute system, but rather how it is that some men in some societies
come to hold such views? How will men's behavior be affected by those
views, and under what altered conditions will they change them? In
formulating questions of this kind, Mr. Nakamura was inRuenced by
Marx, Max Weber, and by Professor Watsuji, whose book, Climate, ex-
plored the problem of the relation between environment and thought.
Thus in the present book Mr. Nakamura uses the study of philosophic
ideas to carry through an inquiry that lies largely beyond the traditional
scope of philosophy. ,This inquiry seeks to analyze the modes of thought
or "ways of thinking" of the four Asian peoples-those distinctive and
slowly evolving ways in which people sort and classify experience, argue
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with one another, and make value judgments or practical decisions. For
such an analysis, he has been concerned with a whole range of phenomena
which might be classifIed as social-historical, psychological, and linguistic.
The design of this comparative study of modes of thought was de-
veloped out of the intellectual interests we have noted. Each of the four
sections of the study is developed on a common plan. First there is some
discussion of language and logic, of the characteristic ways in which each
of these Asian peoples habitually made certain types of judgment and
inferences. In each section the author then proceeds to the manifestations
of these patterns in formal philosophical writing, in literature, and in
individual and group behavior. In each section Buddhism is used, in the
manner described earlier, as a kind of chemical precipitant to isolate those
indigenous habits of thinking that are most enduring and resistant to
change.
Mr. Nakamura is aware that explicit logic and philosophical formula-
tions of all kinds are the particular property of the small educated elites
in the societies he is considering. But, if I interpret him correctly, he re-
gards the philosophizing of the elite as a kind of translation into more
general and abstract terms of the problems encountered in the common
life of the society. And, in turn, folk sayings, proverbs, everyday thought
reflect a translation downward or a seeping downward of what the philoso-
phers have voiced. To fInd evidence of how this occurred and of how
Buddhist ideas and values entered into this process in the four societies,
Mr. Nakamura has cast a wide net. He has combed folk literature, prayers
and the scriptures of popular cults, collections of proverbs, descriptions of
everyday life and, wherever possible, he has used -the accounts of foreign
observers whose fresh eyes often register characteristics that escape the
native critic of his own society. Thus, in the end we are shown not only
how each elite grappled with the problems of Buddhist thought and belief
but also how this process affected habits of thought and modes of be-
havior in the society as a whole.
The present revised English edition reflects at many points the de-
velopment of Mr. Nakamura's thought in the period since 1947. When
the fIrst Japanese version was written, Japan was only beginning to emerge
from the isolation of years of war and military rule. Since that time
Mr. Nakamura has read widely in newer writings in the fIelds of philoso-
phy, anthropology, and linguistics. During 1951-1952, he visited Stanford
University where his work was the focus of a year-long faculty seminar.
Again in 1962-1963 he discussed his fIndings with a seminar of scholars
at the East-West Center. Portions of his book, certain lines of argument,
and much of the documentation have been revised in the light of the
author's experiences over the last fIfteen years.
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It is a pleasure to present this revised English edition to the Western
reader. In its pages scholar and layman alike will find a wealth of insight
into the range of great problems with which Mr. Nakamura is concerned.
He will also, I think, come to admire its author as a tireless explorer on
the frontiers of knowledge, a scholar whose virtuousity in research is
matched by his relentless drive towards new understandings.
ARTHUR FREDERICK WRIGHT
Yale University
--
....
EDITOR'S PREFACE
Professor Nakamura's book was the basis of conferences held at the
East-West Center, in 1962-1963, where everyone agreed that the existing
English version, now out of print, deserved highly to be replaced by a
more readable, updated, and revised edition. With the help of the Senior
Scholars and the department of Research Translations of the Institute of
Advanced Projects at the East-West Center, and through close collabora-
tion with the author and with our colleagues at the University of Hawaii,
especially with Professor Kenneth K. Inada, my editorial task has been
directed at providing a more correctly printed and revised text incorporat-
ing many new features. Among these are a new Foreword by the dis-
tinguished Far Eastern scholar, Professor Arthur F. Wright, who has been
intimately acquainted with the evolution of Mr. Nakamura's studies;
he and Professor Charles A. Moore have encouraged us to produce this
new edition.
The renouned sinologue Professor P. Demieville has recently said of
Dr. Nakamura's work: "No statement or hypothesis is enunciated in this
book without resting on some document duly indicated in the footnotes.
. . . It is a comparative study of 'the ways of thinking' characteristic of the
peoples of India, China, Tibet, and Japan, with an Introduction and Con-
clusion on East Asia in general. . . . They are treated in a broad manner,
as "cultural phenomena" (bunka genzo in Japanese), through language
chiefly but also bringing in psychology, sociology, esthetics, and logic . . .
all without pedantry, in a lively and at times humorous tone which holds
your interest. ... I was particularly struck by the part on Japan which oc-
cupies nearly half the work, for it constitutes a national self-criticism, whole-
some and sharp, such as you would not have thought written by a Japanese.
. . . The myth of an "Oriental mind" common to the whole of East Asia is
denounced without beating around the bush.... The claim of Western
thought to universality does not escape any better off." (T'oung Paa,
vol. L, 1-3 [1963], pp. 287ff.)
Professor Nakamura's numerous emendations and additions of new
material to the text of both the original Japanese edition and first English
version have resulted in the following changes. The Introduction has been
enlarged, recent studies on Indian, Chinese, Tibetan, and Japanese
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thought and culture have been utilized, entirely new chapters on Tibet
have been added, the chapters on Japan have been re-organized, and an
Index has been compiled (since none existed in the first English version).
Bibliographical notes have been revised to include more recent references,
and more titles have been translated; more dates of authors and leaders
of thought have also been discussed.
The breadth and plasticity of Professor Nakamura's thinking are
evidenced by his willingness to revise even his basic ideas and interpreta-
tions, such as the greater emphasis in this edition on socio-cultural tradi-
tions and environmental inBuences than on innate, national, or racial
traits.
I am greatly indebted to the author for broadening the scope of my
own interests in the history of ideas, since I have learned so much from
his work about the myriad aspects of the profound thought and culture
of Eastern peoples. It has been an honor as well as an edifying experience
to ~ollaborate with so eminent a Japanese scholar as Professor Hajime
Nakamura.
PHILIP P. WIENER
East-West Center, University of Hawaii
City University, New Yark
-
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to bring it to completion.
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Ito of the University of Tokyo, who was commissioned by the Ministry
of Education Committee of Japan to promote the comparative study of
the ways of thinking of different peoples, asked me to collaborate in this
study during the year 1945-1946. I accepted his proposal, proceeded with
the necessary research, and submitted reports to the committee.
Since then, I have continued to develop my studies further. I first
wished to determine the procedure I should adopt and the form in which
I should embody the results. I realized that if I was not clear on method-
ology, I would not achieve the scientific accuracy desired. Hence, in
order to pursue the study systematically, I adopted the following methods:
When possible, I aimed to isolate the characteristic features of the ways
of thinking of each people by analyzing their typical forms of judgment
and inference; such features are, I believe, most clearly revealed in these
forms of expression. I have refrained from discussing them in toto; but oc-
casionally using the characteristic features thus isolated, I intended to
proceed with investigations of concrete cultural phenomena which also
reflect the ways of thinking and the thought-processes of each people.
To clarify the particular ways in which Buddhism and Indian logic were
introduced from India into China, Tibet, and Japan-that is, how a
universal religion and logic came to be adapted to the native characteristics
of each people-constituted the special focus of my research. I therefore
applied the same methods in investigating the ways of thinking of each
people. (Concerning the Japanese ways of thinking, I realized I had to
deal also with the problem of the introduction and modification of Con-
fucianism. However, as this problem lies beyond my ability, I touched
upon it only occasionally.) The contrasts and comparisons with Occidental
ways of thinking were not a separate topic but were made an integral part
of the study. As a result, I took special care to indicate the contrasts
presented by the ways of thinking of ancient Occidental peoples in that
part of my study in which Indian ways of thinking are explained. AI-
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though the ancient Indians and the ancient Occidentals were ethnographi-
cally and linguistically related, there are many differences in their indi-
vidual ways of thinking. I feel that a clarification of these differences is
a scientific problem of great importance. I do not refer to a study of differ-
ences in their philosophical theories of culture, but to a specific and
positive study of the characteristic features of their ways of thinking ex-
hibited in linguistic and cultural phenomena.
When Dr. Charles B. Fahs, Director of the Rockefeller Foundation
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for discussing the contents of the translated portions, the members being
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Nobutaka Ike (Political Science), Bernard Joseph Siegel (Anthropology),
Bert Alfred Gerow (Anthropology), David Shepherd Nivison (Chinese
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Smith (History), and Raymond K. Waters (Japanese). The session was
held every other week, and reports were distributed each time. Some
parts of the translation were criticized and revised.
After the author left America in July 1952, Professors Nivison and
Waters continued the work of editing the English manuscript, which
was thus brought to partial completion. Some portions of the chapter on
"Chinese Ways of Thinking" were translated by the author during his stay
in London in 1952, and were later edited by Professor Wright and dis-
tributed by the Committee for Chinese Thought at Aspen, Colorado.
This work was taken up by the Japanese National Commission for
UNESCO, Government of Japan, as the first attempt to translate philo-
sophical works by Japanese scholars. The Editorial Board, set up by the
Commission for this task, helped the Secretariat in the arrangements for
translation. The author was requested to collaborate in the project on
August 21, 1958. The translation of the whole work was finished in
June 1959. Finally it was published in 1960 by the Japanese National
Commission for UNESCO under the title: THE WAYS OF THINK-
ING OF EASTERN PEOPLES.
Now we are going to present a new different English translation,
chiefly based upon the revised Japanese text, published in 1961-1962
by the Shunjusha Company, Tokyo.
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WAYS OF THINKING OF EASTERN PEOPLES
India, China, Tibet, Japan
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INTRODUCTION
Ways of Thinking of East Asian Peoples
Our sense of belonging to one world has never been keener than at
present. Yet the emphasis today on this evident fact itself implies that while
every individual is affected by the quickening flow of world events, he is
still strongly influenced by the ways of living and thinking in his own na-
tion and culture.
It is commonly said that following the Meiji Restoration in 1868,
Japan in less than a century rapidly and skillfully adopted and assimilated
Western civilization; this acceptance was selective and beneficial in several
respects. But may we say that it is actually being accepted in its entirety?
And how much the less may this be said of those great peoples of Asia, the
Indians and the Chinese? For despite their close relations with Westerners
for several hundred years, industrialism and capitalism have failed in many
respects to replace their traditional ways; it is not surprising therefore that
verbal expressions, beliefs, ritual practices, etc. show few signs of being
easily transformed. Western thought, from its first arrival in these lands,
was theoretically rather well understood among the educated classes as a
part of their general cultivation. And yet it certainly did not govern com-
pletely the practical and concrete behavior of many of these peoples. How
are we to explain this? We cannot dismiss these phenomena simply by
labels like "cultural lag," "backward peoples," or "Asiatic underdevelop-
ment," but must rather seek the answer in the cultural characteristics and
traditional ways of thinking of each group of people.
There has long been a tendency to think in terms of a dichot-
omy between East and West, presupposing two mutually opposed cultural
sets of values labeled "Occidental" and "OrientaL" Thus the Oriental way
of thinking is represented as "spiritual," "introverted," "synthetic" and
"subjective," while the Occidental is represented as "materialistic," "ex-
troverted," "analytic," and "objective." This sort of explanation by paired
opposites is now rejected as too simple; the cultures of the "Orient" and
"Occident" are too diversified and each one is extremely complex. If we
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inquire into what these words refer to, we are struck by the fact that the
sense of each is composite, embracing a range of various narrower concepts.
For example, the Greek and Hebrew civilizations, among the historical
components of Western civilization, differ markedly from each other.
Moreover, the civilization formed by the fusion of these strains is divisible
into the ancient, medieval, and modem periods, each of which has its
peculiar characteristics; and further, modem Western civilization takes on
different characteristics from nation to nation. Consequently, without a
thorough grasp of these differences it is impossible to generalize accurately
about the ways of thinking of Westerners.
So likewise in the case of Eastern peoples,t we must first explain the
characteristic ways of thinking in each of their diverse cultures. If we are
to hazard any conclusions about Eastern peoples as a whole, it must be as a
tentative hypothesis in a comparative study of the data. Generalized con-
clusions drawn before such individual preparatory studies have been made
will perforce be hasty and dogmatic. Thus, in order to deal with the ways
of thinking of Eastern peoples, it is first necessary to examine the ways of
thinking of each of the peoples individually. However, such a study of all
the peoples of the East is, from a practical point of view, impossible at
this time. I intend to concentrate on India, China, Tibet, and Japan. My
reason is that among these four peoples alone did there exist-however
imperfectly-a study of traditional Buddhist logic, which came first from
India to the other three areas, and then developed independently in each.
I believe that the various other peoples of the East have nearly the same
ways of thinking as one or another of these four. Specifically, one may say
that Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, and western Indo-China (Cambodia and
Laos) are akin to India. Central Asia and Mongolia are akin to pre-
Communist Tibet. Manchuria, Korea, and eastern Indo-China (Vietnam)
are akin to China. Thus, an examination of the ways of thinking of these
four is, in effect, a study of the most influential peoples of the East. It is
only after such a study, if at all, that a generalized view of the ways of
thinking of Eastern peoples can emerge.
"Ways of Thinking" and Other Terms
In order to prepare an explanation for the problems raised above, I
shall first define several related concepts as they appear in this work.
(I) "Rules of logic" (formerly called "Laws of Thought") are those
explicitly expressed formal rules put forward by logicians. When inter-
preted, such rules usually claim to give universally valid results, that is, to
lead from true assumptions to only true conclusions. Traditional logic
claimed special priority for the "laws" of identity, contradiction, and the
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excluded middle; alternative systems suggest other rules. The rules of logic
do not purport to describe how people think. Hence the present work, not
being a work in logic, does not deal with thinking from a logical and
formal point of view. But, of course, it is a historical fact that certain
people have at certain times accepted, organized, and promulgated logical
systems and rules, and from this fact, among others, conclusions can be
drawn about how people think. In this sense alone, the present book is
concerned with viewing rules of logic and logical systems as cultural
products of reflective thinking.
(2) The phrase "ways of thinking" refers to any individual's thinking
in which the characteristic features of the thinking habits of the culture
to which he belongs are revealed. 'Ways of thinking" as here used will
designate especially ways of thinking about concrete, empirical questions,
which may, on many occasions, involve also value-judgments and ques-
tions of values in ethics, religion, aesthetics, and other such human con-
cerns. The thinker need not himself be aware of any way of thinking
when he is engaged in operations of thinking. However, his ways of
thinking are, in fact, conditioned by his culture's habits and attitudes when
he communicates his thoughts. I have adopted the phrase "ways of think-
ing" in the title of this work as the main subject of our study.
On some logical or other specialized problems all members of a society
or a group may think in the same way. But concerning informal or non-
technical problems of daily experience, the individuals constituting one
and the same people do not necessarily think in the same way, and so we
can only point out a general tendency of the thinking of the people con-
cerned. Thus, as each individual may think in a slightly different way, our
work can only mention the predominant tendencies of each people.
(3) Following one or more of several "ways of thinking"-as defined
above-any thinker might develop a coherent, self-conscious system of
thought. We call this system and its tradition a "system of thought." For
example, any well-organized, coherent system of theology or philosophy is
a "system of thought." We refer to such systems only when they have
affected or reflected ways of thinking of most people in Far-Eastern
countries.
Ways of Thinking and Language
In studying the ways of thinking of a people, we find one of the
first clues in their language. Language is basic to the cultural life of a
people; so basic that when a special language system comes into beilig,
we may say that a people has come into being. The existence of a common
language and culture serves as a criterion for the identification of a people.
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Even though linguistic activity is common to all mankind, a universal
language has never been adopted by all people, and consequently there has
never been a worldwide speech community. Several international languages
have been devised, and some have, moreover, actually begun to be used
for international communication. These, however, are languages used only
by people who, faced with the actual situation of many different languages
existing in conflict, wish to overcome this confusion. Practically speaking,
these languages are also in a sense only special artifacts.
Forms of linguistic expression become, in the inner consciousness of
people, norms for psychologically ordering in a fixed pattern and carrying
to conclusion the operations of thought. Therefore the special forms for
developing the effectiveness of a given language, especially the grammar
of that language and more especially its syntax, express the more conscious
ways of thinking of the people using the language, and what is more, may
be said to explicate such ways of thinking.
Are philosophical ideas or traditional thought relative to language?
For some time a good deal of discussion has taken place in Western
scholarly circles concerning the relation between linguistic forms and
ways of thinking. Many scholars2 believe that between the two there
exists some sort of parallel development and mutual correspondence.
However, there are other scholars3 who either deny such parallel develop-
ment and mutual correspondence entirely or assert that the relationship
is not a significant one. Recently, especially in America, the relation
between language and action based upon communication has been dis-
cussed as one of the most important philosophical problems.
Recognizing that many theories exist as to the relationship between
linguistic forms and ways of thinking, in this work I have nevertheless
followed what seems to be the general assumption that between the two
there is a close relationship of correspondence or parallel development-
that language is a representation in sound, writing, or gesture of the concept
produced in the operation of thinking.
If there is such an intimate relationship between the operations of
language and thinking, it is worthwhile and indeed necessary to inquire
into forms of linguistic expression as a key to the study of forms and ways
of thinking.
Studies have already been partially undertaken which attempt to
clarify the differences between the ways of thinking of various peoples,
using as a key the differences in the forms of grammatical construction
in the languages used by these peoples. For example, Wilhelm von
Humboldt thought it possible to study the differences between the struc-
tural aspects of different languages by making a study of such questions
as how a given form of grammatical structure is handled in each language,
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what sort of grammatical position it has, and what sort of relationship it
has to other grammatical forms. As one instance of this, he made an in-
vestigation of duals. 4 Thus, with this method as a key, he proposed to
attack the problem of the forms of thinking of a people. Again, the
sinologist Granet said, "Just as linguistic research permits the analysis of
the mechanism of thoughts transmitted in language, in the same way the
analysis of the guiding principles of thought can verify the analysis of
its means of expression."s Taking this position he endeavored to explain
the ways of thinking of the Chinese people as a whole, by using the
analytical study of the Chinese language as a key.
In this work it is my aim to carry out an investigation of a broad
scope with regard to the most important peoples of the East, following a
similar scheme of analysis for each people.6 The procedure I have followed
with each people is to study their forms of e~ressing judgments and
inferences as initial clues to their ways of thinking, and then to attempt
to elucidate these ways of thinking by analyzing the various cultural
phenomena correlated with them. But for comparative purposes I have
placed particular emphasis upon Buddhism-a cultural phenomenon
common to all.
Ways of Thinking and Logic
Although the forms of linguistic expression raise many different
problems, since we are concerned with ways of thinking it will be proper
for us to give primary emphasis to the forms of judgment and inference.
These are the basic forms for expressing the operations of thinking. I shall
postpone for the present such questions as what varieties of forms of
judgment and inference there are, and how these varieties ought to be
classified, for these are, properly speaking, problems of logic.7 Accordingly,
although it would be desirable to examine the special characteristics of the
ways of thinking of each people, taking up all the forms of expression of
judgment and inference one by one, yet insofar as the problem of their
classification is concerned, the actual fact is that the content of logic in
this respect is not yet definitely fixed. I would like to select for considera-
tion merely those judgments and inferences which are fundamental or
especially characteristic.
First, as to judgments, I shall consider the most fundamental and
simple forms, namely judgments of identity, judgments of classification,
judgments of inference, and judgments of existence.S In Western
logic the problem of impersonal judgments has been widely discussed but
propositions (such as "it is raining," for example), which in the West are
considered impersonal judgments, cannot be so considered in Japanese and
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Chinese, differing as they do from Western languages in their linguistic
forms. Furthermore, in the ancient Indian language, which is on a par
with Western languages in its linguistic forms, very often the same idea
is not an impersonal judgment but is expressed as a judgment with a
subject ("it is raining" equals "devo var~ati" i.e. "the god of rain causes
rain"). Consequently, since the question how to classify the "impersonal
judgment" must first be argued out logically, in this work comparisons of
the linguistic forms of various languages in the matter of the impersonal
judgment will not be carried out as an independent topic, but will merely
be discussed as an illustration of the relation of language to logic. Moreover,
in recent years there have been many logicians who have emphasized the
"judgment of relation" (relational statements).9 However, inasmuch as
the views of scholars vary as to the meaning of the concepts of "relational
judgments," in the present work it will suffice to discuss such judgments
only when necessary, without bringing them together and examining them
under an independent heading.
Moreover, among the various forms of inference, I should like to call
attention especially to the forms of expression of simple types of inference.
In Western formal logic this problem used to be examined under the
"syllogism"; but in everyday life we very often demonstrate a conclusion by
advancing only one premise in the manner "x, therefore y." We must in
addition consider the joining together of several inferences. However, the
compound syllogism-i.e. a form which joins together complete syllogisms
-is in actual fact seldom used; in almost all situations a form is used which
links together abbreviated syllogisms. This is called in formal logic the
sorites or chain argument. We must, of course, also be concerned with
the question of how these chains of inference are differently applied by
various peoples.10 We shall seek these forms of expression which exhibit
especially clearly the typical features of the ways of thinking of a given
people; but even better material is sometimes offered by logic, whether
developed or adopted by the people. Since the original name for logic,
~ '\oyU(~ Tt:XV~ I means skill in regard to logos (word), the features of the
ways of thinking which are unconsciously embodied in language may pos-
sibly become explicit in logic and may moreover be displayed in a sys-
tematized, organized state. In this sense, logic is one of the most important
keys for the study of the features of the ways of thinking of a people. Ac-
cordingly, by studying Eastern logical works and at the same time com-
paring them with those of the West, we should be able to comprehend
some features of the conscious ways of thinking of the various Eastern peo-
ples. Logic in the East originally appeared in India, but when it was intro-
duced into Tibet, China, and Japan, it was studied in different ways in
each place, and in each country it was considerably modified. Although
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logic should be the most universal form of learning, as a matter of his-
torical fact it has by no means been formulated or transmitted to these
other peoples in a universal language. Naturally, the characteristic fea-
tures of ways of thinking, differing with each people, are reflected in the
mutual differences of native or imported patterns of logic when the latter
are tied to the structure of a given language.
But it ought to be noted here that those who have mastered logic
and actually apply it are the intellectual class of any people. Some of the
intellectual class within a given society think in conformity with logic,
and logic becomes a standard for them in the orderly statement of the
content of their thoughts.ll In spite of the fact that the masses use language
constantly every day, their use of logical forms of expression is almost
non-existent. Consequently, it is incorrect to say that logic regulates the
ways of thinking of a given people to the same extent as do linguistic
forms. It is impossible to hold that conclusions obtained from the examina-
tion of the systems of logic of the past are directly applicable to the entire
people who study this logic. In order to take logic as a key for the
examination of the ways of thinking of a given people, it is necessary to
take into consideration just such facts as these.
The comparison of the systems of logic of East and West is in itself
a large problem and an independent topic of study. Since it is impossible
to discuss this problem fully in this work, I shall discuss it only insofar as it
is related to the ways of thinking of peoples in general.
Ways of Thinking and Cultural Phenomena
Here, as above, we shall not concern ourselves with logical systems
as such, nor shall we deal mainly with questions of comparative philos-
ophy.12 The reason is that, in studying the ways of thinking of a given
people, one should consider the ways of thinking adopted by most of the
members of that group. In doing so, it is preferable not to consider exclu-
sively the characteristic ways of thinking of individual philosophers. Of
course, every philosopher, however great, is conditioned by events in a
certain region of space and time. His thinking cannot, moreover, avoid a
certain continuity with that of his associates, as a member of a particular
society. Thus, the ways of thinking of philosophers cannot be freed
completely from national or historical traditions. On the other hand, how-
ever, a great philosopher not infrequently follows a way of thinking
which differs from that of the nation which gave him birth. Indeed, a
philosopher is often considered great for this very reason. Therefore, the
ways or patterns of thinking of individual philosophers will generally be
referred to only when necessary. However, it will be pertinent to inquire
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whether the ways or patterns of thinking of the majority of the philoso-
phers of a given people exhibit certain common tendencies.
On the other hand, I shall take up, in my study of the ways of thinking
of a people, the characteristic popular sayings, proverbs, songs, mythology,
and folklore of that people. Nor will it be out of place to include within
the limits of this study generally current expressions even when found in
the writings of formal philosophers. One must, however, exercise con-
siderable caution in determining which of the numerous expressions found
among the people are universal and truly characteristic of the people. In
addition, such things as myths, religious scriptures, the arts (music, paint-
ing, architecture, etc.), and works of literature in general must, of course,
be considered as important sources for our study. Since such documents
abound among all peoples, one must choose as source material those
which are particularly cherished by the people in question. Those works
which are not esteemed by the people, even though they may be interesting
from the point of view of the modern reader, will be of little significance
as sources for determining the ways of thinking common to the entire
people. But, on the other hand, works which furnish a critique of the
ways of thinking of a given people written by foreigners, in spite of the
fact that the people in question may know nothing of such works, are
very important sources in that they clarify the differences between the
ways of thinking of the two nations involved.
Ways of Thinking as Revealed in the Pattern of Adoption of a
Foreign Culture
The modern investigator draws his conclusions about the ways of
thinking of peoples by the method of comparative study, with linguistic
forms, logic, and general cultural phenomena furnishing the bases for
such study. There are, however, instances of a given people, in the course
of its history, elucidating concretely its own ways of thinking which differ
from those of another people. This insight is furnished by the way in
which one people adopts the ways or patterns of thinking of another.
One people does not generally adopt the ways or patterns of thinking of
another culture straightaway, but rather criticizes the "alien" ways, selects
from them, and modifies them in the very course of adoption. In this
process the characteristics of the ways of thinking of both peoples are
clearly indicated. The problem of the interplay of cultures has been
investigateda great deal, but such studies have been made mainly from the
historical and philological point of view. The subject has not been suf-
ficiently explored from the standpoint of ways of thinking. It is this
problem to which I address myself in this book.
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I
....."
Regarded from the standpoint of ways of thinking, the reception of a
universal religion, among the various phenomena of cultural diffusion,
would seem to furnish a most valuable clue to the understanding of the
characteristic ways of thinking of a people. In what form does this people
adopt the universal religion, and in what way is the religion modified?
Now the most widespread religion in the East is, of course, Buddhism.
(In the case of Japan, Confucianism should also be considered.) As a clue
to the characteristic ways of thinking of the Eastern peoples it will be
important to study how they modified Buddhism. There have been many
studies of the spread (adoption, from the point of view of the people) of
Buddhism. These too have been principally historical and philological,
and it appears that there has been no consideration of the problem from
the standpoint of ways of thinking. This is the problem I should like
especially to consider.
The Order in Which the Ways of Thinking of Various Eastern
Peoples will be Considered
In accordance with the methodology outlined above, I intend to
proceed with this study in the following way. First, in my study of each
of the Eastern peoples, I shall bring out the characteristics of their ways of
thinking as discernible in the forms of expression of the simplest judgments
and inferences. These characteristics are among the most fundamental to
the ways of thinking of a people. Next I shall examine the ways in which
such characteristic ways of thinking operate in connection with actual
cultural phenomena (especially the mode of acceptance of Buddhism).
These phenomena most certainly have a socio-psychological relationship
with the characteristics discernible in the mode of expression of simple
judgments and inferences. My study will concern itself with this relation-
ship.
In studying the characteristics of the ways of thinking of Eastern
peoples, the question arises as to the proper order in which to deal with
the several peoples. In my opinion, studying India, China, and Japan in
that order follows best the actual historical order. Since the Indians are,
as Aryans, said to be of the same ethnic, linguistic, and cultural (Indo-
European) family as Occidentals, I shall first contrast these two groups
and point out their differences from the standpoint of their ways of
thinking. Then I shall discuss the Chinese, who are a completely different
people in origin. Lastly I shall come to Japan, which was influenced
culturally by India and China (note that in contrast to this, pre-modem
India had no cultural influence from Japan and only some from China).
One would have to discuss India and China even if one began with
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Japan. Therefore, out of practical considerations I have decided upon the
first-named order. Further, Tibet, although not an important region from
the political or economic point of view, cannot be overlooked in a con-
sideration of ways of thinking, in that it was there that Indian logic found
widest acceptance. Consequently we shall give collateral consideration to
the ways of thinking of the Tibetans.
I should further like to point out here that "the Chinese" as used
in this book refers to the Han people. "Chinese national" is a political
concept, whereas "the Chinese," "the Tibetans," are cultural concepts. In
a consideration of the ways of thinking, the Chinese and the Tibetans
must, of course, be distinguished.
Various Cultural Phenomena and the Ways of Thinking of East
Asian Peoples.
Are there any common features in the ways of thinking of Eastern
peoples despite the variety of their cultures? In Japan as well as in the
West we often hear people maintain that a certain trait is "Oriental" or
"Eastem."13 However, the East-West dichotomy has been challenged and
strongly denied.a
Bertrand Russell points out that man is perennially engaged in three
basic conflicts: (I) against Nature, (2) against other men, and (3)
against himself.15 Inheriting this classification, Huston Smith says:
"Roughly these may be identified as man's natural, social, and psychological
problems. The great surviving cultural traditions are also three-the
Chinese, the Indian, and the Western. It helps us to understand and relate
the unique perspectives of these three traditions if we think of each as
accenting one of man's basic problems. Generally speaking, the West has
accented the natural problem, China the social, and India the psycho-
logical."16 Now it is well known that Asia includes several cultural areas.
But the term "Orient" or "the East" is still used unfortunately as if it
referred to one culture common to all Eastern countries.
Let us inquire further into the meaning implied by this term, Eastern
or Oriental. First of all, it is generally said that in the East man's individual
existence is not fully realized, but that the individual is subordinated to
the universal. Hegel, for instance, asserted that God or the Absolute in the
East has the feature of "das Allgemeine" (the Universal).
"The fundamental principles of the various religions of the East are
that the single Substance alone is the True, and an individual has no value
in itself, nor is capable of attaining any value so long as it is by itself, apart
from that which exists in and for itself (das Anundfursichseyende), the
Absolute; that an individual is only capable of assuming true value by
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uniting itself with Substance, when this individual, however, is no longer
a 'Subject' but is dissolved into the unconscious."11
And regarding the difference between Eastern and Western thoughts,
he says: "On the contrary, with the Greek religion or Christianity the
'Subject' is aware of its freedom; and we ought to think in this manner."
In the philosophy of the East, however, 'The negation of the finite is
real. But that negation is one in the sense that an individual only attains
its freedom in unity with what is substantial."
Hegel had only a limited knowledge of the classics of the East,
acquired through his reading of translations; his views, however, are shared
by many Western people even nowadays. To what extent then are Hegel's
statements true? Indeed, a blind subordination to authority in some form
or other has prevailed in some countries of the East. Is it possible for us to
assert that in the West "the self was free" and devoid of such subordination?
The complete, unquestioning faith in authority during the Middle
Ages in the West and the subsequent destruction or regimentation of alien
cultures did not occur in the East. Was this phenomenon of "being united
with Substance" as Hegel called it, not illustrated, in some cases, in the
West as well as in the East?
It is often said that the peoples of the East are intuitive and accord-
ingly not systematic or orderly in grasping things; by contrast the West-
erners are said to be "postulational" or logical, and that they try to grasp
things systematically and by orderly planning. Indeed, the ways of thinking
of the Chinese or the Japanese may be characterized as "intuitive." But in
the case of the Indians this label is hard to apply. For example, the intricate
arguments of the Abhidharma literature are logical and can never be
called intuitive. There is no need to refer to the difficult literature of
theology in order to point out how far removed from any intuitive grasp
is that complicated, fantastic, and strange set of sentiments symbolized in
Indian paintings and sculptures. Indian art urges us to form a complicated
association of ideas, and leads the spectator into a strange, fantastic
atmosphere.
Secondly, it is often asserted that the ways of thinking of the Eastern
peoples are synthetic, and that of the Westerners analytic. The Chinese
word, for instance, gives us the impression that it is synthetic, but it is
more properly set in a stage prior to analysis. So long as it has yet to pass
through the process of analysis, it would hardly be called synthetic. On
the other hand, it is generally recognized by scholars that the Indians
showed a great skill in the analysis of linguistic or psychological phe-
nomena. We cannot say that only Westerners have a tendency to be
analytical. For example, Indian grammar was most advanced in the
analysis of words and phrases, but very weak in its consideration of the
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synthetic construction of sentences, while, on the other hand, Greek
grammar has left an excellent achievement concerning syntax which deals
with the synthetic field of words and phrases. Therefore, it is unjustifiable
to characterize the ways of thinking of the Eastern peoples simply as
"synthetic."
Let us next consider the problem of knowledge. Max Weber says,
"The premise which is common in the last analysis to all philosophies and
soteriologies in Asia is that knowledge-whether it be that of books or
mystical gnosis-is the only absolute way leading to supreme bliss in this
world as well as in the next world. A careful examination would reveal
the fact that 'knowledge' does not mean knowing the things of this
world, nature, social life, or laws regulating both nature and man. Rather,
it is the philosophical knowledge of the 'meaning' of life and the world.
It is naturally understood that such a knowledge cannot be replaced by
Western empirical learning, and that it should never be sought by empirical
means, if we are to do justice to the purpose proper to that learning."1s
Indeed, it is true that knowledge as conceived by the East Asian
people has c0!1notations which for the most part bear out the definition
given above. But in the history of Western thought, we are able to note
the existence of a similar religio-philosophical connotation. The word
gnosis itself here is Greek, but a gnostic inclination is also seen in various
religions in the western part of Asia, and is not peculiar to India and China
alone. In the West, too, it explicitly appeared in Neo-Platonists like Ploti-
nus, and may be traced back to Plato. It is generally presumed that such
philosophical schools might have been influenced by Indian or Persian
philosophy or thought, but this relationship is yet to be clarified. Under
the influence of Greek philosophy the Gnostics arose in a movement to
elevate the Christian faith to the level of knowledge. Likewise in the
Middle Ages, such an inclination is said to be noticeable in some of the
Christian mystics who were regarded as heretics, such as T auler or Eckhart.
Let us consider the next problem. There are some people who main-
tain that all the principal religions of the world originated in Asia; there-
fore, if we label the whole area including the western part of Asia "East,"
the East might be said to be religious, whereas Europe (and America) or
the West non-religious. Such a view was fairly dominant in Japan prior to
the Pacific War, and it has never completely disappeared. However, as
pointed out above, among the East Asian peoples, the Indians in particular
are extremely religious, but the spiritual disposition of the Japanese or the
Chinese could never be termed religious. On the contrary, there is some
evidence that Western people are far more religious than the Japanese
or the Chinese.
In the same way, the contention that has repeatedly been made that
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the Western civilization is "materialistic," while the East Asian civilization
is "spiritual," is erroneous. A non-religious race can never be "spiritual."
Of course, it all depends on what one means by "religious" and "spiritual."
Ancient civilization and its continuation in modem Western culture,
which restored the ancient culture, were superior in scientific research and
application of material science (technology), and consequently, the West
with all its power was able to make advances on the East. The East Asian
peoples, menaced by this invader, labeled the West "materialistic"; on the
other hand, the West characterized the less advanced East itself as "soul-
ful" or "spiritual." As far as the inability to control material nature is
concerned, a similar feature can be seen in the aborigines of Africa as
well as of America, and so is in no way peculiar to East Asia alone. For
equally good reasons, the justification for defining the East as "internal"
or "subjective," and the West as "external" or "objective" is also highly
questionable.
Furthermore, it would be a very superficial observation to single out
the East as "being ethical," for ethics is a part of every and any society.
Observing that some of the traditional ethics of the Japanese and Chinese
are not practiced in the modern West, some conservative Japanese, trying
to preserve the ethics of old, have made this dubious claim. In connection
with the above observation, Eastern thought is often regarded as meta-
physical, and it is said that the basis of the Eastern metaphysical thought is
"nothingness peculiar to the East."19 It is well-known that "nothingness"
was propounded in the philosophies of Lao-tzu. and Chuang-tzu.. On the
contrary, Indian philosophy generally inquires into the "existent." The
meaning of "existent," however, is different from that of Greek philosophy.
In Indian philosophy in general, there is a mental tendency to seek a
transcendent substantial basis for "what is real." In the case of Samkara,
the ultimate being of the world is the "real," and it is rather the phenomenal
world which is void, so that his thought is diametrically opposed to the
thoughts of Lao-tzu. and Chuang-tzu., so far as literal understanding goes.
In Buddhism, especially in Mahayana Buddhism, "voidness" is expounded
but it is different from "nothingness"; this fact is often emphasized by the
Indian Buddhists.20 These two ideas were either identified or confused
when the method known as Ko-yi (the evaluation and interpretation of
Buddhism through the doctrines of Chinese thoughts, such as Confucian-
ism, Tao-ism, etc.) was practiced after the introduction of Buddhism into
China. Master Chia-hsiang,21 however, repeatedly affirmed that Buddhist
"voidness" and the "nothingness" of Lao-tzu.'s or Chuang-tzu.'s were not to
be equated. Therefore, it is very dangerous for us to qualify the whole of
Eastern thought with the term "nothingness peculiar to the East." (How-
ever, if the term is used to refer just to one aspect of the thought, there
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would be no objection. Or if a modern philosopher sets up such an idea
as a result of his own contemplation, then he is free to do so, but this has
nothing to do with the historically verified thought of the East.) More-
over, it could not possibly be averred that the East is metaphysical and the
West is not so. Among the East Asian peoples, most of the Chinese, and
the Japanese in particular, have been much more non-metaphysical than
the Westerners.
Returning to the fundamental problem of the ways of thinking, it is
often said that Westerners are rationalistic, but that East Asians are
irrationalistic. Such characterizations seem to have acquired general ac-
ceptance and usage especially after World War II. It is particularly empha-
sized that the Japanese are anti-rationalistic. Indeed, the Japanese have
shown in the past a distaste for systematical and logical ways of thinking.
But when we consider the question more deeply, in practice the Japanese
generally tend to follow certain customs and a code of conduct. Their
devotion to a limited social code is a general tendency, upon which they
base their criterion for moral evaluation. Accordingly, in this sense we can
claim rationality for them-if "rational" is the correct term for behavior
in accordance with rules.
At first sight the Chinese give us the impression of being indifferent
to logical exactitude. The ways of expression in the Chinese language are
extremely ambiguous, and the historical fact that there has never been a
development of formal logic (apart from the short lived Mohist school)
among the Chinese seems to support this view. To be indifferent to rules
of formal logic, however, is not necessarily to be irrational. It is widely
known that Chinese thought, due to its rationalistic character, exerted a
great influence upon the philosophy of enlightenment of the modern West.
Max Weber says: "Confucianism is extremely rationalistic since it is
bereft of any form of metaphysics and in the sense that it lacks traces of
nearly any religious basis-to such a degree that it is questionable whether
it is proper to use the term 'religious ethics.' At the same time, it is more
realistic than any other system, outside of Bentham's ethical system, in the
sense that it lacks and excludes all measures which are not utilitarian."22
If "rational" means thinking in a practical utilitarian way then it is the
Chinese rather than the Westerners who are far more rationalistic. And it
is due to this rationalistic character that Chinese thought inspired the
thinkers of the period of the Enlightenment, such as Voltaire and Wolff,
and came to serve as their weapons against the shackles of medieval
Scholastic traditions.
Although the Indians did not achieve as remarkable a development in
the field of natural science as the West, they conducted far more elaborate
speculations than the Westerners of antiquity and the Middle Ages with
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respect to the theory of numbers, the analysis of psychological phenomena,
and the study of linguistic structures. The Indians are highly rationalistic
insofar as their ideal is to recognize eternal laws concerning past, present,
and future. The thought represented by Tertullian's aphorism, "credo quia
absurdum," or "I believe because it is absurd," had no receptivity in India.
The Indians are, at the same time, logical since they generally have a
tendency to sublimate their thinking to the universal; they are at once
logical and rationalistic. On the contrary, many religions of the West are
irrational and illogical, and this is acknowledged by the Westerners them-
selves. For example, Schweitzer, a pious and most devoted Christian, says,
"Compared to the logical religions of East Asia, the gospel of Jesus is
illogical."23 In this sense, the East is more rational, and conversely, the
West is more illogical. A rationalistic attitude is seen consistently in
Dharmakirti's Buddhist logic or in the natural philosophy of the Vaise~ika
school of India. Consequently, we cannot prudently adopt the classification
that the East is irrationalistic and the West rationalistic.
Some writers make a distinction between the rationalism of the East
and that of the West. For example, Max Weber says, "The practical
rationalism of the West is extremely different in nature from that of the
East, notwithstanding the outward or actual similarity of the two. The
post-renaissance rationalism was especially rationalistic in the sense that it
abandoned the restrictions of tradition and believed in the power of reason
in nature."
This statement appears to be well grounded. The thought-tendency,
however, which was bent on disregarding traditional authority or restriction
appeared as early as the turbulent days of the so-called "Ch'un-ch'iu,"
Spring and Autumn Annals (722-481 B.C.), to the beginning of the Ch'in
dynasty (221-206 B.C.) in China; and in India it was prominent in urban
society during the period of the advent of the Buddha in the 6th century
B.C., and even afterwards it was propagated by naturalistic philosophers
and logicians. In modern Japan as well, the germination of free thought
is faintly perceived. Accordingly, it is indeed beyond doubt that disregard
for conventional authority and restriction was dominant in the modern
West, and was weak in East Asia, but this is merely a difference of degree
or extent; it is not a difference in essence. And even if that thought-tend-
ency were inHuential in the modern West, it was not so in the Middle
Ages; therefore, it would be improper to distinguish the East and West on
this point.
In connection with this, a nostalgic conservatism is very conspicuous
among the Chinese, and it can also be seen to a considerable degree among
the Japanese, while in India it was once partly forsaken. The Moslems, who
make up a fairly large part of the Indian sub-continent, have disengaged
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themselves from the religions of the Indian people; therefore, nostalgic
conservatism cannot be_called a general feature of East Asia.
Although this nostalgic conservative character is partly common to
both the Indians and the Chinese, the former are more prone to exalt
the universal law underlying the past, present, and future. Thus, the basis
of these two similar nostalgic characters harbors a difference in outlook or
thought.
Again, we find that many people think that the character of the East
Asians is their passivity. There is evidence that this has been a con-
spicuous feature of the way of thinking of the Chinese and the Indians.
Among the same East Asians, however, the Japanese in particular are
highly sensitive to the transition of things. Buddhist teachings and Con-
fucian learning alike have been transformed into something dynamic in
character since their introduction to Japan. Therefore, it is impossible to
sum up the ways of thinking of the East Asians in general as merely being
"passive." And although the thinking of the Westerners might indeed be
called "dynamic," the idea of evolution or development in phenomenal
existence or in history has manifested itself clearly only in modern times
and could notpossibly have been clear to ancient thinkers.
It is often pointed out that India, China, and Japan are situated in
the monsoon zone, so that the three countries have a climatic trait in
common. People living in the zone are said to be generally passive and
submissive to objective nature and lacking in the will to conquer it by
means of rational and measured thinking, and as they move en masse,
they are easily subordinated by a specific authority, so that they dislike to
assert themselves positively. Accordingly, when various thoughts are
found opposed to one another, they are likely to recognize their rational
force, and to compromise and synthesize, rather than to adopt one of them
alternatively to the exclusion of others.
Therefore, it is often contended that in contrast to Western thought
the spirit of tolerance and mutual concession is a salient feature of Eastern
thought. The religion of the West at times is harsh and even emphasizes
struggle for the sake of keeping the faith and condemning unbelievers:
"If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and
wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also,
he cannot be my disciple." (Luke, 14-26.)
"I am come to send fire on the earth; and what will I, if it be already
kindled?-Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you,
Nay; but rather division: For from henceforth there shall be five in one
house divided, three against two, and two against three. The .father shall
be divided against the son, and the son against the father; the mother
against the daughter, and the daughter against the mother; the mother-in-
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law against her daughter-in-law, and the daughter-in-law against her
mother-in-law." (Luke, 12.49-53.)
Such aggressive thoughts as expressed here did not appear at all in
the religions of East Asia. Throughout the religious world of India a more
tranquil and peaceful atmosphere has prevailed from time immemorial.
Gotama and Mahavira ended their lives in peace. Perceiving the fact that
in China a perfect freedom of faith had been preserved since ancient
times, Voltaire, who has been called the "Apostle of the freedom of faith,"
was utterly fascinated by Chinese law.24 Although in Japan, the principle
of the freedom of faith has not fully been realized where political influence
was exerted, due to the interference of the state, hatred against the heretic
has been mild among the people in general. Even the Jodo Shin sect, the
most clear cut sect in its uncompromising attitude toward the other
faiths, advises that in order to spread the faith it is wiser to wait calmly for
a suitable opportunity rather than to force the situation.25
With the Indian people, self-conscious reflection on the impact of
oneself against other selves is not clearly evidenced. Underneath this fact
lies the view that all men are one in essence. And such a view as this
seems to be shared by the other peoples of East Asia, though in different
degrees.
The idea of tolerance and mutual concession is based on admitting the
compatibility of many different philosophical views of the world. The
Indians are prone to tolerate the co-existence of philosophical thoughts of
various types from the metaphysical viewpoint; the Chinese are inclined
to try to reconcile and harmonize them from a political and practical view-
point; and the Japanese tend to emphasize the historical and physiographi-
cal features of such diverse thoughts. Interference with religions on the
part of the state was not found in Hindu India, but in China it occurred
to a considerable degree, and in Japan it was occasionally extreme. Con-
sequently, we hesitate to sum up these standpoints with one adjective
"Asiatic." While in the West, in modern times, the spirit of tolerance and
mutual concession was preached especially by the thinkers of the En-
lightenment and by the Pietists, in Asia, especially Iran, heretical views on
religion were relentlessly persecuted.
It is often pointed out, particularly by Westerners, that Eastern thought
has a tendency toward escapism, and that it is rather indifferent toward
social and political action. They say that Christianity preaches the im-
portance of practice within this world but religions of East Asia teach
man to shun this world.26 Such criticism seems to have become common in
the West. In relation to this, especially concerning the traits of the
religions of Asia, Max Weber says, "Indifference to the world was the
attitude taught them,-whether in the form of external escapism, or in
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actions indifferent to this world, although taking place in this world.
Accordingly, it is resistance to the world and to our participation in it."27
Weber goes on to say: "The fundamental creed of Protestant ethics in
the modem West is 'inner-worldly' asceticism. It attempted to rationalize
this world ethically by accepting the will of God positively, rather than
to tend toward escapism as in the case of meditation.28 Daily conduct is
elevated, through rationalization, to the level of god-sent vocation, and
this is also man's assurance of happiness. In contrast with this, religions
of the East hold nothing but a herd of meditative, fanatic, or insensitive
devotees and they regard any inner-worldly practice as nonsense and are
anxious to leave this world. Not that Buddhist monks have no practice at
all, but, since their ultimate objective was to escape the 'cycle' of trans-
migration (samsiira), their conduct could never have undergone any
thorough, inner-worldly rationalization."29
Indeed, the ethics of Protestantism may have been as Max Weber
described it. But Western thought in and prior to the Middle Ages has not
always been characterized by an attitude of inner-worldly rationalization.
"A herd of meditative, fanatic, or insensitive devotees" did exist in the
West in the past as well as in the East. That the religious men of the East
were engaged in inner-worldly activity is a fact beyond doubt. The religion
that pervaded the various countries of East Asia was Mahayana Buddhism
which stresses such inner-worldly activity. Yet we can see in the religion of
Iran a tendency also toward the worldly.
In relation to this, it is often asserted that the East Asian people
contemplate nature and attempt the identification of man and nature by
meditation, whereas the Westerners attempt to conquer nature. The attempt
on the part of man, however, to assert himself and to conquer nature was
not uncommon in East Asia. In China and India as well, the construction
of canals, banks, water tanks, and ramparts was undertaken. On the other
hand, the yearning for nature appeared also in the West, in which people
sought to return to nature. Accordingly, on this point also, it is very
difficult for us to make a clear distinction between the two spheres. Con-
cerning problems of philosophy, the opposition of subject and object,
for instance, was already taken up in ancient Indian philosophy. The
reason why natural science has made remarkable progress in the West,
especially in modem times, will be considered on another occasion. In
any case, the attitudes toward nature as found in the West and the East
are difficult to define or distinguish.
Max Weber states that during or prior to the Middle Ages, the
ascetic life in the Christianity in the West had been tinged with a rational
character: "Its object was to overcome the state of nature (status naturae),
to rid man of his dependence upon the power of irrational impulse and
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upon nature and the world, to subordinate man to the rule of a deliberate
scheme, and to place man's conduct under the incessant self-examination
and the evaluation of ethical significance. Herein lies the world-historical
significance of the monk's life of the West in contrast to that of East
Asia-viewed not from the whole of it, but from the general type...."30
From the viewpoint of the rationalization of life, however, the workaday
practices at Zen monasteries in Japan are extremely rationalistic, and, as
was pointed out before, the social work of Japanese priests prior to the
Middle Ages was very extensive. We agree with Weber's opinion that it is
difficult to make a clear distinction between the East and the West on
this particular point.
After having examined what has heretofore been designated as features
peculiar to Eastern thought, we find ourselves in reality incapable of
isolating a definite trait which can be singled out for contrast with the
West. It appears possible for us to recognize a few similarities common to
the nations in East Asia; however, it is impossible to regard them as
common Eastern features and to compare them with those of Western
thought as if they were non-existent in the West. These features were
regarded as "Eastern" because they were conspicuous in certain countries
in a certain period or among certain peoples. Accordingly, it is also certain
that those common features are not without some basis in human nature.
Thus, we must acknowledge the fact that there exists no single
"Eastern" feature but rather that there exist diverse ways of thinking in
East Asia, characteristic of certain peoples but not of the whole of East
Asia. This can be affirmed by way of comparison among the cultures of
the East Asian nations, and by noting the fact that Buddhism was
received by various nations of East Asia according to the character of the
recipients; this clearly testifies to the cogency of our viewpoint. In other
words, Buddhism, whose basic principles are universal and transcend the
distinction of social classes and nations, has been adopted with certain
modifications, modifications which were made according to the features
peculiar to the ways of thinking of each recipient nation.
Of course, there can be similarities in ways of thinking among the
Buddhists of various nations, even if they may differ in nationality, since
Buddhism is a world religion and it has especially exercised a profound
influence over the spiritual and social life of the East Asian peoples.
Buddhism, insofar as it is a single religion, should be basically consistent
wherever it may be found. (The problem of the general or common fea-
tures of Buddhist sects is not treated within this book, for the problem
belongs to the philosophy of religion.) It is only natural that some common
traits should be perceived so long as an overwhelming number of East
Asians are Buddhists. However, we cannot generalize from the facts of
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Buddhism to the East Asian nations as a whole/1 because the East Asian
nations are not all necessarily Buddhist. To say that there are similarities
and parallelisms among Buddhists of the East Asian nations is not tan-
tamount to showing the parallelisms and similarities of the East Asian
nations as a whole. Whether the conclusions regarding the Buddhists as a
whole are applicable to, for instance, the Indians-in general they are
non-Buddhists-must be considered separately.
According to the above considerations, the inevitable conclusion is
that there are no features of the ways of thinking exclusively shared by the
East Asians as a whole, unless they are universal traits of human nature
in the East and West. Furthermore, if the ways of thinking differ according
to the cultural history of each people, then we should expect the cultures
formed by these nations to be heterogeneous. Sokichi Tsuda recently
remarked that the three nations, India, China, and Japan, have established
respectively their own distinct cultures 32 As far as the ways of thinking or
folk-traits of each nation are concerned, it seems proper for us to admit
this cultural pluralism in order to begin our study of the fascinating
diversity of h}lman nature which led Pope to his famous saying: 'The
proper study of mankind is man."
Universal and Particular Aspects of East Asian Thought and
Culture
THE CONCEPT OF THE "EAST" AND PREVIOUS COMMENTS ON IT
We have clarified in the previous chapter that there is no way of
thinking generally applicable to the East Asians. Why then are such
phrases as "East Asian thought" or "East Asian culture" used as if they
were axiomatic concepts? I believe the answer is an historical one. The
Japanese people were thrown into spiritual confusion due to their abrupt
acceptance of Western culture after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. In
Japan, prior to this period, Chinese and Indian thought intermingled with
traditional Japanese thought, and they existed in harmony, oblivious of
any peculiar differences. As a result, Japanese thought was regarded as
being at one with Chinese and Indian thought, and thus the phrase
"East Asian thought" came to be applied to all three countries, as identical.
The people advocating the necessity of preserving the old Japanese
cultural tradition especially emphasized the importance of East Asian
thought; at the same time, almost invariably, such people have been
"Orientalists." Admittedly, an exclusive minority with nationalistic ten-
dencies did their utmost to rid Japanese culture of the remains of the
influence coming from the Indian and the Chinese cultures. This faction
maintained that they would pay their respect only to things proper to
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Japan, but as the predominant part of old Japanese culture owed much of
its substance to India and China, such a narrow-minded attitude was not
shared by liberal intellectuals in general. They paid, instead, attention to
the similarity and affinity between the old Japanese culture and the
cultures of East Asia in general. Accordingly, despite the difference of
geographical location between "Japan" and "East Asia," the conflict be-
tween the two has been scarcely felt. Along with the attitude which
maintained the superiority of Japanese culture, the following view was
generally held: "The Japanese are the most ingenious people in regard
to accepting foreign culture. They assimilated the essential elements of
the culture of East Asia. Buddhism and Confucianism are examples.
Hereafter Japan might well avail itself of progressive traits of Western
civilization and thereby build a new culture."
However, as we point out in this book, the way in which the
Japanese received the cultures of India and China led to serious modifica-
tions and even distortion; they did not accept and assimilate these cultures
in their entirety. There is a fundamental discrepancy between the old
Japanese culture and the cultures of other countries in East Asia. We
must not overlook this fact.
Taking notice of this situation, it has already been observed even by
the Japanese scholars on East Asia that the culture of East Asia is far from
being a unified entity. "Whatever amount of space may be allotted to the
area which should be called 'East Asia,' as far as cultural significance is
concerned, it never existed from ancient times as a unified world; there
has existed no single history called the cultural history of East Asia, and
accordingly, it is fundamentally impossible for us to assume that there is
a single culture to be called the culture of East Asia."33 The scholars who
advocate this view deny the cultural unity of East Asia but some go so far
as to impute a unity to the culture of the West: "On the whole, the West
has evolved, moved by a single world history, though the nations existing
therein had their own singular cultural traits and were not without their
own national histories."34 At the same time it is emphasized that the
Western culture is the same as world culture. "At present, modern culture,
world culture, that is to say, Western culture is not opposed to Japan's
culture, but is rather reflected in and constitutes a development of
Japanese culture itself."35 This view expressed by a respected scholar on
East Asia is shared and supported by a good number of intellectuals at
present. However, when such an observation is analyzed, it is found that
there are two premises presupposed: (I) the unity of Western culture,
(2) the identity of Western culture with world culture. These two premises
are formulated in opposition to the idea of the unity of the culture of
East Asia. We must, however, examine and criticize these two premises.
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First, concerning the unity of Western culture, there is no aJUDt I
that European countries throughout past ages developed a culture by
keeping in close communication with one another spiritually and materially.
However, can we rightfully claim that Western culture is a single, unified
entity? Western culture may be traced back to two cultural currents,
Greek and Judeo-Christian, but it is historical fact that they conflicted
with each other. These two currents were compromised and blended with
each other in the Middle Ages somehow or other, but in modern times a
certain number of Westerners, certain materialists and positivistic
scientists, do not subscribe to the Western religious tradition. Furthermore,
in Western culture, there are many conflicting trends of thought, and we
have already pointed out that the features of the ways of thinking which
are generally called "Oriental" are also found among the ways of thinking
of the WesternerS'.36 It is one thing to admit that there was a close relation-
ship among the Western nations and it is another to acknowledge the
unified character of the ways of thinking of these nations. Therefore, as far
as the ways of thinking are concerned, we must disavow the cultural unity
of the West as we did in the case of the East. The cultural character of the
West is in th~ final analysis nothing but that of a variegated type or an
approximation to it. In any case it cannot be established as unique at all.
Next, let us deal with the contention that Western culture can be
equated with world culture. It is generally acknowledged that the unifica-
tion of the world was accomplished by Western' nations with their domi-
nance of power in the world in recent times. It goes without saying that no
people or nation can exist isolated from the West politically or economi-
cally. In other fields as well, such as mathematical and natural sciences,
learning, art, etc., the influence of Western culture is decisive. This is the
reason it is generally thought that the world was unified and at the same
time westernized. The unification of the world, however, is only outstand-
ing in regard to man's efforts to control, and utilize material nature; while
on the side of language, ethics, religion, art, customs, etc., the spiritual
traditions of each nation can be altered only with much difficulty. For in-
stance, the Westerners arrived in India for the first time towards the end of
the fifteenth century and, at last, she came to be ruled by them. In spite of
their skillful ruling policy, the Christian population in India is only a little
over two per cent of the whole population; the majority of Indians profess-
ing Christianity consists of either the outcast from the Hindu society or
the lowly, while the majority of the whole populace embraces the popular
faiths, derived from ancient times. In China the situation is somewhat
similar. The fact that the nations of the East refuse to be altered
easily in their ways of thinking or their social customs, even in the face of
the thought or cultural influence of the West, should not be characterized
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merely as due to the backwardness or retardation of the East Asian people.
Some scholars report that the characters of the ways of thinking which we
have delineated mainly in terms of how Buddhism was received, presented
themselves in the case of Christianity as well. If it were true, then it follows
that the ways of thinking of various nations have been unexpectedly firm
enough to retain their cultural peculiarities to this day.
The East Asian people and their cultures will not be regarded as inferior
or backward. In some cases it is as advanced as the West. For example, it is
common to the West, India, China, or Tibet that culture has developed
from the integral language form to the analytical one. We shall refer to this
fact later. In some phases, the principal nations of the world have gone
through a common process of progress. Such a common process of progress
is also seen in the field of religion, ethics, social institutions, political organi-
zations, etc. Research into the cultural contributions of various nations as
seen from the viewpoint of their interrelationship is necessary. In different
times, there are different social structures, and different forms in the con-
trast of social classes. In spite of that, there is something unchangeable that
has survived to this day, and here, I have attempted to define this. I do not
mean to say that something traditional or constant is always superior to the
ever-changing products of dynamic historical and social processes, but it is
well to realize that while the world is making progress in new directions,
many traditional cultural traits of its varied peoples are still able to enrich
the world with their distinctive contributions.
EAST ASIAN THOUGHT AND ITS UNIVERSALITY
It may be noted that those who contend that westernization is the
same as universalization have the following view in mind: "Cultures of
East Asia are subordinate after all to Western culture. The characteristics
of various ways of thinking of the East Asian people are to be overcome
some day by those of the Westerners. Western culture is in possession of
universality, while Eastern culture is not." For example, Max Weber says,
"The cultural phenomena which promoted the development of universal
meaning and applied science happened to appear in the West, and in the
West alone." And he has conducted sociological research into almost all
the religious systems the world over in the light of the question, "Upon
what kind of chain of conditions was the above fact dependent?"37 In
Japan on the other hand, Dr. Tsuda observed likewise that Chinese
thought, for example, is incapable of assuming universality.38 However,
what is meant after all by "being incapable of assuming universality"? East-
ern thinkers find the scientific knowledge or techniques which arose in the
modern West can be understood or assimilated with ease and without
change. But with respect to other cultural fields, is it possible for us to say
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that anything born of the culture of the West is capable of assuming uni-
versality, whereas all the cultural products of other nations are not? When
we look back over the history of mankind, we can see the traces of Eastern
influence upon the West. It is often observed that in the Bible there are
traces from the stories of the Buddhist scriptures or that a part of Greek
philosophy was influenced by Indian philosophy; these assertions may be
vague and have not been fully worked out. However, the fact that in
the parables or stories current in the Middle Ages of the West the in-
fluence of the Indian civilization appears acknowledged by scholars.39
Among others, the fact that the concept of the Buddhist "Bodhisattva"
was transferred to the West and made into a canonized Catholic
saint should not be overlooked in spite of its triviality.40 There is
also the fact that the life story of the Indian Sakyamuni was brought over
to the West, where it was transformed into the life of one of the Catholic
saints; subsequently, it was carried to Japan by Christian CKirishitan) mis-
sionaries, but neither Buddhists nor Christians were aware of its back-
ground.41 In modem times, however, by means of translations Eastern
thought has be~ome increasingly familiar to the West. As a result, the influ-
ence of Eastern thought on the intellectual history of France42 and Ger-
many has been indeed remarkable. Chinese thought especially served as an
impetus to the Enlightenment in Europe and inspired such people as Vol-
taire and Wolff. Likewise, Indian thought contributed to the formation of
Romanticism in Germany. The movement by the brothers Schlegel, the
philosophy of Schopenhauer, the thought of Keyserling in modem times,
etc. could not be imagined without the influence of Indian thought. W. von
Humboldt spoke highly of the Indian Bhagavadgttii as the most beautiful
and most profound philosophical work in the world; Schopenhauer called
the Upani~ads "The consolation of my life and death" and found in that
philosophical epic the fountainhead of his thought. Count Keyserling con-
cluded his book Travel Diary of a Philosopher with the following lines:
"The turmoil of the world after the great war can be saved only by the
Bodhisattva Ideal." Professor Charles Morris, a philosopher in contempo-
rary America, has given the name "Maitreyan Way" to the path upon which
the world should tread in the future. In America also, pragmatists like John
Dewey have shown a keen interest in the practical social aspects of Eastern
thought. Northrop's comparative studies of East and West have been done
from a methodological viewpoint. In England, Germany, or America,
groups of people who call themselves "Buddhists," though very few in
number, have formed small organizations.43 Thus, if Eastern thought
should come to be understood more deeply, the possibility of its influence
looms larger.
Even within the confines of East Asia, a great cultural interchange
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was accomplished in the past. Buddhism spread over almost the whole of
Asia. To what extent Confucianism regulated the actual life of Japan is
yet to be studied; however, there is no doubt that it held a kind of regu-
lating power in the actual, social life of Japan. According to one scholarly
Confucian, it was not until the beginning of the introduction of Confu-
cianism that a moral code prevailed in Japan.44 Confucian scholars such as
Ogiu Sorai, Dazai Shuntai, Yamagata Shiinan, and others, thought also
that in ancient Japan there was no philosophy which could be regarded as
ethics, and it was not until the advent of Chinese Confucianism that
morality came into being. Particularly, Dazai Shuntai believed that in an-
cient Japan from the beginning there was lacking any sign of ethical aware-
ness, and that it was not until the introduction from China of the 'Way of
the Sage" or "The Teaching of the Sage" that the Japanese became inter-
ested in ethics. "In Japan from the beginning there has never been such a
conception as 'the Way.' In recent years, however, Shintoists are said to be
solemnly teaching the 'way of our country' as if it were profound, yet what-
ever they are teaching is nearly all fabrication and interpolation of later
times. The fact that there were originally no Japanese equivalents to the
Confucian list of the greatest virtues, benevolence (jen), righteousness
(yO, propriety (li), harmony or music of the soul (yiieh), filial piety
(hsiao), and brotherly respect (t'i); the absence of these words is proof
that there was no such concept as 'the Way' (Tao) in Japan, and so the
lack of Japanese equivalents reveals that their origin is not to be placed in
Japan. From the time of the mythical gods to somewhere around the forti-
eth Emperor (ca. 645 A.D.), for want of decorum, marriages were held
among parents, children, brothers, uncles, and nieces. In the meantime
communication was established with foreign countries so that the way of
the Sage of China carne to be diffused in Japan. The result was that the
Japanese people became acquainted with decorum and more acutely con-
scious of the ways of civilized society. The most lowly of society at present
regard people who have behaved against decorum as no better than beasts;
this is all due to the influence of the teaching of the Sage."45 While from
the viewpoint of the Buddhists, prior to the introduction of Buddhism,
Japan was utterly in the dark, it was not until that time that people were
saved, and Buddhism and its enlightening virtues were received with re-
joicing. For instance, Rennyo (1415-1499) expressed his feeling of joy in
the following manner:
"The spread of Buddhist teachings in this country (Japan) can be
traced back to the time of the Emperor Kimmei (in the sixth century),
when Buddhist teachings first arrived in Japan. The Tathagata's teaching
was not Widespread prior to that time; people did not at all hear the way to
Enlightenment. Having been born in an age when the Buddhist teaching
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is widespread, we are now fortunate enough to have heard the way of de-
liverance from the world of birth and death, though we do not know what
good causes brought this happiness about. Indeed we are now able to meet
whatever is difficult to meet."46
Nichiren also says: "In ancient days prior to the advent of Buddha-
Dharma, people knew neither the Buddha nor the Dharma. Yet after the
struggle between Moriya and J6gii Taishi (Prince Sh6toku), some people
came to believe in the Buddha and others did not."47
How can we contend that there was no universality in the teaching
which impressed so many people as being the universal teaching? Those
who deny the cultural singleness of the East are prone to disavow the uni-
versality of Eastern thought. But logically speaking, it is inconsistent to
deny the universality of Eastern thought as a consequence of disavowing
the singleness of the East, dividing it into a number of wholes, and at the
same time recognizing a mutual (or unilateral) influence among these cul-
tural wholes. We must avoid this inconsistency. We deny the singleness of
the East but affirm the establishment of a number of cultural wholes. And
it is because of this that we should like to acknowledge a universal signi~­
cance in certain aspects of various thought-systems established in East Asia.
It is by no means true that all these systems have universality, but we should
recognize it in some aspects of them. What we can state the universal as-
pects are would depend on the analysis of the cultural conditions.
If we take the standpoint of those who favor an impartial objective ex-
amination of the thoughts which mankind has produced, it follows that we
could not possibly say that Western thought alone is universal and that the
thoughts of other nations have no universal significance. The ancient
Greeks, or at least some of them,48 had acknowledged that the philosophical
thoughts of other nations had their individual significance. Also among the
modem philosophers of the West there are a good many who hold such a
view.49 Nevertheless, there are some who would attribute universal superi-
ority especially to Western thought alone, perhaps because they wish to
display the power of the modem West to control nature or are fascinated
by it alone.
Indeed it is a fact that the modem world is being unified by dint of
the political and military pressure of the West, but this does not affirm the
insignificance of the cultures of the non-Western nations. In the ancient
West, for instance, Greek culture still held its position of leadership even
under the political and military rule of Rome, while India was gorgeously
adorned by the flowers of culture, in spite of the oft-repeated dominance by
foreign peoples during her long history. We ought not to disregard the cold
fact that culture is subject to political, military pressure, but at the same
time we must not forget the dignity of man which no power can subdue.
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Customary and conventional as the phrase may be, if we remember
this fact, it would not be meaningless for us to emphasize the significance
of "East Asia" at present. There is a great significance in knowing East
Asia and developing its diverse cultures. Originally such concepts as East
Asia, the East, or the Orient were set in opposition to the Occident. In
spite of their obscure connotation, these words came to be used by peoples,
long subjected to oppression by the military and political superiority of the
Westerners, as an attempt to preserve their respective cultural traditions. In-
deed the famous slogan "Asia is one" uttered by Okakura T enshin is not
free from inaccuracy and is not in accordance with the facts of the history
of thought. But the nations of East Asia, which have long cherished the
desire to preserve and develop the respective cultures of their own, have
inadvertently associated themselves with this slogan, because of the com-
mon feeling that they shared the same objective. It was a sort of common
impulse aiming at defending their respective cultures against the rule of
the West.
The desire on the part of various nations to preserve and develop their
respective cultural traditions is justifiable. We ought to respect this desire.
In that case, however, it behooves each nation to see to it that while being
critical of foreign cultures they remain critical also of their own indigenous
culture. That is, with modesty and self-awareness a new culture may be
formed through enlightened self-criticism.
The neglect of criticism and the mere affirmation and preservation of
the past would be tantamount to annihilating one's own culture. However,
if it accepts foreign cultures uncritically, it would be merely blind accept-
ance, and consequently, no positive contribution toward forming a new
culture for mankind will have been made.
From this standpoint, studies in East Asia should reflect something
more than the mere tastes of dilettanti, and should be ready to contribute
more positively to forming a fresh culture. There have been people who
regard the learning and the scientific methods established in the modern
West as the only absolute ones, and such a thought-tendency seems to
remain fairly influential at present. This may be only natural but we ought
to be critical as well as appreciative of the learning and sciences of the
modern West. Learning in the future may be reformed and developed by
Western advances reinforced by the results of studies in Eastern cultures.
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF WAYS OF THINKING AND PHILOSOPHY
A study of ways of thinking of the East Asians, at the same time,
should be compared critically with the studies of Western philosophy. It
goes without saying that we must compare above all the philosophical sys-
tems of East Asia with those of the West. Deussen once speculated as fol-
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lows: "Suppose that there exists a certain planet in the solar system, say,
Mars or Venus, inhabited by human beings or other beings with their cul-
ture flourishing and with an established philosophy. Suppose we come to
know their philosophy through one of the beings living there, who had
entered into the sphere of our terrestrial gravitation after being shot out in
a missile. In that case we might undoubtedly take an enormous interest in
the results of their philosophy, and we might carefully compare and ex-
amine their philosophy and ours. If there should be some difference, we
would determine which side is true, and if it should be found that there is
no difference between the two, then this would imply that the truth of the
outcome of the philosophical contemplation of both sides had been sub-
stantiated. Although in this case we would have to take into account the
natural and inevitable sophistication of pure reason, as Kant put it. This
may be wishful thinking, but we have a similar situation in Indian philoso-
phy, for Indian philosophy has taken a course of development independent
of Western philosophy."50
He then proceeds to say, "Here, people may raise the following ques-
tion: We are living in an age which has attained such a remarkable stage of
development, 'that would it not be a childish and inappropriate attempt
for us to learn something from the ancient Indians? To know the view of
the world of the Indians, however, is profitable, We are enabled thereby
to realize that we have fallen into a great prejudice in favor of the whole
system we have established about religion and philosophy, and that besides
the way of understanding things established by Hegel as the only
possible and reasonable one, there exists as yet another one totally different
from Hegel's."51
Deussen's allegation offers a number of problems over which we must
ponder. As we are concerned in this book with the ways of thinking of
various nations, we shall not treat here the significance of comparative phi-
losophy.52 Instead, we would here especially lay stress on the following
point:
As is seen in modem Western philosophy, the concept of philosophy,
which is required for instance by Kant, is not the "technical concept"
(Schulbegriff) but the "general human concept" (Weltbegriff, conceptus
cosmicus). He was not merely looking for the "epistemological system
which was to be sought for only as a branch of learning, and which re-
gards as its object nothing more than the unity of knowledge, that is, the
logical perfection of cognition." With him, the ideal of philosophy was to
be the "learning of the relationship between all cognitions and the essence
of human reason." A philosopher was not the technician of reason but the
legislator of human reason (Gesetzgeber der menschlichen Vernunft).53
Therefore, for him the truth to be given by the supreme philosophy is
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nothing but what is already latent in the minds of all people. It may per-
haps be due to such a standpoint that in his metaphysics the commonsensi-
cal view about religio-ethics held generally by Westerners seems to be lurk-
ing.
In the "a priori dialectic," in his work Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
Kant made an inquiry into the nature of such ideas as the soul, freedom,
God, etc. and contended that they are concepts not of the Understanding
but of Reason; therefore, in regard to natural cognition they are not struc-
tural as in the case of a category, but regulative, and that there is a danger
of substituting an image for the Idea or guiding concept and thus misun-
derstanding its meaning. According to his philosophy, however, an Idea is
in no wayan image. He therefore rejected the phenomenal status of these
Ideas but recognized their metaphysical function. And it is well-known
that Kant grounded his practical philosophy (ethics) on these regulative
Ideas.
It is this regulative function that constitutes the "general human con-
cept" lying behind the metaphysical reality of such Ideas. It is not certain
whether he himself was aware of it, but in any case there was a traditional
religio-ethical concept among Westerners which made him set up these
Ideas, for his Ideas are not necessarily taken for granted among East Asians
in general. For example, the thought which recognizes the metaphysical
reality of soul as a permanent substance was rejected by Buddhism. Bud-
dhists try to ground the establishment of ethics without setting up the idea
of the immortality of soul as a condition. As for the idea of God, neither
Buddhists nor Jains accept God as the creator of the universe. In Eastern
thought in general, especially in Indian thought, gods are possessed of no
meaning or any importance. Indian people generally are inclined to base
their ethics on a domain free from God's authority. This view did not enter
into Kant's philosophical vision. Despite commentaries written from various
viewpoints, the attempt to understand Kant's thought mainly as initiating
an epoch and a stage of development to be made by mankind's society and
thought, is one-sided. As far as this point is concerned, Kant's philosophy
is after all nothing but a philosophical and theoretical expression of the
Protestant pietism in modern Western culture.
What we have said in the above is only an example, but in any case
if we introduce various ways of thinking of East Asians into philosophical
speculation, then we should have a wider and more fruitful basis for the
critical consideration of the philosophical thoughts of the West.
If, however, we should admit any of the philosophical thoughts of the
West indiscriminately, then we would be committed to nothing but a blind
adherence to authority, already conspicuous among Japanese intellectuals.
What the German philosophers have taken as the "universal human con-
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c~pt" (Weltbegriff) was after all restricted by the historical tradition of the
German people's cultural and social life, so that the attempt by the West to
foist the concept on Eastern society, admitting a universal significance
only for it and neglecting their circumstances, is a kind of non-critical atti-
tude in the formation of culture. Among ideas that Western philosophers
have taken up as "universal human concepts," there are not a few that
seem to a majority of Japanese to have been transformed into "technical
concepts."
By reflecting upon the seemingly irrelevant ways of thinking of the
East Asians, we can be critical of the philosophical thoughts of the West.54
And as a result of the criticism, we should be able to acquire an efficient
basis for going forward towards the establishment of a new and truly uni-
versal philosophy.
The Cognitive and the Existential Basis
for the Differences in Ways of Thinking
In the following pages, we shall occasionally disclose the traits of ways
of thinking ~f various nations in respect to their forms of expression of
judgment and deduction among the peoples of East Asia, and then
consider how these traits are expressed in various cultural phenomena,
particularly how they have influenced Buddhism, as a universal religion, to
assume different phases. In that case, we have adopted the method of
inferring other traits when possible, from among some typical expression-
forms of judgment and deduction. The former method proves to be the
means to know the latter. Therefore, the traits seen in expression-
forms of judgment and deduction are the cognitive basis (ratio cognos-
cendi, jiiiipaka hetu).
Here several questions arise: What is the existential basis (ratio exis-
tendi, kiiraka hetu) which brings about the differences in ways of thinking
among nations? By what causes were such differences of expression-forms
or ways of thinking brought about?
These questions cannot easily be solved here, because they are difficult
questions which concern the foundations not only of philosophy but of
all the sciences and humanities. The general glimpse which we shall have
from a limited range of observation might help us in solving these ques-
tions.
Unverified theories have been proposed to explain why various nations
show differences in ways of thinking. First of all, the features of ways of
thinking seem to have nothing to do with the blood or lineage of nations.
That is to say, the features of ways of thinking are not explicable by alleged
racial propensities. Being left to live among a numerically greater and
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stronger people, a minority group naturally becomes accustomed to the new
social and cultural environment and finally takes on the same traits and
ways of thinking as the dominant majority. A good example of this process
of acculturation, is seen, for instance, in the familiar case of Japanese emi-
grants who have settled down abroad. The fact is that even the so-called
"Aryan race" which was divided into East and West, that is to say, the
Europeans and the Indians, came to show different features of ways of
thinking. It seems that the Indians are not pure Aryans, after all, but a
hybrid of Aryans and aborigines, hence such differences appear; however,
there is also evidence to the contrary. Although the inhabitants of Pakistan
are trying even at present to keep their "pure Aryan blood," they have
already discarded the religion of their ancestors and embraced Mohammed-
anism. Accordingly, there is no intrinsic relationship between physiological
or racial lineage and peoples' ways of thinking.
Another fairly common theory for our consideration refers us to differ-
ences of climatic environment.55 It is believed that such physical causes as
climate, weather, geology, the nature of the soil, and topography of a cer-
tain locale, account for the differences in the ways of thinking among
peoples; for instance, the differences of the ways of thinking between the
Europeans aDd the Indians in the Aryan lineage might have been derived
from or dependent upon such differences of climatic environment. Even the
climatic or topographic environment, however, does not possess a singular
or decisive influence over the differences of man's ways of thinking. If it
were so, then the theory of climatic determinism would be established.
But the real facts testify to the opposite. It very often happens that the
selfsame people living in one and the same climatic environment changes
its ways of thinking under the influence of the thought of other nations.
Although the ways of thinking of an isolated people become set and hardly
changeable, they can yet be changed to a considerable degree under the
influence of other nations. This fact can easily be understood if we go
through the history of each nation. If we stick to the climatic environment
alone as its decisive cause, then we can never explain the changes of ways
of thinking or thought-patterns of a nation-that is, its intellectual history.
Also in this connection, no geographical environment or topography
constitutes a decisive factor, either. As is often said, India and China be-
long to the Continent, so that the nature of the cultures born there is
continental, while that of the Japanese culture is insular, and indeed, they
do create a contrasting impression. Among other things, Japan is an island
nation, out of the reach of any great foreign invasion, so that she has pre-
served the ancient culture and even keeps such cultural products intact
as have already been lost in the mainland of Asia. In the island of Ceylon,
to cite another instance, the most primitive of all forms of Buddhist orders
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in other countries have been preserved. Therefore, it is true that an island
nation is characterized by the tendency to conservatism which preserves the
traditional ancient culture intact, but a nation on the continent is not
without such a conservative character. The anti-progressive or static charac-
ter of traditional Chinese culture has often been pointed out. And it is
astonishing that a part of the Indian population still preserves the Vedic
culture as it was established three thousand years ago. Anti-progressivism
or conservatism is seen in many of the countries mentioned above. Ac-
cordingly it is impossible to draw the conclusion that the geographical
environment or topography, continental or insular, is the only factor which
determines the differences in the ways of thinking of peoples.
Ought we not to recognize the existential basis of the difference of
ways of thinking, not in the natural scientific conditions of heredity and
physical environI1,1ent, but in the material conditions which have to do with
man's social behavior? What emerges here is a theory which attaches great
importance to economic conditions in the social life of humanity. Historical
materialism may be an example of such a theory. Since the criticism of
materialism would constitute an independent theme of study, it is impos-
sible for us to ~efer to it here. As a result of our inquiry into the ways of
thinking of the East Asian peoples, we shall not hesitate to conclude as
follows: The theo~yof the materialistic view of history or economic view of
history is incapable of explaining in its entirety the fact of the different
ways of thinking which vary according to the thought and culture of
people. Needless to say, the materialistic view of history emphasizes that
the sum total of the productive relations in a certain period, or the eco-
nomic structure of society can alone provide the material base upon which
the juridical and political superstructure is established, and in accordance
with which a certain social or class consciousness is also formed. Despite
the fact that it affords a number of solutions to problems of social organiza-
tion or social thought, it does not adequately explain other cultural prob-
lems. As a matter of fact, to what extent will the standpoint of the materi-
alistic or economic view of history suffice to explain the differences of ways
of thinking among peoples which are disclosed in our studies?
Differences of productive types cannot explain many totally opposed
variants of ways of thinking; for example, the fact that the Chinese people
attach so much importance to concrete individuality; while the Indians
seek abstract universality, and in contrast to the Chinese people who are
empirical, sensuous, and realistic, the Indian people are imaginative, other-
worldly, and metaphysical. It is said that in the East Asian society people
generally inherited the same type of agricultural production from ancient
times and that there should be little divergence of type among agricultural
nations. This is the very reason why the phrase "Asiatic productive type"
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is used as if the uniformity of type is taken for granted by economists and
sociologists, though, of course, whether it is true that there is such uni-
formity is a serious question. In economics the "Asiatic productive type"
might well be admitted, but so far as ways of thinking is concerned, we
shall reject the use of the word "Asiatic" as an unclear and highly ques-
tionable concept. According to my opinion, ways of thinking vary accord-
ing to the cultural traditions of the peoples respectively concerned. The
concept of the "Asiatic productive type" does not explain the historical and
cultural grounds upon which the differences of ways of thinking existing
among Asian nations have arisen. Consequently, as far as this point is con-
cerned, the materialistic view of history or the general economic view of
history has in its dogmatic monolithic approach exposed its fatal weak
point.
In this connection, it is often maintained by scholars that the absence
of the city-state in East Asian society has produced the characteristics com-
mon to East Asian thought. It is true that the "polis" or "civitas" was never
established in East Asia, and the "bourgeois" in the Western sense of the
word has never existed in East Asia. "Shimin" (Japanese for citizen) is
merely a coined word; "Chanin" (inhabitant of a town) is not identical
with citizen.56 The absence of a city-state might have been the actual basis
for the appearance of thought-characteristics common to all the East Asian
nations, but it is impossible for us to explain thereby the differences in
their ways of thinking.
After such considerations, the following hypothesis emerges; namely,
a unique religious ideology is the determining factor of the distinctiveness
of the social and economic life of each nation. Apparently this hypothesis
was intended to correct other thoughts such as the materialistic view of
history. Max Weber, a representative of such an idealistic view, says:
"An idea shapes the world's course just as a switchman directs man's
motivated interests on to a track."57 Attaching great importance58 to the
influence of religious ideas on social life, economics, and ethics, he ex-
amined the relationship between religion and social life in almost all the
important nations of the world. The result of his study must be highly
valued, but the study of cultural factors, in addition to religion, cannot
neglect the characteristics of ways of thinking in every people. Most In-
dians have certain general characteristics common to Hindus, Jains, and
Moslems, and most Chinese have characteristic ways of thinking shared
by the devotees of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. Now it is not
unusual to find the same person regarding himself a follower of many
religions. The fact that this eclecticism occurs among the Japanese with
Shintoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity shows that in
Japan there is a tendency, characteristic of Japan's culture, to transcend all
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sectarian distinctions of religions. A foreign religion has often wholly
transformed the ways of thinking of a nation, and at the same time the
ways of thinking peculiar to a nation have reciprocally changed the foreign
religion itself.
Therefore, we have to pay attention to the fact that historical circum-
stances of a nation count to a great extent in bringing about a difference of
thought types. We shall point out the fact that the view of most Indians
about human relations favors the identity or fusion of the self with others,
in contrast to the primitivistic Westerners' view which insists on the hostile
and antagonistic relations of individuals in the "state of nature." The
development of such a difference of thought-forms is considered to be due
to the historical evolution of the society which different conquerors and
ruling people formed in India and in the West. In the case of the West,
the Greeks, for instance, formed their city-state (polis) after conquering
the older inhabitants. They had come as adventurers and invaders amidst
a foreign people, and first of all built a safety-zone encircled by stone walls
so as to keep the common enemy out of their own world. They thought that
they would th.ereby succeed in protecting themselves against the power of
the dead souls of the enemy, and would at the same time be protected
against assault from the living enemy around them, so long as the city
provided them a refuge.59 Against their expectations, however, the Aryans
who invaded India did not face any such violent resistance on the part
of the aborigines, so that their society was less menaced by the aborigines.
They constructed puras (fortresses) on hills, wherein they confined them-
selves only in such emergencies, as an enemy invasion or flood, while in
ordinary times living outside the puras. The differences of historical back-
ground in regard to social evolution, as illustrated above, continue to shape
the ways of thinking of every nation for a long enough time to come. The
differences of historical background, however, can be affected and seriously
modified by future historical changes. Consequently, past evolution is not
possessed of any absolute significance as a cultural determinant.
The question:-What is the existential basis or empirical factors
which determine or explain the characteristics of a people's way of think-
ing?-yet remains unsolved. The question then is: Are not the expression-
forms of judgment and deduction which we adopt as the cognitive means
for studying the characteristic ways of thinking, working at the same time
as an existential basis? Generally speaking, since the grammar and its
syntax, which regulate the expression-form of judgment and deduction,
do not easily change,60 they are not only expressive of the characteristic ways
of thinking of a nation but in return they also regulate them for some time.
In other words, it is probable that the ways of working of a thought-form
might in turn be qualified by its language-form. Therefore, as far as this
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point goes, the expression-forms of thought employed in language are the
existential basis for the characteristics of ways of thinking of a people.
But this relationship of language to thought is by no means absolute in
nature. A grammar or a syntax might change on account of social unrest
or as a result of a contact with foreign languages. In such cases, the ways
of thinking would have undergone a change. The change of ways of
thinking of a nation depends upon the many historical changes that affect
the cultural customs and habits of its people.
According to the above considerations, we may offer, in the last
analysis, the following hypothesis: There is no such thing as a single
fundamental principle which determines the characteristic ways of think-
ing of a people. Various factors, as mentioned above, related in manifold
ways, each exerting its influence, enter into the ways of thinking of a
people. If we deal with the question of the existential basis which brings
about differences of ways of thinking, we see no way left for us but to take
the standpoint of pluralism. The attempt to seek out an isolated single
cause looks alluring but it is destined to fail to grasp the complexities of
social change. We are obliged to recognize in this case also the principle
of "Things are born of various conditions" which Buddhism put forth
against the monistic metaphysical theory. In what order, then, do these
elements make themselves felt? This is a question to be contemplated
upon and investigated again in the future. Here we cannot dwell upon
this question in detail, and even if we try to get a general perspective, it
would be difficult for us to offer a single order in response. Since the
thinking function is one which in the long run affects man's conduct and
practice, it might have to be said that it is conditioned by how man stands
at a certain point of time. Man is a historical being and is all the time
subject to the currents of history, so that he should heed both the
predictable aspects of history, and at the same time, the unpredictable
factor of chance. For instance, such an accidental event in which a nation
comes into contact with another culture can bring about an unexpected
change of affairs of a more serious nature than the nation in question had
ever expected.
The ways of thinking of a people have the double relation of being
conditioned by the products of man's own creation, and, at the same time,
of qualifying them in return. In some cases we can also see the phase on
which each one of the above mentioned sundry cultural factors is in turn
characterized and formed by the ways of thinking of a people. It is an
independent subject of study to clarify the operation of the mutual factors
in both relations. In this book, however, we shall have practically attained
the objective of our study, if we succeed in clarifying the following two
points: In the first place, there are some characteristic differences in the
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ways of thinking of East Asian nations. In the second place, with regard
to all people, there is a certain logical and human connection among these
characteristics.
Attention should also be paid in this connection to the fact that in
the history of every people there is a distinction of periods, such as the
ancient, the middle, and the contemporary, according to which the ways
of thinking of peoples naturally differ. This fact we do not mean to deny.
But at the same time we also ought to recognize the fact that in every
nation there are special thought-tendencies which have persisted through-
out these historical stages. The more communication progresses, the
closer the intercourse between nations becomes, and the more the world
becomes unined, the less will be the disparity of ways of thinking among
nations. Notwithstanding this fact, however, it will never be easy for
any people totally to sever itself from the traditional habits and customs
of the past. In order to balance variations in the ways of thinking of nations
and to create a new-world culture, we need nrst of all to reflect upon and
ascertain the characteristic ways of thinking of diverse peoples. Of course,
it goes without saying that we should equally consider how they under-
went changes'in the course of history. The overall renovation of ways of
thinking of nations will not be easily accomplished by taking only external
or institutional measures such as reforms of land-ownership, economic,
and political systems. For the purpose of building a new culture aspiring
to truth, a rigorous criticism of the ways of thinking of nations ought
continually to be made.
PARTI INDIA

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
By what method can we grasp the special features of the traditional
ways of thinking of the Indians? Going back to the various cultural
phenomena of Indian history in order to examine them thoroughly and
impartially for characteristic traits will not be an easy task. If a student,
neglecting methodology, judged on the basis of his selected and partial
data that Indian cultural characteristics were of a peculiar sort, he might
perhaps reach the right conclusion but he would more probably draw
wrong conclusions. For instance, studies of ancient Indian society have
often resulted in completely opposite conclusions; those based on Brah-
manic literature clash with those derived from Buddhist sources. In our
present study of the ways of thinking we face a similar danger, because
it is impossible to exhaust all extant sources and data.
In order to formulate objective conclusions, we must consider the
methodology to be employed. First, we shall lay stress on the expression of
culture in language; in this chapter we shall examine some of the major
problems related to linguistic expression. It is important, as a first step, to
compare the Indian language with the Greek and Latin languages with
respect to their grammars and syntaxes. If we had some concrete examples
of Greek or Latin translation of the Indian languages or vice versa, they
would be very convenient for our study, but unfortunately we have
nothing like them. Although the Bhagavadg'itii, a famous religious book of
India, and the Dhammapada, sacred verses of Buddhists, have been
translated into modern languages by European scholars, the Greek and
Latin translation of the former book and the Latin translation of the latter
offer us important data for reference.1 The archeological relics and epi-
graphs, in which Indian languages are written together with European
classical languages, are limited only to certain coins so they are of little
use in our present study.
Secondly, as a source of data we must lay stress on the way the Indians
have taken to foreign cultures; but we regret that the evidence here has
not been too clear. This is due to the fact that they did not accept Chinese
INDIA
culture (although Dr. S. K. Chatterjee has recently indicated some Chinese
influence on Indian culture); the degree to which they accepted Greek
culture has yet to be clarified sufficiently. But it is a fact that to a certain
degree they accepted Greek and Latin cultures, a fact which must be
considered as a part of our investigation.
Thirdly, we must lay stress on the criticisms of Indian thought by
foreigners as important data for our study. In ancient times some Greeks,
Romans, and Chinese criticized Indian thought from their respective
standpoints. And there were some Japanese who criticized Indian thought,
basing their criticism on the Chinese translation of sacred Buddhist books.
Again, it is a well known fact that in modern times many European
scholars have examined and criticized Indian thought.
Lastly, we must select data from the works written by the Indians
themselves. This appears simple, but in reality the problem of selection
is very difficult. What should we choose from so many available sources?
From what sources can we learn the characteristics of peoples' ways of
thinking? First of all, we consider those literatures which have been
considered autochthonous by the majority of people. For example about
"the Prasnottararatnamiilikii" (Treasure garland of question and
answer),2 Brahmanic tradition says it was written by the Vedantist 8amkara,
Jain tradition says it was written by the Jain King Amoghava~a or the
Jain Vimala, and Buddhist tradition says it was written by a Buddhist;
we can really find its Tibetan translation in the Tibetan Tripi!aka. From
all of this we can say that this book is an important datum, though it is
relatively unknown, in our examination of the general ways of thinking
or cultural tendencies of Indian traditions. Again the Kural, which has
been called the Veda in the Tamil language, has been admitted as the
sacred book by each of the Jain, Buddhist, Vai~I)ava, and 8aiva religions.
Thus, it falls into the same category as that of the Prasnottararatnamiilikii.
On the other hand, even though a book is well known to foreigners,
if its thought content had not been known widely to the Indians, we
should be very careful when we use it as a datum for our investigation. As
only a limited number of books will be admitted by the followers of any
religion as their authority, we must carefully compare all sources with one
another on each point. Especially, when the same sentence is found in
various books belonging to different religions of India,S this general
acceptance may be referred to in judging the characteristics of the ways of
thinking of a people.
We shall be able to reach the right conclusion by which the charac-
teristics of the ways of thinking of a people will be shown, when we shall
have compared various sources with each other and examined all the rele-
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vant data. In the following, we shall combine the conclusion gained
through examining occasionally these data with the conclusion gained
through examining the forms of judgment and inference; and then around
these results, we shall consider synthetically the dominant characteristics
of the ways of thinking of the Indians.
CHAPTER 2 STRESS ON THE
UNIVERSAL
Preponderance of Abstract Notions
Indian people are inclined to consider the universal seriously in ex-
pressing their ideas of things. This can be easily seen in the fact of their
verbal usage in which they have so great an inclination to use abstract
nouns. In Sanskrit, an abstract noun is formed by adding -ta (f.) or -tva
(n.) suffix to the root. These suffixes correspond to TrJ (Greek), -tas
(Latin), -tat. (German), -te (French), -ty (English), and etymologically
they have a close connection. In these European languages, however,
abstract nouns are not often used except in scientific essays or formal
sentences, while in Sanskrit they are often used even in everyday speeches.
For example, "He becomes old,"l "Er wird alt," is expressed in Sanskrit
"He goes to oldness": vrddhatiirh (-tvarh, -bhavarh) gacchati (iigacchati,
upaiti, etc.); "The fruit becomes soft," "Die Frucht wird weich" is ex-
pressed in Sanskrit "The fruit goes to softness": phalam mrdutiim (-tvarh,
-bhavarh, mardavarh) yati; "He goes as a messenger," "Er geht als Bote"
is expressed "He goes with the quality of messenger": gacchati dautyena;
"A man was seen to be a tree" is expressed "A man was represented by
the quality of tree" (pumiin kascid vrk~atvenopavaT1;zita~).2 The European
languages express the individual by its attribute or quality realized con-
cretely by the individual itself, while the Sanskrit expresses the individual
only as one of the instances belonging to the abstract universal.
In Sanskrit, furthermore, any noun or adjective can become an abstract
noun by addition of -ta or -tva suffix, i.e., the abstract noun can be made
without limit in Sanskrit. On the contrary, in the Greek or Latin language
the abstract noun is made by addition of -T7J or -tas, and does not allow
such freedom. Here we can also find one of the Indian tendencies to think
anything abstractly and universally.
Expressions with cognate objects appear more often in early Indian
languages than in European languages. In English there are some expres-
sions with cognate objects as "to fight a battle," "to die a hard death,"
"to live a good life," etc., but such usage is limited. On the contrary, in
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classical Indian languages such expressions have been widely and freely
allowed through all the ages.3 Therefore it is often impossible to translate
from Sanskrit directly into the European languages; e.g., kiimakiima~ =
amori dediti (desiring desire or given to love) in A. W. Schlegel's Latin
translation of Dhp., 83 (those in pursuit of their desire), abhijiiiiniib-
hijiiiit* (possessed of occult power), var~am var~ate, tapas tapate, etc.
That Indians were at home in abstract speculation can be seen in
their skillful expression of the ideas of numbers. A large number or an
infinitesimal number often appears in religious books and literary works.
This reveals their rich imagination and analysis. The decimal system of
Arabic numerals based on the place notation, had been invented by the
Chinese and Indians, and the Arabians only transmitted it to European
countries. The manner of writing numbers in a linear horizontal order
appears in ancient Chinese, but our circular sign for zero was invented
by the Indians. In Sanskrit zero is called "sl"inya" which is translated as
"kung" by the Chinese word for "empty" in the Chinese Buddhist canons.
A dot was used for zero in the ancient Chinese place system.
We are impressed by one of the main features of most philosophical
thinking in India, namely a predominant way of minimizing the particular
in the logical sense. This does not mean that the Indians did not develop
the concept of the individuaJ.4 They did. The Sanskrit equivalent of
individual is vyakti. But vyakti did not play much of a role in the history
of Indian logic.
Most Indian thinkers are apt to emphasize universal concepts and to
subordinate the concrete individual and the particular perception to the
universal. Even in the Vaise~ika philosophy of atomic naturalism, which
organized objectively the most advanced, logi~ally coherent system of
natural philosophy in India, there is no direct awareness of the concretely
perceived individual. Instead, the Vaise~ika philosophers used the technical
term antya vise~a5 to represent the principle of particularity or what the
Western scholastic metaphysicians called the principle of individuation.
Of course, in other pluralistic philosophical systems in India there
was more attention to the concept of the individual, and its unique meaning
was investigated. In ancient India there were frequent debates between
the Individualist and the Universalist concerning the meaning of a word.
The Individualist (Vyaktiviidin) held that the individual (vyakti) is the
denoted sense of a word, whereas the Universalist (Jiitiviidin) held that the
universal (jiiti) is the denoted sense of a word. For example, when we are
asked to bring a cow, it is only obvious that what is requested is an
individual cow and not a universal existing in the entire class of cows,
said the Individualist, whereas the Universalist said that the universal
form of the cow is implied in this case.6
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But in Indian philosophy for the most part, the pOSItIOn of the
perceived individual was minimized in favor of the inferred particular and
the conceived universal, differing from the schools of European philosophy
in which the individual, the particular, and the universal were all given
equal consideration with respect to their meanings and logical status.
Even Indian realists and pluralists esteemed universals. In giving the
definition of "substance" some of them said, "A substance is that which
is endowed with the genus of substance."1 This is a purely verbal definition,
or a truism which teaches us nothing new about the thing to be defined,
but they were satisfied, perhaps because of their very tendency to reify
concepts.
We are aware of the opinion that there is a strain in Indian philosophy
which also stressed individualism. But the individual soul is given the
metaphysical status of a permanent substance "co-eternal with God"; as
Dr. D. M. Datta says: "Emphasis on the importance of the individual is
common to all the Indian systems of philosophy. It is worthy of special
note that even those who believe in God as the creator do not hold that
the individu§ll soul is created by God. God creates only the material objects,
including the human body. But the soul is co-eternal with God."8
Even the Buddhists who did not believe in a soul as a permanent sub-
stance believed in the potential Buddhahood of every individual. However,
Indian esteem for the individual raised problems concerning its metaphysi-
cal sense of "the essence of living things," but it was only in the logical
sense of the word that Buddhist thinkers admitted the significance of the
individual (vyakti). With them the individual meant "the thing in itself"
(svala~a1!a), which is just an instant or moment in any given situation in
the transient course of time; it is the extreme concrete and particular
(kiiicid idam-the hoc aliquid).9 Mental construction or judgment (kal-
pand, adhyavasiiya) comes later. lO
This way of thinking appears not only in their philosophy but also in
their daily speech; e.g., in Sanskrit the plural form of the abstract noun
often appears, Le., la~mya~ means "happiness of a person," kirtaya~
means "honor of a person" and bhaye~u (lit. in horrors) means
"when he was filled with horror" (bhayakiile~u). There are a fewexpres-
sions like this in European languages, but they are generally used with
special meaning, while in Sanskrit many plural forms of abstract nouns
are used in a meaning not dissimilar to its singular form. Moreover, in
modern European languages, like German and French, the exactly opposite
phenomenon can be seen, Le., the plural form of a proper noun designates
those who bear the name, families including all servants and maids, or
those who can be ascribed to that person's type; e.g., "die Goethe" means
"the family of Goethe," "men who are self-centered like Goethe" or "people
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who have a brilliant talent"; "les Pericles" means "people who are conceited
about their talent like Pericles."ll In short, Europeans generally think of
the abstract notion of an abstract noun as constructed solely by means of
the universal meaning which is extracted from daily experience, so that
they represent it in the singular form; on the contrary, the Indians think of
the abstract notion as what is included within experienced facts and so
fused with them that the essential principle is often represented in the
plural form. And again, modem European people lay stress on the signifi-
cance of the individual, so that they can easily classify a man by a type
consisting of those who are similar to a special person, and thus change
a proper noun into a common noun; on the contrary, the Indians tend to
neglect the significance of the individual, so that such expressions as "die
Goethe" or "les Pericles" do not appear at all.
According to the way of thinking of most Indians, therefore, the es-
sence of the individual or the particular is no more than the universal by
virtue of which the individual or the particular is grounded and realized.
The tendency of most Indians is to lay stress on the significance of the
universal only, and they almost neglect the significance of the individual
or the particular. From this a characteristic way of thinking is introduced;
i.e., the difference between that which possesses an attribute and the attri-
bute itself is not clarified adequately by the Indians, and the difference
between that which supports a substance and the substance itself is not
clarified. In Indian languages there are many examples of "KaT' f~OX~V";
i.e., a common noun was extended to a proper noun; e.g., buddha (literally,
he who has won enlightenment) became a proper noun for Sakyamuni,
The Buddha, and jina (literally, one who has won) became the proper
name of Jina (Vardhamana). As a result of the same thinking process, the
neuter singular form of an adjective sometimes fulfills the function of an
abstract noun, e.g., sud (pure, pureness), sthira (= solid, solidity =
sthairya), slaghya (excellent, excellence); or again the neuter Singular
form of an adjective sometimes fulfills the function of a collective noun,
e.g., palita (gray, gray hair).12 So in Sanskrit there are similar cases where
the distinction between abstract "solidity" and a concrete "solid" thing is
not clarified in the actual language, even though it may be clarified by
using an abstract noun.
In short, these linguistic phenomena in Indian languages may have
resulted from the fact that the earlier Indians were unaware of the signifi-
cance of the inherent or attributive judgment.13 Now the characteristic
way of thinking mentioned above is seen in the structure of the Indian
languages and reveals some important differences when compared with
other peoples' forms of thought and expression. In this way of thinking,
the distinction between an attribute and a ground of that attribute is
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almost always neglected, so that the Indians can hardly distinguish between
substantive and adjective as two parts of speech. In Sanskrit grammar,
these two show little difference in regard to declension, composition, and
derivation. Especially in the Vedic literature, it is very difficult for us to
find out which is substantive and which is adjective among many terms
that indicate the same object. Even in classical Sanskrit, an adjective is
used as a substantive, e.g., suhrd (goodhearted, a friend), tapcma (burning,
the sun). On the contrary, in classical European languages, regarding
the inherent judgment, the distinction between substantive and adjective
is fairly fixed and occurs with little variation except in special instances.
The inclination to lay stress on the universal appears to some degree
among the ancient Europeans in their languages. An adjective takes a form
corresponding to the gender and number of the noun which it modifies,
both in classical European and Indian languages, and it does not appear
in its original form; e.g., (lv~p o:ya06" vir bonus (good man), yvv1] aya8~,
mulier bona (good woman). Such a grammatical rule of declension makes
a speaker understand clearly that the essence of a conception expressed by
an adjective is different from the specific attribute indicated by the adjec-
tive which modifies some concrete thing. Plato touched the problem of
"Virtue itself as to its universality" after he had examined human virtue
(apfT~), by analyzing the general idea into the virtue of man, of woman,
of child, of slave, and so on. Plato's intellectual procedure would have been
very natural and rational for the Greek people at that time; the problem,
however, of whether it is possible to pursue abstract "virtue in general"
apart from concrete deeds becomes a difficult question in modern ethics.
But in India the conception, which was represented by an adjective, had
more importance than the individual that was modified by the adjective;
and the significance of individual things, which embodied the conception
represented by the adjective, was reduced to almost nothing for the
Indians.
Abstract Conceptions Treated as Concrete Realities
As a result of the Indian propensity for the abstract notion, in their
way of thinking an abstract idea is expressed as if it were a concrete
object, i.e., in their thinking process the universal is easily endowed with
substantiality. Already in the BrahmaI).as, which offer explanations of the
Vedic sacrifices, abstract ideas are treated as if they were on the same plane
as concrete things. This has been stated as follows: "The most remarkable
characteristic of this age was that they gave spiritual powers, mysterious
powers, and the role of deities without personification to the concrete
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elements of which the universe was constructed (heaven, sky, earth, sun
and moon, stars and compass-directions, soil, water, nre, wind, and ether;
years and months; seasons; animals, plants, and minerals, and so on), to the
elements which were necessary for their rituals (the apparatus, rhythm,
curse, and name, and so on), to the physical and mental organs, functions,
qualities, abstract conceptions, numerals, and so on; in other words, to all
sorts of phenomena in the natural world and human life, especially in a
religious ceremony."14 It seems that Brahmin priests of ancient India were
certainly engaged in such speculations in accordance with this way of
thinking. The word "brahman," the original meaning of which was the
magical power of spells used freely by Brahmins, became at the same
time the name of the Brahmins themselves merely by changing the position
of its accent; by the same thinking process "k~atriya," the name of the
royal family, came from the word "~atra," the original meaning of which
was the reigning power. Here the essential nature of a thing is identined
with the realizer of its power, and an abstract noun is used as a common
noun; i.e. the Indians expose their thinking to the so-called charge of
"reincation" by nctitiously endowing every notion with substance.
According to the description in some Upani~ads, the Indians assumed
two routes (i.e. the devayiina and the pitryiina) which a man follows
after he is dead.15 One who goes the way of devayiina (the way of the
gods) enters successively into the flame of his cremation, from the flame
into the day; from the day into the half-month while the moon waxes; from
the half-month of the waxing moon into the six months while the sun
goes north; from these months into the world of the gods-the sun, the
moon, the lightning-nre; and then he enters, guided by a person of mind
(miinasa) , into Brahman or the world of Brahma; thus he never returns
to this world. On the other hand, one who by sacrinces and austerity goes
the way of pitryiina (the way of the fathers) enters successively into the
smoke of his cremation and into the night; from the night into the half-
month while the moon decreases, into six months while the sun goes
south; from these months into the world of the ancestors' spirits; from this
ancestral world into the moon where he stays to become food for the gods;
then he begins to descend into space; he enters successively into the sky,
air, rain, the earth; and then he enters into food (like rice and barley);
he becomes a spermatozoon if he enters into the nre of a man; and then
he enters into a womb of a woman to be reborn. In these steps after
death, the smoke of cremation, the world of ancestors' spirits, the sun,
the moon, and the lightning have some extent in space, so that it is no
wonder that a dead man passes through these steps; but the night, the
half-month while the moon waxes or wanes, and six months while the
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sun goes north or south are not anything in space but something in time,
so that these descriptions in the Upani~ads seem very strange, as it tells us
a dead man passes through the devayiina or pitrYiina both in space and in
time. This, however, caused little wonder to the Indians at that time, who
had inherited the way of thinking in the Brahma~a literature as it had
been. Those scholars, who wrote the Brahma~a literature, thought that
all abstract conceptions or ideas in space also had substantiality, and
discussed them as if they were on the same level as material things in space.
In this way of thinking, the day, the night, a half-month, and six months,
etc. can be expressed as if they were concrete things. Some philosophers in
the Upani~ads seemed to be incapable of getting rid of such a way of
thinking, and the theory of the two ways after death in the Upani~ads
has been adopted without change by the later Vedantic philosophers.16
Thereafter, this way of thinking became popular among the common
people in India. In many popular books, e.g., in the Upamitibhavapra-
paiicakathii, an educational story of the Jains, the Prabodhacandrodaya,
a drama based on the Vedantic philosophy, many abstract nouns are used
as the main characters in them. These stories and dramas would not be
read enthu!iiasticaIIy by Europeans but they can excite much interest
among Indians.
There are many cases showing that this way of thinking has been
adopted by Indian philosophers. In the Buddhist period, Pakudha Kac-
cayana (c. 500 B.C.) posited pain and pleasure in addition to the earth,
water, fire, wind, souls, and sky as the eternal, unchangeable, independent
elements, of which all things in the universe are composed. Makkhali
Gosiila of the Ajivikas supposed good and bad fortune as weIl as life
and death as substantial principles. With the Jains the condition or law of
movement (dharma) and the condition or principle of non-movement
(adharma) were also independent substances. The Sarvastivadins, who
became the most prosperous Buddhist school, maintained that all the
elements admitted in Buddhism exist reaIly in events occurring through all
time, Le. the past, the present, and the future. The principles (dharma)
mentioned by them rather belong to psychological functions or to abstract
ideas. The Vaise~ikas supposed the six padiirthas (categories) as funda-
mental principles; they are abstract ideas that are classified into six groups
and admitted as substantial elements. The philosophy of the Sarvastivadins
and the Vaise~ikas is caIled "Conceptual Realism" (Begriffsrealismus) by
European scholars because these Indian systems are similar to the moderate
Realism of European philosophy in the medieval period.
Hegel confirms our description of Indian philosophy in characterizing
it as the "growing of the mind inwardly in the most abstract way" (Fur-
sichwerden der SeeIe auf die abstrakteste Weise), and he called it "in-
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tellectual substantiality" (intellektuelle Substantialitiit).l1 This characteri-
zation by Hegel is not correct in the case of the Vedanta Philosophy, which
has been the main flow of Indian philosophy; however the endowment of
concepts with substantiality can be regarded as a prominent characteristic
of most schools of Indian philosophy.
CHAPTER 3 PREFERENCE FOR
THE NEGATIVE
Fondness for the Negative Expression.
The Indians were led to an ultimately unlimited or indeterminate goal
as the result of their leading school's way of thinking and seeking the
universal. Generally, the philosophers of this school say that the universal
is less limited than the individual, so that at the end of their quest for the
universal they posit the undetermined.
Thus the negative character of Indian thought comes into prominence.
When we take up their language as our first problem, we cannot help
wondering why the Indians are so fond of the noun with the negative.
For instance, the Indians say "victory or non-victory" (jayiijayau) instead of
distinguishing "Victory or defeat" and "victory or draw" as in other lan-
guages, and they say "non-one" (aneka) instead of "many or none." The
word composed with the negative serves to express not only negative but
also positive meaning. In the Indian mind "non-idleness" (apramiida) ,
"non-grudge" (avera)/ "non-violence" (ahi1J1sii), etc. appeal as more posi-
tive moral virtues than "exertion," "tolerance," "peace," etc. To Europeans
such a negative expression of these virtues appeals less than a positive ex-
pression for practical conduct but to most Indians these negatively ex-
pressed virtues have more power.
A yoga-disciple of the Brahmanic schools must always keep five moral
precepts, i.e., non-violence (ahi1Jlsii), sincerity (satya), non-theft (asteya),
chastity (brahmacarya) and non-acquisition (aparigraha).2 Thus three of
them (the words beginning with a-) are expressed in the negative form.
The precepts which must be kept by the layman in Buddhism and Jainism
are all shown in the negative form, the original meanings of which are
"to rest apart from violence," "to rest apart from theft" and so on.3 The
Sarvastivadins also enumerate negatively "non-idleness" (apramiida), "non-
covetousness" (anabhidhyii) , "non-wrath" (avyiipiida) and "non-violence"
(ahi1J1sii) among the ten great attainments of the mind. In the Brahmanic
canons the various precepts are sometimes given positive expression; but
in the Vinaya-pitaka, in which the precepts for Buddhist monks are
pREFERENCE FOR THE NEGATIVE 53
set forth, they are almost written in the negative form. Thus the Indians
are apt to see morality in the negation of ordinary men's actions, so that
they lay stress on the negative phase. Apart from the Ten Commandments
of the Old Testament, showing moral precepts in a negative form seems
somewhat powerless and unsatisfactory to most other people, but to the
Indians, who lay stress on the negative phase and pursue the undetermined,
the negative form of expression has more positive and powerful meaning.
We find it not surprising, therefore, that the Indians like to use
negative conceptions even in ordinary sentences. In the classical and
modern European languages the negative judgment is usually expressed
by adding the negative to the finite verb in the predicate, e.g., "Er wird
nicht gehen." On the other hand, in the ancient Indian languages the
central conception of a sentence is expressed in negative form, e.g., "One
(who attains to Enlightenment) goes to a non-meeting with the king of
Death" (adassanam maccuriijassa gacche (Dhp., 46) =mortis regem
non videbit. = he will not meet with the King of Death.) Thus the
Europeans and the Japanese express the negative sentence by using the
positive and affirmative conception as its subject, while the Indians express
it by using the negative conception as the main subject.
Again in the classical European languages, the negative of the parti-
ciple of a verb is formed in the same way as the negative of the verb; on the
other hand in the ancient Indian languages it is formed in the same way
as the negative of a noun is made; e.g., appasam udayavyayam (Dhp., I 13)
=ortum (rerum) et interitum non animadvertens. This linguistic phe-
nomenon again illustrates their fondness for the negative conception.
The Indians think a negative form of judgment is not only negative
but also positive and affirmative. So in Indian logic the universal negative
judgment (E) is not used, and is discussed only by being changed into the
universal positive obverse judgment (A); e.g., "All speeches are non-
eternal." (anitya~ sabha~).
Grasping the Absolute Negatively
Due to their way of thinking or expressing everything negatively,
the Indians pursue the Infinite or the Negative and focus on the idea of
infinity in their philosophical approaches. The Absolute is expressed as
the Infinite or the Negative by the Indians.
In remote times, philosophical thought about the world's creation,
expressed by the poets of the l)g-Veda, reached its peak when they sang
of the universal prinCiple in the hymn called "Niisadiisiya" (Then there
was neither non-existence nor existence).4 According to this hymn, in
primordial antiquity there was neither non-existence nor existence, neither
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heaven nor space, neither death nor non-death, and there was no distinc-
tion between day and night. The whole universe was covered with darkness
and was filled with rippling water devoid of light. "That One" (tad ekam)
appeared there, by its own heat, and gave existence to desire (kiima). Then
it realized all things in the universe using desire as the motivating power.
After the creation of the universe many gods appeared too.
According to Yajiiavalkya, the greatest philosopher among the wise
men in the Upani~ads, the highest principle in the universe is that which
is free from all differential qualification. He says, "This essential being
(iitman) is no other than pure wisdom without internality and externality.
. . . It has an indestructible and imperishable quality. . . . This Atman
can be expressed only through the negative as 'not so, not so' (neti neti). It
is incomprehensible for it cannot be perceived. It is indestructible for it
cannot be destroyed. It is non-attachable for it attaches itself to nothing.
It has never been restrained, disturbed, or injured."s In another passage he
calls this highest principle the "Non-perishable" (ak~ara), and says, "It is
neither large and rough (sthula) nor infinitesimal (suk~ma), neither
short nor long, neither burning nor moist. It has no shade, darkness, wind,
space, attachment, taste, smell, eyes, ears, speeches, mind, light, vitality,
mouth, quantity, internality and externality. It eats nothing and nothing
eats it."6
We can see similar expressions in the later Upani~ads: "There
shines neither the sun nor the moon nor the stars. That lightning bolt
also never shines. To say nothing of fire on earth!"7 Light in the phenomenal
world is almost nothing when it is compared with the Brahman, the light
of the Absolute.
In early Buddhism the state of enlightenment is explained by a
similar expression. 'Where there exists no earth, water, fire, and wind
there shines neither the sun, nor the moon, nor the stars, and there exists
no darkness. When a Brahmin becomes able to perceive this by himself
and becomes a saint (muni) by silent meditation, he shall be able to be
free from materiality and non-materiality (rupiirupa); pain and pleasure."8
Negative expressions are used very abundantly in the scriptures of
Mahayana Buddhism. As one of the instances I would like to introduce
some passages from the Prajiiiipiiramitiihrdaya-sutra. "Thus, these ele-
mental things (dharma) all have the characteristic of voidness (Sunyatii);
therefore they are neither created nor perished, they have neither impurity
nor purity, they can neither increase nor decrease. Therefore, in the void
there is neither materiality (rupa) nor sensation (vedanii) nor imagination
(smhjiiii) nor volition (sarhskiira) nor consciousness (vijiiiina); there exist
neither eyes nor ears in it nor nose nor tongue nor tactile organs nor
intellect, there is neither color and shape nor sound nor odor nor taste nor
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tangibles nor non-sensuous objects; there exists neither the sphere of vision,
the sphere of intellect, ignorance, the extinction of ignorance, old age and
death, the extinction of old age and death, suffering, the cause and
extinction and the path toward extinction, wisdom nor the attainment of
wisdom, for there is nothing to be attained. Because the bodhisattva relies
on the' prajiiiipiiramitii, the mind is unobstructed. Because there is no
obstruction, there exists no fear. Abandoning all inverted phantasies, the
bodhisattva penetrates to Nirviil!a."
Nagarjuna (ca. A.D. 150-250), who is considered to have established
the foundation of Mahayana Buddhism, in his version of Buddhist philoso-
phy was able to expound and demonstrate the theory of "the excellent
causal origin of things (pratityasamutpiida) which is non-destructive, non-
productive, non-extinguishable, non-eternal, non-uniform, non-diversified,
non-coming, and non-going, and causes vain phenomena to cease."9 The
eight kinds of negative expression enumerated here, referred to as the
"Eight Negations," can also be found in other Mahayana scriptures.1o
Nagarjuna, his followers thought, had chosen these eight nega-
tions because they are the most important representative statement of the
numerous negations needed to clarify the real aspect of the emptiness of
all things.ll Thus the ultimate reality shown by Mahayana Buddhists is
the absolute voidness (sunyatii) that is devoid of all qualifications and
about which no conceptual determination can be formed.
Such negative expressions of Mahayana Buddhism exerted a favor-
able influence upon many schools including the Vedanta. "There is
neither extinction nor creation, neither one who has been bound nor one
who has practiced austerities, neither one who wishes emancipation nor
one who obtained the emancipation. This is the highest truth12 (para-
miirthatii)."13 The influence of such expressions can be seen not only in
Samkara14 and his followers15 but in the schools of later Hinduism.16
The Jains also state similarly: "[One who has obtained enlightenment
is] neither long nor short nor circular nor triangular not square nor globular
nor black nor blue nor red nor yellow nor white nor fragrant nor ill-smell-
ing nor bitter nor pungent nor puckery nor sour nor sweet nor rough nor
soft nor heavy nor light nor cold nor hot nor coarse nor smooth, he neither
has a body nor departs from the body nor remains in the body, he is neither
feminine nor masculine nor neuter; he has wisdom (prajiiii) and intellect
(sarhjiiii). However, there is no simile [by which the emancipated soul
can be known]. The essence of the emancipated soul has no form. One
who has no word cannot speak a word. There is neither sound nor color
and shape nor smell nor taste nor tactile objects."17
Let us compare this with the parallel case of Greek philosophy where
we find the ancient idea that the universe is a circular and complete globe
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in itself. This theory perhaps originated in XenophaneslS and was advo-
cated by Parmenides who maintained that TO £ov (Being) as the funda-
mental principle of the world is a complete globe.19 Pythagoras and his
followers thought, 'What is determinate is more excellent than what is not
determinate."2O Empedocles taught that in the beginning of the world the
universe was globular when it was in chaos.21 And this idea of the globular
universe was inherited by Plat022 and Aristotle.23
Greek people, who had pre-eminent skill in visual intuition and such
arts as sculpture, preferred to see the clear image of all things. Therefore,
that which was devoid of boundaries was considered to be indeterminate,
without certitude, incomplete, and imperfect, so that even in regard to the
super-sensory, they could not divorce themselves from their concrete way
of thinking. Even Parmenides, who seemed to grasp the ultimate principle
of Being most abstractly and negatively, discussed the fundamental princi-
ple of the world as if it were a material existence, expressing it as a spatial
or extended thing. And, the fact that he thought it a globe shows us that
he was influenced by the intuitive and concrete view of things which was
general among Greek people. Even Plato called immaterial substance by the
visual name of "idea" (or literally, figure, form).
In general, the ancient Greek people had a way of thinking
concretely. Though they speculated on things rationally and conceptually
they rarely ever tried to reach such vague abstractions as total voidness.24
As I shall show later, the Chinese people, even more than the Greek people,
were. fond of expressing themselves concretely and intuitively. On the
other hand, the Indians generally disliked grasping the Absolute or the
ultimate principle concretely and intuitively. We should not maintain that
our conclusion would apply to all Indian thinkers, but we can say that
those who liked abstract speculation were inclined to grasp the notion of
the Absolute or ultimate principle in terms of the unlimited and absolute
negative.
Now the Absolute which seemed to have such negative characteristics
has been expressed as a non-personal principle by the Indians. We can also
discover such a representation of the Absolute in some of the mystics in
Europe, but they did call such an impersonal Absolute by the name of
"God." For instance, Scotus Eriugena maintained, "It is not unreasonable
for God to be called Nothing because of His transcendent superiority."
Yet he called the Absolute "Deus" to whom he refused to give any attribute.
On the contrary, Indian philosophers regard the highest God as an inferior
existence when compared with the highest principle. According to the
Vedanta school, the creation of the world by the highest God was caused
by illusion (maya). They say, "The God that is Atman discriminates
himself with his own powers of phantasy (illusion, miiya)."25 "The God
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that is Atman is deceived (sammohita) by the powers of phantasy (maya)
of this God."26 There is no maya in God himself, but when he creates the
world as a Supervisor maya attaches itself to him. God is in an illusory
state. And because this illusion exists, the evolution of the world is
possible. Therefore it became the fundamental notion in the followers of
samkara that "Supervisor (Isvara) = Highest Principle (brahman) +
Illusion (maya)." This view that the Absolute causes the world to come
into existence through illusion has been inherited by some sects of
Hinduism.
Thus the ultimate Absolute presumed by the Indians is not a personal
god but an impersonal and metaphysical Principle. Here we can see the
impersonal character of the Absolute in Indian thought.21
The inclination of grasping the Absolute negatively necessarily leads
(as Hegel would say) to the negation of the negative expression itself.
According to some Upani~ad, Badhva, a wise man, answered with silence
when he was asked the true nature of Brahman. Someone asked him,
"Please teach me the true nature of Brahman." Badhva was rapt in
silence. The man asked again, and still Badhva spoke nothing. When he
was asked repeatedly he said, "I am teaching now, but you cannot under-
stand it. For this Atman is tranquility itself."28 Vimalaklrti, a wise
Buddhist layman, seems to have attained a more abstruse state of mind.
According to the Vimalakirtinirdesa, Vimalaklrti asked thirty-two Bod-
hisattvas, "How can it be possible to attain the unequalled truth of Bud-
dhism?" And he listened to their answers silently. At last they asked
MafijusrI, a Bodhisattva, to tell his opinion. He told them, "Where there
is neither word nor speech, neither revelation nor consciousness. Such a
state of mind is called the attainment of the unequalled truth of Buddhism."
Then Mafijusrl called on Vimalaklrti to express his own views. But
Vimalaklrti was in silence. Seeing this Mafijusrl cried, "Well done! I
have spoken of 'non-word,' but you have revealed it with your body."
In India the various religions refer to the sage and to the religious
aspirant as "Muni," which means "he who maintains silence."29 They
believe that truth is equivalent to the state of silence. Moreover, Mahay-
ana Buddhism rejects any view attached to the void, and insists that "The
void too must be negated." Here we have again the logic of negation.
Attraction for the Unknown
It is a fact that the Indians tend to pay more attention to the unknown
and to the undefined than to the known and the defined. This attraction
for the unknown resulted in a fondness for concealing even the obvious;
their way of thinking tended to prefer the dark and obscure over that
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which was clear. As a result the Indians like expressions in the form of a
difficult riddle. In the Samhitas of the Veda we can occasionally find poems
offering for conjecture a riddle. Gods were pictured as amusing themselves
with a riddle.30 Even philosophical problems are expressed in the form of a
riddle; e.g.,
"A swan never pulls up one leg when getting out of water,
If he did pull one leg up indeed there would be neither today
nor tomorrow,
Also there would be neither day nor night,
Also the light at dawn would never shine."31
This poem is interpreted as being an expression of the following
truth: The Supreme Existence manifests itself through the world, and yet
exists behind the phenomenal world and is immutable. Such forms of
expression found their way into the Upani~ads and later literature. This
method must not be confused with the riddles that also provide amusement.
In contrast to this, from the outset Buddhism has maintained the
position that it was an "open" religion. "0 bhikkhus, the dharma and the
precepts revealed by the Tathagata send forth clear light. Never are they
observed in secrecy."32 They are as clear and evident "as the sun-disk or the
moon-disk." Furthermore, "Regarding the dharma of the Tathagatha, there
exists no closed teacher-fist"33; i.e., Tathagata as a teacher has no secret in
his teaching. These passages, however, can mean only that the religion
that originated with Gotama would never be hidden from any people and
it would never reject any people. Even Buddhists were unable to free
themselves from the Indian propensity to express their thoughts through
unintelligible riddles.
"Killing his mother and his father,
killing two kings of the K~atriya tribe,
Killing the kingdom and its subjects,
a Brahmin goes on without pain." (phammapada, 294)
"Killing his mother and his father,
killing two kings of the Brahmin tribe,
Killing a tiger as the fifth,
a Brahmin goes on without pain." (Ibid., 295)
It would be impossible for a Buddhist, who would feel it a sin to kill only a
little worm, to teach another to kill his mother and father, etc. According to
the commentary of these sentences, "his mother" means "passion" (kiima);
"his father" means "conceit"; "two kings" means "two unjust opinions," i.e.,
to believe that the soul perishes absolutely after one's death and to believe
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that the soul exists for eternity after one's death; "the kingdom" means the
"twelve Ayatanas," Le., the six internal organs (eyes, ears, nose, tongue,
tactile organ, intellect) and the six external objects (color and shape, sound,
odor, taste, tangibles, non-sensuous objects) of which our individual
existence is constituted; "its subjects" means "attachment to pleasure";
"a tiger" means "doubt" and "the tiger as the fifth" means "five kinds of
obstacle," i.e. covetousness, anger, sleep, evil-doing, and doubt. We are
unable to understand the meaning until we paraphrase the interpretation
of the commentary. Whether or not this interpretation explains the purport
of the analogy, remains a problem; however, that there exists some sort of
hidden meaning within this analogy cannot be seriously doubted. We can
also find many allegorical expressions in the Katha, Svetasvatara, and other
Upani~ads.
CHAPTER 4 MINIMIZING
INDIVIDUALITY AND
SPECIFIC PARTICULARS
Language
To lay stress on the universal inclines the mind to disregard the
individual and the particular. I have already referred to the Indian disre-
gard for the individual and the particular in a previous chapter, so in this
chapter I shall consider it from a different point of view.
It is necessary to use an article (the, a) to show where the individual
is placed within a proposition. There was, however, no article in ancient
Indian languages. Both the definite article and the indefinite article did
exist but only in a formative state which failed to develop. So the meaning
of the word "mahiin" can be both "great," as an adjective and "a great thing
or the great," as a noun. And a substantive can even enter into a compound
as if it were an adjective, e.g., hinasevii = same, with an adjective and
participle used like an adjective. An adjective can even enter into a com-
pound as if it were a substantive, e.g., h'inasevii = hiniiniim sevii, maha-
diisraya~ = mahatsv iisraya~.l
In the European classical languages to say "someone's descendant" or
"someone's army" is expressed by two words, i.e., "someone" and "descend-
ant" or "someone" and "army"; while in Sanskrit it is often expressed by
one word containing a possessive connotation and thus having a vague
meaning, e.g., miimaM~ pii1!4aviis ca = vtOt p.ou Kat oi TOU IIavllam,
nostrates Piinduidaeque2 (Bhag. G., 1. I): Saumadatt~= 0 TOU ~op.allam
(ibid. 1. 8). From these instances we may infer the following: the Indians
in accord with their way of thinking indicated above, express only pre-
scribed attributes as determined, and avoid indicating the substantive as
the determined; thus they lay stress on the essentially determining charac-
ter of a substance which lies in the background or cannot be seen, ignoring
any concrete direct perception.
Such a characteristic way of thinking can be also found in the way
they express abstract notions. Early Europeans used two different concepts
to express what existed independently in each abstraction; on the other
hand the Indians thought that these two conceptions really came into exist-
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ence conjointly so that through the correlation of these two the more pro-
found conception, from which these two conceptions evolved, had to be
sought. In accord with this way of thinking, Indians using Sanskrit often
express one of two contrary conceptions by the negative form of the other,
e.g., "liibhiilabhau jayiijayau" (Bhag. G., II. 38) (literally "attainment
and non-attainment and victory and non-victory =good and bad fortune,
victory and defeat").
The tendency to grasp abstract ideas in this way of thinking appears
most prominently in the philosophy of the Madhyamika school of Mahay-
ana. The founder of that school, Nagarjuna (c. A.D. 150-250), said, "Im-
purity (asubha) cannot exist without depending on purity (Subha) so
that we explain purity by impurity. Therefore purity by itself cannot be
attained. Purity cannot exist without depending on impurity, so that we ex-
plain impurity by purity. Therefore impurity cannot exist by itself."3 He
did not try to grasp them separately. He thought that "purity" apart from
"impurity" or "impurity" apart from "purity" cannot come into existence;
"purity," however, exists by negation of "impurity" and "impurity" exists by
negation of "purity"; thus they are dependent on each other. He advocated
as a basic notion of causation that, "When there is this, then there is that,
just as when there is shortness then there is 10ngness."4
On the contrary, the ancient Greeks and Romans did not like this way
of thinking. So their languages expressed two opposite conceptions by two
contrary words independently, as we have seen in the example of "good
and bad fortune," "victory and defeat" (Ka1 T~V 17rnux{ov Ka{ G."Il"OTUX{OV, Ka1
T~V V1K1]V Ka1 'rjTTaV).
Because their method of thinking puts more stress on the underlying
features or essence of the individual than on the particular surface qualities
of the self, the Indians seem inclined to stress more the relational meaning
of a thing than its fundamental uniqueness. According to the dominant
way of thinking in India the nature of the individual or the particular is
dependent on the universal through which the individual or the particular
is supported and inferred. For instance, "gatabhartrkii" means a widow
whose husband (bhartr) is dead (gata). Such a way of expression,
which was called "bahuvrihi" (possessive compound, attributive com-
pound) by Indian grammarians, has developed eminently in Indian lan-
guages; so that the word of "bahuvrihi" is used as a technical term in
modern comparative philology.
That the Indians are inclined to neglect the individual can be noticed
in many other usages of their language. Sanskrit, the classical Indian lan-
guage, has no single pronoun to represent "the same," "identical." So to ex-
press "the same" an indeclinable "eva" (only, just), which expresses only
emphasis, is added after the demonstrative pronoun "tad," so that "tad eva"
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is after all a general term for a singular object. To express "identical" an
adjective "sama" is used in Sanskrit-this word is derived from the same
etymological origin as the English "same"-but this word means also
"equal" and "similar." And a noun "samya" means "equality" and "identity."
Thus the Indians did not strictly distinguish between "equality," "similar-
ity," and "identity" in their daily usage. This usage is again evidence of
their tendency to disregard the individual. Therefore when they need to
express "identical" or "same," they used "abhinna" whose literal meaning is
"not different." Indian philosophers have invented such circuitous ex-
pressions as "ekatva," "tiidatmya," "aikiitmya," "ekatmatii," etc. to denote
the meaning of "identity" or "sameness."
In this connection the fact may be worth noting that ancient Sanskrit
speaking-people used the singular form of "sarva" (all) to express "each"
and "every."5 The pronoun "sarva" means "all" in its plural form, and
in the singular form it means "each" or "every," although when they wanted
to express "each" they used the word "ekaika" or repetition of the same
word, e.g. vane vane (in each forest), dine dine (every day), yadii yadii
(whenever). Moreover, the dual form has remained in Sanskrit and it has
never been ·dropped. The dual form can also be seen in ancient Greek in
Homer's epics, the Gothic (ancient German language), Celtic (Irish
native tongue), etc., which are called collectively Indo-European languages.
The Latin language dropped the dual form in its early stage, but we can
find the traces of the dual form adhering to some words. The German lan-
guage lost it in the thirteenth century, but we can find its traces in collo-
quial Bavarian. Among Slavic languages it remains only in some meaning-
less colloquial phrases. Among the Ugric (Hungarian and Finnish)
languages, of different descent from that of Indo-European languages,
it remains only in colloquial Ostyac and Vogul whose cultures are mostly
extinct, and in other languages it has been dropped already.6
The meaning of the dual form is not, as is l,lsually thought, that it
indicates "two things" or multiplication by two, but indeed two things in
such a relation that when one of them is expressed the other is necessarily
remembered. For example, the Indian god of Heaven, VaruI)a, is always
connected intimately with Mitra, so "Mitrau" (the dual form of Mitra)
means "Mitra and VaruI)a"; "pitarau" (the dual form of pitr = father)
means not "two fathers" but "father and mother," i.e., "parents." The same
expression remains in Finnic-Hungarian languages, where the dual form of
both "father" and "mother" means "parents." As father and mother are con-
nected intimately, such an expression by dual form becomes possible. In
Finnic-Hungarian languages the dual form of both "father" and "mother"
means "parents," while in the Indian language only the dual form of
"father" is used. This fact shows us that in India the patriarchal system of
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paternal rights dates back to early times, but in the other cultures the more
ancient notion was preserved.
It was an original rule that the dual form was adapted to two things
which were connected intimately as pairs, e.g., two hands, two feet, pairs
which exist in the natural world or which are made artificially. The In-
dians, however, did not limit the application of the dual form to practical
use. Therefore they generally used the dual form to express two things con-
nected to each other. It is a well-known fact that in a primitive man's mind
two things connected intimately could not be separated into two units,
and they were usually expressed together as one thing. Together with
the advance of civilization, however, the idea of a unit became so
clear that people thought it unnecessary to distinguish dual from singu-
lar and plural, so in time the dual form disappeared from the grammatical
system.7 As a concrete example of this general rule, the dual form disap-
peared from the colloquial Indian languages (Pali and other Prakrits). But
in India Sanskrit has been used by the intelligentsia until recently, so that
the dual form has been retained in use. Thus the thought pattern of the
Indian intelligentsia has been influenced to the present day by this way of
thinking of a pair of things grasped and expressed in a Gestalt rather than
each thing individually. The dual form has had only a numerical value in
many cases in Indo-European languages, like the ancient Greek. This lin-
guistic phenomenon may have had little to do with ways of thinking, but
anyhow it is worth noticing as an interesting case of a linguistic habit ex-
pressing a cultural trait for a given time.
Moreover, many literate people of India liked to express the notion of
number by concrete nouns which come from their historical and social life;
e.g., "r~i" (sage) is often used to express "seven" for seven ni are enumer-
ated as a group in their myths, "agni" (fire) is "three" for three kinds of
agni are used in a large ceremony.s This tendency may have some connec-
tion with the Indian tendency of fondness for poetic diction, which will be
discussed later. The tendency can be seen also in ancient Egyptian and
German, which express a certain quantity by a concrete noun, not by a
numeral,9 but such expressions of cardinal numerals by concrete nouns can-
not be seen in other languages, especially in modern times.
Many literate people of India indeed liked to express number con-
cretely and intuitively, although Indian logicians developed the most ab-
stract notion of number as the class of classes, as in the case of vyiisajya-
VTtti in the N avya-nyiiya school.10
Discussing problems about ways of thinking of ancient peoples, Max
Wertheimerll made it clear that number and the notion of number are so
very different between ancient peoples and modern Europeans-Le., an-
cient peoples generally grasped concrete numbers and the abstract notion
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of number according to their way of thinking by laying stress on Gestalt,
while the notion of number of modern Europeans has been reached as a
result of abstracting from the process of counting by numbers in common
experiences. Such a way of thinking clearly remains in the ancient Indians,
e.g., 19 is expressed "subtract 1 from 20" (ekonavifhsati), 597 is expressed
"subtract 3 from 600."12 The same way of expression can also be seen in
the Greek language, e.g., "Now, Megasthenes says, there are'120 lacking
2' (i.e. I 18) nations in India." "EOVEa 8e '!V8LKU f'lKOcn €KaTOV Tn 7raVTa ),,/.yfl
MfyalTO/.V7]' 8voiv 8/.oVTa" (Arrianos, Indike VII).
Why didn't the Indians use abstract expressions for number, in spite
of their inclination, which I have mentioned on several occasions, to
lay stress on the universal and to use the abstract expression? We suggest
the reason for it is as follows: number is an objective form that is valid for
the quantitative aspects of the objective world; and the Indians, not inter-
ested primarily in an objective study of such aspects of the external natural
world, would not be too concerned with constructive reflection about the
application of number. That the natural sciences did not develop as far in
India as in Europe seems to have an intimate connection with their way of
thinking of universals as mentioned above. And, though the Indians had
an intensive consciousness of the idea of time, they had little interest in
calculating, grasping, and describing time quantitatively. This fact is con-
nected with the neglect of historical details and the temporal causes of
social change by Indian thinkers who look down upon time and change as
illusory.
Minimizing Individuality and Specific Particulars
The inclination of most Indians to subordinate individuality and par-
ticularity to the universal appears in many spheres of India's cultural life.
In the first place, the particular details of local geography and climatology
have been neglected in India. Secondly, in their ethical books and moraliz-
ing fables, there is very little attention or criticism given to the individual's
feelings and conduct. Thirdly, in their essays on art and aesthetics there is
a good deal of speculative discussion of the nature or essence of beauty in
general, but scarcely any detailed analysis of individual works or time-
honored masterpieces of the many works of art in India.
A similar tendency may be noticed in the mythological personages of
India. Gods in Indian mythology have hardly any individual personality
insofar as they are symbolic mainly of universal powers or virtues. For ex-
ample, Indra, a thunder-god, is a very highly respected deity in the ~g­
Veda, but the word "Indra" is also used as a common noun to stand for any
divine being who performs the same function.13
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The underlying idea that motivates this minimizing of the individual,
as a concretely perceived being, is the Indian tendency to think that all
particular beings perceived by the senses are only illusions because only
the universal is real. The subsumptive judgment ("A is a B") is simply a
logical step from an illusory particular to a more real universal.
It may be argued that attention to particular details of individual
things characterizes the scientific literature of India, especially in the bio-
logical sciences. However, the tendency to classification in any detailed
concrete fashion has been confined to Indian works of a general kind such
as the Kama-sutra, the Artha-sastra, and the Natya-sastra of Bharata. But
most of these works lack case-histories of natural phenomena, just as there
is a general neglect of specific events in human history other than the court
annals and family records, never as detailed as the writings of the Chinese
historians.
The Buddhist logician Dharmakirti (ca. 650 A.D.) already had in-
vestigated problems concerning analytical and synthetic judgments. For
him, however, in the following inference "This is a tree, because it is a
simsapii," the major premise "All simsapiis are trees" is an analytical judg-
ment, and "tree" is the essence of "simsapii," so tree is connected to
"simsapii" by the relation of identity (tiidiitmya). Now, common sense
would not identify "tree" with any of its predicates, but the Indian Bud-
dhist logic regards the essence of the predicate to be pervasive of the sub-
ject, and in that ultimate abstract sense finds an identity between them.
Dharmottara, a follower of Dharmakirti, says:14 "'Identity' with the predi-
cated fact means that (the mark) represents itself, its essence (svabhiiva).
Since (in such cases) the essence of a logical reason is contained within the
predicate, it is therefore dependent on it (and invariably concomitant with
it)." He then goes on to present an objection: "The question arises, if
they are essentially identical, there should be no difference between the
reason and the predicate, so will the argument be (a repetition or) part
of the thesis?" His answer to this question is: "These two are identical
with reference to the ultimately real essence (i.e., the sense datum under-
lying both facts). But the constructed objects (vikalpa-vi~ayas), those (con-
ceptions) which have been superimposed (upon reality), are not the same
(in the facts constituting) the reason and the consequence."15
The universal or the species, upon which the particular is based, must
be subsumed under the higher universal or more general species. If such a
relation to higher species is pursued, then eventually ultimate existence
(satta) is reached, beyond which nothing exists.
As a matter of fact, Bhartrhari (ca. A.D. 450-500) expressed just such
speculative thought. He maintained that since all species are realized by
ultimate existence in the final analysis, so all the meanings of words are no
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other than ultimate existence. Moreover, he thought, the only ultimate ex-
istence is absolute being and what gives existence to species as species is
not true being; as this relation between truth and non-truth can be seen
between the subsuming upper species and the subsumed lower species, so
any kind of conception is non-true against the universal while it is true
against the particular. He said, "Now, as it was testified in the sacred book,
these two things (bhava), true and non-true, are present within every
thing (bhava); and the true thing is the species, the individual is non-
true."16
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CHAPTER 5 THE CONCEPT OF
THE UNITY OF ALL THINGS
As a result of their inclination to emphasize Universal Being, to which ~
all individuals and particulars are subordinated, most Hindus concentrate
on the idea of the unity of all things. They look down upon the changing
manifestations of the phenomenal world as illusory. According to those
Indian philosophers who were more or less Vedantic, only Universal Being
behind these manifestations is the ultimate source of reality. And the more j
anything is individualized, the less it shares in the essence of reality. In-
dividuals are nothing else than limited manifestations of Universal Being. ,
From very ancient times, the Vedantists had a strong tendency to think of .
the multifarious phenomena of the world as self-realizations of the one Ab-
solute Being. The main current of Advaita Vedantic metaphysics has been~
a thoroughgoing monism imposed on pluralistic but illusory phenomena.
Although there were other branches of Vedanta, such as that of Madhva
who adhered to a purely realistic and pluralistic standpoint, the main em-
phasis was on monism. The monistic Vedanta has dominated the classical
scholarship of India, which has left its impress on Indian philosophy in gen-
eral. This tendency has penetrated into more popular philosophy. Even the
dualistic Samkhya and the Vaise~ika schools also finally came to make a
compromise with monism.
A primitive form of this monistic view was expressed in the Bg-Veda
in the hymns of the creation of the universe, and it took a more clearly de-
fined form in the Upani~ads. The Upani~ads express Absolute Being in
many different ways. They follow the Vedas, assigning the role of the pri-
mal principle to things in nature, such as Wind, Water, or Ether. Adding
to those survivals of the old Vedic ideas, the Upani~ads took again the
primacy of Absolute Being over the principles and functions of individual
being such as the Spirit, the Understanding (vijnana), or the Soul
(puru~a). And before they named it the Brahman or the Atman, they at-
tempted to express Absolute Being by various notions like "the existent,"
"the non-existent," "that which is neither existent nor not existent," "the
undeveloped," "the controller within," or "the imperishable." Though the
Upani~ads express the Absolute by such multiple names, we can point out
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one feature common to these concepts: all of them suppose the existence of
the One Absolute Being, underlying the diversified phases of the phenome-
nal world. All of the phenomenal phases belong to it, proceed from it, de-
pend upon it, and are controlled by it. Furthermore, in the Upani~ads,
they conceive that the soul in individual beings is in its ultimate nature
identical with the true Self (Brahman; Atman). And this metaphysical
monism in the Upani~ads is followed in later Hinduism.1 It is natural, there-
fore, that the Indian ethics sets as its highest goal the unification and
assimilation of the individual self with the Universal Self. Even when one
cannot hope to attain this goal in this life, he should continue his efforts to
achieve it in the next world. One of the Upani~ads describes the state that
a man freed from desires enters after his death as follows, "Being Brahman,
he goes to Brahman."2 And the sage saI,1<;lilya declares, 'When I shall have
departed from hence, I shall obtain it (that Self)."3 When one has attained
this final goal, he is one with the Absolute Being. There he no longer
bears any personal differentiation. Uddalaka teaches as follows: "As the
bees, my son, make honey by collecting the juices of distant trees, and re-
duce the ju.ice into one form, and as these juices have no discrimination,
so that they might say, I am the juice of this tree or that, in the same man-
ner, my son, all these creatures, when they have become merged in the
True (either in deep sleep or in death), know not that they are merged in
the True."4
This monistic view of the Upani~ads was developed further by the
Vedantic philosophers. Sarilkara is the chief representative of the monistic
philosophy of the Vedanta. "So great is the influence of the philosophy
propounded by Sarilkara and elaborated by his illustrious followers, that
whenever we speak of the Vedanta philosophy we mean the philosophy
that was propounded by Sarilkara."5 Nearly two thirds of contemporary
pundits (scholars of traditional scholarship) of India belong to the school
of Sarilkara.6
Of course, it is wrong to say that all the Indian thinkers hold such a
view of the unity of all beings. But this is the view maintained by a majority
of the philosophers in India. Even the schools of Indian pluralism did not
always reject monism; in the philosophy of Vallabha (1481-1533) who
was a pluralistic monist, "the duality that we perceive in the world does
not contradict monism; for the apparent forms and characters which are
mutually different cannot contradict their metaphysical character of iden-
tity with God. So Brahman from one point of view may be regarded as
without parts, and from another point of view as having parts."1
A monistic tendency forms the core of the theological system of the
Hindu religious schools. Throughout the history of philosophy in this
country, the monistic view has been accepted by a majority of its thinkers.
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"The tendency of Indian philosophy, especially Hinduism, has been in the
direction of monistic idealism. Almost all Indian philosophy believes that
reality is ultimately one and ultimately spiritual. Some systems have seemed
to espouse dualism or pluralism, but even these have been deeply permeated
by a strong monistic character."8
The Buddhists, however, rejected the existence of any metaphysical
principle as advocated in the Upani~ads and in the Indian orthodox philo-
sophical schools. And they did not engage themselves in metaphysical dis-
cussions about the unity of one with the Absolute, but they emphasized
participation in the current affairs of the world for the realization of abso-
lute virtue. They taught the importance of unity among individuals in the
actual society of their fellow-beings. From its inception, the Buddhist reli-
gious movement strongly opposed class discrimination in any form. A sen-
tence in one of their siitras reads: 'What has been designated as 'name' and
'family' in the world is only a term."9 Within the early community of the
Buddhist monks, this idea of equality of all classes was faithfully carried
out. Gotama the Buddha no longer belonged to any particular caste or
family (gotra). And whoever, having renounced the world, joins the Bud-
dhist community (samgha) to become a Bhik~u is called uniformly a
Sakya-putra or a son of Sakyamuni the Buddha. Within the Samgha,
everyone belongs directly to the order of the Samgha without any inter-
mediary agent and he is treated as absolutely equal to others in all his
qualifications. The standing order within the Samgha was fixed according
to the number of the years elapsed since one had taken orders. So, one of
their Vinaya texts describes the Samgha as follows: "Just, 0 Bhikkhus, as
the great rivers-that is to say, the Ganga, the Yamuna, the AciravatI, the
Sarabhii, and the MahI-when they have fallen into the great ocean, re-
nounce their name and lineage and are thenceforth reckoned as the great
ocean, just so, 0 Bhikkhus, do these four castes-the Khattiyas, the Brah-
mans, the Vessas, and the Suddhas-when they have gone forth from the
world under the doctrine and discipline proclaimed by the Tathagata, re-
nounce their names and lineage, and enter into the number of the Sakya-
puttiya Samal)as."lO In one of the Upani~ads,we can find a teaching with a
similar context. "Just as the flowing rivers disappear in the ocean
casting off name and shape, even so the knower, freed from name and
shape, attains to the divine person, higher than the high."ll It can be said
here that the metaphysical or ontological concept of the unity of all things
held in the Upani~ads shows itself in Buddhism only by taking the form of
practical ethics.
Buddhist thought was refined remarkably in the hands of the Ma-
hayana Buddhists. The idea of Sunyatii or The Void admits nothing
real or substantial, but even in this idea we can notice a feature of the old
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Indian monism. Sunyatii means absolute negation and it permits nothing
differentiated. The great teacher of Mahayana Buddhism, Nagarjuna,
teaches: "the release (moksa) is the extinction of all action (karman) and
of all defilement (klesa). The action and the defilement arise from the
differentiating notions (vikalpa). They corne from the concept of diversity
(prapaiica). This concept of diversity, however, is terminated in the state
of Voidness."12 The release in Nagarjuna's sense means the attainment of
this state of Voidness.
For most Indians, to enter into a perfect state of tranquility where the
mind is immovable and identical with the Absolute is the highest reli-
gious experience that only a man of wisdom can hope to gain. And they
attach only a relative and secondary significance to other states of religious
experience, considering them to be lower states only serving as intermediate
means to help one attain the highest.
This tendency can also be noticed even among present-day intellec-
tuals of India. They prefer to study the philosophy of Hegel, Bradley, or
Whitehead. The philosophy of Spinoza, which is also a favorite subject
for contemporary Indian philosophers, is often interpreted in the non-
dualistic, monistic light of the Sankaraite Vedanta; for example, the infinity
of God's attributes is explained as the "absolute indeterminateness of God,"
which is surely a Vedantist speaking and not Spinoza.13
Now, as additional evidence to show that the core of Indian thought
is the idea of the unity of all things, we will proceed to study a linguistic
phenomenon observed in the Indian languages. In Sanskrit, the universal
class of "all the individuals or things in the universe" is designated by
words in the singular like "ida1J1 sarvam," "ida1J1 visvam, (all this) or
simply "idam" (which means "this").
And this usage of the words in the singular number can be observed
in the old Upani~ads, in the Buddhist books,14 and in many other Indian
works in generaP5 In Japanese, to express "the things in the universe,"
we say banyu, bansho, monomina, all three implying the infinite diversity
of the phenomenal world. In contrast to the Japanese way of thinking, the
Indians tend to ignore this diversity and the differentiated phases of the
phenomenal world and grasp all things as one unit. Of course, it is gram-
matically correct to write in the plural the Sanskrit pronoun "sarva" and its
equivalents in other Indian languages. There are some cases of such usage
in old Indian scriptures.16 But, in those cases, we should not overlook the
fact that the word "sarva" does not mean all things without limitation, but
that it implies the whole within a certain boundary. And to mean all things
without limitation, the Indians never fail to write "sarva" in the singular
number.
This Indian usage of the words in this case presents a remarkable
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contrast to the Greek and the Latin usage of the equivalent words, 1rcfvTa,
omnia. In Greek, though it belongs to the same language root as Sanskrit,
the pronoun equivalent to "sarva" in the neuter plural form means "all
things." There is a fine example of this Greek usage in Heraclitus' well-
known proposition "all things How ('7l"cfvTa p£t)." Both PlatoU and Aristotle18
represent the universe as a complex body using the word 1rcfVTa in the
plural number. And this usage was accepted by the Greeks for a long time
up to comparatively recent times.19 When they use the Greek equivalent
of "sarva," in the singular number, it has the meaning of "everything" and
the meaning of "all" will not be expressed accurately.20 There is a very rare
case in Greek expressing "all things in the universe" by the pronoun in the
neuter singular "1r11.. ."21 But, in this case, the philosopher who used this
expression took a stand very similar to the Indian monistic view of the
world and its pantheism. His view was more like the Indian than like the
Greek one, for such a view was rarely held by the Greeks in general. In
Latin, too, they use "omnia," the word in the neuter plural form, to mean
"allthings."22 And to mean "all things as one unit" or "the universe," the
Romans have another word "universum" so that they have no fear of the
confusion that might exist in Greek. In Greece, not only philosophers but
people in general thought that the universe was a complex body consisting
of innumerable individual and particular things. Greek atomists regarded
the atoms as innumerable. In contrast to this Greek view, the Indian
philosophers have mostly maintained that all beings in the universe are
limited and particularized manifestations of the sole ultimate reality. Here,
without relying upon other methods of comparative philosophy, we can
maintain the foregoing conclusions through analysis of linguistic expres-
sions.
Now, insofar as most Indians attach little significance to individual
phenomena, it is natural that they should be inclined to minimize the
absolute value of any individual being.
As a natural result of such a way of thinking, there appears in India
the idea of the oneness of opposite pairs, of good and evil, and of beauty
and ugliness. Megasthenes, referring to the features of Brahmanistic
thought, writes as follows: "[According to the Brahmanists] whatever
.happens in human life is neither good [aya06v] nor evil [KaK6v]. For if the
nature of a thing or an act is fixed for good or evil, why is there any
difference among men, whose notions are all more or less like a dream, of
those who are pleased by a thing or act and those who are troubled by the
same thing or act?"23 In the old Upani~ads, too, it is repeated that what
appears good or bad to our human eyes is not so in the absolute sense and
that the difference between the two is only a matter of comparison.24 For
instance, one of the Upani~ads reads as follows: "[The true Self], the Con-
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troller of all, the lord of all, and the ruler of all, does not become greater
by good works nor smaller by evil works."25 And in another text, it is said,
"As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who
knows it."26 And this idea of the oneness of opposite pairs held in the
Upani~adswas accepted by the Vedantists, the most influential philosophi-
cal school in the India of later ages.27
To the above, of course, a counter-argument will be presented: how
could the Indians have gone into such minute classification of phenomena
and their division into sub-sub-types if this were really true? Also, why is
it that one powerful school of philosophy has felt compelled to develop
an ultimate category of differentiation (vi~ajya) without reference to
which phenomena could not be intelligible? These counter-questions are
pertinent. Still the writer cannot help retaining the impression that many
Indian thinkers admitted pluralism only on a secondary plane, and not in
the metaphysical realm. Even if we admit the predominance of pluralism
in Indian philosophy, still we cannot deny the stronger influence of monism
in other cultural areas of Indian thought, such as religion.
...
CHAPTER 6 THE STATIC QUALITY
OF UNIVERSALITY
Comprehension of This Quality Through Static Aspects of
Language
It has already been suggested that most Indians incline to comprehend
phenomena statically. This tendency has a close relation to their tendency
to put a high value on universality. All things in this world are always
changing and moving. On the other hand, the substance of these things
continues as long as they exist and its nature changes little. Therefore, the
tendency to prefer universality generally draws more attention to the na-
ture or essence of things than to their manifestations which are always
changing, and again this tendency stresses the static aspect of things more
strongly than their dynamic functions.
Some special characteristics of this way of thinking can be found in
the Indian usage of parts of speech. First, it can be said that the noun (or
verbal noun) is more likely to be used than the verb in a Sanskrit sentence,
because the noun expresses the more stable and unchanging aspects of the
thing. Secondly, the adjective which modifies a noun is used much more
frequently than the adverbial form which is seldom used in Sanskrit.
The former characteristic will be explained first. Although expression
by verbs was very complicated in the sentences of the Vedas, it became
very simple in classical Sanskrit. Verbal nouns came to be mainly used
instead of the finite verbs in classical Sanskrit.! Especially in prose writ-
ings, the nominal predicate is widely used and the finite verb is seldom
used. The noun which is used in Sanskrit as the predicate is in some cases
a participle and in some cases a verbal noun. For example, the sentence
"due to rain, the food appears" is expressed in the form of "due to rain,
appearance of the food (is possible)" in Sanskrit. (parjanyad annasam-
bhava~, Bhag. G. III, 14. = imbre fit frugam proventus, In Of Kap7rOL £K Tal)
6P.f3pou.) It was the practice since ancient times to use the participial form
instead of the finite verb to express the past tense, and it became a cornman
expression in colloquial speech of the later periods.2
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The adjectives whose quality is static are used in Sanskrit in place
of the finite verbs used in the classical languages of the West. For ex-
ample, the sentence "sarvam anityam (all things are impermanent)" is
used in Sanskrit instead of the sentence "all existences change and move"
(7l"&VTa pH).
Thus the "periphrastic form" was established in Sanskrit. Although
it is seldom found in the Vedic Scripture, the periphrastic perfect, one of
the periphrastic forms, can be frequently found in the literature after the
Brahma:gas. For example, in order to express the meaning ''he went," the
phrase "gamayiith cakiira (he made a going)" is used. And again the form
of periphrastic future is used in some cases in order to express future
action.3 For example, the word "gantiisi (you are the one who goes)" is
used to express the meaning "you will go." (gantiisi = pervenies ad . • .
a7l"OUTpoep~V 7l"Ot~U£t~. Bhag. G., II, 52,)
Again in Sanskrit, the denominative, a special form of verb, which is
formed from a noun, is established. For example, putriyati, a denominative
which was formed from a noun putra (son), means "to desire to have a
son," and sViimiyati, a denominative formed from a noun sviimin (master)
means "to regard as a master." Generally speaking, denominative is used as
the word which connotes the meaning of "to be . . . :' "to work as . . . :'
"to regard as . . . ," and "to desire. . . ." Such special categories of verbs
as the denominative are not found in the classical grammar of the west.
Another grammatical fact can be considered as showing a similar
tendency; namely, in Sanskrit, sakya, an adjective, or sakyam, an inde-
clinable, is used to express the meaning "to be able to ... :' which is
expressed by using a verb or an auxiliary verb in the Western languages.
(For example, "na devasurai1,l sarvai1,l sakya1,l prasahituf!1 yudhi" [Riimii-
yana II, 86, I I] = non potest proelis superari a cunctis dis daemoni-
busque.)4
In the Sanskrit language, it is seldom that a verb in the form of the
finite verb is used; the verb is mainly used in the form of the verbal noun.
Therefore, the general characteristic of Sanskrit construction is that the
nominal sentence is more likely to be used than the verbal sentence.
Especially in classical Sanskrit, the finite verb is seldom used.
In connection with the above fact, usage of the infinitive form of the
verb is very much limited. In Sanskrit the infinitive form is never used as
the subject.5 Nor is the infinitive form ever used as the object. When it is
necessary to use the infinitive verb as an object, an abstract noun formed
from the root of that verb is used instead of the infinitive form of that verb.
Originally, the infinitive form of a verb preserved the case ending of the
verbal noun in the J;lg-Veda, that is, it preserved case endings of accusa-
tive, dative, genitive, and locative cases. However, in classical Sanskrit,
I
I
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only one form, which ends with "-tum" (one of the above mentioned case
endings), remains. Moreover, in most cases in classical Sanskrit, the in-
finitive form is used only when the meaning "in order to do-" which
denotes an object of behavior is expressed. Even in this case, usage of the
infinitive form is not necessarily the same. The infinitive form is used in
both the active and passive voices.6
There is a remarkable difference between Sanskrit and the classical
languages of the West on this point. For example, there are two kinds of
infinitive, the present and the perfect, in Latin. The present infinitive
expresses continuation, repetition, and process while the perfect infinitive
indicates completed action. The infinitive in Latin can become subject,
predicate, and also the object of a sentence as a noun, because it possesses
the properties of both verb and noun.
It is quite likely that the reason why there exists such a great difference
between Sanskrit and the Western languages is that the Indians did not
pay as much attention to the changing and moving aspects of existence.
Another striking characteristic of Sanskrit will be considered. Sanskrit
does not possess any adverbial suffix which is common to all Western
languages. As a general rule, an adjective can become an adverb by
adding some suffixes such as "-w~" in Greek and "-ment" in French, in
the Western languages. However, there are no such adverbial suffixes in
Sanskrit; so we find the accusative case of the adjective (neutral, singular)
is used in Sanskrit when it is necessary to modify the verb.7 Again accusa-
tive, ablative, and locative cases (singular) of adjective are used adverbially
in some cases. In brief, the adverb is not acknowledged to be a part of
speech in the system of Sanskrit grammar. And it is very common to use the
adjective where the adverb is used in Western languages.
(The same disparity between the Indian way of thinking and other
ways of thinking can also be found among modern Western languages.
Among the modern Western languages, German tends to stress the un-
changing, static, and universal aspects of phenomena. On the contrary,
English attaches great importance to changing aspects of things. There
exists no special suffix which can distinguish adverb from other parts of
speech in German, whereas in English an adverbial suffix is added to the
adjective when it modifies a verb.S)
This tendency to comprehend things through their static aspects can
also be found elsewhere. For example, a demonstrative pronoun "sa" is
usually added to the subject when it is necessary to connect two sentences
to express the meaning of "and" or "then." Namely, the demonstrative
pronoun is used in Sanskrit instead of the conjunction.9 In order to
show compound events, it is often necessary to use the conjunction in
Western languages. On the contrary, the Indians repeatedly mention the
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same subject of action which remains unchanged through a period of
time.
The subject of action which influences the gerundive, which has
passive meaning, or the past participle, which ends with "-ta," is
expressed by the instrumental case or genitive case in Sanskrit. The
following sentences are its examples: "bhavatii (or bhavata~) krta~ kartav-
ya~ (you fulfilled your duty)"; "rajiiii~ pUjita~ (one was respected
by kings)." Here the instrumental case is apt to express the same meaning
with a participle but the genitive case is used with an adjective.10 In the
case of Western languages, the subject of action is always introduced with
prepositions such as V'll"O, a, by, von, or par. It can be concluded from the
above fact that, on the whole, Western people comprehend action through
its changing aspects, while Indians comprehend action attributively. That
is to say, many Indians consider that action is an unchanging aspect or
only an attribute of phenomenal existence.
The above-mentioned characteristic way of thinking also influenced
the construction of concepts. In classical Indian languages, there was no
word which .corresponded to the word "to become." Although the verb
formed from root "bhii" connotes the meaning of "to become," this word
also connotes the meaning of "to exist" at the same time. Why did the
ancient Indians fail to distinguish the word meaning "to become" from
the word meaning "to exist" in their daily conversation? It was because
"to become" was one form or aspect of "to exist" for them. A noun "bhiiva"
formed from root "bhii" is understood as the word which means either
"being born" or "existing."ll That is to say, "to become" is "to be born," in
other words, for the Indians. Therefore, the. Indians managed to produce
the words "anyathii bhavati"12 or "anyathiibhiiva" (being otherwise) in
order to express "to become" or "to change."
For the Indians, therefore, "all the things of this world are changing
and moving" is not the expression of the changing aspect of existences but
is the expression of a static and unchanging state. In the sentence "sabbe
sankhiirii aniccii (all things are impermanent)," a common expression of
the Indian Buddhists, "aniccii" is an adjective. Thus, change is understood
statically. This adjectival form of expression is fundamentally different
from the sentence" 'll"CivTa 1m (all things flow)" of Western thought in
which the predicate is dynamically expressed by a verb.
The Static Quality of Thought
Thus, in Indian philosophy the Absolute is generally explained as a
Being beyond all temporal appearances. According to the Upani~ads, the
Absolute is also expressed as Imperishable (ak~ara) in the following ways.13
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"Atman is imperishable for it cannot be destroyed. It is unfettered,
it does not suffer, it is not injured."14 "This is that great unborn Self who
is imperishable, incorruptible, eternal, fearless, Brahman."15 In early Bud-
dhism such a metaphysical principle as the Absolute is not laid down, but
it is claimed that the principle of pratityasamutpiida, whether the Buddha
has appeared or whether he has not appeared, is unchanged and eternal.
According to Mahayana Buddhism, sunyatii or dharmatii (the essence of
things) is the principle of prat'ityasamutpiida that nothing can disappear
or arise. As stated above, the idea of the Absolute, which Indian philoso-
phers have conceived, is of a negative character. Accordingly, the Absolute
can only be expressed as essentially static in quality in relation to all
appearances of changing things.
The same kind of way of thinking is discernible concerning their
concept of man. Let us compare it with the Christian concept of man.
According to St. Paul, the concept of man is roughly as follows: Man is
composed of two parts, i.e. body and mind, representing the external and
internal aspects of man respectively. Mind is that which gives vitality
to body or the source of life. He calls this mind "psyche," and when he
defines it as the subject of consciousness or self, especially distinguishing it
from the body, he also gives the name "pneuma" or soul to mind. However,
the term "pneuma," which was employed in few cases, generally means the
origin of a resurrected life in the awakened man as distinguished from
the ordinary man. In other words, it denotes the generative power of
the resurrective, sacred, and eternal life which comes from God or the
Savior and which controls man. Accordingly, soul is identified with
the Holy Spirit, which is distinctly separate from the mind of man. On
the other hand, the body, which represents the external aspect of man, is
supposed to be constituted by a bony substance (sarx). It might be ac-
knowledged that it does not apply merely to the flesh, but to all the
elements composing man-in-nature/6 due to imagining that the sarx is the
main element of all constituents of body. On the contrary, according to
Indian philosophers, soul is defined as priitza, iitman, or jiva, and body as
sarira or deha, not as mii1Jlsa or flesh. It appears that they considered the
bone to be the central part of the body. Saririitzi, the plural form of sarira
(body), means the bones or remains. That the bone is considered to be the
fundamental component of the body, we see in the following passage of
the Dhammapada: "Body is formed by the bones together with flesh
and blood spreading on it. It contains decay, death, pride, and false-
hood."17 As seen from the above statement, the Christians in the West
find the central significance of body in the dynamic element of which
body is constituted; Indian philosophers in the East find it in the static
element, i.e. bone.
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Such being the case, generally in Indian philosophy the idea of
"becoming" is not considered primary, but the idea of "being" is the
central consideration. Therefore, Indian philosophers in general explain
three aspects of "being," i.e. appearance, extinction, and continuance or
intermediate state of "being." These three are referred to early in the Old
Upani~ds/8 and they are generally accepted by the orthodox schools of
Brahmanism and the Jain schools. However, the idea of "becoming" is
little mentioned in these schools. Vikara, vikriyii, parh.ziima, viparh.ziima,
etc. are considered to be equivalent to "becoming," but they show that
the simple becomes specialized into complexity, and these words rather
mean evolution or development. Var~yayani, philosopher of language of
ancient India, set forth the theory of the sixfold aspect of being (bhiivavi-
kara)19 in the phenomenal world, i.e. appearance, existing, changing,
increasing, decreasing, and extinction, and in later ages it was accepted
by the other famous Indian philosopher of language named Bhartrhari.20
However, samkara, the famous Vedantist, refuted this theory as meaning-
less, and he maintained that appearance, continuance, and extinction are
recognized ~o be the only three aspects of "being," and that all other
aspects of being might be included in these three.21 Also in Buddhism these
three aspects are designated as those of the conditioned (samskara) or
phenomenal being.22 The Sarvastivada school, the most eminent of Abhid-
harma Buddhist schools, maintained the theory of four aspects of being
by adding the fourth aspect of being or the conditioned, namely, jarii
or decaying, which was interpreted as "changing to other" (anyathiibhiiva,
anyathiitva).23 Accordingly, they show the four aspects of the conditioned
as appearance, extinction, continuance, and decaying.24 However, this
theory was not accepted by all Buddhist schools.
From the point of view that the idea of "being" is considered primary,
and that the idea of "becoming" is ignored, Indian thought is considerably
similar to Greek thought, and departs from modern thought. As pointed
out on several occasions, the central problem of ancient Greek philosophy
was to investigate reality or "being," and there the truth was nothing but
"being" and it was to be materialized in Existence. The truth is thus
realized by insight into the form of reality and it denotes the discovery of
the essence of "being." Accordingly, the science of geometry was the typical
pattern of science in ancient times, through which the principle of the
£lxed forms of material bodies in space was investigated. Only Statics
was developed even in the £leld of physical science. On the other hand,
the idea of "becoming" is investigated mainly in modern thought. Kinetics
has developed in the £leld of physics of the modern age. Mathematics has
developed in the form of analytics and algebra studying variable quantities
and relations. And for the £lrst time analytical geometry was organized
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and studied. Indian thought is similar to Greek thought from the point of
view of its difference from modern thought in which the idea of "becoming"
or movement is regarded as its chief characteristic; however, compared
with Greek thought, Indian thought may be said to go to extremes in
expressing its ideas ontologically.
Thus, the static quality of ways of thinking of some Indian minds is
distinctively far from the dynamic quality of modern thought; however,
from the very point of view of its contrast with modern thought, it can
offer a certain significance for modern civilization. While modern life is
inclined to drive man to a disturbed or mad restlessness, the static quality
of Indian thought is capable of giving pc~ce or rest to the mind of modern
people. Accordingly, Indian culture is helpful in presenting rest and
a quite joy to persons today who are tired of the turbulent movement of
their culture.
In introducing the life and activity of Ramakrishna (1834-1886),
who was one of the most eminent religious teachers of modern India,
Romain Rolland writes as follows: "He was a fruit harvester of early
autum whom Europeans had rarely if ever known." And he goes
on to say: "I should like to inform European people who are feverish and
restless because of this arterial throbbing. I want to wet European lips
with unperishable blood."25 Even Albert Schweitzer, who is known as
a devotional Christian teacher, though criticizing all Indian religions,
acknowledged the following merit in them: "However, there is one
significance which we European people ought to acknowledge in regard
to the religious thought of India. It is that the Indian religion teaches us
calmness or equanimity of mind . . . the Indian people comprehend the
essential weak point in the faith of modern Christianity. We Europeans
believe that Christianity is only dynamic in its religious activity. There are
too few occasions when we reHect on our deeper selves. We Europeans are
usually devoid of equanimity of mind."26 In view of the contrast between
Indian calm and modern activism, it is no wonder that the Indian idea of
"inner peace" is so attractive to the minds of modern people.
Lack of Common-Sense Concepts of Time
The thought process which regards existence behind the phenomenal
world as more important than the phenomenal world itself, naturally
results in destroying the concept of time, especially the concept of dif-
ferences in time necessary for expressing specific events in experience.
This thought process can be seen in the fact that mood in the Sanskrit
language has gradually vanished and become simplified; various kinds of
tense have disappeared, and accordingly their usages have been confused.
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In the proto-Indo-European language, the difference of verb usage
is mainly based on mood and, therefore, the verb of this language was
based on a flimsy grasp of the concept of time. The present tense of direct
speech simply indicates sustaining action, while the perfect tense denotes
the state of action which was momentarily conceived regardless of dura-
tion as completed. It was somewhat later before the concept of time was
emphatically introduced by the use of verbs. The old writings of the
Greek language preserved a good variety of moods. It was so with the
Vedic language. However, in Latin the verb is principally based on a
concept of time. Even in the present Greek language the mood of the
verb persists with considerable tenacity, and in the Slavic languages it is
still preserved.27 However, generally speaking, the tenses of verbs came to
occupy the important place and the differentiation of tenses became
developed in later ages. These trends are remarkably discernible in all
modern languages.
However, though there are five kinds of tense in the Sanskrit lan-
guage as in Greek,28 they are not sharply discriminated. For example, in
indicating the past tense, the following five forms are actually used almost
without discrimination in usage; imperfect, perfect, past participle active,
aorist, and historical present.29 Simply concerning the frequency of each
tense's use, there are differences according to periods. At the end of the
period of the BrahmaI).a writings, the aorist30 was frequently used, and in
the Pali language a single tense denoted almost all past events. According
to the famous grammarian of ancient India, PaI).ini (c. 4th century B.C.),31
the aorist is a single tense which indicates the recent past. However, after
PaI).ini, the past participle has been gradually employed as equivalent to
the aorist. Finally, in classical Sanskrit there is little usage of the aorist.
Besides, the Sanskrit lacks the past perfect and future perfect tenses
in either the indicative or subjunctive moods as well as the past tense in
the subjunctive.32 This fact shows that discrimination between absolute
past and relative past is not made in Indian languages.
Furthermore, it is also possible to employ the present tense of Sanskrit
in order to indicate recent past and future.33 For example, in the sentence
'What is the use of it? (It is of no use)," the present tense is used in the
Sanskrit language, while the future tense is used in Latin: kim karomi
tena = quid faciam eo. Thus Indian people do not have too clear a
consciousness of the discrimination of tense. There seems to be a similar
linguistic phenomenon in Hindustani in which the same word-kal,
adverb-has two meanings, namely, yesterday and tomorrow. Similarly,
the term "parson" means the day after tomorrow and at the same time the
day before yesterday, and the term "atarson" means three days after and
before. Such being the case, the determination of the meaning of these
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kinds of words is dependent on the context, and so confusion can be
removed.
That Indian people are not very sharply aware of the discrimination
of tense denotes their unwillingness to comprehend the current of time
from past to future in the form of quantitative time through which the
length of time is capable of being measured. However, it does not mean
that the Indian people have no concept of time, but rather the reverse.
The law of transiency and its philosophical expression, i.e. their view of
the uncertainty of life, sharply pointed out by the Jains and the Buddhists,
can be realized only by those who understand from their heartfelt experi-
ence the changing phases of the world.
The Indian people, who have not exerted themselves to grasp the
concept of time quantitatively, have rarely written historical books with
accurate dates, and we have indicated that this fact signifies a characteristic
feature of Indian culture. It may be said to result from the characteristic
way of thinking described above. Presumably, according to the world-view
of the Indian people, the universe or world and the social order remain
eternal; on the other side, personal life is nothing but one of a succession
of lives existing repeatedly in limitless time, and therefore finally becomes
meaningless. The idea of the transition of life which the Indian people
have conceived is transmigration, i.e. a perpetual wheel of rebirths. Such
an idea appeared occasionally in Greek (Pythagorean) philosophy, but in
India it has always been maintained by all people. So far as this way of
thinking is concerned, such passing phenomena as political or social
conditions, as a matter of course, do not attract people. Consequently, it
is not surprising that historical descriptions have not been made with
much attention to accurate dates in India.
Contemplative Attitudes
Viewing the essential universality behind and beyond the variety of
concrete phenomena of our experience can be defined as a contemplative
or meditative attitude. It means no more than comprehending all progres-
sive phenomena as eternally completed. Accordingly, in describing succes-
sive events, the present participle is used only in Greek and Latin. The
gerund which shows a kind of past tense is used instead in ancient Indian
languages. Here are some examples: upasamgamya = accedens (Bhag. I,
2); para1Jl d!~tvii = l7TftO~ OfWPfi TOY OfOY (II, 59). (Only in this case OpWY
also may be used.); pallal~ hitvii = lacum relinquens (Dhp. 91) (having
left a pond, the bird ...); maccu iidiiya gacchati = mars prehendens ahit
(Dhp. 46); kumhhupama1Jl kiiyam ima1J1 viditvii/naJigarupama1J1 cittam
ida1Jl thapetvii/ /yojetha miira1Jl pannayudhena (Dhp. 40) = Vasi simile
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corpus hoc agnosscens, arci similem cogitationem hanc sistens, subigat
(sapiens) Miiram intellectus armis (Having known that this body is a
weak vessel and that the mind is like a confused thoroughfare in a city,
you should battle against the Evil One with the aid of wisdom). As seen
from these examples, in the Sanskrit language the main and subordinate
actions are expressed in different tenses, the latter in the past tense; on the
other hand, in the Greek language both are expressed in the same tense.
Furthermore, in saying "by means of" for the sake of showing the instru-
ment of action, iidiiya or upiidiiya, the gerund form relevant to the past is
used in the Sanskrit language; however, in the Greek language £xwv
or Aa{3wv the present participle, is used.
Also the same characteristic is recognized in constructing compounds
in the Sanskrit language. In indicating the causal relation between two
notions, a compound is formed which suggests that the order of thought
follows the way of tracing effect back to cause. Accordingly, the expression
"effect and cause" (phalahetu) occur·;' instead of "cause and effect" as
stated in other languages. Instead of the expression "the relation of cause
and effect," "the relation of effect and cause" (kiiryakiirattabhiiva)34 is
used. Likewise, the following expressions are used in the Sanskrit language:
relation of the knowable and the knower (gamyagamakabhiiva)35; relation
of the generated and the generative (janyajanakabhiiva); relation of the
proved and the prover (siidhyasiidhakabhiiva); relation of the established
and the establishing (vyayasthiipyavyavasthiipakabhiiva)36; relation of one
being excited to activity and the instigator (pravartyapravartayitrtva)31;
relation of that on which anything depends and that which depends on
(iisrayiisrayibhiiva).38 These expressions of the Sanskrit language are
remarkably different from those of other languages. Accordingly, when
scholars translated the Indian original texts into Chinese, they changed
the word order of the above expressions and they appeared as "the relation
of cause and effect." The Tibetan people also translated "effect and cause"
(phalahetu) into "rgyu dan bbras-bu" (cause and effect), changing its
word order. The way of thinking, in which the notion of effect is first
formed and that of cause is inferred and stated afterward, is retrospective,
and in this regard, it is basically different from the way of thinking in
which the notion of cause is first formed and then that of effect is deduced.
(By the way, it is needless to say that such a way of thinking of the
Indian people is basically different from the thinking process of natural
science through which, with the help of inductive and deductive reasoning,
the cause of an effect is investigated and is ascertained by functional
correlation without giving primacy to either the cause or the effect.)
The Indian people, even if they investigate the relation of two things
from cause to effect, generally do not take the view that a single effect is
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caused by a single active movement, but prefer to assume that various
effects are produced by the combination of various causes. Therefore, most
Indian thinkers do not employ the definite technical term which cor-
responds to efficient cause (causa efficiens). It seems that nimitta-kiira1Ja
is equivalent to causa efficiens; however, it is also used in expressing
causa occasionalis and final cause of aim (teleological relation).
The thinking process through which the experienced action and
change are immediately perceived as past matters not only restricts the
thinking process of common people in India, but exerts an influence on
the thinking process of Indian philosophers. The fact that the main Indian
philosophies are contemplative is closely related to this thinking process.
Greek philosophy is characterized as investigating overtly and speculatively
the substance of matter and of watching its forms of activity, and therefore
it is commonly criticized as theoretic. However, on this point, it may be
rightly said that Indian philosophy has been more contemplative. Indian
religious teachers have generally practiced yoga, by way of which they have
contemplated the truth or intrinsic nature of phenomenal matter, whereas,
it appears that such introspective contemplation did not predominate in
Greek philosophy. It is said theoria is very similar to yoga;39 however,
yoga does not mean merely watching; it denotes also attaining a state
transcending one's own limited self.
Passive and Forbearing Attitudes Toward Behavior
The contemplative attitude leads people usually to assume a rather
passive attitude toward the objective or the natural world instead of
encouraging an active attitude. They attempt to adapt themselves to nature
without reconstructing nature. When assuming such an attitude, they
especially tend to speak highly of the virtue of self-surrender or forbearance
in its moral sense. Even in the Upani~ads forbearance is mentioned as
follows:"Therefore he who knows it as such, having become calm, self-
controlled, withdrawn, patient and collected sees the Self in his own self,
sees all in the Self."40 In early Buddhism it is also explained as follows:
"By virtue of forbearance he should suppress anger."41 "Indeed in this
world if he return evil for evil, he cannot be apart from evil. Give up his
Own evil and take a rest. This is eternal and unchangeable law."42 And
again, according to the Jain school, the true hero (vira) is a man who has
ceased hostility (vaira-uparata).43 In Mahayana Buddhism forbearance is
counted as one of six virtues (piiramitii). The following passage shows the
predominant point of view of Indian religion: "By whom can this world
be conquered? It can be conquered by the man who is truthful and
patient."44 Here, "conquest" does not denote controlling all things
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existing in the natural world by sheer force, but subduing one's own un-
controllable passion deserves to be called "conquest."
Accordingly, in regard to human effort in action, it is praiseworthy to
hold one's desire and passion in check: "Who is the hero? He is a man
who is not disturbed by the arrow of beauty's eyes."45 The cause of our
living in the illusion of becoming (hhava) is craving (tmzii).46 We
have to eliminate it in order to attain emancipation. In every Indian
religion the man who eliminates all evil passions is especially extolled.41
Such being the case, the attitude of non-resistance by the Indian
people toward outward oppression is extremely forbearing and passive. In
resisting the king, Brahmins resorted to the method of fasting. It was
believed in India that if a Brahmin who resorted to such a fast died of
starvation, the king would sustain a dreadful injury by the force of its
miraculous effect. On account of the faith in such miraculous strength,
the king was obliged to submit to the resistance of Brahmins, and to
grant their request. Even in India today, those who resist governmental
power often resort to a hunger strike, emulating Gandhi's successful fasts
against British rule.
With "respect to economic morality, Indian people lay stress on the
fairness of sharing rather than on that of production, because they are
not inclined to have an active approach to the natural world. The plains
of the Ganges, where the ancient Indian culture flourished, possesses
fertile soil and the climate of this area is very hot and rainy. Accordingly,
it is fit for rich farm production without much artificial effort. On the
other hand, when natural violence comes, the artificial effort is wasted.
As far as primitive industry is concerned, nature in India has inflicted its
overwhelming power on the Indian people. In such a natural environ-
ment all production is controlled by the power of nature and only
sharing it requires an artificial effort. Such being the case, the morality of
sharing is invoked and taught, and the virtue of the act of giving has been
emphasized. Early in the ~g-veda, there appeared about forty poems
praising the act of giving (danastuti), in which the Brahmin poets praised
kings and lords who had offered them cows, horses, servants, etc. Since
then, the virtue of the act of giving has been regarded as common in
Indian society. This virtue is taught also in the Upani~ads.48 In early
Buddhism, considering the extant sacred texts, the act of giving to mendi-
cants and priests is often emphasized, however, and general charity is also
taught as a virtue of social morality. The offered things are to be used
efficiently and enjoyed both by oneself and by others, and the central
point of giving, that one should offer what others need, is repeatedly
asserted with emphasis. The sutra condemns and rejects the notion that
only those who are rich in property and full of treasures and foods live
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on dainty food. 49 And moreover, it teaches us that even the poor should
offer what they can in the following way: "Just like a companion of a
traveller proceeding on a wild plain, those who offer something in spite
of being poor never perish among the dead. This is theeternallaw."50 In
Jain teaching the virtue of the act of giving is alike regarded as important.
In Mahayana Buddhism the act of giving is the first virtue which is to be
practised by Buddhist followers. Accordingly, in India, guided by this
thought, the act of giving things which the king and the rich offer to the
poor and forsaken has become an almost fixed convention. Thus, it might
be rightly said that the respect for the virtue of the act of giving is a really
remarkable character of Indian morality.51
The extremity of 'the contemplative attitude finally results in praising
inactivity or "absence of work as the ideal state." Jain followers set a value
"on absence of work" (akamma),52 and also aim at ceasing all action. 53
They aim at wiping away the dust of karma54 from the past without a new
karma or action, because good and bad actions generally produce pleasure
and suffering. Also in Brahmanism inactivity or abstinence from action
(nai~karmya) is regarded as an ultimate ideal. In Buddhism, though
slightly different from the above teachings, the saint who has attained the
highest state of quiescence has achieved what he should have sought in his
practice, and there is nothing more for him to do.
However, in regard to this view, some objections have been offered
by some Indian thinkers themselves. For example, Bhaskara, a scholar
of the Vedanta school, says, "Properly speaking, it is impossible to do
nothing at all. If emancipation could be attained by the virtue of in-
activity, the religious mendicant (parivriijaka) would not have attained
emancipation. Generally speaking, it is impossible for a living person
to do nothing."55 According to Bhaskara, it is not possible for anyone to
refrain from all action, but one can and should aim at renouncing attach-
ment to self-centered action. His criticism certainly applies to all. In spite
of that, the majority of Indians have not thought that way, for inactivity
prevails among them at least ideologically. That is the reason why so many
Indians seem to lack a drive to activity.
The inactive and contemplative attitude of the Indian people has an
inHuence even on Indian philosophy. Among the four principles, namely,
efficient, material, final, and formal causes, which are ascribed to Aristotle,
the cause (causa effzciens) corresponds to nimitta-kiirm;za, the material
cause to upiidiina-kiirm;za, and the final cause to prayojana in Indian
philosophy; however, formal cause does not have its corresponding term in
Indian philosophy. (Of course, it cannot be said that form has not been
considered. For some Indian philosophers sabda is regarded as the form.
However, they do not regard form as the so-called cause.) In other words,
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action in order to create a specific form has not been fully considered
among Indian philosophers.
Some may think that the cause of such an inactive attitude on the
part of Indian thought may be ascribed to the "state of despondency"
arising from the influence of hot climate. It may be surely accepted as a
contributory cause. However, this type of causal explanation again requires
to be criticized as too one-sided.
>CHAPTER 7 SUBJECTIVE
COMPREHENSION OF
PERSONALITY
Subjective Comprehension of Personality as Revealed in Language
When we examine the simple subject-predicate form of judgment in
the Sanskrit, we find that the predicate is as a rule placed first because of
the importance attached to the predicated quality or attribute; the Indians'
way of thinking thus tends to emphasize qualities as subjective rather than
as objective relations. This is also one of the eminent characteristics of
Indian thought. We shall examine in the following passage the reflections
of this way of thinking in language.
First of all, as a visible example of this tendency, in Western lan-
guages, when a person is the object of a verb, the name of the person is
expressed most of the time in the accusative case, while in Sanskrit the
person in question is often referred to in the nominative case. For example,
in a Greek sentence: 7faTfpa S£vocf>WVTa EKaAOVV ( = They called Xenophon
father), both "Xenophon" and "father" are in the accusative case. Simi-
larly, a Latin verb "nomina" governs two accusatives. In Sanskrit, what is
to be defined or named is expressed in the accusative case, as in Greek or
Latin, but the new term to be added is expressed by a noun in the nomina-
tive case followed by an indeclinable "iti." This kind of expression appears
even in the oldest literature, e.g., tam iihu~ suprajii iti, ~g-Veda, IX, 114,
I ( = they call him a man having good offspring). It may be said that in
Sanskrit, importance is attached to a new term rather than to what is
already known. By using this kind of syntactical form, i.e. by the use of
an independent nominative case for a new term, the Indians regard a new
term as the expression of an independent subjective existence different
from what is named by it.
The same tendency is clearly observed in the use of the gerundive.
In the cases of Greek and Latin, the object of a transitive verb is expressed
in the accusative case even in gerundive construction. But in old Indian
languages it is expressed in the nominative case. The Indians never use
the accusative case in such a situation.
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E.g. Greek: 8tWKtEOV TO~<;' 7rOAEpiov<;'
We should seek after the enemy.
Latin: aeternas poenas in morte timendum est.
We should be afraid of eternal punishment after death.
Sanskrit: briihma1Jo na hantavya~
A brahmin should not be killed.
tiismat sViidhyayo "dhyetavya~," SEr. XI, 5, 7, 3·
Therefore the daily lesson is to be practiced.
Indian languages have no form of "accusativum cum infinitivum" as
do the Western classical languages/ that is, they do not use the accusative
case to express the subject which takes a verb in infinitive form as the
predicate. It is replaced by an instrumentaP This seems to reveal an Indian
tendency to avoid as much as possible the use of the accusative case for
expressing the subject of action.
Then what is the significance of the expression in the accusative?
All noun cases except the accusative can stand for the nominal predicate
of a sentence,3 that is, among all noun cases, the accusative alone has no
predicative ~eaning. The accusative, by definition, has an objective sense
and cannot express a subjective sense. In the light of this linguistic rule
and the fact mentioned above, we may be allowed to draw a conclusion
that Westerners are inclined to comprehend an object of observation as an
objective matter, while the Indians, disliking such a way of comprehension,
try to grasp its subjective significance.
In self-reflection, the Indians did not like to comprehend themselves
objectively by placing the self at a distance. In the expressions such as
"to think oneself," "to call oneself," "self" is expressed in the accusative
case in Latin and Greek, but it is expressed in the nominative case in
ancient Sanskrit; e.g., pariibhavi~yanti manye. I think I shall be one who
has disappeared. (Tait. Sa1J1h., II, 5, I, 2.) katha1J1 so 'nusi~to bruvita.
How can he say [by himself] that he has completed his study? (Chand.
Up. 5, 3,4·)4
The Indians did not want to reflect upon their own self objectively
as the substratum of mental activities. The use of impersonal judgments in
which the mental substratum, when it is influenced by sentiment, is shown
in the accusative, is occasionally observed only in early Sanskrit literature.5
But it has a fairly good number of examples in Western languages; e.g.,
"One should keep one's self calm." Similar contrasts between Western
languages and Sanskrit are also observed in impersonal admonitions which
express the idea of duty or necessity.6 It shows that some characteristics
common to the old Indo-European languages have been lost in Classical
Sanskrit.
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Subjective Comprehension of Personality as Revealed in
Philosophy
The Indians tried to avoid comprehending mind as an external sub-
stance not only in their ordinary language but also in their philosophical
thinking. The mind or soul, which is termed "vou~," "spiritus," "mens,"
or ·VuX~" and "anima" by Greek and Roman philosophers, is called
"atman" by Indian philosophers. The term atman is etymologically re-
lated to German "atmen" (to breathe), but is used as a reflexive pronoun
in Sanskrit. In Chinese Buddhist scriptures, it is always translated into
"wo" (1, ich). It was probably natural for the Indians, who thought of
mind as a substance mostly in terms of subjective concepts, to use a
reflexive pronoun in order to express such a concept. If a concept is named
by any kind of noun, as in Western philosophy, there usually is a more or
less objective comprehension about it. In Greek, there is no form like
"TO u€auT6v" or "0 u€auT6~," and "0 aUT6~" means "the same," but
has no sense of "the self." In modern philosophy, too, the main point of
discussion was on the "I" (das Ich), but not so much on "the Self" (das
Selbst) as in Indian philosophy.
One may perhaps object here that there existed a few Indian thinkers
who understood the subject of mental activity in terms of the objective
world; for example, the Nyaya-Vaise~ika schoo1,7 the Mlmamsa school,
and even some Vedantists like Bhartrprapanca8 held such an objective
way of thinking. Indeed, these philosophers called the mind a substance,
"atman," but, so far as the use of such terms is concerned, it was usually
in accord with the Indian mode of thought. Their natural philosophy was
indeed objective, but its significance lies merely in its criticism of the
general tendency of the Indian way of thinking, and they were against
orthodoxy merely by way of protest. There can therefore be no objection
to characterizing the Indian mode of thought in the manner indicated
above.
In the main current of Indian philosophy-from the Upani~ads to
the Vedanta philosophy and to Hinduism-this "self," i.e. titman, is
regarded as identical with the Absolute, the ultimate Ego, and both are
equally called litman. Sometimes the latter is called paramdtman in
contrast with the former, jivdtman. Though both are different in their
attributes, parama or jiva, they are included in one and the same genus
of atman. Thus the Indians thought of an intimate relation between the
self as the substance of individuality and the reality belonging to the
ultimate self. On the contrary, such an idea was hardly established among
Western empiricist philosophers, for not until modern times is there an
investigation of "the real self" in Western philosophy.9
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A prominent tendency of Indian philosophy is often referred to as
"pantheistic." For example, according to Siil)gilya, a famous Upanishadic
thinker, the Absolute Brahman is said to be "that which is of true thought,"
"that which is of true intention," and "that whose own thought and mind
is realized as they were." Also it is said that it "performs all the activities,"
it is "endowed with all kinds of desire," and "manifests whatever is intended
by it"; therefore "it is possessed of all kinds of odor, all kinds of taste," it is
limitless in its scale, "pervades everything," moves "as quick as mind," and
"governs over all directions."
This kind of universality is not unique to Siil)gilya, and we find
a similar concept of deity in the philosophy of Xenophon. However,
Siil)gilya regarded his Absolute as being identical with the real self,
whereas Xenophon did not.
One may here naturally recall the Buddhist negation of iitman
against the orthodox iitman-theory, and this would raise the objection that
the substantial view of iitman cannot be regarded as common to the
Indians because a major religion such as Buddhism denies it. But did
Buddhism really deny iitman?
Accordi~g to the non-iitman theory expressed in the scriptures belong-
ing to the oldest phase of early Buddhism, Buddhism denies the concept
of "mine" or "my possession" (mama). Mendicants are first of all requested
to remove their affectionate hold on the concept of "mine."lo It means that
they should not harbor the idea of possession, of "mine" vs. "others."ll
This concept of renunciation and its practice have characterized Brahman-
ism since ancient times. Renunciation is described in the Vedic scriptures
as a kind of religious observance under the name of "sarvamedha." In the
earliest Upanishadic literature, a real Brahmin who realized iitman is said
to go wandering and begging, casting off desires for sons, wealth, and the
world.12 The same idea of the rejection of the concept of "mine" is also
taught in Jainism.13 And if the so-called non-iitman theory means this
rejection of the "mine"-concept, Jains must be said to have kept the idea
of "non-iitman" (nirmamatva) until later days.a
Why then is the concept of "mine" to be rejected? In giving us the
reason, the early Buddhist scriptures teach that whatever is regarded as
one's own possession is always changeable. Therefore wealth does not
belong to the self forever, and after a person's death, all the things
possessed by him and all the relatives and subordinates who are regarded
to be his possession will be separated from him. Therefore one should not
be attached to his own possessions.15 Thus, in early Buddhism, they
taught avoidance of a wrong comprehension of non-iitman as a step to the
real iitman.16 Of things not to be identified with the self, the misunder-
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standing of body as iitman is especially strongly opposed. Foolish people
comprehend their body as their own possession. l1 Even gods are captured
by this sort of infatuation so that they cannot release themselves from
suffering through transmigration.1s Buddhists of early days called this
mis-comprehension "the notion on account of the attachment to the
existence of one's body" (sakkiiyadi~~hi) and taught the abandonment of
it.19 What is therefore taught by early Buddhists is that whatever is not
litman, especially the body, should not be regarded as one's own. With the
establishment of technical terms in Buddhist philosophy, the component
elements of a body or individual thing are designated by the terms
samsklirii~ (conditionings), or paiica-skandhii~ (five groups), and using
these terms, the scriptures explain the Non-iitman theory in the
following way: "paiicakkhandhii (or samkhiirii) are to be understood as
different things (from iitman), and not as iitman."20 And in the scriptures
of a little later period, we find the following formulae often repeated:
"Form (rupa =feding, idea, volition, consciousness) is impermanent.
What is impermanent is of suffering. What is of suffering is non-iitman.
What is non-iitman is not mine, nor is it I, nor is it my iitman." Ordinary
people and philosophers superimpose the existence of iitman, or the soul,
and are seeking it. But whichever elements, mental or physical, may
compose human existence, these are not to be understood as iitman. These
elements are always changing, and hence they are unlike litman which is
permanent. Also, being accompanied by suffering, they are different from
iitman, which is the ideal perfect reality. Then what is our iitman? It cannot
be comprehended objectively. Whichever principle or function is imagined
by people to be iitman is in reality neither iitman nor that which belongs to
iitman at all. Such is the outline of the non-iitman theory of Buddhism.
Therefore early Buddhists never maintained the non-existence of iitman.
They merely opposed the substantial permanence of anyone's iitman.
As for the metaphysical question whether an absolute iitman exists or not,
early Buddhists kept silence.
On the other hand, Buddhists admitted the self (iitman) as the moral
agent and ground in the problem of responsibility for one's acts,21 for
example, when they say that one should perform one's own duty,22 or one
should be conscious about his "own good."23 Here what is meant by one's
own benefit (svattha, svahita) is neither material nor sensual but rather
the realization of truth.24 Lord Sakyamuni is said to have asked those
youths who indulge themselves in amusement "to seek after the self
(iitman)" rather than "to run after women," and advised them to become
monks. Seeking after iitman is emphasized in the Upani~ads.25 In early
Buddhism it was said that, being desirable (priya),26 iitman was to be
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loved and protected.27 This teaching corresponds to that of Yajfiavalkya.28
The ]ains, too, call themselves "iitmaviidins"29 and teach the purifica-
tion30 and protection31 of iitman.
Thus, in spite of the existence of different opinions among various
religions and philosophies with regard to the essence of iitman as the
metaphysical principle, the significance of iitman as the moral agent of
one's actions is sure to be generally admitted among the Indians. For any
religion of India, the ultimate goal of emancipation is the recovery or
discovery of one's true self. In Brahmanism, attainment of self-control
(sviiriijyam adhigacchati) is generally considered as the state of emancipa-
tion.32 Hell is said to be nothing but "the state of bondage to others."33
Buddhism specially emphasizes that "man is the master of himself."34
d
>CHAPTER 8 SUPREMACY OF THE
UNIVERSAL SELF OVER
THE INDIVIDUAL SELF
The Unlimited Extension of the Self as Revealed in Language
From these intellectual tendencies in the culture of India, there
emerges another notion, viz. the supremacy of the universal Self over the
individual self. The Self which is grasped through the way of thinking
described above is not identified with the numerable individual selves
which are regarded as only relatively separate while they coexist on the
same illusory plane of the external world. Beyond this plane of appearances
the agent or subject of action transcends the opposition or gulf between
the self and "other-than-self," because the transcendent agent cannot be
conceived as something subjective. The qualities through which it mani-
fests itself-that is, its qualitative phases-alone are emphasized. Here, it
may be noticed that this view brings out by a striking contrast the dif-
ference in the views of the self held respectively by Indian and Western
peoples. Generally it is claimed that the consciousness of self appeared at
the beginning of the modern age. However, in some respects, it had
appeared previously among the Western peoples of classical antiquity.
The Romans of antiquity, having conceived each self as endowed with
the same capacity as other selves, weighed all things respectively on the
basis of their own selves. In the Latin language, the expression "ego et tun
(I and you) is used in order to refer to "one's self and others" at the same
time.! In Japanese, this is a very impolite way of addressing others or one's
opponent, while in Latin it is a rather usual expression. The Romans neither
accepted the spiritual supremacy of another's self over one's self, not set
up a distinction of social standing between one's self and another's.
Even gods and superiors were addressed only by the pronoun of the
second person "tu." This is also true in the Greek language. Hence in
Western languages of ancient times honorific expressions are few. On
the other hand, most Indian people are destitute of any acute awareness
that the self of others is distinct from one's self. In India the tendency is
not to regard another's self as an independent subject of action opposed
to one's self.
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This attitude of Indian thinkers is manifest in the usage of the San-
skrit language, as seen in the way they often employ a particular kind of
causative mood. For example, kiirayati (to cause to do), a causative mood
of karoti (to do), is often used in Indian languages. However, in Western
languages of ancient times there is no usage corresponding to the causative
mood. When one wants to express a causal relation in the Latin language,
he has to use a complicated formula, e.g. "cogo (duco, permitto) ut +
subjunctive." Accordingly, in the Sanskrit language the causative mood is
often used, in order to express a certain situation, while in the Western
languages of ancient times very complicated expressions must be employed
in order to show the same meaning. Here, two examples will be given:
kathatp sa puru~a~ . ... katp ghiitayati hanti kam (that man ... how
can he slay or cause to slay-whom?) (Bhag. G., II, 21) =quomodo is
homo quempiam aut aliorum ministerio, aut sua manu occidat? = ?TW~
O~TO~ oi'76~(T£Tat, W~ ~UTO~ avatp£t, ~ atno~ ytv£Tat ~vatp£6~vat;naiva kurvan
na kiirayan (not in the least acting nor causing to act) (Bhag. G., V. 13)
= neque ipse agens, neque aliis agendi auctor =P.~T·~UTO~ ?TpaTTWv, p.~t
aAAOt~ ai:'no~ ytv6p.£vo~ Toli ?TPI1.TT£tV.
When' the expression "to cause others to . . ." is used in Greek and
Latin, various attitudes of others toward one's self are taken into account,
and then only after these are expressed is the causal expression used.
Therefore, the causative mood "to cause someone to . . ." is formed by
using various verbs according to the pattern of behavioral relations between
"someone spoken to" and the speaker. In contrast with this the action of
another's self is manifested as an extension of action by one's self. The
Indian people, who frequently use the causative mood, are very often
unconscious of the distinction between the actions of one's self as narrator,
and of another self, the person addressed. Accordingly, in the Sanskrit
language, there are even some cases where the meaning of the causative
mood of a verb is not different from the indicative mood. For example,
dhiirayati (to cause to hold) is actually used as having the same meaning
as dharati (he holds).
These cases become rather striking in the Piili and Prakrit languages.
Generally in these languages, the opponent, when caused to do something,
is expressed by the accusative case, but when regarded as a means of action,
is expressed by the instrumental case.2 In this case, he is not regarded as
possessed of intrinsic personal value, but only as an instrument or means;
therefore, he may be denoted by the instrumental case, and because he is
nothing but an instrument, the causative mood of a verb is actually
identified with its active mood in such cases.
There is a tendency for the Indian to be concerned with an unlimited
extension of the will or volition in place of a more finite human relation.
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In such a case the subject or agent is sometimes omitted. On describing
the process of personal and mental experience, the Indian people do not
use a personal pronoun or a term which corresponds to "one" or "man" in
English. The subject is denoted only by using a verb;3 e.g., gacchet
(should go) can take practically any subject (he, anyone, etc.).
In the social circumstance where the will's unrestricted extension
might be materialized in another person, those who are coerced to act by
this will are dependent upon that other person. This circumstance gives
rise to honorific usage in addressing that person, although it has not been
so highly developed in India as in Japan. However, there are some honor-
ific words which belong to pronouns of the second person.4 On the other
hand, the Greek and Latin languages do not possess any honorific words
(bhavan = ~v aUTO" tu ipse, Bhag. G., I, 8). We find in Indian epics
that the pronoun of the second person "you" is permitted to refer to a
younger person or one's contemporary but not to a senior or higher ranked
person, and one is not permitted to call the latter by his real name.5 Like-
wise in sacred writings of early Buddhism, it is noteworthy that those who
were lower in their caste never called the Kshatriyas (members of the
ruling class) by pronouns of the second person or by their real names.6
The Continuity of One's Self and Other Selves
Although the people of India are concerned with the unlimited exten-
sion of the self, as seen in their forms of expression, it is also undeniable
that they do not ignore the personality of others; on .the whole, they
characteristically show a high regard for others. The early Buddhist writings
and other doctrines urge everyone to pay respect to others at all times.7 We
can only suppose that they did not consider others as other selves or as
opponents of one's self. In other words, they conceived the idea that
other selves become one with the self as an extension of the self. The
aphorism: "Buddha's identification with the self and the self's identifica-
tion with the Buddha," stated in Tantric Buddhism, is based on the view
of the continuity of one's self with other selves which the Indian people
commonly conceive.
Here we have a striking contrast with the familiar view held by an-
cient as well as modern Western people who hold that other selves are
hostile counterparts of one's self or stand in opposition to it. One can find
any number of passages which reveal this kind of view in the writings of
Western people: "War is the father of all things" (1T6AfP.O' 1TaT~p 1Tll.VTWV-
Herakleitos); "Man is a wolf to others" (Homo homini lupus-Plautus);
"If you wish for peace, prepare for fighting" (si vis pacem, para bellum).
Even in modern times the natural condition of human beings is compre-
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hended as "A war of all against all" (bellum omnium contra omnes-
Hobbes).
From ancient times, the Westerner's view of life has been rather
aggressive. In Western history peace was gained largely as a result of bitter
struggles. It is not a continually standing peace but the aftermath and
interlude of ravages of war. On the other hand, in India, peace was
eternal and the soul's tranquility the highest end. Of course, wars occurred
time after time in India; however, on many occasions only lords and their
mercenary soldiers fought in war, while ordinary people did not join them.
In some cases, farmers near the battlefield cultivated their lands without
fear and without worrying about it.8 Hence in the agricultural districts of
India, peaceful religious ceremonies and customs of a thousand years
ago, or more, have been conveyed to the present time almost without
sustaining any changes. Generally speaking, the character of the Indians is
obedient and remarkably opposed to aggressiveness. Naturally they want
and love a calm and peaceful life. As Indian history affords a proof of this
view, it is difficult to find instances in which Indians invaded countries
outside of India.9
Generally, the Indians have not cultivated the idea of hating other
people. The Aryans conquered other Indian peoples and incorporated
them into their community as their slaves; but they did not treat their slaves
with much cruelty and did not drive them very hard. Megasthenes the
Greek writes, in his record of his personal experience in India, that it is a
marvellous fad that all men of India are free people and among them
moral equality (llT6T1j") prevails.10 Sudra, a man of the lowest of the four
castes in the ancient society of India, is commonly interpreted as "slave";
however siidra denotes a kind of social standing. Accordingly, siidras are
not identified with the "slaves" of Western society who were treated badly
and driven to hard work. It is thought that some siidras were only engaged
as individuals at work in some Aryan's family. Accordingly, in the eyes of
a Greek, slaves did not exist in the ancient society of India.
In the ancient languages of India there is no pronoun which denotes
the public or a mass of people in contrast with an individual, a pronoun
which indicates the common subject, as e.g. "man" in German,l1 because
the Indians did not regard the individual self in opposition to another
self. Therefore, in order to indicate the common subject, generally the
active voice of third person singular is used. If necessary, sa (he), nara
(man), puru~a (person), and loka (world) are substituted. Conversely,
comparing the old language of India with Western languages, this fact
shows that, for the sentence whose subject is man, the active voice of the
third person singular is commonly substituted in the former language. In
d
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India, it is common in this connection for a proposition to have a universal
as its subject; it is rather exceptional that the individual is its subject.
This fact exhibits a tendency to attach importance to the universal self
beyond the individual self who comprehends it.
To cite an example of the ways of thinking of the Indians, people or
men as subject of a sentence are, in many cases, stated in the singular
form, and then its predicate becomes singular. For instance, ayam pajaI2
(whose form is singular) means "these men." In the ancient language of
India, jana (meaning "people") is predicated in the singular form;13 on
the other hand, people in English takes a predicate in the plural form.
In the ancient languages of the West, even though a nation or group is
stated in the singular form, its predicate is expressed in the plural form.14
This linguistic mode is inherited even in German.15 Therefore, in the
West not only modern people but also Greeks and Romans had a clear
idea that the subject of action was an aggregate of individuals, while in
India there was a strong tendency to regard the subject of action as a
group or united body. Thus, in Western society each individual has an
intrinsic value, and each individual opinion becomes the object of public
attention. Such passages as "quat homines, tot sententiae" (there are as
many thoughts as men) or "vox populi, vox Dei" (the voice of people is
the voice of God) are characteristic of this society. The Indians, on the
contrary, emphasize that as a member of the united body, i.e. of humanity,
each individual is worthy of love and respect.
The distinctive feature of Indian thought that the individual self is
not to be discriminated ultimately from other selves is acknowledged also
by another linguistic phenomenon, the fact that the desiderative mood is
often used in India. On a few occasions, an independent word which
means "to desire" is used,t6 but, on the whole, the desiderative mood is
preferred when the meaning "to desire to do .. ." is required. The de-
siderative mood is formed by a special conjugation of the verb. (As its
derivative, the noun form is also used.) For instance, in order to express
"he desires to live," two verbs, "to desire" and "to live," are required in the
ancient languages of the West as well as in Japanese, while in the Sanskrit
language a desiderative conjugation "jujivi~ati" is used.17 In the latter
language, "to desire" is grasped only as a case of the verb "to live," just as
the future conjugation denotes only an action "to come." Therefore, in the
West, the desire for action is comprehended as different from the action
itself, since it depends upon the free will of the subject of action whether
he desires to act or not, while in Indian, the desire for action is seen to be
only an annexed action of the subject of that action.
Outside of the desiderative mood, in order to express "I hope he
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may... ." for instance, in the Latin language "raga ut vivat" (= Je
veux bien qu'il vive) (I hope he may live) is used; in the Sanskrit language,
on the contrary, "(api nama) jivet" is simply used.18
Even in everyday practical life the idea of non-discrimination between
the self and the other selves appears. According to Megasthenes, the
Greek ambassador to India from Syria (c. 300 B.C.), the Indians did not
ask for a bond when they lent money to others.
In brief, the Indians are not possessed of any very conscious reflection
that the desires of one's self will meet with the antagonistic reaction of
others. It is the idea of non-discrimination that underlies their attitude to
all men.
About this way of thinking, Hegel says: "Intellectual substantiality
(of the Indians) is the opposite of the reflection, reason, and subjective
individuality of the Europeans. For us Western people, it is the important
thing that, in accordance with his own nature, the individual ego desires,
knows, believes, or considers something as he pleases, and on that freedom
immeasurable value is subjectively placed. On the contrary, the intellect's
substantiality stands on the other pole, and there the subjectivity of the
self comes 'to lose its significance. For this subjectivity, all objective things
come to be meaningless, and moreover there is neither objective truth nor
duty nor right. The result is that only subjective falsehood remains."19
Obviously, it is a misunderstanding on the part of Hegel that the Indians
have no conception of either objective truth or of duty and right. The
fact is that many scientific discoveries and moral conceptions were formu-
lated in India. However, it is an obvious fact that the Indians seek their
religious and moral ideal by effacing the subjectivity of the self. It is on
the basis of this way of thinking that absolute unlimited devotion is
emphasized in the PuraI)as of Hinduism and the Jatakas of Buddhism.
It has been the ideal of the Indians to attain the state of non-discrimination
between the self and other selves.19"
Consciousness of the Existence of the Self
Then would it be right to say that in India, where the idea of the
continuity of one's self and others' selves is generally accepted, no attempt
has been made by its thinkers to prove the existence of the self? No, on the
contrary, in ancient times the thinkers of India were already engaged in the
study of self-consciousness and the demonstration of its existence. But
their way of conceiving the self is quite different from the more analytical
methods used by modern European philosophers.
The Vaise~ika philosophers20 asserted that the existence of the atman
or the self can be known by intuitive perception. According to Upavar~a21
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and other Vedantic philosophers, the existence of the litman cannot be
known by inference or demonstration, nor can it be accepted on the
authority of scriptural statements. But the iitman is known to exist intui-
tively through the notion that every individual person entertains towards
his own self. Really the litman is known to exist from the very fact that
"a man is conscious of his own self."22 Because anyone can have ideas about
himself, like "I get thinner" or "I perceive this," we cannot deny the
existence of the iitman or the agent which makes him have such ideas. In
a later period, the Kumarila school in the MlmaJ!lsa system continued
this idea of Upavar~a, claiming immediate perception of the litman. And
it was on this point that this school was distinguished from the Prabhakara
school of the same system. 23 In accord with what we have observed above,
we can say that the assertions concerning the iitman by the ancient Indian
thinkers are very similar to the view of the self which Western thinkers
like Augustine, Descartes, Fichte, and Hegel came to hold through their
study of self-consciousness.
It should be noted, however, that in India the litman is generally
understood to mean not only the individual ego but also the Brahman or
the Universal Self. The Hindu thinkers were inclined to make a big leap
in their reasoning; they assume that the existence of the Universal Self
is known directly from the existence of the individual self. For instance,
8amkara, the prominent eighth-century Indian philosopher, makes the
following statement in one of his books: "Moreover the existence of Brah-
man is known on the ground of its being the Self of everyone. For everyone
is conscious of the existence of (his) Self, and never thinks 'I am not.' If
the existence of the Self were not known, everyone would think 'I am not.'
And this Self (of whose existence all are conscious) is Brahman."24 And
as to the existence of the Self (iitman), 8amkara writes as follows: "[The
existence of the Self cannot be denied]; since that very person who might
deny it, is the Self."25 In another part, he gives a full explanation of the
existence of the Self. "Just because it (the Self) is the Self, it is impossible
for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable of refutation. For the
(knowledge of the) Self is not, in any person's case, adventitious, and is
not established through the so-called means of right knowledge; it is
rather self-established. The Self does indeed employ perception and the
other means of right knowledge for the purpose of establishing previously
non-established objects of knowledge; for nobody assumes that such
thin~s as other selves can be self-established independently of the means
of right knowledge. But the Self, as the abode of the mind-function that
acts through the means of right knowledge, is itself established previously
to that function. And to refute such a self-established entity is impossible.
An adventitious thing, indeed, may be refuted, but not that which is the
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essential nature (of him who attempts the refutation); for it is the essential
nature of him who refutes. The heat of a fire is not refuted (i.e. sublated)
by the fire itself. Let us further consider the relation expressed in the
following clauses: 'I know at the present moment whatever is present; I
knew (at former moments) the nearer and the remoter past; I shall know
(in the future) the nearer and remoter future.' Here the object of knowl-
edge changes accordingly as it is something past or something future or
something present; but the knowing agent does not change, since his
nature is eternal presence. And as the nature of the Self is 'eternal
presence,' it cannot undergo destruction even when the body is reduced
to ashes; nay, we cannot even conceive that it ever should become
something different from what it is."26 In another part, Sarhkara also says
that the interior Self (pratyagiitman) is "the object of the notion of the
Ego (asmaspratyayavi~aya)" and is well known to exist on account of its
"immediate intuitive presentation (aparo~a)."27
Apparently Sarhkara was influenced by the idea of Upavar~a. But,
starting from the latter's standpoint, Sarhkara developed his unique system
of thought. According to him, the demonstration of the existence of the
Self only proves the existence of the individual embodied self which is
the agent of our consciousness, but the existence of the Highest Self or
the Brahman cannot be known directly from this demonstration. The
Highest Self is not the object of the notion of the ego, for it surpasses all
the elements that the individual self has. What can be perceived by the
individual self is limited only to the things of the phenomenal world.
So Sarhkara says: "It is only this principle of self-consciousness (ahamk-
artr), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in all cognition,
which accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results."28 Strictly speaking,
the agent that has the power to cause the notion of "the ego" is the buddhi
within the individual self. "If the buddhi has the power of an agent, it
must be admitted that it is also the object of self-consciousness (ahampra-
tyaya), since we see that everywhere activity is preceded by self-conscious-
ness, '1 go, 1 come, 1 eat, 1 drink,' etc."29 According to Sarhkara, it is the
buddhi within the individual self that causes the notion of the ego and
effects all action in practical existence. The Highest Self, on the other
hand, shares no Ego-Consciousness that the individual self has. It is not
the object of the notion of the ego, nor is it the agent that causes the notion
of the ego. It surpasses all these elements. It is absolute and indivisible. It
is so-called absolute knowing. It is beyond the perception of all ordinary
people, but it reveals itself to a Yogic ascetic in the state of self-nullifying
concentration (samriidhana).
"Neither from that part of the Veda which enjoins works (vidhikii-
tt4a) nor from reasoning does anybody apprehend that the soul (puru~a),
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different from the agent that is the object of self-consciousness, merely
witnesses that which is permanent in all transitory beings; uniform; one;
eternally unchanging; the Self of everything."30 As we can observe in this
quotation from samkara, the Highest Self in his sense is beyond the notion
of the ego held by the individual self. We should not forget, however, that
in his thought the Highest Self is understood to be identical ultimately
with the individual self which is known to exist on the ground that every
man has an undeniable knowledge of his own existence. Samkara
succeeded and relied upon Upavar~a's idea of the Self, but he went
further than his predecessor and established his own unique system of
thought.
To the present day, samkara's philosophy has been accepted by most
of the traditional orthodox scholars (PaJ/~its) of India. And his idea
about the Self can rightly claim to be the representative view of most
Indian people. Furthermore, similar views are observed in the theological
assertions of modern Hinduism. The Cartesian proposition cogito, ergo sum
was conceived in Hindu philosophy in a way quite different from the
individualistic European view. The Self or the Atman in the Indian
concept does not simply mean that individual souls populate this phe-
nomenal world, each one claiming itself to be distinct from others in spite
of its substantial homogeneity with others. But, by the Atman, Indians
imply also the Self hidden behind the competing individual souls, or more
properly speaking, the Absolute Self shared by every individual soul. In
many Indian books of philosophy and religion, the Self means the Absolute
Highest Self as well as the individual self. As the form of the word
(sol-ips-ism) indicates to us, solipsism in the Western sense is the concept
of "Only I am." On the other hand, as a result of their unique concept
of the Self, the atmavada or the Indian theory of the Self-only emphasizes
the oneness of all beings in the universe.
As we have seen above, Indians acknowledge the Highest Self as
being the substratum of the individual soul. It is natural, therefore, that
they insist on the oneness or identity of the two. The relation of the
individual self and the Highest Self is one of the major problems for
philosophers in India, each working out his own conclusions.
Here we shall limit ourselves to the fact that the idea of the avatara
or incarnation is also based on this concept of non-duality between the
individual self and the Highest Self. The avatara is the idea that for the
salvation of living creatures the Supreme God emerges in this world in
the incarnate form of man or animal. In India, this idea of incarnation is
most remarkably expressed in the Purt'i1;Zas and subsequent works. In
these works, they relate the multiple avataras of Vi~l/u, though the stories
of incarnation of other gods like Siva and Indra are also abundant. The
102 INDIA
number of ViglU's manifestations is said to be variously six, ten, twelve,
sixteen, twenty-two or twenty-three, and is not definitely fixed. Generally
the Hindu religionists count the following ten as the avatiiras of ViglU:
fish, tortoise, boar, man-lion, pigmy, Rima with the axe, the strong Rama,
Kr~~a, the Buddha, and Kalki. Vi~~u, taking those forms, subjugates evil,
saves living beings and stands for Brahmanism. In Buddhism, too, the
Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas are supposed to have the magical power of
revealing themselves in various forms for the salvation of suffering
creatures. For instance, they say that the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara
possessed thirty-three manifestations.
In India, where people hold such a non-dualistic view, monotheism
in the Western sense has never come into being. In the Upani~ads and
in the philosophical assertion of the Vedantins, the Absolute Being is
assumed to be an impersonal spiritual principle without any limiting
attribute. But, because such an abstract principle is far from appropriate
as an object of worship for the common people, they desired ardently to
have an anthropomorphic god in place of the abstract principle. And as
Hinduism supplemented its system by a religious order, one of the gods
like Vi~~u;Siva, or Kr~na came to be worshipped as the Highest Absolute
Being. All the gods other than the Supreme One are supposed to be His
avatiiras. Thus, the Indian worship of the One Supreme God at the same
time retains a coloring of pantheism. Indians combine whole-hearted
devotional faith together with mysticism of a high intellectual level. And
in their religious systems, the element of refined spiritual introspection is
mixed with that of primitive vulgar ritual. Indians, however, feel no
sense of contradiction in this existence of antagonistic elements in one
system. In their way of thinking, these elements can be embraced in one
big unity. Here, it can be said that metaphysical monism in their basic
way of thinking is aimed to justify this mixture of different elements.
Ethics of the Non-duality of One's Self and Other Selves
When most Indians think that each self is essentially identical with
others and that the distinction of persons is merely a matter of phenomenal
form, it is natural that they look upon the state of non-duality of one's
self and others' selves as the ideal. In the Upani~ads they teach, "All this
thou art,"3! or "I am Brahman."32 And these statements form the core of
their ethics. Both Brahmanism and Hinduism are founded on the basis of
this view of non-dualism.
The philosophical standpoint of Buddhism was considerably different
from that of Brahmanism. Buddhism adopted rather the pluralistic view.
Buddhists do not acknowledge the individual soul as a metaphysical
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entity, so that they attach no importance to the consideration of the relation
between a self and other selves. But their ethical ideal has been to remove
the barriers among different ages. As we have already seen, Buddhism
prescribed that men in the monastic order (Samgha) live as one body with-
out any personal discrimination. Here, we can say that the Indian view of
non-dualism between one and others takes another form of expression in
Buddhism. This opinion still prevails in present-day Southern Buddhism.
Reverend U. Thittila, a spiritual leader of Southern Buddhists, explaining
the fundamental principle of friendliness (mettii), says: "It is mettii which
attempts to break all the barriers separating one from another. There is no
reason to keep aloof from others merely because they belong to another
religious persuasion or nationality. The true Buddhist exercises himself
with all, making no distinction whatsoever with regard to caste, color,
class, or sex."33 Mahayana philosophers also taught that in the ultimate
state one can reach the "transformation of one's neighbor into one's ego
(pariitma-parivartana)."34 Things being so, the union of one with others
is the ideal in the practical ethics of the Mahayana Buddhists. In the
final stage of Indian Buddhism it was claimed that everything is Buddha.35
According to most Indians, respect for life, which is found in any
living being, can be logically deduced from non-dualism. Non-violence
(ahimsa) is often described as the supreme virtue (parama-dharma).S6
Buddhism teaches Not-killing, and most Buddhists extend this prescrip-
tion to animals. The altruistic virtues and duties have men's respect and
help each other to work out their respective spiritual ideals. Every
individual, every living being, thus comes to be regarded as a sacred
center of potential value, deserving of respect and possessing freedom for
progress toward its goal of perfection.
An Indian explanation on this point is as follows: "Insofar as the
individual is a self, it is a distinct reality; its spiritual freedom is the ultimate
end to which its entire life's activities should be directed. But insofar as
the self is embodied, and all its activities are through the body, subtle and
gross, and the body is an inseparable member and product of the world of
Nature, out of which the bodies of other selves also have evolved, there is
an indissoluble bond between the embodied individual and all other such
individuals forming the social corpus."31
In Indian religious schools, a man is urged to work for "the interests
of the public as well as of himself."38 For Indians, truth (satya) means
nothing other than the good of all living beings (bhutahita).39 They think
that the good of oneself and others can be realized through one's act of
love and mercy. They say, "Benevolence (maitr'i) brings happiness and
ease to people,"40 or "Even gods make a respectful salutation to merciful
(dayii) persons."41 The virtue of benevolence is especially emphasized by
1°4 INDIA
the Buddhists. They teach that we should abandon hatred against others.
"For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time: hatred ceases by love,
this is an old rule."42 And they urge us to be compassionate to others, men
and all other living beings. "As a mother at the risk of her life watches
over her own child, so also let everyone cultivate a boundless (friendly)
mind towards all beings."43 In another place, they teach that we should
render to others a service greater than what we get from our parents and
from our relatives.44 This idea of benevolence was developed further at the
time of the Mahayana Buddhists.
This trait of benevolence brought about an important effect on some
social and economic problems. In the West capital punishment was not
necessarily regarded as bad by Christians. Luther, for example, while
explicitly condoning the hangman as exercising a tolerable Christian
vocation, condemned the late medieval usurers and speculators.45 Buddhists
of ancient India, on the other hand, while tolerating money-lending on
the basis of reasonable rate, excluded the hangman and the butcher from a
list of justified vocations. (This does not hold true of Buddhism in other
countries.)
The ideal of love and mercy forms one of the characteristics of Indian
thought. Some Westerners recently, however, seem not to have fully
realized the true nature of this Indian idea. Consciously or not, they hold
biased views. And those Western views are accepted without due considera-
tion by the Japanese. To quote Bergson as an example: "Not that Buddhism
ignored charity. On the contrary it recommended it in the most exalted
terms. And it joined example to precept. But it lacked warmth and glow.
As a religious historian very justly puts it, it knew nothing 'of the
complete and mysterious gift of self. . . .' That enthusiastic charity, that
mysticism comparable to the mysticism of Christianity, we find in a
Ramakrishna or a Vivekananda, to take only the most recent ex-
amples. But Christianity, and this is just the point, have come into the
world in the interval. . . . But let us suppose even that the direct action of
Christianity, as a dogma, has been practically nil in India. Since it has
impregnated the whole of Western civilization, one breathes it like a
perfume, in everything which this civilization brings in its wake. In-
dustrialism itself, as we shall try to prove, springs indirectly from it. And
it was industrialism, it was our Western civilization, which unloosed the
mysticism of a Ramakrishna or a Vivekananada."46
This view of Bergson can be safely taken as one of the common
views of Indian religion held among very many Westerners. But, contrary
to Bergson's contention, various manuscripts and edicts of ancient India
and the records of the foreigners who travelled through the country all
present detailed descriptions of the political and social movements of the
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ancient Indians which were all based on the idea of benevolence. Bergson,
either for lack of knowledge of the historical facts or because of his
presumption that complete mysticism appeared only among the Christian
mystics, is led to erroneous conclusions about Indian social movements.
As historical evidence reveals to us and as the historians confirm,
the so-called social welfare policy or charity movement began in Asia
earlier than in the Western world. Law books of the ancient Brahmanists
refer to many social facilities. And the sacred books of the Buddhists of
the earliest time tell us that the kings during Buddha's lifetime, under
his influence, advocated a social policy for the welfare of the general
public. King Asoka (c. 250 B.C.) promoted social welfare policy on a still
larger scale. He had strong faith in Buddhism and he made efforts to effect
rules in conformity with the teachings of the Buddha. He taught the
people that magical acts of spell and rites are useless and he persuaded
them to have faith in Buddhism. He prohibited people from killing living
creatures in the name of sport and from castrating animals. He built charity
houses to relieve the poor and went so far as to establish hospitals even
for animals. He encouraged the cultivation of medical plants. He protected
the minority tribes in the remote regions. He granted amnesty to prisoners.
King Asoka's social policy, based on the teachings of the Buddha, was
carried on by the Indian people of later periods, and the tradition lasted
for a long time.47
The charity movement in the West began at a later date. In one of
his historical works, Vincent A. Smith quotes Sir H. Burdett's statement
as follows: "[In the West], no establishments for the relief of the sick
were founded until the reign of Constantine (A.D. 306-37). Late in the
fourth century Basil founded a leper hospital at Caesarea, and St. Chrys-
ostom established a hospital at Constantinople. A law of Justinian (A.D.
527-62) included hospitals among the ecclesiastical institutions. The
Maison Dieu or Hotel Dieu of Paris is sometimes alleged to be the oldest
European hospital. It dates from the seventh century."48 In Greek philoso-
phy, there was no element encouraging the development of social welfare
services and any charity movement. The Indians are in fact the people
who first established the spiritual and social tradition of public welfare
service. (We should not forget, however, the fact that the social movement
in India was later doomed to stagnation while the Western movement
showed remarkable progress especially in the modern age. This problem
will be dealt with on another occasion.)
The religious leaders in modern India have been striving to restore
the spiritual tradition of their ancestors. Romain Rolland writes as follows:
"Usually in European thought 'to serve' implies a feeling of voluntary
debasement or humility. It is the 'Dienen, dienen' of Kundry in Parsifal.
106 INDIA
This sentiment is completely absent from the Vedantism of Vivekananda.
To serve, to love, is to become equal to the one served or loved. Far from
abasement, Vivekananda always regarded it as the fulfillment of life."49
The Indian leaders of national movements emulate Ghandi whose life
was in turn guided by the strong religious faith of love and service
exemplified by Vivekananda. The tradition of non-dualism of self and
other selves continues to shape the attitudes of millions of Indians today.
CHAPTER 9 SUBSERVIENCE TO
UNIVERSALS
>
Subservience to Universals as Revealed in Language
As we have seen, most Indians attach greater importance to universals
than to individuals and, with respect to action, they hold the view that
one's self is immersed in and identical with others. For Indians, the acts
of individuals are not of great importance; they tend to emphasize the
power of the universal Being which transcends individuals.
This feature of the Indian way of thinking is revealed in their lan-
guage. In Sanskrit, to describe an act of a person, one is likely to write in
the passive as well as in the reflexive form (Atmanepada). In the Vedic
language, the active form is preferred, as in Western writings. But, in the
classical Sanskrit, the passive form began to be used instead, and this tend-
ency grew stronger as time passed. In Sanskrit, even intransitive verbs
have their passive forms. As a consequence, there are in Sanskrit a great
number of passive sentences used impersonally;1 e.g. karmm:zo hy api
boddhavyam (Bhag. G., IV, 16) = Tt ll'lUTt TO 71'paKTiov ••• lyw o!lla =
tum ad opus omnino est attendum; kair maya saha yoddhavyam (Bhag. G.
I, 22) = Tt ot Il~ poOL uvpo71'Aa/(~vaL = quibuscum mihi pugnandum. These
two sentences may be respectively translated into English as: "For one must
understand the nature of action"; and "With whom must I fight?"
Sanskrit sentences are written impersonally in the passive mood: the
subject is not stated. In the dominant Vedantist view of the Indians, an
act is not ascribed to a particular subject primarily, but is regarded as a
changing phenomenon caused by many conditioning factors, and the sub-
ject of the action is only one of many factors. It can be said, therefore, that
the Indian preference for propositions stated impersonally in the passive
form shows a feature of their way of thinking which places importance on
unrevealed and hidden power, rather than on the spontaneity of overt
individual action.
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The Extension of the Subject of Action
As a result of this characteristic of Indian thought which refuses to
acknowledge a fixed and substantial subject of action, the moral status of
the individual self became a problem, and gave rise to many ideas. The
Buddhists theory of "non-self" (aniitman) is one of the oldest of such ideas.
Buddhists, as we have seen, do not necessarily deny the existence of the
Atman itself. But, they refuse to recognize any permanent subject of action
whether it is the Atman or not. The idea of "non-self" is generally
supposed to be a concept unique to Buddhism, but there are in India
other schools of thought having a similar view. A sentence in the Maitii-
Upani~ad (3. 2.) for instance, reads as follows: "Like a bird trapped in
the net, (the individual ego) binds itself thinking 'It is I (aham)' or 'it is
Mine (mama).''' And it exhorts man to free himself from all bondage.
The Bhagavadgitii (2. 71) also teaches man not to cling to one's ego saying:
"The man who casts off all desires and walks without desire, with no
thought of a Mine (nirmama) or of an I (nirahankiira) comes unto
peace."2 A theory of "non-self" is also found in a book of the Samkhya
where we' read that the individual soul (puru~a) is delivered from
attachments when it has attained "the pure and complete wisdom" that "I
am not; (Nothing) is mine; and (Nothing) is 1."3 The Samkhya supposes
the Puru~a, which is identical to the Atman, to be a unique metaphysical
principle. On this point, their doctrine is in essence quite different from the
Buddhist theory of "non-self." However, so far as the expression of their
doctrine is concerned, they are very close to the Buddhists. Bhartrhari, in
his metaphysical study of the Word, asserts a kind of "non-self" theory.
According to him, the Word is the subject of cognition-the Atman or
the Absolute Being. And just as one projects one's image on the wall,
the Word, which is the subject of cognition, projects itself objectively on
the screen within itself and perceives its own image, viz. the Word as the
object. This is cognition in Bhartrhari's sense. What serves as the screen
in the case of the Word is the internal organ (anta~karaJ:za) which
performs the apperceptive function (buddhi). The Buddhi is in reality
no more than the screen reflecting the image of Absolute Being and has
no active power in itself. In short, cognition is understood to be only one
phase of the self-evolving process of the Absolute Being-of the
Word which divides itself into two parts, one as the subjective knower
and the other as the object, and unfolds itself in a process of mutual
interrelation. Bhartrhari explains action in the same way as he explains
cognition.4 This may be considered an expression of the "non-self" theory.
It is erroneous to maintain that the idea of "non-self" and ideas
similar to it are popular in India apart from its metaphysical thinkers.
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However, it should be noted that in no other country has the idea of
"non-self" developed into such various forms as we see in India where a
metaphysical way of thinking pervades the spiritual background for the
growth of such ideas.
Because they were apt to suppose that the action of an individual is
supervised and regulated by an invisible power so that the action, having
no creative function in itself, is no more than an attribute of the self,
most Indians have been inclined to take a submissive attitude toward
their fate and conditions. The ideas of Karma and Samsiira are still
deeply imbedded in the minds of most Indian people. And a man of a
lowly family in India is likely to be resigned to his fate, simple expecting
to be reborn under more favorable circumstances in the next life. And here
it is assumed that the ultimate subject of action is not the individual but
a Reality beyond and above the individual.
Because of their basic emphasis on a super-individual Being, Indians
assert that the idea or action of a person is universally valid if it conforms
to the True and Universal Law. And it does not matter for them whose
idea or action it is.
It is not seldom in India that a book and its commentary are published
at the same time; not infrequently, the two are composed by one and the
same author. Indians claim that their books, which reveal the eternal
truth, deserve to be handed down to posterity for ages without modification.
And commentaries are necessary in order to make others understand the
truth expounded in their books. For ancient Indian scholars, therefore, it
was never regarded as strange to write commentaries on their own works.
In India there are many forged manuscripts, though there are, of
course, many such also in China and in Western countries. But far exceed-
ing anything like it in other countries, there exist in India a great many
books claiming to be the works of ancient saints. Almost all the religious
scriptures which mention the names of the authors are spurious documents.
This sort of forgery is understandable in the light of the tendency of most
Indians toward self-effacement and philosophical minimization of the
importance of unique individuals. All the Mahayana texts claim unduly
to be "the Buddha's discourse." They are forgeries in the sense that they
were not expounded directly from the Buddha's own mouth. Even the
texts of the Buddhists of earlier days, nearly all of them, were in reality
completed after the Buddha's death by his followers. But all of them
claim to be "the Buddha's discourse." Then, the question arises, how
could the ancient Buddhists make such claims without damaging their
moral conscience?
It is natural for the Buddhist devotees to assume that the Buddha's
teachings are absolutely authentic. King Asoka stated in one of his Edicts
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that "whatever the Buddha taught is a good teaching."5 The Buddhists
after the death of the Buddha went further and asserted that any idea
insofar as it is good and correct is the Buddha's teaching. The A1iguttara-
Nikiiya reads as follows: .
"Imagine, 0 King, a great heap of grain near some village or market-
town, from which country folk carry away corn on poles or in baskets, in
lap or hand. And if one should approach the folk and question them
saying: 'Whence bring you this corn?' how would those folk, in explaining,
best explain?"
'They would best explain the matter, sir, by saying: 'We bring it
from that great heap of grain.' "
"Even so, 0 King, whatsoever be well spoken, all that is the word of
the Exalted One, Arahant, the Fully Awakened One, wholly based
thereon is both what we and others say."6
The ancient Buddhists thought that whatever is true should and
must have been taught by the· Buddha. Thus, it is not surprising that
most Indians were not concerned with the identity of the authors; their
only concern was whether or not a certain work expounds the truth. Be-
cause the Buddha is any man who realizes the truth perfectly, any book
containing the truth is rightly assumed to be the Buddha's teaching. Thus,
we see why the ancient Indian Buddhists had no feeling of guilt in
claiming the title of "the Buddha's discourse" for their own works.7
In India there are many anonymous books. The authors did not like
to record their names on their own works. There is no need, they thought,
to attach the name of a particular author so long as the book conveys the
universal truth. In fact, the forged documents and anonymous books in
India are both expressions of one basic characteristic of their way of
thinking.
In India the biographies of those who expounded the truth is
completely ignored. The word buddha is not a proper noun. It means "the
enlightened one" in general. Anyone who has realized the truth is buddha.
And Gotama the Buddha, the historical founder of Buddhism, is one of
many enlightened ones. Since the oldest period of their history, Buddhists
had faith in the Seven Buddhas of the Past-Gotama Sakyamuni and the
six Buddhas preceding him.s In later periods, faith in the twenty-four
Buddhas was cherished by them. Mahayana Buddhists came to think
that there exist numerous Buddhas in all directions and throughout the
past, present, and future. Together with this idea of the multiplicity of
Buddhas, a new idea appeared which, as we see in the Lotus Siltra of the
Mahayana, asserts that the Buddha had attained enlightenment many
Kalpas (aeons) before his awakening under the Bo-Tree of Buddha-gaya.
The ]ains hold a similar idea. They believe in the twenty-three saints
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preceding Mahavlra. Both the Buddhists and the Jains respect Gotama
and Mahavira as the founders of their religions; and at the same, they claim
that their religions have their origin in the past long before the days of
their historical founders. This attitude of the Indians toward their religions
presents a remarkable contrast to the case of the unique personal God of
Christianity as an historical individual.
Reverence for Universal Standards in Behavior
As a result of their inclination to submit themselves to a universal
Being, Indians harbor an ardent desire to have direct relations with the
Absolute and refuse to have any intermediate agent. They assert that the
salvation of one's soul should be attained only by one's own efforts without
relying upon others. In the philosophy of Brahmanism, regarding the
emancipation of the soul, it is taught that a man who has realized the
truth of the universe "gets into his own Self by dint only of his Sel£.9
And Buddhists, though they do not engage in any metaphysical considera-
tion of "the Self" (Atman), acknowledge its moral significance as the
subject of action saying. that only the Self can save the Self. A passage
from the Dhammapada reads as follows: "Sons are no help, nor a father,
nor relations; there is no help from kinsfolk for one whom death has
seized."lo Jains, too, admit that all things other than one's self are useless
for one's salvation saying: "They cannot help thee or protect thee."ll They
say again: "Man! Thou art thine own friend; why wishest thou for a
friend beyond thyself?"12
In later periods the Mahayana Buddhists had faith in salvation
through the power of the great compassion of the Buddhas and the
Bodhisattvas, and the schools of Hinduism emphasize salvation by the
grace of Vi~l).u or Siva. But, it should be noted, even in such cases one
confronts the absolute by pleading directly to these gods for the salvation
of one's soul. And here little significance is attached to any intermediate
agents between the absolute and the individual beings.
It is natural that from such views of the Indians on salvation no
religious order, which is itself a limited social organization, would take
active leadership as the absolute source of authority. In Europe, the monks
united and formed organized communities such as the Jesuit Order which
sometimes had political power equal to that of the king. In India, on the
other hand, the political influence of the religious bodies was very weak.
Brahmanists maintained a consanguineal cultural unity among themselves.
This unity, however, served only to form their own particular exclusive
class, and this body of Brahmanists did not function as a political unit.13
What is more, they had no leader to rule over the body, and an individual
s
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Brahmanist could behave at his own will without any check by a super-
vising authority. It is natural that such a loose organization had no solid
financial basis like the Roman Catholic Church. Since the time of its
establishment the Buddhist Samgha (monastic order) was also without
political or economic unity. Even while the Buddha was still alive, his
followers lived apart from him and no regulation was made binding all
of these followers. After the death of the Buddha, they were intent only
on the faithful observance of the doctrines and the disciplines set forth by
their late teacher, and did not choose to have a political leader of their
Samgha.14
Moreover, the Buddhist Samgha did not claim to be a legislative
authority or an authority on the interpretation of the doctrine. This asser-
tion can be safely made at least in respect to its attitude toward important
issues. Buddhists attributed the authority of legislation exclusively to the
Buddha. They considered that all the rules of the Samgha are authorized
by claiming that they all came under the title "the Buddha's own dis-
course." Even the new rules established after the Buddha's death to meet
the changing social situations were also attributed to the Buddha's
authority. One of their books of precepts states as follows: "If a new
situation arises at some time to confront the Samgha, not ordaining what
has not been ordained, and not revoking what has been ordained, one
should take it upon himself to direct himself always according to the
precepts laid down. This is the resolution."15 Interpreting the vague state-
ments in the old texts, Buddhists attributed their own interpretation to the
Buddha. And for authority they referred not to the Samgha but to the
Buddha. This is the attitude of the Buddhists, at least the Buddhists of
the early days, in their interpretation of the texts.16
The same features of thought discernible in the early Buddhist
Samgha are found among the Jains. The Mahayana Buddhists who
appeared later in history assumed the same attitude, as did the schools of
Hinduism. Although some of the Indian sects-the most distinct example
being the Sikhs-kept a systematic unity in their body, they were excep-
tional cases.
Indians, in contrast to their indifferent attitude toward social organiza-
tions like the Samgha, attach the greatest importance to the authority of
the universal law-the law that all individuals and all social organizations
should follow. And they call the law "Dharma." This word comes from
h ' I-dh h' h "h Id" " "" b " Dht e root v r, w IC means to 0 , to support, or to ear. arma
means "what serves as the norm to support human behavior," or in short,
"the norm of action" or "the rule of conduct." They affirm that the Dharnws
differ from other things found in the natural world. Further, Dharma
means "usage," "customary observance," "the thing to be done," or "duty."
I
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An old book of rites in Brahmanism prescribes the four Dharmas of the
Brahman: to be a man of a Brahman family; to do what becomes the
dignity of the Brahman; to maintain honor; and to lead the people. As to
the duties that a layman should observe toward the Brahman, it mentions
the four different Dharmas: to pay respect to the Brahman; to make
offerings to the Brahman; to protect the Brahman from harm and injury;
and to refrain from condemning the Brahman to death. l1
The Dharma, as the norm that guides a man to establish and to per-
form moral acts, is the power that realizes ''Truth'' in this world. Thus, the
ancient Indians understood the Dharma to be the truth that works as a
creative power, and identified the two. "Thus the Law is what is called
the true. And if a man declares what is true, they say he declares the Law;
and if he declares the Law, they say he declares what is true. Thus both
are the same."1S
And in the course of time, this norm of behavior for the realization
of morals was raised to the position of the Absolute. Indians came to
think that the Dharma is the basis of the whole universe and that all
things in the universe rest on the Dharma. "This whole universe is in the
Dharma. Nothing is more difficult to do than the Dharma. On this
account, they hold the Dharma in high esteem."19 "The Dharma is the
basis of the whole universe. In the world, people wish to emulate a man
who keeps the Dharma best. They eliminate all evils by force of the
Dharma. All beings rest in peace in the Dharma. On this account, they
say that the Dharma is the highest being."20 Furthermore, it is maintained
that the Dharma has a form superior even to that of the creator of the
universe (the Brahman).21 In the Vaisesika, it is assumed that the rise and
the deliverance of the soul is attained oniy on the strength of the Dharma.22
Indians considered that the Dharma exists eternally. Already in an
old Vedic text, a wife is required to lie down on the pyre beside her dead
spouse at the cremation of her husband on the grounds that it is "the
time-honored rule" (dharma~ puriitIa~).23 As the following quotation tells
us, the Dharma is allegorically identified with eternal absolute being: "He
from whom the sun rises, and into whom it sets . . . Him the Devas
(gods) made the law, he only is today, and he tomorrow also."24
This idea of the eternal universal law was inherited by the Jains and
the Buddhists. The Jains, from their very rationalistic standpoint, assert
that there exist universal laws (dharma) which all mankind should observe
at all times and all places. For instance, one of their sacred books teaches:
"All breathing, existing, living, sentient creatures, should not be slain, or
treated with violence, or abused, or tormented, or driven away. This is
'the pure, unchangeable, eternal law... .' "25 The founder of Jainism,
Mahavira, set forth the philosophy and the practical morality of this
c
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religion in accord with what he believed to be the true principle or law.
Buddhists hold a similar view of the law. They consider that the law
of causal origination is the unchangeable truth. 'Whether there be an
appearance or non-appearance of a Tathagata, this causal law of nature,
this orderly fixing of things prevails...."26 A Tathagata is one who,
having realized this law of nature, endeavors to reveal it to all sentient
beings. The enlightened one is not to be considered as a mystic, inspired
by a revelation, but only as a man who has fully perceived the true law
of nature that exists eternally. Buddhism, or at least Buddhism in its
early stage, pays special reverence to the law that is eternally valid, and
assumes that the authority of the law precedes that of the Buddha. All
beings, including even the gods, adore the law that the Buddha has
revealed and accept it.21 Even the gods are bound to worldly sufferings,
and they have to follow the law to free themselves from the sufferings of
rebirth.
Here one may find an analogue of this Buddhist idea of the law in
Hugo Grotius's jus naturale or "natural law." His natural law is supposed
to be impartial to any person or nation and unchangeable under any
circumstances. Even God cannot alter this product of his reason. But it
should be remembered that natural law regulates human existence. The
law is valid without necessarily referring to God's authority so long as it is
clear to reason as a universal principle necessary in governing the relations
of human beings in this world. The Buddhist law of nature, on the other
hand, is not the law regulating the relations of individual human beings,
but it is the law controlling the relations between the state of ignorance
(which is inevitably attached to individual human existence and behavior)
and the way of deliverance from it. Though Grotius's natural law and the
Buddhist law of nature are similar in form, they are quite different in
essence.
As Indians put great emphasis on the universal law that stands above
individuals, the significance of the individual personality is thoroughly
ignored by them. And even Gotama the Buddha, the man of greatest
character, is considered to be only one of many men who realized the
universal law in this world. As we have pointed out in the previous section
of this book, Buddhists espouse the idea of the multiplicity of Buddhas.
The ]ains, in a similar manner, assume the existence of twenty-three
founders preceding the historical founder, Mahavira.28
In the thought of the Indians, Buddhas or the founders of religion,
however deified they are as the object of worship, are human beings who
are not different from ordinary people. A man can be a Buddha or a
founder of religion if he has accomplished the works necessary for en-
lightenment. We are all in essence one and the same with the absolute
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Being. This assertion is correct also in the case of Bhaktic Buddhism. The
man saved by the grace of Amitabha-Buddha becomes a Buddha equal in
all respects to his savior.
The concept of the eternal and universal law prevailed in Indian
thought and took root among the people. King Asoka believed in the
eternal law which should be observed by all, regardless of race, religion,
nationality, time or place. This law is the norm of human behavior and he
called it "dharma" or "the time-honored rule." He stated in one of his
Edicts that many kings preceding him had intended in vain to rule the
people on the basis of the Dharma, and that the reign of the Dharma
was first realized by him.29 King Kharavela who ruled over South India
in the second century B.C. was called "the universal monarch (Cakra-
vartin)."30 After Kharavela, the kings of this country sometimes claimed
the title of "the king faithful to the law."31 And all the followers of the
religious sects in India were taught that to observe the law was the most
precious of virtues.32
The Indian religion which acknowledges the authority of the eternal
universal law is very rationalistic in its character and it offers a striking
contrast to some less logical, personal religions of the West. Schopenhauer
once said that the Indian religion which has developed from rational
speculation about the world is superior to Christianity.33 Setting aside the
question of whether he is right or wrong, his remark indicates the essential
difference between the Indian and Christian religions.
Moreover, there is another important question, i.e. whether this
universal law was ever conceived in specific determinate terms as the
Western notion of abstract, universal, determinate law is. A distinction
should be drawn about the universality of law in the Hindu view and that
in the West. Also the Hindu's distrust of any specifically formulable law
applicable to all cases should be considered. Hindu laws were more flexible,
and commentators on established laws allowed modifications of them in
applying them to each new case. In this connection, Northrop's discus-
sion,34 giving specific examples to substantiate his view that the Indian is
distrustful of the abstract formulation of the law and wants to consider
each individual case on its own merits, should be considered relevan.t.
However, there remain various problems for critical reflection.35 ..
Perceiving the Truth: Faith and Rationalism
For Indians, it is a matter of the greatest moral and religious importance
to know the Universal Law and to submit themselves to it. And this
feature of Indian thought can be observed also in their concept of "faith."
Sraddhii is the Sanskrit word that is usually translated into the Western
t
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languages as "fides," "Glaube," or "faith." But what Indians mean by the
word is not exactly the same as the faith of Western religions. Sraddhii
means to believe in and rely upon a man of superior wisdom and at the
same time, it indicates wholehearted acceptance of the doctrines that the
man professes. Indians, refusing to place faith in a particular person or
saint, hope to submit themselves to the Universal Law that stands above
all individuals.
In early Buddhist texts, faith in the Buddha is expressed, but this
should not be understood as being a worship of a particular saint, Gotama
the Buddha. Gotama is one of the Buddhas-the Enlightened Ones.
Buddhist faith in the Buddha means faith in the law that makes the
Enlightened One as he is. Jains hold a similar view of faith. Jains in the
early stage of their history taught "not to have faith in the illusory power
of god."36 They express true faith by the word samyagdarsana or "right-
seeing," and thus true faith in their sense is none other than to see the
truth in the right way.31
For Indians, faith is not the worship of particular individuals and
this nature of their faith can be more clearly observed in the statements
of Brahmanists. Psychologically Sarhkara defines sraddhii as "a particular
kind of mental state (pratyayavise~a)"38 the nature of which is "delicate
(tanu)."39 As the active and practical significance of sraddhii, two views
are given by the Brahmanists: (I) According to the Vedanta, Sraddhii
is not to put faith in a teacher, but "to accept as true the words in the
Upani~ads that the teacher introduces to US."40 All other schools of Brah-
manism agree with the Vedanta in the view that sraddhii means the
acceptance of the sacred doctrine.41 (2) As a logical consequence of the
first view, Sraddhii is applied to mean the ideology that urges people to do
the things generally approved as good in the Hindu community especially
to perform religious works in a broad sense of the word.42 It is "the factor
which makes all living beings do good deeds,"43 and it is in essence "the
idea of traditionalism."44
Since the oldest days of their history, Buddhists use the word prasiida
to mean faith in their sense. As the Chinese translate this word by
"ch'eng ching" (purity) or "hsi" (bliss), it means the calm and pure state
of mind in which one feels the bliss of serenity.45 Buddhist faith is far
from fanatic worship.46 The enthusiastic and fanatic form of reverence,
which urges ardent devotion (bhakti) to the gods, was advocated by
some Buddhist sects of later development and by the schools of Hinduism,
but this kind of fanatic devotion to an individual Guru or God failed to
win the heart of most Indian intellectuals of antiquity. However, we
should not minimize the tremendous vogue of Bhakti cults among the
common people of India, especially in the second millenium A.D. The most
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conspicuous starting-point of this trend seems to be the Bhagavadgitti,
when Vishnu says, "If you surrender everything to Me, you will un-
doubtedly gain salvation." This trend still lingers in contemporary India,
so that we should recognize the existence of various trends in the history
of thought in India.
For Indians, the essence of faith is to see the truth through any
means possible. Whether Buddhists, Jains, or Brahmanists, religious ad-
herents in India all agree in their assertion that right wisdom (samya-
gjiiiina) is the way to liberationY They say that liberation means the
awakening of mind attained by dint of right wisdom.48 And they all
pay great respect to a man of wisdom (vivekin).49 They call such a man
"the man who climbed the terraced heights of wisdom."50 Thus, in India,
faith and knowledge are understood to be compatible; consequently, the
Indian religion bears a strong tinge of philosophy. That is why in India,
such ideas "I believe it because it is absurd (credo quia absurdum),"51
are rarely, if ever, held, and there is no conflict of religion and philosophy.
In fact, the Indian religion is based on philosophical contemplation
and its philosophy is indistinguishable from religion. As Masson-Oursel has
pointed out, in India and China religion is not antagonistic to philosophy
or to science.52 Indians are traditionally a religious and, at the same time,
a philosophical people.
Transcendence of Limited Ethical Systems
TRANSCENDENCE OF NATIONAL AND RACIAL CONSCIOUSNESS
The Vedas, the oldest records in India, are collections of ritual
recitations and commentaries on the rites. They are compiled chiefly for
the purpose of ritualistic practices. The Vedas also preserve many legends
and myths in their original forms. But for the Indo-Aryans, myths con-
cerning the origin of their race or the legendary histories of their expansion
and the lineage of their dynasties were not matters of importance. What
was crucially important for them was the measure of their direct relation-
ship with the gods.53 They were religious people occupied in the considera-
tion of the gods, or more properly speaking, of a world governed by cosmic
law. On the other hand, they had a rather dim sense of national or racial
consciousness. Indeed, in ancient India the aristocrats and the intellectual
class took pride in their Aryan descent, which accounted for the sense of
unity among them. But this unity was the result of the conviction they
held in common, their faith in one superior religion, and not from their
awareness of any racial oneness.
For the early Indians, universal order is the ultimate and the highest
authority. They attach little significance to intermediary beings lying
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between the individual and universal law. It is natural then that they
regard national and racial questions as seco~dary. We find this tendency
even in their earliest history.
They regarded religion as taking precedence over such matters, so
that they were thoroughly apathetic to the problems of nationality or of
race. Buddhism and ]ainism, arising later, continued to cultivate this
outlook. They claimed the abolition of racial discrimination and preached
above all things the realization of the law that is universal to all mankind-
dharma. Even today, Indians are inclined to form religious rather than
political units. In other words, their national actions are due to associations
of co-religionists rather than to groups of men of common political view-
point. And so any movement for national unification based on race is
weak and bound to fail in India.
Since the oldest times in India the authority of the state and the king
has been subordinated to religious authority. A story about a king illustrates
the general feeling of the days before the birth of the Buddha. The king
was once blamed as immoral because he placed his teacher Cpurohita) of
the Vedas in a seat lower than his. But, later, having recognized his
mistake, he 'came to take his lessons in a seat lower than that of his
teacher.54 Kings were no exceptions to the decree of Brahmanic sacred codes
which stressed that "disciples are not allowed to take seats higher than
that of their teacher."55
In the days of Buddha, kings showed absolute obedience to religious
leaders who preached the supreme unchanging law that all men should
follow. For instance, King Ajatasatru of Magadha, the strongest state at
the time, made a round of personal calls to the six leading philosophers of
his day.56 Another king of Magadha drove his chariot to Mt. PaI)9-ava
where Buddha led a secluded life and asked for an audience.57 There is a
description in a Buddhist siitra about a scene of a king calling on Buddha:
"King Pasenadi of Sravasti descended from the chariot, put aside the
umbrella, removed the sword, and took off his shoes. Folding his arms in
token of respect, he stepped toward Buddha, threw himself to the ground,
and made a bow in the most profound manner."58 The sword, the umbrella,
the crown, the brush of long white hair with jewels set in its handle, and
the decorated shoes were "the five adornments of the king" that he was
allowed to wear from the day of his coronation.59 Early Buddhist texts
tell us that it was an established custom of the day for kings to remove all
these five precious adornments before they saw the Buddha.60
After the death of the Buddha, religious authority continued to hold
sway. King Asoka, who reigned over the whole land, expressed his whole-
hearted devotion to the three treasures of "Buddha, Dharma, and
Samgha."61 "King of Magadha, beloved of the gods, bows before the
,
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Samgha and expresses his hope for its peaceful and healthy condition."
It was the king who actually presided over and supported the religious
bodies of the day. And still, as the words "beloved of the gods" indicate,
Asoka accepted the superiority of religious authority over the secular.
In the days of the Ku~aI,la dynasty and thereafter, the religious role
of the king increased remarkably, but still it was emphasized that unfore-
seen disasters would occur in case the king neglected to be obedient to
the Dharma. The Indians believed in the universal law as beyond any
state power. And thus religious institutions which led the people by the
light of the law were assumed to be above state authority.
The state authority, therefore, seldom intervened in religious activities,
and the inner organization of the religious bodies was seldom influenced
by secular powers.62 (This is still true today in India and Ceylon.) For
instance, the seating arrangement within the Buddhist Samgha was deter-
mined solely by the length of service. Any new member, even if he were
a king, had to submit to the lowest rank in the Samgha hierarchy.63 This
exhibits a striking contrast to the case of Japan where the men of the
highest rank in the secular society, members of the royalty or nobility,
always occupied the highest position even at religious functions.
Indian religious bodies, in turn, kept themselves aloof from external
authorities. At the earliest stage of Buddhism, monks were already for-
bidden to associate with kings.64 In one of the oldest Buddhist texts, the
admonition is: "Monks, you should be mindful to keep yourselves away
from state affairs."6s Buddhists took such an attitude partly for fear of the
calamities that connections with the kings might incur; but also it cannot
be denied that the Buddhists of the day thought little of the kings' power.
They believed that the devotee who renounced the secular world no longer
belonged to the state; that he was beyond state jurisdiction.
Later on, even Mahayana Buddhists continued to take the aloof
attitude of regarding the church above the state. Many monks deliberately
tried to detach themselves from any political affairs. "Bodhisattvas do not
serve the king, nor do they serve or associate with princes, ministers, and
officials."66 "A Buddhist monk should not get familiar with the king. Why
so? Because the monk who associates with the king is disliked by all
people and will not receive hospitable treatment. The bad monk who
associates with the king is greedy for treasures, and at the court, at a
village or at a crowded place, he endlessly thirsts for material gain. Even
if he is not greedy for treasures, the monk who comes in contact with the
king is disturbed in his meditation and in his reading. Such a monk is
bound to suffer from distractions even if he tries to concentrate on the
way of deliverance. These are the reasons why a Buddhist monk should
not associate with the king."61'
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As already stated, the earliest Buddhist monks regarded their life as
superior to that of the king. Of course, they admitted that it was significant
to govern the nation well as a king. But a king was bound by the
restrictions of the laity while a monk was completely free from all the
restrictions of this world.6s And it was not rare, as the following quotation
from a Buddhist siitra shows, for kings to visit Buddhist or Brahmanist
monks and ask for instruction. 69 ''The king made a respectful salutation and
then advanced the questions: What is virtue and what is vice? What is
guilt and what is not? How can one attain the beatitudes and be free
from all evils? Having received the instruction, the king endeavored to
realize what he was taught."70 Although Indians placed religious authority
above the king, it is true that in reality the Buddhist Samgha was supported
and protected politically and economically by the king. But the Buddhists
were too proud of their role as guardians of the dharma to acknowledge the
king's supremacy. "The religious order forbids salutation to the king."71
In concert with this attitude of the Buddhists, the Brahmanists told
their adherents, "There is no need for praises and salutations. Cast away
any notions of good and bad, and go into the woods alone, finding things
to eat on the way."72 Another text states: "The disciples should not
praise anyone, nor bow to anyone, nor worship the ancestors, but live in
this ever-shifting world at will and free from all restrictions."73
In Greece, the religion of the polis required every citizen to sacrifice
himself in the interest of "the thing greater than oneself-in the interest
of the aggregation called polis." And it should be noted that this Greek
self-sacrifice was done to meet the practical needs of the men in the polis
as "a service to the fraternity."74 The Indian religion, on the other hand,
attached little importance to secular social organizations, and was prima-
rily directed to the universal order of things. Here, the Indian religion
differs essentially from the Greek religion of the gods of the city-states.
A sense of unity as a nation or a race was not nourished even among
the early Indians. Alexander the Great, during his invasion of India, met
resistance from some local lords but was never harassed by a defense put up
by the Indian nation as a whole. To wage a war in defense of their own
nation and race apparently did not appeal to the Indians of the day. King
Asoka, even after he succeeded in bringing the whole country under his
control, continued to call himself "King of Magadha" and never thought
of himself as the "King of India." Magadha is the place where his Maurya
dynasty had its origin. In his opinion, he was a local king and, as a local
king of Magadha, he guided and ruled the other localities and races in
India. In some of his Edicts, he referred to the land of India as Jambudvlpa.
But in this concept of a land, nothing of a racial or national superiority is
implied. King Asoka had no racial or national consciousness as such; he
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wished to think in a way that went beyond such limitations. He considered
himself the preserver and actualizer of the dharma, and he was ever con-
scious and proud of this. All of his Edicts place emphasis on the realization
of the dharma in this world.
After the downfall of the Maurya dynasty, India suffered many for-
eign invasions. But, contrary to our expectations, in the legends and myths
of India there appear only a few names of national heroes who did much
to defend the nation on such occasions.75 In the epics of Mahiibhiirata and
Riimiiyatza, there are legends told of many heroes. These are typical heroes
of India, but they are not national heroes in the sense of any national and
racial consciousness, which they, as well as their authors, lacked. Ancient
Indians preached as a virtue the offering of one's property, even one's life if
necessary, for the sake of others' happiness. But they were never taught
self-sacrifice for a particular nation or race. The concept of the national
hero in our sense did not appear in Indian history.76
Surprisingly, in the ancient Indian languages, there i5 no term equiva-
lent to "the Indian people." Jambudvipa and Bharatavar~amean only the
land of India and do not connote the people living there. The Greeks called
the inhabitants of this land "Indos" and this was adopted by the Euro-
pean languages in general. Indians themselves had no name to call their
own nation. The Indo-Aryans, who formed the main stream of Indian civi-
lization, called themselves "Arya." It means "one who is faithful to the
religion of the clan," and is the opposite of the word "mleccha"-barbarian
or, loosely speaking, Non-Aryan. There was no word in India to include
both the Aryans and the Non-Aryans together. Indians for a long time did
not awaken to a sense of the unity of "the Indian peoples."
The Brahmanists thoroughly ignored state authority. The early Bud-
dhists conceived a social contract theory for the formation of a state, while
the early Jains insisted that the state power was nothing but the power of
the strongest in arms. Neither the Buddhists nor the Jains found any sacred
significance in the state. The ancient Indians in general believed in the
rule of dharma-the universal law, and they assumed that state power was
subordinate to the dharma. With such a frame of mind, there was no room
for the growth of an organic theory of the state or society throughout In-
dian history.
For more than three thousand years, since the time of the B.g-Veda
up to the present, the unity of the Indian people has come about through
common religious faiths rather than from their awakening in national or
racial consciousness. Since she gained her independence India has still
been troubled with religious problems even though economic and social
difficulties loom largest today. The antagonism between the Hindus and
the Mohammedans has been an especially difficult political problem.77
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THE PROBLEM OF CASTE
The caste system represents a closed and disunited social organization
which was highly regarded by the Indians. Our next step is to study the
idea that underlies this unique social system of India.
About 1000 B.C. the Aryan invaders advanced to the upper reaches of
the Ganges and established an agricultural community. This Aryan so-
ciety prevailed over the whole country and, in the course of years, went
through some modifications until we find it in its present state. The mem-
bers of the conquered tribes were reduced to servitude and they-the
Siidras-were strictly distinguished from the free people. Then among the
Aryans themselves, new classes were formed. The priests and the warriors
created their own independent classes. Their professions were transmitted
through heredity and, in this process, class stratification grew rigid until
finally the caste system was established. Under the major four castes of the
BrahmaI}a, the K~atriya, the Vaisya and the Siidra, many subcastes have
grown.
Class rigidity in marriage and dining is universally observed among
the primitive tribes of the world. But what is remarkable here is that India,
which has already gone through the process of acculturation is still influ-
enced by the caste system. Indian factory workers will share a bedroom
only when they are members of the same caste. In the past when a public
dining hall was planned in a large Indian city, voices would be heard that
it should be constructed according to caste lines.78
The Buddhists completely opposed caste discrimination and preached
the concept of equality among men, while the Jains compromised on it.
The Buddhists were popular among the city dwellers but they failed to
win the conservative rural peasants. And this is one reason why Buddhism
was doomed and vanished from its birthplace. However, the concept of
equality gradually seeped into the minds of the Indians and later on they
began to emphasize even the Buddha's noble birth.79
The caste system has undergone complicated changes before taking
its present form. It is not easy to explain the origin and growth of the castes
in India. Many scholars have introduced various theories concerning this
problem, but since it is a problem requiring separate discussion, here we
can only say that the caste system cannot be explained satisfactorily simply
by the study of productive means or of geographic and climatic conditions.
It must be noted that a mode of thinking crystallized from ancient mores
and ideas has a deep influence on the system.so
On studying the castes, we cannot overlook the influence of the
Brahmin class in Indian civilization. This priestly class has always kept the
highest position in the social hierarchy and taken the intellectual leadership
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of India. In a country where military or political consolidation has rarely
been achieved, it has done much to bring the people under one sway cul-
turally and socially. Indeed, the civilization of India owes much to the
Brahmins, though they have strongly advocated the caste system.
Religious divinity viewed from the standpoint of Brahmanism decides
the standing of a caste's social privileges. In other words, each caste shares
an element of Briihma1,1ic divinity. Accordingly, because of the large share
of divine power, the Brahmin class enjoys the highest rank, the K~atriya
class comes next, then the Vaisya and the Siidra. Within a caste, every
member is treated with equanimity. This phenomenon of equality within
the same caste rank is governed by the concept of eternal and universal
law which functions within the differing castes and at the same time gives
meaning and significance to them. The Indian social structure, therefore, is
quite different from that of a consanguineal community, such as Japan,
where people have a high esteem for blood-relationship, real or fictional.
Caste membership is transmitted through heredity in India too, so that
blood-relationship is still significant. However, Indians consider religion as
above consanguinity. If a member of a caste violates the BrahmaI).ic decrees
of his caste, he is at once turned out of the caste and transferred to a lower
caste. Consanguinity is held in esteem only insofar as the religious
divinity serves it. Thus we see that the peculiar Indian way of thinking
which submits to eternal and universal law implements and underlies the
caste system.
Consciousness of Living Beings: Indian Concept of Man
When Indians speak of man, they are likely to use such terms as
"prii1Jin," "bhuta" "sattva," or "j"iva."81 Western scholars translate these
words as "living being" or "life-force," and the meaning refers not only to
man but also to beasts or any living creature.82 In Sanskrit, there are such
words as "manu~a," "puru~a," or "nara," which are equivalent to the Eng-
lish ''human being." But Indians do not like to use these words even when
they mean man in particular. They think of man more as an instance of the
species of "living being" than as a member of the human race. This Indian
mentality can be traced in the texts of all Indian religions,83 according to
which the subject of ethical conduct is "a living being." The moral rules
that regulate human relationships are not enough. Ethics should be so ex-
tensive that it rules over all the relations among men, beasts, and other
living beings. This Indian concept of man in relation to other beings is
thoroughly different from the Western concept of man. 84
From their standpoint, it is natural that Indians accentuate in ethics
the idea of animal protection. Buddhists and Jains in particular both agree
s
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on this point. "All living things have deep attachment to life."85 "They
want bodily comforts. They should not be treated cruelly."86 Brahmanists,
too, preach loving care of living creatures.87 As a matter of fact, protection
of animals is emphasized in all Indian religious schools, the ideal being
that not even an ant on the road should be stepped on.
There is no essential difference between man and a beast. Like a beast,
man is egocentric and eager to satisfy his desires and is distressed by failures.
A leading philosopher of India, samkara, classed man together with the
beasts: "Man's behavior is not different from that of a beast. A stimulus,
such as a sound, comes to a sense organ such as the ears of a beast. The
beast avoids or runs away from the sound if it feels it unpleasant, while
it makes its way toward it if it feels it pleasant. When a beast sees a man
swinging a club, it thinks, 'This man is going to kill me' and runs away.
But when it sees a man with grass in his hands, it approaches the man.
And the same can be said of man, an intelligent animal. When he recog-
nizes a terrible-looking man threatening with a sword in hand, he runs
away. But when he recognizes a man with a contrary mien, he approaches
him. Thus man's actions with respect to cognitive objects and functions
are shared by the beast. It is generally known that the sensations of a beast
result from its confusion in not being able, to distinguish between the
Atman and the Non-Atman. Man is at many points similar to the beast in
that his sensations continue to mistake the Non-Atman for the Atman.Jl88
Classifications of creatures in the ancient texts of many Indian religious
schools confirm the view that there is no difference between man and
beast.
The Jains hold an animistic view and maintain that everything has its
proper spirit. Earth, water, fire, wind, and plant, have only tactile sensa-
tion. A worm has two sensations and an ant has three. A bee has four and
only a man enjoys five sensations.89 According to another text of Jainism,
the gods, men, creatures in hell, elephants, peacocks, and fish, are said to
have five sensations.90 It seems that the Jains assume two groups among
beings with five sensations, that is, those with mental faculties (saman-
aska) and those without (asamanaska).91
From the modes of birth, Jains classify living beings into three groups:
(I) Accidental (upa-
pata):
(2) Viviparous (gar-
bha):
(3) Coagulative (sam-
murchana):
gods and creatures in hell
creatures born with placenta, without pla-
centa, and from eggs (oviparous)
creatures not included in the above-men-
tioned two groups~2
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The Brahmanists, on the other hand, classify beings into four
groups: 93
(I) Viviparous (jarii-
yuja) :
(2) Oviparous (a1J~ja):
(3) Moisture-produced
(svedaja):
(4) Germinative (ud-
bhijja):
creatures such as man
creatures such as birds
creatures produced from moisture, such as
the louse
creatures produced from buds such as
plants94
..
In another text, Brahmanists classify all living creatures into two; "the self-
moving (eara or jmigana)," e.g. animals, and "those that are not self-moving
(acara or sthiivara),"95 e.g. plants.
In these Indian systems of classification, we are able to extract two
common features: (I) Man corresponds to other animals as one of the
viviparous creatures. This offers a sharp contrast with the Western concept
of man before the Middle Ages, and possibly corresponds with the modem
scientific classification. The Indian concept is not the result of scientific
study of ecological phenomena, but results from their instinctive and natu-
ral way of thinking of man as belonging to the world of living things.
(2) Indians acknowledge the spiritual factor in all living creatures. It is
often stressed that not only men and beasts but even plants have souls.96
However, the spirituality of a plant is not so remarkably developed as in a
man. All this does not mean that the Indians did not, in some respects, hold
that man is superior to other creatures. Man is a "thinking" animal.97 In the
text of Armiyaka of the early Brahmanists, it is stated: "The sap runs in a
plant and the mind (citta) in an animal. And in a man, the Atman is most
clearly revealed because man is endowed with intelligence (prajiiiina). He
sees and tells what he cognizes, knows what tomorrow is about, distin-
guishes between the real and unreal worlds, and tries to attain immortality
though he is mortal."98 The Buddhists regarded highly "The rare state of
being a man." One should be grateful that he is born a man for it is more
difficult to be born a man than for a blind turtle to enter a hole in wood
floating in the ocean.99 The Buddhists also advocated the abolition of capi-
tal punishment. A paragraph in a Buddhist text states thus: "Be obedient
to the saintly kings. Do not condemn a man to death. Why so? Because
for him to come into this world as a man and as any other being is the
consequence of superior factors or conditions. If you take his life, you will
certainly be punished."Ioo This means that man's life should be revered and
no one should destroy it. lOl
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In certain circumstances, man was distinguished from other creatures,
being endowed with the capacity to carry out the dharma-ethical law.
It emphasized the ethical and religious significance in human activities so
that those who neglect the dharma are no better than beasts. In a test of
the ancient Upani~ad, it is stated: "Men of good deeds in this world will be
reborn into the life of the Brahmin of the K~atriya, or of the Vaisya. On
the contrary, men of evil doings will be reborn in the womb of a dog, of a
pig, or will return as an outcast (ca1J4iila)."lo2 The Vaise~ika school says:
"The Dharma is the excellent quality of the human race (puru~a-gu1Ja).
It is the basis for man's comforts, benefits, and liberation. It is beyond
human perception, and it ceases to exist when man understands cor-
rectly ultimate peace (mo~a). This comes about from the unity of
the human spirit and the inner faculties, for those who practise the rules of
their casts and of life's stages."l03
The dharma, the essential distinction between men and other beings,
has continuously been emphasized throughout all Hindu thought. In fact,
human life has been given the unique place, as in it alone can the soul
make the effort to liberate itself from the cycle of birth and death and
achieve liberation. Thus we may say in summary that many early Indian
thinkers advocated the superiority of man over other living beings, on the
one hand, but many people, on the other hand, considered man as equal
only to beasts and worms in the whole run of living beings.
The Conservative Character of Indian Thinking
Indians, in their retrospective way of thinking, believe that an ideal
state existed in the past where the norm of human behavior was faithfully
carried out. But as this state is no longer ideally possible, they worship the
past and admire the classics.
In the codes of Brahmanism, anything new and modern is severely
criticized and rejected. In the Laws of Manu, it was stated: "Legends
which are not based on the Scriptures (smrti) and wrong concepts
(kudr~ti) are false and useless in bringing happiness after man's death.
This is because they are new (arviikkiilika)."lo4
The Buddha, who had originated a new school, scarcely thought of
himself as a founder. He only thought that he had succeeded in grasping
the universal law which is valid for all time. In reality he aspired to become
a true Brahmin or SramaI;la and never to build up anything new or apart
from Brahmanism. The early Buddhists respected and regarded the ancient
sages preceding the Buddha as men who had lived according to Dharma.
"Verily, the dharma is the banner of the sages."105 "The sages of the past
were ascetics who restrained their inner passions, freed themselves from
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the five desires, and did what was truly good for its own sake."lo6 The
early Buddhists severely criticised the Brahmin priests, saying that they in-
dulged in pleasure-seeking-storing treasures and keeping beautiful mis-
tresses-and were no better than the secular kings.lOT
Historically speaking, however, the criticism is not true. As a matter
of fact, the earliest Brahmin priests were engaged in prayers and magical
rites for the general welfare of the secular. And it was rather in a late pe-
riod that we find high-sounding Brahmin priests leading a secluded and
ascetic life. In disregard of this historical fact, the Buddhists never ceased
to set the ideal in the golden age of the past and to detest all contemporane-
ous things.
In the Theragatha, one of the oldest texts of the early Buddhists, it
is said that the monks of the day are deplorably corrupt and degraded
compared with the high standard upheld in the Buddha's time. In this vein
there gradually developed the Buddhist idea of the three stages [Sho-bo
(Right Teaching), Zo-ho (Rote Learning), and Map-po (Decay)] of
the world's declining evolution, which finally took definitive form in the
texts of Mahayana Buddhism.los Brahmanists on the other hand main-
tained the four-stage theory of world history: Krta, Treta, Dvapara, and
Kali. According to this view, our present period belongs to the last one, the
period of decay and termination, and is equivalent to the Buddhist Map-po.
Indians, assuming the ideal age to be in the past, did not accept new things
or what was in existence as good and desirable.
In India, therefore, new thoughts are constantly tied in with old estab-
lished authorities, from which they take on significance. For instance, the
Indian national epic, Mahabhiirata, differs from the Vedas in content and
maintains that it is more important than the four Vedas,t°9 and yet, it re-
gards itself as one of the Vedas.110 Buddhists, too, rely upon the Buddha's
great authority to propagate their ideas. Many of "Buddha's Teachings" in
the texts of early Buddhism and Mahayana Buddhism are in reality the
works of scholars coming later than the Buddha but using his authority.111
Together with adherence to established authority, the obedience to
the elders (sthavira or them) of the Indians is really remarkable. All the
religious sects in India unanimously teach the veneration of the elders and
prohibit, above all things, defiance of the teachers. ll2 "Those who pay due
courtesy to the elders will greatly enhance their four dharmas-Iong life,
knowledge, peace, and strength."l1B
Although scriptural authority was supreme, there were some material-
ists, and naturalists such as the followers of the Vaise~ika school, or logi-
cians such as Dharmakirti, who claimed that scriptures are not absolutely
reliable because they were written by man. But these were in the minority
in India. Almost all the schools of philosophy in India have accepted the
d
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words in the scriptures as the absolute authority of knowledge. Even the
early rationalistic Buddhists maintained that a proposition should be veri-
fied in two ways-by logical demonstration and by confirmation through
scriptural authority.u4 In India even today there still survives a tenacious
and blind acceptance of the scriptures.ll5
It is true, however, that Indian obedience to the scriptures often turned
out to be only nominal. In reality, the ancient Indians were not so re-
strained in their free thinking. Madhva and others of the Vedanta school
developed a dualistic metaphysics incompatible with the monistic stand-
point of the Upani~ads. To resolve the contradiction, they strained their
reading of the holy scriptures, and interpreted the written authority in a
way that would justify their own assertions.
There was a time in early Indian history when free thinking was en-
couraged. This was about the time of the Buddha when materialism,
skepticism, sensualism, and other kinds of very libertarian ideas flourished,
At that time, many city-states were established along the banks of the
Ganges. The kings of such city-states, though interested in philosophical
discussions, never persecuted those who did not conform to their own opin-
ion. But all'this was a temporary phenomenon. Following the downfall
of the city-states the liberal philosophical tendency in India lay dormant
for a long time, so that it can be said that the Indian allegiance to orthodox
authority undeniably obstructed the development of free thinking in the
land.u6
The Development of Nomothetical Learning111
Subservience to the universal law and neglect of individual varieties
lead to "nomothetic" (universalistic) tendencies and to the lack of "idio-
graphic" (individualistic) attitudes in the everyday living of people. An-
cient Indians left few chronologies, documentary works, and personal biog-
raphies.us Studies of details of geography and of topography were not
pursued intensively,119 while historical and descriptive studies like natural
science hardly developed. Their interests were primarily directed to the
quest of the universal norm.120
H. Oldenberg analyzes this Indian nomothetical tendency as follows:
"For Indians, history was not a true science. Generally speaking, science to
their minds leads men to certain actions conforming to a system of rules.
Indeed, no other nation has shown such a strong attachment to rules.
Grammar handed down the rules of refined speech; philosophy adheres to
the rules of release from worldly hardships, and love-poetry to the rules of
true gallantry. These were the sciences that an earnest speaker, and eager
NirvaI)a-seeker, and an intent love-maker could not dispense with. Needless
d
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to say, politics, a science consisting of many rules, was acknowledged by
Indians as one of the true sciences. But the task of expressing those phe-
nomena that were not yet embodied in the rules but that could be related
only in words, was transmitted naturally to a more flexible art of accom-
plishment and presentation, viz. literature."121 On this point, Indians ex-
hibit a striking contrast to the Chinese who attempted to seek universal and
normative significance by the inductive means of accumulating individual
cases.
Many causes are given for the lack of historical works in India. Some
of them are the rather late usage of the Indian written language, the in-
clement weather conditions for the preservation of manuscripts, and the
instability of political and military situations. But a more fundamental
cause should be traced to the peculiarity of the Indian way of thinking
along eternalistic rather than temporal lines.
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CHAPTER 10 ALIENATION FROM
THE OBJECTIVE
NATURAL WORLD
Lack of the Notion of Order in the Objective Natural World
Just as the Indians made no sharp distinction between one's self and
others, they had very little consciousness of the contrast between the self
and its natural surroundings.
They did not, in the past, represent the regions of their native land
apart from the inhabitants, so that the names of countries or districts were
described using the plural form of the name of the inhabitants.l They
showed a st;ong aversion to representing the land as natural surroundings
existing apart from its inhabitants.
Since Indians emphasize the existence of a universal Being behind
phenomena, which are limited in time and space, they tend to minimize
the distinction between two kinds of existence, viz. universal reality and
things in the phenomenal world, in order not to regard them as equally
real. There is also a tendency to slight the distinction between things per-
ceived directly and those perceived by means of inference and other sec-
ondary means of cognition.
This tendency of thought can be seen also in the linguistic form. For
example, there is no "explicative genitive" in Sanskrit. This form, otherwise
called the "definitive genitive," is used in Latin (especially in later days
and in vernacular) for explaining a noun determined by it (e.g. urbs
Romae, the city of Rome; nomen amaris, the name of love). The same form
is observed in modern Western languages, Japanese and Tibetan, etc.,
while in Sanskrit, the same context is expressed by nouns in apposition. (In
case an indication of determination is specially required, an indeclinable
"iti" in the sense of "called" is used, e.g. Pataliputra iti nagaram; mrttiketi
namadheyam.) When two nouns, the explaining and the one to be ex-
plained, are shown in apposition to each other, very little difference of
order exists between the determining and the determined.
The expression "A as B" is also lacking in ancient Indian languages.
Namely they have no term equivalent to the as in English or als in Ger-
man. To express such a term, an appositional form between A and B is
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used. Hence the expression can be construed both ways, "A as B" and
"B as A" Such a linguistic phenomenon seems to be related to the tend-
ency already noted in the Indian way of thinking of minimizing other-
ness.2
This Indian characteristic is shown more clearly in the following
grammatical construction. Sameness of content, usually shown by the
subordinate clause in other languages, is expressed in apposition to a word
in the principal clause in Sanskrit, in order to avoid the use of a subordinate
clause, e.g. pita vrddha~. = the father, when he is old. They do not like
to distinguish the direct field of experience from the content of thought
based upon it. They describe both as if they were in the same dimension.
The sentence, "better is the birth of a daughter," is expressed in the word-
ing: "better, a daughter, born" ( vara1J1 kanyaiva janita). Therefore, the
distinction between the principal clause and the subordinate clause is some-
times obscure. The term "iti" equivalent to "that" or to a quotation mark in
such a sentence as ''he said that ..." or "he said: --" is often omitted.3
In this case, the quotation or the subordinate clause is not identifiable by
its grammatical form unless we construe the meaning from the contents.
Again a subordinate clause in a sentence is placed before or after the prin-
cipal clause, but never in between as in most Western languages/ probably
because of the confusion that would result due to the loose rules of San-
skrit syntax.
Indians prefer the direct narration to an indirect approach in describ-
ing an idea, opinion, thought, intention or doubt in persons other than the
speaker himself. There was very little development of the indirect narration
in Indian languages. In Sanskrit, it is mostly limited to the accusative cum
participio and the indirect interrogatory sentence. A few other cases are
sentences beginning with yad which shows the content, sentences begin-
ning with yad which is equal to the infinitive, and the predicate sentences
beginning with yad or yatha.5
The distinction between "the predicative" and "the conjunctive" as
it appeared in Greek was preserved in Vedic Sanskrit, but was lost in classi-
cal Sanskrit and united in the predicative. It means that those who used
classical Sanskrit vaguely thought of the same sense in the two forms
originally distinguished.6
In modern languages, the hypothetical conditions are expressed by
paraphrasing a long sentence in order to distinguish it from the description
of actual matters, while in Sanskrit, there is no clear-cut syntactical distinc-
tion between the two, and the same content is expressed by shorter and
simple sentences.7
The same characteristic style of thought is also observed in the past
work in linguistics by Indians. Their studies of phonetics and grammar
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are incomparable in their detailed and exact analysis not only of languages
in ancient countries but even in the modern world up to the 19th century.
Nevertheless their linguistic studies are rather weak in the field of syntax.
Indian grammar was superior to the Greeks in analysis of word-construction
while the Greek grammar had a superiority in syntax which treats the
mutual relations and synthesis of words. The Greeks, who were by no
means the rival of Indians in the field of phonetics, showed a distinct su-
periority in the field of syntax. In regard to the reason why syntax remained
undeveloped in India, it has been surmised that it is due to the extremely
free sentence construction of Sanskrit.s Undoubtedly this is the main cause,
but in a further examination, we may find that the Indians tended to be
lacking in their sense of order in the objective natural world.
Again due to their way of thinking, which did not distinguish clear
and direct perceptions obtained through the sense organs from knowledge
obtained through fantasy or inference, Indians were poor in expressions
cognizing order among phenomena. Intellectual people and scholars were
able to overcome this deficiency, but there certainly was such a tendency
among the q>mmon people.
First of all, this tendency can be seen again in linguistic form. Even
when a change of phase is observed between two sentences according to
the western concept of language, Indians describe both plainly without
inserting the term "but" and the like. For example, "therefore the dumb
can speak, but cannot hear" is expressed by the sentence: tasmiid badhiro
viica vadati na sp:wti.9 (Literally, hence a dumb one speaks, not hears.) On
the other hand, Indians frequently use conjunctions to denote conclusions
drawn, e.g. tad, tasmiit, tarhi, atas. These are used even when Westerners
feel that there is no necessity to use them.10 On this point, Indians are
rather similar to the Japanese people. Speyer understood this as being in
accord with the dialectical tendency of the Indian, but actually it seems to
show their inadequate understanding of the relation between the grounds
and conclusion in such compound sentences in spite of their strong tend-
ency to search for and understand the logical or causal relations among
phenomena.
In comparison with Westerners who make classifications of various
phenomena according to their importance, Indians describe them exhaus-
tively but without order. In the Briihma1}as, abstract concepts and concrete
matters are described side by side as being in the same dimension.
Lack of the notion of order with respect to the objective world caused
ancient Indians to describe the symbols of numerals in a row to be summed.
For example, "163" is usually described in ancient Indian manuscripts as:
100 60 3.
The Indians are generally very fond of simple calculations of important
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items. This may be based upon the same tendency of thought. The
Arthasiistra and the Kiimasutra throughout use this principle. In the
philosophy of the Samkhya and Nyaya schools, important principles are
merely enumerated in a row and the distinctions of dimension are never
indicated (viz. the 25 tattvas of the Samkhya, the 16 padiirthas of the
Nyaya). This tendency is striking also in Buddhism, which calls those
principles or terms arranged in a row 'the ordered doctrines' (e.g. tridhiitu,
ratnatraya, catviiry iirya-satyiini, paiica-skandhii~, ~at-piiramitii~, dvadasa-
nga~ pratityasamutpiida~, etc.).
Thus, having no liking for summarizing or making rules of phenomena
from a recognition of some order among them, Indians used frequent
repetition. Tiresome repetition of similar sentences is commonly seen in
the Upani~ads, Buddhist and Jain scriptures, etc.ll
Repetition of the same wording for each item, which makes modern
readers quite tired, is said to have been used for strengthening the memory
in the absence of letters. If letters had been used for description from the
beginning, such repetition would have no value. Another strong reason for
such repetition was the poor development and use of pronouns in ancient
Indian languages. In Sanskrit the same noun is repeated where the Western
classical languages would use a pronoun.
On the other hand, Indians sometimes used extremely simple ex-
pressions. This is also said to have been to help students remember
content easily. If so, repetition of sentences of the same style were probably
used for recitation (viz. infra). This explanation, however, cannot be
applied to the cases of repetition of the Upani~ads. (e.g. Brhad. Up.,
III, 7). In the case of all Buddhist scriptures, as Oldenberg maintained
(Buddha, 7th edition, 206-207), this probably relates to that Indian way
of thinking which resorted to substituting repetition of words for recogniz-
ing objective order in nature.
Another linguistic tendency of Indians, more or less related to this
way of thinking, is that synonymous words are often used side by side to
express an idea or opinion. This was noticed quite early in history by the
ancient Chinese people. Shih Tao-an (4th century A.D.) referred to the
fact that repetitions in Buddhist scriptures were simplified and omitted
when translated into Chinese, by saying: "Foreign scriptures are very
detailed in their description. For example, words of admiration are re-
peated twice, thrice, or even four times without any concern for their
tiring effect. In the present translation, these repetitions are all omitted."12
This same criticism was also made by Japanese who said: "India is a land
where people are fond of thoroughness and minuteness in everything.
It is her custom to repeat synonyms in expressions of admiration.
In China, people like simplicity and try to avoid repetitiousness.
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Frequent use of compound words in the ancient Indian languages, and
especially in Sanskrit, can also be interpreted as symptomatic of the
weakness of the Indian notion of order among various phenomena or
ideas. In the l)g-veda, use of long compound words was comparatively
rare. After that, frequency of their use gradually increased in the course
of time. In verses of kiivya style especially, very long compounds were
welcomed and intentionally used. This same tendency can be observed
in the Prakrit literature.14 In this case, the relation among component
words of a long compound is rather difficult to understand. The rriain
purpose of the compound is not to produce an exact expression of meaning,
but to originate, in the mind, the impression of the idea expressed by
each word one by one without interruption. It, however, often leaves
room for many interpretations of a compound and tends to make the
meaning obscure and less understandable. (On this point Sanskrit
resembles Chinese.) Indians, therefore, themselves tried at times to avoid
the use of compounds as much as possible in scholarly works, and
especially in prose. In the vernacular languages of ancient India, there is
also an avoidance of long compounds. Still as a rule, there is more use of
compounds in Sanskrit than in Western classical languages. Let us mention
the following as an example.
Coins of Parthian kings who governed Northwest India before the
Christian era have the same phrase in Greek script on one side, Indian
Prakrit on the other. Words like "brother of the king" and "king of kings"
are written separately in Greek while they are combined in compounds
in the Indian language.I5
The same tendency is prominently seen in popular works such as the
epics. For example, in the Bhagavadg'itii, the most famous religious work in
India, many such examples can be found though the number of the com-
pounds is comparatively less. For example: janmabandhavinirmuktiis (II,
51) = generationum vinculis exsoluti = Ka~ &7l"aAAaylvT£~ TOU Slap.ou ~T~
y£vv~a£w~ = released from the bondage of birth (m.pl.nom.); Kuruvrddha
(I, 12) = Curuidarum progenitor =;, 'TI'pfaf3~T£po~ TroV tV TV y£v£~ Kovpou
=grown in Kuru; sarvalokamaheSvaram (acc.) (V, 29) =universae
mundi magnum dominum = 'TI'aVTWV TWV K6al'WV p.lyav ~y£p.6va=great
ruler of the whole universe; samithhjaya~ (I, 8) =bellorum pro~igator=
;, V!K1JT~~ tV 'TI'oAlp.cr =victorious in battle.
In the verse (gatha) sections of the Early Buddhist scriptures, the
expressions are generally quite simple and no such complicated and artifi-
cial compounds are found as are observed in the later literature. Neverthe-
less, in a comparison with Latin and other Western languages, use of
certain long compounds can be seen. For instance, the following examples
are found in the Pali Dhammapada: ariyappavedite dhamme (Dhp. 79) =
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a llenerandis enarrata lege = doctrines preached by venerables; saddham-
madesanii (Dhp. 194) = llerae doctrinae institutio = instruction of the
true doctrine; paradukkhupadhiinena (Dhp. 291) = aliis dolorem im-
ponendo = causing others' sufferings; riijarathupamam (ace.), (Dhp. 171)
= currui regali similem = similar to the chariot of a king; sabbaduk-
khii pamuccati (Dhp. 189 f.) =ab omni dolore liberatur =he is liberated
from all sufferings.
More remarkable is the case of the Bahuvrihi compound (possessive
compound) in Sanskrit, which is very much developed and utilized fre-
quently. A compound word of this kind requires a long sentence when
translated into Western classical languages; e.g., pathavisamo (Dhp. 79)
=qui terrae instar est =one who is like the earth; yuktasvapniivabodhasya
(Bhag. VI, 17) = qui temperans est in dormiendo ac llibilando, . . . ei =
P.£Tp{W~ i7rvouvTt Ka1 P.£Tp{w~ YP7JyopOUVTt =of one whose mind is in a dream
as well as awake; kapidhllaja~ (Bhag. I, 20) = simiae effigiem in llexillo
gestans = b £Xwv £V TV u7Jf.La{q. TOV 7rU)7JKa = one who is possessed of the
sign of the monkey, a name for Arjuna.
Some sentences containing Bahuvrj"hi compounds require sentences of
an entirely different structure in translation; e.g., manopubbmigamii
dhammii manosetthii manomayii (Dhp. I) = naturae a mente principium
ducunt, mens est potior pars earum, e mente constant = phenomena are
governed by mind, consist mainly of mind, and are made by mind.
When the subordinate clause is required in Western modern lan-
guages, or the absolute, in the case of Western classical languages, San-
skrit expresses it often in a compound; e.g., adharmiibhibhavat (Bhag., I,
41) = impietate gliscente = TOU 8£ avJp.ov £7rLy£vop.lvov =because there is
arisen immorality.
Sometimes even two contrary ideas are combined in a compound; e.g.,
subhiisubham (ace.) (Bhag. II, 57) = faustum vel infaustum = pure
or impure; pUiiiiiipiipapahinassa (gen.) (Dhp. 39) = bono maloque
vacui =having abandoned both merit and demerit.
Successive mention of various impressive ideas in a long compound
gives vast play to fantastic imagery. Therefore Indian compounds cannot
be translated into Japanese or Western languages without the loss of a
stylistic effect. On this point, Oldenberg said: "As our language is far less
effective than Indian languages in its power of composition, we are some-
times obliged to replace one word in the Indian language by several words,
which makes the final effect weak."16
Obscurity in the meaning of a word is also caused by omission of
syllables within a word in the ancient Prakrit languages. Single consonants
in particular are often omitted between two vowels. This tendency causes
confusion in meaning in the early Mahara~trian lyrics. For example,
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Maharagrian "kai" is equivalent to either kati (some), kavi (poet), or
kapi (monkey) in Sanskrit; in case of uaa ( = udaka, Skt.), only the
vowels were retained. This omission was probably due to the fact that
Indian consonants are not articulated as strongly as in Western languages.l1
This omission of consonants gives the Prakrit languages a feminine
impression in their pronunciation, as has already been recognized and
indicated by the ancient Indians.18 It may correspond to the feminine
trend commonly observed in Indian ways of thinking. Prakrit languages
are purely Indian in character, in contrast with Sanskrit, which is proto-
Indo-European.
In their clear expression of order in the objective world by linguistic
form, modern Western languages are far more developed than Sanskrit
and classical Western languages. In the case of declarative statements, the
latter maintain no distinction between subject and predicate in their
grammatical form, while the former maintain it. For example, in sentences
like "mountains are high," "trees are green," etc., the predicate adjective
agrees with the subject in gender, number, and case, in Greek and Latin,
as is also the case in Sanskrit and other ancient Indian languages. In
these languages, the consciousness of assimilation or identification of both
ideas contained in the subject and in the predicate is prominent. On the
other hand, in modern languages the predicate adjective has no declension.
(These trees are green, this tree is green.) It signifies that in modern
Western languages the subject and predicate are expressed as distinct from
each other in their functions, though the concordance of both parts in
judgment is recognized also.
The Indian tendency to alienate the objective natural world and to
live in the world of meditation also characterizes Indian art. Coomara-
swamy says in effect that Indian artists never used models but resorted to
imagination in making sculptures. This method, which was accepted, no
doubt unconsciously at the beginning, was authorized by rules in a
scripture called Sukranitisiistra.19 Indeed ancient sculptures, as seen in
Sanchi (3rd-2nd century B.C.), are fairly realistic and sensual, but the
character of other arts gradually changed into fantasy in the course of time.
Imagination Which Ignores Natural Law
There is a tendency among the Indians, divested in general of the
concept of a perceptible objective order, not to differentiate too sharply
bet~een the actual and the ideal or between fact and imagination or
fantasy. "If there were a place where the dreams of ideal existence cherished
by mankind since primitive times were to be realized on earth, that place
is India."20
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To many Westerners, God is believed to exist in a high Heaven,
while to the Chinese, Heaven is situated above the earth. However, the
Indian Buddhists thought of Buddhas of the past, present, and future
living in all corners of this universe, including worlds above and beneath
the earth. In contrast to the imagination of other ethnic groups which
conceived of a divinity within the limits of the visible world, the Indian
imagination transcended the bounds of ordinary world concepts.
An extreme example of Indian fantasy is found in their way of
conceiving numbers. A very long period of time is called a kalpa (eon),
whose duration is beyond our ability to imagine. It is said that if a man
of great longevity would rub a mountain of 40 square yojanas (about 3,000
square miles) with a smooth cloth once for every 100 years until the
mountain were levelled, a kalpa would not be exhausted. Or if such a
man were to take a poppy seed once in every 100 years out of the mass of
seed filling a big castle of 40 square yojanas, a kalpa would not come to
an end even though the seeds in the castle were exhausted.21 They also
speak of a practice lasting for 3 mahii-asarhkyeya-kalpas, a period equivalent
to 3 (1060) kalpas/2 for a man to attain Buddhahood. On the other hand,
they also conceive of k~alJa, a short unit of time, which is again divided
several times into smaller units.
The very rich and fanciful imagination characteristic of the Indian
way of thinking leads them to ignore the common-sense limits of physical
possibilities of things in space and time. This tendency is particularly
marked in the Mahayana scriptures and the PuriilJas. Vimalakirti in the
VimaIak'irti-nirdesa is said to have welcomed 32,000 monks to his small
room by means of his supernatural power. Once when the Buddha
Sakyamuni was preaching the SaddharmapulJ4ar'ika (the Lotus Siitra) at
Mt. Grdhrakiita, it is said that a tower, which was 5'00 yojanas high and
25'0 sq. yojanas at the base, decorated with jewels, and containing the
holy relics of the entire Tathagata Prabhiita, emerged from the earth all
at once, and that from it voices praising the sermon of Sakyamuni and
recognizing the authority of the Saddharmapundar'ika were heard. In
dealing with these fantasies, the Indians were not concerned about the
contradictions which marked such fanciful descriptions of time and space.
They ignored the laws of nature and remained unperturbed. That mythol-
ogy relates matters in contradiction to the natural laws of time and space is
a commonplace fact in any country; however, the case of the Indians is
unrivalled. They carelessly refer to such big numbers as million, billion,
"as many as the number of the sands of the Gangetic river," etc. Thus the
Indian mind will transcend the realm of imagination, crushing and
paralyzing ordinary powers of expression.
Among the Hindu scriptures, the PuriilJas are particularly rich in
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imagery. For example, the myth of the miraculous power of the child
K!1I].a is typically Indian in character. The whole story is full of fantasies
and the heroic Kr~I].a is described with qualities which are beyond most
peoples' imagination. This myth corresponds exactly to the mental atmos-
phere created in the Indian paintings and sculptures in which we are
amazed by their portrayal of fantastic and chimerical qualities. The rich
and sensuous illusion that is typically Indian emerges from this myth and
incites feelings of great astonishment.
Such extreme imagination often sweeps away historical facts. E. Se-
nart, a famous French Indologist, was of the opinion that the biography
of the Buddha was nothing but a kind of solar-myth. His remark bears on
the difference between the Indians' fanciful mind and the Westerners'
more realistic character. Indians' love of fantasy also checked the develop-
ment of natural science in India. Even chemistry, which is said to have
developed very early in India, inevitably changed into a kind of magic.
Furthermore, the Indians never made a conscious effort to check their
extravagant development of fantasy. They are extremely sensitive. They
respond immediately to all the impulses or impressions, real or illusory,
brought on from the outer world, and create fantasies one after another.
But they are completely passive towards such impulses or impressions,
and never try to force their will on them. It may be said that they have
nerves rather than muscles.
Referring to this characteristic of Indian ways of thinking, Romain
Rolland once said: "Please don't compare Western 'realism' to Indian
'idealism'! There are two kinds of realism. The Indians are by nature
realisateurs. They find it hard to be satisfied with any abstract idea. It is
through physical pleasure and alluring charm that they attain realization."23
Tominaga Nakamoto, a unique free-thinker in the still feudal years of
1715-1746, referring to this characteristic of Indian thought as "gen" or
"maboroshi" (Japanese) = maya, illusion, observed: "The Indians are
habitually very fond of hallucination, which can be compared to the
Chinese love of wen or 'culture'; he who wishes to establish a school and
teach must follow its way, without which he will not be able to win the con-
fidence of the masses."24 He also remarked, "The learning of the Indians
consists in their pursuit of hallucination without which the people will not
follow."25 Many incredible stories are narrated in the Buddhist scriptures
as a sensational means designed to enlighten the masses.26
He quotes the following sentences as the words of a venerable person-
age: "Magic characterizes Buddhism. It corresponds to 'izuna' (magic)
in present-day Japan. The Indians are fond of it, and unless it is employed
in preaching, there would be no followers. Therefore Sakyamuni must
have been a great magician. The purpose of his six years of ascetic practices
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in the mountain was to learn this magic. The supernatural powers
(abhijiiii) described in the scriptures imply magic. For example, the cases
of the manifestation of 3,000 worlds created by the light emitted from
between the eyebrows (ur~-keSa) or of the vast long tongue reaching the
Heaven of the Brahman, or of Vimalakirti's ability to create 84,000 seats
in a small room, or of the goddess who transformed Siiriputra into a
woman, are nothing but descriptions of magical powers in the realm of
fantasy. Furthermore, the doctrines of transmigration, of moral causality,
stories of marvelous events in previous lives, and other curious stories,
were means of inducing the people to believe in the newly established
doctrine. This is the Indian way of teaching, but is not the way necessarily
for the Japanese."21 If we are to follow this view, the theory of hell and
paradise is nothing but a means for propagating Buddhism.28 Criticizing
this opinion, Tominaga said: "In spite of the venerable scholar's opinion,
abhijiiii is different from izuna. Izuna is merely a matter of technique,
while abhijiiii is the result of strict religious practice. Nevertheless his
words stand with reason." Thus Tominaga believed that miraculous power
was really attained by practice and it was this aspect which characterized
Indian Buddhsim.
If we were to examine the views held by the Indian Buddhists on
this matter, we find, for example, the following words of Nagarjuna:
"There is a man of evil nature, who, possessed of a jealous mind, slander-
ously says, 'the Buddha's wisdom is not beyond that of mortals; he misleads
the world by means of magic.' The Buddha manifested the infinite divine
power and infinite wisdom for the purpose of severing one from such a
crooked and self-conceited state of mind."29 Nagarjuna further remarked,
"A bird without feathers cannot fly. Likewise, the Bodhisattvas without
the perfection of miraculous power cannot lead the people."30 Thus,
Nagarjuna himself was of the opinion that the Buddhas and the Bodhisat-
tvas were actually endowed with miraculous faculties far more powerful
than those of the heretics:
Such a way of thinking naturally met with a reaction. The materialists
of India strongly opposed the doctrine of miraculous power, while the
natural philosophers ignored it completely.
Indian myths and legends of fantastic character were not accepted by
the Greeks. Ambassador Megasthenes, who was sent by a Syrian king to
the court of Indian Emperor Candragupta about 300 B.C., wrote Ta Indika,
his report of India in those days; it was based upon his experiences, and a
few fragments are preserved today. These fragments, regarded today as
valuable material for the study of ancient India, record a lot of myths and
legends then current in India. Modern studies show that these myths and
legends are the same as those described in the Mahiibhiirata and the
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Purii1:za literatures.3! At that time, however, the Greeks who had read
his report did not believe it at all.32 Not only his report, but also
descriptions of India by Deimakhos, Onesikritos, Nearkhos, and others,
were generally criticized by the historian Strabo as being unfactuaI.33
The Greeks thought that the myths and legends told seriously by Indians
were fantastic.
The same criticism is made by modern Europeans. Hegel said: "Sen-
sory evidence is of no value, because to the Indians, generally speaking,
there is no sensory perception. Everything is reshaped into fantastic im-
ages, and any kind of dream is regarded as truth and reality."34 Kern, a
famous scholar on Buddhism, thought that when an Indian conceives an
image in meditation, he seems to lose the distinction between that image
and the phenomena of the objective world. "Buddhists are idealists, they
maintain no clear distinction between phenomenal facts based upon ob-
servation and the products of fantasy. . . . The world is created by medi-
tation (dhyiina)."35 It may be dangerous to generalize the Buddhist way of
thinking in this way, but it is true that such a tendency did exist among
some Buddhists.
Among the later Vedantists, a school developed which held that by
penetrating the realm of the undifferentiated by means of meditation, the
world of phenomena could be eliminated; that, they believed, was the
way of emancipation (mok~a). This theory was called "prapaiica-vilaya-
viida," i.e. the theory of the disappearance of phenomena. In the Upani-
shads, the frequent injunction is: "the Atman should be conceived like
this." It is a command to eliminate the realm of phenomena (prapaiica-
vilaya). In other words the dualism implied by a reality beyond and
contrary to the phenomenal world constitutes "an obstacle to the realization
of truth (tattviivabodha-pratyanika-bhtita)," thus, emancipation is realized
only after the obstacle has been eliminated. This theory was often referred
to as unorthodox in the later Vedantic works. Sarhkara, too, denied it,a6
His criticism is as follows: "If the elimination of all phenomena means
the extinction of our natural world, that is a statement of absurdity; if, on
the other hand, it means the extinction of illusion which is a product of
our ignorance, it is not a matter which can be realized by a 'command' but
only through 'understanding.''' However, the real intent of those who
maintained this theory was to "command" a series of negations and thus
help one to understand that Atman is devoid of character (nirgu~a); e.g.,
in the scripture, it is commanded, "conceive Atman as A," "conceive Atman
as B," etc., in which case, by conceiving Atman as A, Atman is being
negated as B, similarly, by conceiving Atman as B, Atman is being negated
as A, etc. As can be seen, the theory here expressed was, more or less,
...
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similar to that held by Samkara.37 Of course, such a view was not neces-
sarily held by the Indians in general, but it does reveal that the Indians,
through one of their influential thinkers, had established a thought-
pattern which can be recognized as one of their characteristic ways of
thinking.
This pattern of thought is quite significant in that it provides men
dwelling in darkness with light and hope for the future; but because there
is no grasping of the distinction between the real and the ideal, it lacks
the force of the rational recognition and control of the hard facts of
reality. The Indians maintained an unlimited desire for pleasure and
profit, but did not develop a system of capitalistic economy. "An unlimited
desire for profit is not necessarily identical to capitalism, nor is it of the
same 'spirit.' On the contrary, capitalism requires the repression of the
irrational forces of desire, or at least the controlling of these forces."38 Of
course, it was not only the Indians who lacked the rationale of capitalism,
but it can be reasoned that it was the fact that the Indians did not think
much of controlling matters of this world that hindered their development
of capitalism.
Not only is there a recognizable difference between the social and
economic systems of modern India and the West, but the same is true also
of their ways of thinking in the medieval periods of these two areas. Even
European Scholastics who, from the viewpoint of modern men, discussed
meaningless and uninteresting problems minutely, nevertheless, dealt
with matters of "control" in regard to state and society (e.g. Thomas
Aquinas). On the other hand, although the conservative Buddhist scholars
of medieval India likewise discussed many complex problems, as indicated
in the Abhidharma literature, they did not greatly concern themselves with
the problems of state or social structure. They did, however, engage in
long discussions pertaining to mental cultivation and sheer fantasy. Both
Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism discussed in detail the problems
pertaining to the rebirth of mankind in which a cyclic process was con-
sidered the path on which to pursue the work necessary for salvation.
One has the feeling that men who had indulged in the narration of this
process must have lived in a world entirely different from ours.
There might be some objection to the above statement in that
Mahayana Buddhism had dealt in considerable length with the problem of
the state.39 However, it is to be noted that Mahayana Buddhism cannot
be considered representative of the thoughts of the Indians in general;
it reveals only one characteristic aspect of Indian thought. The governing
class of India supported the traditionally conservative Buddhism, and the
state concept of Mahayana Buddhism revealed nothing more than a
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reaction against it. Realistic ideas of state and government were dealt
with by the more secular Brahmins, while the more catholic religions of
Buddhism and Jainism tended to escape from secular matters.
The Tendency to Resort to Extremes
The imagination of Indians ignores the natural limitations of time
and space. It is free, boundless and extravagant, and often goes to extremes.
And as they do not fully realize, in many -cases, the distinction between
realities and dreams, they continue to pursue their dreams even within
the sphere of reality. Let me illustrate these extremes of behavior. An
Indian epicurean absorbs his whole soul and body in pleasure-seeking.
And an ascetic in India leads a very austere life in the woods.40 The Bud-
dhist advocacy of the middle path, detached from either enjoyment or
self-affiiction, is an exceptional case in India.41
The radical conservatives of the Jain monks were called "Digambara-
the sky-clad." They went about completely naked, or in other words,
"clothed in space." They said: "Our body is a cover of the Atman. The
garments are the outer coverings of that covered Atman. To lessen the
coverings of the Atman, we do not wear a garment."42 And the Jains praised
as a master of the highest virtue the monk who died as the result of
observing a fast. One of their sacred books gives a detailed description of
how saints took to death by starvation.43
The Greeks set a high value on the virtue of moderation. They often
quoted Solon's maxim "nothing too much" (P:'18tv a:yav, ne quid nimis). In
China, too, the middle course is one of the essential virtues in their ethics.
Indians, on the other hand, are likely to go to extremes. The idea of the
golden mean (aurea mediocritas) has not developed in this land apart from
the one exception of the Buddhist advocacy of the middle path.
As a result of this feature of their way of thinking, Indians are inclined
to idealize and to consecrate great men in their history to the utmost. This
offers a sharp contrast to the Western trend to avoid excessive glorification
of great heroes. In India, as in other countries, there are many biographies
of great men. The sagas of the saints are especially numerous. And the
stories described in such books are very wild and fantastic. They are myths
rather than the life stories of the heroes. In India legendary heroes like
Kr~l).a have been deified in excessive fashion in the course of time. At
first, the stories of Kr~l).a described the hero's birth, childhood, romances,
fights, and victories in realistic style. But, as the stories were handed down
among people, they were exaggerated to a fantastic extent until finally
K~~a was deified and became the object of enthusiastic savior-worship.
-c1
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Fondness for Myths and Poetry
Indians are very fond of myths and poetical forms of expression, a
natural result of their inclination to idealize the actual phases of human
life. Indians try to beautify the hard facts of reality by contemplating
them from a detached standpoint.
From the time of the J)g-Veda up to the present, for more than three
thousand years, Indians have never ceased creating new myths. And many
myths thus produced come from one source. The gods in the Epics of the
Mahabharata and the Ramayatza are the gods of the Vedas. The Vedic
myths revived and perpetuated the legends of the Epics. The legends of
the Epics are in turn assimilated in the Puratzas, and the legends formed
in the modern age are based on the myths transmitted in this way. Indians
have always been tolerant toward the myths of older ages. Sometimes the
myths of older origin are in conflict with their own, but even in that case
they have included them in their mythological system.
The Chinese are much more limited in their development of mythol-
ogy, while their achievements in historical works are very remarkable.
Indians, on the contrary, have produced an abundance of myths, but
their documents of history are quite few in number. The books of history
and the sagas written in India are all embellished with mythological over-
tones. In their works it is difficult to distinguish the historical facts from
the output of imagination.
Even in philosophical discourses, mythical explanations and metaphors
are frequently used. The philosophers of India follow the rules of meta-
physical and logical reasoning within their own particular circle. But in
order to convey a better understanding of their theories to the common
man, they are willing to resort to mythical ways of explanation. It has
been recognized that the philosophers of the Upani~ads resorted to this
means of instruction. Uddalaka Arul).i, for instance, explains the relation
between the ultimate entity which he terms "being (sat)," and all other
beings by resorting to various allegories.44
The Greeks noticed this Indian affection for myths and poems. Meg-
asthenes observed: "... like Plato, they (the Brahmins) weave into the
fabric of myth (p:6(Jo.) such (philosophical) problems as the immortality
of the soul or judgment after death."45 Thus Megasthenes found a resem-
blance to Plato in the figurative explanation of the philosophical issues
found in the Upani~ads.
The Epics, the Pural).as, and the texts of Mahayana Buddhists, all
resort to the allegorical method in order to explain their doctrines. The
Lotus Sutra is called "the king of all the sutras" and is really a representa-
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tive text of the Mahayana. And we wonder what other elements would
remain in this Sutra if we were to remove the elements of allegory and
fiction explaining the past origin of present events. Indian philosophers
consider allegories or illustrations (dmiinta) to be indispensable in explain-
ing their thought even when they are pursuing their arguments in ac-
cordance with rules of logical reasoning.
Indians are a poetry-loving people. Since the ancient period, many
poems of a high artistic standard have been composed in their country.
Besides, great works in the diverse fields of religion, philosophy, politics,
laws, economics, mathematics, and other sciences employ the verse form.
Since ancient times, Indians have preferred to count numerically not by
means of numbers but by using names-that is, common nouns; for in-
stance, "the moon" or "the earth" stand for "one" and "the eyes" or "the
wings" represent "two." And this manner of counting has grown into a
very complicated one. In some extreme cases, they have forty or fifty ways
of expressing a certain numerical figure by means of various nouns. It is
noteworthy that they have adopted this method of counting simply to
satisfy the need for a rich vocabulary for rhyming in their literature. This
is distinctly'one result of the Indian adherence to the verse-form even in
their scientific works.
Indians are very fond of reciting verses. At present, in various parts
of India, there are many "poetry-parties" where many poets gather together
to read their poems before enthusiastic audiences. One of the general
characteristics of today's Indian periodicals is the custom of devoting a
considerable number of pages to poems.
Indians have much in common with the Western Romanticists in
their way of thinking. For instance, they have in common a longing-or
more properly speaking, a vague and undefined attraction-toward an
infinite, distant, and supernatural Being. It is natural, therefore, that
many Romanticists of the West interested themselves in Indian thought
and participated in introducing this new thought to their own world.
Goethe spoke in the highest terms of Kalidasa's Sakuntalii. August Wilhelm
von Schlegel (1765-1845) translated the Bhagavadgitii into Latin. Wil-
helm von Humboldt read this Latin translation and extolled it as the most
beautiful and most philosophical poem ever known to world literature, and
was thankful for the good fortune to see the book.46 Friedrich von Schlegel,
a younger brother of Wilhelm, wrote a book which is one of the most
significant works in the history of German Romanticism-On the
Language and Wisdom of the Indians (aber die Sprache und Weisheit
der Inder, 1808). Schopenhauer, who was influenced much by the Indian
philosophy was one of the philosophers of Romanticism. A successor of
his thoughts, Paul Deussen, became absorbed in the study of the philoso-
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phies of India. And Count von Keyserling, who was also deeply interested
in Indian thought, once stated that "the savior of the spiritual and material
disorder of the world after World War I is the ideal of the Bodhisattva."47
Lack of Historical Consciousness
All Indian books of history, of which there are very few, are tinged
with a fantastic and legendary color. They are not products of historical
science but rather works of art. Usually they are written in verse. Indians
are not satisfied with the simple and naive description of facts, the language
of daily use. From the artistic viewpoint, the Indians beautify the past
and try to idealize it. They ignore precise figures, the sequences of events,
and other prosaic details relating to the time and the place where the
events took place. Furthermore, to give full play to the imagination, they
exaggerate figures astronomically and stretch the truth with their magnifi-
cent and brilliant style of hyperbole. Like many of their sculptures, their
historical works are far from reality, but are rather the products of their
fantasy.
The Mahiivathsa is the most elaborate and reliable work of history
ever produced in Ceylon. And even this book is surrounded by a mysterious
and legendary atmosphere. For instance, though Mahanaman, the author
of this book, lived in the fifth century-in an age not too distant from the
time of King Dunhagamani's reign, his descriptions of this greatest ruler
in the history of the island are full of mythical and legendary elements,
and therefore, a careful distinction must be made between myth and that
which is historically true. We know that the histories or "chronicles" of
the monks in medieval Europe and the biographies of eminent Buddhist
monks in China and Japan have a similar style. But, to an incomparably
greater degree, the Mahiivathsa goes far beyond the bounds of historical
truth.
Kalhal)a's RiijatarangilJ'i is the chronicle of a Kashmirian dynasty.
This is one of the best historical works ever written by the Indians. In it,
Kalhal)a details the social situation of his time and the activities of the
various characters in it with the accuracy that no other Indian book of
history has attained. But, still, a poetic and emotional atmosphere pervades
the whole of this historical work. To quote Oldenberg: "If one removes
all the poetic elements from KalhaI)a's story, and compares it with events
of the time, he will find that the story is in essence on a level not higher
than that of a more or less accurate article in a newspaper or a cartoon in
a political comic paper. The process of formation that this story has under-
gone is not that of historical thinking but of poetry-poetry in the Indian
sense with its brilliant quality and also with its weakness. And Kalhal)a
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himself has a very distinct idea on this point; he feels himself as a poet
and he is a poet."48 And Kalhar:a scarcely pays heed to historical or causal
sequence when considering historical events. His dates are inac<;urate and
sometimes the products of pure imagination.
In all the Indian documents of the past, little significance has been
attached to the books of history; most Indians have been much more in-
terested in religion and poetry than in historical documentation. For the
Indians, a minor error in the recitation of the Vedas has been a serious
matter, but they have been thoroughly indifferent to the erroneous record-
ing of dates or of facts in their books of history.49 This unhistorical
character of the Indian way of thinking is distinctly observable in the
Buddhist attitude to the rules of their order. Buddhists in the period after
the death of the Buddha had to establish new precepts for their body in
order to meet the changing social conditions. As some of the rules newly
established by them were not compatible with the older ones, they hesitated
to include their new rules in the old and traditional books of ordination
Cpiitimokkha), and managed to attach them to the piitmokkhas as supple-
ments.50 They, however, dared to claim the authority of the Buddha's own
teaching even for these supplementary precepts of their own creation,
completely ignoring historical evidence. Their concern for the proper
observance of the precepts and of the rites preceded and was stronger
than their regard for historical accuracy.
The Chinese derive their rules of social conduct from the examples
of their ancestors as described in their books of history. The Indians, on
the other hand, gain their principles of behavior from their religious books
and, at the same time, fables and parables such as the Paiicatantra and the
HitopadeSa contribute toward the diffusion of practical morals into the
daily life of the Indian people.51 To quote Oldenberg again on the unhistori-
cal character of the Indians: ". . . but, should we blame the Indians for
no other reason than that they are Indians? The Indian folk-spirit would
not have been what it was without the unhistorical character. For the
formation of the spirit of the people, factors other than considerations of
historical truth had the decisive power."52
The Concept of Truth
The Indian concept of truth is different from that of the Westerner.
Satya is the oldest Sanskrit equivalent for truth. And as we have mentioned
above, in the Upani~ads of the early days dharma is considered to be
identical with satya. From this fact, we become aware of the difference
in the concept of truth as held by the ancient Indians and modern peoples.
The dominant philosophical schools of ancient India did not find truth in
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the agreement of subjective knowledge with the objective order, nor in
intersubjectively valid knowledge, but rather, they sought truth in the
practice of ethics; that is in the observance of rules of conduct. In other
words, they sought complete concordance or spiritual unity through ethics,
and they considered this spiritual way of life to be the truth.
Later on, another word tattva came in use together with satya to mean
truth. And, in addition to these two words, Buddhists had their unique
term tathatii also to mean truth.53 The original meaning of tattva is "that-
ness" and tathatii, "such-ness." Truth in the ancient Indian concept is no
other than "to be that" or "to be such." They indicated truth by "that" or
"such"-the terms of the simplest prescription of the object. In other words,
truth exists where all forms of discrimination have been negated. And
satya means "being" or "relating to being." Generally speaking, Indians
are inclined to take an ontological view, and not an epistemological view,
of truth. Of course, it is wrong to assume that the philosophies of India
are all tinged with one color. Nevertheless, it is not incorrect to affirm that
the ontological view has been dominant in this country.
In the West, on the other hand, many philosophers have found truth
in the agreement of knowledge and its object. Kant, for instance, put it as
follows: "If truth consists in the agreement of knowledge with its object,
that object must thereby be distinguished from other objects; for knowl-
edge is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related, even
though it contains something which may be valid for other objects."54 Al-
though this view of Kant was criticized by Hegel and others, we can safely
say that the Kantian view of truth has been predominant in the West. And
this trend can be traced back as far as the ancient Greeks. The Greek
equivalent of truth is "&.A~()(La." The original meaning of this word is "not
to be hidden," "to be known as it is" or "to be noticed." It comes from the
negative form of the verb "Aav()avw" which means "to escape notice," or "to
be unknown." This concept of truth is based on the Greek idea of the ex-
ternal relationship between the subjective knower and the known object.
Non-development of Natural Sciences
In India, studies of the natural world remained underdeveloped. The
ancient Greeks were aware of this fact. "As to nature Cep-6UL<;) on the other
hand, the statements [of Indians] are very simple and innocent." Meg-
asthenes goes on to say: "The reason is that they are skilled in practice
(fpyOL) rather than in argument CAOyOL), and they accept as true what is
said in the myths Cp.-6()O<;)."55 Of course, it is not true to say that there was
no natural science in this country. The ancient Indians developed their
own astronomy chiefly in relation to the Vedic rites. In their texts of in-
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cantations and ceremonies a remarkable degree of knowledge is revealed in
regard to the structure of the human body.56 Their medical science de-
veloped into many branches of specialties, and it is said that chemistry
arose in this country earlier than in any other country. In the third cen-
tury B.C., and thereafter, their mathematics, astronomy, and chemistry were
greatly stimulated by the introduction of the Greek sciences.57 But the
Indians ended by adopting and imitating the science of the Greeks, and
there was no further development of their own in most sciences. The sci-
entific approach to problems failed to develop in this country where think-
ing was much more metaphysical.
Contact with Western scientific thought began in the 19th century to
encourage the study of the sciences in India.
Indians set a high value on learning. But they are not satisfied with
the mere empirical knowledge of substances which are in themselves lim-
ited in time and space. They emphasize a Reality existing behind and
beyond such substances--the subjective entity or Universal Being. Greek
philosophy started as a study of nature (</>vO'('). Indian philosophy, on the
other hand, from the beginning has sought the being which transcends
nature. As 8. Misch pointed out, Indian philosophy is metaphysical in
marked contrast to the Greek geometrical view of the physical world.58
Western metaphysics has, on the whole, developed in relation to the
growth and influence of physical science (ta physika). Western meta-
physics is, or was at least up to the eighteenth century, the study of or the
inquiry into ultimate principles of "being." Thus as the study of the
principles attributed to "being," Western metaphysics established its own
field of study clearly distinguished from that of natural science. And we
can see a good example of this in the Scholastic study of "being." Most
thinkers in India, however, did not and do not consider metaphysics in
contradistinction to physical science. The goal of Indian philosophy
(darsana) is to seek the ultimate principles of universal nature, and there-
fore, traditional Indian philosophers do not take to a positivistic philosophy
of natural science. The Indians include metaphysics and natural science
together as one mental activity-learning in general (vidyii). And they
are unwilling to acknowledge natural science as an independent field of
study distinguished from metaphysics. Even in the naturalistic philosophy
of the Nyaya and the Vaise~ika, natural science held no independent
position. Uddalaka and the scholars of the Vedanta, like the Greek phi-
losophers, regarded "being" as the ultimate source of truth. But it should be
noted here that there is an essential difference between the Greeks and
Indians in respect to the concept of "being." For the Indians, "being" is
Atman and essentially it is identical with the subjective knower. "Being"
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as conceived by the Indians is not objective but subjective; herein lies
the great difference between the Indians and Greeks.
Kautilya's Arthasiistra classifies knowledge into four groups: (I) phi-
losophy (iinvik~ik"i); (2) study of the Vedas (tray"i); (3) economics
(viirttii); (4) study of laws (datt4aniti). In his system, no independent
significance is recognized for natural science. He would probably in-
clude the study equivalent to natural science, in our sense of the term, in
the third group-viirttii'--because it serves to make our lives easy and com-
fortable just like economics. His system of classification was accepted by
many Indian philosophers of later ages.59
Buddhists classify knowledge into five groups: (I) study of language
(sabda-vidyii); (2) studies of technology and the calendar (Silpakar-
masthiina-vidyii); (3) medicine, pharmacy, and the study of magical
charms (cikitsii-vidyii); (4) logic (hetu-vidyii); (5) study of the Buddhist
doctrines (adhyiitma-vidyii).60 The second and the third groups above
mentioned belong to what we call natural science. But, it should be noted
that Buddhists established this system of classification only from a practical
concern. They had no idea of natural science as unique and independent
of other fields of studies.61 In India of later periods, knowledge comes to
be classified into more elaborate and smaller groups. And all the systems
of classification follow the decrees of the Vedas and give priority to the
Vedas. But no endeavor was made to establish natural science as a separate
field of study.
Indian studies regarding nature developed independently of mathe-
matics. This fact presents a great and basic difference between the Indian
concept of natural science and the Western concept which, as we can see
in Kant, places mathematics at the base of all natural sciences.
Indian philosophy has developed almost completely unaffected by
the progress of the natural sciences. And this is one reason why epistemol-
ogy in the modern sense has not made much headway in India. Generally
speaking, modern Western philosophers have a different approach to the
problem of knowledge from that of their predecessors in the ancient and
the medieval worlds. The philosophers of the Nyaya, the Vedanta, and
the Mimaipsa in India agree with the Western philosophers of the ancient
and medieval periods in their assertion regarding truth as the agreement of
knowledge with the substantial being to which it is related. However,
other philosophers in India, e.g. the Buddhists, refused to acknowledge
any substantial being. Both in their rejection of the concept of a self-
existent substance and in their idea of the opposition of "the subjective
knower" and "the object," the Buddhist view is common to the epistemo-
logical standpoint of modern (as opposed to medieval scholastic) Western
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philosophers. In another basic respect, however, Western epistemology
differs from this ancient Indian theory of knowledge. One of the chief
purposes of modern Western theories of knowledge is to supply a theoreti-
cal basis for natural sciences. And to meet this purpose, whether they are
conscious of it or not, they have tried to find a theoretical basis for
synthetic a priori judgments. It is true that the ancient Indians had a
very penetrating insight into the problem of knowledge. Dharmakirti,
for instance, made a clear distinction between synthetic judgments and
analytic judgments and he inquired into the functions of these two
different types of judgments in actual and concrete cases of inference.
But, synthetic judgments in his case are what can be acquired by experience
and are not what exist a priori. In Dharmakirti, there existed no factor
such as the need for a foundation for rational sciences (mathematics,
physics, metaphysics) which eventually led Kant into his quest for a
theoretical basis for synthetic a priori judgments. And, though Dharmakirti
is often compared with Kant, due to the superficial similarity of their
assertions, there is a distinct and essential difference between the two.
A similar characteristic can be observed in the logic of Indians. As
is well known, Greek philosophy originated as a theoria of the order of
the objective world, and it gradually formed its logic through the study of
logos. In the case of most Indians, on the other hand, it was not the con-
sideration of nature that led them to the study of logic. Their interest in
this study arose from a different source. The need for a correct interpreta-
tion of the phrases in the Vedas led the Brahmin scholars to their study of
the principles of grammar. And a close examination of the word-forms
led them to an analysis of the process of thinking and subsequently, to
the study of the categories and to the process of reasoning. Indeed, in
contrast to the Greeks, Indians became interested in logic through their
more elaborate study and analysis of language.
In India dialogue or debate developed to a great extent, but dialectics
in the Platonic sense of the development of a point through conHicting
and opposed points of the debate did not develop so conspicuously. In
the Upani~ads, the sacred books of the early Buddhists, and the codes of
the ]ains, discussions between a teacher and a disciple, between friends,
or between a man and his wife are mentioned. In these cases, there is a
sharp distinction between the one who teaches and the one who receives
the teachings. The lessons were always one-sided; the teacher taught and
the followers accepted his instructions with unthinking obedience. And
at this stage there is hardly any interchange of ideas between the two
sides. In the books of later periods, controversies between men of opposing
ideas are presented. An old Buddhist siitra Piiyasi-suttanta/2 for instance,
is a story of a nihilist, Payasi, who was converted to Buddhism by the
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refutations and persuasions of a Buddhist sage, Kumara Kassapa. And
the Milindapanha (Questions of King Milinda), which appeared in the
second century A.D. or later in the present form bears a strong influence
of the Greek "dialogue." This is a story of the conversation between
Menander, a Greek king who reigned over Northern India, in the second
century B.C., and a Buddhist elder, Nagasena. It ends with the king's
conversion to Buddhism out of respect for the elder. The form of dia-
logue employed in the Milindapanha, formulated under Greek influence,
failed to prevail further in this country.
After the dialogue, a form of debate between two schools carne to be
employed. In this case, the individual elements of the representative
orators were all eliminated. And they did not care who the orators were.
At the end of a close and heated battle of words, the victorious party
took pride in the victory while the defeated party sank into silence. But,
it should be noted, the yielded party continued to adhere to the previously
held view even after the defeat. Of course, there were some cases in which
the defeated debater followed the opinion of the winner.53 It is likely
that the audience was converted to the winning side in an argument which,
after all, is usually the case. But there were other cases in which no altering
of opinion took place after the debate in either party. Indians, in their
static view of things, considered truth eternal and unchangeable. And
many of them failed to give deep consideration to the process of evolution
or development through dialectics.
The non-development of natural science has affected the economic
activities of this country. The natural science of the West with its rational-
ism based on mathematical calculations has made the growth of modem
capitalism technologically possible in the Western world. But India has had
no such foundation for its economic development.
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CHAPTER 11 THE INTROSPECTIVE
CHARACTER OF
INDIAN THOUGHT
The Development of the Sciences of I nner Re~ection
As a result of our study, we have seen that there has been a dominant
trend of thought in India to emphasize the universal and to subsume the
subjective and personal aspects of individuals under the universal. As a
result of such tendencies in this way of thinking, material-external-objective
sciences are not regarded highly and tend to stagnation. Spiritual-introspec-
tive-subjective studies, on the other hand, are greatly encouraged. Experi-
mental physical sciences and mathematics (as a demonstrable science)
failed to develop in ancient India.! Even later on, when theoretical Greek
and technological Roman sciences were introduced into this country,
these sciences did not take root among the people. On the other hand,
humanistic and introspective sciences such as linguistics and reflective
psychology have made noticeable advances in India; we have already
acknowledged the high development of ethical and metaphysical studies
in India.
Like other primitive tribes, Indians in an early phase of their history
believed language to have the properties of objective substances, and so
they identified a word-the name of an object-with the thing it indicated.
In this rather primitive mode of thought, there is a magical essence in
things, and language, which names objects and their properties, is endowed
with mystic power. Those who know words and have a good command of
them are able to control and dominate at will things and their properties.
Thus they believed that knowledge of language constitutes power. And
upon this assumption, they established the elaborate system of the Vedic
rites. Some philosophers asserted that language is the ultimate principle
of the universe, the master of gods, the ruler of the universe, omnipresent
in the universe, and imperceptible by the senses.2 They did not think of
language as a symbolic means for communication of the will, but they
acknowledged it as substantial in principle. In this regard, the Indian idea
of language to some extent corresponds to the Japanese belief in the "soul
of language."
THE INTROSPECTI~ CHARACTER OF INDIAN THOUGHT 153
The Greeks began their study of language chiefly to enhance the
beauty of their language, whereas the Indians were led to the study from
their belief in the mystic and sacred power of language. In India, therefore,
linguistic study started first among the Brahmin scholars. At a very early
stage, they concentrated their efforts on the study of the sentences in the
Vedas. But, gradually they extended their study to a systematic analysis of
their language, Sanskrit, which was at that time the spoken as well as the
literary language. The Sanskrit grammar was first established by PaIJ-ini
in the fourth century B.C. After the critical modifications added by
Katyayana, this grammar was transformed into a final authoritative form
by Pataiijali in the second century B.C. The study of the Sanskrit grammar
after Pataiijali ended in the elaboration of the established doctrines, and
except for some growth in the philosophical theory of language, they made
no advance from the established grammar.3
The ancient Indians in their study of grammar were minutely empir-
ical and analytical. They analyzed elaborately the forms of words. This
empirical and analytical attitude of the Indian grammarians was stimulated
by the fact that Sanskrit has word-forms more heterogeneous and differen-
tiated than those of the Western classical languages. The ancient gram-
marians of India analyzed all words into three elements: the declensional
ending, the stem, and the root. They reduced every word into what they
analyzed as the corresponding root form. Not all these root forms are
correct when re-examined by present methods of comparative grammar.
Nevertheless, we are surprised at the thoroughness and consistency of the
ancient Indians in their study of grammar. The Western grammarians
adopted abstract concepts such as the stem and the root for the analysis of
their languages only after the dawn of the modern age when they came
into contact with the ancient grammar of India.
In the morphological study of language, the ancient Indians had their
general and distinctive system of various categories. For instance, they
made strict distinctions between the primary and the secondary verbal
endings. Moreover, they accomplished a very elaborate system of declen-
sions and conjugations. No other ancient nation has ever produced such a
detailed system of grammar as India.
In the phonological field they also made very careful studies. They
invented a very reasonable and scientific arrangement of the Sanskrit al-
phabet. They put the vowels first in order and then arranged the conso-
nants. In the West, until very recently, phonology or the study of sonic
elements eTa fTTOlx£la, elementa) never developed an adequate system. Al-
though the Greeks and Romans in some measure inquired into the physio-
logical structure of vocal sounds, they failed to achieve a clear and distinct
view that equalled the system of the ancient Indians. At best, they classi-
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fied the sounds into two groups: the vowels (epWV1]fVTa, vocales) and the
consonants (uvp-epwva, consonantes), analyzing them according to degrees
of vibration and their function in a syllable. It is rightly supposed that be-
cause their languages are less differentiated than Sanskrit, the Greeks and
Romans fell behind the Indians in their study of linguistics.
The ancient grammarians of India arranged their texts chieHy to
meet the conveniences of oral teaching and of learning by memory. They
made free use of many abbreviations, rhyming words, and other efficient
means which would aid memory. Naturally, their texts did not have the
categories of classification which distinguish parts of phonology, morphol-
ogy, and syntax in the same way as modern texts of grammar. Along with
the studies of grammar, Indian scholars developed the philosophy of
language to a great extent. In this field there appeared many schools.4 The
orthodox Brahmanist scholars of the MimliIp.sa and of the Vedanta tried
to establish logical theories in order to prove the permanent, unchanging
nature of words. And the grammarians after Patafijali set up the doctrine
of sphota to explain metaphysically the essence of each word. Bhartrhari
(ca. 450-500 A.D.) contributed to a further development of this doctrine
of words (Sphota). Generally speaking, Indian philosophy developed in
close connection with linguistic speculation.5
Together with linguistics, the psychology of re~ection Hourished
remarkably in India. The ancient Indians set a high value on introspection
and they exercised the silent meditation of Yoga to attain serenity of mind.
And at the same time, they made very careful analyses of mental processes
from the religious and ethical standpoint. The Yoga school, as the name
indicates, laid emphasis on the virtues of Yoga, and in their exercise of
concentration of the mind they were engaged in the examination of its
constitution. The Buddhist ascetics, too, were greatly interested in psy-
chological problems and they arranged and expressed their views on the
problems in the Abhidharmas. Maitreyanatha, Asanga, and Vasubandhu
of Mahayana continued this psychological view of the Abhidharmas and
systematized it into the theory of "Mind-only." Dharmapalafrom 'his
unique standpoint developed this theory further and his system of thought
was brought to China, and then to Japan, to Hourish in these countries as
the Hosso sect. As to the psychology of "Mind-only" established chieHy by
Dharmapala, Ryo Kuroda, the Japanese psychologist, expresses the follow-
ing view: "The position that the theory of 'Mind-only' deserves in the
whole history of psychology remains to be determined by future studies.
It is generally accepted that the Asians are excellent in the synthetic
approach while their analytical ability is inferior to that of the Westerners.
But, at least as far as the theory of 'Mind-only' is concerned, this general
assumption is by no means true. Its sharp and minute analysis with a good
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command of logic (hetu-vidya) exceeds the works of the Western psy-
chologists.... Moreover, analysis is not the sole function of the theory
of 'Mind-only.' In regard to the synthetic function as well as the analytic
one, it stands unchallenged."B And there is the other system of Buddhist
idealism which was originated by Dignaga (ca. 500 A.D.) and brought
into completion by Dharmaki'rti. This idealism is generally considered to
be a logical and epistemological assertion rather than a psychological one.
But, in reality, it contains many noteworthy suggestions from the stand-
point of modern psychology.
In the West, too, as we can see in Aristotle's De anima and in
Spinoza's Ethica, reflective psychology had been established long before
the rise of experimental psychology, with its use of the methods of natural
sciences. In a striking contrast to Indian psychology, which was deeply
concerned about the ethical or practical value that the study of different
types of mentalities may have, Western studies of psychology made observa-
tions of the various states of the human mind without any critical evalua-
tion. This difference in the Western and the Indian sciences of psychology
is considered to have resulted from the difference in their approach to the
study of the human mind. The Westerners consider the human mind
capable of being studied objectively as behavior patterns of the body, while
Indians deny its objectivity and understand all mental processes as
qualifying the subject experiencing them.
Indians, in their study of the volitional and the emotional mental
processes, place great importance upon the ethical value that each one of
these mental processes has. They evaluate the ethical and practical worth
of these mental acts and, according to moral standards of judgment,
classify them into three groups: good, bad, and neutral (avyiikrta).
Furthermore, they inquire into the origin of each one of the mental states
and finally go into the examination of the relation between a given mental
state and the ascetic methods which will serve to check or promote it. To
quote Kuroda's comment again on this point: "One of the big defects of
empirical psychology is in its undue neglect of the practical or moral
aspect of the problems. It is generally assumed that empirical psychology
or pure psychology should confine itself to the study of the mind as it is
and that the consideration of the practical significance of mental states
should be left in the hands of the scholars of applied psychology and of
pedagogical psychology. But, so far as psychology claims to be the study
dealing with all matters touching upon the mind, psychologists should be
engaged not only in observing closely individual mental phenomena and
analyzing them to build a synthesis, but also should inquire into their
practical value. As long as this side of the problem remains untouched,
psychologists cannot claim to have done their duty properly. . .. In its
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powers of mental analysis, too, the theory of 'Mind-only' can match
theoretical psychology which has a long history of development in the
West. And with its proper regard to the practical significance of types of
mentality, the theory of 'Mind-only' is akin to the idealistic system of psy-
chology."7
Indians have made a very elaborate introspective examination of states
of mind, especially of the emotional ones, and they have always placed
special emphasis upon the practical and moral significance that such states
have. These two points are the remarkable features of Indian psychology.
CHAPTER 12 THE METAPHYSICAL
CHARACTER OF
INDIAN THOUGHT
The Religious Character of Indian Thought
As a natural result of their ways of thinking, with their deep longing
for infinity and for the unknown world, and with their deep regard for
Universal Being, the Indians have imbued their civilization with a very
remarkable religious coloring. The everyday life of Indians is regulated in
the most minute details by their religion. In this chapter, we are to take into
consideration some of the cases where their religious character is most
clearly observed.
The philosophies of India are very religious. To quote Hegel: "The
philosophy of India is identical with its religion; so that the interest in
religion is the same as its interest in philosophy."! Every leading philoso-
pher in the history of Indian thought professed faith in orthodox Brah-
manism, Buddhism, or Jainism and was a member of one of the religious
orders. Materialists and sceptics opposed religion, but usually their move-
ments in India had a short duration and could not take root in the course
of its history. Both Buddhism and Jainism had very philosophical systems
of thought, but they grew into religious orders rather than into philosophi-
cal schools. Even logicians and scholars of natural sciences, except those
who held materialistic views, all had a deep regard for mystical religious
intuition. At least they acknowledged a special significance in it and be-
lieved that the release of the mind could be achieved with the aid of this
intuition.
Since ancient times, philosophy with a strong religious bent held the
dominant position in the Indian community. This was noticed by the
Greeks. Apollonius of Tyana, a Neo-Pythagorean in the first century,
wrote in his book of travel in the East that philosophy was greatly esteemed
in India and that the Indians governed well under the guidance of philo-
sophical wisdom.2 It is clear that what Apollonius meant by the word
qnAofToep[a, was chieRy intellectual activity with a bent toward religion and
metaphysics.
As the religious character of Indian thought is generally acknowl-
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edged, we shall simply add that the inclination toward religion is not a
feature merely observed in the thought of individual philosophers, but that
it had become imbedded in a deeper source-in the way of thinking of the
Indian people in general. The language that they use as the means of ex-
pressing their ideas bears the unmistakable marks of the religious character
of their way of thinking.
One of the religious features of the Indian languages can be clearly
observed in what the Western logicians call "impersonal propositions." In
the languages of the Indo-European group, the verbs expressing natural
phenomena are always used impersonally in the form of the third person
singular (e.g., .V£t in Greek; pluit in Latin; it rains in English; and es
regnet in German). In the languages of ancient India, however, people
preferred to use such forms of expression as "God makes the rain fall" or
"God makes the thunder roll."3 In many cases "God" is only implied and
not stated clearly in words.4 But the form of a sentence which sets "God"
as the subject had been used by the Indians until recently. The ancient
Greeks had similar forms of expression. In the Homeric epics, for instance,
the verbs indicating the weather set Zeus as the subject.5 In Latin, too,
there were similar forms of expression, so that these ways of expression are
not unique products of the Indian languages. But, the fact that these forms
of expression were particularly favored by the ancient Indian people for
the most part, and the fact that they had been used for centuries, indicates
the religious character of the Indian people. The ancient Indians, when
they thought of natural phenomena, always imagined the gods, who made
the phenomena, as if they operated from behind a curtain.
The Indians developed a very elaborate idea of God, and there are
numerous words which mean "god." The Sanskrit equivalent to the Greek
(h6~ and the Latin deus is deva. These three words correspond to each
other etymologically and also in their meanings. In Sanskrit, however,
there are many other terms that mean god. They call the gods of lower
rank devatii, which the Indologists translate as '(divinity" or "deity." In
this form of the word, devatii has remarkable affinities to German "Gott-
heit" or to the English "Godhead." But in its meaning, it is nearer to
"gottliche Person" or "godlike person." Brahman is a neuter noun which
means the ultimate principle of the universe. But when they consider this
principle of the universe as the divine power, they use brahman as a noun
of the masculine gender. Besides, they have iitman and paramiitman to
mean the Absolute or the innate Self.6 .
All these words indicate divine beings. But each one of them has its
unique meaning and is by no means synonymous with others. In Greek
such a rich vocabulary for the word "God" does not exist. Galanos in his
Greek translation of the Bhagavadgitii managed to translate all of these
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words in Sanskrit by only one word O£Oi.7 (Cf. Schlegel, who in his Latin
translation of this Indian sacred book, gave "deus" for the equivalent of
deva and devatii; "numen" for "brahman; "spiritus" for iitman; "spiritus
summum locum obtinens" for paramiitman).
The languages of ancient India had a very rich vocabulary for convey-
ing the idea of God, in contrast to Western classical languages. It is chiefly
because the ancient Indians had a very prolific imagination concerning gods
or godlike beings. But it is wrong to assume their rich vocabulary for "God"
to be a result of the polytheistic system of their religion. It should be re-
membered that the Greek and the Roman as well as the Japanese religions
were also originally polytheistic.s
Indians are inclined to understand every phenomenon from a religious
standpoint. One of their oldest theological records explains cosmic phe-
nomena by relating them to the parts of a beast's body in sacrifice. "Verily
the dawn is the head of the horse which is fit for sacrifice, the sun its eye,
the wind its breath, the mouth the Vaisvanara fire, the year the body of the
sacrificial horse. Heaven is the back, the sky the belly, the earth the chest.
. . ." Similar cosmological views are expressed in the Briihma1!as and
in the Ara1!yakas. In the North European countries and in China, there are
stories equivalent to the Indian myth which explains the creation of the
world by the self-splitting of the Cosmic Man,lO but the stories which
acknowledge the corresponding relation between the elements of the reli-
gious rites and natural phenomena developed exclusively in India.
In India, the Absolute is called brahman. Originally this word meant
"the phrases in the Vedas" which were recited in the magical rites. In no
other civilized countries has an idea relating to ritual, as brahman did.
rise to the position of the Absolute.
For Brahmanists, it is a matter of great importance to attain a way of
life which would permit performance of the religious rites. For them, to be
born in this world is the first life; to become qualified for the performance
of ceremonies is the second life; and to die to be reborn in Heaven is the
third life.ll
We referred above to the Indians' prolix style of writing, saying that it
comes from their particular repugnance to arranging matters according to
rules. We add here one more fundamental cause that impels them to cling
to this redundant style. It is their religious concern. The ancient Indians
recited by heart and transmitted the sacred texts of their religion by word
of mouth. In the course of time, the form of recitation was established. And
they came to suppose a magical power in the act of the recitation itself. To
keep the magical power at work, it was conceived necessary to follow the
established form obediently and to repeat it faithfully in every case of recita-
tion. No arbitrary change of the form was allowed. Thus, the ancient In-
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dians made neither condensations nor abridgements of the established
form, however repetitive and wearisome the form might be. Every sentence
in the formulae had to be recited and listened to carefully. The omission
of a single word in recitation was considered a grave religious error. The
ancient Indians followed obediently and patiently, without even any sense
of obedience or patience in their mind, the long and dull form of recitation
hardly bearable to the modern ear, and thus, for an ancient Indian ascetic
in a cottage in the depths of the forest or for a monk in a dark cavern, the
passage of time seemed infinite.
Indian natural sciences, too, were strongly influenced by the religious
concern. The ancient Indians wrote many books of mathematics, astronomy,
medicine, and other sciences, and their scientific works were stimulated
further after the Greek and the Roman sciences were introduced. Here it
is noteworthy that almost all these Indian books of science open with words
of admiration for and faith in the gods. The Greek sciences made real prog-
ress only after they had shaken off the fetters of theology. The Indian
sciences, on the contrary, grew as a subsidiary study to aid the study of the
Vedas. Among the natural sciences, astronomy was first acknowledged as
an independent field of study. From an early time, the orthodox Brahman-
ists regarded astronomy (jyoti~a) highly as one of the six subsidiary studies
for the Vedas. They needed astronomical knowledge to hold religious cere-
monies on the exact dates given in the sacred codes. And for this purpose
they began with the observation of the relations among the sun, the moon,
and the fixed stars; thus, the study of "the twenty-eight constellations"
occupied an essential part of their astronomy. It is natural that their science
of the heavenly bodies had from the beginning a very strong hue of astrol-
ogy and that its later development was inseparably related to this art of
divination. The growth of mathematics in India was paralleled by that of
astronomy. Mathematics, too, developed chiefly to meet ritualistic needs.
The ancient Indians had their alchemy and this also bore a strong religious
coloring.12 The naturalistic philosophy of the Vaise~ika supposed "the in-
visible power (adnta)" to explain the movements of the atoms. And with
the lapse of time, they came to attach religious significance to this power.
From ancient times, all Indian scientists were pious devotees of their
religions. Even at present some of the scientific research institutes in India
hold religious services. This does not mean the distortion of scientific study
by religion. In India, religion and science are not necessarily antithetical;
rather the belief is that they exist in harmony and cooperation.
The Indian arts are also deeply connected with religion. Almost all
artistic works are related to religious structures and beliefs, and according
to some of the old Indian books or discourses on art, the ultimate beauty of
art is understood as nothing but self-unification with the Absolute. As to
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their music, many of the favorite songs of Indians are religious ones. Even
Indian immigrants in foreign countries retain this strong affection for
their native religious songs.
Indians are a religious people. After they settled in the region of the
Ganges, the ancient Indians came to conceive the idea of Samsiira (the
cycle of births and rebirths), and they felt at heart that all beings includ-
ing man are involved in the cycle of transmigration. Some of their verbal
ways of expression tell us manifestly that the conduct of the ancient Indi-
ans in their everyday life was strongly influenced by their belief in Sam-
sara. For instance, the Sanskrit equivalent to English "here," iha, is used
in many cases to mean "in this world." The ancient Indians led their life
on this side of heaven with the expectation of a life after death. The belief
in the kingdom to come after death was once very widely cherished among
Western people, too. But, to a degree incomparable to that of the Western
cases, the belief in rebirth permeated the mind of the Indian people and
strongly influenced their daily life. It is reasonable, therefore, that the
Western translators of the ancient Indian languages managed to translate
iha only by resorting to circumlocution. E.g.: iha (in Bhag. II, 5) = £1'
TOther TIp j3[IP = quoad vivam; idha modati pecca modati katapuiiiio (in
Dhp., 16) = in hoc aevo gaudet, morte obita gaudet qui bonum perfecit.
For Indians who believe in rebirth by Karma, there is no eternal grace
or final damnation. All conduct in this temporal world is in itself transitory
and cannot be the final factor for the fate of a man in all his future lives.
The fate of a man in the next world is inevitably determined by the sum
of the good and evil deeds he has performed during his life in this world,
and when he has lived the fate determined by his deeds in the former life,
he will live a new life, and thus the transmigration by Karma proceeds
without end.
The Tendency to Transcend This World
In India, as well as in other countries, there have been many people
who have advocated indulgence in worldly pleasures.13 Although this is one
aspect of Indian thought, we find it rather difficult to find in it anything
peculiarly Indian; so we pass over it in order to discuss another aspect-
the sense of temporal suffering.
The Indian idea of Sarnsara is based on their view that life in this
world is suffering. This view of life is found early in the Upani~ads.
Yajfiavalkya thought that a man is happy when he has realized the Atman
and that a man is in torment when he is detached from the Atman, igno-
rant of this source of happiness. He explained the essence of the Atman
(the Self) saying: "This is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal. Every-
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thing else is of evil."14 Gotama renounced the world to seek for the way of
deliverance from pain in this life. Really the first problem that Buddhism
took up was the suffering pervasive of this life. Wherever he is or whatever
refuge he goes to, a man cannot be free from pain. Everybody will grow old
and die. "Birth is suffering, age is suffering. Grief, lamenting, suffering,
sorrow, despair are suffering. Not to get what one wants, also means
suffering. In short, the five skandhas (basic components of human life)
[involve] suffering."15 Man is exposed to the impending crisis of death.16
'Woe upon life in this world!"l1 And the Jains proceeded further to ex-
pound the miserable state of man in this worldly existence. One of their
siitras says: "Beings torment beings. See the great danger in this world;
many pains (are the lot) of creatures."18 In another place, it says: "Having
well considered it, having well looked at it, I say thus: all beings ...
(experience) individually pleasure or displeasure, pain, great terror, and
unhappiness. Creatures are filled with alarm from all directions and in all
directions."19 In another place, it says: "The (living) world is afHicted,
miserable, difficult to instruct, and without discrimination. In this world
full of pain, s!1ffering by their different acts, see the benighted ones caused
great pain."20
The view that life in this world is suffering is an idea common
throughout India. Madhava, who was learned in all the philosophies of
India, wrote in the fourteenth century: "That all transmigratory existence
is identical with pain is the common verdict of the founders of all sects
and schools; or else they would not be found so anxious to put a stop to it
and engage in a method for bringing it to an end. We must, therefore,
bear in mind that all is pain, and pain alone."21 All the thinkers of India
taxed their brains on this problem of suffering. Even materialists and epi-
cureans were not excepted. They could not hold any of the optimistic views
of life held by thinkers of other nations. In all the religions of India, the
problem was how to find the way of emancipation from this suffering in
the cycle of Samsara. The way leading to peace of mind, has always been
their central concern.22
It is natural, therefore, that Indians in the past were inclined to be-
little their physical body to the extreme. The ancient Buddhists said in one
of their siitras: "After a stronghold has been made of the bones, it is
covered with flesh and blood, and there dwell in it old age and death, pride
and deceit."23 Brahmanists held a similar view of their physical existence.24
Mok§a in their sense is the deliverance of the Atman from the body. For
Jains, deliverance means no other than "the decay of the body."25 And we
can see that Buddhists, too, in the early days of their history regarded "the
cessation of the existing body" as pleasure.26 The Indian ethic of ascetic
mortification was based on these views of the physical b?ciY, far from any
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idea such as we see in a Chinese book of morality, Hsiao-ching, which
reads, "We get our body, hair, and skin from the parents. To keep it from
ruin and injury is the beginning of filial piety."
Indian sages refuse sensual pleasures. They teach us not to cling to
the external material world. Buddhists and Jains are all in accord in teach-
ing not to cling to things by thinking constantly "these are my possessions
(mama)."27
Nearly every Indian religious thinKer seeks to live in the bosom of
nature and there to have direct communion with the Absolute. He re-
nounces the world, lives in the depths of the forest, sits under a tree or on a
rock and, keeping himself aloof from all secular affairs, concentrates his
thoughts on the quest for truth. There have been a few thinkers who try
to seek for truth while remaining in the secular world and living among
people in the street. But, in India, such thinkers have been very few in
number and not so influential. And the main current of the Indian civili-
zation has been not in the cities but in the woods. It has been the civiliza-
tion of the tranquil life in the forest.
India did not develop a city representing its entire civilization. The
ancient Greeks had the center of their civilization in Athens, the ancient
Romans in Rome, and the modern Europeans in London, Paris, and Berlin.
But in India there was or is no city corresponding to these cities in the
West. It is true that the cities of Pa!aliputra and Kanyakubja once flour-
ished. But the prosperity of these cities was of a short duration. There are
no cities prospering throughout the whole history of India to represent its
civilization.
For Indians who are inclined to transcend this world and who hold a
strong longing for a future existence, it is difficult to accept a religion that
sets a high value on secular mundane life.28 More than four hundred years
have passed since the Christians began their missionary work in this coun-
try, and at present (Census of 1961) there are about nine or ten million
Christian adherents in India-less than one-fortieth of the whole popula-
tion. Besides, as the national censuses and the reports of the Christian mis-
sionsindicate, many of the converts to Christianity live in South India and
consist chiefly of those expelled from the Hindu community-the Siidras,
the vagabonds, and the uncivilized people of the mountains. It is truly
significant that the Christian missions have tried hard to enlighten the
peoples left out of the Hindu society. But in spite of their great effort, the
Christian missions have failed to capture the minds of the Hindus who are
the guiding force in the Indian community. As one of the reasons for the
stagnation of the Christian missionary works in India, a Japanese scholar
writes as follows: "In India, a religious missionary is considered to be a man
free from . . . secular desires. From the days of S1ikyamuni up to the
d
!!
'III
1':
II"
0"
."0"'....
:~;:,
INDIA
present, almost all the religious founders of India are ascetics who lead the
very severe life of mortification. But, the life of a Christian missionary, who
has a wife and children to accompany him, a fine house to live in, a car to
drive and meat to eat, is too secular to be understood by the Hindus as the
life proper for a religious man."29
The supermundane idea of India's religions has influenced the ethi-
cal ideas of the Indians. In India, abandoning private property is urged as
a virtue. Buddhists and }ains all teach their adherents to give up the idea of
"mine (mama)" and encourage the virtue of no-property. They teach the
performance of unlimited service to others by surrendering all of one's pos-
sessions. This Indian negation of private property is very similar to the
philosophy of modern socialism and communism. But, it should be noted
that the Indian assertion is based on their supermundane way of thinking.
In practice the socialistic reformation of Indian society is far from being
accomplished.
Indians, in spite of their pessimistic view of life and of their super-
mundane religions, have also optimistic tendencies. This paradoxical asser-
tion can be. safely made on the basis that generally the Indian people are
free from despair. Their optimism is derived from their belief that although
this life is filled with suffering, once one has been united with the Ab-
solute, one will live at ease and without fear. And the Indians never give
up this hope of unification with the Absolute. This phase of their way of
thinking can be observed also in their dramatic literature; they have no
"tragedy." Almost all the Indian plays, after many scenes filled with thrills
and suspense, end with, "They all lived happily ever after." And corre-
sponding to this feature of the Indian way of thinking, their religion has
an optimistic glow. It promises any man, however bad he is, that he will
be saved if he will persevere in his earnest faith or in his practice of severe
discipline.
In a striking contrast to their supermundane character, Indians have
at the same time a yearning for material and sensual pleasures. But these
two different trends in the Indian way of thinking possess one common
trait; both tend to neglect and to transcend the rules of social organizations.
Sometimes Indians venture to neglect and scorn ethical norms of behav-
ior. In their inclination to transcend restrictive rules of institutions and in
their indifference to ethical norms in pleasure-seeking there is an essential
affinity with their religious passion to submit themselves to the Absolute
without admitting any intermediary condition or agent between themselves
and the Absolute.
The decisive factor in the idea of Samsiira is death. All the sufferings
of man in this world come from death. Facing death, a man is led to the
metaphysical contemplation of the problem. And the Indian civilization
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has grown through meditation on the phenomenon of death. Buddhism
and Jainism both are religions arising from deep reflection on this inevitable
moment of human life. A quotation from the Dhammapada reads as fol-
lows: "How is there laughter, how is there joy, as this world is always
burning? Do you not seek a light, ye who are surrounded by darkness?"30
Hinduism holds a similar view on the problem of death.
Megasthenes, the Greek who visited India at the end of the fourth
century B.C. or thereabouts, mentioned as a remarkable inclination of the
Brahmins their practice of philosophical speculation on death. He wrote:
"Now, among the Brahmins, the problem of death is the issue very many
times debated. Usually (they) compare the life in this world to the state of
a child quickening in the mother's womb. And they hold that the true life
begins verily at the moment of death in this world. And they consider this
(life of truth) as the ultimate source of happiness for the philosophical
(c/>rJ..oCToc/>~CTavn». And in order to make the mind ready for death, they
urge the need of the severest asceticism (aCTK~CTt»."31 In Japan, too, Matsu-
miya Kanzan (1686-1780) commented on this feature of Indian thought:
"In India, . . . people are old and feeble in spirit and they like the som-
bre teachings of Buddhism, which is always talking about the problem of
death."32
The artistic works of India reflect this feature of the Indian religion.
Indian structures and sculptures originated from the decorative works
around the Stiipas. A Stiipa is a hemispherical grave-mound built on the
ashes or the remains of a sage. The Stiipas of the early periods were rather
small in scale but after the Mauryas they began to build larger ones. The
ancient Greeks called the Stiipas "Pyramids."33 Gorgeous artistic works of
ancient India were all carved on the gates, pillars, and railings of the
Stiipas, and temples were first built around the Stiipas. The fine art of the
temple architecture grew as one part of the decorative works of the Stiipas.
It may be said that grave-worship is the origin of Indian art. But their ar-
tistic expressions, developed thus as the ornaments of the grave, bear no
gloomy shade of death. On the contrary, they are bright, lively, and beauti-
ful. This bright feature of Indian artistic works is different from the expres-
sions of the sunny and innocent disposition of primitive or uncivilized
tribes; rather, it reflects the peaceful state of mind of the religious people
who challenged and conquered the fear of death. Indians seek eternity
through their im)er medium of meditation on death.
The Tendency of Thought to Transcend the Gods
As we have seen above, every expression of Indian thought is strongly
tinged with religious coloring. It should be noted, however, that their atti-
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tude toward religion is far different from that of the Westerners. In the
West, God is the center of the whole religious system. In the Indian reli-
gions, on the other hand, God does not hold such a prominent position as
in the West. Indians have their own very richly and elaborately developed
idea of God, but they never consider God as the Absolute Being. In the
Indian concept, the gods are beings lower than-the Ab.solute and the Abso-
lute stands high above the gods.
According to the Brahmanistic point of view, the grace of the gods is
the reward given in return for offerings. There is a fixed relation of cause
and effect between the ritualistic service to the gods and the grace given
back to man. And no free-will on the part of the gods is acknowledged to
intervene in this relation. It is natural, therefore, that the idea of a personal
god or of the grace given by him has been scarcely conceived among the
Brahmanists. In the course of time, their attention has been focused more
exclusively on the permanent law that regulates all beings including even
the gods. Except for some theological assertions of Hinduism of the later
periods, almost all the ancient philosophical schools of India regarded the
gods as being of no great significance. Buddhists and ]ains, for instance,
considered the gods to be no more than beings enjoying super-human pow-
ers. And the scholars of the Vedanta school attached little importance to
the God presiding over the universe; they considered him merely an in-
cidental superior cause. In short, -Indians have a higher regard for the
authority of law (dharma) than for the gods. The gods, in their concept,
are beings who follow what the law decrees. They are not the founders of
the law. But, on the contrary, it is the universal and unalterable law that
makes the gods what they are.
The gods in the Indian religions, especially the gods of Brahmanism,
are loose in morals. Their deeds are, like the Homeric gods' pranks, not
always virtuous. The BriihmaJ;la books tell us many stories concerning the
gods' indiscreet deeds of envy, jealousy, hostility, infidelity, gxeed, arro-
gance, cowardice, and adultery. The gods of India are not different from
average creatures, and are by no means the supreme authority of morality.
Generally speaking, one may say that Indians who worship such gods are
little awakened to any sense of morality. In the l)g Veda, only VarUI,la is
the god of morality. But, as the BriihmaJ;las and the books of the later peri-
ods tell us, even this god gradually changed his character and lost his strict
morals. It is natural, therefore, that Indians of the later ages sought
the basis of their morals apart from the gods' authority. And they came to
conceive that the moral law should be observed not because of the gods'
authority but because of retribution according to Karma.34
Many gods of Brahmanism were adopted in the Buddhist myths and
were transformed into Buddhist gods. In the Buddhist concept, these gods,
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though they possess super-human powers, themselves are bound to a life
of ignorance and are waiting to be saved by the teachings of the Buddha.
The ]ains, too, refused to regard the gods as the Absolute Being. The
concept of the Supreme Lord had taken a fixed form in India by the time
the Christian era began. But one of the most outstanding philosophical
schools of India, the Non-dualist (advaita) school in the Vedanta, asserted
that the highest God (lSvctra) is no other than the Absolute, the Brahman,
clouded with ignorance (ajniina), and, because of this ignorance, is bound
to the world of illusion like other beings. The schools of Hinduism urge us
to have faith in the Supreme Lord, but, as we see in their myths relating to
this Supreme Lord, he is more likely to be a human being than the Abso-
lute Supreme Being. It is safe to generalize here and say that most Indians
find the sanction of their morality in the law (dharma) which transcends
the gods. This Indian concept stands in striking contrast to the Western
idea that places the sole source of morality in the one Lord.
The ancient Greeks and Romans used their words for god (8£0<; and
deus, respectively) in a rather loose way. In their thinking the philosopher-
emperors, and other men of outstanding intellect who have contributed
greatly to the happiness of people by delivering them from their errors and
tribulations, thus leading them nearer to the divine life-such men
(whether real or fictional, as it often turned out) were the godlike saviors
of mankind.3s A savior for the Indians, was not the 8£(,<; (J'WTfJP (God-
savior) of the ancient Greeks.
For Indians, on the contrary, a savior is a master of the universal law.
Whether the savior is a human being or a divine being does not matter.
He is a savior by the authority of the Absolute that stands higher than
the gods. He is an incarnation of the Absolute, but not necessarily a god
or the only son of God. The Indian concept of God has produced an idea
of the savior quite different from that of Western religions.
The difference between the Western and Indian concepts of God is
clearly observed also in the literary styles. The Greek writers were careful
to make their gods speak in a manner appropriate to the dignity of gods,
and succeeded in producing satisfactory images to that effect. But, Indian
authors, for instance, the authors of the Upani~ads, could not or, more
properly speaking, did not care for such ways of expression. Like the In-
dian artists in their works of sculpture, the Indian writers scarcely attempted
to idealize the gods or to describe them as being more sublime than human
beings.36
CHAPTER 13 THE SPIRIT OF
TOLERANCE
AND CONCILIATION
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Generally speaking, Indian people have a tendency to recognize and
rationalize the fact that there exist many different world-views, philoso-
phies, and religions in the world. For they think that these different views
which seemingly conflict with each other are based on the Absolute One.
Their viewpoint is based objectively on the idea that all things in the
universe are one, and subjectively on the reflection that all human activities
originate from a metaphysical and monistic principle.
The reflection on the fact that there are different philosophies in this
world, conflicting with each other, appeared in India when Gotama the
Buddha was born and when many towns thrived in the Ganges basin.
Saiijaya, a sceptic, suspended judgment on any metaphysical matter. When
he was asked to answer, he would speak ambiguously and offered no defi-
nite answer. It was difficult to grasp the true meaning of his answer, for it
was just like attempting to grasp an eel by the hands. But Mahavlra,
founder of ]ainism, tried to transcend scepticism. He advocated the rela-
tivistic theory of "Naya" which proved the possibility of offering varying
judgments on general matters provided that the qualification "from a cer-
tain point of view" was added.
Among these philosophers of ancient India, Gotama the Buddha was
the first to reflect thoroughly on this problem. He criticized the philoso-
phers and religious leaders in endless debate as "being attached to their own
views."! And they were said to have committed an immoral act as the result
of being involved in metaphysical discussions which would never be solved.
Gotama himself avoided participation in these discussions2 and regarded
them as quite useless for the attainment of Enlightenment.3
Gotama the Buddha was said "to have remained aloof from all discus-
sions" and "to have taught ascetics or bhikkhus to transcend any prapanca
(discussions which were useless for the attainment of the religious goal)."
Gotama did not insist that his teaching was the only Absolute Truth to the
exclusion of all others. Therefore, he remained in harmony with other phi-
losophers. In this way of harmony he attained and realized the Enlighten-
ment-tranquility of mind. Such being the case Gotama's teachings could
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never be compared with other teachings.4 We cannot say that his teachings
are "equal," "superior," or "inferior" to other ones. Comparison will be pos-
sible only in the case where a common standpoint is seen between two
different views. Buddha's teachings differ from other doctrines in being
neutral to their standpoints and conclusions. Gotama himself seems to have
gone so far as to recognize the raison d'etre of other philosophies. All phi-
losophers, as far as they adhere to their own views, risk becoming unwisely
tenacious. But there must be some reason in each opinion as long as people
believe it.5 According to Gotama, those Buddhists who want to keep aloof
from the views of any type of philosophy must reflect upon themselves all
the time, bearing in mind that they should not be prejudiced.
Such an attitude toward other doctrines can apparently be seen in
Mahayana Buddhism, especially in the Saddharmaputz4ar'ikasutra.6 Even
the lower doctrines, the Siitra declares, are the upiiyas or the means for the
Buddhas to teach mankind the right way. Such a way of thinking was
carried on in Vajrayana Mysticism CShingon Esoteric Buddhism). In
Vajrayana even heretical dogmas are regarded as a part of Buddhism. Bud-
dhism is not a special religion which conflicts with other religions, but is,
in itself, the Absolute Truth. Heretics are nothing but an offshoot-mani-
festation of the ultimate truth. From the absolute point of view there is in
the universe only one principle called "Buddhism."
The spirit of tolerance was not totally maintained in the same manner
among the later Buddhists of India. It was a natural tendency, common
enough in history, for society bound by older customs to oppose the Bud-
dhist order which had to stand against other religions and philosophies as
it became an established religion and created special rites and customs.
However, almost all the Buddhists in India, believing that the fundamental
standpoint of Buddhism was not contradictory to other heretical views, did
not intend to compete with them actively. As a result, Buddhism, in
spreading over the Asian countries, caused less friction among the indig-
enous faiths of the peoples who had received it. Native or traditional faiths
and customs were scarcely destroyed by Buddhists and could easily survive;
so long as they were seen as ethical from the Buddhist point of view, they
were able to remain in existence side by side with the newly-arrived Bud-
dhism, and sometimes were absorbed in Buddhism. In later days Buddhism
itself fused into one of the native religions, giving them philosophical
foundations.
As for the fact that there exist many different philosophies and reli-
gions in the world, Vedanta philosophers also stated views like those of the
Buddhists. Basing themselves on Absolute Monism, they regarded even
heretical doctrines as having their basis in Brahman. According to them,
there are many ultimate principles-elements, gods, breath, time, etc.,-
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which are respectively asserted by many philosophical schools to be the
Absolute Principle. And this is why there are so many schools with diversi-
fied views. From the viewpoint of Vedanta, however, none of them de-
serves to be regarded as the Absolute Truth. They are only assumed (vikal-
pita) to be the world-principle. The fact is that the Atman is the Absolute
One for the Advaita Vedantist who believes that these philosophers mis-
understood the real nature of things.
Their views, however wrong, no matter how heretical, are also in-
cluded in the Atman-theory of Vedanta. Vedanta philosophers thus went
so far as to say that even these heretical views were manifestations of the
Atman, and were partly true even though they were incomplete in them-
selves. The standpoint of Vedanta because of its broader scope is quite
different from these heretical views. In the Mii,,!~ukyakiirikas we read:
"Those who admit duality, adhere to their views and are inconsistent with
each other. However, (Vedantists) are not inconsistent (with such dual-
ists)."7 According to Sarhkara, this is likened to limbs that are not incom-
patible with their bodies.
In later Jain philosophy the same idea was also expressed. Hemacandra
says: "Discussions in other schools produce jealousy because the one insists
while the other opposes. But in Jainism they advocate no dogma and no
discussions because they admit the teachings of 'Naya.' "8
Because of this way of thinking that in every heretical view some
raison d'etre exists, Indian philosophers in the medieval period tried· to es-
tablish a "comprehensive system of world philosophy," or a "systematic con-
ception of the world." These systems also show tolerance in recognizing the
raison d'bre in all others that have different views which are then recon-
ciled into the same school. Generally speaking, we cannot find in any
Indian religion the conception of "heretic" in the sense of Western usage.
Such a tolerant attitude is found not only in religious teachings but in
the fundamental policies of administration taken by many kings and rulers
throughout the history of India. King Asoka, for example, himself an ear-
nest Buddhist layman, never excluded other religions-Brahmanism, Jain-
ism, Ajivikas, etc. He "adored both monks and laymen or' all religions.',g
His sincere wishes were that "everyone in every religion dwell peacefully
side by side," and cooperate with one another for promoting the welfare of
mankind. Though King Asoka made Buddhism a state religion, he did not
persecute the non-Buddhist religions in his territory.
King Kharavela, who gained control of the southern part of India
after the collapse of the Mauryan Dynasty, was a patron of the Jaina order,
but he also repaired the shrines and temples of other religions. He was
called "sarvapa~a,,!~pUjaka (he who adored all the sects)." King of the
Ka~aJ;1a Dynasty, who ruled northern India, also protected many different
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religions. King Kani~ka, for example, cast many coins on which the statues
of gods-of Greece, of Zoroastrianism, of Hinduism, and of Buddha-are
engraved. The Gupta Dynasty in the fourth century was tolerant to all the
religions.10 Centuries later, Akbar the Great (1556-1605) ruled almost all
India, and intended to establish a new religion by mixing other religions
which existed before. He declared that Hindu and Mohammedan should
worship the same and single God. But he was rather tolerant not only of
Hinduism and Mohammedanism but also of Jainism, Parsism, and Chris-
tianity. He also admitted solar-worship. Though not complete, the principle
of tolerance was retained by him in his religious policy.
Such an attitude toward other faiths is manifest in modem religious
movements in India. A religious reformer in the nineteenth century, Ram
Mohan Rai, organized a religious society called Briihma-Samaj, and he
made it a fundamental principle of the society for the followers to worship
the same God irrespective of their race, class, nationality, and even their
religion. Ramakr~I].a, who was the founder of the Ramakrishna Order, de-
clared that "all religions, pursuing different ways, will finally reach the
same God."ll "All the religions that exist are true."12 Vivekananda, his
disciple, delivered a famous address at the International Religious Con-
ference held in Chicago on September 27, 1893, saying that: "Oh, the
Sacred One, called Brahman by the Hindus, Ahura Mazdah by the Zoroas-
trians, Buddha by the Buddhists, Jehovah by the Hebrews, and God in
heaven by the Christians! May He bestow inspiration upon us! Christians
should be neither Buddhists nor Hindus. Buddhists and Hindus should
never be Christians. Everyone, however, must grow up in accordance with
his own religious principle, holding its individual character firmly while
assimilating others' spiritual merits.... This Conference has proved that
Holiness, Serenity, and Compassion should not be monopolized by any
religious order. And it has also proved that there were no religions in the
world which never produced noble and spiritual personalities. I firmly
believe that we will read the following passages on the flags or banners
of all the religions in the future: Help each other. Don't struggle against
each other. Be reconciled with others. Don't destroy others. Keep harmony
and peace. Don't compete in useless matters13 .... I approve of existing
of religions in the past. I adore God with them."l4.
These religious attitudes differ from those in the West. In the history
of Europe we often find religious antagonisms which inevitably led to
political and military conflicts. But we can hardly find many cases of
religious war in India. There were, of course, in India a few rulers who
adhered to some indigenous faith and oppressed some of the universal
religions arising among the Indian people. But we cannot find any rulers
who were Buddhists or Jainists and who persecuted other religions.
!~
"
..
'.
..
"
INDIA
This fact would be more obvious if we compare it with the facts in the
West. Christianity and Mohammedanism have both engaged in religious
wars. According to the Calvinists, hatred directed against sinners or heretics
is regarded as a virtue.15 We know that religious leaders in the West were
often persecuted and put to death. On the contrary, in India there were no
religious wars. Neither Buddhists nor Jains ever executed heretics. What
they did to heretics was only to exclude them from the orders. Religious
leaders in India died peacefully attended by their disciples and followers.
Toleration is the most conspicuous characteristic of Indian culture.
The Indians developed individualism in their unique way. They have
preserved the attitude of religious freedom traditionally, probably more
than any other country. An American professor says, "It is paradoxical that
we, who put so much emphasis on individualism in economics and politics,
have so little room for it in morality and religion, as compared with Indian
thought."16
Recent questionnaires on the comparison of life-ideals show that there
are many students in India who think that among many different ways of
life the most noble is the recognition and understanding of the existence of
varied path~. This fact shows that toleration is still alive as a way of think-
ing among Indian students.l1
What, then, is the reason behind the spirit of tolerance in people's
minds in India? Oldenberg enumerates the following reasons: Indian cli-
mate and circumstance, early and easy invasion of Aryan race, nonexistence
of great wars, calm atmosphere in the Brahmin class, etc.1B Wars in India
were fought only by mercenary soldiers, and not by ordinary people. This
fact contributed much to promote the attitude of toleration in the Indian
people. Throughout the centuries of Indian history no military expedition
was attempted by Indian rulers. According to Arrianos' report, "Megas-
thenes says that Indians never attacked other peoples outside the borders,
and other peoples never attacked the Indians. Alexander was the only ex-
ception when he attacked the Indian people."19 "Indians did not conquer
other countries because of their spirit of righteousness (dikaiotes)."20
The love of peace advocated by the philosopher of India is acknowl-
edged by Western scholars. The word "peace" signifies in itself a willing-
ness to recognize the claims of other views besides one's own. So the peace-
loving attitude in Indian people seems to be closely related to their unique
way of thinking that different philosophies and different conceptions of
the world are nothing but manifestations of the Absolute One.
PART II CHINA
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CHAPTER 14 INTRODUCTION
China, the largest of the Eastern countries, has a cultural tradition.
going back several thousand years; its influence has been widespread and
taken deep root in adjacent countries. Chinese culture has even occasionally
been called "the Far Eastern culture."
It is important to know to what extent the language spoken and writ-
ten by the Chinese reveals the connections of its culture with its traditional
ways of thinking. Many overall approaches have ended in failure. Logical
studies on Chinese grammar have not sufficiently explained particular prob-
lems underlying its structure, due largely to the efforts on the part of re-
searchers to apply the standards of Western languages to the Chinese.
Their studies have not been fruitfuJ.1
Other cultural aspects of the Chinese civilization will provide mate-
rials for investigating ways of thinking of the Chinese. But in this work
the author will use the phenomenon of the introduction of Buddhism to
China as an important clue to the problem of understanding characteristi-
cally Chinese ways of thinking.
The Chinese did not accept Buddhism in its Indian form. After it
was introduced into China, it was modified under the influence of certain
traditional ways of thinking of the Chinese, so that Chinese Buddhism
diverged from Indian Buddhism to a very great degree. The following facts
about that influence indicate the nature and extent of these divergencies:.
(I) The Chinese made complete translations of the Buddhist scrip-
tures into their own language. They did not use Sanskrit or Prakrit as the
sacred language of the Buddhist church.
(2) In translating, Chinese scholars and exegetes often gave peculiarly
adapted interpretations of the original. Thus the Indian texts were not
always faithfully translated. Interpolations were often added. The sentences
were frequently embellished with Chinese literary ornament, thus taking
on the appearance of original works of Chinese literature.
(3) Later Chinese Buddhist scholars, with few exceptions, were not
in a position to refer to or to understand the original Indian texts, and
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sometimes they failed to understand even the meaning of earlier Chinese
translations.
(4) Many texts of Chinese Buddhism developed along lines entirely
different from the doctrines of Indian schools.
(5) The exegetical techniques of the Chinese Buddhists are entirely
different from those of the Indians.
These differences and divergencies are understandable as occurring
under the influence of the habitual and distinctive ways of thinking of the
Chinese. The purpose of this section is to attempt to describe those persist-
ing traditional ways of thinking of the Chinese by pointing out the ways
in which Indian Buddhist thought was altered under their influence; we
do not mean to imply that the Chinese always differed from the Indian
Buddhists.
Of course, we cannot regard all people in a nation as having the
same characteristics. At various times and in various regions the Chinese
have engaged in diverse sorts of activities, and as in all cultures, conformity
has never been 100 per cent. The opinions of learned persons may not be
the same as the opinions of the masses; after all, the "characteristics" of
a people are" the customary ways of living and thinking of most of the
population, which mayor may not be reflected in or influenced by the
ideas of intellectuals.
CHAPTER 15 EMPHASIS ON
THE PERCEPTION OF
THE CONCRETE
Graphic Character of the Writing
The results of Granet's study of the vocabulary of Chinese coincide
with many of the findings of Levy-Bruhl's study of the languages of
American Indians.! However, there exists an important difference between
Chinese and the American Indian languages. Granet says, 'Whereas
primitive languages are characterized by the extreme variety of verbal
forms, Chinese is extremely poor on this point. It uses uninflected mono-
syllabic words; there is no distinction of parts of speech. However, the
flavor of concreteness-provided by various forins in other languages-is
shown by the extreme abundance of Chinese words which convey concrete
phases of things with unparalleled power...."2
Consequently, it is characteristic of Chinese that it is abundant in
words expressing bodies and shapes, but poor in verbs expressing change
and transformation. Whether this is peculiar to Chinese alone or common
to primitive languages in general, is an open question. Stenzel writes: 3
"Considering the process of the establishment of syntactical forms, we can
say that subjects were in origin mostly words expressing 'things,' a single
word as a unit standing for a thing as a unit. When this idea of thing is
applied to objects in general, appellations expressing changing phenomena
come to be substantiated. This process can be perceived in German, but it
is more evident in Greek. In any language, generally speaking, verbs,
adjectives, pronouns, adverbs, etc. were originally nouns expressing 'things,'
but they changed to become other parts of speech; losing their independent
meaning, they have sometimes become affixes. This process of transforma-
tion is said to be most evident in isolated languages, especially in Chinese."
No proof is offered for this statement, but it seems plausible. It seems
clear, in any case, that Chinese thinking has tended to concreteness of
expression.
The influence of language structure on thought can be seen in the
way in which the characters are made. Chinese characters are, of course,
originally hieroglyphic. The character which symbolizes the sun is derived
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from a drawing of a circle; another character symbolizes fire through a
representation of flame. Later many phonetic characters were also devised,
but these were based upon hieroglyphics. The four classic ways of con-
structing Chinese characters are, following Karlgren's terminology: (I)
hsiang hsing, image shapes (pictographs); (2) chih shih, pointing to
situations (indirect symbols); (3) hui i, meeting of ideas (associative
compounds); (4) hsing sheng, picture and sound (determinative phonet-
ics). The two modes of transference are: (I) chuan chu, transferable
meanings (mutually interpretative symbols); (2) chia chieh, borrowing
(phonetic loan characters).' Yet the hieroglyphs are fundamental to the
characters developed by these six devices.
The Chinese were accustomed to these types of symbols, even when
they transcribed foreign words with Chinese characters. The choice of
characters for transcription was random. There was no systematic way of
consistently transcribing a particular foreign sound by a particular charac-
ter. Even one and the same translator often adopted different ways of
transcribing one and the same sound.5 They did not go on to invent an
analytic and. constructive method of consistently using an agreed set of
characters equivalent to the sounds of say, Sanskrit. In choosing characters
to transcribe foreign sounds, the Chinese were influenced by the
appearance of the character. For example, the Pali word bhikkhu for "men-
dicant" was always transcribed pi-ch'iu and never as p'i-chiu. Characters
chosen to transcribe certain key words were invariably so used, regardless
of the fact that the same syllables in other words were differently tran-
scribed.
The Concrete Expression of Concepts
On the basis of a study of the vocabulary of the Book of Odes, Granet
observed that Chinese concepts are expressed in highly concrete form.
Nearly all words express particular ideas-forms of existing things per-
ceived in a particular state. They aim at expressing things by individualiza-
tion and specification rather than by analysis. For example, in the Book of
Odes more than three thousand words are used: this seems a very large
number in proportion to the limited number of ideas expressed. These
words correspond to images of ideas which are complex and particular. In
the book there are 18 words which might correspond to one concept
"mountain" qualified by one or more adjectives. In the same work there
are 23 words which mean "horse."
On the other hand there is no one word which corresponds to a
Western word expressing a general and abstract idea. Because of their
synthetic and particular character Chinese words are more nearly proper
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nouns than the common nouns of Western languages-for example, the
many words for "rivers": ho, chiang, etc.5a
The classics, including the Odes, were written long before Chinese
philosophy appeared, and they did not propound philosophical theses.
But the vocabulary of the classics has continued in use up to the present
day and the observations made above thus have some application to the
whole history of the expression of Chinese ideas.
The Chinese way of expressing concepts is concrete. Thus for the
term "epigraphy" the Chinese use the graphically concrete expression
"writing on metal and stone."
In the expression of attributive qualities they tend to use concrete
numbers, thus for "a fast horse" they use ts'ien-Ii-ma "a horse good for a
thousand Ii" (one li = 1890 feet); for a man endowed with clairvoyance
they use the expression ts'ien-li-yen "thousand Ii vision." These numbers
are not used in a simple quantitative sense but symbolize qualities which
are expressed in Western languages in more abstract terms. The two
characters mao-shun ("halberd and shield") form a compound used to
mean "contradiction," and no other compound is used for expressing this
concept. The association of the original meaning of these characters is
not lost so that it was perfectly natural for the Chinese to create an
alternative compound on the same basis, kan-shun.6
The same associative process is revealed in the case of the character li
(reason) which is of key importance in the history of Chinese philosophy.
This character originally meant "well distributed veins on minerals or
precious stones." It eventually came to mean "principle" and finally "uni-
versal principle."7 This third meaning was developed by Ch'eng Ming-tao
(Che'eng Hao, 1032-1085) in the Sung period. Under his interpretation
it became the fundamental principle which pervades and makes possible
all phenomena. "The development of this abstract meaning is generally
attributed to the influence of Buddhist scholars, particularly those of the
Hua-yen sect, who set up the distinction and contrast between Ii and shih.S
The tendency to express abstract philosophical ideas in concrete
images is conspicuous in Zen Buddhism. The universe or cosmos is
expressed as shan, ho, ta-ti, "mountains, rivers, and the great earth." The
basic ego of a human being is expressed as ts'ao-yuan i-ti-shui,9 "a drop of
water in the source," one's true nature as pen-Iai mien-mu, "original face
and eye" or as pen-ti feng-kuang, "the wind and light of one's native
place." Words which were used as literal translations of such original
Indian words as Bodhi pen-chio or Tathata chen-ju were not well adapted
to Chinese ways of thinking and they thus developed such concrete
expressions as those noted above. Zen Buddhism uses highly evocative
terms to create the type of concrete image which its teaching requires.
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Thus for the human body the Zen term is ch'ou-p'i-tai, "stinking bag of
skin." The Zen term for essence is yen-mu, "eye" or yen-ching, "the pupil
of the eye." For a monastic community the Indian word is sangha or gatza
which mean "group, conglomeration." Zen on the other hand uses the
word ts'ung-lin10 by which it means to suggest that the harmonious life of
a monastic community is analogous to a thicket where trees and grasses
grow together. The Zen term for an itinerant monk is yun-shui, "clouds
and water" which, of course, graphically symbolizes the monks' lack of a
fixed abode. This is in striking contrast to the less pictorial Indian term
for medicant parivriijaka, "traveler."
The tendency suggested by these examples is not confined to Zen
Buddhism. The founder of the San-lun sect expounded the fundamental
teachings of Buddhism in concrete poetical terms of which the following
is an example: "It has been a long time that the sweet drug (= the Buddha-
nature) has dwelt in mountains (= the minds and bodies of individuals).
A long period has elapsed since the round jewel (= the Buddha-nature)
sank in water (= transmigrated).... May reflections be revealed in
mirrors and may faces (= our proper selves) return to their proper places.
Lost children (= sinful people) are those who have wandered a little
from their native places."ll
The use of concrete imagery is common not only to Buddhism but to
Chinese philosophical writing in general.
Explanation by Means of Perceived Symbols
One of the most important characteristics of Chinese psychology is
its reliance on sense-perception. They reluctantly dwell on that which is
beyond the immediately perceived. In novels, for example, they tend to
recreate the tangible world of sense-perception. Of course, there are
exceptions such as the Hsi-yu-chi (Records of Travel in Western Regions)
but works of this genre are far fewer and less influential than realistic
writing.12
For the purposes of instruction and persuasion they resort to images
that have the appeal of direct perceptions. For example, in the Yen-shih
chia-hsun ("Family Instructions" by Yen Chih-t'ui) there is the following
argument illustrative of this phenomena: "There are some who doubt the
wonders and miracles accepted by the Buddhists. Such doubt is mistaken
because there are things which may not lie within the field of our immedi-
ate perception but which may be perceived in the future. When I lived
in South China, I could not believe that a tent existed which could
cover a thousand people. But when I came to North China, I found such
a tent. I, as a southerner, know very well that there are ships which can
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carry twenty thousand tan [picul or tan = 133lh. Ibs.] but northerners do
not believe that such vessels can exist. It is the same with wonders and
miracles." In conclusion Yen Chih-tui says: 'What a man believes is only
his ears and his eyes. Everything else is to be doubted."13 This is an
expression of a typical characteristic of Chinese thought. The Chinese in
esteeming what is immediately perceptible-especially visually perceptible
-seek intuitive understanding through direct perception. This tendency
is reflected in the use of characters which convey concrete images to
express abstract concepts; it is also revealed in the manner of elucidating
philosophical doctrines. Thus, the use of diagrammatic explanation is
frequently resorted to. A good example for it is the "Book of Changes"
(I-Ching). In this work symbols are used as directly perceptible figures for
a wide variety of phenomena, although they may also refer to non-percepti-
ble concepts. Generally speaking, the Chinese have relied upon concrete
perception, even in instruction or persuasion.
In Chinese perfection is often expressed as round. It is said, for
example, that the heart of a sage is round.14 In the translation of Buddhist
scriptures into Chinese, the Indian word "perfect" was translated by
"round and filled." The Sanskrit word sampad, "equipped with," was
translated by the same compound. Parini~pannalak~a1Ja, the true "nature of
all phenomena," was translated by Hsiian-tsang as yuan-ch'eng shih-hsing
and in this case the word yuan (= round) was not expressed in the
original Sanskrit term.15 The most perfect doctrine in Buddhism was, in
some systems, called "the round doctrine" (yuan chiao).16 This equivalence
between perfection and the circle, or the quality of roundness, was peculiar
to the Chinese. It did not have such a meaning for the Indians. Roundness
as used by Chinese Buddhists as a symbol of perfection-illustrating the
concreteness of Chinese thought-was paralleled in the allegedly contrast-
ing pattern of Indian thought by the wheel symbol. The wheel (cakra) was
highly esteemed as the symbol of the perfect doctrine of the Buddha, or as
an attribute of the God Vishnu. But in the figure of the Indian wheel the
idea of motion was represented, while the circle is static. Moreover, the
Indians regarded the absolute as without limits and therefore incapable of
being represented in concrete symbols.
The Greeks regarded a sphere as the most perfect form of reality,
and this attitude persisted through much of Greek philosophy.l1 But
whereas the circle-symbol of perfection for the Chinese-is a plane, the
Greek symbol is tri-dimensional. The Vaise~ika philosophy conceived an
atom to be globular (parin1a1Jqala) but the Chinese translator rendered
this as yuan t'i, "circular."18
Even in expounding such an elaborate philosophical system as the
Hua-yen its founder resorted to a visual demonstration of the close inter-
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relationship of all phenomena by the use of ten mirrors facing inward at
eight different angles and placed above and below with a Buddha figure
in the middle.19 His purpose was to elicit, through an immediate appeal
to visual perception, an intuitive understanding of the nature of phenom-
ena.
Diagramatic Explanation
In the course of the domestication of Buddhism in China there ap-
peared a tendency to explain Buddhist doctrines by means of diagrams.
Feng-kuei Tsung-mi (780-841), a scholar of the Hua-yen sect explained
the relation between the pure and the impure aspects of mind by a dia-
gram in which the former was indicated by the sign 0 and the latter with
the sign •.
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The fundamental essence of existence (iilayavijiiiina) consists of pure
and impure aspects. The process of development of a mundane creature is
shown in ten stages and the means by which this existence is annulled and
absorbed into reality is likewise explained in ten stages.20
The amalgamation of different kinds of visual arts was also charac-
teristic of Chinese culture. For example, the Chinese custom of writing
an appreciation or a panegyxic on a painting did not exist in ancient Greece
or in India. An example of a series of pictures accompanied with panegyrics
in the Chinese Buddhist tradition is the Praises of the MafijusrI's Dia-
gramatic Teaching by Zen Master Fu-kuo.21
The same tendency manifested itself in Zen Buddhism. Tung-shan
(807-869) lectured on the five stages. Behind this scheme there is a
type of abstract speculation, but the disciple of this Zen master Ts'ao-
shan pen-ehi attempted to explain these five stages with diagrams and
poems relating each stage to a hierarchical position between monarch
and subject.22 Here a set of abstract notions was explained by means of
readily perceived imagery.23 Still later this explanatory device was fused
with explanations in terms of the symbols of the I-Ching,24 the Book of
Changes.
The tendency to explain Buddhist doctrines by diagrams came to be
~ .- .IE
- *0 If!
-
~e .-
*
e
-
{!ifj
If!0 -- If!
-- !f:~ -
-
~
0 .IE
-0
-
~ If!~ - {!ifj
e {Ri_.
0
-
jt If!
0 - IE
• -
~
- !Ii0
-
If!
-
J!5
• -- ~J
CHINA
merged with traditional Chinese scholarship on the [·Ching. In Tung-
shan's Pao-ching San-mei-k'o (Songs of Meditation called Jewelled Mirror),
the Five Stages were explained in terms of "I-Ching" scholarship. Finally
Hui-hung of the Sung period explained them with diagrams.
This tradition of diagramatic explanation exerted a great influence
on Sung neo-Confucianism, and was manifested in the "T'ai-chi-t'u" by
Chou Tun-yi (1017-1°73). It has been surmised that in his diagram of
the gestation of the universe he was influenced by Buddhism, although
there are some scholars who doubt the influence. Anyhow, in explaining
the genesis of the universe he did not resort to abstractions of the Indian
variety but introduced such concrete empirical principles as "Yang and
Yin" or "man and woman."25 It is interesting to note that the Chou Tun-yi
(Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate) of neo-Confucianism in turn in-
fluenced Buddhism, and the theory of the five stages was modified and
developed by it.26
In Zen Buddhism there appeared a diagram called the Poem of
Reality. The twenty characters of the diagram are arranged in a circle as
follows: 21
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The author advised the practitioner to meditate upon reality by means of
these twenty characters. They express, or suggest, a variety of abstract
notions but there is no indication of any logical connection among them.
Diagrams for explaining metaphysical theories are not found in
Greece or in India where such theories were rather set forth in complicated
series of sentences. The same tendency can be observed in the use of
diagrammatic genealogies depicting the descent of doctrine from master
to pUpil,28 while in India the same material is presented in dry prose.29
>CHAPTER 16 NON...DEVELOPMENT
OF ABSTRACT THOUGHT
Lack of Consciousness of Universals
We have seen that the Chinese esteemed the data of direct perception,
especially visual perception, and that they were concerned with particular
instances. This meant that they were little interested in universals which
comprehend or transcend individual or particular instances. They thus
seldom created a universal out of particulars.
In Chinese one finds many different words used to denote subtly
shaded variations of the same thing or action. Thus, for example, the fol-
lowing words are used for different shadings of the action word "to carry":
tan, chih, jen, run, pan, pao, tai, cho. The same phenomenon can be seen
in the languages of primitive peoples elsewhere. For example, in Malay
there are many different words translatable simply as "carry" but which
mean "to carry by hand," "to carryon a shoulder," "to carry on head," "to
carry on the back," "to carryon the body, as a garment, a weapon, or an
ornament," "to carry a child in the womb," etc.1 Although one can see the
residue of some such variety in Greek and English generally, such a range
of variant verbs does not exist. It may be said that in these languages, unlike
Malay, a high degree of universalization and abstraction has been reached.
Another example. In Chinese there is no word which corresponds to
the English "old." For "sixty years or so" the Chinese word is ch'i; for
"seventy years or more," the Chinese word is tieh; for "eighty or ninety years
old" the Chinese character is mao. Similarly, different words were used to
express the notions of death and to die. The term varied according to the
status of the person concerned. For the Emperor it was peng; for feudal lords
it was hung; for grandees, soldiers, gentlemen, it was pu-lu; for the common
people ssu.2 We might draw the conclusion from such examples as these
that the Chinese esteemed differences of rank more than they valued
comprehending a group of related phenomena in a universal.
We do not mean that the Chinese completely lacked the concept of
the universal. The existence of the concept of the universal among them
is evidenced occasionally by the structure of the characters. For example,
.
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there are many words denoting different varieties of mountains, but these
words include a common element shan which designates the universal of
"mountain" or "mountainness."
The above mentioned argument is not proof that all Chinese philoso-
phers were unconscious of a relationship between universals and particu-
lars. Hsiin-tzii had a rather clear notion of this.3 He distinguished be-
tween common or general names (kung-ming) and particular names
(pieh-ming). But he did not attain a full consciousness of "definition" as
did Aristotle. He was not a logician by profession. Why should he have
been? There was only one Aristotle! But lack of this consciousness in a
Chinese philosopher so far advanced in logical thinking is symptomatic
of the general lack of consciousness of genus and differentia in the
abstract among the Chinese.
Of course, efforts were made to express concepts more clearly using
compound words. This device aimed at making the meaning of the word
clearer by defining the extent of the meaning through a second character.
This is quite different from the Greek practice which aimed at making the
meaning clearer by limiting the genus with differentia.
So, generally speaking, the notion of a universal and the ordering of
particulars under universals are not characteristic of Chinese thought. The
Chinese, on the whole, did not have a hierarchy of universals as did the
Greeks and the Indians.
These phenomena may be explained by the fact that definitions and
categories were formally expressed by gentlemen, not by ordinary people
who had no need to indicate different meanings of "death" for differing
ranks of people. These phenomena were not limited to Chinese alone, but
can be noticed in Japanese also, in which educated people use more
honorifics. Preference for polite diction among educated people can be
seen in English also, but this feature was very common in Chinese usage
in the past.
Grammatical Ambiguity of Chinese Language and Thought
The distinctive character of Chinese thought is intimately connected
with the peculiarities of the Chinese language. Words corresponding to the
prepositions, conjunctions, and relative pronouns of Western languages are
very rare. There is no distinction between singular and plural. A single
character (j£!n) can denote "a man, men, some men, or mankind." There
are no fixed single terms for the expression of the tense or mood of verbs.
There are no cases. One word can be noun, adjective, or verb. This kind of
ambiguity explains why the exegesis of the classics has produced an im-
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mense variety of interpretations, many of which are directly opposite in
sense to others.4
We should not expect then that the Chinese language would be as
suitable as the Greek for philosophizing. If the use of plural forms were
essential in philosophy, we should have to regard the Aryan languages as
more suitable than the Chinese for philosophy. However, for many aspects
of ethics or practical philosophy, the linguistic distinction of numbers is not
necessary. But the distinction between the singular and the plural is indis-
pensable for logical mathematical thought.
Because of this tendency toward ambiguity the Chinese had great diffi-
culty in understanding the meaning of the Buddhist scriptures which had
originally been written in an entirely different type of language. Because of
the lack of number, gender, and case in Chinese pronouns, sentences in the
Chinese version of Buddhist writings were misinterpretations. Misinter-
pretation is very often characteristic of translation from one language to
another, but some of the misinterpretations thus produced were often very
important in the doctrinal development of Chinese and Japanese Bud-
dhism.
For example, the famous verse in which Nagarjuna sets forth the
concept of the middle way (Madhyamaka §astra, XXIV, 18) as translated
from Sanskrit runs as follows: "What do we mean by 'dependent origina-
tion' (that is, the inter-relatedness of all things)? We call it the void; that
is an assumed hypothetical entity and that is the middle way." In this
Nagarjuna asserted that the four concepts-dependent origination, the
void, an assumed being, the middle way-were synonymous. This verse
was translated by KumarajIva but later Chinese Buddhist scholars altered
the wording of the sentences, and Hui-wens explained the above verse as
follows: All things have their causes. These causes are beings but not
definite beings; they are devoid of all substance, and even description is not
absolutely true, but hypothetical. It is this situation which is called "the
middle way." The T'ien-t'ai sect explained the verse as teaching the three
truths: all things have originated from causes and are destitute of individual
essence, i.e. are void, but even "the void" is "hypothetical." We should not
treat it as a substance; the void also should be negated. Thus this sect set
up the three truths, the void, the hypothetical, and the middle way.6 This
variety of interpretations-involving possible misinterpretation-is at-
tributable to the lack of gender, number, or case notation in the demon-
strative pronoun, although this kind of misunderstanding by misinterpret-
ing an abstract text is not confined to Chinese thought.
Because there are no plural forms of Chinese nouns, various devices
are used to express the plural: adding numerals to nouns, e.g. wu-jen,
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ch'ien-jen; reduplication e.g., jen-jen; the addition of a character such as
chu to nouns, e.g. chu-jen. Moreover the character teng can be used as a
suffix expressing the plural, but it can mean "et cetera." For example,
nui-teng may mean "oxen" or "oxen and horses and sheep." When the
Chinese came in contact with Sanskrit they recognized the difference
between a plural and et cetera. Chinese Buddhist scholars differentiated
the pluralizing teng, namely, hsiang-nei-teng from the "et cetera" teng
which they called hsiang-wai-teng. However, this distinction did not go
beyond Buddhist scholarship. It was never used in secular thought.
Another syntactical ambiguity of Chinese is reflected in the frequency
of anacolutha or change of subject within a sentence. In Sanskrit this occurs
only in such ancient literature as the Brahma:t:tas,7 whereas in Chinese it is
very common because Chinese frequently omits the subject of a sentence.s
In the Chinese versions of Buddhist scriptures anacoluthon is common even
though it is rare in the Sanskrit originals from which those versions were
translated. It is especially conspicuous in KumarajIva's translations which
are famous for their style-their appeal to Chinese literary taste and habitual
ways of thinking.9
The various ambiguities described have meant that Chinese has been
an awkward medium for expressing abstract thought. Although there is
evidence of metaphysical speculation in the Taoist writings there is little of
this in the Confucian tradition which long dominated the thinking of the
ruling class. In the Analects of Confucius there are many separate examples
of moral conduct from which certain lessons are inductively drawn. There
are many aphorisms, but there is no dialectic such as one finds in Plato.
This may be natural, for the Analects represents the beginning of philoso-
phy in Chinese, but, even if compared with the fragments of the pre-
Socratic philosophers, the sayings of Confucius (all handed down by later
disciples) are less metaphysical. I Ching scholarship was often, in later
times, united with metaphysics, but the I Ching itself-full of suggestive
explanations of human events-did not itself aim at metaphysics. Meta-
physical theory developed later. Tung Chung-shu, in the first century A.D.,
has metaphysics galore, although it might not be called such by some
scholars. With Neo-Confucianism metaphysical speculation was brought
to perfection. But even with this school, philosophizing was, as we have
seen, still figurative and intuitive.
The lack of the controversial spirit of dialogue in ancient China is
noteworthy, although it is still problematic whether dialectic is necessary to
philosophy. The dialectic-the art of questioning and answering as a device
for philosophical analysis-did not develop as it had in Greece. Western
sinologues10 often assert that the dialectic is present in the rules of discourse
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given by Mo-tzii,ll but we have too little data on the application of these
rules to establish the existence of a true dialectic.
In India it was long a custom for the assertor and the objector to
argue with each other in a public assembly sponsored by a great personage.
In China this practice of public debate was relatively rare. It occurred for a
short period in the sixth and seventh centuries.12 Likewise, Chinese court-
procedureI3 was not characterized by the development of judicial dialogue
between the accused and the accuser. The reason is that the Chinese judge
was not an arbitrator between two groups, but an official who took evidence
from both sides, then sent out his own underlings to examine the truth of
the statements made by both sides. That is to say, Chinese court-procedure
was not the same as that in the West.14 The almost total absence of this
type of phenomenon in Chinese society meant that a great deal of Indian
logic, which in origin was a logic of dialogue, had no significance for the
Chinese. For this reason Indian logic could not be taken over in its original
fonn by the Chinese.
Lack of Conscious Use of General Laws
It was perhaps a result in part of the non-generalizing nominalistic
characteristic of Chinese thought which we have described, that the
Chinese tradition was weak in the formation of objective laws. The esteem
for the individual and the concrete, a lack of interest in universals, aborted
the discovery of laws which order many particulars. This parallels the lack
of strict laws for linguistic expression. Indifference to or lack of conscious-
ness of the necessity for rules of language meant that the grammar was not
developed. Unlike the Greeks and the Indians, the ancient Chinese pro-
duced no works on grammar or syntax, although they engaged in elaborate
investigations and compilations of characters, phonetics, etymology, etc.
Even though some Chinese pilgrim monks became acquainted with the
Indian science of grammar, they did not attempt to establish a parallel
science of Chinese grammar. The science of grammar was very important
in the history of Indian philosophy, whereas a scientific grammar was
developed in China only after the impact of Western civilization.
In ancient times China was ahead of many other countries in the field
of natural sciences. The Chinese have been most observant of religious rites
and have taken utmost care in calendrical regulations.ls It is likely that
Chinese mathematics developed independently of India's although there
may have been some influence from the latter.18
The Chinese did much with mathematics. They developed the decimal
system for counting and used it in computations as early as the first century
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B.C. Chinese herbals and early botanical works are oustanding. The
Chinese did not develop the same sort of scientific work that the Indians
and the Japanese did, but pursued the sciences in their own way. However,
Chinese sciences were finally surpassed by modem ones of the West. One of
the reasons may be the fact that up to a point, Chinese investigative study
can be called inductive. The Chinese sought for precedents and facts but
induction ceased at a certain point and deduction based on the authority of
the classics then took over.11 This is a partial explanation of the non-
development of purely experimental or deductive science in China.
In Sung neo-Confucianism "ordered intuition into the essence of
things" was esteemed, but this was not natural cognition nor particularly
objective cognition; it was rather a quest for the essence of all things.18
When one adopts the standpoint of "intuitionism," necessary truth is
difficult to prove to others with different intuitions.
In the Chinese Buddhist tradition there is no single authoritative
interpretation of a given phrase. Chinese Buddhist scholars produced dif-
ferent and varied interpretations of the same phase. Rather than compel a
uniform belief they interpreted phrases very freely. Zen Buddhism carried
this to extremes enunciating the principle "not to set up any words."
Similarly, "if our mind goes astray we are ruled by the Lotus-Sutra. If our
mind is enlightened, we rule the Lotus-Sutra."19 "Not to set up any words"
does not mean "do not resort to the use of the written word," for there
were few sects which used and valued literary expression as much as the
Zen sect. The term therefore means, rather, "do not set up dogmas in the
form of propositions."
Zen Buddhists, with this attitude, denied the importance of the Bud-
dhist canon. They compared the canon to fingers pointing at the moon;
they also used the simile of which the Taoists were fond, and compared
the Buddhist canon to fish-nets and rabbit-traps;2o in other words, one
should concentrate on the content and not place great value on the literary
meaning of apprehending that content.
Chinese dislike for canonical formulae can be seen in the process of
their acceptance of various Buddhist arts. 21 Although the Chinese built
many Buddhist monuments and reliquaries they cannot be classified into
canonical types. In the case of Buddhist images there were formulae for
making images and such formulae were carefully followed in Japan, but
they were not followed in China and one cannot classify surviving Chinese
Buddha images according to these type-forms. For example, in China a
Buddha image holding a medicine vessel is not always Bhai~ajyaguruta­
thiigata and his image is not always accompanied by this object. Buddha
images were made arbitrarily in whatever form the artist desired. This
....
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feature is regarded as a virtue by individualistic thinkers and amateurs of
art.
Acceptance of Indian Logic in a Distorted Form
Since nomothetical sciences did not develop in China, it is natural that
logic which deals with the laws for the expression of thought did not
develop either.
A certain degree of logical consciousness naturally existed among the
Chinese, but they did not build upon that consciousness "a logical science."
Some scholars assert that deductive argumentation-if not logic-was de-
veloped by the followers of Mo-tzii and termed hsiao (testing).22 In my
view, it is doubtful that this term really coincides with what is known in
the West as deduction.23
In later times Indian logic was introduced into China, but it exerted no
significant influence on the ways of thinking of the Chinese. It soon
declined and disappeared as a branch of study.
In some Buddhist works translated into Chinese there are passages on
logic; for example, the Upiiyahrdaya translated by Kif!lkara, the work
translated by Paramartha,24 the Nyiiyamukha of Dignaga translated by
Hsiian-tsang (596-664), and the Nyiiyapravesaka also translated by Hsiian-
tsang. The commentary upon the last work by a disciple of Hsiian-tsang,
Tz'u-en, was regarded as the highest authority in this field in China and
Japan. After Hsiian-tsang at least thirty works were composed on Buddhist
logic.25
In the history of the introduction of Buddhist logic into China we can
observe several striking phenomena. First, very few logical works were
translated into Chinese. If we compare that number with the vastly larger
number of such works which were translated into Tibetan, we are bound
to conclude that interest in Buddhist logic was very slight among the
Chinese. Secondly, only logical works of the simplest kind were translated
into Chinese and voluminous works intended to be systematic expositions
of the whole science of logic were left untranslated. It would appear that
the Chinese translated simple handbooks or compendia, the bare mini-
mum necessary to get a rudimentary knowledge of the logical terminology
of Buddhist treatises in general. Thirdly, Indian works on epistemology
which attempted to develop a theory of knowledge as a basis of knowledge
for logical theory were not translated. Perhaps the ultimate development
of Buddhist logic in India was accomplished by Dharmakirti. He sought
the source of human knowledge in perception and reasoning. He dif-
ferentiated between synthetic and analytical judgments. On this basis he
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established an elaborate system-a science of knowledge. His system has
often been compared to that of Kant. The Tibetans translated and studied
Dharmakirti's works, whereas the Chinese Buddhists made no effort to
study or to understand them. Even after Dharmakirti the Chinese translated
earlier works, mainly on discipline and ritual. For this reason it is perhaps
justifiable to say that the Chinese did not seek theory for theory's sake but
rather gave their attention to that which was immediately relevant to
practical understanding and conduct.
Thus Indian logic was accepted only in part and even the part that was
accepted was not understood in the sense of the Indian originals. Even
Hsiian-tsang, who introduced Indian logiC, seems not to have fully under-
stood it. In a great assembly in India he made the inference that mind alone
really exists while objects in the external world do not exist. In developing
his argument he violated the rule of Indian logic which holds that the
proposition "reason" should be one which is admitted by both assertor and
opponent. Under this heading he set forth a proposition which was only
agreed to by the assertor.26 Tz'u-en's work, which was regarded as the
highest authority in China and Japan, contains many fallacies in philosoph-
ical and logical analysis.21 He apparently did not understand the Indian rule
that in syllogisms the middle term should be distributed by the major term.
The formula of the new Buddhist logic was called the three-membered
syllogism and it consisted of assertion, reason, and simile.28 Some Chinese
Buddhist scholars understood this,29 but Tz'u-en misunderstood it, asserting
that it consisted of reason and similes of likeness and unlikeness.3o This
mistake in interpretation became henceforth authoritative in China and
Japan.
In Chinese Buddhist scriptures ratio essendi (karaka hetu) is translated
as sheng-yin and ratio cognoscendi (jiiapaka hetu) as liao-yin.31 But Tz'u-en
failed to understand the distinction and connected both concepts with the
three concepts of yen (words), shih (knowledge), and yi (meaning).32
In doing this he simply made a mechanical classification and his explana-
tion is self-contradictory as well as at odds with the original meaning. His
application of logical rules in elucidating the idealist philosophy (the
"mind-only" theory) was utterly fallacious. This fact was pointed out even
by early Japanese Buddhist scholars such as Genshin, Rinjo, and Kaijo.33
There is a further fundamental difference between Indian logicians
and Chinese Buddhist scholars. Indian Buddhist scholars of the logical
school accepted perception and reasoning as the sole sources of right knowl-
edge; they denied independent authority to the Canon in this field where-
as Chinese scholars of Buddhist logic accepted the authority of the Canon.
Even the sort of limited logical study carried on by the sect of idealism,
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the followers of Tz'u-en, declined when this sect declined. It was only in
the Tang dynasty that logical studies had any vitality.
Logical studies having no basis in traditional Chinese thought never
became significant and exerted very little influence on later Chinese
thought. Most Chinese scholars merely accepted the authority of the
Canon. This fact will probably betray a weakness in logical thinking on the
part of scholars. It should be noted that this is in striking contrast to the
importance and vitality of logical studies in Tibet.
The Non-Logical Character of Zen Buddhism
The non-logical character of Chinese thought is particularly con-
spicuous in Zen Buddhism, which is the most sinicized of Chinese Bud-
dhist sects. Early Zen was not non-logical. The early system of explanation
known as "the two enlightenments and four practices"34 was quite logical
and even later the dialogue of Hui-hai is characterized by logical
consistency.35
However, a non-logical tendency soon manifested itself and eventually
prevailed. The monk Huang-po said36 " ... they say that the true
universal body of the Buddha is like the sky . . . but they do not
understand that the universal body is sky, and sky is the universal body. The
two are not different." Now the Buddha nature or the originally pure mind
were often compared to the sky in India. But the Indians regarded the sky
as an element or principle in the natural world, and distinguished it from
the Buddha nature, whereas the Chinese lost sight of this distinction. When
there is a tendency to lose sight of the function and significance of a simile,
theoretical philosophy is unlikely to develop. Moreover, theoretical as-
sertions were neither widely understood nor was their meaning developed.
For example, Lin-chi's ( ? -867 A.D.) four alternatives are philosophically
important and allow many different explanations. Their author did not,
however, discuss them in an abstract speculative way. He explained them
in figurative language: "(I) 'To take away man and not to take away
objects'-warm days appear and brocade is laid out on the earth-baby's
hairs falling are like thread. (2) 'To take away objects and not to take away
man'-the king's orders are promulgated and circulate over the empire;
generals take their ease outside the stronghold. (3) 'To take away both men
and objects'-to live in a retreat cut off from all communication. (4) 'Not
to take away either men or objects'-a king ascends to a jeweled palace and
old peasants sing gaily."37 The point in this quotation is not that figurative
explanations are given but that figurative explanations alone are given.
Poetical and emotional phrases take the place of logical exposition. Later
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explanations of these four alternatives were generally of the same sort.
The non-logical character of Zen is most evident in its dialogues. We
have said that the spirit and technique of the dialogue did not develop in
China, so it is important to emphasize that the so-called dialogues of Zen
were utterly different from Greek dialogues. When Chao-chou (c. 850 A.D.)
was asked "Does the Buddha nature exist in a dog?" he answered in the
affirmative on one occasion and in the negative on another. Mo-tzii said on
one occasion "Mind is the Buddha" and on another occasion "Neither mind
nor Buddha."3s The reasons for these contradictory answers are to be found
in the concrete situations which elicited them. We may compare this to the
different advice given by doctors to patients of different physical types
suffering from the same disease. There is an obvious contradiction in the
theoretical sense but no contradiction in the practical sense. This is an
example of the aspect of expediency in Buddhist thought.
However, in the type of thought which is called expedient, there is a
definite connection between the end desired and the means employed. Later
Zen Buddhism gradually lost sight of that connection. For example, there is
a frequently repeated question in Zen Buddhism: "For what purpose did
Bodhidharma come to China?" It really means something like "What is
the essence of Zen Buddhism?" To this question Zen masters give a variety
of answers: 39
"I am tired, having been sitting for a long time."
''Today and tomorrow."
"A piece of tile and a bit of stone."
"The wind blows and the sun heats."
"Frost comes upon clouds."
"An oak tree in the garden."
"In the daytime I see a mountain."
"White clouds embrace rocky stones."
"Ch'ang-an [a large city] is in the East, Lo-yang [another large city]
is in the West."
"With a fan of blue silk, I feel cool enough in the wind."
"A thousand sticks of bamboo outside the gate and a piece of incense
before the image of Buddha."
''There being no water during a long drought, rice plants withered in
the fields."
There are said to be more than a hundred answers to this question.
Since no semantic connection between the questions and the answers was
required, the answers can be of infinite variety. The question and the
answer are given in a moment. There is no sustained development such as
characterizes Greek dialogue. The answers seem strange indeed, but it is
said that many of those who heard the answers gained enlightenment. Zen
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masters never answered questions in the form of universal propositions.4o
They believed the philosophical problems could best be solved by evoking
intuition. They gave answers in a figurative and intuitive way. This form of
question and answer was more prevalent in later Zen Buddhism from the
Sung period (960-1279) on.
.This whole complex of ideas and practices is alien to Indian Buddhism.
The dharmas, that is, universal religious and moral norms, were seen in
China not as the content of judgments shared by other people, but as the
direct experience of each individual, inexpressible in words. Yung-chia
said of himself "Since my youth I was devoted to scholarship. I investigated
siitras and commentaries. Nothing but an endless discrimination of terms!
It is like counting the sands in the sea. The Buddha reprimanded me
saying What is the use of counting the treasures of others?' "41
Once they had given up the effort to grasp and to express truths in the
form of universal propositions, the Zen Buddhists gradually fell into the
habit of non-logical discourse. Chu Hsi (1130-1200) pointed out that Zen
masters at first engaged in very clear dialogues but later became com-
placent, enmeshed in nonsensical dialogues.42 Chu Hsi himself had this
in common with the Zen masters: he never gave exact answers. The later
Zen masters did not seek to give explanations in rational terms; they
sought rather to give them in a figurative and intuitive way.
A commentary by Wan-sung (1166-1246) to an ancient dialogue by
Bodhidharma runs as follows: (the comments are given in brackets) "Em-
peror Wu of the Liang inquired of Bodhidharma [he got up early and
went to market without making any profit.] 'What is the ultimate
reality, the sacred truth?' [now ask the second head.] Bodhidharma
said 'That where there is no sacredness at all.' [He has split open the
abdomen and dug out the heart.] The Emperor said 'Who is talking with
me?' [We can perceive a tusk inside the nostril.] Bodhidharma said 'I
don't know.' [We can see the jowls behind the brains.] The Emperor
could not agree with him. [A square peg cannot go into a round hole.]
Finally, Bodhidharma crossed the Yang-tse River and went to the Shao-lin
temple where he practiced meditation for nine years. [If a family does not
have overdue rent it cannot be rich.]"43
Though this dialogue itself has a hidden logic of its own, we can see
from this bracketed commentary the tendency in later Zen to use explana-
tions made up of concrete images of a suggestive kind.
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CHAPTER 17 EMPHASIS ON THE
PARTICULAR
Emphasis on Particular Instances
The tendency to value and to devote attention to the particular rather
than to the universal is observable in many different aspects of Chinese
culture.
The Five Classics, which are works of the highest authority regarded
as providing the norms for human life, contain, for the most part, descrip-
tions of particular incidents and statements of particular facts. They do not
state gen'eral principles of human behavior.1 Even the Analects of Con-
fucius records mostly the actions of individuals and the dicta of Confucius
on separate incidents; these dicta for the most part have a personal
significance. Through the classics and their commentaries the Chinese
sought valid norms of moral conduct through individual instances.
The Chinese way of esteeming concrete particulars did not let the
Indian Buddhist mythology, with its fanciful creations of the imagination,
stand in that form. The Chinese modified the Indian phantasmagoric
myths, so remote from historical reality, so that the mythological beings
were identified respectively with actual historical persons (euhemerism).
Thus, for example, the Buddhist divinity Yama, King of Hell, or Yen-lo
in Chinese, became identified with a Sui dynasty official who died in
592 A.D.2
Buddhism, which had set forth, in the Indian manner, general and
universal principles, was often presented to the Chinese through concrete
examples and individual instances.
Zen explanations were of this sort. The true nature of the Buddha
comes not in words but only through concrete experience. Ethics is grasped
on the basis of particular experiences. Universal truth is in the human being
and not in a universal proposition. (By contrast, Indians mostly resorted to
universal propositions.)
The most frequent example of this development is the mode of ex'
planation developed by Zen Buddhism. "A priest asked Tung-shan: What
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is Buddha?' He replied 'Only three pounds of hemp.''' Yuan-wu of the
Sung dynasty explained this as follows. 3 "Many people have given differ-
ent explanations of this. Some say that Tung-shan was weighing hemp
when he was asked the question. Others say that he is inclined to answer
west when asked about the east [i.e., he was inclined to answer in an un-
expected way]. Others say, 'Originally you yourself are Buddha whereas
the questioner sought for Buddha outside himself; in order to tell him
how silly he was, Tung-shan answered in an elliptical way.' Other silly
people say that the three pounds of hemp themselves are nothing but
Buddha. These answers have nothing to do with Tung-shan's purport."
Then what is the true meaning of the answers? Yuan-wu is evasive, saying,
"The true way cannot be obtained by words." In these explanations and
Yuan-wu's comment we can see a distinctive feature of the Chinese way of
thinking, i.e., the true way is not to be obtained by words-not through
universal propositions-but only through concrete experience. Thus, one
should not regard the Buddha as something mystical and transcending
ordinary life.
Nagarjuna had expressed a similar idea. He said that the long se-
quence of discussions on the essence of the Buddha did not reveal that
essence. He said 'The Buddha transcends all metaphysical discussions
and is indestructible; yet those who discuss it fail to see the Buddha, being
blinded by their own sophistication."4 According to him, in every experience
we experience Buddha. "The true essence of Buddha is nothing but that of
this mundane world." This thought coincides in meaning with that of
Tung-shan. But the difference between the Indian and the Chinese ways
of thinking lies in the difference in the expression of that meaning.
Whereas Nagarjuna taught in the form of universal propositions, the
Chinese did not do so but produced the concrete example of the three
pounds of hemp.
We can see much the same contrast in the differing sorts of answers
to questions about life after death. "A monk asked, 'Where did Nan-
ch'iian go after he died?' The master replied 'In an eastern house he became
an ass, and in a western house he became a horse.' " This answer did not
mean that he had been reborn as an ass or a horse. "The monk asked,
What do you mean by this?' The master said, 'If he wants to ride he can
ride, if he wants to get off he can get off.' "5 This means that the deceased
had attained the freedom to do what he wanted, having transcended life
and death. Let us compare this with the answer to a comparable question
in early Buddhism. When the Buddha was asked whether the Enlight-
ened One existed after death, he did not give any answer to the question
because, as the Siitras say, discussion and speculation about such meta-
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physical problems could not lead men to enlightenment. Thus, not giving
any answer is a kind of definite answer and is logically conceived. Here
we can see the difference in ways of thinking between these two peoples.
Explanation on the Basis of Particular Instances
The way of thinking in which the Chinese prefer particular, concrete,
and intuitive explanations may be seen in their way of explaining ideas and
teaching people by the use of particular examples. To most Chinese, there-
fore, ethics is not understood or taught as part of a universal law, but is
grasped on the basis of particular experiences, and is then utilized to
realize human truth. Such a mental attitude is readily discernible in the
Analects (Lun Yii), and especially in Zen Buddhism. Men are placed in
special circumstances limited by time and space, and their experiences are
changing every moment, which means that no two people can have exactly
the same experience. There is a limit to collective experience. The particu-
lar situation in which the individual finds himself is called "Chi" by Zen
Buddhism. The idea of "Chi" is characteristically Chinese, for we cannot
find its exact equivalent in India.6
Next, I wish to relate, as a concrete case of a K6an, the "Chii Chih
Shu Chih"-Chii Chih's erect finger. Chii Chih was a disciple of the
monk T'ien-lung. When asked about the most important matters of life and
death, he would reply always by showing his finger. Later, a boy who was
studying under him imitated his master's manner of showing his finger
when he was asked by a stranger about his master's teaching. When Chii
Chih heard of his conduct, he cut off the boy's finger. The boy went away
crying, unable to endure the pain. He then called the boy back. The
boy came back and saw his master unexpectedly show an erect finger.
At that instant, the boy attained enlightenment. Chii Chih said at the
time of his death, "I was taught Zen in a finger tip by my master, and have
been unable to exhaust it all during my life-time."6&
I think this catechism is an admonition that one should not pretend to
have attained enlightenment if one has not actually done so. I should like to
make a comparison here with an Indian case. In the Vinaya-Pitaka of
Hlnayana Buddhism, uttari-manussa-dhamma is thought to be one of the
four terrible sins for a monk. This means that one who has not attained
the superior stage, should not pretend that he has.
Indians generally liked to express the truth about human beings with
a universal proposition, while the Chinese did not like to do so. The
Chinese made an effort to realize the universal truth in the human being
and revealed in particular instances which cannot be altered by factors of
both time and space. When Fa-ch'ang, a famous monk of Zen Buddhism,
d
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gathered his disciples at his death, and finished giving his final instructions
to them, they heard a flying squirrel cry out, whereupon he said, "That's
it! Nothing but it! Retain this well. I am going to die soon."7
In Zen Buddhism, they call the particular cases "Chi." It is said that
an enlightened man knows "Chi" and utilizes expedients. It should not be
called merely "Chance" or "Contingency," but should be thought of as
something containing a purpose in which subject and object are in both
opposition and correspondence to each other. It freely shows an adaptability
to each situation. Generally speaking, it means that "one should be the
master in every situation." Thus, Zen Buddhism aims at a suitable mind
activity for each situation, i.e., an intuitive action "correctly manifested."
Therefore, it is said that although the act of ridding oneself of mind and
body is rather easy, it is difficult to express in words.s It is thought that we
must remove deep attachments and prejudice, must be "mindless" in order
to take measures suited to the occasion, and must have a "free flexibility" in
order to have an adequate cognition suitable to the situation and time.
Development of Descriptive Science in Regard to the Particular
The Chinese lay stress especially on particular facts in the historical
and social spheres, as the result of their emphasis on the concrete, includ-
ing phenomena which are perfectly unique in time and space.
In the historical sphere, this trend may be observed in the objective
and minute compilation of historical works. It is said that the ideal of the
compilers of the Erh Shih Ssu Shih (Twenty-four Dynastic Histories up
to the Manchu Dynasty) was as exhaustive an entry as possible of the
incidents occurring in each dynasty. In the opinion of specialists this ideal
is impossible to achieve, granted that Chinese historians were very succinct.
But the fact of the existence of such a legendary ideal evidences their
inclination to aim at portraying individual events in detail. Moreover, it
is recognized that Chinese historians continually tried to enlarge and perfect
their historical annals, and were always at work on supplements which
would include materials omitted from the standard histories. Therefore,
they think that the more complex the description is, the better the his-
torical work is. Such a method of describing history is just the opposite
of the method which aims at simple and concise description. Of course, we
can also recognize the trend of summarization and simplification, but it was
more usual to take the method of making the historical records more
complex through the compilation of histories.9 Therefore, some Westerners
criticize such history books and say that they are elaborate, encyclopedic,
and almost impossible to read through.to But even the Western scholar
who believes in the superiority of Greek culture cannot help acknowl-
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edging that the Chinese history books are not only minute but also
accurate and objective.
"A l'autre bout de notre continent eurasiatique, la Chine offre anotre
desir d'information de prestigieuses annales, d'une objectivite hors pair, que
pourrait lui jalouser notre propre culture."ll
The Chinese made an effort to preserve the historical materials which
are apt to be destroyed. They collected many kinds of epitaphs and pro-
duced such works as the Chin Shih Ts'ui Pien and the Pa Ch'iung Shih
Chin Shih Pu Cheng which is a bulky work of 130 volumes. In India, we
cannot find such materials as these.
Moreover, they made every effort to record climatic features and
peculiarities, and produced many kinds of book catalogues like the Ssu K'u
Ch'iian Shu Tsung Mu (The Complete Library of the Four Treasuries)
in 200 volumes. So many catalogues of books have been made that we even
find "catalogues of catalogues."12
Such phenomena are just the opposite of what holds true for India. As
mentioned above, Indians wrote few historical books, and even these have
contents which are largely legendary. Indians have seldom produced topog-
raphies, much less catalogues of books. The Indian paid attention
chiefly to universals, neglecting historical and climatic particularities, while
the Chinese, on the contrary, attached great importance to these. For this
reason the descriptive sciences of particulars reached a high level of
development in China. According to the philosophy of Rickert, the designa-
tion "idiographic science" is applied to that kind of descriptive science
which treats non-recurring historical phenomena. If we allow this term to
include peculiarities of space and climate, then it is most applicable to the
studies made by the Chinese.
The Chinese way of thinking in their descriptive studies of particulars
limited their acceptance of Indian Buddhism when it went contrary to
Chinese attitudes. When accepting Buddhism, the Chinese did not neglect
historical reflection and self-examination, and valued highly historical
works on Buddhism and biographies of Buddhists, translating them into
Chinese. In India also, history books and biographies were composed,
though their contents were not too accurate, but these were lost because
the Indians cared little for them. The I Pu Tsung Lun Lun, for instance,
which describes the process of the formation of sects of Hinayana
Buddhism in India was translated into Chinese three times. Besides,
biographies of King Asoka, the Buddhist philosophers, Asvagho~a, Nagar-
juna, Aryadeva, Vasubandhu and others, all of which are legendary, were
translated into Chinese.I3 The originals of these works have all been lost,
and their translations also for the most part do not survive.14
As Indian historical works and biographies were few in number, the
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Chinese themselves tried to write a history of Indian Buddhism. The
result of these efforts is the Fu Fa Tsang Yin Yuan Chuan in three
volumes. This is a description of the transmission of the True Teaching
from the first Patriarch Mahakasyapa to Buddhasimha, the twenty-third
Patriarch. It is presumed that this work was completed by T'an-yao, and
is based on the accounts transmitted by Kimkara, a monk from Central
Asia, with occasional reference to the Indian "Biographies."15 Thus, many
books were produced describing the order of the transmission of the teach-
ing from masters to disciples ranging over India and China. Seng-hsiang,
a Buddhist monk of the T'ang dynasty, compiled a Record of the Transmis-
sion of the Lotus Siitra (Fa Hua Ching Chuan Chi) in 10 volumes. Simi-
larly Fa-tsang of the T'ang dynasty wrote the Hua Yen Ching Chuan Chi
(Record of the Transmission of the Avatamsaka-siitra) in five volumes,
and Shih-Mng in the Sung dynasty compiled the T'ien T'ai Chiu Tsu
Chuan (Biographies of the Nine Patriarchs of the T'ien T'ai School) in
one volume; yet it was Zen Buddhists who turned out history books on the
largest scale: Ching Te Chuan Teng Lu (Record of the Transmission of
the Lamp) in 30 volumes by Tao-yuan of the Sung dynasty, and Fa Tsu
T'ung Chi (Record of the Genealogy of Buddhist Patriarchs) in 54
volumes by Chih-p'an of the Sung period. Besides, numerous collections of
biographies of Chinese Buddhist monks were compiled from the sixth
century to modem times. More than a hundred volumes of such bio-
graphical records were compiled by monks, principally by Chih-p'an, Hsieh-
ch'ung (also of the Sung period) in 9 volumes, Nien-ch'ang (of the Yuan
period, 1279-1367) in 22 volumes, Chiao-an (of the Ming period) in 4
volumes; also Tao-hsuan (of the T'ang period) in 30 volumes, Tsan-ning
and others (of the Sung period) in 30 volumes, ]u-hsing, etc. I-tsing (of
the Tang period) in two volumes collected the lives of famous monks who
went to Central Asia or India to study Buddhism, after his own travels in
India and Sumatra (671-695).
The Indians, when compiling short treatises into a larger work, were
apt to omit their titles and the names of their authors. Such works as the
Mahiibhiirata and the Abhidharma-mahii-vibhii~ii-siistraare examples of
this. In China, however, each title, the authors' names and careers,
etc., of the short treatises contained in the larger books were carefully pre-
served. Books like the Hung Ming Chi, the Kuang Hung Ming Chi, and
the Yao Pang Wen Lei are good examples.
In this way, the Chinese, trying to understand matters historically on
the basis of particular individuals, would accept even the founder Sakya-
muni as a historical person. That explains the fact that Seng-yu, a Buddhist
monk of the Sung dynasty, compiled and arranged many records of biog-
raphies of the Buddha under the title Shih Chia P'u in 5 or 6 volumes,
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and Tao-hsiian, a Buddhist monk of the Tang dynasty, edited the Shih
Chia Shih P'u in one volume. It was a matter of great importance when,
where, and to whom Sakyamuni taught the siitras which were translated
into Chinese. Therefore, they tried to relate each siitra to a period in
Sakyamuni's lifetime. The 'Wu Shih Chiao P'an" devised by the Chinese
scholar Tien-t'ai is a typical example of this. According to modern textual
criticism, we know that the siitras were all produced in a later period, so
that efforts to determine who uttered them are meaningless. Yet, Chinese
Buddhist scholars at that time believed that these theories were correct.
Thus the Chinese scholars at least showed their interest in particulars, more
so than the Indians. We can say that the dominant object of the Chinese
scholars' worship and faith was Sakyamuni, which probably was the result
of their emphasis on historical matters. Even if there were some statues of
Vairocana as an object of their worship, they were exceptions. They made
it a rule to enshrine the statue of Amitabha in the west, Maitreya or Yao
Shih Ju Lai in the east, with Sakyamuni as the central figure in the
grand hall of the temple.
They usually install statues of Kasyapa and Ananda, the two great
Arahats; but Mafijusri and Samantabhadra, the two great Bodhisattvas,
often replace these. Sakyamuni, having these Buddhas as attendants, might
be considered as a Sambhoga-kaya (a model body), i.e., a Buddha endowed
with all the virtues of Buddha, by most Buddhists. Thus, we can see the
tendency to regard Sakyamuni as a historical person by virtue of the fact
that they enshrine the two great disciples, Kasyapa and Ananda. That is
an important difference between Chinese and Japanese Buddhism.16 Thus,
the objects of worship in most Japanese temples, though they are not
all the same, are originally Amitabha, Vairocana, Bhai~ajyaguru, and
Sakyamuni. Sakyamuni, however, had already been considered not so much
a historical person as a Tathagata (the Truth-Revealer) of Original Wis-
dom, namely as a Sambhoga-kaya Buddha.
There is also a tendency among the Chinese to emphasize spatial and
climatic particularities. The Fo Tsu Tung Chi, previously mentioned, con-
tains two volumes on topography, entitled the Shih Chieh Ming Ti Chih.
Records of travels written by Buddhist pilgrims who traveled to Central
Asia and to India from China contain considerable geographical and cli-
matic descriptions. The Ta Tang Hsi Yii Chi (Records of the Western
Regions During the Tang Period), in 12 volumes by Hsiian Tsang is well
known for its accuracy in geographical descriptions, even when compared
to modern surveys. Chinese pilgrims tried to hand down detailed topog-
raphies of India although the Indians themselves did not.
Another manifestation of the tendency to emphasize particularity, as
seen in the form of the acceptance of Buddhism, is the publishing of
'ttz
EMPHASIS ON THE pARTICULAR
catalogues of siitras. In the first stage, the catalogues of siitras were only
very simple lists of the siitras found in libraries which were owned by
Buddhist monks, devotees, scholars, and others. In addition, catalogues of
siitras were made to preserve the record of the achievements of Buddhist
translators for posterity. Eventually, such catalogues were brought together,
the many surviving catalogues of the Buddhist canon being their result.
These evolved from the catalogues made for the convenience of individual
scholars in their study, and included the contents of the catalogues pos-
sessed by each temple at that time. The compilers examined as carefully
as possible the titles of siitras, names of translators, dates of translation,
etc., and strove to list all siitras translated into Chinese. Tsung Li Chung
Ching Mu Lu in one volume, which was edited by Tao-an in 374 A.D., was
the first such catalogue. Fifteen kinds of catalogues were compiled by the
Tang dynasty.l1
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CHAPTER 18 CONSERVATISM
EXPRESSED IN EXALTATION
OF ANTIQUITY
Importance Attached to Past Events
There is a tendency in some Chinese ways of thinking to understand
phenomena statically, which can be seen in certain modes of expression in
the Chinese language. For example, in Chinese there is no single word
capable of expressing precisely the meaning of "to become" as there is in
modern Eqropean languages. The character "ch'eng" which is used by
Japanese philosophers as an equivalent for "become" originally meant
"accomplish," i.e. "a single phenomenon or thing is brought to a more
advanced stage and this has accomplished its object," and, therefore, does
not have precisely the same meaning as "become." The character "wei" is
indeed used with the meaning of "to become," but it was employed as a
copulative "to be" as well as "do" and "to make." Thus, it may be seen that
at least ancient Chinese lacked a common verb (or auxiliary verb) meaning
"to become." There is, however, a Chinese verb kai, "to change." This
attitude of static understanding, linked with the way of thinking in some
groups which emphasizes particulars, produced a trend of thinking which
attaches importance to past events. The Chinese very often stress precedents,
not abstract principles; whence their abundant historical allusions and set
literary phrases. A people stressing particulars and concrete perception is
inclined to set a basis of law in past customs and recurrent events, i.e. in
previous examples as precedents. In other words, the fruit of the past
experiences of people of older times arouses in the Chinese mind a sense
of validity. It is only natural then that the Chinese would feel a certain
uneasiness regarding the method which attempts to fix the laws governing
human life solely by the abstract meditative power of the individual. The
laws based on abstract thinking teach what conduct should be followed in
the future, but they leave a sense of uneasiness among many Chinese who
do not trust abstract thinking alone. For this reason, the conclusions
reached by abstract thinking alone are not relied on to the same extent as
the lived experience of the past. It is quite understandable then that with
such an outlook, the Chinese try to discover in precedents the laws
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governing life. Thus, for the Chinese, learning implies full knowledge of
the precedents of a past age, and is therefore referred to as "Chi-ku," i.e.
"searching out the ancien't ways."
Most Chinese think it better to imitate in their writing the ways of
expression used by their predecessors rather than to contrive new styles
by their own efforts. Ability in writing was always closely tied to a knowl-
edge of the classics. Therefore, classical Chinese texts consisted of a series
of phrases or idioms generally taken from old texts; the foremost of these
texts are the classics called the "ching."
As a consequence, texts abound in literary and historical allusions,
which is the result of the Chinese attachment to ways of expression based
on historical particularity; for example, "Ssu-mien Ch'u-ko"-"to find one-
self surrounded by enemies"; "Hsien Wei Shih"-"to begin with oneself."
In both of these instances, a phrase or a sentence denoting a single historical
event is used to convey a universal, abstract concept. In the arts also,
artistic effects are heightened and a powerful stimulus is given to the viewer
or reader through the medium of historical allusions or quotations from
the classics. Such productions as the Yiian drama (Ch'u-tzu) as well as
the modern Ching-chu are essentially a series of historical allusions and set
literary phrases. Metaphors used in Chinese literature are always linked
with historical facts of the past with the result that Chinese literature
became very extensive and profound.1 We can see a striking contrast, in
this respect, to the Westerner's use of metaphor which is limited to his own
direct experience or at least to that of the age to which he belongs. The
Chinese use of metaphors contrasts also with the Indian's use of metaphors
which transcend historical experience, or at least, were thought by the
Indians to do so.
Chinese Buddhists did not prove to be an exception to this trend of
thinking. Chinese equivalents of Sanskrit terms appearing in the Buddhist
canon, when once fixed, were seldom changed thereafter. For this reason
Hsiian-tsang writes, "I follow the old usage and do not translate this word
anew." This traditional trend of thinking was particularly in evidence in
Zen Buddhism. Particularly, the Zen sect began to use the Koan, a kind of
question-and-answer dialogue by a master and his disciple, with increasing
frequency after the Sung dynasty. The original meaning of "Kung-an"
(Koan) is "records of cases in public office," and its meaning was changed
to "pattern" or "previous example" and came to be called the "law of
ancient times." Finally, in Zen Buddhism they consist of questions-and-
answer dialogues, actions and anecdotes taken from the lives of famous
monks as well as quotations from siitras, among which there are not a few
creative works made in a later period.
Conditioned by the above-mentioned ways of thinking, free thought
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along the line of individualism did not develop as prominently as it did in
the West. The Spring and Autumn period (722-481 B.C.) and that of the
Warring States (403-221 B.C.) may be the only exceptions.
Continuity of the Classical Way of Thinking
As long as the Chinese practiced the way of thinking described above,
it is quite natural that they should have regarded the writings of their
predecessors as having unquestionable authority. The thought and life of
the Chinese people must always be examined in relation to the Chinese
classics, for the life of the Chinese has been strongly conditioned by the
classics. Since ancient times in China, the books which set the pattern of
life have been fixed. They are called Wu Ching (the Five Classics): I
Ching (Classic of Changes), Shu Ching (Classic of Documents), Shih
Ching (Classic of Songs), Li Chi (Record of Rituals), Ch'un Ch'iu
(Spring and Autumn Annals). These five classics are each nominally equal
in status, and are accorded a degree of authority not possessed by any other
books. According to later tradition, Confucius selected precedents which
were to serve as models and compiled the works now known as the Five
Classics. It seems to be true that Confucius held the Shih and Li in high
esteem, and urged people to put the Li Yiieh of the Duke of Chou into
practice. Mencius included the Ch'un Ch'iu. According to a legend, it
was said that it was Hsiin-tzii who finally fixed the number of classics at
five. Mencius had a particularly high regard for the Ch'un Ch'iu, and thus
strengthened the tradition of respecting precedents. Hsiin-Tzii, who sup-
posedly fixed the number of the classics at five and advocated respect for
the doctrines of one's teacher, contributed much toward the formation of
the peculiar character of classical learning in the Han dynasty afterwards.2
Han Fei and Li Ssu, however, strongly urged replacing the laws of past
emperors with the law of the new ruler. But this exceptional view held
sway only during the reign of Shih-Huang-Ti of the Ch'in dynasty, and was
unable to produce any change in the characteristic Chinese way of thinking.
Thus, the Five Classics were established as a pattern for the life of
the Chinese people. It offered the precedents par excellence, ruling over all
other precedents, so that in time the work came to be considered truth
itself and perfection. -It was thought that no matter how much human life
might change, all the truth vital to human life was to be sought in these
Five Classics. Another word for "Ching" (classics) is "Tien" (law) or
"Ch'ang" (eternity), which indicate the eternal aspect of the truth em-
bodied in the Five Classics.3 Though dynasties in China have often
changed, each dynasty has accepted the Five Classics as a supreme authority
cd
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and treated them as the pattern for human life. The Ch'un-Ch'iu Tso-Shih
Chuan tells us that this attitude towards the classics as the pattern for
human life was already in existence in the time of the Chou dynasty. In the
dialogue of the Ch'un-Ch'iu Tso-Shih Chuan we find individuals seeking
authority for their own thoughts or deeds in the Shih Ching or the Shu
Ching. Thus, by the middle of the Chou dynasty these two classics had to
some extent enjoyed a position comparable to the one they were to have in
later ages. At that time, however, the status of the Shih Ching and the Shu
Ching had not yet been determined. There is a later tradition that it was
Confucius who firmly established their status and laid the foundation for
using the classics as the pattern for human life.4
Confucius' teaching did not aim at finding new truth by free specu-
lation and originality. He tried to imitate and revive past traditions while
affirming at the same time the values of the social organization and family
system of his day. He had no desire to alter the system or social organization
of his time. He says in his Analects, "I do not invent, but merely transmit;
I believe in and love antiquity," and "I am not a man born wise. I favor
what is ancient and strive to know it welL" Therefore, he would have said
that the truth in which he believed was not of his own creation, but that
he was only amplifying truths handed down from ancient times. Thus, the
Way of antiquity, according to Confucius, was, concretely speaking, the
Way adopted by the Duke of Chou, who had laid the foundation of the
political and social systems of the Chou dynasty as well as its moral
principles. Confucius called the system of the Duke of Chou "the Li of
Chou Kung," and expressed regret that it had declined and was no longer
practiced completely in his days. The purpose of his teachings was the
revival of the "Li" so that they might be practiced once more. Confucius
was a teacher especially of moral ideals which do not change with time.
Respect for the classics was not limited to people of the Confucian
school only; other schools also held them in high regard, although there
was some difference in degree. Mo-tzii, for example, quotes the Shu Ching
as a work of considerable authority. The only difference between the Con-
fucian attitude toward the classics and the attitude of the other schools is
that the former regarded following the way of the classics as indispensa-
ble.5 The attitude of reverence toward the classics can also be seen in the
Chinese translation of the Buddhistic scriptures, wherein we often come
across the word "Ching" (classics or siitra) in the title of a Chinese transla-
tion of a Sanskrit work, although no such word is found in the original
Sanskrit text.
Many peoples besides the Chinese hold their classics in esteem and
strive to make their life conform to them, without implying that their life
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in all its everyday details must be in complete accord with them. But in the
case of China an extraordinary effort was made not only to let the classics
set the patterns for life, but also to cause everyday life to conform entirely
to the classics. Thus, Chinese thought was passed on from generation to
generation without much change or development after its form had become
fixed. As Chinese society and culture were fixed, its thought was also fixed
in keeping with them. Scholars differ in their opinion as to how far fixed
thought controlled the actual life of the Chinese. On this problem,
S6kichi Tsuda offers the following explanation:
"China has never had a revolution in her world of thought. The
reason for this is that Chinese life itself was fixed. Yet, we should not fail
to notice a secondary cause, namely, that thought had authority only as
thought and did not necessarily control actual living, it was not deemed
necessary to resist and reform thought which has no authority on actual
life, so long as both actual society and politics, whatever the doctrines of
morality or politics may be, were in effect independent of them; yet it is
true that doctrine itself had an authority as doctrine in China."6
I think that this explanation also contains considerable truth, although
China too :has had great changes in the long history of her society. The
degree to which ancient thought controlled the actual life of the Chinese
is a question requiring further examination in the future, but at any rate,
it is a peculiar feature of Chinese culture that it preserved and esteemed
some forms of thought just because of their antiquity.
Once Voltaire stated that it was miraculous that there had never been
any remarkable change in the legal and administrative system of the
Chinese for about four thousand years, from about 2000 B.C. to his own
day, and took that fact as a proof that the legal and administrative system
of the Chinese was the most excellent in the world.7 Voltaire exaggerates,
but I think the reason why some ways and forms of thinking had prevailed
among the Chinese for four thousand years can be attributed to the fact
that they had considered the legal and administrative system devised by
themselves to be the most excellent or natural, so that they dared not
resist it.
People who knew China well before the Second World War would
often remark that when Chinese were discussing a problem with each
other, if one of them would quote a passage of the classics, the others
would at once express their approval. Since China's turn to Communism,
Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung have replaced the Chinese classics. Al-
though this is a great change, we can see how deeply the way of thinking
of the nation is rooted in its yielding to propaganda with little if any
resistance, so long as an authority is cited from the new Communist leaders.
CONSERVATISM EXPRESSED IN EXALTATION OF ANTIQUITY
In~uence Of the Reception of Buddhism
China's classical and conservative ways of thinking modified the form
of its reception of Buddhism. As we have already frequently pointed out,
Chinese Buddhists, especially the priests, took over the doctrine founded
and taught by Siikyamuni, and considered it their duty to exalt their inter-
pretation of his teaching, in spite of the fact that Chinese Buddhism differs
from Indian Buddhism in many respects. Therefore, they rewrote arbitrarily
even the sentences of the siitra; for instance, in spite of the original
of Fa Hua Ching which states that "An enlightened self (Pratyekabuddha)
opened his eyes to the Truth without looking to his master for help
(aniiciiryaka)," the Chinese translation reads "he listened to the Buddha's
law and accepted it as being true."8 This is just the opposite of its original
meaning.
The way of thinking indicated in a phrase like "I only state the truth
but don't make it" dominated even Buddhist scholars in China; for instance,
the venerable Hui-chao (ca. 714 A.D.), the second founder of the Fa Hsiang
school, said that the teaching of pure consciousness, the fundamental
doctrine of the Fa Hsiang school, was preached by Siikyamuni, and
Vasubandhu (320-400), who expounded the doctrine of pure conscious-
ness practically, was a mere commentator.9 In fact, the historical Siikyamuni
expounded no such teaching, but we know that Vasubandhu and other
persons expounded this theory for the first time seven or eight hundred
years after Siikyamuni's death; whereas, Chinese scholars thought the actual
and first advocator to be the commentator. Therefore, as the venerable
Chi-tsang (549-623) pointed out, in case an author of a Buddhist treatise
wished to denounce the theories of other schools, he would claim that his
theory was in accord with the teachings of Siikyamuni and he based his
argument on the authority of the Buddha.10 Zen Buddhists also adopted this
policy (the lessons of antiquity enlighten our mind) as their fundamental
attitude.ll
Chinese Buddhists did not use historical criticism on what was claimed
to have been taught by the Buddha. Buddhist sects each taught what its
founder was supposed to have taught. Critical thought on such matters
did not take root among Buddhists. This attitude is not true of all the
intellectuals of China. The Chinese did do a considerable amount of
historical criticism on their own history and classics, especially after the
Chin (317-419 A.D.) dynasty.
It is true that some Chinese apologists looked at the classics from the
viewpoint of historical origins or criticized them. But the situation in the
modern age is different. A century and more ago the Imperial throne had
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a bureau of Chinese scholars prepare a critical study of each book in the
Imperial library. This work has been published and is available in every
good library. It represents first-rate historical criticism-as good as that in
any European critical work. This includes Chinese classics, etc. Historical
criticism has always been very much alive in China. The Chinese scholars
include not only those who are able to harmonize contradictions in books,
but those who have employed a keen sense of criticism in detection of
such contradictions! Perhaps Chinese Buddhism has been more at fault
logically than the Chinese classics. The Chinese as a whole have never
accepted any single doctrine! So the varying interpretations of a siitra
represent some typical aspects of Chinese ways of thinking.
The custom of attaching importance to past events led the Chinese to
a way of thinking that assumes a master is generally superior to his disciples.
Then the question arose why Aryadeva, disciple of Nagarjuna, vehemently
denounced the philosophical theories of other schools in his treatise called
the One Hundred Verse Treatise, although his master Nagarjuna had
never rejected other schools so explicitly; the venerable Chi-tsang explained,
as the reason for this, that since Nagarjuna had achieved world-wide fame,
none of th~ heretics and Hlnayana Buddhists dared argue against him,
whereas they argued without restraint against Aryadeva who was only
Nagarjuna's "disciple."12 This explanation by Chi-tsang may seem odd to
a reader today.
This attitude of respect for the transmission of the master's teaching
to his disciples led the Chinese Buddhists to be strict in studying the
genealogy of the doctrines transmitted from a master to his disciples. The
very venerable Chi-tsang, who liked arguments, examined carefully the
history of schools in Indian Buddhism and the distinctions in their
language.iS The venerable Chih-i (538-597) who had completed a new
Buddhist theory and founded the T'ien-t'ai sect, wrote down the transmis-
sion of the True Teaching to the disciples amounting to twenty-four Bud-
dhist monks, from Kasyapa, an immediate disciple of Sakyamuni's, to Bud-
dhasiIl1ha in a later age.14 As for Chinese Buddhism of that day, temples
all over China belonged to the Zen schools who esteemed their master in
Zen Buddhism so highly that it came to be a matter of first importance to
obey the master under whom they practiced austerities and followed his
teachings. Such an attitude of thinking led some to call the relation be-
tween master and disciples in question, even with respect to the age before
Bodhidharma, the founder of China's Zen Buddhism, who came to China
about 520 A.D.
Thus, they made up in their own way the genealogy of the twenty-
eight patriarchal founders ranging from the great Kasyapa, one of Sakya-
muni's immediate disciples, to Bodhidharma.15
....
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Many history books on Buddhism were composed, especially by Zen
Buddhists, on the basis of the genealogy of the transmission of doctrines
from master to disciples. The Indians, with their deep respect for universal
law or doctrines, do not mention the transmission from master to disciples
as seriously and minutely as the Chinese do.
As a result of this high esteem for the master, the Chinese Zen sects in
some instances attach more importance to their founders than to Sakyamuni
or the Tathagata; they went so far as to think their respective founders'
Zen Buddhism to be superior to the Tathagata's. Consequently, in their
way of thinking, the master's sayings and deeds became their golden rule,
and served as clues for attaining the goal of the practice of Zen meditation;
they were finally standardized in the form of many K6an of the Zen school.
Following the former examples and ancient practices, the founder's
sayings and deeds came to be regarded as more important than the sutras of
the schools of Mahayana Buddhism which were scanty in historical de-
scriptions: Koan depending on sutras of the schools of Mahayana Buddhism
are merely 5 percent of all the catechisms recorded in the Pi Yen Lu and
the Ts'ung Yung Lu, and the rest, 95 percent of them, are based on the
founder's sayings.16
Because of this high esteem for the founder's oral teachings, Zen Bud-
dhists in later ages preferred their founder's interpretations to the Indian
sutras, and began to concentrate more and more on their many catechisms.
The origin and the significance of the Chinese manifestations of
respect for elders should be dealt with separately, but I consider it to be
closely related to the classical conservatism which is traditional in the
Chinese. The words starting with "Lao" ("Elder"), Lao Jen, Lao Tseng,
and Lao Han are pronounced by Zen Buddhists in order to express a sense
of respect.
Exact logical thought, which would critically examine statements in
the sacred books themselves, is not an outstanding trait of those Chinese
ways of thinking in which classical conservatism regards the authority of
the sacred books to be absolute. This is the reason why Indian logic did not
take root in China. The school of logic brought to China from India by
Hsiian-tsang was the latest one (new Hetu-vidyii) in India of those days,
which stood on a thoroughly rational standpoint and acknowledged only
sense (pratyak~a) and inference (anumiina) as the basis for forming knowl-
edge. This Indian school considered the sacred books of religion, tradition,
the sayings of great men, and so on, as unreliable sources of knowledge, and
disqualified them as a basis of knowledge;11 in this regard, it had something
in common with the natural philosophy of Vaise~ika.
This rationalistic theory of knowledge was brought to China and
taught together with Mohist formal logic, but both were not at all in tune
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with most Chinese who had high regard for the authority of ancient tradi-
tions. They wished to regard traditional knowledge as the solid basis of
knowledge at any rate, and did not permit sense and inference as adequate
substitutes for the traditional ground of knowledge in China. They in-
sisted that the traditional sacred books are more authoritative than knowl-
edge based upon sense and inference, and considered it natural to feel this
way.18
Bearing in mind this characteristic attitude of Chinese Buddhists, we
can easily comprehend how the problem of "forged siitras" came about.
A thought theoretically explained is not sufficient to convince the ordinary
Chinese:To make the ordinary Chinese accept it, it is necessary to base it on
the authority of books. Thus, many "forged siitras" produced in China
were always professed to have been made in India. If they came to be
suspected of having been produced in China, they would at once be re-
garded as lacking truth and authority.
The Chinese popular way of thinking, which idealizes and praises the
past, naturally came to consider the present and future as degraded and
corrupted, so that Chinese thought is said to be pessimistic and non-
futuristic; the pessimistic way of thinking that became predominant in
ancient Chinese Buddhism seems to be related to this Chinese way of
thinking.
Non-development of Free Thought
Of course, it cannot be said that free thought did not appear in China.
It is a well-known fact that all the philosophers of the Spring and Autumn
Period (722-481 B.C.), as well as the Period of the Warring States (403-
222 B.C.), had been advocating their own opinions. Disputes in The Hun-
dred Schools period died down gradually, largely because of the persecu-
tion of scholars and thinkers between 221 and ,206 B.C. by the Ch'in
dynasty which unified all China; it adopted the opinion of the Realists
(Legalist School) who advocated: "Though certain exceptional people
might be successfully ruled by kindness, the average man cannot be con-
trolled except by law."19 This Legalist school tended to be oppressive.
When the study of Confucianism came to be the official course of
study during the Han dynasty, it became the basis for civil service examina-
tions; i.e., the thought of intellectuals was consolidated by Confucianism.
Of course, it cannot be said that all thought with the exception of Con-
fucianism disappeared completely, but rather that no independent school of
thought could exist in opposition to Confucianism. Once the authority of
Confucianism was established, it prevailed in spite of some resistance to it.
No questioning of its authority occurred later. Consequently, due to this
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kind of mentality, the Chinese felt no contradiction between their yearning
for the social and administrative systems of old times and their efforts to
maintain the social and administrative systems of the day. Conservatism and
principles to maintain the status quo were adopted generally. It is often said
that such classics as the Four Books and the Five Classics of Confucianism
restrained the Chinese from thinking freely, but in fact, it is their con-
servative attitude and worship of the past, emphasizing the authority of the
Classics, that really restrained the Chinese.
Thus, free thought was not characteristic of ancient and medieval
China, except in some periods. The real cause for this seems to be connected
with the fact that no urban community (apart from the Imperial capital)
had developed in China. Concerning this absence of urban community,
Max Weber has said the following: "In China, there had never been
formed any citizens' defensive and political organization. Cities in [feudal]
China did not have the characteristics of a religious service (monastic)
organization or of a sworn constitutional government as in the West. Of
course, there existed a prototype of civic thought. The tutelary deity of
cities in ancient China was not a guardian god for civic union, but merely a
guardian spirit for a region, so we might rather say that they were generally
deified beings of high executives of the cities. Cities, the fortresses of the
Imperial Government had, in fact, less guaranty of self-government than
the village communities. Cities were permitted to have neither the right to
conclude a contract nor a jurisdiction, so that they were unable to take
united action. At any rate, the village communities, on the contrary, had all
of those rights. Now, the reason for this type of city can be attributed to the
fact that the cities in the West were formed to be trading centers, whereas
in China, they were products of administrative offices. First of all, a castel-
lated wall was constructed around a city, and then a small number of people
were often forcibly brought within [for protection against robbers or by
allocating land to them]. Moreover, the very name of the capital city itself
or of cites in general was changed whenever one dynasty changed to the
next."20
He added: "Cities in China were not administrative in character, and
they had no administrative privilege as seen in the polis in Greece or modern
cities in the West. It is true that there were many cases in which the
whole city rose to resist the bureaucracy, but their purpose was always
limited to mere opposition to a certain government official or to a given
decree, especially to an imposition of a new tax, but not once did they
venture to stipulate the political freedom of the city. The reason the latter
could not be accomplished as it was in the West can be attributed to the
fact that the Chinese could not get rid of their kinship ties. The settlers in
the cities-especially the rich-had never severed their connections with
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their native places, or their own kinship societies, but maintained all of
their ritual or individual relationships with the village communities in
which they were born."21
In China, private property rights were established, but rights of
freedom guaranteed by law did not exist.22 It is natural, therefore, that
free thinking was not encouraged, and conservative thought and respect
for the past were dominant; cities did not develop as independent communi-
ties, the right to personal freedom was not recognized, and only village com-
munities continued to maintain the same way of life as in ancient times. It
was only in the earlier part of the twentieth century that revolt against
tradition and anti-Confucianism started on a large scale.23
Traditional Character of Scholarship
Within the scope of this way of thinking, learning was apt to be mere
acceptance of traditional knowledge handed down from generation to gen-
eration without change. Confucian scholarship was adopted as orthodox
by the former Han dynasty. This tendency did not exclude critical scholar-
ship. Even in Han times (first century A.D.) some extremely keen critical
work was done. Chu-tzu himself was an extremely keen critic in some
matters. But as a general tendency traditional scholarship was highly
esteemed in the above mentioned period.
Etymologically, the Chinese word "to learn" has no other meaning but
"to imitate." This is especially obvious in the Confucian teachings. The
most important plea of Confucius was that man should take his norm for
living from previous examples and the classics. Therefore, he regarded
reading books, scarce as they were then, as most important. "The master
said that once he had not taken a meal all day and stayed up all night to
meditate, but he found it to be useless, and then he realized that nothing is
better than learning."
In other words, our life should be guided by thorough knowledge of
previous examples rather than by meditation. Therefore, Confucianist
moral theory insists that the concrete contents of Jen, as "the way" or
practical model for morality, should be taught by other persons as knowl-
edge. However, they did not explain how the moral model given by knowl-
edge is related to Jen or how Jen could be affected by knowledge. Also,
the Analects of Confucius, gave no explanation of why "Jen" was the very
core of morality itself, nor did they give any explanation of "¥i" or of
"Ti" which are concrete and practical matters. Again, they did not explain
definitely where the basis for morality should be placed,24 so that, in
China, "to learn" meant simply "to search for ancient ways"; conse-
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quently, "things" or "meaning" is, in fact, nothing but "things which were
taught."25 This trend then led study in the school of Confucius to be-
come mainly the annotation of the classics. The main achievement of
Cheng Hsiian (127-200), a representative scholar in the Later Han
dynasty, was his explanation of the classics. Chu Hsi was the great phi-
losopher, in the Sung dynasty, who completed Confucianism; and yet his
works consist largely of annotations of the classics or his own explanations
of annotations of the classics. He made no completely independent, syste-
matic statements in his works.
This trend also dominated Buddhist scholars. Since Buddhism arose
in India, Chinese Buddhist scholars were influenced by the Indian ways of
thinking so that some of their statements are more systematic and inclusive,
but many of them made efforts to annotate siitras and Indian theories in
order to explain their chief meaning. The venerable Chi-i (538-597) of
Mount T'ien-t'ai, great Buddhist center at Chekiang, wrote an independent
and systematic work in 20 volumes called Mo Ho Chih Kuan (On the
Profound Quiescence) but most of his works consist of explanations of
siitras.
Among the works written by the venerable Chi-tsang-twenty-six sets
of his works are in existence-of which only two books, Le., f-rh Ti I in
three volumes and Ta Ch'eng Hsuan Lun in five volumes, are systematic
treatises; the rest of them are explanations of siitras or of theories. As for the
representative books written by the venerable Fa-tsang, who completed the
doctrine of the Hua Yen school (Book on the Five Teachings of the Hua
Yen School), we should mention his three-or four-volume work Hua Yen
Wu Chiao Chang, but most of the rest of his books are explanations of
siitras or theories. Consequently, it may be correct to call Chinese
Buddhism explanatory, though it is referred to as academic.
The way of thinking which emphasizes explanadon brought some
very extraordinary phenomena; for instance, Ch'eng-kuan, a famous scholar
of the Hua Yen school in the Tang dynasty, who wrote an explanatory
work for the Hua Yen Ching,-Ta Fang Kuang Fo Hua Yen Ching Shu,
in sixty volumes; later on, he continued his explanatory work by adding a
ninety-volume study to it, called Ta Fang Kuang Fo Hua Yen Ching
Yen I Ch'ao.
Since the sacred books of Buddhism in China were all translations
from the Indian originals it may have been necessary for the Chinese to
consult explanatory studies in order to grasp their meaning perfectly, so
that those explanatory works themselves came to have the peculiarity of
being more meaningful than the original books. The way of thinking which
takes to explanations is still evidenced among the Chinese of our own day.
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Once Marxism-Leninism was fixed to be a national policy, the party-leaders
commented on it and lower rank leaders added explanations to the com-
ments of the former. Such a way of thinking has been steadfastly main-
tained to the present day, in spite of the fact that the Chinese have often
experienced revolutions.
G-IAPTER 19 FONDNESS FOR
COMPLEX MULTIPLICITY
EXPRESSED IN
CONCRETE FORM
The Concrete Character of the Artistic Imagination
The Chinese had a high regard for particulars, and presented content
concretely in accordance with their way of thinking; therefore they natu-
rally came to be fond of complex multiplicity expressed in concrete form.
Their standpoint, which relied upon and clung to sensory qualities, made
them especially sensitive to the complex variety of phenomena instead of
the laws and abstractly conceived unity of things. Diversity rather than
similarity characterizes the realm of phenomena. Consequently, the Chi-
nese, who depend upon perceived phenomena and value particulars, are
naturally sensitive to the multiplicity of things, and rarely attempt to think
about the universal validity of laws which regulate this multiplicity of
things.
This characteristic trait of their way of thinking has influenced the
growth of various forms of Chinese art. There is a definite limit to the
force of artistic imagination of the Chinese. Their attitude of observing
only those things that can be concretely experienced, that are grasped
specifically through sensory effects directly perceived, weakens their power
of imagination. This is the reason why in China no epic has been pro-
duced, although novels and a kind of drama, which combine concreteness
and reality, developed on a large scale. This is just the opposite of the
Indians, who produced the Mahabharata, the world's greatest epic, and the
Ramayatta, a beautiful poem of a hero, and other similar imaginative
works, but until recently, India has seldom produced novels.
The Chinese, too, under the Tang and the Sung dynasties, produced
excellent poems, but most of the ideas expressed were concrete and stayed
within the natural laws of time and space. In the later Tang dynasty, there
were people like Li Chang-chi (791-817)/ a poet who was unusually
imaginative, but the basic, individual ideas contained in his poetry are not
very imaginative. The Indian, on the one hand, gives abundant play to the
power of his free imagination, while the Chinese, on the other hand, gives
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play to a different sort of imagination, hovering over the complex multi-
plicity which he loves so much.
Hereupon, the following question may arise: The Chinese are given
to exaggeration by their artistic nature, as seen, for instance, in an ex-
pression of a poem by the famous Tang poet Li Tai-po (7°1-762): 'White
hair, grown 3,000 feet long on account of my sorrow." In this expression the
laws of nature clearly seem to be disregarded, but, reflecting upon this
example, we cannot regard it as very imaginative. Masaaki T ozaki, a
Japanese scholar, offers the following explanation: "The 3,000 feet men-
tioned in the poem have the same meaning as thousands of feet long, i.e.
unfathomably long. Expressions of 'three thousand disciples,' 'three thou-
sand court ladies,' 'a distance of three thousand li' are similar."2 Therefore,
both the concepts of "white hair" and "three thousand" are permissible as
concrete representations of human experience.
Only the combination of the words "white hair" and "3,000 feet long"
ignores natural laws. This Chinese way of thinking has to be distinguished
fundamentally from the Indian way of thinking, which uses huge numbers
such as "hundred millions of," "hundred thousand millions of," "as many
as the grain's of sand in the Ganges river," which are beyond any concrete
human experience and nonchalantly represent concepts outside the per-
ceived world.
Fondness for Ornate Diction
The Chinese language consists of various kinds of rhythmical forms
that appeal to the senses. The characters in sentences are often arranged in
patterns of four each or seven each. For the sake of form the Chinese often
sacrifice meaning, and do not reject a sentence because it is vague. This is
how the euphemistically antithetic style, "5s1£ Li1£ P'ien Li T'i," origi-
nated during the Six Dynasties. It can be said that the Chinese language
is an artistic one, for it aims at euphony, and that its sentences are full of
elegant nuances based not upon universal and abstract concepts but rather
on free usage of historical allusions and phrases.
This characteristic of the Chinese way of thinking naturally also
transfigured Buddhism. The schools of Chinese Buddhism which are
linked directly with the philosophical systems originating in India are
abstract and speculative, while the Zen sect, a purely Chinese form of
Buddhism, is very literary. I have previously indicated how this characteris-
tic is concerned with concreteness in the Chinese way of thinking. The
literary character of Zen Buddhism is especially remarkable in the verses
attached to catechisms (Koan) of the Zen sect, where a certain religious,
metaphysical atmosphere was created by an odd array of persons and
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things which are concrete and appeal to the eyes. In those places, few
abstract remarks can be found.
Fondness for complex multiplicity expressed in concrete form is
evidenced by the efforts made by Chinese writers to fascinate people by
an excessive array of similes and metaphors. In other words, the tendency is
to use expressions which aim to lead people to the meaning to be conveyed
by an intertwining of various representations, using complex expressions
with elaborate words full of suggestions, even if the meaning is simple.
Hence the habit of rhetorical devices is frequently used by the Chinese.
The Japanese scholar, Tominaga Nakamoto (1715-1746) once pointed
this out as follows: "The Chinese Confucian scholar likes to use ornate
styles, while the Japanese is fond of using concise and pithy expressions."
In other words, the Japanese prefer plain expressions and dislike exagger-
ations, while the learned Chinese love to use difficult passages which are
hard to read.3 He also said, "Buddhists are inclined to use passages too mys-
terious to understand, while Confucian philosophers like to use passages
too ornate to understand. If only they would abandon this habit, they could
express their true meaning."4
This same way of thinking appears in the Chinese fondness for dis-
cussion and eloquence. The Chinese mode of explanation is not based upon
theoretical reflection. Rather the aim is to grasp the psychological state
of the other person and try to convince him to agree with one's own
opinion. This aim accounts for the Chinese skill in eloquence.
The Chinese themselves recognized this mental peculiarity. Tao-an
(312-385), a famous Chinese monk, recognized an essential difference
between the Chinese fondness for ornate diction and the writings in the
Indian language. He said, "The Sanskrit siitras lay stress on essence, but
the Chinese are concerned primarily with style and strive to make the
siitras suit the taste of the people."5 Even though there had been a gorgeous
style, the so-called Kavya style, in the ancient Indian language, it was
hardly used in Buddhist siitras. He felt that a defect of the translations of
Buddhist siitras into Chinese was the fact that the translated versions
tried to please popular fancy too much by means of aesthetic effects.
Tsung-mi, another Chinese monk, felt that the sect taught the attitude
of "No reliance on word or letter" in order to cure Buddhists of this bad
habit. He said, "The Chinese cling to ornate styles, and harbor illusion in
their minds. Because they settle for names instead of substance, Bodhi-
dharma selected some sentences and transmitted the true meaning of Bud-
dhism to his disciples who substituted words for substance-for instance,
by practicing meditation facing the wall to break off various kinds of
verbal relations with others."s
Yet in spite of this, it is a well known fact that Zen Buddhism eventu-
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ally developed a fondness for Zen expressions and became a book religion.
China is said to have a vast literature even when no more than three
percent of its population have been literate. The Chinese are fond of
ornate styles and are skillful in literary composition. However, the concepts
found in their writings are based on actual experiences. It is true that the
Chinese are a people fond of grandiloquent styles, but such styles are no
more than simple exaggeration, and it seems that there are few cases in
which they overstep natural limits. The Chinese have rarely made any
representations of abstract universal things themselves by enlarging on
them freely, as the Indians tended to do, without any specinc relation to
the concrete facts of life. Since most Chinese did not indulge in abstract
speculations and ignored universals, they did not try to transmit the con-
tents of thought with logical precision, but were content to give only some
suggestive impressions to the reader. Moreover, so many Chinese orators
thought that the most important thing was eloquence without regard for
certain logical or ethical rules concerning truth and error, good and evil.
A form of Chinese sophistry at times results from such a mentality; even
Confucian philosophy, which has occupied the chief position of govern-
ment-supported scholarship, is sometimes prone to this sort of sophistic
oratory.
Ju philosophy, which is the official name for Confucian philosophy, is
a doctrine of the literatF who love style. As Max Weber denned it, Ju
philosophy is nothing but a system of class ethics maintained by a secular
and subsidized elite who have a certain literary culture.s However, these
literati were meant to be not only intellectuals or well-read people but
also moral leaders of the people in such matters as truthfulness, courtesy,
etc. Successive officials in China were selected from among such literati.
Although the general public could not afford to read books, fundamentally
their lives centered around the lessons of the classics and the enjoyment of
listening to stories.
T'ao Yiian-ming says in his work, a biography 6f Wu-liu: "I was fond
of reading books, but I didn't always try to understand them thoroughly.
Whenever I found any agreeable passage, I would often gladly forget to
eat. I always enjoyed myself by composing sentences."
This was the ideal of the Chinese literati.
Exegetical and Literary Predilections of the Chinese
Chinese Buddhism was a religion for the literati in its intellectual
aspect. Chinese Buddhism might be called "a religion of documents"9
because the whole Chinese culture is characterized by an emphasis on
documents. Indeed, there were many schools in Chinese Buddhism, and
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their variety was based upon theoretical distinctions, not upon administra-
tive or social differences as in Japan.
We had better call them schools than sects. We can find at least
seven schools which were initially formulated in India: "P'i T'an School,"
"Chii She School," "San Lun School," "Ssu Lun School," "Ti Lun School,"
"She Lun School," and the "Fa Hsiang School." These schools of Bud-
dhism are linked directly with theories of Indian Buddhism. There are
similarly seven schools of Buddhism which arose in China: "Lii School,"
"Nieh P'an School," "Ch'ing T'u School," "Ch'an School," "T'ien T'ai
School," "Hua Yen School," and "Chen Yen School." The Lii School
consists of the "Ssu Fen Lii School," the "Shih Sung Lii School," and the
"Seng Chih Lii School"; the Ch'an School is divided into five branches
and seven sub-schools. The main reason why so many schools were formed
is that there are basic differences among sutras and theoretical works.10 But
these differences apply to theoretical rather than practical matters. In the
Sung period a merger took place between the Pure Land School and Ch'an
School, both of which are representative of the practical moral aspects of
Buddhism.
Consequently, generally speaking, it can be said that Chinese Bud-
dhism was divided into many schools along theoretic lines, but they were
quite similar in their practical aspect. Chinese Buddhists were largely
literati, and consequently had a deep attachment for complex styles of
writing. This trend became particularly prominent during the Northern
and Southern dynasties, especially during the latter. I should like to point
out a few interesting examples of this. The Sheng Man Paa K'u, a well-
known commentary, was written by Chi-tsang. He says in his comment, "I
have been studying and appreciating this sutra for many years, and have
made reference to many books of all ages. I have examined many sutras
and treatises, selecting passages with profound meaning, which I have
compiled into a three-volume work."ll
As he says, we find many passages quoted from a great number of
sutras, and many explanations on each word and character. Because he cited
such a wide variety of authorities, we soon become weary and bewildered
when reading this work, and ironically the main meaning of the book
becomes all the more vague. Fujaku (17°7-1781), a Japanese monk,
commented on this book thus: 'We find therein very elaborate explanations.
In this book, the author comments on each phrase and sentence minutely
to enlarge the beginner's knowledge. There probably is no more elaborate
book than this." But this commentary of Chi-tsang does not give us the
main meaning of this book. That this book came to be highly prized by
scholars, Fujaku observes, shows that the study of Buddhism has been
degraded to mere formalism. 12 The very opposite of this may be seen in
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the Commentary on the Srimala Siitra (Shomangyogi-sho) written by
Prince Sh6toku of Japan, which is much more concise and pertinent.
The Chii She Lun Chi written by Pu-kuang is said to be the most
authoritative book on the Chii She Lun (Abhidharma-Kosa-siistra), which
is an important guide to the doctrines of Hinayana Buddhism. The book
is said to include the interpretations of Sarvastivada scholars of Western
India as related to Pu Kuang by Hsiian-tsang, which are quite accurate.
However, because of his respect for tradition, Pu Kuang included the
different theories found in the Abhidharma-mahavibha~a-Sastra,the largest
explanatory work of the Sarvastivada School, as well as passages from the
earlier translation of the Chii She Lun and the Shun Cheng Li Lun
(Nyiiyiinusiira-siistra), so that too many opinions are given and therefore
it lacks conciseness.
This tendency is seen in all the commentaries on the Fa Hua Ching
(Saddharmapu1;'lqarika-siitra) produced in China, and especially the Fa Hua
Hsiian Tsan written by K'uei-chi, which contains many ornate phrases.
In general, documents written during the first part of the Tang dynasty
are hard to read, but there are few books which contain such minute and
needless ekplanations as the Fa Hua Ssiian Tsan. The Erh Ya, Kuang Ya,
Shuo Wen, Yii p'ien, Ch'ieh Yiin are freely cited, but their value here
is little more than decorativeY
Therefore, it was no easy task for Chinese Buddhist scholars to ex-
plain even the title of a siitra or treatise. Chi-tsang explained in great detail
the title of the Madhyamaka-siistra (sometimes called Chung Kuan Lun
in China) written by Nagarjuna, on which the school of Chi-tsang was
based.
As for the main point of his explanations, he says, "In short, each of
these three characters of the Chung Kuan Lun has the meaning of
Chung, of Kuan and of Lun." Logically speaking, this seems utterly mean-
ingless, and we may not be far wrong in saying that he enjoyed playing
with words.14 Judging from the next example, he must have been ignorant
of the fact that a title of a book denoted a definite notion. He says, "Each of
these three characters of Chung Kuan Lun has no definite meaning of its
own and therefore, one might say Kuan Chung Lun or Lun Chung Kuan.
The first one is represented by the Theorist, the second one by Insight, the
third one by Theory." He added further very complicated explanations to
these classifications in an effort to amplify the text.15
In short, it may be said that the Chinese scholars were forgetting the
fact that a name indicates a certain concept. Even the scholars of Buddhistic
logic, who ought to have been able to think matters through logically,
took no account of this. "Ying Ming" is the Chinese equivalent for the
Sanskrit word of "hetuvidyii," which is translated literally "the science of
...
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reason." Nevertheless, the Chinese Buddhists forgot its original meaning
and recognized only the meaning resulting from the linkage of the two
characters, ''Yin'' and "Ming," giving arbitrary explanations. K'uei-chi says,
"The character of Yin means a statement made by a debater and serves as
the proposition; and the character of Ming represents the wisdom of the
opponent, which illuminates meanings and words." He explains again,
"It is a cause of Ming, and therefore called Ying Ming, and Ying is the
original cause of a word, and Ming means a revealing cause of wisdom."
All of these explanations are in error. He merely listed these absurd ex-
planations one after another, and did not offer any conclusion, nor did he
try to decide which was right. In addition, he also gave minute explana-
tions for the title Ying Ming Ju Cheng Li Lun (NyiiyapraveSlfka), listing
five kinds of explanations one after another.16
Examples of the extremes to which Chinese commentators went when
interpreting a title are not uncommon. The full title of the Hua Yen Ching
isTa Fang Kuang Fo Hua Yen Ching. Its original name is "Mahii-vaipulya-
buddha-avata'f!Zsaka-siitra," and therefore, we must be careful to read it
'Ta Fang Kuang Fo Hua Yen Ching." Nevertheless, Fa-tsang, whose teach-
ings centered around the Hua Yen Ching and is recognized to be the
highest authority on it, did not think that the title was composed of certain
concepts, but further regarded the title merely as so many characters, and
offered an explanation for each separate character: "Ta stands for inclusion;
Fang for regulation; Kuang for a state where activity is extended univer-
sally and the mental constitution has reached its ultimate; Fo for a state
where the effect is in perfect harmony and the enlightenment is full; Hua
for a simile which means a state where all kinds of practices have been ac-
complished; Yen for a simile indicating the ornament of substance; Ching
for a state where all forms of existence are linked with one another to reveal
the Teaching of Buddha. Following the Law, using similes with regard to
human beings, we call it Ta Fang Kuang Fo Hua Yen Ching."17 It is only
natural that we should grow tired of such complicated explanations, yet his
predilection for explanatory expressions does not stop here. He goes on to
say, "Ta has ten kinds of meaning," and enumerates the ten kinds of
complicated explanations for this character.Is He then says, "Next, I want
to denote ten kinds of explanations of Fa Kuang," and enumerates ten
kinds of explanations for each of the subsequent words. Fa-tsang's passion
for enumerating ten kinds of explanations is due to the fact that the
Hua Yen Ching itself has a tendency to enumerate things in groups of ten.
But he does not give any conclusions about which meanings are funda-
mental and which of lesser importance. Also we cannot find any trace of
his own reflections on these matters.
In general, when translating Buddhist siitras into Chinese, the Chi-
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nese aimed at heightening magical and artistic effects; for instance, the
Chinese equivalent for the Sanskrit "Prajiiii" is "Chih Hui," which means
'Wisdom," but the Chinese chose to use their phoneme "Pan Jo" as the
transcription of the Sanskrit word, rather than "Chih Hui," in order to
endow it with dignity.19
Such being the case, exegetical studies developed in China, but not
like the scholasticism during the Middle Ages in Europe. Exegetic works
lack the character of rational formalism seen in jurisprudence in the
Western countries. Furthermore, it did not have the casuistic character
seen in the Jesuit tlieologians of Catholicism, in the Talmudic Rabbis of
Judaism, in the theologians of Islam, and in the Buddhist scholars studying
the theory of the Abhidharma.2o
In Chinese Buddhism, which is a religion of documents, scripture
was highly esteemed, so that as a matter of course the copying of siitras
came to be regarded as an act of religious merit, of greater value than
practicing the morality of Buddhism. Chih-i says, "The aim of siitra
copying lies in enforcing people to practice the Eight-fold Sacred Path so as
to awaken them from delusion. There are various ways of carrying out
Buddhistic 'practices, and therefore he who is possessed of insight into the
fact that our consciousness is appearing and disappearing incessantly and is
impermanent, and he who wants to practice the Eight-fold Sacred Path
should copy the collection of sacred books; and he who is possessed of
insight into the fact that our consciousness is capable of many kinds of
false discrimination which he, the ordinary person, as well as persons of the
two vehicles cannot realize, although Bodhisattvas who have eyes of the
Law can perceive it, and he who wants to practice the Eight-fold Sacred
Path should copy siitras of the separate doctrines, and he who is possessed
of insight into the fact that our consciousness is nothing but Buddha
nature, and who wants to practice the Eight-fold Sacred Path should copy
siitras of the Middle Path."21
If there had been no way of thinking which emphasized siitra-copying,
such statements would never have been made. Because of this kind of
thinking, stone slabs were engraved with Buddhist scriptures. The first
persecution of Buddhism occurred during the reign of the Emperor Tao-
wu of the Northern Wei dynasty (386-534), resulting in the destruction of
Buddhist images and siitras. A great number of monks and nuns were
forced back into common society. Buddhists at that time came to have a
premonition of further persecution, and therefore they engraved Buddhist
siitras in stone, on the face of cliffs, in stone pillars, in stone slabs and
walls. We find the Wei Mo Ching, Sheng Man Ching, and Mi U Ching
engraved on walls of stone caves which were polished as smooth as glass at
Mt. Pei Hsiang Tang in Wu An Hsien of Honan Province. A religious
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vow, still extant, written by Tang-yung, a distinguished official under the
Northern Chi dynasty (550-577), tells us that he intended to engrave the
entire canon on the walls of famous mountains. Under the Sui dynasty
(58r-6I7), Ching-wan, a Buddhist monk, also made a vow to engrave the
canon on stone slabs. Efforts were made during five successive dynasties
to have the canon incised in stone, but were at last discontinued as a result
of the persecution by the Tang Emperor Wu-tsung. Again during the
Liao dynasty the work was continued with the support of the government.
More than half of the entire Buddhist canon has been carved in rock.22 It
may be said that no other nation could have achieved so remarkable a feat.
In India, where Buddhism had its origins, some siitras may have been
engraved on bricks or stone slabs, but we can only find short statements of
the 'Twelve-linked Chain of Causality" and "the Four Noble Truths." In
India, the purpose of engraving a part of a siitra was not mere
siitra-copying, but was done for the sake of obtaining religious merit. It
would be proper to say that such a difference between India and China is
due to the characteristic trend of thinking of the Chinese who place such
emphasis on literary style. (In this connection mention should be made of
the fact that various Chinese, however, did not indulge in this custom of
scripture-copying.)
..
CHAPTER 20 FORMAL
CONFORMITY
Fondness for Formal Conformity
As mentioned before, many Chinese scholars regarded certain old
classics as absolute authorities, and it was only on these that they composed
their commentaries and explanations. Except for the Taoists, they never
looked at the classics critically or historically, and thought it sufficient to
find no contradictions amOIig the phrases and words. That is to say, they
attached gr~at importance to formal conformity.
Cheng Hsiian (127-200), a representative scholar who commented
on the Chinese classics in the Later Han dynasty, studied the Five Classics
with some other classics, and composed commentaries on them as a unit.
Characteristic of his style is the way in which he always referred to the
other classics and tried to remove contradictions among them, because he
believed that all classics stood on the same basis. In order to have uniformity
in the contents of all the classics, he sometimes emended the characters
because he thought some words or characters of the classics had been
miscopied. This tendency continued in the San-kuo (Three Kingdoms
Period, 222-280) and Liu-ch'ao dynasties.1
Chinese Buddhist scholars also commented on the siitras and abhi-
dharmas in this manner. Buddhism was first introduced into China in the
time of Emperor Ming (68-75 A.D.) of the Later Han dynasty, and the
translations of Buddhist scriptures first started during the time of Emperors
Huan (147-167) and Ling (168-188). The basic Buddhist siitras were
translated chiefly by An Shih-Kao and the Mahayana siitras by Lokarak~a.
Thus, both Hinayana and Mahayana siitras were translated into Chinese
soon after the first introductions of Buddhism. Afterwards, many siitras
were introduced and translated by many Buddhist monks such as Chi-ch'ien
of the San-kuo dynasty, Dharmarak~a of the Hsi-chin dynasty, Kumarajiva,
Buddhabhadra, and Dharmarak~a of the Tung-chin dynasty; this work
was continued in later periods by other scholars. Among them, Paramartha,
who translated many abhidharma works, Hsiian-chuang, who translated
many siitras and abhidharma works, and Amoghavajra, who translated
---"
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many esoteric writings, were famous. The contents of these siitras and
abhidharma works were so varied and different that Chinese Buddhists
could reach no conclusion as to what the fundamental doctrine was. There-
fore, Chinese Buddhist scholars selected a certain siitra or abhidharma
work as their fundamental text and classified other siitras and abhidharma
works under it. Thus they endeavored to show the mutual relations of
these works, and systematized various doctrines of many siitras under one
system. This so-called "critical classification of the doctrines" was tried
first in the Eastern Chin dynasty (317-420) and frequently in the later
periods. It is one of the characteristics of Chinese Buddhism that the
Chinese classified various doctrines of Buddhism under certain systems.
Each one of the Chinese Buddhist scholars made his own classification
under a certain siitra or abhidharma work which he regarded as the
highest authority. Therefore, many classifications arose in China. Among
them, the classification which shows a typical way of thinking of the
Chinese is the classification of "the Five Periods." The Chinese, in their
high esteem of the individual man, interpreted Sakyamuni as a historical
personage who preached all the siitras. Therefore, they tried to apportion
the different siitras to certain periods-five periods of his life between the
time of his enlightenment and his death. This classification of the five
periods was first formed by Hui-kuan of the Liu-sung dynasty (420-479)
and reorganized by Chi-i, the founder of the T'ien-t'ai sect of China.
According to this classification the five periods are as follows:
(I) The first period is the period of the Avatamsaka Sutra. Just after his
enlightenment, Sakyamuni preached the doctrine of the Avatamsaka
Sutra at Buddhagaya under a bodhi-tree for Boddhisattvas for three
weeks. The truth can immediately be realized by hearing this doctrine.
(2) The second period is the period of Deer Park. The average person could
not understand the teaching of the Avantamsaka Sutra. Therefore,
Buddha expediently taught the Hinayana doctrine at the Deer Park
near Benares in order to lead them. The length of this period is twelve
years.
(3) The third period is the period of general Mahayana siitras. For those
who understood the teaching of the Hinayana doctrine, Buddha
taught the doctrine of many Mahayana siitras such as Vimalakirti-
nirdda-sutra, Vise~acintiibrahma-pariprcchii-siitra, Suvartzaprabhii-
sottama-sutrendrariija-sutra and Srimiilii-sitzhaniida-sutra. This pe-
riod continued for eight years.
(4) The fourth period is the period of the Prajniipiiramitii-sutras. After the
third period, Buddha taught the Prajniipiiramitii-sutras for twenty-two
years in order to let the people understand the doctrine of Siinyata
(non-substantiality).
..
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(5) The fifth period is the period of the Saddharma-PU1J~arika-siitraand
the Mahiiparinirvii1Ja-siitra. The Buddha preached the doctrines of the
Saddharmapu1J~rika-siitra in which he taught that both Hinayana
and Mahayana Buddhists can realize the truth, for the last eight years
of his life. At the moment of his death, he taught the Mahiiparinirvii1Ja-
siitra in order to manifest the principle of the Buddha-nature.2
The Chinese calculated the number of years of each period from
fragmentary records concerning the duration of each preaching mentioned
in the above siitras, although most of these siitras were composed in periods
after the time of the historical Sakyamuni. Here, the characteristic of a
Chinese way of thinking historically can be seen very clearly. A question of
great importance was whether this siitra came before or after that siitra.
This division of years of each period is however most unreasonable,
as the people who studied the siitras logically were aware. For example,
even though it was generally believed that the Avatarhsaka Siitra was
preached by the Buddha just after his enlightenment, there are some points
in the siitra which lead to a different conclusion, for people at the time
were doubtful as to whether that siitra was preached by the Buddha
immediately after his enlightenment. It is stated in the siitra that Sariputra
was at this preaching and listened to this siitra with his disciples. The
other siitras, however, mention that Sariputra lived in a remote country
when Sakyamuni realized the enlightenment. Therefore, it was impossible
for Sariputra to attend the teaching of this siitra taught by the Buddha
just after his enlightenment. It is also unreasonable that the Buddha
preached this siitra in the "Hall of Truth of Universal Light,"a as this hall
was not yet constructed at the time of Buddha's enlightenment.
Such questions from a detailed study of the text reveal its weak points.
However, Chih-yen (602-668) commented on this problem as follows:
"According to the doctrine of the Avatarhsaka Siitra, the worlds of the
past, present, and future mutually interpenetrate one another and are
identical. Therefore, it is not unreasonable that there are some contra-
dictions concerning 'before and after' in this siitra."4
From this statement, it appears that Chih-yen did not distinguish be-
tween time in the phenomenal world and time in the metaphysical realm. If
this doctrine of Chih-yen is recognized, the criticism of the original texts
cannot stand. The Chinese Buddhist scholars arranged not only the
critical classifications of various doctrines, but also synthesized systemati-
cally the thought of the siitra which they regarded as the absolute authority.
It may have been the influence of the Indian way of thinking that led
Chinese Buddhist scholars of the Sui and Tang dynasties (581-9°7) to
make systematic and methodical explanations in spite of the fact that the
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traditional Chinese philosopher was not fond of systematic arguments.
Among the many systems of Buddhist philosophy which were organized in
China, those which possessed the greatest systems are the doctrine of the
T'ien-t'ai sect and the Hua-yen sect.
The siitra upon which the T'ien-t'ai sect relies is the Saddharma-
pU1J~afika-siltra from which a new philosophy was systematized. The
second chapter of this siitra in the Chinese translation states: "Only the
Buddha and Buddhas can fully realize the basic truths of all existences
which are in various processes thus-formed, thus-natured, thus-sub-
stantiated, thus-forced, thus-activated, thus-caused, thus-circumstanced,
thus-effected, thus-rewarded, and thus-begun-ended-completed." The
Chinese took the ten categories of form, nature, substance, force, activation,
cause, circumstance, effect, merit, and beginning-ending-completion from
this passage, and said that all existences should come under these ten cate-
gories; and this siitra also contains the doctrine of "a moment of thought
has the whole cosmos immanent in it." Based upon this doctrine, they
again formed different ways of meditative practice. In such ways, the T'ien-
t'ai sect developed the new doctrine based upon and summarizing the
thought of the Saddharmapu1J~afika-siltra.
The Avatamsaka siitra is a collection of siitras of a strange kind,
consisting of 60 volumes in the old translation by Buddhabhadra and 80
volumes in the new translation by Sik~ananda. This siitra states various
philosophical ideas in an imaginary world beyond human description and
ordinary thought. Therefore, it is very difficult to grasp systematically and
enter into the thought itself. Chinese scholars, however, read this siitra in
detail and systematized its doctrines through their own experiences. Thus,
the ten-mysteries theory of T u-shun and six-forms theory of Chih-yen were
organized. It was Fa-tsang who combined these two theories together and
established the "ten-mysteries-six forms" theory.
The Chinese endeavored to systematize not only the siitras, but also
the Vinayas (disciplinary rules of monastic life). The precepts stated in
various Vinaya Pitakas (scriptures on precepts) which were conveyed
from India to China were not always the same. Moreover, the views of
Buddhists who practiced precepts were also different. Therefore, it was
necessary for the Chinese to arrange and systematize the precepts which
they actually followed in their lives. The most important personage among
scholars who studied and systematized the precept-rules was Tao-hsiian.
The Chinese Vinaya sect was founded by systematizing the precepts in the
above manner. This sect continued to prosper for a long time in China.
Although this sect was introduced into Japan, it never became popular
among the people. The reason for this fact will be mentioned later. As we
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have seen, it was the important task of Chinese Buddhist scholars5 to retain
formal conformity by classifying, organizing, and systematizing various
doctrines and precepts in siitras and vinayas.
External Conformity
When the Chinese Buddhist scholars organized their classifications and
systematizations, they did not deeply consider the logical connections of
various doctrines, and only tried to retain an external and formal con-
formity. They were oblivious of the fact that there were many logical
faults in the explanations of their commentaries. They liked to arrange all
things in one diagram. A typical example of it can be seen in the theory of
five natural elements. They did not investigate the essential character of
each thing, but combined all things together by looking for similarities in
their external appearances; namely, each one of five directions, five sounds,
five forms, five tastes, five internal organs, and many other things divisible
into five classes, was assigned to one of the five natural elements, each thing
deriving its nature from its respective natural elements.6 On the basis of this
theory, anew doctrine was constructed, explaining the change of dynasties.
This theory says that each dynasty possessed one of the natures of the five
natural elements, such as wood-nature or fire-nature; therefore, a change in
dynasty conformed with a change in the order of the natural elements.1
When a dynasty would not fit satisfactorily into this system, the sequence
of the lineage of dynasties of the past periods was even reversed.8
In the acceptance of Buddhism, the same kind of logic appeared. Yen
Chih-t'ui (6th century) of the Northern Ch'i dynasty declared that the
five precepts taught in Buddhism are the same as the five infallible in-
structions taught in Confucianism. And he matched each one of the five
precepts to the five Confucian instructions.9 A similar interpretation was
also adopted by the Chinese Buddhist monks. For example, Tsung-mi said
that the objectives of the five precepts and the five instructions were the
same although their ways of being practised were different. He also
identified each of the five Buddhist precepts with each of the five Con-
fucian rules10 even though this identification was not correct. Furthermore,
Chih-i matched each one of the five precepts of Buddhism to each one of
the five invariables, the five classics, and the five natural elements of
Confucianism respectively,u
The method of classification and exposition used by each of the
Chinese Buddhist scholars was to include all things in one system. A great
importance was attached to their newly made systems, which tried to
explain all other doctrines relative to their own basic doctrine. This tend-
ency often went to an extreme. A typical example of this distortion of texts
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occurs in their version of the fourth chapter of the Saddharma-pU1.uj.arika-
siitra, a parable in which a father sought his runaway son. The father
represents the Tathagata (a name for the Buddha, meaning "thus come")
and the son stands for sentient beings. In one paragraph, the father in
seeking the son arrives at a big house where there were abundant treasures
and gems such as gold, silver, ruby, amber, coral, and crystal in the store-
house, and many kinds of servants, such as child servants, head-servants,
the second servants, the third servants, and general servants. It is true that
powerful families in the country of India possessed an abundance of
treasures and servants in ancient times.
The Chinese, however, did not consider this passage merely as a
parable. They thought that there must be some important meanings in
this paragraph, because it was a part of the holy scripture, the Saddharma-
pU1!tJ,arika-sutra. Therefore, they tried to correlate the different kinds of
servants mentioned to each step of discipline in Buddhism. According to
Fa-yun's (467-529) opinion,12 they are divided as follows:
child servants-commoners, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, as well as
novices in Buddhist study
head-servants-Bodhisattvas who are ranked higher than the eighth stage
the second servants-Bodhisattvas who are ranked between the first and
seventh stages
the third servants-Pratyekabuddhas
general servants-Bodhisattvas of Ten Stage Grades
According to Chih-i's identification: 13
child servants-Pratyekabuddhas, sravakas, and Bodhisattvas of Distinct
and Common Vehicles
head-servants-Boddhisattvas of Distinct and Perfect Vehicles in ten
stages
the second servants-Bodhisattvas of Ten Merit-transference Grades
the third servants-Bodhisattvas of Ten Practice Grades
general servants-Bodhisattvas of Ten Stage Grades
Again, according to Chi-tsang's interpretation:u
child servants-non-Buddhist commoners
the third servants
and
general servants-Buddhist commoners
head-servants
and
the second servants-Bodhisattvas higher than the first stage
In the same story, the runaway son who became a laborer happened
to come to his father's house and saw his father sitting on the lion's seat
surrounded and respected by many Brahmins, K~atriyas and capitalists
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(grhapati). Chinese Buddhist scholars likewise classified these people in
detail. According to Fa-yun's interpretation: 15
Br1ihmins-Bodhisattvas higher than the eighth stage
K~atriyas-Bodhisattvas lower than the seventh stage
Capitalists-general people of Mahayana Buddhism
According to Chih-i's classification: 16
Brahmins-Bodhisattvas of enlightenment, rid of all defilement
K~atriyas-Bodhisattvasbetween the ninth and the first stages
Capitalists-Bodhisattvas of the 30 grades under the Ten Stages
According to Chi-ts'ang's interpretation: 17
Brahmins-Bodhisattvas higher than the eighth stage
K~atriyas-Bodhisattvas of the seventh stage
Capitalists-Bodhisattvas higher than the first stage
A great many of such classificational divisions and correlations can
be found in the commentaries on siitras written by Chinese scholars.
Almost all of these interpretations are unreasonable and twisted. There-
fore, they are useless for comprehension of the true spirit of the Saddharma-
purz4arika-siitra. In the philosophical and systematic doctrine of the Hua-
yen Sect, all things are also frequently divided into ten categories and
classified into each one of them. In this case also, the Chinese favored
formal analogies rather than deductive systematic thinking.
CHAPTER 21 THE TENDENCY
TOWARDS PRACTICALITY
The Anthropocentric Attitude
Since ancient times the Chinese have tended to consider all things
from an anthropocentric standpoint. They tended to understand even ab-
stract ideas in relation to man. For instance, the Indians expressed the
concept of "being" by using the term "bhiiva," and the notion of man's
"phenomenal existence" by "bhava." The Chinese, however, translated
both bhiiva and bhava by the same term "yu" without distinguishing the
two. tryu" connotes "man has or possesses" as well as "to exist";l that is to
say, the ancient Chinese considered all things anthropomorphically and
did not consider the idea of "existence" as an abstract universal apart from
man's concrete impressions of the universe.
In Chinese sentences, the subject is in many cases man (even if it
does not appear in the sentence), and the object is stated in the predicate.
Therefore, the Chinese can understand the meaning of the sentences in
spite of the fact that case-endings are not used, the order of the words not
fixed, and most of the phrases consist of the same number of characters.
Therefore, there are differences in the ways of expressing ideas between
the Indians and the Chinese. The Indians, sometimes, make abstract ideas
the subject, while the Chinese usually make man the subject who has the
ideas. For example, the Indians say, "therefore, the sufferings accompany
him" (tato na1J'l dukkha1J'l anveti)/ while the Chinese translated the same
sentence as "therefore, he endured various sufferings" (yi tsu chung). Thus,
even when they express ideas, the Chinese are apt to consider man as the
subject rather than the object of the verb. In Indo-European languages
when there is no object following the transitive verb, it generally changes
into a passive verb.3 Since the Chinese did not pay much attention to the
passive voice, they did not understand man objectively in spite of the fact
that they considered all things anthropocentrically. Influenced by this way
of considering things anthropocentrically, most Chinese were apt to be
utilitarian and pragmatic. In this respect their way of thinking has been
different from that of most European scholastic and idealistic philosophers.
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It is a well-known fact that the habits and customs of the Chinese are
usually based on practical common-sense and utilitarian ways of thinking.
The philosophical traditions and studies pursued by the Chinese intel-
ligentsia were centered on practical subjects which had direct relations
with everyday living. Most of the Chinese scholars were interested in
morals, politics, worldly ways of living that would lead to success. Many of
the teachings of Taoism dwell on the art of self-protection, on the method
of attaining success, or on the right way of governing. Confucianism,
which occupied the highest position in Chinese thought, is also largely a
system of ethics for the governing class and a set of precepts for governing
the people.
In their characteristic mode of reasoning, the Chinese did not develop
the study of logic when it had no relation to utility. The theory of the
Category which was discussed by the Chinese is based on pragmatic
views. The Japanese translated the word for category by "Han-chii" which
is derived from the term "Hung-fan-chiu-ch'ou" in the Shou Ching. This
Hung-fan-chiu-ch'ou, however, is not a grammatical or formal-logical
category, but a political, moral, and systematic way of reasoning. Chinese
historiography also is based upon this pragmatic attitude.
For example, the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien ("a general history written for
the purpose of governing"), which is a history written by Szu-ma (Wen-
kung), quoted more than two sources connected with each historical event
in order to establish correct records. Whenever there are any contradictions
among the records, he tried to ascertain which one was correct after a
detailed documentary collation. Even if the difference was minor and did
not greatly influence the event itself, he gave the collation in detail and
judged which was correct. With respect to such an attitude it may be said
that the style of this history is similar to the modern positive science of
history.5 The purpose of histories such as Tzu-chih T'ung-chien was to
assist the government, as the title indicates.
Some aspects of Chinese thought can be called "realistic"6 insofar as
they are concerned only with those principles of morals and politics needed
in the actual life of the people. This humanistic or anthropocentric tend-
ency of thought also appeared at the time when Indian Buddhist thought
came to be accepted by the Chinese, and when they did not accept the
natural sciences and mathematics developed in India. It was an exception
to the rule that Hsiian-tsang translated the Sheng-tsung-shih-chu-i-lun
(VaiSe~ka-dasapadiirtha-siistra)of the VaiSe~ika philosophy which is a
kind of natural philosophy in India. However, no one continued the
studies in this book after him. In the same light, Indian logic was not
accepted eagerly by the Chinese, because it lacked direct connection with
practical life.
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The method of keeping thoughts in close touch with objects connected
with the daily life of man can be found in the expressions of Zen Bud-
dhism which is the most typical sort of Buddhism in China. For example,
Fa-tsang said at the moment of his death, "no one can stop man coming
and no one can follow man going."7 The Indian Buddhist expressed the
same idea in a different way as "one must not take anything from it and
must not remove anything from it. One should see truth as truth. Those
who see truth are emancipated."g The idea which the Indian contemplated
as an ontological relation between man and an object, was viewed by the
Chinese in some concrete human relationship of their daily life.
This tendency has been very influential in the process of the trans-
formation of Buddhism in China. Roughly speaking, Buddhism "from an
Indian religion of non-ego, has become in China a humanistic religion,"9
following the anthropocentric humanistic tradition of China.
Worldly Tendency in Religion
The tendency of Chinese thinking to dwell on the actual daily life of
man leads to a worldly and materialistic outlook. Such a tendency appeared
in various cultural spheres.
First, it can be said that there is very little mythology in Chinese
writings; especially in connection with the process of how the sky, earth,
sun, moon, and human beings were created. Although some mythological
explanations exist in such collateral records as Chun-nan-tzu (A compila-
tion of various schools of thought by guests of Prince Huai-nan [d. 122
B.c.]), the Shu-i Chi (Recorded Analysis of Different Views), and the
San-wu Li-chi (Records of 35 Histories), this sort of explanation is scarcely
found in the traditional and authoritative scriptures and records of China.
The first record which is described in the Shih-chi, a history of ancient
China written by Ssu-man Tan (d. IIO B.C.) and his son Ssu-ma-ch'ien
(145-86 B.C.), is a record of five Lords who are regarded as the first human
beings. Yet, supernatural and incredible stories are not mentioned in this
history. From ancient times, the Chinese writers have very little use for the
mythological imagination and preferred a practical and worldly realism. A
typical example of this tendency can be found in the answer of Confucius
when asked by people about death: "I do not know what birth is, then how
can I know what death is?"lO (The same attitude can also be found in other
philosophers of China.)
Various folk religions existed in China from ancient times and exerted
their influence not only on the common people, but also on intellectuals
who partly followed these religions. Certain supernatural beings beyond
human power were invoked. From ancient times, ancestor worship was an
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important ceremony in China by which the family and its prosperity were
upheld. It was therefore impossible to change this sort of worship into a
supernatural and metaphysical religion. There was the idea of "T'ien"
(Heaven) which can be identified with the idea of "God" in other religions.
On the one hand, they also rationalized this idea by giving it the meaning
of a natural principle at the same time that they gave it the religious mean-
ing of God. Patriarchs and sages were deified and worshipped, and even
the scriptures written by them were highly respected by the people, in
spite of the fact that a saint is still a human being. In the Han dynasty,
Confucianists taught ways of ridding oneself of disasters and receiving
good fortune, as well as many other superstitions. Lao-tzii was also wor-
shipped by some people; his naturalistic doctrine was combined with a
theory which insisted on the existence of immortal human beings, and
which explained how one can attain immortality. Taoism was founded by
organizing and systematizing the folk faiths centered on this theory of
superhuman beings, and developed through Buddhist influence, but also
influenced Chinese Buddhism. Consequently, the religions of China in-
cluded many prayers and charms through which people wished to remove
disasters and to receive good fortune. Originally, Confucianism tried to
remove spells and charms from its teaching.ll However, it could not neglect
this religious tendency in the common people. It was not unusual that the
teaching of morals and politics was combined with these religious teachings,
because the fundamental aims of the Chinese were to satisfy the physical
and material demands of human beings.12
Chinese Buddhism was also influenced by this worldly trend of
thought. Indian Buddhism was generally a metaphysical teaching about
the past and future worlds of man, but the Buddhism which spread among
the common Chinese was often a Buddhism of spells and prayers. In the
early period of Buddhism in China, most Buddhists were immigrants
from Central Asia who were treated as Chinese. All the Buddhist priests
who translated the siitras into Chinese in the early period of Buddhism in
China were familiar with spells and charms. For example, it is said that
the Parthian prince An Chih-kao (c. 175 A.D.) mastered not only astronomy,
geography, and medical science, but also the mimicry of voices of animals
and birds.13 It is also said that Dharmakala mastered all kinds of studies and
sciences;14 and K'ang-seng-hui mastered astronomy, geography, and the
art of Taoism, and worked many miracles.1S There was Fo-t'u-ch'eng who
came to China in 310 A.D. and spread Buddhism at one time among the
people by performing various miracles.16 He constructed 893 temples and
pagodas during his life time. He was respected by the Emperors of the
Later Ch'ao dynasty (319-352) and spread Buddhism through their
political power. It was in his time that the Chinese people were openly
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permitted to become priests by the Emperor.17 Most of the Chinese Bud-
dhist priests in later periods also spread and propagated Buddhism among
the people in the same way as Fo-t'u-ch'eng. As the Chinese highly
esteemed the employment of spells and charms, they did not accept any
sect of Buddhism which prohibited spells and charms in its doctrine.
Therefore, they rejected the traditional and conservative Buddhism which
prohibited spells and prayers, and called it "Hinayana Buddhism." On
the whole, they accepted Mahayana Buddhism, which permitted charms
and prayers to some extent,18 In early Buddhism, any sort of charm, prayer,
divination, sacrifice, or the art of devil-subjugation had been excluded as
superstition. Not only priests but lay followers as well were forbidden to
perform such superstitious rites in early Buddhism; this ban continued
into the later periods.
Mahayana Buddhism, on the contrary, compromised with the faiths
of the common people and adopted charms and prayers as expedient
methods to teach people, for Mahayana Buddhism was originally founded
as a religion of the common people. It was this Buddhism that was
introduced later to flourish for some ten centuries or more in China until
the Ming dynasty, and even later.19 Therefore, spells and charms were
clearly a part of Chinese Buddhism. For example, there is a spell in the
last part of the Chinese-translated Prajiiii-piiramitii-hrdaya-siitra which is
the transliteration of "gate gate piiragate piirasa1JZgate bodhi sviihii" mean-
ing: "Gone, gone, gone to the other shore, enlightenment, gone to the other
shore, so may it be!"
The Indians understood this literary phrase, while the Chinese, on
the contrary, transliterated it by adopting Chinese characters which could
not be understood, in order to increase the effect of the spell. Therefore, it
can be said that Chinese Buddhism possessed the tendency to go in for
superstitious ceremonies very strongly. Even at present, the Chinese people,
when they become ill or are destitute, perform prayers to various bodhisat-
tvas, heavenly beings and deities of Buddhism as well as to various gods of
folk faiths. They also possess highly valued amulets. Buddhist schools
which did not possess this tendency did not spread among the people. Even
Chih-i, the founder of the Tien-tai Sect, who was one of the philosophical
and systematic Buddhist scholars, taught that "illness is in some cases
caused by devils or Maras; therefore, man should chant a certain charm
when he is taken ill."20
It was the mystical esoteric sort of Buddhism which greatly developed
and taught the art of spells and charms. This Buddhism was first introduced
in the Tang dynasty (618-907) and flourished fairly well. This esoteric
Buddhism was prohibited in the Ming dynasty (1368-1662) because of its
harmful effects. But it has been revived in recent times, since it is suited to
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the traditional psychology of those Chinese who were originally very fond
of ceremonies designed to insure good fortune and relieve disasters.21
Influenced by such a tendency among these Chinese, spells and charms
came to be accepted in the doctrine of the Chinese Pure Land teachings,
which, originally, did not possess magical elements. The Japanese Pure
Land teachings, and in particular the Shin Sect, openly opposed such a
tendency. Chinese Pure Land teachings, on the contrary, compromised
with the tendency of the Chinese. When the Chinese translated the siitras
of the Pure Land teachings, they made use of the special terminology and
"method of analogy" (ka yi) of Taoism. Moreover, they infused the thought
of superhuman beings into the Pure Land teachings by adopting Taoistic
words and phrases which could not be found in the original Sanskrit texts.22
Chinese Pure Land teachings, since the time of their first introduction
from India and Central Asia, have been under the influence of Taoism.
Chinese Buddhism today is generally the teaching of the Pure Land sect.
At present, Chinese chant a certain spell to invite the soul of the dead
before the corpse is put into the coffin. Next, the sutra to reject hell is
chanted, and finally the names of Amita Buddha, AvalokiteSvara Bodhisat-
tva, and K~itigarbhaBodhisattva are called three times as a prayer for the
dead, and the spell "01J1 ma1,1i padme hU1J1" is chanted after each name.23
Also, in the prayer which is chanted after the corpse is put into the coffin
in order that the dead may be born in the Pure Land, there is a spell "01J1"
at the beginning and "Ahu1J1" at the end.24 The name "O-mi-t'a Fa"
(Amita Buddha) itself, which has been in the Chinese Pure Land sects,
possesses the magical element of spells or charms.
O-mi-t'a Fa is the transliteration of the Sanskrit term Amitiiyur Bud-
dha which connotes the meaning "Buddha who possesses infinite life." This
Buddha also had another name Amitiibha, which means "the one who
possesses infinite light (or wisdom)." As we can see, the idea of this Buddha
is very philosophical. Such a philosophical idea, however, could not spread
among the illiterate people of China. Up to the Sui dynasty, the Chinese-
translated name 'Wu-liang-shou-fo" (Buddha of Infinite Life) was used.25
After the Tang dynasty, however, the Pure Land teachings spread widely,
and the transliterated name "O-mi-t'a Fa" came to be adopted. One reason
was that the tone "Nan-wu-a-mi-ta-fa" (Adoration to Amita Buddha!)
sounded better than "Nan-wu-wu-liang-shou-fa" (Adoration to the Buddha
who possesses the infinite life!) when chanted, and another is that the
transliteration of the Sanskrit term possesses the strong power of a charm
when chanted repeatedly. Moreover, the Sanskrit name which was
especially sanctified and could not be understood by the Chinese was
easily accepted by the Chinese Buddhists.26 They felt an exotic and mystical
connotation in the name which could not be understood. The name
THE TENDENCY TOWARDS PRACTICALITY 239
"A-mi-ta," however, is not the complete transliteration, because it lacks
the last part, namely, Shou (life) or Kuang (light). Nevertheless, the
Chinese did not pay much attention to this error. (The single name of
"Amita" did not exist in India.) When the Indians say "Amitiiyur Buddha,"
it is always associated with "the Buddha whose life is infinite." On the
contrary, the Chinese did not associate this; name with its meaning because
they transliterated it as "A-mi-ta," instead of Amitayur or Amitabha.
However, the Chinese Buddhists were fascinated in chanting a word
which could not be understood. Tan-Iuan thought that the name "O-mi-t'o
Fa" itself was identified with the actual Buddha just as the words of
Dharal)i cast a spell. He said that this name possessed inconceivable
powers like that of a spell or charm.27 In this sense, the Pure Land teachings
which originally rejected the elements of spells and charms spread in
China among the people only through their magical nature.
This tendency which gave great importance to magical power appeared
in an extraordinary manner in China. For example, it was a frequent per-
formance for a priest to cut his arm or burn his fingers in order to express
his gratitude and pleasure in hearing and accepting the teachings of
Buddhism from his master. When, as sometimes happened, a priest burnt
himself to death in the joy of hearing the teachings, his memory was
highly revered by the people.
The tendency, however, which esteemed incantation, prospered usually
only so far as incantation brought worldly and material advantages, in
contrast with the complicated and illusionary imagination prevalent among
the Indian people.
Paramartha, who came to China from India in 546 A.D. and translated
many siitras into Chinese, declared: "There are two kinds of felicities in
China, one is that there is no devil and the other is that there is no heretical
thought in this country."28
The Chinese thus disliked the mysterious, imaginary, and illusionary
atmosphere surrounding Buddhism. Therefore, the Chinese who opposed
Buddhism often attacked and criticized it at this point. In Zen Buddhism,
these illusory fantasies were clearly disliked. Although it cannot be said
that no mysterious tendency exists in Zen Buddhists, they acknowledge
mysticism only in nature or in the events of daily life, and seldom refer to
inconceivable miracles or fantastic mysteries. An example of this can be
found in the following questions and answers:
A priest asked his master, "It is said that one who chants the Prajiiii-
piiramitii-sutrds can become most meritorious. Do you believe this?"
The Master answered, "I do not believe it."
Then the priest again asked, "If so, is it useless to believe in the
miraculous stories mentioned in the siitras?"
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The Master then answered, "It would be useless to be dutiful to one's
parents who are already dead. The siitras consist of only words, paper, and
ink. Therefore, there is no miracle in the siitras themselves. Miracles
exist only in the minds of persons who chant and believe the siitras; namely,
the divine power of the siitra completely depends on the person who
reads it. Place the siitra on the desk. Does the siitra possess miraculous
power by itself?"29
According to the Zen doctrine, therefore, the divine power or the
miraculous function taught in Buddhism is none other than such daily
activities as "fetching water and carrying firewood."30 In other words,
they are not miraculous experiences. Furthermore, Zen Buddhism in China
did not teach that one could be transported to heaven by practicing Zen
meditation. The difference between heretical meditation and Buddhist
meditation may be said to hinge on this point.31 The fact that the Chinese
were generally worldly does not always mean that they regarded this world
as the best world from an optimistic standpoint. From ancient times, there
were some thinkers in China who advocated peace of mind and also
adopted a pessimistic attitude. For example, Lao-tzii said, "The reason why
I am suffering is that I have a physical body, if I did not have this physical
body, then I would not be suffering" (13th chapter of the Lao Tzu)
Chuang-tzii also expressed a similar thought when he regarded this world
as the world which should be despised, as in Buddhism. This similarity of
attitude was one of the reasons why Buddhism was easily accepted by the
Chinese. Nevertheless, Lao-tzii and Chuang-tzii did not consider past
worlds before birth and the future world after death. The Chinese had a
very simple idea concerning the destiny of man after death. They thought
that death was "the separation of one's soul from the physical body." And
again they believed that one's soul was always hovering over the physical
body after burial in the tomb. Therefore, they thought it possible to call
back the departed soul to its body by crying out and calling its name. For
this reason, a religious ceremony where friends cry and weep for the dead
was established over two thousand years ago, and is still performed among
the common people at present in China.32
Chinese philosophers also were very indifferent to man's destiny after
death. They thought it is useless to ask about the world after death since
the present world itself cannot even be understood well. This idea is very
different from the ideas of most Indian philosophers. According to the
early Buddhist siitras, Gotama Buddha was silent in answering this question
about life after death. In the case of Gotama, however, he did not answer
because he realized that the answer to such a question would generally
perplex people. Confucius, on the contrary, would not discuss the next
world because he was too concerned about moral and political problems
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from a worldly and utilitarian standpoint. Zen Buddhism's way of facing
this problem by accepting the essential standpoint of Buddhism is strik-
ingly Chinese. For example, Hui-hai's view can be seen in the following
question and answer:
A disciple asked his master Hui-hai, "Do you know why, when, and
where you were born?"
Hui-hai answered, "As I am not dead myself, it is impossible to discuss
birth. If you realize that birth is identical with the essence of non-birth,
then you will never assert the existence of non-birth apart from the essence
of birth."33
In the philosophy of Chu-tzii (1130-1200) also, the soul and spirit
are not mentioned. "Even the saint cannot explain what the soul and
spirit are. It is, of course, not correct to say that the soul exists. Again it
is not correct to say that the soul actually does not exist. Therefore, it is
better not to mention anything about matters which man cannot actually
see or clearly understand."34
The problem of eschatology which discusses man's destiny after
death was discussed very little and hardly existed in China. According to
the way of thinking of the Chinese, death is a necessary phenomenon for
birth. Therefore, they faced death composedly and did not worry about
life after death. That is to say, "birth is identical with death."35 Chuang-
tzu's attitude towards death, exemplified again and again in his work, is
"one not merely of resignation nor even of acquiescence, but a lyrical,
almost ecstatic acceptance."36 Yang Hsiung (died in 18 A.D.) taught,
'Those who were born will surely die. It is a natural principle that things
which have a beginning must have an end."3T
This way of thinking is very different from the conception of birth
and death among the Indians. According to the view of Indians in general,
man, as one of the world's living beings, has to go through repeated
transmigration in cycles of birth and death. Therefore, for Indians, the
ideal state of man is to be born in the heavenly world or to attain the
state of absolute existence or absolute joy in the future life by accumulat-
ing good deeds and practicing various disciplines in his life. Buddhism in
India was not an exception to this idea. After Buddhism was introduced
into China, however, a view peculiar to the Chinese concerning the
conception of birth and death appeared instead of the original view of
Buddhism. For example, Chi-tsang (549-623) said at the moment of his
death:
"Man cherishes birth and fears death as he does not understand the
true aspect of birth and death. Death originates from birth. Therefore,
man should fear birth instead of death. If I were not born, then I would
surely not die. If birth, the beginning, is realized, then death, the end,
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will surely be known. In this sense, man has to be sad about his birth and
need not fear death."38 From this statement, we can understand why Chi-
tsang, who was a great Buddhist scholar, was still actually Chinese in his
way of thinking.
Such a tendency concerning the conception of birth and death can be
seen most clearly in Zen Buddhism,39 for it is widely believed that high
priests who seriously practiced Zen meditation would be born in the
land of death instead of in the Heaven where the Europeans and Indians
believed such great recluses were born. For example, Ju-ching (II63-
1228) composed the following poem at the moment of his death:
"For sixty-six years, I committed a great many sins, and now I am
going to the land of death."40
Dagen (1200-1253), who introduced the Soto Zen sect to Japan from
China in 1227, also was in a similar state of mind on his death bed. In
India, as in the medieval age in Europe, the thought that life in this
world was a preparation for a better future world was very strong. In
China, however, this thought did not arise so often, and in that sense it
may be said that the Chinese did not practice deep and religious in-
trospection;' that is to say, they did not possess a deep consciousness of
sin. It is often pointed out that the ideas of "original sin" and "salvation"
were not taught in Confucianism. Buddhism was accepted and spread
quickly in China as a religion which made good these deficiencies of the
other Chinese religions, and had a great influence on Chinese culture.
Chinese Buddhism, however, gradually became harmonized and mixed
with popular folk religions or Taoism and again became a worldly
religion, As Fung Yu-Ian aptly says, we must distinguish Buddhism in
China from Chinese Buddhism.
It is an undeniable fact that religion still possesses an important
significance in the society of present-day China. De Groot points out in
his book that those who know Chinese religions know the Chinese people
because in China, as in all half-civilized societies, every activity of social
life of the Chinese was greatly influenced by religious thought and
religious customs which were to a great extent the basis of public morality,
customs, family system, government system, and the legislation of the
Chinese.41
In the philosophies of the Chinese religions, the deep consciousness
of sin and a reliance on, or obedience to, an absolute cannot generally be
found. On this point, present-day Chinese religions are greatly different
from present-day Indian religions. Therefore, De Groot believes that
"most of the rituals and customs which are conducted by the Chinese at
present cannot be recognized by people of the world except in uncivilized
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areas."42 Thus, again it can be said that some salient characteristics of the
Chinese religions are their incantatory, utilitarian, and worldly features.
These same characteristics of the traditional Chinese trend of think-
ing, manifested in the acceptance of Buddhism, can also be found in their
acceptance of Christianity. Generally speaking, the Indian Christians
highly esteem the church and the faith, and they are other-worldly,
transcendental, and mystical. Chinese Christians, on the contrary, are
generally this-worldly, humanistic, realistic, and pragmatic. Because they
are, furthermore, political and practical, they are generally indifferent to
supernatural considerations concerning the transcendency of the Gospel
or the relation between God and man. On the contrary, most Indian
Christians believe that the practice of Christian Love is not to be sought
in politics, and they exclude all worldly interests when they pray to God.43
Thus, the same differences of ways of thinking between the Indians and
the Chinese appear in the case of adopting Christianity as in the case of
accepting Buddhism.
In modern times the Chinese have become increasingly worldly and
more averse to accepting Indian religious thought than ever before. When
Tagore-a comparatively worldly thinker for an Indian-visited China in
1924 and preached the superiority of "Eastern spirituality" over 'Western
materialism," he was attacked as a living symbol of the futile passivity of
Eastern religions, a passivity that had reduced India to colonial and
China to semi-colonial status.44 Though "this-worldliness" is not a unique
trait of the Chinese, it is especially salient as a characteristic way of think-
ing among them.
Non-development of Metaphysics
In connection with these tendencies, non-religious transcendental
metaphysics did not develop among the Chinese out of their own habits
of thinking, but only under the impact of foreign culture. In the second
millennium B.C., the Chinese had the conception of "Heaven" (T'ien)
as a place above the world where rulers, i.e. kings, generals, and ministers,
went after death. Since the Supreme Ruler of the universe lived there,
the term "T'ien" also denoted the supreme deity, who was named "the
ti." With the passage of time, other ti were postulated, until there were
many ti.
Records mentioned in the Five Classics (Wu Ching) mostly represent
events connected with the actual human world, and are hardly concerned
with transcendental worlds. Sometimes, we are told, T'ien rules all
existences as well as human beings. This idea of T'ien, however, is not
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separate from the idea of T'ien as the visible sky above; in this sense, this
idea does not transcend the empirical world.44 Certainly with the rise of
Taoism, "Heaven" became materialized.
Among the ancient Chinese philosophies, the philosophy which might
be said to have a metaphysical character was Taoism. Taoists thought that
the real tr\.1th (Ta-tao) exists in the realm where all names and ways of
practices of doctrines such as benevolence and justice in Confucianism
are abandoned. And the original state of the Universe was an existence of
no form or name to serve as the symbol of the Truth.45 We can recognize a
germ of metaphysical character in this consideration. Taoism, however,
harmonized and combined the arts of self-protection and cultivation in
later periods when it renounced its metaphysical system. Aside from this
idea of Taoism, there were some other metaphysical ideas in Chinese
philosophies. The conception of T'ien in the Five Classics, the doctrine of
T'ai-chi (first principle) in the I Ching, and the principle of Li (reason)
taught by Chu-tzii, of the Southern Sung dynasty (II27-1279), are
examples of such ideas. Explanations of these metaphysical principles,
however, were not fully given, and clear definitions of these principles
were not shown except orally. The existence of these principles was only
asserted. For example, in the philosophy of Chu-tzii, which is the most
philosophical study of all, a clear explanation of "Li" cannot be found.
Chu-tzii declared frequently that Li ruled all existences in this world.
However, he invariably answered the questions of his disciples as to
what Li was as follows: "It will be realized in the near future." That is to
say, he kept silent about the character of Li in spite of his assertion of its
existence.46
In this manner metaphysical systems did not develop in China. Chi-
tsang pointed out the fact that, in general, Chinese philosophies regarded
the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity as merely relative, that is,
as one that did not transcend common sense.47 .Tsung-mi also criticized
this same point in the Chinese philosophies.48 Again some Buddhist
priests criticized Chinese philosophies in general because they never set
forth the three worlds of the past, the present, and the future, or the six
divine powers,49 and moreover they did not understand what the soul
or the spirit was.50 These criticisms can be said to be correct evaluations of
Chinese philosophies in general.
When Confucians saw the attractive aspects of metaphysics in Bud-
dhism, they too developed a metaphysics. NeG-confucian metaphysics in the
Sung Learning (Sung-hsiieh) owed much to Buddhist metaphysics. It is
said that Chinese philosophical thought attained its summit when the
Sung-hsiieh philosophy was completed. Nevertheless, even Chu-tzu, the
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founder of the Sung-hsueh philosophy, did not state a systematic explana-
tion of the doctrine at al1.51
The Chinese, lacking the copula in their language, were not quite
conscious of judgments of attribution. Therefore, they could not clearly
distinguish the difference between the metaphysical principle of substance
and derivative attributes.52 After Buddhism was introduced into China,
it was greatly influenced by the anti-metaphysical trend of thought among
the Chinese. For example, the Chinese San-lun school (Three Treatises)
was based upon the Chung-lun of Nagarjuna and other treatises. The
doctrine of Nagarjuna states that worldly truth is the foundation of all
existences, but that metaphysical truth is the essence of worldly truth and
ontologically different from it. In the non-metaphysical, nominalist doctrine
of the San-lun school, on the contrary, it is thought that the differences
between these two truths are only differences in ways of expression. They
therefore interpreted worldly truth as an explanation of what existence
was and real truth as the evidence of non-substantiality.53 In such a view-
point a constructive metaphysics cannot be established. By this reasoning
the philosophy of the Vijnaptimiitrata. (pure consciousness), which in-
vestigated the order of establishment of absolute existence, did not become
influential in the world of thought in China in spite of the fact that it
was introduced into China by Paramartha in the Liang and Ch'en dynasties
(6th century A.D.). This philosophy again was introduced by Hsiian-tsang
in the Tang dynasty (7th century) and was protected and supported by
the Imperial Court. Nevertheless, it soon declined.54 An analysis of psy-
chological phenomena in the doctrine of the Abhidharma of Hinayana
Buddhism also did not develop in China. This kind of subjective idealism
was not suited to the mentality of the Chinese. Scarcely any metaphysical
tendency can be found in the doctrine of Zen Buddhism. Tsung-mi
acknowledged the fact that the teachings of Zen Buddhism concerning
metaphysics were very simple.55
It may safely be said that the doctrine of the Hua-yen sect was
the greatest adaptation of Mahayana Buddism among thie various
philosophical systems organized by the Chinese. This doctrine transcends
the traditional Buddhist philosophy while accepting it in modified form.
Philosophical thought in Buddhism as well as in Indian metaphysics
generally set forth the two ideas of absolute existence and the phenomenal
world. The absolute is the idea of indeterminate non-form and non-dis-
crimination, while the phenomenal world is known through form and
discrimination. The Indian metaphysicians tried to explain the relations
between them mainly by arguing about the relations between the
Reality and the Appearances. The Chinese Hua-yen sect, on the contrary,
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insisted that all phenomena mutually interpenetrate, and moreover, each
one of them possesses absolute significance in itself. In this theory, the
Absolute is not the important subject while the relation between one
phenomenon and another is greatly expanded. It is from this standpoint
that the basic doctrines are taught that "all phenomena are interdependent
without obstructions" and "one is all, and spontaneously at the same time,
all is one." In these theories, the Reality is understood as something which
is included in phenomena. In the Indian philosophies, the relations be-
tween individual existence and permanent existence, or the one and the
many, were the central subjects. On the contrary, in the Hua-yen sect of
China, the main subjects were relations between one individual being and
another, or between one limited existence and another. Although this
tendency can be found in the doctrines of the T'ien-t'ai sect, it is more
clearly formulated in the doctrines of the Hua-yen sect; therefore, it can
be said that the Hua-yen sect is a more Chinese and more developed form
of Mahayana Buddhism. In such a philosophy, the attempt to assume
metaphysical principles was completely abandoned; philosophers dwelt
only in the :hadow of the empirical and phenomenal worlds.
CHAPTER 22 INDIVIDUALISM
The Tendency Tawards Egoism
Contrary to certain opinions current in the West, the Chinese devel-
oped an individualism of their own which goes back to ancient times.
"While property was held in common, each son had his inalienable
right to inheritance. There was no individual vote guaranteed by a
constitution, and yet in village meetings every male adult was a voting
member by natural right. In the thirteen-century-Iong tradition of civil
service examinations, the basis for the selection of government officials
was individual merit rather than race, creed, economic status, sex, or
age."l The significance of the individual was fully admitted in ancient
Chinese philosophy: "Although the leader of three armies can be captured,
the will of a common man cannot be destroyed."2
Confucianism, the main ideology of Chinese intellectuals, was
normally and properly associated with the idea of civic participation or
public service. In fact, however, there was an equally valid aspect of
Confucianism, apparent in the thought of Confucius and Mencius, which
justifies the individual's withdrawal from public life and official service
under some conditions. Confucian eremitism was especially prevalent in
the Yuan period (1271-1368). Needless to say, this tendency was strong
among Buddhist recluses. In many cases they showed a voluntary eremit-
ism in protest against political power.
Dr. Chan has recently indicated "an excess of individualism" in
China:
"Actually, one of China's chief troubles in recent decades has been an
excess of individualism. Everyone has his own opinion. There have been
far too many individualists who think they are above society. Teamwork
and cooperative enterprise have been conspicuously lacking. This is the
type of thing the communists have set out to destroy. The problem is
whether they will destroy the individual himself."3
Then, does Chinese individualism conflict with altruism? The
Chinese, like other people, do not lack the spirit of altruism. Mutual
helpfulness in the family and in the villages is common. There is, of
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course, plenty of selfishness-as there is in other cultures. Buddhist
altruism helped China, but altruism was esteemed as a high virtue in
China long before Buddhism arrived. The first legendary ruler is believed
to have spent a good part of his life in digging watercourses for the rivers
in order to stop floods, neglecting his own family in serving the public. The
only difference between Chinese altruism and that of other peoples is that
the Chinese consciousness of being members of the nation or state has
been weak. Perhaps, that is why they were occasionally blamed as ego-
istic even by their countrymen, and this is what the Communist Govern-
ment is striving to correct through its totalitarian indoctrination.
Chinese individualism was limited by several cultural factors, and did
not develop along the same line as it did in the West. Among these factors
were (as we have already seen) the traditional Chinese attitude of static
understanding, their way of thinking which emphasizes concrete particu-
lars, and the trend in their thinking which imposes upon the individual
the great importance of past events and the traditional wisdom of the sage.
This incubus of historical tradition differentiates clearly the concept
of the individual held by the Chinese from that held by the Indians. To
these limitations on Chinese individualism must be added the factor of
the traditional Chinese tendency towards a "closed" society and morality.
That is to say, the Chinese always regarded themselves as confined to life
around such limited human relations as the family, which provides the
most intimate of personal relations. In ethics, for example, moral relations
among only certain individuals, such as father and son, sovereign and
subject, wife and husband, were considered important, so that the Chinese
people tended to pay little attention to any international principles of
morality or laws valid for society in all countries (such as the jus gentium).
This may have been a natural way of edification. Chinese ethics was
written and taught for the use of those who could read, the literate few
who were the potential leaders of the people. The common people, being
illiterate, were expected to follow the practices of the literate; hence if
morality was taught to the literates, it would spread through the society.
The ethical doctrine of Lao-tzii is consequently a morality for the
self-protection and safety of the individual even in the cases where altruis-
tic virtues were taught. The Buddhists criticized Lao-tzii by saying that his
teaching pertains only to one's own life and is useless to other people.4
The view of Yang-tzii is "to complete the true nature of man and follow
truth,"5 which, he implies, is none other than to satisfy men's physical
desires. Chuang-tzii also insisted that man should not perform good deeds
for fame, should not perform evil deeds which would bring about punish-
ment, and should behave in conformity to his physical desires, for then
he would be able to realize his true nature and live a long life.6 The theory
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of self-cultivation which appeared in the latter part of the Chan-kuo
(the Age of Warring States, 403-221 B.C.) period is an art meant to protect
and preserve one's physical health. The theory of seclusion also is the
art of protecting one's life by keeping away from worldly and powerful
positions where dangers are apt to arise. The theory of superhuman
beings also stems from the desire to prolong man's life eternally and to
enjoy life endlessly. All these theories can be said to foster a kind of
egoism. Some scholars even regard the teaching of Mo-tzii (died c. 390
B.C.), who taught the way to love others, was also a form of egoism inso-
far as he taught that to love others is simply in order to be loved by others.7
The humanistic spirit of Confucianism appears in its teaching the
rules of statesmanship. It, however, teaches the art of statecraft followed
by the governing class. It expects that the sage will benefit all. But it does
not expect the sage to teach all people, for the simple fact that illiterates
could not benefit. Illiterates must be taught by ordinary Confucians, not
by Confucius. For example, Tung Chung-shu (ca. I79-ca. 104 B.C.), one
of the greatest Han Confucians, is said to have had over 3,000 disciples.
But he never saw most of them! He taught a small coterie of intimate
disciples and expected them to pass on his teaching to the others! So the
ordinary Confucian was expected to be an official or a teacher.
Thus, the Confucian theory of humanism was not derived from the
idea that man is saved as man and sentient beings as sentient beings. The
moral practice of filial piety also possessed the tendency towards egoism.
In the 13th century, Dagen of Japan pointed out this fact very clearly in
order to contrast this tendency of Confucianism with the altruism of his
Buddhism. Dagen said that the teaching that Buddhas and Bodhisattvas
can appear in various forms at any place and time in order to save all living
beings, cannot be found in the teachings of Confucianism.s
It is evident that these humanistic and individualistic tendencies in
Chinese thought had a close connection with the actual conditions of
life in the Chinese farm-villages. Of course, I mean pre-communist China.
There was relatively little group consciousness in the Chinese farm-
villages, for very seldom did farmers cultivate and irrigate the land
together. Consequently, the independent government of the farmers was
very conservative. These characteristics in the life of the Chinese farm-
villages were naturally correlated with the Chinese way of thinking. The
rural situation of present-day communist China may be different.
The Spiritual Leadership of Buddhism and Its Transformation
Chinese Buddhists criticized the self-centered attitude of other Chi-
nese philosophers. After Buddhism was introduced into China sometime
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in the first century, Buddhists engaged in a great many altruistic activities
in accordance with the ideal of "Compassion." Ever since Shih-lo (ca.
329 A.D.) of the Later Chao period, who was influenced by the teaching of
Fo-t'u-ch'eng, left the education of his children to the temple, the
temple possessed great importance in education. The social work of Bud-
dhist priests was especially noticeable in its medical treatment and relief
of the poor. In the Eastern Chin period (4th and 5th century A.D.), Fo-t'u-
ch'eng, Fa-k'uang, K'o-lo-chieh, An-hui of Lo-yang, and Tan-tao of La
ching-shan helped the people obtain medical treatment. The necessary
offerings were also available in the temples. In the T'ang dynasty (618-
9°7), the system of temple hospitals was established, and institutions for the
poor, the sick, and the orphaned were built. In times of famine, Buddhist
priests and nuns devoted themselves to the relief of the people. As the
organ of monetary circulation for the common people, a pawn house
called 'Wu-chin-tsang (the limitless storehouse)" was founded in the
Six Southern and Northern dynasties. Besides these activities, Buddhist
priests endeavored to build bridges, plant trees, dig wells, and construct
rest-houses: In the Southern and Northern dynasties, many temples were
built in the center of the city. The people were charmed by the noble
images of Buddhas or the ornaments of the temples which gave rise to
thoughts of the Pure Land. Thus, temples became comfortable rest places
for the people who became interested in and familiar with Buddhism.9
It appears, however, that the Chinese Buddhists were not conscious
of the individual worth of others when they performed these social works,
but believed that one could be identified with others by practicing these
activities. From ancient times, the Tao religion taught that "the correct
way of human morality is the oneness of all existence."lD Chuang-tzii also
esteemed "the equality of nature," and again Chang-tzii of the Sung
philosophy said that "human beings and all other creatures are my
friends."ll In the traditional thought-system of the Chinese, it seems that
the existential problem of "confrontation" of one person with another was
not a relevant issue. On the contrary, in the Buddhist doctrines of the
Sui and T'ang dynasties, this problem was logically resolved. Accord-
ing to the doctrine of the T'ien-t'ai sect, the fundamental principle which
makes possible practical and altruistic activities is the "non-duality of
self with the other,"l2 50 that the doctrine of "helping others in con-
formity with their capacities" followed logically, since self-realization was
the major premise. In the Hua-yen school, the doctrine that "one is all and
all are one" was taught also by Zen Buddhism.l3 Philosophical arguments
such as the demonstration of the existence of others, set forth by Dhar-
makirti of India,14 and the proof of the existence of the self, discussed in
modern Europe, did not appear in China.
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The doctrine of altruistic practice based upon the compassion of
Buddhism could not completely change the Chinese tradition, which was
focused on limited human relations. Buddhism was accepted and spread
in China in ways which led to compromises with the thought of medita-
tive seclusion, compromises peculiar to Chinese Buddhism and in con-
formity with Chinese habits of thought. Generally speaking, Chinese
Buddhism was transcendent and other-worldly and apart from common
society. Most of its temples were situated in forests and mountains.IS This
can be clearly found in the Chinese phrase that "to build a temple" was
"to open the mountain." The famous and big temples were all built in
far-off mountains far away from villages.16 All Buddhist recluses went to
these mountains and observed the precepts, practiced meditation, and
furthered themselves spiritually by living together with their fellow-
monks. They believed that truth could be realized only through these
practices. Although the followers who chanted the name of Amida Buddha
were mainly in contact with the people, many of their famous monks were
confined to mountains.l1 Famous Buddhist scholars such as Tsung-miIB
and Chih-i, the founder of the Tien-t'ai sect, had also secluded them-
selves in the mountains for study and self-cultivation. It was the ideal of
Zen priests to be secluded in mountains to enjoy the peaceful quiet. When
Dogen intended to return to his homeland Japan, his Chinese master,
Ju-ching, instructed him as follows: 'When you go back to your country,
spread the doctrine of Buddhism for the benefit of both men and deities.
Do not stay in the center of cities or towns. Do not be friendly with Kings
and state ministers. Dwell in the deep mountains and valleys to realize
the true nature of man. Do not break the tenets of our Sect!"19
Corresponding with this tendency among the Buddhist priests, the
Chinese in general also praised and esteemed it as the pure and desirable
way of life. For example, Meng-hao-jan composed the following poem to
praise the hermitage and Zen practice of his teacher Yi: "Master Yi
practices the quiescence of meditation and built a hermitage in the forest;
a mountain is situated near it and shadows of trees cover the hermitage;
when the sun sets there is perfect silence around the hermitage. Here, he
realized the pure mind of man by observing the pure and beautiful lotus."
There are many poems honoring temples and priests in the T'ang-
shih-hsiian (a collection of poems composed in the Tang dynasty).
These poems praise the fact that temples were situated in quiet places
far from the villages and also praise the priests who sincerely endeavored
to purify themselves and practice the Buddhist exercises in these quiet
places.2o
Such an attitude of life where one lives in a quiet place and enjoys
the state of quiescence is especially prominent in Taoistic teachings. Ac-
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cording to the Lao-tzii, a return to the root of existence is called quietness,
and figuratively, a rebirth.21 And again his follower, Kuan-yin, said, "one
should be quiet as a mirror and response should be like an echo," and "one
becomes pure by quiescence."22 Lieh-tzii (third century A.D.) taught
that man should abandon all discrimination and thought and should have
quiescence and "emptiness."23 T'ien-p'ien, P'eng-meng, and Shen-tao also
taught that man should abandon discrimination and judgment of diversity,
that is, one should reject judgments of this and that, one or the other, and
should observe the oneness of all existence.24 Such thought can also be
found in the teaching of Kuan-tzii (Kuan Chung, ca. 6)0 B.C.).25
This sort of quietism also influenced Chinese Buddhism. The practice
of meditation was highly esteemed in Chinese Buddhism.26 The important
practice for Chih-i (Master of the T'ien-t'ai School) was that of meditative
concentration of the mind. Even the San-lun sect, which is regarded as a
representative sect of philosophical Buddhism, insisted upon the impor-
tance of "concentration of mind."27 Introspective and meditative tendency is
especially prominent in Zen Buddhism, in which the mind is called "the
origin of the truth or Dharma,"28 and asserts that our mind is namely the
Buddha itself.29 In order to purify and attain the mind's realization,
which reveals the essence of truth, one must practice the meditative
posture of sitting (zazen).30 Meditative rest is not merely a means to attain
the final stage, but the meditative posture itself epitomizes the "funda-
mental or fullest essence"31 of man. Meditation at rest is the substance of
wisdom.3~
The wisdom which is emphasized in the Ch'an (Meditation, Zen)
sect is one which is absolutely separate from the confrontation of "self
and others." This aim of self-realization by emancipation characterizes
Buddhism in general: "The true Dharma (virtue) is to abandon both the
mind and its objects."33 It is when discrimination of all forms is rejected
that the absolute appears: "vVhen thought is stopped and discrimination
abandoned, the Buddha spontaneously appears before one."34 Now this
state is namely the state of emancipation which can be attained only by
realization of the nature of the mind in the meditative posture of
sitting.35 This state of emancipation, however, is not always a mere state of
quiescence. For the enlightened priests of Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism, this
state yields an awareness of life in practice. And this is called "a road of
furtherance"36 which must be realized by the man who practices it himself.
Thus the technique of Zen practice became utterly Chinese; the type of
meditation became occasionally diametrically opposed to Indian medita-
tion. In Indian meditation, the mind tries to avoid the external world by
ignoring outside influence; however, Chinese meditation works with the
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aid of external influence, operates in this world, emphasizes quick wit
and insight, and aims at self-realization.37
The teachings of the Pure Land sect~8 were also influenced by this
way of thinking advocated by Zen Buddhism, for some early Pure Land
teachings of China possessed characteristics of the original teaching. For
example, the Pure Land teaching of Shan-tao (613-668 A.D.) asserted
that the Pure Land actually exists in the direction west of this very world.
It is not surprising, therefore, to read that many people committed suicide
in order to be born in the Pure Land by following the doctrine of Shan-tao
who taught: "Loathe this defiled world and desire to be born in the Pure
Land." The way of practicing the thinking of Buddha taught by Chih-i
was to meditate and observe each one of the excellent features of Amida
Buddha in one's mind.39 The Chinese, however, who were worldly,
realistic, and preferred peace of mind, changed the teachings of the Pure
Land sect. They insisted that the Pure Land of Amitabha Buddha existed
only in the mind of man. There is a paragraph in the Chinese translation
of the Amitiiyur-dhyiina-sutra which states that "the Pure Land of
Amitabha Buddha is situated not too far from this world, and therefore,
the features of the Pure Land can be observed by meditative concentra-
tion of the mind." Zen monks interpreted this as follows: "The ignorant
desire to be born in the Pure Land by calling the name of the Buddha.
The enlightened one, on the contrary, purifies his own mind. The Buddha
therefore, said, 'In conformity with the purity of the mind, the land of
the Buddha also becomes pure.' If the mind is purified, the people of the
east are sinless. If the mind is not purified, on the contrary, even the
people of the west are sinful. The ignorant desire to be born in the land
to the west. The lands of the east and the west, however, are situated in
the same place. If the mind is pure, the Pure Land exists close to this
world. On the contrary, if one awakens impure thoughts in the mind it is
difficult to be born in the Pure Land even if one chants the name of the
Buddha,"40
The Zen monks then asserted the teaching which they derived from
the passage of the Vimalakirti-nirdesa-sutra that "the pure mind is
identical with the Pure Land."41 Thus, they insisted on "a mind-only
doctrine"42 and finally the teaching came to be taught that "the Pure Land
of the pure mind exists in all parts of the world."43 After the Sung
dynasty, the Chinese Buddhists exclusively followed this pure-mind view,
and after the Ming dynasty, no contradiction was felt in practicing
simultaneously sitting and the Pure Land practice.
In Chinese Buddhism the most important practice, therefore, was to
purify one's own mind so that one would need to depend exclusively
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upon oneself, and not rely upon any other power, not even the power of
the Buddha. In this connection, Hu-hai (550-606 A.D.) said: "You should
realize the fact that man saves himself, and the Buddha cannot redeem
man. Practice by yourself and do not rely upon the favor of the Buddha.
It is set forth in the sutra: 'Therefore, those who look for the true dharma
should not rely upon Buddha.' "44
According to this theory each individual has to face the Absolute by
himself. Consequently, the authorities of the church, religious organiza-
tions, or any divine person who claimed to act as a medium between the
individual and the Absolute were not recognized.
Non-formation of Religious Sects
Since priests and religious organizations as intermediaries were
regarded as unnecessary in China, Chinese religions do not have the
sectarian character so typical of the religions of other peoples. Con-
fucianism, which was originally worldly, was combined with govern-
mental officials' power. It did not, however, form a state-church organiza-
tion. Neither did Taoism form a religious organization with a central
state-controlled administration. The same circumstances prevailed in the
case of Chinese Buddhism. There were no monks in China such as the
itinerant SramaIJas of India. All the Buddhist monks in China stayed
and lived in temples, where sectarian distinctions were not recognized.45
The individual priest had a right to live in any temple so long as he
observed the Buddhist precepts.
In present-day Chinese Buddhist society, there is no organization
controlling the temples and they are not interfered with politically. Mt.
T'ien-t'ai is the sacred place for Chinese T'ien-t'ai priests because it was
here that the founder, Chih-i, lived and founded the doctrine of this
sect, so that this place became the headquarters of the Chinese T'ien-t'ai
priests in various other districts, for there are no relations between an
individual priest in one locality and another priest elsewhere. Similarly,
the Shao-lin-ssu Temple on Mt. Sung is the place where Bodhidharma,
the founder of the Zen sect, practiced meditative sitting, facing the wall
for nine years, so that this temple is the most holy temple as well as the
incomparable practice-ground for Zen priests. Nevertheless, it is not the
headquarters of the Zen sect and there is no connection between this
temple and other Zen temples although some pilgrims come to it. Zen
Buddhism originally insisted on the importance of the conveyance of the
teachings from teacher to disciple, and the relation between master and
disciple was very important. In spite of this fact, there is no connection
between various temples.46 The temple in pre-Communist Chinese Bud-
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dhism was a mere structure to accommodate priests. Therefore, priests of
various sects lived in the same temple. If the head priest of a temple was
a priest of the Pure Land sect, the temple belonged to the Pure Land sect.
If the head priest of a temple was a priest of the Zen sect, it was a temple
of the Zen sect. For this reason, the sect of one and the same temple was
always changing in accordance with the sect of the head priest.47 In this
sense, it can be said that the distinction of sects depended solely on the
will of the individual priest.
In Japan, on the contrary, a temple always belongs to a certain sect,
and it does not change with the sect of the head priest as in China where
the sect of the temple is always changing with the change of the head
priest.48 Generally speaking, in modern times Chinese Buddhism has
tried to harmonize its various Zen sectS.49 It seems to me that this tendency
of Chinese Buddhism appeared in the latter part of the Ming dynasty.5o
Therefore, Chinese became Buddhist followers only through the
preaching of individual priests. Chinese temples do not have fixed followers
or believers. Great land-owners who supported the temple sometimes
contributed land or forests, with the income from which a temple could
maintain its disciples and become prosperous. Head priests of great temples
considered it a very important mission to train and foster many priests.
Therefore, they requested contributions and offerings from their followers,
believers or anyone with whom they had relations. 51 On the occasions of
religious services and funeral rites, the Buddhist followers usually invited
a certain priest to perform them. Or in some cases, they held the ceremonies
at a temple they designated. In this connection, many followers of Bud-
dhism gathered at a temple of a famous and virtuous priest whose name
was widely known. Therefore, a temple was often revived or newly built
through contributions and offerings which were donated to these virtuous
famous priests.
What has happened to the priests and their disciples in Communist
China today is not well known. Since the Communist revolution the
social situation has greatly changed. But, judging from information
occasionally acquired by us, the Buddhists' situation seems to remain
unchanged so long as the Buddhist orders do not conflict with the policy
of the government.
Universality of Tao (The Way)
Thus, Chinese Buddhists disapproved the authority of the religious
organization or church as the medium between the Absolute and the
individual, and they exlusively followed the dharma (the norm or
principle) or the tao52 (the way) which was considered the Absolute
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itself. Indian people made use of the term dharma in many cases but the
Chinese preferred the term tao. The word tao possesses a more concrete
connotation that the word dharma. Otherwise, the meaning of these
two words was essentially the same in the eyes of Buddhists at that time.
The practice of Taoists is similar to the Indian practice of Yoga with
respect to seeking tranquillity of mind, longevity, miraculous powers,
etc.53
In this sense the Chinese have been fully conscious of the uni-
versality of tao. They assume that even though countries differ, the same
moral principles are observed and followed all over the world,54 and that
a certain thought system transcends time and possesses a universal
validity true for all ages.55 They believe that the idea of tao, which can be
found in all religions in various forms, is also universal truth. Therefore,
it is said that "tao is not able to realize itself, but can be realized by man.
Even though there are various ways to realize it, the tao itself, however,
does not change through the ages. That which changes in time and place
is not tao, but men and the world. The theory of one principle covers all
(Confucius~, the idea of non-creation (Lao-tzii), and the goal of nirvii!Za
(Sakyamuni), all point up the fact that different men taught the same
truth."56
For some thinkers, the idea of dharma in Chinese Buddhism was a
higher principle than that of the Buddha. The authority of the Buddha is
established only insofar as it is based upon the authority of the dharma.
'Those who realized the dharma are called Buddha."57 It is said that
Tan-hsia, a priest of the Zen sect, burnt a wooden image of the Buddha to
admonish people who idolized the Buddha but ignored the significance of
the dharma embodied in it. The Pure Land teachings state that one
should meditate on Amitabha Buddha with all one's heart and soul.
Modern Chinese interpreted this teaching as none other than to meditate
on Tathatii (thusness).58 Chinese Buddhists also esteemed the authority of
the dharma more highly than filial piety, as is shown in the statement:
"The obligation to ancestors covers only seven generations, while the
obligation of the Buddhist teacher is so great that it covers a great many
Kalpas."59
To respect a Buddhist teacher does not mean to respect the teacher
himself as an individual, but it means to respect the person who realized
the truth of Buddhism by himself.60 Tsung-mi (780-841) taught that
only those who were inferior in their spiritual capacities had to depend
upon a teacher.61 This point is directly contrary to the case in Japan, where
devotion to or reliance on an individual teacher was and is strongly
emphasized.62
A prominent characteristic of the Indian religions in contrast to
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Chinese Buddhism appears in the fact that the idea of precepts for
virtue or dharma was highly esteemed in both countries but was accepted
in different ways. The Chinese emphasized only the concrete worldly
aspect of this idea of dharma, so that for them the universal principle of
virtue appears in different forms according to the time and place. The
principle can be universal only by changing its form in different contexts.
The idea of dharma set forth in Buddhism is not a stagnant one, and
therefore, ethical principles or dharma naturally change and develop with
the lapse of time. A characteristic of Chinese Buddhism in the later
period can be seen in the greater attention given to the individual concrete
form of the principle of dharma as interpreted by the Chinese Buddhists
when compared with the attitude of most Indian Buddhists earlier.
Chinese Buddhists did not form religious organizations which
governed priests and temples. Nevertheless, they did greatly esteem the
observance of the precepts and believed that it was the essential basis of
all good actions to keep the precepts, because they were fully conscious
of the importance and sacredness of the dharma as the Absolute. 63 Even
at present, Chinese priests observe and practice the precepts.64 It is said
that priests who violate the precepts cannot be respected by the people.
The laymen as well as the priests, observe the precepts very strictly in
China.65 There is no governing religious organization in China. Therefore,
Buddhist followers are not punished or expelled even if they do not
observe the Buddhist precepts. Nevertheless, they follow them closely,
thus differing from the Japanese Buddhist societies where the precepts
are not necessarily observed by the followers in spite of the fact that
these followers are strictly controlled, politically and economically, by
the sectarian organization.
To keep the precepts does not merely mean to follow ascetic
practices or continue a life of mortification. The great priests of China
excluded ascetic practices. This can be seen in the writing of Fa-tsang
(643-712) who praised the precepts of a Bodhisattva stated in the Fang-
wang-ching (Brahmajala sutra) as follows: "If one does not observe the
precepts of the Bodhisattva, he is the same as an animal or a bird even if
he does undergo the ascetic practices in the mountains or eats only fruits
and vegetables."66
In Zen Buddhism, ascetic practices were also completely excluded.67
The observance of the precepts was esteemed only so far as it was a help
in realizing the dharma.
In this connection, there was also no discrimination of social position
or status in the monkhood and nobody was refused entrance in the
Buddhist organization on this account. Thus, Chinese Buddhism in
modern times came to possess a strikingly democratic character. In reaction
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to this tendency, members of good families or the upper class did not
become priests after the time of the "Suppression of Buddhism." That is
to say, people from the upper classes used to enter the priesthood in the
time before the Sung period. In modern times, only people from the lower
classes have entered the priesthood, and this tendency is seen in the
fact that in present-day China, priests are mostly from the illiterate and
ignorant classes-in particular, the farmers and common inhabitants.68
The principle of equality in Buddhism, with regard to social position and
classes, is strongly supported by many Chinese. However, it could not
eliminate the idea of class morality which was traditionally and strongly
rooted in Chinese society.
CHAPTER 23 ESTEEM FOR
HIERARCHY
The Moral Personality
Since ancient times Chinese philosophies have respected an ethical
hierarchy in human relations, and we must not forget that a salient
characteristic of Chinese thought is its ethical nature.1 The Chinese
regarded ethical studies as a more important branch of learning than the
sciences connected with nature. However, the contents and the significance
of "ethical" in Chinese thought are clearly different from what they are
in Western thought or Christianity. In the following sections, the ethical
characteristic in the ways of thinking of the Chinese will be discussed.
It seems that the Chinese were not very conscious of the distinction
between natural phenomena and the actions of human beings. They
thought that man could exert some power over nature, when events de-
pended upon the behavior of man, and that natural power and the power
of ideas were two aspects of one and the same universe.
As a result of the humanistic trend of Chinese thought, discrimination
between the individual and the human organization to which the in-
dividual belongs was not fully acknowledged. An interesting example
concerning the relation between the individual and the human organiza-
tion can be found in Chinese Buddhism. Seng is the abbreviation of
seng-chia (the transliteration of sangha) which signifies a Buddhist organi-
zation. The individual, on the contrary, who belonged to this organization
was called a pi-eh'iu (bhikkhu or bhi~u). These two terms are clearly
distinguished in the Buddhist siitras. In China, however, the individual
monk was also called seng, which originally meant the organization. In
India, the individual monk was never called sangha; I-Ching, who made a
pilgrimage to India, pointed out this fact,2 which Chinese Buddhist
scholars in general acknowledged. Nevertheless, they insisted that they
Were justified in using the term.3 And this idea of the Chinese also was
inherited by the Japanese.
The Chinese highly esteemed the cosmic hierarchy which included
man, and therefore, they established a clear discrimination between
human beings and other living beings. They thought that man was man
.
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only when he observed the right way of acting as a man. In this respect,
Kan-t'ui-chih excluded barbarians, animals, and birds from the concept
of humanity.4 This way of thinking is remarkably different from that of
the Indians. In most cases the Indians subsumed man and all other living
beings under one concept which was "being" (sattva, priilJin, or dehin),
as they thought all beings suffered from the defilement and illusions of
this world in the same way. Buddhism in China was at times influenced
by this kind of Indian thought. According to Tsung-mi, the human being
is the highest being of all existences, and is the only living being who can
completely harmonize with the spirit and gods. Fa-tsang also instructed
people by saying, "If an ascetic does not observe the precepts, he is
exactly the same as an animal or a bird."5 Buddhism, which originated
in India, changed its way of thinking accordingly, after it went into
China, so as to conform to the Chinese idea of man. That is to say, the
views of the Chinese and of the Indians concerning the relation of man to
other living beings were so opposed that Buddhism had to be transformed
in going from India to China.
Their !WO different views were derived from difference in viewpoints
in regard to man. As has been pointed out, the Chinese people as well
as many other peoples have attached great importance to the individual
or the concrete. The Indian people, on the contrary, greatly esteemed
the universal or permanent. For the Chinese, social nexus attaches the
most important significance to individual human beings. Man is regarded
as the most significant and highest existence, and beings transcending man
possess little meaning in actual human life. For the Indians, on the
contrary, the life of man in this world is impermanent and mortal, with
the differences between man and all other living beings being almost
nil. Consequently, Chinese thought did not transcend ethics while the
Indians gave ethics a subordinate place subject to discipline of a religious
character. Such features in the ways of thinking are not always peculiar
to a certain people, for it is also possible that a culture in time will accept
different ways of thinking. The Chinese were greatly influenced by
Indian thought for long periods after the introduction of Buddhism into
China. For example, the idea of compassion taught in Buddhism was
widely accepted in the Sung dynasty, and many compassionate acts, such
as liberating living creatures, abolition of animal sacrifice, and refraining
from killing living beings, were highly commended.6
Elegant Attitude on Sexual Matters
Generally speaking, Indians are indifferent about sexual matters.
This tendency is also found in Indian Buddhism. They are plain-spoken
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in describing sexual affairs, and what is said is accepted by the Indians
only so far as it is a description of an objective fact, and only remarks about
sex which cause unpleasant reactions in one's mind are disliked. On the
contrary, the Chinese, or at least Confucianists, have an aversion towards
writings about sex. To be sure, some indecent literature has been written
in China. It was, however, considered unworthy for wise men or gentle-
men to mention such sexual affairs. Such a tendency is not peculiar only
to the Chinese but to all decent people in the world as well. Nevertheless,
it can be said that this tendency was one of the noteworthy characteristics
of the Chinese educated people.
Buddhism was also influenced by this tendency. When the Chinese
translated the Buddhist siitras, for example, they tried to remove the
plain-spoken words and phrases on sex. The Chinese version of the
Saddharma-pu1J4arika-siitra (chapter "Devadatta") states that "a female
dragon suddenly changed her figure to become a male dragon." This
phrase is very famous as proof of enlightenment of women in China as
well as in Japan. The original text, however, states that "a daughter of the
dragon king in the ocean explained the fact that she became a Bodhisattva
by concealing her female organ and displaying the male organ."1 The
Chinese removed or abbreviated such expressions of the Indian text when
they translated it. Another example: why was it wrong to drink stimulants?
This was because various evils would result. The original Pali text says
one of the defilements is that "those who drink liquor are apt to display
their sexual organs." The Chinese translator turned this phrase into
"those who drink liquor are apt to became angry."s
The Chinese version of the Hua-yen-ching (Buddhiivatamsaka-
S11tra) translated in the Chin dynasty states as follows: "Vasumitra told
Sudhanasre~!hi-daraka: 'Those who A-li-i me surely attain the state of
Samadhi where all beings are saved, and those who A-chung-pei me surely
attain the state of Samadhi of virtue and mystery.' "9
A-li-i is the transliteration of Alingana which connotes the meaning
of embrace while A-chung-pei is derived from Paricumbana which means
to kiss. The original Sanskrit can be translated as follows: "Some people
can remove all defilements only by embracing me and can surely attain
the state of the Bodhisattva Samadhi called 'the womb which saves all
beings of the world' without fail. Again some people can become rid of all
defilements only by kissing me and can surely attain the state of the
Bodhisattva Samadhi called 'the state where the womb of virtue of all
beings of the world can be realized.' "10
As is seen in the above phrases, the Indian indifferently used terms
connected with sex such as "embrace" or "kiss." On the contrary, the
Chinese who taught the correct way (Tao) of a gentleman could not
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follow this tendency. For the Chinese, it was a terrible thing to mention
sexual words in religious scriptures. They thought that indecent terms
desecrated the scriptures' authority and sacredness. Buddhabhadra, there-
fore, who translated the Hua-yen sutra, transliterated these two terms in
order to conceal them.
However, in the other Chinese translation of the Hua-yen sutra
translated in the Tang dynasty, these two terms Alingana and Paricumbana
are literally translated from the Sanskrit as embracing and kissing,u It
is thought that Confucianism was more influential in the Chin dynasty
when this sutra was first translated than later in the Tang dynasty.
In this connection, German scholars, among the modern Europeans,
usually translated literally the sexual explanations mentioned in the Indian
literatures. On the contrary, English scholars, in many cases, used the
Latin or euphemistic explanations instead of the literal translation. In this
respect, there seems to be a similarity between the ideal of Confucianism
and that of the English gentleman.
In another part of the Hua-yen sutra, there is a story of a mother and
daughter whose names are SudarSana and Suvalitaratiprabhasasri.I2 Both
mother and daughter were high-class prostitutes (agragm;tikii). This sort
of thing can also be found in modern Indian society and may be one of its
characteristics. Most of this story in the Chinese Tang dynasty version
was translated literally.I3 Nevertheless, some differences can be found
between the original Sanskrit text and the Chinese translation due to the
influence of Confucianism. (I) According to the original text, both mother
and daughter are prostitutes, and they talk about the teachings of Bud-
dhism. From a Confucianist standpoint, such facts were not agreeable.
Therefore, the word "prostitute" is removed in the Chinese translation.
(2) In the original text it states that "the daughter wishes to marry the
prince Tejo'dhipati." According to Confucian thought, however, marriage
is none other than the wife serving her husband. Therefore, this part was
translated as follows: "If possible, I wish to serve this person." (3) Accord-
ing to the original text, the reason why the mother had her daughter give
up this love was that "we prostitutes are the pleasure instruments of all
the people; therefore, you cannot become the wife of one person." On the
contrary, the Chinese translation says, "We lower people are not suitable
for wives of such noble people." That is to say, the reason why the daughter
had to give up her love was the difference in the social position. On the
contrary, the original text does not mention that the prostitute is a lower-
class person. In Indian society, some prostitutes were ranked highly in
society and were also very rich. Such facts, however, could not be
recognized in Chinese thought.
The older Chinese version14 of this sutra, translated in the Chin
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dynasty, states that the prince instead of the daughter fell in love. This
explanation is exactly opposite to the explanations of the above two-the
original text and the Chinese version of the Tang dynasty. Of these, it
can safely be said that the explanation of the original Sanskrit text and
the Tang version of the Chinese are the original form since there is a
contradiction in the Chinese Chin version concerning this explanation.
That is to say, the Gatha (verse) portion mentions the daughter express-
ing her love for the prince. Moreover, it can usually be said that the verse
is older than the prose portions of the same siitra. Therefore, it is certain
that the explanation of part of the Chin version was modified in a later
time. Again possibly the translator of the Chin version changed the
expression of this part. Perhaps, the translator thought that if this part
were translated literally, the ethics of the social position would be broken.
In connection with sexual ethics, the commentary on the Abhi-
dharmakosa written by Yasomitra states: "the man who observes the five
precepts marries a wife." The Chinese version of this commentary trans-
lated by Hsuan-tsang, however, translated it as "the man who observes
the five precepts takes a wife and concubines" (XVIII, 18, left). Buddhism,
from its beginning, prohibited sexual relations with women except with
one's own wife. Therefore, concubines were not permitted. It is true that
it was permissible to have plural wives in India, as can be seen in the
Brahmin scriptures or in the Jataka Buddhist stories (Jiitaka, IV, 99 G).
It was permissible only so far as the women were wives. China, however,
pennitted concubines without the sanction of marriage. Therefore, Hsiian-
tsang, who translated this siitra, added the word "concubines" when
he translated this part of the siitra. This idea was also accepted by
the Japanese. For example, in the Ju-zen-hii-go written by Jiun of
Japan, it was not forbidden to have concubines although sexual rela-
tions with wives or concubines of others are strictly prohibited. In this
respect, a somewhat different ethical idea can be recognized in India on
the one hand and China or Japan on the other.is
Buddhism seems to have had many followers among the elite; there-
fore, the words and phrases of the siitras had to be translated in the above
ways, at least up to the period of the Tang dynasty. However, further
investigations are necessary in this field.
Sexual relations in China were strictly prohibited if they opposed
the human order based on the family system. This thought probably
stemmed from the idea of the high value of the human order in the family.
A love affair was regarded as physical and not spiritual. Confucianism did
not recognize .spiritual significance in love although some romantic poems
can be found in the Shih Ching. This tradition also influenced Buddhism.
Esoteric Buddhism arising in the last stage of Indian Buddhism was
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influenced by the Siikta school, the folk-faith of that time, which included
many indecent elements. Mysterious rites and ceremonies which violated
public moral standards were performed under the name of Buddhism.
The Chinese, however, did not accept these mysterious rites although the
esoteric Buddhist doctrine itself was adopted. Among the esoteric sutras
translated into Chinese in the Sung dynasty were some which described
sexual relations symbolically; yet they hardly exerted any influence.
Although the Chinese accepted wholesale the magic spells of esoteric
Buddhism, the indecent side connected with sex was not accepted.
Therefore, no sexual esoteric image at all exists among the images of
Buddhas and Bodhisattvas which were worshipped by the Chinese. A
few European scholars see a similarity between the worship of Bodhisattva
Avalokitesvara and that of the Madonna, and have tried to find a latent
element of Indian Sakti in Kuan-yin. Such elements, however, cannot be
found in any sutra stating the worship of Bodhisattva AvalokiteSvara.
According to the Chinese view, the physical body of man is ugly and
dirty, so that clothes are coverings for the ugly body.16 Therefore, the
Chinese peither accepted nor founded any religious customs such as are
seen in Jainism where clothes are regarded as shackles and the naked
image of the Jina is worshipped.
Formalism in Behavior
The most important thought of ancient China is the idea of Ii (Rules
governing the way of life) which Confucius gave to the whole system of
political and social customs handed down from an early age. It was the
ideal of moral conduct to be followed in actual life. Every duty of man,
such as filial piety or obedience to an elder, had to be performed in
conformity with Ii. Therefore, the ideal of the Chinese is that every
act should conform to the idea of Ii. This doctrine was strictly observed
by the Confucianists.
It has been commonly asserted that at the time of the Emperor Wu
of the Han dynasty, Confucianism was accepted as the national ideology
of the ruling class.17 Thus, the idea of Li became the fundamental morality
of literate Chinese society.
This tendency to follow rules is likely to produce formalism in
behavior. Buddhism was also influenced in a manner shown above where
the Chinese Buddhists at that time observed Buddhist precepts very
strictly. The following story will show how rigorously (and even drasti-
cally) some of the Chinese Buddhists observed the formal precepts.
When Hui-yuan (died 416) of Lu-shan became seriously ill, his
disciples asked him to drink alcohol as a cure. He refused, for it would
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transgress the Vinaya Rules (Pitaka). A disciple then asked him whether
he would drink rice porridge. He refused again as it was already after
twelve o'clock. (In India the precepts state that the priest must not partake
of food after twelve o'clock noon.) Finally, he was offered honey and told
to mix it with water and drink it. Hui-yuan then told his disciples to search
the Vinaya Pitaka in order to find out whether it was admissible to drink
honey with water. He died before they finished reading all the Vinaya
texts."18 Nakamoto Tominaga of Japan criticized this story saying: "One
can say that he observed the precepts very strictly, since he did not break
them even when he was dying. However, how eccentric it was that he
did not eat the rice porridge."19 The Vinaya sect was founded in a later
period and was influenced by this kind of strictness of behavior. I-tsing
even went to India at a great risk primarily to clarify the rules of the
precepts. Although Zen Buddhism has become very loose today in China,
the spirit of strict behavior still exists. It is said that the Pure Rules which
are the precepts of Zen Buddhism were formed by Huai-hai (720-814 A.D.).
It is in these Pure Rules that even the minor points of everyday life in a
Zen monastery are stated. Among Zen priests in later periods, some
have behaved very freely, but the tendency in which even the minor
precepts are strictly observed still remains.
Esteem for Superiority in Status
The ethics of Li gave a high value to order of rank and social
position. The ethics of Confucianism was one for the governing class,
namely, for people who were ranked in high positions in society. These
people were the governing class politically and the intelligentsia cultur-
ally.20 Superiority in society and status in the govering class was the
important thing. A one-sided obedience of the lower class to members of
the upper class was emphasized. This phase of Confucianism was also
supported by rulers of all dynasties after the Han. The fact was that
Confucian morality protected the position and the power of the govern-
ment and gave it justification. This line of thought was easily accepted by
the Chinese, because from ancient times, Chinese society was based
On an order constructed upon the discrimination of classes.
Words and expressions used commonly in every day life in China
were also greatly influenced by this idea of social order. For example, there
are many kinds of personal pronouns directed to others, and each of them
is used according to the social class of the person addressed;2l it is the
same in the case of the person doing the talking.22 In the universal
phenomenon of death, various terms are also used according to the
Social status of the deceased.23 Besides these, the Chinese classics2~ state
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in detail that different terms expressing the same thing should be used in
accordance with the social position of the person. There are also some
kinds of adverbs which express respect or humility in China.25 Further·
more, there are gradations even among children born to the same parents.
Children are caped kyodai in Japanese, brothers and sisters in English,
and bhaginyas ca bhriHaras ca in Sanskrit. In Chinese, however, they are
divided into four kinds by age-namely, hsiung (elder brother), ti (younger
brother), tzu (elder sister), and mei (younger sister).
Hierarchical structure in status was, however, not a rigid one. In
general, in the old-fashioned family in China, only younger generations
are expected to obey their elders. But in many cases, a younger son of
ability may break with the family and, especially if he attains an official
position, may become much more important than his elder brother.
Buddhism, when it was introduced into Chinese society, where
discrimination of standing existed and one's social position was a determin-
ing factor, was revolutionary in teaching the equality of mankind with
disregard for status and class. It seemed almost impossible that Buddhism
could concur or even compromise with the thought of Confucianism.
Therefore, the Confucianists frequently criticized the Buddhist teaching
as one which destroyed human relationships. Some Chinese Buddhists,
however, asserted the superiority of the Buddhist doctrine from the
standpoint of Chinese ethics. That is to say, they said that the Buddhist
doctrine stemmed from Sakyamuni who was from a royal family and
therefore was superior to the doctrines of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzii, who
were from the lower classes. Chih-i, the founder of the T'ien-t'ai sect,
declared that "The Buddha was from a royal family in India, while
Chuang-tzii and Lao-tzii were lower government officials. Therefore, one
cannot compare their teachings on the same level."26 He again stated that
Tathagata Sakyamuni turned the wheel of the Dharma and became the
Buddha in spite of the fact that he possessed the possibility of becoming
a great King of the World. Lao-tzii, on the other hand, did not give up his
position and his land even though this mythical sage was said to be only a
low official and a poor farmer; therefore, it is impossible to say that both
teachings possessed the same value and significance.27 Chi-tsang also
stated this.28 It is also said that the Buddha possessed greatness and
magnificence as a spiritual king or ruler, while Lao-tzii and Chuang-tzii
did not. The Chinese Buddhists finally came to the conclusion that a
Buddha was expected surely to be born in the family of a King or a
Brahmin, and could not be born in a low class, or a commoner's family.
Therefore, it is said that all Buddhas will never be born to the two lower
classes, the Vaisya and Siidra, and they will surely be born to the upper
two classes, the K~atriya and the Brahmin.29 Thus, we see that Chih-i and
--
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Chi-tsang who founded the Buddhist doctrines of China could not but
help compromise with the idea of class discrimination. Otherwise, they
could not propagate their teachings to the general Chinese public.
The Chinese explained even philosophical ideas in the framework
of class discrimination. An example of this will be shown in the following:
In the doctrine of Hinayana Buddhism, the function of the mind is
called caitta (in Chinese hsin-so) and the central mind, citta (hsin). Hsiian-
tsang, however, translated the term citta into hsin-wang, the king of the
mind. After Hsiian-tsang, the Chinese scholars were fond of using this
term hsin-wang instead of mere hsin. They thought that the mind could
not function by itself but had to be accompanied by other actions. This
character of the mind is somewhat similar to that of a king who was always
accompanied by many soldiers and servants whenever he went out. (In the
original Sanskrit text of the Abhidharmakosa-siistra; such terms as "citta-
raja," which indicates the king of the mind, do not appear.)
Generally speaking, Buddhism could not be accepted by the Chinese
without compromising with the idea of class discrimination.
For example, the early Buddhist texts state that both the master and
his servant have duties to each other. The master had to care for his
servants in the following five ways: "The task had to be given in accordance
with the ability of the servant. Board and salary were necessary. Illness
had to be cared for. Delicious food had to be shared. Timely rest had to be
given." The servant had to serve his master in the following five ways: "He
had to rise earlier and retire later than the master, receive only what he was
given, work hard, and also spread the fame and praise of the master.so
In all ages and countries, the precept that "the servant should serve
his master and the master should love his servant" has been universally
taught. The early Buddhist teaching, however, states this differently in
that the master should serve the servant. It can be understood that the
noble religious spirit of early Buddhism can be recognized in requiring
that the upper class r"egard the lower with a spirit of respect and service.
Such a thought, however; could not be accepted verbatim by the
Chinese who thought it terrible and absurd that the master should respect
and serve his servants. Therefore, the Chinese translator changed the
words as follows: "The master has to teach his servants in five ways."Sl
Only by such adaptation to traditional Chinese forms could the thought
of equality in Buddhism be introduced into China.
Buddhists, therefore, could not change the idea of class status of the
Chinese in spite of their acceptance of Buddhism. Although the Sung
rhiIosophy was greatly influenced by Buddhism, the ethics of Confucian-
Ism still remained. Ch'eng I-ch'uan (1°32-11°7) understood the philoso-
phy of the Hua-yen Sutra deeply and was greatly influenced by it. Never-
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theless, his doctrine was based only upon the idea of harmony between
noumenon and phenomenon, but he could not realize the idea of the
harmony between one phenomenon and another. Perhaps he considered it
harmful to the hierarchical social order for Confucian morals to teach the
idea of harmony.32
As the result of the two revolutions in the modern period, the
traditional order of status and social class is completely destroyed. How-
ever, a new class order was re-established after these two revolutions. In
the Communist government, the iron rule of the party bureaucracy is
supreme, and demands strict obedience from the people. In this sense, it
can be said that esteem for superiority in status still persists today in
China.
The High Value Placed on Patriarchal Kinship
Chinese morality was centered on the family as all-important in the
life of an individual. Relations among family members provided the
human basis for the moral virtues of the Chinese, and filial piety was the
most important among them. The morals of Confucianism flowed from
the heads of the families constituting the governing class. Family govern-
ment, in other words, was applied and extended to governing the whole
nation or to statesmanship.
How did this family morality of the Chinese affect Buddhism in-
troduced from the foreign country of India? The Buddhist organization
was symbolized in China by the chia (family or home) and was called
fo-chia (Buddhist family).33 Each sect of Buddhism was also called a
family (chia). For example, priests and followers of the T'ien-tai sect
called their sect "this family."34 the rules of Zen Buddhism were generally
called chia-feng (the customs of the family), and specially formed rules
were called chia-hsun (the instructions of the family). These rules had
to be observed and practiced because they were the customs and instruc-
tions of the Buddha, the founder of Buddhism.35 The Chinese, further-
more, regarded people who had deep relations with Buddha as his
relatives. For example, the Chinese regarded the five companions with
whom Sakyamuni had undergone various ascetic practices before he
attained enlightenment, as relatives of Sakyamuni in spite of the fact
that the families and classes of these five Bhikkhus were unknown.36
It is a very interesting fact that the Chinese even expressed the
ideas of natural science in the form of kinship relations. According to the
Indian atomic theory, in ancient time, a dual-atom body is formed from
the union of two atoms, and the natural world is formed by the combina-
tion of many "dual-atomic bodies." The Chinese called the simple atom
•
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a "parent atom" and the dual-atomic body a "child atom."37 The Greeks
and the Indians did not use such names in their atomic theories.
Buddhists were forced to teach filial piety to the common people in
China just because the most important virtue in Confucianism was
filial piety, which demanded a one-sided obedience from children, the
younger people, to their parents, the venerated elders. This idea, however,
did not exist in Indian Buddhism, as can be seen in the original Sanskrit
texts where there is no such term corresponding to the idea of hsiao,
filial piety, found frequently in Chinese translations of siitras. The
translators must have added this term. The virtue which corresponds to the
idea of filial piety is, of course, taught in the original Buddhist siitras,
but only as one of the virtues and not as the supreme virtue.3s The
Chinese, not satisfied with the family morality taught in Indian Bud-
dhism, composed as a last resort certain spurious siitras such as the
Fu-mu-en-chung-ching and the Tai-pao-fu-mu-en-chung-ching, which
teach filial piety.39 The great and deep obligation which all children owe
to their parents was heavily emphasized. These two siitras were diffused
widely not only in China but in the neighboring countries and were
frequently quoted; commentaries on them were written by famous Bud-
dhist scholars.
The family-centered morality of China attached great importance to
the ceremony of ancestor-worship which was based upon the high value
of the family-line. It possesses an important social and economical signifi-
cance. In India, there was the worship of Pitr (the soul of the ancestor) and
of Preta (his ghost) which was performed in each family. China, however,
gave it great importance. Ancient Israel also performed the ritual worship
of the dead (Totenkult) which seems to have diminished in later periods
with the decrease of the social and ceremonial significance of the family-
line.40 Thus, one of the remarkable characteristics of the Chinese religions
is this soul and ghost worship (chthonischer Kult, as Max Weber calls
it).41
After Buddhism's introduction into China, Confucianist scholars
strongly criticized Buddhism as a religion which destroyed the family
and its morality. As monks did not marry, they had no children, and
their line becoming extinct, the ceremony of ancestor-worship was not
performed for them. Chao-yung (1011-1077 A.D.), a Confucian scholar
in the Northern Sung dynasty, criticized Buddhism, saying that it was
contrary to natural human relationships. "The Buddha abandoned the
relationships between sovereign and subject, parents and children, wife
and husband. Then how can it be said that his teaching corresponds to
natural reason?"42 Indian Brahmanism also criticized Buddhism in the
same way. The filial piety taught by the Indian Buddhists was "to respect
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and serve one's living parents in this world." The necessity of a memorial
service for the dead parents or ancestors was not strictly taught, because
the Indians believed that parents, after death, would be born either in
heaven or hell according to their behavior in the past. They performed
ancestor-worship only to express the feeling of gratitude to their ancestors,
and the achievements or the memorial day of the individual ancestor
were not contemplated as important in worship. This fact has a close
relation to the tendency of Indian thought to stress universality. In this
sense, it was very difficult for Buddhism to be accepted by the Chinese in
its original form.
Buddhism, when transferred from India, could not, therefore, help
but adopt the ancestor-worship of the Chinese. This trend is seen in the
period of the Northern Wei dynasty. A good example of this amalgama-
tion is the Ullambana ceremony held on July 15, the last day of the
summer retreat period, for the sake of ancestors going back seven genera-
tions. On this day, people gave offerings to the monks in order to have
their ancestors' sufferings cease. Although the idea existed in India that
the sufferings and pains of one's dead parents could be removed by offering
foods to the monks, it is not clear whether this Ullambana ceremony was
observed in India. It was, however, greatly esteemed in China and widely
performed by the Chinese from its beginning in the time of the Emperor
Wu of the Liang dynasty. It is believed that one can attain the highest
state of Buddhahood43 by performing this ceremony. Its significance and
method is explained in the Ullambana-siitra. Many commentaries on it
were written in spite of the fact that it was probably not known in India.
The concept of karma, in its Sinicized form, may be found in all
types of literature. Before the advent of Buddhism, divine retribution
was believed to fall upon families; then Buddhism introduced the idea of
karmic causation, but this was on an individual basis. Finally, the two
ideas were interwoven in the view that has prevailed since the Sung
period, namely, that divine retribution works on a family basis but
through a chain of lives.44
Esteem for family has a close relation with the social structure of
China where the individual family could live without relationship to the
prosperity of the nation. For the same reason, patriotism in the political
sense did not develop well in China. Therefore, it was natural that the
Chinese who esteemed only the family and relatives were surpassed in
patriotic feelings by the Japanese who possessed a strong sense of
nationalism in the modern period. At present social circumstances and
living conditions are very different in China.
As a result of the revolutionary success of Communism, the land-
owner class lost its position in society. Therefore, the idea of the family
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has been changed drastically by the Communist Party. Present-day
Chinese Communism has broken family ties; for example, children are
encouraged to inform upon and even to injure their Christian parents.
Religion's Struggle Against the State and Its Defeat
The idea of respecting the Emperor is derived from the traditional
Chinese esteem for order. In China, this idea was established under the
name, "the theory of Heaven's command,"45 in which Heaven was
believed to have given a mandate to the Emperor. "Heaven (t'ien)" was
believed to be the highest of all powers in the universe and to control all
other powers.
The power of the Emperor ranked above various divine beings in
folk-faith, and his authority was a power given by heaven. It was thought
that the duty of the king was to organize a moral system and establish the
social order. "Only the Emperor could discuss moral virtues and organize
the system of the world" (Chung Yung-The Doctrine of the Mean).
Thus, the Emperor was gradually deified, and after the Tang dynasty
(618-906) came to be regarded as the perfect human being. This thought
cannot be found before the Tang dynasty,46 and it greatly influenced
Chinese history subsequently. In China, however, this thought did not
develop into the idea that the Emperor was a living god. His power was
limited by Heaven's command. According to it, the Emperor's throne
was given to him by the command of Heaven, which the people had to
follow. "When the Emperor possessed little virtue and the people did not
obey him, then his throne was given to the person whom the people
would follow." The Chinese believed that this change of the throne was
caused by a change in Heaven's command. In this respect, this theory is
also called "the theory of revolution."47 In this sense, the Emperor of
China was not an absolute autocrat. High officials of the court, whenever
necessary, possessed the right to advise and instruct the Emperor, who
was thought to be a wise man possessing many virtues. And even the
Emperor had to follow and observe the universal moral code. Though the
power of the Emperor was limited by Heaven's command, in this sense,
he often possessed in practice great authority and power. "The Emperor is
the main trunk while the subjects are the branches."48
When Confucianism was ascendant, the Confucian authorities ad-
monished the Emperor, and when Buddhism was ascendant, the Buddhist
authorities did likewise! Hence it was natural that the state and the
Buddhist organization should each seek to become supreme. Govern-
mental power, however, opposed and suppressed Buddhism, the goals
of which were equality and compassion for all human beings.
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The most important study in Chinese ethical thought was the code
for the Emperor's rule. Politics and cosmology were not separate studies
as is shown in the word "T'ien-hsia" which connotes the meaning of the
"universe" as well as of the empire.49
Buddhism was regarded as a teaching from the outer world, since
Buddhism was introduced into China from India. After the Later Han
dynasty, many Buddhist priests came from India or Central Asia to become
teachers of Kings, and eventually the doctrine of Buddhism and other
subjects were taught to the King as well as to state ministers and other
high officials. It was natural for the Chinese, however, to attack this
tendency. According to Taoists, as the Emperor is ranked the highest
with the tao and the t'ien, and priests are the subjects of the Emperor, it
was unreasonable that the Emperor should be taught by a low monk or
to venerate monks; they were expected to respect and pay homage to the
Emperor. This problem was frequently discussed in the years to come.
This problem was of great importance during the time Hui-yiian was
at Lu-shan. He wrote the Sha-men-pu-wang-che-Iun (a treatise on Bud-
dhist priests who need not pay homage to the king) and opposed the
suppression 'of Buddhism by Emperor Huan-hsiian who insisted that
Buddhist priests should attend the Imperial ceremonies together with
other government officials. This was opposed by Hui-yiian who tried to
separate the Buddhist organization from governmental power. He was
able to oppose the Emperor strongly because he was supported by the
aristocrats of South China who cherished his opinion.
However, since the Buddhist organization Hourished, it was not
desirable for the state to have the Buddhists outside of its power. Thus,
this attempt at independence by the Buddhists was suppressed in North
China. Generally speaking, the power of the state was stronger in North
China than in the South. From an early time, many people entered the
priesthood in order to evade military service and payment of taxes. At
times, several hundred young men would enter a temple and together
become monks. The safety and prosperity of the nation was threatened
by the increase of that kind of monk. As a preventive measure, examina-
tions of monks were held often. That is to say, all those who did not
possess a monk's ability were forced to return to secular life. Buddhism
was finally crushed through such practices. Among the many Emperors
who suppressed Buddhism, Emperor Tao-wu of the Northern Wei
dynasty, Emperor Wu of the Northern Chou dynasty, King Wu of the
Tang dynasty and Emperor Shih of the Later Chou dynasty are famous.
In some cases, Buddhism was persecuted as a danger to the state's
economic status in regard to metal currency. A great amount of metal
and other materials was used for Buddhist arts, such as Buddha images,
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vases, and other temple treasures. Consequently, the economic condition
of the nation became steadily worse. The state tried various measures to
meet the situation, none of which were really effective in the long run.50
The real cure was to wipe out the Buddhist organizations. In this way
the Buddhist organizations were gradually taken over and controlled by
the nation. A system of officials to control Buddhism was founded in the
Eastern Chin dynasty (317-419): in every district and prefecture, a
priestly official was appointed as a government officer to control the monk
groups in the respective district or prefecture.
Because Buddhist society was completely controlled by the state,
Buddhists had to compromise with the doctrine that the Emperor was
deified. Fa-kuo, the first priest official in the Northern Wei dynasty
(386-534), regarded Emperor Tao-wu as a living Tathagata and said that
"all monks must respect him."51 Many other people, such as Wei Yuan-
sung and Jen Tao-lin, also stated that the Emperor is a Tathagata or
Bodhisattva. Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty was a faithful Buddhist
and was called the "Bodhisattva King" or "King Bodhisattva" by his sub-
jects, and he was called a "real Buddha" by a foreign country. A religious
ceremony was held on the birthday of the Emperor beginning with the
Tang. In the Sung dynasty, a priest of Zen Buddhism prayed for the
long life of the Emperor, and finally in the Yuan dynasty (1280-1367),
people came to believe that the Emperor must be a Dharmakaya Buddha
(the Buddha of the true body).52
During the Yuan dynasty, all of China was conquered by the military
might of the Yuan. The Zen Buddhist organization, the representative
religion of the time, showed its submissive attitude to the Yuan govern-
ment by announcing: "The most important matter for man is to realize the
principle of Tao. From ancient times, therefore, the excellent Emperors
of China respected the teaching of the Buddha, the saint of the Western
country, and for this reason, we Buddhist priests were treated with
special hospitality by the Emperors. The Yuan government has especially
treated us well. We can endeavor to realize Buddhist truth free from
taxes and other worldly duties. Our obligation to the Emperor is so vast
and great that it cannot be expressed by words. To return this obligation
we will surely endeavor to realize the Buddha-nature and teach the holy
doctrines of Buddhism to the people. We Buddhist priests will never
forget his mercy and do our best."
Furthermore, a religious ceremony to honor and pray for the long
life of the Emperor was provided.53 In this respect, the attitude of Chinese
Buddhists towards state power was exactly the same as the Japanese. The
basic spirit of Buddhism, repeatedly taught since its original form, which
was not to make friends with emperors or kings, was completely ignored.
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More investigations and study are necessary to realize how this idea
of Buddhism changed in the Ming and the Ch'ing dynasties. One fact is
that Buddhism was supported and protected by the state. Until the estab-
lishment of the Republic of China, the authority of the Emperor ranked
higher than the authority of the Buddhist organization. Although there
was no king in the Chung-hua-min-kuo, the authority of religion was
no more influential or powerful in society than it had been in the past.
In present-day Red China, religion is strongly controlled. Various
opinions are expressed by people who have visited Red China recently
concerning the relation between religion and state. Some people report
that religious organizations are protected by the state, while others say
that they are suppressed. What is common to all opinions is the power
and strictness of the state. It is indeed a noteworthy fact that a strong
Communist government was established in China in such a short period.
However, what should be considered is that this was possible partly
because the Chinese have since ancient times traditionally accepted
strong state power.M
Racial Pride and Reverence for Lineage
The Chinese who recognized the reign of an Emperor and glorified
his deification as having the highest ethical significance far above the
value of individual man, insisted on the superiority and the greatness of
their own nation. National pride and haughtiness made the Chinese
discriminate against foreign countries, calling their own land "Chung-
kuo" (the central state, middle kingdom, or the superior country); some
even were willing to believe that other countries belonged to their country
"China."
However, some people among the Chinese did not recognize the
superiority of old Chinese culture, and they did not call their country the
central kingdom. To the Chinese monks who traveled to India to look
for the doctrines of Buddhism, China was far removed from the splendor
of Indian culture. Therefore, these priests use the term "Chung-kuo"
(the Central Country) for India.55 However, with the spread of Buddhism
in China, Chinese Buddhists also came to call their country "Chung-
hua"56 or "Chung-hsia,"51 a tendency naturally connected with their
nationalism. According to the general opinion of the non-Buddhist Chinese,
Buddhism was the teaching of a foreign country and not the thought of
China. They, therefore, thought that China was occupied and governed
by foreign peoples for a long time because of Buddhism. For this reason,
some people like Fu-i58 insisted on the suppression of Buddhists; xeno-
phobia in Europe was no different.
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Nevertheless, the patriotic Chinese had to recognize the worth of
foreign culture to some extent. Therefore, they tried another angle in
order to show the superiority of their culture; namely, they claimed that
all kinds of studies and true teachings were originally founded in China.
When Buddhism was recognized as a teaching which stated truth, the
Chinese showed the superiority of traditional Chinese thought by saying
that "Buddhism was originally taught by the Chinese," instead of
criticizing the doctrine of Buddhism logically. Thus, the Lao-tzu-hua-hu-
ching, which was composed by the Taoists in the Western Chin dynasty,
stated that Lao-tzil went to India and became Sakyamuni in order to
teach the Indians, or again that he was the teacher of Sakyamuni. Further-
more, Fu-i of the Tang dynasty (618-907) insisted that the Chinese
Buddhists surreptitiously borrowed and used the profound terminology
of Lao-tzil and Chuang-tzil in translating and interpreting the Buddhist
siitras.59 In the Eastern Chin dynasty, many siitras showing the relation
between Taoism and Buddhism were composed by the Taoists. The
Buddhists also composed many spurious siitras concerning this problem.
According to the Ch'ing-ching-fa-hsing-ching (The Siitra of Pure Prac-
tice), one of the siitras composed by the Buddhists, Buddha dispatched
three disciples to China in order to teach the Chinese. It further stated that
these three disciples were called "Confucius," "Yen-yuan," and "Lao-tzil"
in China. In these arguments, doctrinal truth was not important; it was
subordinated to the question of priority. The Chinese did not admit that
the Indian religion originated earlier that that of China. Therefore, Chih-i,
who organized a Chinese Buddhist doctrine, adopted the Chinese theory
that saintliness appeared earlier in China than in India. He thought that
even the devil could transform his body into a Buddha image, and
heretics could show divine power; therefore, it was very possible that
Lao-tzil taught the Indians by transforming his body into the Buddha.
He further stated that the doctrines of India were not the real
teaching.60
This way of thinking also influenced the Chinese historians of
natural science. Although scholars of the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1908)
were interested in and accepted the culture of Europe to some extent,
they were still proud of the superiority of Chinese culture in the same
way. They accepted the astronomy of Europe, but they said that,
although European astronomy had become fairly well developed, it
originally came from the astronomy of China, for Chinese historians wrote
that many students of astronomy went to foreign countries in order to
escape war in the Chou dynasty, so that the current astronomy of Europe
was developed by their descendants. 6 !
As the result of this esteem for historical lineage, Chinese Buddhists
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came to insist that all sciences and studies were originally founded and
developed by Buddhism, and that heretical people adopted these sciences
and studies afterwards. Though this way of thinking can also be found
in India, it can be said that it was more prominent in China than in
India.62
Generally speaking, there may be no country which has not at some
time thought that it is the "best" or "supreme" country, so that it is not
surprising that this tendency remains very strong even nowadays among
many Chinese leaders.
The Buddhist ideal of the Bodhisattva could be appropriated with a
Chinese modification; for example, Fan Chung-yen (989-1°52) pictured
a Bodhisattva as "one who is first in worrying about the world's troubles
and last in enjoying its pleasures." Even in modern schools this aphorism
has often served as an essay topic, and has been reiterated by Chinese
communists.63
CHAPTER 24 ESTEEM
FOR NATURE
Conformity to Nature
The tendency of Chinese thought which paid attention only to con-
crete and phenomenal objects and considered that all things could exist
only so far as they were in conformity with man, came to esteem the
principle of Nature which exists in the mind of man. Since ancient
times, the idea of Heaven (T'ien) was conceived by the Chinese in close
relation with man.1 According to a poem composed in the ancient period
of the early Chou dynasty, Heaven created man, and therefore, Heaven,
as the ancestor of man, handed down moral precepts which man had to
observe.2 This idea was inherited by Confucius. He recommended ac-
knowledging the order of Heaven" which meant "one should follow the
morality given to man by Heaven."3 Some modern Europeans were deeply
stirred by the fact that ancient China-where Confucianism was recognized
as the national ideology, and politics was administered by its doctrine-
followed laws based upon natural law. It is an undoubted fact that some
similarities exist between the idea of natural law in Europe and that of
ancient China.
The opinion that "man should follow his true nature" was also stated
by other scholars in ancient China, and yet their meanings were different
from that of Confucius. Mo-tzii taught that the ruler should follow what
Heaven wished and not follow what it did not wish. Lao-tzii insisted that
the correct way of man is to follow the way of Heaven; therefore, it can
be said that the basis of the correct way of man is T'ien-tao (the Way of
Heaven). Yang-chu (who lived between the time of Motzii and Mencius)
stated, "The original nature for man desires only sex and food. Therefore,
it is better for man not to have relations with others but only to satisfy his
OWn desires." "It is a natural law that man does what he wants."4 Mencius
taught that "the true character of man is good; however, the evil mind
arises by the temptation of material desires. Therefore, man should
cultivate his mind himself and exhibit his own true character." An excep-
tion to Chinese thought was Hsiin-tzu, who maintained that the true
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character of man tends to evil. Nevertheless, he recognized the possibilities
in man of becoming good. Chuang-tzii taught that man should perfect
his true character, and his followers came to teach the theory that "man
should return to his true character." In the San-kuo dynasty, Wang-pi
(226-249) also taught the "return to the true character."5 This thought
developed greatly in the Sung philosophy where the central theme was
the concept of man's true character. The traditional current of thought in
Chinese history is "to return to the true and natural character of man."
Buddhism was also influenced by this current of thought. Buddhists
did not look for truth in the phenomenal world but explored the inner
world by concentration of mind. In Zen Buddhism, Chinese traditional
thought is expressed in a peculiarly Chinese way: "If one realizes the
truth that all existences are the same, he immediately returns to his true
nature."6 Both illusion and enlightenment of man were understood to be
derived from the natural character of man. "The mind is the ground and
nature is the king. Where there is nature there is the king, and where
there is no nature, there is no king. Where there is nature, there are the
body and mind. Where no nature exists, there is neither body nor mind.
Buddha is created by self-nature; therefore, one must not look for the
Buddha through the body. If self-nature is an illusion, then the Buddha
is namely a sentient being. If self-nature is enlightenment, then the
sentient being is namely the Buddha."1 There was, in India, no such idea of
self-nature as the principle which maintains the body and mind as
ignorant or enlightened. Some Chinese scholars have recognized a Taoist
influence in this conception of self-nature.8 However, this concept could
have appeared from the traditional ideas of the Chinese.
Medieval Confucians said that the whole of nature is to be found in
anyone item, which theory seems to have originally been due to the
influence of Buddhist philosophy, especially the Hua-yuen school. So
Wang Yang-ming undertook to investigate a bamboo tree. After studying
it in meditation for a week, with no results, he gave it up completely.
Chinese Pure Land teachings also adopted the ideas of Taoism.
Chinese Buddhists had to pass through a process of complicated thought
before they acknowledged a Chinese naturalism. In this connection,
Chi-tsang reasoned as follows: 9 Chinese philosophical thought, especially
in Lao-tzii and Chuang-tzii, regarded existence as phenomena, and
voidness as a substance other than existence. Therefore, voidness was not
identifiable with existence. Buddhism, on the contrary, taught that
phenomena are actually the manifestation of the Absolute.tO Therefore,
the absolute significance of the phenomenal world cannot be recognized
in actual life in the philosophy of Lao-tzii and Chuang-tzii. In Buddhism,
however, one can accept this phenomenal world as absolute states of
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existence, because actual life in this world is identical with absolute
exi5tence.11
Although this criticism by Chi-tsang may not be correct, at least he
tried to recognize a significance in life in this world. T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen
sects further expanded on this thought. According to the T'ien-t'ai sect,
appearance and actuality are not different kinds of substances. Appear-
ances are identical with reality. Therefore, they taught that "each
existence in this world is the middle way." Each of the phenomenal forms
of this world is a form of absolute existence. The Hua-yen sect developed
this thought even further. That is to say, the theory of "mutual penetra-
tion and identification of all things with one another" is taught by this
sect. The supreme meaning emerges when all phenomena are perfectly
identified by their harmonious interrelationships. Therefore, nothing exists
outside of phenomena and their diverse forms of manifestation.
As a result, the actual natural world was acknowledged as absolute
existence. In Zen B'uddhism, the following answers were given to the
question "What is absolute existence?" "It is the cypress tree in the
garden" or "It is three pounds of hemp." It is also seen in Su Tung-p'o's
poem: "The sound of the stream is the teaching or sermon of the Buddha,
and the color of the mountain is the pure and True Body (Dharmakaya)
of the Buddha." This naturalistic tendency came to the conclusion that
each one of the existences of this world is, just as they appear, the
manifestation of truth.
Zen monks, of course, opposed and rejected mere superficial natural-
ism. For example, Hui-hai stated: "Ignorant people do not realize the
fact that the True Body (Dharmakiiya) manifests its form in accordance
with the object although it does not possess any form originally. Therefore,
they say that the green bamboo tree is none other than the True Body
(Dharmakaya) and the chrysanthemum is identical with Prajna (wis-
dom).12 If the chrysanthemum is wisdom, then wisdom is the same as an
insentient existence. If the green bamboo is the True Body (Dharmakiiya),
then the True Body is the same as the grass or the tree. If so, eating the
bamboo-shoot carries the meaning of eating the True Body. Therefore,
it is unworthy to think of such things."13
Nevertheless, the Chinese generally accepted the view that nature is
the absolute. Finally, the T'ien-t'ai sect taught the theory that "all
existences and even grass, trees, and earth can attain Buddhahood." That
is to say, even physical matter existing in nature can realize enlightenment
and become Buddha. Generally speaking, the tendency was to regard
nature as the most beautiful and highest existence, with man on an
equal plane. These were the tendencies that influenced Buddhist thought
in the above manner.
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Therefore, the Chinese Buddhists (especially Zen monks) tried to
seek absolute significance in everyday life. "Those who wish to attain the
state of the One Vehicle (Ekayana) must not defile the six sensual objects
(form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and ideas). If one does not defile the
six sensual objects~ then he is enlightened."B In other words, everyday life,
just as it is, is identical wtih enlightenment. This thought is clearly found
in the following questions and answers: "Chao-chou asked, What is Tao?'
His master Nan-ch'iian answered, 'The mind in everyday life is Tao.' "15
"The priest asked, What is the mind in everyday life?' His master
answered, 'It is to sleep whenever necessary and to sit whenever necssary.'
The priest said, 'I do not understand you.' Then the master said, 'It is to
be cool when it is hot and warm when it is cold.' "16
The state of enlightenment is therefore none other than this actual
world. A poem composed by Su-tung-p'o states that "Rain is falling at
Mt. Lu and the tides are full at Che-chiang bay."17 In other words there
is a unity in nature to be enjoyed. In China many other poems exist which
express nature as it is. "The moon shines and the wind blows. What shall
I do in this long and beautiful night?"18 "Various flowers bloom in the
spring, the moon shines in autumn, cool wind blows in summer and
snow falls in winter. How nice and pleasant the seasons are for men!"19
"Everyday is a pleasant and good day for man."20
The state of enlightenment seems externally to be indistinguishable
from a state of ignorance. In the following questions and answers, this is
shown very clearly and impressively.
A PRIEST: 'What is Buddha?"
CHAD-CHOU: "He is at Buddha's hall."
A PRIEST: "The Buddha at Buddha's hall is the Buddha image made
of mud."
CHAD-CHOU: "Yes, you are right."
A PRIEST: "Then what is the true Buddha?"
CHAO-CHOU: "He is at Buddha's hall."21
While the external appearance is not different in the states before and
after enlightenment, the spiritual condition must be completely different
from the state before enlightenment. When Chih-hsien was asked 'What
is enlightenment?" he answered, "It is the flute behind the dead tree" or
"It is the eyes behind a skeleton."22 These things are not lifeless. Those
who have realized truth can manifest the absolute light in things which
seem unworthy or meaningless.23 Zen monks, for example, expressed the
state of enlightenment poetically by impressive examples.
As the result of the tendency to regard nature or actuality as absolute
existence, the Chinese came to adopt the idea of optimism. Thus, they
regarded this world as a good place in which to live; they finally came to
<>-
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believe that perfect existence must exist in this world. Here, the idea of
the "Sheng-jen" (sage) was established. He was the perfect person such as
the Chou King or Confucius. The sage is not a god but a man. However,
he is in principle the ideal. In art, Wang I-chih was called "the sage of
writing" and Tu Fu "the sage of poetry." They were regarded as the
perfect models of principle in art.24 In the idea of wu (nothingness) of
the Wei and Chin dynasties, the concept of the creator or the absolute
was amalgamated with the concept of the sage or the perfect human
being. In this theory of nothingness, the perfect human being realizes
the principle of nothingness and is able to manifest every phenomenon
and give the correct way of life to every person.25
This way of thinking which insisted on perfect existence in this
world established the thought that the perfect life existed in the past.
That is to say, the Chinese made what occurred in the past the rule for
governing present life. As the result, the Chinese came naturally to esteem
the life in the past more highly than the life in the present. The thought
which acknowledged nature's actuality was also one of the foundations
for the establishment of Chinese classicism, although it was not the
sufficient condition for it.
The more important fact is that the long history of China has been
comparatively peaceful because the Chinese identified nature with man.
Undoubtedly there were wars in China. However, Derk Bodde, an
American sinologue, states that the typical hero in Chinese literature
was the poor but virtuous scholar. The military genius, on the other hand,
is praised and appreciated in Western literature much more than in
Chinese literature, which seldom praised military heroes. The Chinese
attitude is shown in the following saying: "Good iron cannot be a nail
and the good man does not become a military man."26 The harmony of
all existences is necessary in order to harmonize with nature and live in
peace. Thus, they asserted the idea of "moderation." As the Chinese
regarded man as a part of nature or the universe, they did not regard
nature as opposed to man. Since they seldom thought nature needed to be
overcome by experimental manipulation in order to master her ways or
laws, natural science did not develop quickly in China. This fact is perhaps
the chief reason why China lagged behind other countries in the modern
world. Leaders of Red China recognize this fact and are trying to improve
and develop natural science.
Relationship of Interaction between Heaven and Man
In connection with their idea of nature, the Chinese elaborated an
organic theory of a "reciprocal relationship between Heaven and man."
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In the period of the Chan-kuo (Warring States period, 480-222 B.C.),
"scholars of the positive and negative principle" advocated a kind of nature
worship which was carried into the Early Han period. According to this
principle, natural phenomena and man-made institutions are mutually
interrelated, and therefore, if the King, who was the representative of
man, governed the country well, then the phenomena of nature, such as
weather, wind, and rain would be favorable to man. If the reign of the
King was poor, on the other hand, then natural calamities would arise.
This idea was most strongly stressed by Tung Chung-shu (c. 179-C. 104
B.C.) of the Early Han dynasty, who thought that disasters were sent from
Heaven in order to admonish the King. The thought of Ko-ming (revolu-
tion) which means, literally, "to cut off (or take away) the mandate of
Heaven from some particular ruler" played a role in checking or correcting
the tyranny of autocrats.
This reciprocity between Heaven and man influenced even Chinese
historians who have been well known for their accuracy in recording
historical events. For example, all accounts of Confucius known to us date
his birth in the year 551 B.C., whereas it actually occurred in the year 552
B.C. The reason why the date was falsified by a year is revealing. An eclipse
of the sun had always been considered in China, during the last two
millennia and more, as a nefas event, indicating the anger of the super-
natural powers, especially of the supreme Chinese God, Heaven or Tien,
against some human wrong-doing. Hence, it was considered impossible
that a solar eclipse could have occurred in connection with the birth of
Confucius, who was early accepted as the greatest of all sages.27
This thought was also influential in later periods in China. Buddhism
also had siitras which stated the theory of disaster and which were highly
regarded by the Chinese. A typical example of these siitras is the Chin-
kuang-ming (Golden Splendor) siitra, which states in detail, in the 13th
chapter, that if the King does not protect the dharma well, a terrible
calamity will arise. That is to say, as the result of maladministration on the
part of the Emperor, falsehood and struggle will increase in his country,
and the ministers and subjects will rise against him. Furthermore, the
deities will become angry; wars will break out; the enemy will overrun the
country; family members will fight each other; nothing will be pleasant or
comfortable for man. Natural phenomena will at the same time become
worse.28 Living beings will lack rigor, plagues will arise, and pestilence will
sweep the land. Therefore, the Emperor should attempt his best in govern-
ing the country by the dharma. Now this siitra is unusual as Buddhist
siitras seldom teach the theory that "disasters arise through poor govern-
ment by the King." Yet the Chinese Buddhists highly esteemed this theory
in this siitra, as can be seen by the fact that five different Chinese transla-
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tions as well as many commentaries on this sutra were composed in China.
Naturalized Buddhist monks from India propagated Buddhism in
conformity with this organismic way of Chinese thinking. GUJ)avarman,
for example, taught Buddhism to Emperor Wen of the Sung dynasty in the
following way: "The four seas are your land and all existences are your
subjects. One pleasant word and all your subjects are happy. One act in a
good rule brings harmony to the people. If you only punish wrong-doers
without killing and do not impose heavy taxes, then nature will harmonize
with man, and fruits and crops will ripen we11."29
More investigation is necessary to know how long this organic form of
ethical thought continued in China. It can, however, be safely said that
this thought of reciprocity between Heaven and human deeds is not an
exclusive characteristic of Chinese ways of thinking. It was taught not only
in Buddhism but also in Indian and other ethical systems that good results
generally spring from good deeds and evil comes from evil deeds. Chinese
Pure Land teachings also explained this ethical theory in terms of the
relationship of reciprocity between Heaven and man.
CHAPTER 25 RECONCILING AND
HARMONIZING TENDENCIES
The Absolute Character of Existence
If the reality of all natural phenomena is absolutely upheld, then
nothing imperfect can be denied existence; this idea persisted from
ancient times in China. For the Chinese, the five Confucian classics are the
source of ethics. They further believed that the other classics or books are
also a partial revelation of the same perfect wisdom. The Chinese believed
that not only can perfection exist in this world but other existences cannot
be denied in spite of the fact that they are not perfect. Thus, not even a
single existence is denied, and there is perfect existence which must be
absolutelyafhrmed.1
The Chinese lacked, therefore, the idea of absolute evil. Every form of
human life was acknowledged as existing for some reason. It is natural that
the Chinese did not explain the origin of evil because they lacked the idea
of absolute evi1.2
Chinese Buddhism was also influenced by this way of thinking, and
particularly in the doctrine of the "mutual penetration of the ten worlds" of
the T'ien-t'ai sect. These are the worlds of hell, hungry ghosts, beasts,
fighting demons (Asura) , man, heaven, Sravaka, Pratyekabuddha,
Bodhisattva, and Buddha. The first six worlds belong to the illusory world
and the last four to the enlightened world. Each one of these ten worlds
mutually possesses all the characters of the ten worlds. Therefore, Bud-
dhahood is possible for beings in hell, while at the same time the Buddha
possesses the possibility of going into the illusory world. In such a world,
there is neither an absolutely evil person nor an absolutely good person.
There are neither permanent rewards nor retributions.3
In Chinese Zen Buddhism, this thought is explained very clearly.
"The pure-nature of thusness (tathatii) is the actual Buddha; evil thoughts
and the three kinds of defilement are the actual demons. Those who possess
evil thoughts are the demons and those who have right thoughts are
Buddhas. Where there are the three kinds of defilement originating from
various evil thoughts, there is the king of the demons. On the contrary,
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where there is right thought, the demon changes its fonn and can attain
Buddhahood."4 Here, the demon is identical with the Buddha.
No man is absolutely evil, and everyone has the possibility of being
saved. This thought greatly influenced the Pure Land teachings introduced
from India. The eighteenth Vow of AmWiyus-Buddha, one which is so
highly esteemed in Japanese Pure Land teachings, is as follows: "If the
beings of the ten quarters-when I have attained Enlightenment (Bodhi)-
blissfully trust in me with the most sincere mind, wish to be born in my
country, and chant the name of Buddha ten times, but are not so born, may
I never obtain the State of Enlightenment. Excluded, however, are those
who have committed the Five Deadly Sins and who have abused the True
dharma."
The Chinese could not understand the last part of this Vow, because
they believed that all evil persons could be saved by Amitayus-Buddha.
The Five Deadly Sins are to kill one's own father, to kill one's own mother,
to kill an Arhat (one who has attained enlightenment), to disturb the
harmony of the Buddhist organization, and to harm Buddha's person. Shan-
tao (613-681) explained the Vow as follows: "The reason why those who
committed the five deadly sins or abused the dharma are excluded in
Amitayus-Buddha's vow is because these two transgressions are very
heavy sins and if one performs them, he will surely be born in the lowest
hell and stay there for a long period of time. Therefore, T athagata, the
Perfect One, mentioned these words as a means of stopping one from
committing these sins but he did not mean that he does not save evil men."
He further explained why both good and evil men can be born in the
Pure Land as follows: 'The Amitayus-Buddha, in compassion, took this
Vow before the attainment of Buddhahood. And it is by the power of
this Vow that the Five Deadly Sins and Ten Evil Deeds are cut. Therefore,
those who have committed these sins can also be born in the Pure Land.
Even the Icchantika (one who has no hope of being saved) who has
abused the true dharma can be born in the Pure Land if he will turn his
efforts toward the Pure Land."5
Religious wars or struggles over ideology, which frequently arose in
Europe, did not arise in China. It is true that Buddhism was frequently
suppressed, not because of Buddhist doctrine, but because the Buddhist
organization menaced and weakened the nation's power politically and
economically. While in Mohammedan countries fighting sometimes started
On account of violations of such religious customs as eating pork, religious
wars never arose in China. The emperors of China and India were similar
in that they both did not regard religious differences a justification for
war.
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Acknowledgment of All Heretical Doctrines
The Chinese acknowledged the individual significance not only of
every human being but also of each kind of philosophy as a thought
possessing some degree of truth. This tolerant leniency, however, did not
exist in the thought of ancient China-Confucius (or his later disciples)
stated that "it is harmful to study heretical thoughts."6 Commoners, how-
ever, thought that all writings as well as the five classics revealed truth
more or less, even though they were not perfect. Study was highly esteemed
in China, and it became necessary to read the classics in order to become a
more perfect man.7
Foreign thought would not be excluded so long as the Chinese ac-
knowledged some truth in all writings. It was not strange, therefore, that
the Buddhism which was introduced into China as one great thought
system was discussed and admired by the Chinese and began gradually and
slowly to permeate their thought. The Chinese in the medieval period did
not feel any contradiction in the fact that they followed Buddhism and also
esteemed die Confucian classics as manifestations of truth at the same
time.
From the very beginning, Buddhist thought was understood by the
Chinese in a reconciling and harmonizing way. The method used first was
"Ka Yi" which means to explain the meaning of Buddhist terms by analo-
gies with the terms of another philosophy. That is to say, the doctrines of
Buddhism were explained by the doctrinal writings of the Chinese philoso-
phers. In the first stage of Chinese Buddhism, -piiramitii-sutras of the Prajiiii
were translated and studied. As there were many similar points between
the thought of the Prajiiiipiiramitii (Wisdom)-sutras and the thought of
Lao-tzi1 and Chuang-tzi1, Buddhist scholars explained the thought of the
Prajiiiipiiramitii-sutras in conformity with these Chinese philosophies. They
regarded the idea of K'ung (non-substantiality) of the Prajfziipiiramitii-
sutras· and the idea of Wu (nothingness) of the Laa-tzu and the Chuang-
tzu as the same. Scholars prior to Tao-an understood Buddhism through
this interpretative method of analogy.
A few Buddhist scholars started to oppose this method of interpreta-
tion. Chi-tsang, for example, rejected the interpretations made by followers
of Lao-tzi1 and Chuang-tzi1 as different from Buddhism. According to his
opinion, the views of Lao-tzi1 and Chuang-tzi1 were merely heretical phi-
losophies similar to the heretical thoughts which confronted Buddhism in
India.s Many times problems of practical morality were the issue between
Confucianism and Buddhism, and gave rise to great disputes.
Chi-tsang and others, however, could not change the traditional mode
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of Chinese thought. A compromise between the theory of Confucianism
and Buddhism was possible because both aimed at the same goal. This
thought can be recognized in the Yu-tao-Zun of Sun-ch'o (Eastern Chin
dynasty) and Chia-hsun of Yen-chih-t'ui (531-591, Northern Ch'i
dynasty). Chih-i acknowledged the authority and significance of Confu-
cianism and identified the five permanent morals of Confucianism with the
five precepts of Buddhism. He also recognized a corresponding relationship
between the five precepts of Buddhism and the five sacred classics of
Confucianism.9 Again, he compared the three practices of Buddhism,
viz. SiZa (precepts), Samiidhi (meditation), and Prajiiii (wisdom) with the
virtues of Confucianism.lo
The similarity of Buddhism with Taoism was noted along with that
between Confucianism and Buddhism. In 467 A.D. during the Liu Sung
dynasty (420-478), when Ku-huan wrote a book called "I-hsia-Zun" in
which he rejected Buddhism as Taoistic, many people opposed his opinion
and insisted that Buddhism and Taoism were the same.l1 Chang-jung, a
Taoist in the Southern Ch'i dynasty, is said to have passed away, with the
Lao-ching and Lao-tzu in one hand and the Chinese version of the Wisdom
Siitra (Prajiiiipiiramitii-st"itra) and the Lotus Siitra (Saddharma-pu1;l4arika-
siitra) in the other hand, on his deathbed.
A syncretism of three religions, in which Buddhism was identified
with Confucianism and Taoism, finally arose from these two relations.
This theory was stated by the Buddhists in the Tang dynasty. Tsung-
mi for example declared: "Confucius, Lao-tzii, and Sakyamuni all attained
sainthood. They preached their doctrines in different ways in accordance
with the time and place. However, they mutually helped and benefitted
the people by their teachings." He stated, however, that Confucianism and
Taoism must ultimately be rejected as they were merely expedient teach-
ings.12 Other Zen monks, however, at that time said these three religions
were the same. When one asked whether these three religions were the
same or differ~nt teachings, the master answered: "For those of great
wisdom, they are the same. On the other hand, for those with little capacity
they are different. Enlightenment and illusion depends solely on the ca-
pacity of man and not on the difference of teachings."13 With this idea,
Buddhists completely abandoned the idea of the superiority of Buddhism.
In the Five dynasties (9°7-960) and the Sung dynasty (960-1126),
this theory that the three religions were the same was widely believed and
supported by the general public. Many scholars of the three religions also
backed this theory. Many Zen monks such as Chih-yiian, Ch'i-sung, Tsung-
kao, and Shih-fan also believed in it.14 In the Ming dynasty, many monks
asserted the syncretism of Confucianism and Buddhism. Furthermore,
when Mohammedanism was introduced in the Yuan dynasty, Chinese
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Mohammedans identified the God of Allah with the Heaven of Confu-
cianism.Is
It was possible to advance such a theory because the Chinese regarded
the original tao or principle of the Universe as one able to appear in this
world in different forms, such as Buddhism and Confucianism. Therefore,
they said that "Buddhism and Confucianism are not two different teach-
ings; their origin is the same though their development is different."16
Hui-lien (1°°9-1°9°) said: "The four seasons of Heaven nourish and
further the growth of all things. In the same way the teachings of the Sages
perfect and teach those under the heavens. However, the original principle
or ultimate truth of these teachings is only one."17 Ch'i-ch'ung (10°7-1°72)
also stated "All teachings of saints are good. All the ways taught by saints
are right.... The good and right teaching is not only Buddhism, not
only Confucianism, not only this, not only that. Buddhism and Confu-
cianism are only offshoots of the original truth."18 That is to say that every
thought-system possesses some significance. "In olden times, there were
many holy saints such as Buddha, Confucius, and others. Although their
teachings differed, the basic doctrine was the same. They all desired to
teach people that 'man should do good.' However, this was taught in
different ways. . . . The teaching of Confucianism is necessary to this
world, as are also the other religions, and, therefore, Buddhism is also
necessary. If one teaching vanishes, then the evil of this world will surely
increase."19 Li P'ing-shan, a Confucian scholar, also acknowledged the
significance of other philosophies.20
Such being the case, both Buddhists and Confucianists recognized the
same significance in other thought-systems as existed in their own thought-
system. Of course, much opposition existed to this way of thinking. It,
however, lingered on and was supported by people for a long time.
The above may not be a peculiarly Chinese feature. In Europe, too,
there was the belief that all religions are the same, but among its diverse
sects there was much opposition to this belief. However, in China there has
been less opposition, although this may be just a difference of degree;
however, it must be remembered that with regard to religion the Chinese
have enjoyed freedom of belief toa very great extent. "While in traditional
China the Chinese has had no personal choice in marriage, he has enjoyed
absolute freedom in the choice of religion."21
Syncretism within Buddhism
Since the significance of all philosophical thoughts was recognized,
various thoughts within a certain religion had to be harmonized. The
doctrinal classification of all Buddhism by the Chinese must be considered
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in the light of how the different thoughts within Buddhism were regarded
and harmonized.
This classification went through a complicated process of development,
but what was common to all of them was the idea of expediency, which the
Indians had used when different opinions existed within the same religious
scripture. It can therefore be said that classification of doctrines originated
from the Indian way of thinking. Such being the case, this thought also
possessed the characteristics of the Indian conception of the world. For
example, history is almost completely ignored. In China, however, only
the doctrines within Buddhism were harmonized, and all other doctrines
ignored. This syncretic attitude is common to all sects such as the T'ien-
t'ai, Hua-yen, San-lun, and Fa-hsiang schools.
(It is true that the San-lun sect referred to various philosophies other
than Buddhism, such as Confucianism and Taoism, because the funda-
mental standpoint of this sect is "the refutation of erroneous views and the
elucidation of right views." However, these thoughts were only refuted as
erroneous views and not acknowledged as the right views.)
The Chinese did not like to accept a belief based on only one
doctrine. Therefore, the scholars' task was to criticize and classify the
varieties of different thoughts within Buddhism in a harmonious arrange-
ment. Since Buddhists, in general, did not like to bother with a complicated
classification, they threw logic aside to acknowledge all sorts of thought,
and thus effect an easy compromise. One example of this electicism is the
theory of the "oneness of all Buddhist sects" as advocated by Tsung-
mi. He deplored the fact that Buddhists insisted on the superiority of their
own sect while refuting the doctrine of others,22 and said it was useless to
quarrel over the respective doctrines of the Buddhist sects. The supreme
consideration, he further emphasized, was the unity of truth. "The Su-
preme principle is one and not two. It is unreasonable, therefore, that two
types of truth should exist. The highest principle and its meaning also is
not one-sided. One should not understand only a part of truth. Therefore,
all Buddhist doctrines should be unified into one in order to have a perfect
teaching."23 He stated this in spite of the fact that he classified Buddhist
sects into doctrinal and practical ones, and further divided them into three
kinds of teachings.24 All doctrines ultimately had to lead to the one truth.25
Then, how were the disputes and oppositions of Buddhist scholars with
one another to be reconciled in his theory? According to his opinion,
disputes were not refutations but the positing of arguments on both sides,
because new standpoints were established by the mutual refutation of the
prejudices of each side.26 That is to say, he wanted to acknowledge a new
philosophy founded on the conclusions of the arguments among the phi-
losophers.21
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The way of thinking which acknowledges a significance in all Bud-
dhist doctrines is especially striking in Zen Buddhism. For example,28
someone asked Hui-hai: "Who is the superior? The master of precepts, the
master of meditation, or the master of doctrine?" He answered: "Although
the methods of presentation in accordance with ability lead to superiority
in one of the three learnings, they are all ultimately one." The Zen sect,
according to its followers, is not just another sect of Buddhism. "The sect
founded by Bodhidharma is the essence of Buddhism."29 Zen (meditation)
is the same as the body of Buddha while it is also the essence of all
meditations (Samadhis).30 Its doctrine, therefore, neither contradicts nor
opposes doctrines of other sects. One should not be overly attached to one
doctrine. "One cannot understand by being confined to only one teaching,
one ability, or one sentence, because the Buddha never taught any fixed
doctrine...."31 "It is not difficult to realize the supreme enlightenment.
One must not, however, select a fixed doctrine. If one neither likes nor
dislikes a set doctrine, then enlightenment can easily be attained."32
Such eclecticism or syncretism can also be found in other sects. In the
Sung dyna~ty, nobody adhered solely to the Pure Land teaching. The most
famous Pure Land followers belonged to the T'ien-t'ai, Vinaya, and Zen
sects. Though the Pure Land teaching especially prospered in the T'ien-
t'ai sect, with the rise of the Zen sect many priests also practiced both Zen
and the Pure Land practice. Yiin-ch'i-chu-hung (1535-1615 A.D.), a repre-
sentative Buddhist of the Ming dynasty, revived the precepts to harmonize
with the Zen practice and the Pure Land practice of calling the name of
Amitayus-Buddha.
The Lotus Siitra (Saddharma-pu1,l4arika-sutra) was highly esteemed
as king of all siitras in China. It seems that this fact also was based upon a
syncretic way of thinking.33 One of the main thoughts in this siitra is its
acknowledgment of the enlightenment of those who practiced Hlnayana.
Even Devadatta, who intended to destroy the Buddhist organization, and a
female dragon become enlightened in this siitra. This spirit of tolerance
and harmony nicely suited the syncretic tendency of Chinese thought.
Chinese Characteristics of Reconciling and Harmonizing
Although it seems that this way of Chinese thinking is very similar to
that of the Indians, who acknowledged the authority of various thoughts in
a tolerant and harmony-seeking spirit, a great difference exists between
them. Most Indians acknowledged the significance of various religions and
philosophies and understood them as partial manifestations of an absolute
truth. Further, they considered that absolute truth was to transcend and at
the same time include all religions and philosophies. They did not main-
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tain, however, that the doctrines of these religions and philosophies could
be matched and were mutually alike. The Chinese, on the contrary, simply
kept asserting that the doctrines were the same. In this regard the Tien-
t'ai sect's influence was especially decisive. "The syncretism of this sect,
which sought to harmonize sectarian divisions within the faith by treating
them not as mutually exclusive but as forming a hierarchy of 'levels,'
prepared the way for finding the truths of Buddhist metaphysics in Confu-
cian texts as well. Several of the early Tang Nee-Confucians were lay
followers of this sect, and the influence of its metaphysics can be seen in
their writings."34
Yen-chih-t'ui of the Northern Chai dynasty stated that the five perma-
nent moral rules of Confucianism were the same as the five precepts of
Buddhism. In the Sung dynasty as well, Ch'i-sung interpreted the ten good
virtues and five precepts of Buddhism as identical with the five permanent
moral rules and the idea of benevolence and justice of Confucianism.3s
Yang-kuei-shan and Hsieh-shang-ts'ai asserted the correspondence between
each idea of Buddhism and each idea of Confucianism. According to their
opinion, Buddhism and Confucianism were exactly the same teaching.
Therefore, the founders of both teachings were the same. "The Duke of
Chou and K'ung-fu-tzu are identical with the Buddha, and the Buddha is
identical with the Duke of Chou and K'ung-fu-tzu at the same time....
The term Buddha is Sanskrit while the Chinese use Chiieh (enlighten-
ment). Both connote the meaning of realization of truth...."36 The same
statements are asserted about the oneness of Buddhism and Taoism.
"Taoism is identical with Buddhism and Buddhism identical with Taoism
at the same time. . . ."31 What stands out in this sort of reasoning is a
certain sort of utilitarianism and easy compromise, with cold logical con-
sideration completely abandoned.
When the Chinese explained these theories of oneness, they used
pictorial or intuitive similes. For example, they explained by the following
simile that the substance of both Buddhism and Taoism was the same:
"Once, a duck was flying in the sky. Someone saw it and said that it was a
pigeon, while another said it was a mandarin. A duck is always a duck;
however, only men distinguish things from each other."3S
Such intuitive imagery always seems to satisfy the Chinese. Hui-
sung (1°°7-1°72) in his poem said, "Buddhism and Confucianism are like
the difference between a fist and the palm. There is no difference in the
respect that both the palm and the fist are the hand."39 When Li Shih-
Ch'ien was asked whether Buddhism, Confucianism, or Taoism was the
superior teaching, he answered "Buddhism is the sun, Taoism the moon,
and Confucianism the five stars." The questioner could not ask any more.40
Nakamoto Tominaga (1715-1746) of Japan criticized this answer by say-
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ing: "His answer seemed excellent to the people of that time. However, this
answer is meaningless. I myself cannot understand what it means. There-
fore, this is not a wise and excellent answer."41 As he pointed out, Li
Shih-ch'ien's answer was not logical and yet the Chinese were satisfied. As
the result of the tendency, these three teachings were harmonized without
deep logical reflection.
Attempts were made to recognize one doctrine as the fundamental
teaching by reinterpreting each of them, but then basic differences among
the philosophical systems were overlooked. What was emphasized was
which one was older historically, with the idea that anything older is more
correct. For example, Taoists composed spurious ancient classics, such as
Lao-tzu-hua-hu-ching (Siitra on the Transmigration of Lao Tzii) and Lao-
tzu-hsi-sheng-ching (Siitra on the Western Travel of Lao Tzii) , which
stated that Sakyamuni was an incarnation of Lao-tzii. On the other hand,
Buddhists also composed spurious siitras such as Ch'ing-ching-fa-hsing-
ching (Slitra on the Advance of Buddhist Teachings) in which Sakyamuni
dispatched three disciples, K'ung-fu-tzu (Confucius), Yen-huei, and Lao-
tzu, to China to teach people.42 The origins or dates of these philosophies
were discus'sed in these cases, without any opinions as to whether any of
them was more fundamental doctrinally than any other.
Although the Chinese vaguely pointed to the one way as the basis of
the three religions, there were no deep metaphysical connotations. How-
ever, some Buddhists explained tao by a theory of two-fold truth which
explained that the highest tao is real truth and various others are worldly
manifestations of truth.43 Or again they explained tao by a socially expedi-
ent theory44 just as in the Lotus Siitra. Again Buddhism was thought to be
a metaphysical explanation, while Confucianism was a practical or secular
religious teaching.45
The Chinese regarded these three religions not as different in teach-
ings or thought but in ideological influence. They, therefore, did not deal
with various types of thought, but with the influential power of the three
religions in their society. Philosophical thoughts unpopular to the Chinese
society or Indian ideas stated frequently in Buddhist siitras were not
discussed in spite of the fact they were known. Furthermore, in some cases,
Indian philosophy was looked down upon. A typical example of the non-
logical and political compromise tendency of the Chinese Buddhists can be
found in the following sentences of Chih-i: "When the people follow the
unenlightened currents of thought, evil teachings such as Sarhkhya,
Vaise~ika, and the 95 others arise. Again, good teachings, such as the
positive-negative theory, the theory of divination, the study of the five
classics, and other excellent teachings appear in accordance with the purity
of the mind."46 Why are the metaphysics of the Sarhkhya and the natural
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philosophy of the Vaise~ika evil teachings?47 Why are superstitions such as
the theory of positive-negative and the theory of divination good teachings?
The discrimination here between good and evil is not based upon any
logical standard but solely upon one that is political and social. Therefore,
very little philosophical criticism exists in such thought, compromising as it
does with social and political powers.
Thus, it is clear that the Chinese tried to solve the problem concerning
various philosophies in a frame of mind restrained by powerful conven-
tional ideas of society. They therefore did not consider this problem of
one truth from a universal standpoint, unlike the Indians who reflected on
various types of philosophies with respect to their claims to truth, disputing
their arguments but ignoring their practical social and political side. Mate-
rialism did not possess enough weight to become a powerful philosophical
school in India. Buddhism disappeared in the II th century in India.
Nevertheless, Indian scholars with a cosmopolitan and cosmic outlook48
always referred to it. In this respect, a great difference can be recognized
between the Indian way of thinking and that of the Chinese. The study of
world-concepts (Weltanschauungslehre) was not well established in China
with the exception of the classification of doctrines that was more or less
eclectic in character.
This arbitrary syncretism had a great influence on the common people,
and is one of the striking characteristics of the modern Chinese religions.
Typical of this compromising and syncretic attitude is that seen in a Taoist
temple where many images of various deities, including a central image of
Lao-tzii, are enshrined. A Taoistic classic mentions that Siikyamuni, Lao-
tzu, Christ, Mohammed, and Hsiang-t'o were fellow-deities; consequently,
a follower of any religion can become a Taoist without conversion. Among
the various deities revered in a Taoist temple are St. John of Christianity,
Chu-ko-wu-hou and Yiieh-fej,49 images of AvalokiteSvara, and Siikyamuni,
the Prajiiii-piiramitii-hrdaya.siitra (Wisdom of the Heart Siitra), and Kao-
shih-ktum-yin-ching (a Goddess of Mercy Siitra). Taoists wrote three short
classics to teach the common people, namely, the T'ai-shang-kan-ying-
p'ien, Wen-ch'ang-ti-chun-yin-chih-wen, and Kuan-sheng-ti-chun-chueh-
shih-chen-ching. The three are based upon the idea of retribution and
teach that "one must not perform evil, but do good," which if followed
would result in one's becoming either a heavenly superhuman being or an
earthly superhuman being. This Taoist doctrine came from the ethical
theory of Buddhism.
The amalgamation of Buddhism and Taoism started in the period of
the Six Dynasties (222-589) and became very prominent in and after the
Ch'ing dynasty. In famous large Buddhist temples today, Kuan-ti (a god of
War)"o is enshrined in most cases, with divination and fortune-telling
"".
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performed. Such being the case, modern Chinese do not discriminate
between Buddhism and Taoism.
The compromising and syncretic tendency is especially remarkable in
the Buddhist faith of present-day Chinese. For example, in Peking, a
powerful layman, who is a Pure Land devotee, enshrines not only various
images of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in his place of worship, but Tibetan
Buddha images as well. No standard or fixed pattern of these images existsj
for this layman, these images are neither objets d'art nor curios, but objects
of worship to which he pays reverence and homage. In Japan, the object of
worship varies according to sects. Therefore, followers of a certain sect do
not worship Buddhas and Bodhisattva when they have no great importance
for their sect, but merely respect them. On the other hand, the Chinese
people worship any images of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Another example
of the compromising and syncretic tendency of the Chinese is that some
other equally powerful layman in Peking might be a follower of the
Hung-wan religion as well as a follower of Buddhism, Confucianism, and
Taoism at the same time. He sincerely believes in all of them together
without the political or social reasons51 which a Japanese would suspect
him of having.
From ancient times, the Chinese governing class acknowledged Con-
fucianism as the correct religion and tried to suppress the other religions in
an attempt to maintain the superiority of their class and social position.
They tried to make the teaching of Confucianism the chief fount of
literary studies. Neyertheless, they failed to suppress the compromising and
syncretic traditional Chinese way of thinking.
-•
PART III TIBET

CHAPTER 26 INTRODUCTION
In Tibet, a barren highland situated a few miles above sea-level,
surrounded by lofty mountains on all four sides, assailed by heavy storms,
with ice and snow covering the land two-thirds of the year, its hardy people
established a unique culture. Lamaism, governing the inhabitants with its
great religious power, has produced many impressive religious texts and
architectural structures. Describing the characteristics of Tibetan culture,
Max Weber said: "Due to the existence of the military service system of the
old Chinese style and of the monastic order of Lamaist priests who live
side-by-side with the common men who are required to enter military
services, pay taxes, and offer donations, there has been produced a culture
in this land where there is, from the standpoint of capitalistic rentability,
no possibility of producing great buildings because of its basically unfavor-
able natural conditions. The dissolution of this system would spell out an
end to their traditional ways of living, practices, and beliefs."l Indeed, in
this vast highland, of no value from the standpoint of a capitalistic econ-
omy, there flourished a unique culture.
Tibet is located to the north of India and Burma, occupying a vast
plateau amounting to 625,000 square miles, an area greater than that of
England, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy combined. The average alti-
tude is almost three miles above sea-level. Throughout all seasons it is
covered by snow, being surrounded by huge ranges of high mountains
whose summits, some more than I 8,000 feet high, tower in groups.
But nowadays Tibet is no longer a secret country. Generators and steel
works have been established. In Lhasa, the capital, automobiles are run-
ning. It is only a two days' trip by truck from India, and from Peking one
can get to Lhasa in ten to fourteen days. After an airport is established,
Lhasa will be a short distance from Peking. When the peace of the world is
established, the country will become a resort place for people of all coun-
tries, so that it is doubtful whether Tibet will be able to remain an
independent cultural area in the future also. There is a report that Tibet,
~hose total native population is only 2,700,000 now, has had its population
Increased by 5,000,000 immigrants sent by the Communist Government of
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China to demolish the cultural independence of Tibet. If this is true, the
unique culture of Tibet will be brought to naught very soon. However, it is
an undeniable fact that Tibetan culture has contributed significantly to the
culture of Asia and the world.
When we talk of Tibet, we are apt to think of an uncivilized country.
However, even in material respects, Tibet has left huge and magnificent
things. The huge stone ramparts and simple beauty of the Potala Palace,
the symbol of Lamaism, sloping inwardly in the upper part, are 900 feet
high, or 70 feet higher than the golden cross on the dome of S1. Peter's
cathedral in Rome. It is amazing that such a huge structure was built in the
wilderness.
Furthermore, this religious culture of Tibet contains an element of
universality. Lamaism had some influence upon the vast inland area of
Asia covering the interior of China proper, Mongolia, Manchuria, and
Central Asia.2 This fact is quite remarkable in comparison with what little
influence Japanese religion has had upon foreigners despite the fact that
some Japanese have been very proud of their religious heritage.
The Tibetans referred to in this work are not necessarily the inhabi-
tants of Tibet. It is said that the total number of Tibetans in the world is
four and one-half or five million, but only about two and a half million live
in Tibet proper; the others live mostly in western provinces of China,
although nearly all are Lamaists nonetheless.
Moreover, the regions in which Lamaism is professed are very vast.
With Tibet as their center, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan in the south, in addition
to Ladakh and Kashmir within India, outer Mongolia and the border
provinces of Soviet Russia, where Briat Mongolians are Lamaists, Interior
Mongolia, part of Manchuria and of Northern China in the north should
be counted as.Lamais1. These areas are deserts or wildernesses in terms of
climate. People raise cattle, and move in search of grass. The regions to
which Lamaism has spread have a similar climate.
The religious and economic phenomena of the Tibetan highlands are
not easy for people of other cultures to understand. Even though the
Tibetan people may be of little importance from a political, military, or
economic viewpoint, so far as ways of thinking are concerned, their habits
and ideas are of great significance and relevance for our study.3
The peculiarities of Tibetan culture are due not a little to the physical
surroundings of the land. Isolation from neighboring countries by the walls
of the world-famous highlands made Tibet a land of mysteries. Being a vast
barren land of poor natural resources and severely cold climate, which
refuses to yield food in any great quantity, the land can nourish only a
limited number of people. These geographic and climatic conditions have
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had their influence in establishing customs characteristically Tibetan, and
also in conditioning the ways in which Tibetans accepted Buddhism.
Altogether unknown to the Tibetans themselves who designate their
creed "Buddha's religion" (Sans-rgyas-kyi-chos) or "the orthodox religion"
(nan-chos), the term "Lamaism" is in many ways misleading, inappropriate,
and undesirable.' However, the fact that Tibetan Buddhism is known
under the current name of "Lamaism" implies that it includes various
elements which cannot be found in Buddhism in general, and that fact is
puzzling to outsiders. Buddhism in South Asia, China, Korea or even in
Japan was never called by any name other than "Buddhism." Since the
term "Lamaism" is popular, we anticipate the existence of various com-
plicated problems or features.
According to legend Buddhism was introduced from India under the
reign of King Sron-btsan-sgam-po (seventh century A.D.). In the eighth
century Tibet as a whole was not a Buddhist country,5 but with the aid of
its kings Buddhism gradually took root in the country, and came to the
fore. However, Buddhism was severely persecuted by King Clan-dar-ma,
who reigned from 836 to 841 A.D., and this became a turning point in the
history of Tibetan Buddhism.
Before the persecution by Clan-dar-ma there was no sect in Tibetan
Buddhism. The sectarian movement begins with AtIsa, the Indian monk,
who came to Tibet in 1°38 A.D. He is responsible for the innovation of
Tibetan Buddhism-the enforced celibacy of monks-and the establish-
ment of high moral standards; he rejected the rituals of the Bon religion
which had crept into Buddhism. Then he founded the Bka1)-gdams-pa
sect. This sect was altered slightly by Tson-kha-pa three and one-half cen-
turies later. He demanded the strict observance of disciplines and forbade
the marriage of monks, against the general tendency of the order of those
days, but the sect itself became more lenient with regard to the observance
of disciplines, and more ritualistic. Since then this sect came to be called
the Dge-Iugs-pa sect. This is also called the Yellow Hat Sect in contrast
to the Red Hat, or Rfiin-ma, sect. Moreover, the Bka1)-rgyud-pa sect was
founded by Mar-pa in the latter half of the 11th century, and the Sa-skya
sect in 1°72 A.D.
Tibetan Buddhism was based upon the Tibetan Tripitaka (whose
~eking edition comprises 3522 works), a huge collection of Tibetan transla-
tions of Buddhist texts of India. It might seem that if we compare Tibetan
versions with the Indian originals very carefully and point out differences
between them, we might be able to point out differences of ways of
thinking of these two peoples, but this method is not so easy, for Tibetan
translations adhere very literally to the Indian originals (mostly written in
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Sanskrit), and distorted translations are rather rare. But we should not be
disappointed, but go ahead with the task.
Although the translations are on the whole very literal and trust-
worthy, certain passages describing Indian life that were not understand-
able to Tibetans were translated with some modification. For example, the
tank-pond in the Pure Land in which lotus flowers are blooming is de-
scribed in the Indian original: "In these lotus-lakes there are, around all
four sides, four stairs, beautiful and brilliant with the four gems-gold,
silver, beryl, crystal."6
It is clear that in this passage the reference is to the Indian quad-
rangular tanks whose four sides consist of artificially made staircases. Pools
of this sort are found near Hindu temples, especially, of South India, even
nowadays. The author of this sutra thought that the staircases on the four
sides were made of four jewels-gold, silver, beryl and crystal-if we judge
from the Sanskrit original. But Tibetans did not know that such pools were
used for religious bathing. Since they could not imagine the holy bathing-
places of India to be like stadiums filled with water, they translated the
passage to the effect that there were four (narrow) staircases on each of the
four sides, i.e. a staircase of gold, one of silver, one of beryl, and one of
crystal, and so sixteen all together.
Tibetan scriptures are mostly translations of Indian texts, but there are
some which were translated from Chinese, a round-about way from the
original. In this respect we can discuss the additional problem of the
acceptance (or refusal) of Chinese Buddhism by the Tibetans. Incidentally,
the Mongolian scriptures coincide substantially with the Tibetan ones.
Modern Tibet, in the year 1931, was described by Charles Bell, the
researcher of Lamaism, as follows: "Politically and socially, Tibet is in the
condition of Christian Europe in the Middle Ages, but the Tibetan wom-
an's level is, and long has been, consistently higher than what Europe
could then show."1 To be sure, Tibet had many cultural features com-
parable to those of mediaeval Europe, or of feudal Japan.
The brilliant culture which blossomed out in this land and the pecul-
iar social structure which was formed with Lamaism as its center, are
rapidly going to be transformed and dismembered owing to modern indus-
trialization and communist rule. In which direction will the Tibetans
develop? It is difficult to anticipate the future of Tibet. In any case, it
would be impossible to ignore completely the traditional and hereditary
ways of thinking of its people.
CHAPTER 27 CONSCIOUSNESS OF
THE INDIVIDUAL
Weakness of Consciousness of Association among Individuals
The people of Tibet live in scattered villages and pastures connected
by narrow routes. To deviate from these paths is to risk death in a mountain
wilderness. Having to live under these severe conditions, the Tibetan is
everywhere confronted with this physical threat to his existence so that he
is constantly faced with the problem of survival. Death is a favorite subject
in Tibetan poetry.
The Indian king of the dead was called Yama (i.e., "one who
controls"), which name was introduced into China and Japan and was used
without alteration. However, the Tibetans translated it as "Lord of Death"
Cbchibdag). This Lord of Death occurs very often as the subject of
sentences in Tibetan verses.
The gloom and despair surrounding man's existence was envisaged by
Mi-la-ras-pa, the religious poet (1040-I 123 A.D.) :
My growing old unknown to my friend;
My sister unaware of my last illness.
If I can die in this solitude;
This devotee will be fully content.
My death unknown to any being;
My rotting corpse unseen by the birds.
If I can die in this solitude;
This devotee will be fully content.
None to ask where I have gone;
No place to point to, saying "There."
If I can die in this solitude;
This devotee will be fully content.
May the prayer regarding the death of this beggar
Be fulfilled for the benefit of all beings
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In a rocky cave in an uninhabited country!
Then will my mind be fully contento1
In solitude he found deliverance:
Hail son (i.e. his master Mar-pa) of the Lord Naro
and way of Deliverance!
Send the waves of grace over this beggar that he may
cling to the solitude.
Keep me free from the distractions of Evil Ones and
the World
Grant me advance in samadhi (concentration).2
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Who would think of finding such an acute expression of profound
feeling nine hundred years ago in the Tibetan plateau? Even today there
are some Tibetan ascetics who practise meditation or dwell in phantasy in
monasteries or caves. It is said that one of them never came down from the
mountain in which he had lived for fifty years.
When the consciousness of the individual is strong and predominant,
the significaOnce of the family as a linkage of individuals tends to be weak.
According to ancient inscriptions, an individual who committed a crime
was punished, but his brothers, descendants, or relatives were not tried by
court, nor were they punished.3 Criminal law as practised only in modern
days in other countries was already established in antiquity in Tibet.
The Tibetan family system was shrouded in curious customs that go
back to prehistoric times, and became one of the most secluded institutions
devised by mankind.
First of all, the Tibetan practice of polyandry must be described. If a
bridegroom were to have brothers, his bride is automatically married to her
brothers-in-law, and is the co-wife to all the brothers. The right to possess
the co-wife is limited only to sons of the same mother. If a woman were to
have a sexual relation beyond this limitation, she is regarded as an adul-
teress. When she bears a child, however, only the eldest husband is called
the father, while the others are called uncles irrespective of who the actual
father is. Such a custom seems to go against our normal sense of morality,
but Tibetans think it ideal.
In Tibet one should not ask a woman who her husband is. Many
Tibetan women have several husbands, so that such a question by a
foreigner might be taken as an insult.
According to recent studies, details of polyandry in Tibet are as
follows: "Though a large percentage of marriages are monogamous, not too
negligible a percentage of polyandry is recognized among the agricultural
Tibetans. Among the Tibetans the idea of generation hierarchy is feeble,
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but the idea of gradation of natural age is remarkable. Often a polyandrous
wife has as her plural husbands, brothers of another clan. In fewer cases, a
set of plural husbands is composed of uncle and nephew. Even paternal
polyandry, in which a father and his real sons have a common wife, as long
as she is not an actual mother of the sons, is reported by some travellers.
These three kinds of polyandry have a common denominator. If they put
importance on the difference in the ancestral hierarchy as is the case in
Chinese culture, then the fraternal relationship will be quite different from
the avuncular or paternal relationship in its meaning. However, if they
attach more importance to the gradation of natural age, neglecting the
genealogical hierarchy, then the three kinds of relationship mean only one
kind of age gradation, irrespective of whether they are paternal, avuncular,
or fraternal.
Among a set of plural husbands, only one is dealt with as the main
husband, who can be called an accentuated husband. However, this status
of accentuated husband is not always occupied by a certain brother or an
uncle, but moves from an elder to a younger; since usually an accentuated
husband coincides with a housemaster, this means that the status of house-
master also slides from an elder to a younger. The transmission of the status
of housemaster usually takes place at the age of forty or so. Accordingly the
system of polyandry is a device which makes it possible to charter a more
able younger male kinsman as a leader in the household, avoiding friction
between wives. Usually the average age of maximum ability is so young
that the sons of the outgoing housemaster are too young to take leadership
in the family when the ability of their father has passed the maximum.
In conclusion, polyandry is an adaptation to the principle of talent
mobility, on the one hand, and an attempt to heighten the stability of a
household, on the other, by trying to avoid a crisis in the household.
Therefore polyandry is usually prevalent only among the agricultural
Tibetans, not among the nomadic Tibetans, because the needs of property
accumulation and familial cooperation are stronger in the former than in
the latter."4
The existence of such a custom does not necessarily mean that there is
sexual promiscuity among Tibetans. In Indian palace-courts there were
high-class prostitutes. In an Indian drama a prostitute is mentioned by her
daughter who was an actress as "a courtesan" (ajjukii) , whereas in the
Tibetan version she is mentioned as "lady-mother" (yum),5 in the same way
SOme Chinese versions avoided the term "prostitute."6
Why was such a system adopted in Tibet? Rev. Aoki, who had lived in
Tibet for some years, once gave the following answer: (I) Being a barren
land, Tibet cannot nourish so big a population. Polyandry is quite suitable
to limit the increase of population. (2) Officers and merchants are often
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obliged to be away from home for a long time due to the difficult conditions
of their journeys through the mountain wilderness. In such a case the wife
stays home with the remaining brothers to whom she is married.
The stri-rajya (Land of Women) is often mentioned in Indian and
Chinese classics, referring to a country having the custom of polyandry,
but probably not Tibet.
Polygamy is also permitted. For example, the King Sron-btsan-sgam-
po is reported to have had five wives. Polygamy, of course, was rather a
common custom among the ruling classes in the world of pre-modern
periods. The peculiarity of Tibetan polygamy lies in its form-that is, one
of the pre-requisites is that wives should be sisters born of the same mother.
It is especially desirable for noble families that have only daughters.
Actually, however, most Tibetans adhere to monogamy: polyandry or
polygamy is rather an exceptional arrangement. However, the existence of
such a system seems to reveal a unique way of thinking in the Tibetan
culture. That is to say, although the Tibetans do have a concrete idea of a
family, they are not strongly conscious of any personal bond between man
and woman.
Another example can be cited. A Tibetan re-marries immediately after
the death of his or her partner, and as a result there is said to be almost no
widow or widower in Tibet. In a land adhering to such a custom, marriage
often means no more than a sexual relation rather than a realization of a
spiritual bond. This Tibetan custom is quite the opposite of the "suttee"-
custom of medieval Indians.
These customs did not change even after the introduction of Bud-
dhism. High-priest lamas were obliged to admit this fact. Wives were once
regarded as property. In Tibetan, the words for "wives" and "children" are
often the same word bu. For example, bu-smad (lit. "lower child") can
mean "family," "children," and "wife" (Sanskrit kalatra). The word bu-
chen-ma (lit. '1arge child") means a "pregnant woman" (cf. the Japanese
use of ko at the end of women's names).
Consequently, the Tibetans have no strong concept of family lineage.
Ancestor-worship is hardly noticed in Tibet except in a form of a mass for
the dead, similar to the Japanese Segaki ceremony. The term "ancestor-
worship" has no equivalent in the Tibetan vocabulary. Each Tibetan home
keeps the Buddha's image in a niche or altar, but unlike the Japanese and
the Chinese, the Tibetans never keep ancestral tablets (Japanese ihai) or
portraits of their ancestors on it. The Tibetans' lack of consciousness with
respect to the inheritance of property, which is indirectly related to the
present subject, will be discussed below.
Weakness of consciousness of association with a specific person does
not mean disregard for others, but occasionally the contrary. Tibetans are
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well known for their hospitality. It is regarded as a virtue to be sincere to
others. For this purpose, they have a strange form of greeting. They thrust
their tongue out toward the guest, and show the palms of both hands. This
action is the Tibetan equivalent of Western hand-shaking. That is to say,
to open both hands means to show that the man is hiding no weapon; to
show the tongue is relevant to the traditional Tibetan belief that the
tongue of a poisoner is black. Even nowadays they send greetings by
thrusting out their tongues at the driver of a fast-running automobile.
However, this custom is vanishing; now Tibetan laborers prefer clapping
hands and cheering when they are in groups.
Tibet was called the "Red-Face Country" in Chinese Buddhist scrip-
tures.7 Tibetans themselves called their country such (gdon dmar yul),
because they smeared their face with a sort of red soil. It is said that, as this
strange custom was abhorred by the queen from China, King SroIi-btsan-
sgam-po prohibited that custom for some time.s However, this is not essen-
tially different from the use of cosmetics or lipstick by Western ladies,
which is abhorred by South Asians, for in South Asia this custom is chiefly
limited to women of dubious character. Anyhow, the custom of smearing
a sort of red soil is observed in deference to others.
Social pressure by tribes upon individuals appears to have been quite
strong. Among the Na-khi tribes, a group of Tibetans who live in South-
Western China and practise the Bon religion, even nowadays "forced
marriage between individuals who have perhaps never seen each other till
the day of their marriage, and betrothal during early childhood, has caused
great misery and unhappiness, and many, in order to avoid marrying
people whom they have perhaps never seen or perhaps dislike, go up the
mountain and commit suicide."9
Another example of strong social pressure appears in an interesting
linguistic phenomenon. "To commit suicide" can be expressed in Tibetan
with a one-syllable word: lceb-(pa) (to kill one's self). In English we have
to use a longer expression to express this act. In Sanskrit also they used
such a compound as iitma-hatyii. The linguistic fact that Tibetans used a
short single word to denote 'committing suicide' suggests the hypothesis
that it was a fairly frequent social phenomenon. In Tibetan chronicles
cases of suicide are often mentioned. Killing one's self on the death of one's
lord also was practiced. It seems that in these cases tribal pressure to com-
pel one to commit suicide was strong.
Strong ethical features can be noticed in other linguistic expressions.
Respect (gaurava) and affectionate devotion (bhakti), both of which are
distinguished from each other in Sanskrit and other Indian languages, are
both translated by one and the same word: gus-pa because no distinction
Was made between the two. Such an emotion as the anxiety of a wife about
;0 l.
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her husband or that of a devotee who worships God earnestly was not
distinguished from respect in general. Affectionate devotion (bhakti) did
not have an important religious significance in Tibet. It is likely that social
and ethical elements imbuing one with respect in general overwhelmed
other emotional elements (as in the case of the Japanese in feudal days).
Tribal control was strict, especially in warfare. This feature was no-
ticed as a custom of the Tibetans by ancient Chinese.
"(Among Tibetans) order of command is strict. In battles, after the
soldiers in the front rows had all died, those in the rear march forward.
They esteem death in the battlefield, and dislike death by illness. A family
whose members died in battles generation after generation is regarded as an
excellent one. Those who were defeated in battles had tails of foxes placed
on their neck in order to show everyone that their cowardice was fox-
like. Being thus put to shame, they determine to die in battle next time."lO
This attitude resembles the Way of Warriors in ancient Japan.
The rule by tribal chieftains or kingly sovereignty was very strong in
ancient Tibet. Ancient Chinese historians reviewed the ethics of the Tibet-
ans who "e~teemed loyalty to lords and minimized their service to par-
ents."ll After the unification of tribes many mausoleums of ancient mon-
archs were built.12 This is in contrast to the fact that in ancient India not
mausoleums of monarchs, but huge stupas of religious sages were built.
Conflicts and strifes among major tribes did not cease even after the rule of
Lamaism was established.
Probably due to such social pressure, Tibetans occasionally used ethi-
cal expressions more often than ancient Indians. In Sanskrit the prefix
su- means just "good," and in this case Indians did not distinguish between
"good" in the moral sense and "good" in the sensory and aesthetic sense, as
in the case of Japanese. However, Tibetans distinguished between these
two. For example, "a good place" (su-gati) was translated in Tibetan as
bde-~gro (literally, "pleasure-going-place"), "a good act" (su-krta) as legs-
par-spyad-pa ("done righteously").
Some Indian ideas were introduced with ethical connotations. The
Indian word meaning "friar" was bhik~u, which literally means "one who
begs (food)," "one who asks for (alms)," but the Tibetans have always
translated this word as "one who seeks for (morally) good" (dge-slon). The
Indian word: "one who is desirous of welfare" (Sr"eyaskiima) was translated
as "one who seeks for righteousness or good" (legs-pa-bdod).13 The Indian
"sage-hermit" (r~i) was translated as "one who is straight and honest"
(dran-sran) .
Tibetans have no fixed mythology about the origin of their race. Some
of them believe that they are the descendants of the King PaI).9u who is
spoken of in the Mahiibhiirata, the great epic of India, while others say that
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they are the descendants of a Rak~asi and a monkey who lived in the
Himalayas and who is believed to be the incarnation of the Bodhisattva
Avalokitdvara. These facts-the lack of a fixed mythology about their
origins, and its connection to Indian mythology-seem to show that they
are not quite conscious of the genealogy of their race.
The idea of a national ancestor, such as the Sun Goddess of the
Japanese, is also lacking in the Tibetan consciousness. They surely venerate
the three kings, Sron-btsan-sgam-po, Khri-sron-Ide-btsan, and Dar-pa-chen,
but merely as the three great ancestors who made Tibet prosperous. Na-
tional consciousness, too, is lacking.
Consequently, the Tibetans do not pride themselves as a superior
people or as those who live in the center of world-civilization as the
Chinese did. They rather respect India as the land of the sages, and regard
their country as a remote region of the world.14
The Gupta dynasty (32o-ca.500 A.D.) was proud that King
Candragupta, its founder, married a lady of the Licchavi clan, and this fact
was mentioned in every edict (inscription) promulgated by this dynasty. In
the same way, when ancient Tibetans extolled King Sron-btsam-sgam-
po, the virtual founder of the Tibetan Empire, inscriptions extolled him
saying that he was a descendant of the Licchavi clan.15 To extol a king for
the reason that he is a descendant of a foreign clan was rather an unusual
event in Asian countries. Tibetans viewed their own country's ancestry
as a lineage from India.
A sort of Compendium of Buddhism written by I:Iphags-pa, a Tibetan
Lama and an Imperial Preceptor of the Mongolian dynasty, and handed
down in Chinese, is based upon the Abhidharma-kosa of Vasubandhu of
India, but traces the lineage of kings from the Sakya clan through kings of
India up to King Kublai Khan of the Mongolian dynasty.16 In the Indian
text only mythological monarchs were mentioned, but in the text by
I:Iphags-pa and the "Golden Annals of Mongolia" not only mythological
monarchs but also many historical kings were mentioned.
The tendency to regard India as an especially holy place is found in
the impressive way in which the Indians went about compiling the whole
corpus of Buddhist scriptures. The Tibetans included in the Tripiraka (a)
the holy scriptures compiled in India and (b) the texts written by Indian
scholars; (a) is called Kangyur and (b) Tangyur. Texts written by Tibetans
were all placed outside of the Tripiraka, in contrast to the compilation of
the Chinese and Japanese Tripirakas in which works by their own
respective countrymen were included. This implies that Tibetans had a
high esteem for India as a religious country.
What then is the basic idea of morality among the Tibetans, whose
consciousness of association among individuals, as well as the concept of a
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genealogical recording of their race or nation, is not well developed? The
answer lies in their unconditional submission to Lamaism.
Lamaism is the Tibetan form of Buddhism. Buddhism was officially
introduced into Tibet during the rule of Srori.-btsan-sgam-po (in the early
7th century A.D.). The king became a devout Buddhist, welcomed Buddhist
monks from India and China, and ordered them to translate the scriptures
into the Tibetan language. At the same time he sent Thon-mi-saf!1bhota to
India to study Sanskrit. On his return to Tibet, he was asked by the king to
establish an official Tibetan script and to compose a Tibetan grammar.
Then about a century later, Esoteric Buddhism entered Tibet during the
rule of the King Khri-srori.-Ide-btsan (755-781 A.D.), when two Indian
pandits, Santira~ita and Padmasaf!1bhava, were said to have come to Tibet
and performed miracles, quelling the curse of demons, etc., by the magical
power of "mantra"-practice. Afterwards Tibet welcomed a great many
Indian monks, who came to Tibet successively, and thus Esoteric Buddhism
flourished in Tibet.
The uncontested predominance of Esoteric Buddhism, however, re-
sulted in an extreme degeneration of Buddhism in Tibet. It was Tson-
kha-pa (1357-1419 A.D.) who reformed this degenerate form of Buddhism.
He established a religious atmosphere based upon a code of Buddhist
precepts. His reformed school was called the Yellow-Caps (shwa-ser) in
contrast to the traditional school which was called the Red-Caps (shwa-
dmar). His first disciple, Dge-};dun-grub, was renowned for his virtues and
regarded by the Tibetans as the incarnation of AvalokiteSvara. As the chief
abbot he was endowed by the official title of Dalai-lama, a title which has
been handed down to the present 14th Dalai-lama. The Yellow-Caps are
predominant in Tibet at present, and the Dalai Lama, who resided at Mt.
Potala in Lha-sa, the capital of Tibet, was the chief abbot of Lamaism and
the King of Tibet as well, before his departure for India as a refugee from
the Communist invaders.
Then how is Lamaism connected with ways of thinking of Tibetans
in general? Details will be discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 28 DISCOVERY OF THE
ABSOLUTE IN MAN
In the wild and hostile climate of Tibet, people feel more dependent
on each other than they do on the environment. Here we cannot expect to
find that relaxed attitude that is common in Eastern Asia, where man tends
emotionally and poetically to merge his being with nature around him.
The Tibetans are grateful if nature lets them survive, and they respect the
ability of a human being who can work with his fellow beings in order to
face their harsh conditions of living. Reports of these conditions are more
terrible than anyone can imagine. The Older Tang Annals say: "The
bedrooms of Tibetans are dirty. They do not bathe or wash themselves."l
Tibetans today who come to Buddhist temples in India appear unclean and
filthy. Ancient Tibetans report that they were "mostly fond of lice which
creep into their hair and clothes. When they catch these lice, they do not
throw them away but put them in their mouth."2 There is little fuel for
heating purposes, and the dung of yaks is sold at a high price in the cities
for fuel.
The nomadic life of the Tibetan requires active and vigorous living.
The ancient Chinese described their habits as those of a people who
"esteemed vigor and despised feebleness."3 Retaining the habits of nomadic
hunters, "when they treat foreign guests, they drive out the yaks, have their
guests shoot them, and then treat them with the game flesh."4
The martial temper is extolled in the Ke-sar Saga, perhaps the oldest
heroic poem of Tibet:
"If you are powerful, come to me now.
If you kindle a fire, it will burn you.
Oh, ye three brothers, known as the faxes!
Have you any courage? If so, arise!
Oh, thou Sky-god of the White Tent tribe!
If thou possessest power, display miracles!
If the army of one hundred thousand men
Of Hor are brave, let them come forth.
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The swords of other men are made of iron;
We do not need swords; our right hands are enough.
We will split the body in the middle, and cut the side into pieces.
Other men use clubs made of wood;
We require no wood; our thumbs and forefingers are enough.
We can destroy by rubbing thrice with our fingers.
If a skull-drum is to be sounded it should be shaken
like this.
(Lifting up the spy and shaking him.)
If a dor-je (thunderbolt-sceptre) is to be held in
the hand, this is the proper way.
(Holding the spy very tightly, as the dor-je
should be held by a Buddhist priest.)
If a drum is to be used, this is the way to beat it.
(Beating him.)
If a rope is to be pulled, it should be pulled like this.
If a skin is to be tanned, it should be tanned like this.
This body with eyes and head
Will be made into a hat for the King of the White Tent tribe.
I offer the heart to the war god of the white people of Ling."5
Tibetan dancing is orgiastic and inciting. This kind of dancing, which
was introduced from Central Asia into China of the Tang period, was
rather varied and somewhat similar to that of Russian peasants in Sibe-
ria.6
Buddhist ethics was also accepted with its firm insistence on activity.
In the "Diamond Sutra" the determination of the Bodhisattva is
described as follows: "Not by a Bodhisattva who clings to a thing should a
gift be given, nor by one who clings to any place should a gift be given.
Not by one who clings to form should a gift be given, nor by one who
clings to sounds, smells, tastes, touchables, or mind-objects."T However, the
Tibetan version changed the whole structure, as follows: "A Bodhisattva
should give a gift in as ardent a way as he would refuse to cling to a
thing. . . . mind-objects."8 The Indian sentences were negative and pro-
hibitive, whereas the sentences of the Tibetan version were active, positive,
and exhortative.
There are many cases in which negative expressions of the Indians
were changed to positive and affirmative ones by the Tibetans. "To en-
deavor" was expressed by Indians as "not to be negligent" (apramiida) ,
whereas Tibetans translated it with an affirmative and positive word: "bag"
(to endeavor). The Sanskrit negative expression anartha (something not
.'
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beneficial) as translated by the Tibetans is an affirmative expression; gnod-
pa (something that does harm).9 Indians used the word amogha (not vain),
which Tibetans translated as don rod (significant, useful). The sentence
"The result becomes not-vain" (amoghaphala1p vartate) in a Sanskrit text
was translated as "The result becomes fruitful" (don yod pa~i ~bras bur
bgyur ro).l0 Early Buddhism of India taught: "One should not despise
what one has acquired." (svaliibha1p niivamanyeta.) Whereas Tibetans
translated it in an affirmative and positive way: "One should (plainly)
accept what one has acquired." (Ran gi rned pa blan bra shin.)l1
Pure Land Buddhism was also introduced as exhorting the practice for
being born into the Pure Land.12
The ethics for those who have to live in difficult surroundings, facing
death or life, is fundamentally different from the ethics for those who are
enjoying a settled and stable life in agricultural communities. In the former
situation bodily vigor matters. Deference and respect to the elderly, as
found in other Asian countries, are not discernible. A Chinese classical
work described this custom as follows: "(The Tibetans) do not remove bows
and weapons from themselves. They esteem youth and deride the elderly.
Mothers greet their children; sons conduct themselves arrogantly toward
their fathers; in processions, youths go first, and old people follow them."13
The Tibetans were once a strong people, well-known for their bravery
even after the introduction of Buddhism. Their invasion of neighboring
countries lasted for about two hundred years after that. The Tibetan
nation was one of the most virile ones in Eastern Asia, and overran and
even conquered China more than once. But it has steadily declined in
power and numbers to less than a tenth part of its former population.14
Cultivated lands have been forsaken. Travelers often notice devastated
ruins of the civilization of the past. Why has Tibet declined to such an
extent? Some people ascribe it to Lamaism. It is said that in Tibet one
among five persons, including women and children, is a Lama. This rate is
higher than that in South Asian countries. The largest monasteries in the
world were located in Tibet, one of them once accommodating nearly a
hundred thousand Lamas. Such a large number of youthful men of vigor
was economically unproductive, for monks were not allowed to cultivate,
and they had no progeny, since most had to practice celibacy. This self-
destructive system was closely connected, sociologically, with the feudal
system since the medieval ages of Tibet, and, ideologically, with the pre-
dominance of medieval other-worldliness.
The tendency to live in seclusion and refrain from economical produc-
tion was one of the striking features of medieval Tibet. Other-worldliness,
we know, was also one of the features of the medieval period, not only in
Tibet but throughout all countries in Europe as well as in India, Japan, etc.
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But here in Tibet, this trait of withdrawing from the world took a very
conspicuous form. However, it is an indisputable fact that the ancient
Tibetans were a hardworking people, as their living descendants are. If
industry and technology based upon modern sciences are introduced, Tibet-
ans will display a new development. As can be said of Buddhism in
general, Tibetan nobles did not despise commerce, quite unlike Western
nobles and clergy. In this respect the development of commerce in Tibet
would probably be realized without much resistance, and modernization
also would be easy.
Due to the necessity of developing the wilderness to establish their
material existence, the Tibetans found it natural to esteem the human body
and its functions. According to the Tantric religion introduced from India
to Tibet, the breath of man is understood to be articulated in three func-
tions; i.e., breathing-in, holding the breath, and breathing-out, which are
nothing but, respectively, the three holy sounds, Le., 01p, a~ and hu1p. This
theory had to be religiously learnt. To carry out this theory is tantamount
to repeating continually the recitation of these three holy sounds. Breathing
and reciting holy formulas are not essentially different; one is supposed to
continue repeating the Diamond-Recitation day and night. One practices
the Diamond-Recitation twenty-one thousand six hundred times for a
whole day and night.15
It is difficult not to believe that an extreme interpretation has
been given to a natural act; while a man is breathing, he is reciting the
three holy syllables: 01p, a~, and hu1p, which represent the coming, staying,
and departing of the Principal Buddha. So if we retain these three syllables,
we shall coincide with the ultimate truth. Accordingly, recitations of holy
scriptures and holy words, worshipping images, and constructing platforms
for ceremonies, etc. become useless. All these religious elements are
scrapped and one returns to human nature itself again.
In Mahayana Buddhism, in general, it was customary to assume the
three bodies of the Buddha. But the members of a certain school of Tibetan
Tantric Buddhism (Pi1;1~ik!ta-sadhana) assume a fourth body, which is
called "the body in itself" (svabhava-kiiya). It is not a body conceived by
means of abstract thinking, but the body which can be vividly felt or
directly experienced. It is "the body by birth" (sahaja-kiiya), "the body for
pleasure" (sukha-kaya), or "the body for great enjoyment."16 A certain
scripture (Guhyasamiija) of Esoteric Buddhism aims at "concentration for
fulfilling all desires" (sarvakamopabhoga-samadhi)Y
Therefore, Tibetan Buddhism brought a peculiar practice into exist-
ence, which is called "Non-Differentiation of Enjoyment and Voidness"
(bde-ston-dbyer-med). It is a practice based upon the thought that the State
of Voidness which is the ultimate truth of Buddhism is nothing but human
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enjoyment (of carnal desires). (This is not the practice of Japanese Esoteric
Buddhism in general.) It taught that "the Great Enjoyment," i.e., the
unification of father (yab) and mother (yum) was nothing but the En-
lightened State of Mind,t8 The man who has attained this state of Enlight-
enment experiences "the Great Enjoyment." Whatever he does is not
improper, just as a lotus flower, coming out of mud, is not defiled with
filth.19 Ultimately in this sort of practice there is no need of discipline.
Drinking liquor, eating meat, sexual intercourse, etc., constitute the Way
of the Buddha.20
Of course, there was some ethical thought contrary to the above.
Mi-Ia-ras-pa taught, "To drink wine or tea for pleasure is to drink (a brew
of aconite)."21 But such thought did not take root among common people.
Many Tantras conveyed to Tibet had to be classified in the Four
Divisions. Tsori-kha-pa, the Great Master of Tibetan Buddhism, showed
that the way of classifying a given Tantra among one or other of the four
Tantra Divisions was by four degrees of mutual attraction, or "courtship"
(anuraga) of the male and female deities, who represent respectively
"means" (upiiya) and "insight" (prajiiii). The four degrees are: Laughter
(rgod pa), Looking (lta ba), Holding Hands (lag bcmis), and The Two
United (giiis giiis ~khyud). For example, the Vajrasekhara has the follow-
ing passage: "The goddess Rdo-rje Ca-co-sgrogs . . . seized the hand of
the Bhagavat." Since this Tantra shows the deities attaining the third
degree of mutual attraction, it is included in the third Tantra division (the
Yoga-tantra).22 To classify Buddhist scriptures in accordance with the
degree of heightened sexual love was never dreamt of by Chinese nor by
Japanese Buddhists.
According to a theory of Tantric Buddhism,23 the "Great Pleasure"
should not be worldly enjoyment. It should not be "worldly pleasure
deriving from laughter, looking, holding hands, and embracing." It is the
supreme and permanent pleasure transcending those mentioned above.
Then, what kind of pleasure does it virtually mean? The theory of Tantric
Buddhism does not clearly explain it. Bu-ston, the Buddhist scholar, ex-
plaining it, says that ultimately one should not cling to attachment, nor to
non-attachment, but stay in the state of non-attachment to NirvaI)a. He sets
forth the Great Mahayoga-tantra to control the desire to embrace, which is
the strongest one among the above mentioned four stages of fulfilling
sexual desires. He says, the vilest Cm;uJalas (most abject creatures) do not
distinguish between things pure and things impure. They resort to all sorts
of drinking and eating, and commit all sorts of vile acts, eat five kinds of
meat, and five kinds of nectar (dung, urine, etc.). However, it is especially
such vile people who are fittest for the Great Yoga-tantra. It is they who are
glutted with sensuous attachments, hate, and delusion who have the possi-
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bility of attaining the Great Pleasure (the state of Vajradhara). In this faith
in redeemability the mission of Tantric Buddhism edifies and guides lost
people, knowing that they are living in defilement.24
Such masters as the Lamaists Dge-legs-dpal-bzan-po and Tson-kha-
pa say, "Human existence is a sacred (holy) existence. A man, when born,
is a Buddha incarnate." The birth of a man means that "Buddha brings up
Buddha's child whose essence is a Buddha, and to have a Buddha come
forth."25 Then how explain death? Death is "unification with the ulti-
mate truth."26
That is how the idea of Buddha incarnate came to Tibet. KamalasIla,
who introduced Buddhism into Tibet, has often been called "The Holy
Buddha." His body was embalmed, and is still preserved in a good condition
as a mummy in a monastery twenty miles north of Lhasa.27
Moreover, the Buddhism which admits human desires affirmatively
originated in Tibet. In a practice called "the Great Practice" (Mahiis-
adhana) young daughters of dyers or dancers, say, 12 or 16 years of age,
who belong to the lowest CaI]~iila class, were chosen; their bodies were
regarded a~ ceremonial configurations (matz4ala); at each spot on their
bodies a goddess was assumed to exist to be worshipped.28 The prayer
(mantra) for a divine being called Hayagrlva is aimed at the highest bliss
with a woman (Paramananda), because "Desires are extinguished by fulfill-
ing desires."29
The concept of deliverance also changed. In order to express: "De-
liverance will occur," the Indians said: "One will become free from tempta-
tions" (nirvrti~ bhavi~yati), whereas Tibetans said: "Mind will become
pleasant" (sems bde baT ~gYUT TO ).30 That is to say, deliverance was beyond
pleasure and suffering in the eyes of Indians, whereas it was pleasure itself
in the eyes of Tibetans. In a ceremony described by Bu-ston a goddess
addresses the principal Buddha of the configuration with the phrase: "May
you love me!"31
The idea of the Pure Land also was transformed by Tibetans. Accord-
ing to the notion of ancient Indians there was no sexual relation between
man and woman in the Pure Land of Amitabha Buddha.32 But this was not
congenial to Tibetans, who changed the passage to: "There is no adultery
in the Pure Land."33
The religious exaltation of sexual enjoyment is one of the prominent
characteristics of Tibetan Buddhism. For Buddhist mendicants, the goal is
to enter the absolute state through the practice of meditation, a state which
is usually expressed in a negative way. Lamaism, on the contrary, expresses
its highest goal through the image of deities in sexual union as the symbol
of the greatest pleasure (maha-sukha). This image of coupled deities is
referred to as the "Excellent Pleasure" (bde-mchog). This idea seems to
.,
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have its origin in a Hindu image of Siva and Kali (-Durga) in "samyoga"
(union).34 Also the linga (phallic symbol) is regarded as something sacred.
Though there is no linga worship in Tibet, we sometimes find a scene of
religious dancing there with a linga held in the hands. Even Tson-kha-
pa, the reformer of Lamaism in the 14th century, could not stamp out the
practices described above.
Tibetans did not accept the Buddhism of rigorous moralism whole-
heartedly. Chinese Buddhists once tried to propagate their own brand of
Buddhism in Tibet, but were soon expelled by the natives.35 The strict
morality of Chinese Buddhism could not take root in Tibet. What was
accepted by the Tibetans was the Buddhism of worldly enjoyment which
sometimes leads people to engage in sexual enjoyment, the corrupted form
of Indian Esotericism.
L$t
CHAPTER 29
ABSOLUTE SUBMISSION
TO A RELIGIOUSLY
CHARISMATIC INDIVIDUAL
Lacking the consciousness of belonging to any such specific human
nexus as a family lineage or a race, the Tibetans act on the principle
of submission to the Lamas as religious preceptors. Submitting to the
Lama, a person endowed with religious charisma, is then the Tibetans' way
of adhering to a social order.
The attitude of absolute submissIOn to Lamas did not appear from the
beginning of the history of Tibet. As in other ancient states which first
came into ~xistence under the authority established by the "divine right of
kings," Tibetan monarchs were called "sons of god" (lha-sras).l The appella-
tion "Son of Heaven" is surmised to have been introduced from China or
Khotan into Tibet.2 In a stone pillar inscription King Khri-sron-Ide-btsan
was extolled: "In accordance with the divine nature his power was great."3
This king was aiming at "Tibet, the country of Law" (chos bod yul) in his
edict/ and he "had Law in due consideration."5 In this respect he aimed at
relying upon universal human laws, and did not depend on the authority of
any syecific religious preceptor.
What Tibetan Buddhists also sought was universal laws transcending
the differences of countries and peoples. The Tibetan translators went to
India to learn Indian languages and Buddhist teachings; they sometimes
even went as far as Burma. Their death-rate there was very high, for the
climate of the tropics was deadly to those nurtured in the dry cold of Tibet.
Out of a party of eight or ten, usually not more than two or three would
return to their own country.6 But the danger of death did not intimidate
those anxious to seek eternal and universal laws.
However, in later days the tendency to rely upon the charismatic
authority of Lamas as specific preceptors became predominant. The
Tibetan attitude of absolute submission to a religiously charismatic individ-
ual is directed toward the personality of the lamas (bla-ma). The Tibetan
term "bla-ma" literally means "a high (bla) person (ma)," and is identical
with the Japanese concept of "sho-nin" in its literal sense. Actually, how-
ever, it is the Tibetan counterpart for the Sanskrit word "guru" (teacher),
or sometimes for "kalyiirza-mitra" (a friend of virtue). "Bla-ma" was origi-
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nally an appellation for a high priest or president of a monastery, but
nowadays it is used by any disciple in addressing his master. Thus, the term
means "a master" or "a teacher."
The thought of extolling the charisma of a religious preceptor existed
in the sects of medieval Hinduism; it was introduced to Buddhism, and was
established as the Esoteric Buddhism of India.
"One who has fallen from the summit of Mount Meru will fall down,
even if he wishes not to fall.
One who has acquired the beneficial oral tradition by grace of the
Lama will attain deliverance, even if he wishes not to be delivered."T
This opinion became popular in Tibet.
Worship of a Lama coincides with the worship of a Buddha as a
personal existence (not as an abstract principle). In Tibetan versions more
honorific appellations are applied to Buddhas.s
A unique and important characteristic of Lamaism, which distin-
guishes it from other schools of Buddhism, is that the living lama is more
highly revered than the Buddha or the Dharma. Bu-ston said, "A preceptor
is Vajradhara himself. Without a preceptor there is no Buddha. Unless one
understands this, there is no Enlightenment."9 Mar-pa, the famous sorcerer,
tested the faith of Mi-Ia-ras-pa, the disciple, in his guru (preceptor). Unless
faith is complete, there can be no spiritual advance in the disciple. Bell, the
British Tibetan scholar comments upon this: 'We have traveled far now
from the teaching of Gotama, who made but little appeal to faith. Rather
we are with the form of Buddhism that has been mingled with their old
Faith, and thus the more fully adapted to the needs of the great Tatar
branch of humanity."lo This is also the Tibetan equivalent of guru worship
of Hinduism.
On this point, Lama Tada, the Japanese priest who went to Tibet,
explains as follows: "There is a saying which is usually recited by Tibetan
monks: 'Before the Lama there was not even the name of the Buddha. All
the Buddhas of a thousa1?-d eons existed in dependence on the Lama.' It
means that we can know about the existence of Buddha and his teaching
only through the Lama's instruction, and only through that way can we
follow the Buddhist practices; therefore Lama is the real teacher who
enables us to enter the right path and leads us to enlightenment; all the
Buddhas in the past, too, having received the Lama's instruction, believed
in Buddhism, practiced it, and attained enlightenment. In this case the
term 'lama' seems to have kept its original meaning, i.e. 'master.'
"A more important concept is added to this term in the sense of 'one's
own master who saves him.' Namely, a master is regarded by his disciples as
something more venerable than the Triple Jewel. Disciples are requested to
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pay homage first to the Lama, then to the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha,
not only as a matter of concepts but also in actual practices. Therefore, for
the Tibetan Buddhists, the objects of worship are the 'Four Jewels' instead
of the usual 'Three Jewels.' This is the principal doctrine of Lamaism, and
to take refuge in these Four Jewels is one of the characteristics which
distinguish Lamaism from other schools of Buddhism. Lamaism was estab-
lished and developed on the basis of such a faith.
"In a further developed form of this concept, Lama is regarded as the
synthesis of the Triple Jewel. That is to say, they believe that the Jewel of
the Lama is not the same as the other three, but is the unity or the
substratum of them all. Lama is the substratum of all the virtues, the basis
of all the paths, and the root of merits. To serve a Lama is nothing but to
pay homage to the Triple Jewel. This service is to be conducted in medita-
tion and practice, since it is not only the best way to accumulate the root of
virtues but also the shortest way to acquire enlightenment. Therefore, the
followers should try to satisfy their Lama materially and spiritually as well.
For pursuing this duty, they are required to be prepared even to sacrifice
their lives."ll
Lama{sts never speak of their master's name in front of others. They
refer to their master not by name, but abstractedly or with an explanation
of the meaning of his name so that hearers can judge who is the master. In
case the sign of Lama's name is required for a document, etc., they do so
with a preface: "though I feel it painful to scribe my master's name... ,"
Thus they hesitate even to utter the Lama's name.12
This religious charisma was connected with economical conditions in
one respect. It was customary among Tibetan families that at least one boy
take the order and be parted from his family while young. In the devout
families of Ladakh in India, one son, usually one of the younger ones and
occasionally the eldest or favorite one, is sent to the order to become a
monk. Younger sons are not entitled to inherit property, nor can they share
the same wife in common with their elder brothers. So there is no alterna-
tive but to be sent to a monastery. It is only in cases when boys do not take
the order that daughters are made nuns. There are fewer nuns than
monks.13
Before Tson-kha-pa's reformation, a kind of caste system was observed
among the Lamaist priests who were actually married (although this fact
was not officially recognized) and the priesthood was maintained by heredi-
tary rights. Priests of the Yellow-caps, the reformers, practiced celibacy,
and today, only the red-caps still retain this hereditary custom. Even in
this case, however, the qualification to be a successor is given only to the
son who is at the same time a disciple of his father. Unless he has earned
the described qualification by study and practice, he cannot succeed to the
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priesthood. Hence, the transmission of priesthood is not always by heredity.
Here, too, we can observe the way of thinking which regards the religious
charisma as more important than blood.
In a society where a charisma is regarded important, we cannot expect
educational training to permeate all strata of society. In Tibet, only special
individuals are allowed to write books and articles.14
What then is the character of the Lama hierarchy? It is divided into
two classes: ordinary monks and noble monks. Of these, the "noble" monks
are those who had entered the order through recognition as incarnate
Lamas. Their number is about thirty in each monastery and they are
treated very respectfully because they are believed to be the incarnationsof
virtuous Lamas.I5 Thus the noble monk does not mean the monk born of
the nobility, but one who is personally qualified to be treated as a noble.
Contrary to the manner in which monks of noble families are accorded
special treatment in Japan, the Tibetan lamas placed importance not on
family origin but individual charisma.
Esteem of authority of a specific person, logically underlying Lama
worship, has taken unexpectedly deep root among Tibetans, and can be
noticed in various cultural phenomena.
Tantric Buddhism in India was founded by Indrabhiiti (in the ninth
century A.D.), and was conveyed to Tibet by Atisa, but it has been said by
tradition that many Tantric masters of India, including not only Indrabhiiti
but Saraha, Sabari-pa, and Nagarjuna (tenth century A.D.), composed
many works.I6 Once a specific person comes to be known as an
authority, many treatises are ascribed to him in an accelerating chain
reaction, and he is regarded as an authority in many fields.
Those who twisted and transformed Buddhism in Tibet did not like to
be called "degenerators." In order to justify and authorize the practices
adopted from the Bon religion native to Tibet, they tried to "discover"
hidden revelations allegedly set forth by Padmakara, the establisher of
Tibetan Buddhism. They were all spurious. But the "discoverers" of these
revelations claimed that there had been twenty-five disciples of Padmakara
in the past life. l1
Mar-pa (1012-1°98), the founder of the Bkal}-rgyud-pa sect, visited
India three times, and under the pretext that he had inherited the authority
of Indian Buddhism he was able to establish his own sect. The name of his
sect, Bkal}-rgyud-pa, means "continuity of teaching," implying that the
esoteric teaching was conveyed directly from master to pupil, or from
father to son in the spiritual sense.
In the branches of this sect, founder-worship has prevailed. Images of
the founders of respective branches of the sect have been principal objects
of worship.Is
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In medieval ages a large number of biographies of high priests were
composed besides various compendia of dogma and commentaries. The
biography of Mi-Ia-ras-pa became the pattern of Lama biographies of the
later Bkal).-rgyud-pa sect.19
The idea of the set of Sixteen Arhats was introduced from China (of
the Tang period) to Tibet, and finally the figure of Lha I:Igro-bal).i mgon-
po, the Chief Abbot (1186-1259), surrounded by the Sixteen Arhats,
became popular and prevalent.20
Moreover, in Tibet religious charisma of a specific person has been
closely connected with the belief in transmigration. We can trace the
origin of this belief to an early date.
Tson-kha-pa, the reformer of Tibetan Buddhism, was adored so much
that he was regarded as an incarnation of AvalokiteSvara or MafijusrI
Bodhisattva; he was thought to have passed sixty-two lives before he was
born Tson-kha-pa, the previous lives including those of the kings of India
and Tibet and of Lamas.21
Here the living Lama is regarded as the Absolute. Lama is said to be
the person<!,l manifestation of the three virtues, wisdom, compassion, and
power, each of which is usually held to be represented by the Bodhisattva
MafijusrI, Avalokitesvara, and Guhyaraja, respectively.22 In a yoga practice
called "Biama~i rnal-~byor," mendicants, sitting in front of an image of
Lama, meditate upon the identity of Lama with Vajrasattva, and in accord-
ance with this meditation, they are expected to receive a miracle by which
they can get rid of all the miseries of this world. This way of thinking led
finally to the belief in the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama.
As the mountain at the southernmost edge of India in which
Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva lives is called "Potalaka," the palace of Dalai
Lama in Lhasa is called the Potala Palace. The highest sovereignty of
Tibet was in the hands of the Dalai Lama, while the Bkra-sis Lama
(PalJ-chen bla-ma) possessed merely a part of the territory. According to the
religious idea commonly accepted by Tibetans, however, the Dalai Lama is
believed to be the incarnation of the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, while the
Bkra-sis Lama is that of the Buddha Amitabha. The Dalai Lama has
therefore received an honorific title of "the Holy AvalokiteSvara" UJphags-
pa Spyan-ras-gzigs). On the basis of a common belief in Indian Buddhism
that AvalokiteSvara saves all living beings by means of his incarnations in
thirty-three forms, the Tibetans believe that each Dalai Lama is rein-
carnated in this world in the form of a baby forty-nine days after his
death.23
For the first several generations, each Dalai Lama uttered a prophecy
on the name of the place where he was to be reincarnated after his death,
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and there was no difficulty in discovering his successor. In later days, how-
ever, a Dalai Lama passed away without such a prophecy, and the subordi-
nates were obliged to seek his successor by means of an oracle. Since then
the oracle method has become customary. The most famous place for the or-
acle was Nechung (Gnas-churi) near the Bbras-phuri monastery, followed
by the three monasteries of Bsam-yas, Dgal).-Idan, and Lha-mo. In each of
these monasteries, there was enshrined the Protecting Deity whom the
priest asked for an oracle about the successor to the Dalai Lama. The
decision was made after considering the contents of the messages received
from these four monasteries. Sometimes each messenger announced a differ-
ent oracle. A unanimous choice among the four was hardly to be expected.
Therefore, if there were more than two candidates selected by this method,
the officers nourished them till the age of four or five. During this period,
the candidates were examined on their abilities and behavior before the
officers would render their final decision. If the final decision were still
difficult to make, they would be called to Lhasa where officers selected one
of them by lot. The lot-drawing was held in the public hall in the presence
of high government officers, secular and ordained, and the Chinese ambas-
sador to Tibet. In the process of lot-drawing, however, there was room for
conspiracy. Sometimes the oracle was misled by corruption, sometimes by
bribery of the high officials, or by collusion with the Chinese ambassador in
the lot-drawing. Bribes often held the key to the final decision. "There is no
social disorder because, fortunately, neither the Dalai Lama himself nor
the people know that such conspiracy ever takes place."24
Thus the Dalai Lama, the highest sovereign in both religion and state,
is determined not by hereditary right but by the commonly held belief in
rebirth. Dalai Lama, the holder of the highest religious charisma, should
receive a proper education deserving of his honor, and practice disciplines
strictly. The rules for educating the young Dalai Lama were very strict.
Needless to say, he does not drink liquor. For the first three or four years he
never sees women, not even his mother, and for the rest of his life he does
not associate with women.
Among the successive Dalai Lamas, the fifth and the thirteenth have
been specially respected; their tombs are big. The Fifth made the Yellow
Hats sect the orthodox one of Tibetan Buddhism, and constructed the
Potala Palace; the Thirteenth ruled Tibet for thirty years and resisted the
British Army. His corpse is shrouded with a ton of gold. So, the greatness
of the Dalai Lamas is evaluated according to the measure of successful
worldly achievements, but in the subjective consciousness of common
people they are incarnations of Buddha through and through.
In the beginning of the twentieth century a Tibetan officer said to a
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British colonel, "If the Dalai Lama told me to go to Hell, I would go there
gladly.... Does not the proverb say? 'If told to strike a rock, strike! If told
to go to Hell, go.' "25
The belief in rebirth also plays an important role in determining the
religious charisma of common lamas. Virtuous lamas are believed to be the
incarnations of certain specified lamas of ancient days. Although such
beliefs in Tibet characterize the ways of thinking of its common people,
those who were ambitious for worldly power must have thought in a rather
different way. In previous times, a number of Lamas, and even some Dalai
Lamas, are supposed to have been poisoned. There are some Tibetan
medical works on poisoning. But even poisoners seem to have admitted
religious charisma in the persons whom they wanted to support.
The belief in rebirth or incarnation is, needless to say, of Indian
origin. It was prominent especially among Indian Mahiiyiinists, who be-
lieved in the doctrine that Buddhas and Bodhisattvas manifested them-
selves in various forms in order to save all living beings. But they had no
belief, as in Tibet, that an individual of certain qualifications is the incarna-
tion of a certain Buddha or Bodhisattva of the past. For Indians, the
question was the general possibility of reincarnation, and the admission of
innumerable incarnations. For Tibetans, on the contrary, the problem was
limited to particular personalities of certain qualifications. Here we can
observe the transformation of a thought-pattern of the Indians, who at-
tached importance to universality, into the Tibetan way of thinking, which
attached importance to individual differences. Moreover, this transforma-
tion is observed not in the form of the importance given to a mundane
authority based upon blood or hierarchy as in China and Japan, but to the
religious charisma of the individual, the selection of whom was based upon
the belief in rebirth.
The same way of thinking exerts a great influence on the daily
customs of the Tibetans. Since they attach no great importance to blood
lineage, they are likely to mistreat the body of a deceased in the conduct of
a funeral. "The head is tilted down between the knees, and the knees are
tied firmly to the breast, making the body nothing but a solid mass of
matter which is wrapped up in a dirty blanket and is placed at a corner of
the room. On a fixed day, they hand it over to a carrier at early dawn.
Neither relative nor pupil accompanies it. It is quite different from the
elaborate funeral ceremonies observed in Japan. The Tibetans regard a
body without a spirit as something like a solid lump of clay of no value.
Thus the body is carried near a rocky cavern, where condors live, and is
offered to them for consumption."26
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However, in some Lamaistic areas of Nepal it is customary to throw
corpses into rivers, and occasionally cremate them.27 In the respect that
they do not worship corpses their belief is in common with that of the
Siamese, etc., and to have corpses eaten by vultures is a practice common
with the Parsis.
The Tibetans may not be able to understand the Japanese custom of
regarding the body as the Buddha's image and reciting scriptures in front
of it.28 Here is a contrast in the way of thinking between two peoples who
accepted the same Esoteric Buddhism. The Japanese attaches importance
to blood lineage, while Tibetans completely ignore it.
What is important for the Tibetans is the soul, the substratum of
transmigration. "Generally, at the death of a Lamaist, they never offer in-
cense and flowers for the dead, but ask the fortune-teller about the situation
of the dead in the other world. If he is announced to be with AvalokiteS-
vara, they make an image of the same Bodhisattva and offer incense and
flowers in front of the image."29
There is a ceremony of the returning of the departed soul to this world
observed in Lamaism. It consists of a kind of a mass for the dead similar to
the Japanese Segaki ceremony.
To explain the reason why such an idea has occurred, climatic condi-
tions should be taken into consideration. Chinese or Japanese who once
settled in hereditary agricultural communities wish to return to home
villages to die, or to bury their ashes at native places. However, nomadic
Tibetans or Mongolians, being accustomed to the life of migration, do not
mind forsaking corpses. What they wish is only to be born into a better
world in their after life.
The way of thinking which minimizes the body and esteems the soul
as the subject of human existence occasionally brings cruel practices into
effect. According to the reports of Hedin and other travelers to Tibet, there
is "a sage of the cave." He is reportedly said to enter a cave, enclosing
himself inside it, leaving only an opening sufficient to receive food, and
continues to live in this solitude and place of no light for the rest of his life.
When the supplied food is found untouched, people outside recognize his
entrance into NirviiJ;za, and open the cave in order to perform the funeral
for the sage. Some sages are reported to have lived about five or six years
under such conditions, while another, more than twenty years. Many sages
perform this feat of asceticism and die in the conviction that it is one of the
short ways to liberation.30
Not even the Indians observed such a harsh form of ascetic practice,
which is completely different from the Zen training of Japan. Such asceti-
cism seems possible only in the belief that the soul must be revered even at
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the cost of the body. This way of thinking, i.e. of attaching importance to
the soul as the substratum and of ignoring the body, is also observed in the
manner of keeping Buddhist discipline.
Buddhism, especially Mahayana Buddhism, prohibits eating meat be-
cause of its emphasis on the spirit of compassion to all living things. In
Tibet, however, Buddhists could not help eating meat due to the extreme
climatic and other unfavorable natural conditions. They eat boiled mutton
or yak meat by cutting it into pieces with a knife. Sometimes they eat raw
meat with blood dripping down. Dried meat frozen in winter is also
supplied for the table. Thus Tibetan dishes are full of meat. Even today, it
is reported, people often come across the sight of robed monks purchasing
meat. Thus the precept which prohibited eating meat was not adhered to
in Tibet.31 The only exception is that they never eat fish because they
"don't like the idea of depriving so many fish of their lives." By the same
token, they do not eat birds. They interpreted the precept as follows: that
to kill a big beast like a yak is not sinful because the meat of a yak can
supply enough food for many, while to deprive many small animals like
birds or fish of their lives for the purpose of eating is quite sinful.
Anotner example relevant to the problem is that in Tibet scriptures
are generally written or printed upon paper, and occasionally upon silk as
an excellent writing materia1.32 This use of silk was forbidden in India, for
silk is made by killing silkworms, and therefore regarded as unfit for holy
scriptures. But it is likely that the reason why Tibetans did not mind using
the silk was that the silkworms were killed by somebody else.
However, the thought that a Tibetan should not himself kill even
worms interfered with their economic development. Tibetan peasants dis-
liked the use of scythes, spades, and other metal tools for tillage, for they
would cause the death of worms in the earth.
The tendency to care more for the soul than for this worldly blood
relationship or personal associations also greatly influenced the economic
life of the Tibetans. They have little desire to transmit their personal
property to their relatives after death. The legacy of an unmarried monk is
offered as a donation at his death. (In Japan such a legacy is handed over to
his relatives or disciples.) In the case of a noble monk, the amount of
donation at the time of his death is quite big, since he was in a position to
accumulate a large amount of property. Following the monks' example
laymen, too, donate one third or one fifth of their property after death. And
such a habit of donation is said to make the otherwise poverty-stricken
Tibetan economy run smoothly. Incidentally, donation virtually meant
donation to the religious order.
The order or temples have been endowed with specially sacred
significance. The Indian word "monastery" (vihiira) originally meant "the
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place where (monks and nuns) stay," whereas Tibetans translated it as "the
house for sacred learning" (gtsug-lag khan), endowing it with a special
meaning.33
The way of thinking characterizing the importance of religious cha-
risma can be applied to worldly affairs and political relations. For example,
when the British and the Russians competed for domination of Tibet at the
beginning of this century, a Mongolian lama called Dorjief, who studied in
Russia, approached the Dalai Lama with a special message from the Rus-
sian Emperor and was thereby able to sway the Lhasa Government favor-
ably to the interest of Russia. In order to arouse a pro-Russian feeling
among the Tibetans, he preached "the Pure-Realm theory" and said that
"the Pure Realm" meant Russia, which lay in the West, and that the
Russian Emperor was actually the incarnation of the Lord Amitabha. He
further interpreted Tibet as the land of Avalokitesvara, who is virtually an
incarnation of the Lord Amitabha; he added that since Russia and Tibet
were but one and inseparable, therefore, Tibet should ally herself with
Russia.34 The religious charisma ascribed to a particular personality is more
effective in moving the Tibetans than appealing to economic interests.
The same way of thinking, however, frequently contributes to the
corruption of human morality. Because Esoteric Buddhism permitted
monks to approach women, high priests of the Red Caps were allowed to
have contact with many women, and a woman who bore the child of a lama
and the child itself were both believed to be sacred. Such a belief and
practice led the monks to indulge in promiscuity and created a vitiated
atmosphere. This practice prevailed particularly in the Khams province
and the provinces near Mongolia.
An extreme example in history is the life of Rwa the Translator (from
the middle of the lIth century to the beginning of the 12th century). He
had five Yoga Mothers (i.e., wives) for the practice of Esoteric Buddhism.
When he took a girl of twelve years of age, people loudly condemned him.
But he was composed, saying, "There is no Tantra which makes a Yoga
Mother dispensable."35
Even theft is justified by faith in Lamas. "Long ago, Pliny noted that
the Arabs were addicted both to robbery and to trade. And the same holds
true of some Tibetan tribes, in many ways religious, whose members may
trade abroad peacefully for part of the year and devote themselves to
brigandage nearer home for the rest-an orderly arrangement. Even monks
will go on marauding expeditions. The large monastery of Cha-trin in
SOutheastern Tibet had on its roll many monks who did so, and not once or
twice but habitually. . . . This brigand-priest was talking of coming to
Lhasa to prostrate himself in worship before the Head of the Faith whose
pilgrims he was plundering. But he wished to bring five hundred of his
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rough band with him. The Lama and his Government were quite willing
that he should come, provided that he limited his escort to twenty, a
manageable number. Religious devotion-and no doubt offerings-being
the objective, there was no question of prohibition or punishment."36
When one sticks to the standpoint of esteeming the theological system
of Lamaism as the absolute one, one comes to hate those who are opposed to
it and to regard them as enemies. I:Igos-khri-bzan, being a Buddhist, buried
his opponents alive.37 Even in recent times there were terrible jails attached
to monasteries, and there tortures were inflicted.
The above-mentioned three tendencies are contrary to the original
thought of Buddhism, and yet these evils were conducted owing to the
esteem for the Lamaistic religious and social system as the absolute. While
Buddhism contributed to making the mentality of the Tibetans mild and
meek and to elevate their character, the charismatic authority of Lamaism,
nevertheless, admitted such evils. Here we find some problems, which we
shall explore below.
,
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CHAPTER 30 ABSOLUTE
ADHERENCE TO THE
LAMAIST SOCIAL ORDER
The attitude of absolute submission by a collective mass of people to a
religiously charismatic individual is fully exemplified by the Lamaist social
order.
The historiographies of Tibet, after the establishment of Buddhism,
do not often refer to wars, but concentrate on religious events. To Tibetans
of the past their state did not have as much vital importance as their own
religion.
Tibet is at present within the dominion of the People's Republic of
China. Formerly, however, she was always an independent state, and an
absolute monarchy under the rule of the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama was
the head of Lamaism, and at the same time the political ruler of the
country. Thus he was the ruler of both the religion and the state.
As a nomadic people living in a desert highland, the Tibetans were
originally divided and ruled by several tribal heads. In later days, kings had
arisen among these tribal heads, but they maintained no systematic political
organization. It was Lamaism that organized Tibet for the first time into
One political unit. The role of the Lamaist monks was important in the
making of Tibet and they are sometimes compared with the Catholic
priests in the age of the Germanic migration in the Western history. Till
the end of the 9th century A.D., the sovereignty of Tibet was in the hands of
the king, who protected the monastic order of Lamaism. Later on, however,
the sovereignty was gradually transmitted to the Lamaist high priest.
The theocracy of Lamaism was established by worldly power in the
thirteenth century. When Kublai Khan, the grandson of Genghis Khan,
conquered Tibet, he was converted to Buddhism by the Abbot of the
Sa-skya Abbey. Since this Abbot crowned the Khan as Emperor of China,
he was appointed head of the nationwide order of Tibet by the Khan as a
token of gratitude, and was assigned the rulership of Western Tibet. Since
then, high priests of the Sa-skya sect have held the post of the Imperial
Preceptor of the Yuan (Mongolian) dynasty in succession. With the help
of the Mongolian kingship the Sa-skya dynasty (1270-1345) ruled Tibet.
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From the fifteenth century on, virtual sovereignty was shifted to the
Dalai Lama, who was at the same time the monarch of Tibet, until the
invasion of the Chinese communists in recent years.
The ideas of patriotism and loyalty among the Tibetans were based upon
religious faith. That is to say, Tibetan patriotism was based upon the faith
that Tibet is a sacred religious country and that the Dalai Lama, the
sovereign of Tibet, is an incarnation of the Bodhisattva AvalokiteSvara.
Neither patriotism nor loyalty to the king could therefore exist apart from
Lamaism, and to do something for the sake of the country or king was
synonymous with doing something for the sake of their religion.
In Tibet there was until recently an army of armed monks called "the
Golden Army." What Tibetans were most afraid of in case of an invasion
by a foreign army was not the loss of their own country, but the loss of their
"holy religion."
We can trace to a fairly early time the tendency of certain Tibetan
families to claim the most distinguished personalities as the first who in-
troduced Buddhism to Tibet as well as those who started the monkish
tradition. Some of these families became, in the course of time, the most
powerfuU'The choice of the Dalai Lama as an individual who transmi-
grates could not remain a problem of one individual in the social structure
of Tibet, which is made up of tribes as units. One family, from which came
the eighth and twelfth Dalai Lamas, was ranked as one of the nobles.
When the fourteenth Dalai Lama, the present one, was chosen, all the
members of his family who formerly had been peasants were immediately
appointed nobles, and were given vast areas of public lands. This treatment
is in contradiction to the idea of transmigration, and yet Tibetans did not
take notice of the contradiction.
As Tibet was the Lamaist kingdom, the priests played an important
role both in religious and secular affairs. They were trained in the details of
their religious organizations and actively participated in political matters.
Tibet in the early 20th century was said to have a Central Government
consisting of three premiers and four ministers who controlled both civilian
and military officials in the central and provincial governments. The gov-
ernment was responsible to the Dalai Lama and endeavored to carry out his
will politically as well as religiously. It was decreed that one of the premiers
and one of the ministers must always be a monk. Such a rule was also ob-
served among the posts occupied by sub-officials and local boards. The
number of such officials was about 175 and comprised both priests and
laymen. Among the local boards, the lay-officials took charge of economic
affairs, while the priest-officials took care of religious and educational af-
fairs. Lay-officials were usually in charge of judicial affairs, but sometimes
the priests helped them.
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In the court of the ancient Mongolian ("Yuan") dynasty there was the
institution of the "Imperial Preceptor," and Lamas were especially well
treated. They were very influential, although we do not exactly know to
what extent they interfered with politics.
Buddhist priests in India2 and China had seldom taken part in political
matters directly as government officials. Chinese priests were concerned
only with the administration of religious affairs. In Japan, even the admin-
istration of religious affairs was for most periods in the hands of secular
authorities. Therefore, in the history of Buddhism it can be said that it is
rather an unusual phenomenon to observe Buddhist priests taking an
active part in governmental administration in their official capacity. Also it
is to be observed that in most Buddhist countries a strong political con-
sciousness or controlling force has never developed, with the inevitable
result that an organized hierarchy could not be established. Tibet was an
exceptional case.
What then was the relation between the Lamaist rule and the social
hierarchical order in Tibet?
The hierarchy in Tibet was roughly divided into the nobility and the
commoners. The latter was again divided into three: high, middle, and low,
according to occupational differences. Among them the nomads constituted
the largest group, followed by the peasants and merchants. The artisans
were placed at the lowest level of the Tibetan hierarchy. The nobles, being
descendants of feudal lords, possessed extensive lands, but did not possess
the right to manage them. Their lands were governed by officials sent by
the Central Government. During the reign of the fifth Dalai Lama, at
which time the Central Government was established, feudal lords lost their
lands. However, they obtained the right to become government officials
with the status of nobility. Thus they exclusively occupied the positions of
lay-{)fficials in the government, until recently, when the posts of govern-
ment officials were opened to the commoners as well. On the contrary, any
priest could be a priest-official, irrespective of his origin, nobility or com-
moner, but he was required to be a graduate of the school of priest-officials.
This fact shows the existence Qf a confidential belief in the religious
charisma, besides the feudalistic way of thinking in Tibet.
Laws which should be applied equally were favorable to the Lamas.
Laws were interpreted for the benefit of the Lamas whenever difficulties
arose between clergy and laity.
Influenced probably by this idea of hierarchical order, the Tibetan
language retains honorific forms to some extent. Personal pronouns differ
according to the speaker's attitude towards the person spoken of. Some
nouns and verbs have their honorific form besides the usual one. For
example, these are pronouns of the first person singular ("I") :
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na
ned
nos
hdag
kho ho
khomo
na-ran }
na-hdag
na-iiid
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This is the most common form and can be used by every-
body.
This term seems to be preferred in elegant speech.
This is very common in modern letter writing, at least in
Western Tibet.
Originally it means "self." When speaking to superior
persons, it occurs very often in books, but has disappeared
from common speech, except in the province of T san.
Used by men in easy conversation with persons of equal
rank, or to inferiors.
Used by women.
Myself.
As pronouns of the second person singular ("you"):
khyod
khyed
iiid-ran
Used in books in addressing even the highest persons,
but in modern conversation only among equals or to in-
feriors.
Elegant and respectful, especially in books.
In modern speech the usual respectful pronoun of ad-
dress, like "Sie" in German.
As pronouns of the third person singular ("he," "she"):
de
kho
khon
kho ma
sku-shahs
rin-po-che
Generally used in books.
Seldom occurs in books.
Common to both the written and the spoken language,
and used, at least in the latter, as respectful.
Used in referring to ladies.
(Literally, "respected; body-feet.") His Excellency.
(Literally, "jewel.") His Majesty, His Holiness.
"The predilection of Eastern Asiatics for a system of ceremonials in
the language is encountered also in Tibetan. There is one separate class of
words, which must be used in reference to the honored person, when
spoken to as well as spoken of. To this class belong, besides the pronouns
iiid ran, khyed, khon, all the respectful terms by which the body or soul, or
parts of the same, and all things or persons pertaining to such a person, and
even his actions, must be called."3 In Sanskrit they say, "I would like to see
the king" CTlijiinam aha1J1 dra~tukiima~), whereas the Tibetan translation
runs literally: "I seek for seeing the face of the king." CBdag ni rgyal po~i
shal mthon har ~tshallo.Y'
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In Tibetan, words used in addressing persons (like "Hello" in English)
differ with the status of the persons addressed-"kye" to kings, "ka-ye" to be
a friend, "kva" to an employee, and "ba-ye" to a servant.6 When they
address their father, they say, "Oh! God!";6 occasionally they say, "Oh! God
(Iha)!" instead of "YoU!"T In order to show respect or to be elegant, they use
nouns of different kinds, for example: sku (honored body) instead of Ius
(body), "(Respected) father (yab) and mother (yum)" instead of "father
(pha) and mother (ma)." There is a class of verbs which show respect. A
class of what might be called elegant terms is used when conversing with
an honored person (or also in referring to a high person), such as "bgyid pa"
instead of "byed-pa" (to do); "mchis-pa" instead of "yin-pa" (to be). For
example, Ius, the Tibetan term for "body," is replaced by sku when it
denotes 11 body of a respected person; e.g., sans-rgyas-kyi sku, Buddha's
Body.s
Due to the absolute power of Lamaism, the Tibetans accept calmly
what would seem quite irrational to the eyes of modern people. For ex-
ample, all the priests and monks in Tibet, more than 400,000 in number,
have no tax duty. Lhasa is a tax-free area because it is a holy place. "Such
an arrangement seems quite unfair to the people living outside Lhasa who
are suffering from heavy taxes. But to suffer is, they believe, the result of
karma in former births, and owing to their services to lamas in this life,
they will be able to attain a happy life in the next birth in accordance with
the disappearance of karma."9
Because of the unique culture of Lamaism, the Tibetans regard their
country religiously and as something unique, and have therefore developed
aconsciousness of exclusiveness in relation to non-Tibetans.
First of all, the Tibetans call their country "the land of the lotus
Hower." They compare the Chos-khan Palace of Lhasa to the calyx of a lotus
Hower, and the mountains surrounding the lands as its petals. The calyx of
a lotus flower signifies the Buddha's seat or Paradise. This idea is akin to
the fact that the Japanese followers of Esoteric Buddhism consider Mt.
Koya the seat of the central monastery of Esoteric Buddhism in Japan, as
the lotus flower with the eight petals.
The Tibetans believe that Tibet is the Pure Land of AvalokiteSvara.
They say, Buddha Sakyamuni once gave prophecy to AvalokiteSvara, say-
ing: "Beyond the Himalayas there live people to be saved. Go there in-
stantly and save them." This prophecy is recorded in the ManjuSri-
paramartha-namasamgiti.l0 Here, they think that what is meant by "the land
beyond the Himalayas" is Tibet, and hence Tibet is the world entrusted to
AvalokiteSvara, so that the Tibetans and AvalokiteSvara stand in the rela-
tion of people to be saved and their savior.
It was probably due to this conviction that the Tibetans have come to
~.
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regard the successive Dalai Lamas, the sovereigns of Tibet, as the reincarna-
tions of AvalokiteSvara, and called their palace in Lhasa, "Potala," after the
.name of AvalokiteSvara's Pure Land. They are pleased to have been born
in such a holy land of Avalokitesvara and desire to be reborn in Tibet. We
cannot underestimate the desire of the common Tibetan for rebirth in the
Pure Land of Amitabha or in the Tu~ita Heaven of Maitreya. Generally,
however, the Tibetans regard their country as an ideal world for religious
reasons.
Tibetan exclusivism is the result of their idealization of their country.
It is motivated by a religious idea, rather than by the thought of territorial
possession as among other peoples. Although they have no idea of "the
centre of the world civilization," they believe that their country is the
proper land for Buddhism. They further believe that due to the Buddha's
grace, this Buddhist land is secure, and even if a disaster were to occur, it
would easily be removed, and everyone would be able to enjoy equally the
life of peace and quietness; therefore, if foreigners entered this land, the
pure Buddhist land would be instantly spoiled, the people would lose their
happiness, receive the Buddha's punishment, and fall into misery forever.
Such a strong belief is the basis of their exclusivism.ll
Thus the Tibetans prohibited the entrance of foreigners into their
country. When they found strange travelers, they would at once chase
them out of Tibet. Some explorers were killed by them. Tibetans who
tried to invite foreigners were punished in a cruel manner.
~.
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CHAPTER 31 SHAMANISTIC
TENDENCIES
~
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The Bon Religion prevailed in Tibet prior to the introduction of
Buddhism. This religion is a form of Shamanism, originating somewhere
in Central Asia, and was probably conveyed to Tibet in the course of tribal
migration. It is animistic in character. It teaches that there exist countless
free spirits in the universe, whose activities cause good or ill fortune.
Through prayer, people ask these spirits to remove ill fortune and bring
good fortune. These spirits reveal their will to people through mediums. At
first a medium performs a ceremony in order to induce the spirit to enter
his body. When the spirit transports itself into the body ofthe medium, the
latter loses his personality, the spirit reveals itself, and utters a command or
prophecy through the mouth of the medium. The belief is that the spirit
sometimes performs various miracles and feats which task the imagination.
Thus it cures people from illness and turns misfortune into a blessing.
There was no organized doctrine in the Bon Religion.1
The introduction of Buddhism caused the Bon Religion to decline.
But accepting Buddhist doctrines, it still lives side by side with Lamaism in
the hearts of the Tibetans. The relation between the Bon Religion and
Lamaism is quite similar to that between Shintoism and Buddhism in
Japan. There are also similar characteristics observable in both Shinto
ceremonies and those of the Bon Religion. In the Bon Religion, there is no
shrine as in Japan, but the place where gods are thought to live is regarded
as holy; something like a tower is built in such a sacred place, and the way
to that place is adorned with sacred rope ("shimenawa" in Japanese). (In
Shintoism, shrine construction was an art that developed at a much later
period.) Sacred dance and music in Japan and in the Bon Religion are also
very similar. A Lama priest who visited Japan some years back expressed his
impression when he observed the Kagura-dance held at the Ise shrine,
saying, "It is just like the sacred dance of the Bon Religion."z Nowadays
the Bon Religion accepts Buddhist terminology, compiles scriptures, and
maintains temples.
What then is the difference of the ways of thinking between the Bon
Religion and Shintoism, both of which are of shamanistic origin? The
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answer is not a simple one. We can only compare some of the characteristics
of both religions in a rather superficial manner. Respect for purity and
emphasis on simplicity observed in Shinto are absolutely lacking in the
Bon Religion. Not only the Bon Religion, but the Tibetans in general
reveal a fondness for complexities of ornament and colors in decorating
things, particularly in their paintings. Reverend Aoki, who lived in Tibet a
long time, confessed that he could not understand the Tibetan characters.
The virtue of love, though it is sometimes said to be lacking in Shintoism,
is surely emphasized particularly in the medieval age of Japan under the
name of "compassion" (karurzii) due to the influence of Buddhism. But in
Tibet, despite their acceptance of Buddhism, people in the mountain areas
show a much more violent character. The existence of cruel penalties
justifies this statement. Of course, the Tibetans, especially the educated
ones, apart from the primitive mountain inhabitants, are quite gentle.
Although the cruel forms of penalties which existed in the past came under
a prohibition by the 13th Dalai Lama, nevertheless, the long existence of
cruel forms of punishment suffices to reveal to us an aspect of Tibetan
customs. Th.e seemingly cruel behavior of the Tibetans is probably due to
their habit of hunting and their nomadic life.
Buddhism, which took the place of the Bon Religion, was not entirely
alien to the latter but quite compatible with it in many respects. Being of
esoteric character, it was, in a sense, more shamanistic than the Bon
Religion, and thus was able to replace the Bon Religion. Most scriptures
translated into the Tibetan language are those concerning Esoteric Bud-
dhism. This newly introduced Esoteric Buddhism was a developed form of
Indian Tantrism, but it attached importance to the practice of ceremonies
associated with alcoholic drinking, magic, and sexual enjoyment. Tson-
kha-pa, in his reform program, tried to remove these elements from Lama-
ism, but he was not able to uproot them completely.
On the contrary, traditional, conservative Buddhism which prohibited
enchantment, ceremony, magic, and divination did not find room in Tibet.
In the Tibetan Tripitaka, there are included thirteen scriptures translated
from the Piili Canon. Out of these thirteen, nine scriptures belong to the
Paritta-sa1pgaha, i.e., the collection of scriptures and phrases which are
believed, among Southern Buddhists, to be effective enough to drive out
evils and invite good luck, and are equivalent to the Mantra-p#aka of the
Dharmiikara schooL3 It seems that the Tibetans selected only passages of
magical character out of the Piili scriptures of early Buddhism.
The practice of dhyiina-meditation was also introduced into Tibet, but
it was observed merely among the more sincere monks in monasteries,
while the people in general relied upon esoteric ceremonies.4 The people
believe in the existence of the demon of ill health which invades the
SHAMANISTIC TENDENCIES 335
human body. When they fall ill, they ask a priest to tell their fortune and
then, worshipping the gods and Buddhas, they offer a prayer to remove the
illness. The objects of their worship are not limited to the Buddha Sakya-
muni and Amitabha, but include Mahavairocana, Mahabhai~ajyaguru, and
all the other Buddhas and Bodhisattvas of various worlds in ten directions,
as well as the gods in heaven and on earth, demons and serpents. In a
Lamaist temple, these objects of worship are enshrined side by side without
order. Among them, the gods and demons are mostly of Bon origin. As the
Tibetans absorbed Buddhism, they came to be regarded as the protectors of
Buddhism.
These gods and demons are believed to take possession of selected
persons, who thus become mediums or magicians. When a medium or
magician is consulted on marriage, a journey, or on the fortune of a
newborn child, he will be observed, with bloodshot eyes and foaming
mouth, uttering words and sentences scarcely comprehensible, which are
interpreted afterwards in a horoscope.
The Tibetan belief in demons exists side by side with modern tech-
nology. In their belief, there is a demon of eclipses who deprives the sun or
moon of light. In order to kill the demon, they perform a ceremony against
the demon, recite charms, and discharge a gun towards the eclipsed sun or
moon. Unless this is done, they are convinced that the sun or the moon will
lose its light and the world would become dark forever. 5
Buddhism was accepted by the Tibetans only to the degree that it
adapted itself to the Tibetan ways of thinking. Consequently, Lamaist
priests were almost indifferent to the propagation of the Buddhist doctrine.
They scarcely engaged in missionary work. Even in Lhasa, preaching was
held only two or three times a year and the number of those who attended
the sermon was not more than two or three hundred at a time. "The
experience of truth is, in Lamaism, a secret, and hence, to preach to the
common people is considered rather a debasement of the truth."6
Thus the common people7 were almost indifferent to sermons. There
were exceptional cases, however. For example, families of high position
would invite an intimate lama to their home on special occasions to hear
him. In Tibet, preaching did not mean propagation, but was merely a
part of a ceremony. On the other hand the recitation of scriptures was
very popular among the Tibetans. Every home invited lamas for this
purpose.
The unique method for seeking a new Dalai Lama seems to be
somehow related to the ancient shamanistic way of thinking. According to
the viewpoint of the Tibetans, Lamas must be possessed of a supernatural
pOwer resulting from their perfect practice in Esoteric Buddhism which
makes them immortal. Therefore their death means merely a change of
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body or the shift of a place for living and going from one body to another.
Thus, the Tibetans seek for a newborn child at the death of a Lama,
welcome him as the reincarnated Lama, and render service with a pious
attitude to him as if to the former Lama. Thus a religious custom unique to
the Tibetans was established.
The unification of twelve Tibetan tribes was said to have been caused
in the past by magical power. When Buddhism was established in Tibet,
kings decided state affairs by resorting to lottery and dreams.s
The same shamanistic method was used until recently even in state
affairs. The state magician of the Tibetan Government, who lived in the
Nechung (Gnas-chmi.) monastery, had once influenced the course of Ti-
bet's internal and external policy by his predictions. His greatest influence
was seen when a search was conducted for a new Dalai Lama. His office
was established during the reign of the fifth Dalai Lama. A very fateful part
was played by one of the State Magicians in the political developments
which led up to the British military expedition into Tibet in 1904. The
State Oracle was consulted regarding the measures to be taken, and he
suggested. that a certain mountain, situated a short distance within the
Sikkimese territory, should be occupied by the Tibetan troops, as this
mountain, by its magical qualities, would stop further advances by the
British. The move, however, did not meet with success and the Tibetan
troops were easily defeated. He seems to have been still of the opinion that
eventually the Tibetan army would be victorious. Therefore, the Tibetan
Government refused to negotiate with the advancing British forces for a
long time. This policy was reversed only after Lhasa had been captured.
The Dalai Lama removed the State Magician from his office because of his
false prophecies.9
CHAPTER 32 LOGICAL
TENDENCIES
The Tibetan language belongs to the same family as the Chinese, and
originally was not very suitable for the expression of abstract ideas. For
example, it had no word for "size," a concept which can only be expressed
in Tibetan by "big and small" (che-chun). Under the influence of Sanskrit,
however, Thon-mi-saJ1lbhota systematized the Tibetan language and gave
it, to some extent, a more logical character; this is most clearly shown in
the mode of the acceptance of Buddhism by the Tibetans.
First, we shall examine this logical character as it appeared in the
Tibetans' method of translating Sanskrit. If a Sanskrit word contained two
ideas, they are expressed in two words in the Tibetan language. For
example, the Sanskrit word pari1;ziima, which means both the process of
changing and its result, is translated into Tibetan as yons-su ~gyur-ba and
y01is-su gyur-pa, respectively. Thus the Tibetans distinguish the result of
an action from its process.
A long Sanskrit compound word that is difficult to analyze is often
explained clearly in Tibetan. For example: "Buddha-k~etra-vyuha-ananta­
prm;zidhiina-prasthiina-parigrhita"l (buddha-land-adornment-unlimited-vow-
entrance-being embraced), a Bahuvrihi-compound showing a qualification
of the Bodhisattva, is translated into Tibetan in the following way: sans-
rgyas-kyi shin-gi bkod-pa mtha~-yas-par smon-pa-la ~jugs-pas Y01is-su
gzun-ba. This translation states clearly that "(a Bodhisattva who is) em-
braced by (the mind) enters into the vow for unlimited adornment of the
Buddha's land." Thus Tibetan is indispensable for understanding Buddhist
Sanskrit texts. The Indians, using Sanskrit, which is replete with technical
logical terms, produced obscure expressions by using too many compounds,
while the Tibetans, using a primitive and less logical language, made it pos-
sible for us to understand such expressions through their language. We
cannot but acknowledge the efforts of the Tibetans, who were fairly suc-
cessful in expressing the logic and the exactness of the Sanskrit words
through the medium of the Tibetan language, which is generally far from
having any logical clarity.2 (The efforts of the Tibetans in this respect may
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suggest that the Japanese improve the structural character of their language
along more logical lines.)
The same logical tendency is observed also in the Tibetans' way of
accepting Buddhist ideas. The Tibetans translated a good number of Indian
Buddhist works on logic (Nyaya). The Sde-dge edition of the Tibetan
Tripitaka contains 66 works on Nyaya, some of which are quite volumi-
nous. It is in remarkable contrast to the fact that the Chinese Tripi!aka
retains only a few Nyaya texts, e.g., the Yin-ming cheng-li-men-lun
(Nyiiyamukha), the Yin-ming-ju-cheng-li-lun (Nyiiyaprallesaka) , all of
which are simple textbooks. These Tibetan translations are indispensable
for the study of Buddhist logic, in view of the fact that many Sanskrit
originals are lost.3
The Nyaya doctrine introduced into Tibet was mainly that of Dhar-
makirti, who dealt with epistemology. The Tibetans are said to have
conducted a critical examination of the theory of direct perception
(pratyak~a, miwn-sum) taught by him.
The Tibetans utilized the Nyaya doctrine for practical purposes.
Discussions were held among student-monks in the monasteries by means
of the Indian logic of dialogue in order to examine the Buddhist doctrine, a
procedure which was rather different in China and Japan where logic
remained merely a branch of auxiliary learning in the preparation of
making a commentary on one of the Buddhist texts, but was not actually
put into full practice.
The course of logic in Lamaist monasteries continues for about four
years,4 during which time students are required to learn by heart all the
two thousand verses of the Pramii1!alliirttika (Critique on knowledge), the
masterpiece of Dharmakirti.5 This text is regarded as the basic scripture
(mula) on logic, and is the only text in Tibet concerning logic written by
an Indian 10gician.6 There are a lot of Tibetan commentaries on it, some of
which present rather unique theories. The Tibetans study them by means
of summaries composed by Tibetan logicians of the ten schools. Despite the
existence of many commentaries by Indian writers, the Tibetans study
logic only through the commentaries and summaries made by their own
fellow countrymen and pay little attention to those of Indian origin.
Notable here is the fact that only the Pramii1!alliirttika of Dharmakirti
is studied, so that all the other works by him, and by Dharmottara (who
developed the Buddhist logic established by DiIinaga and Dharmakirti),
are almost forgotten by the Tibetan logicians. Why is this so? According to
Vostrikov, the Tibetans attached special importance to Chapter II of the
Pramii1!alliirttika, which discusses validity of knowledge in general, al-
though in actuality, it is a commentary on the verses concerning the prayer
to the Buddha written by DiIinaga, and is devoted to the discussion of Ma-
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hayana Buddhism designed to prove that the Buddha is the Absolute, the
Omniscient (sarvajiia), and the Manifested Knowledge (pramanabhuta).
In other words, in this chapter Buddhism is defended and established as a
religion. Therefore, the Tibetans' attitude toward logic was basically re-
ligious; logic was merely an "ancilla religionis," the handmaid of religion, so
far as they were concerned. Therefore, the most suitable and acceptable
section of the book was this chapter which attempted to establish a pure
faith in the Omniscient and Absolute through a critical examination of the
matter while Dharmakirti's other works and those of Vasubandhu, Din-
naga, and Dharmottara, were conceived to have taken the standpoint of
agnosticism so far as their analysis of the Buddha as the Omniscient was
concerned.
Although this view expressed by Vostrikov has been accepted by
Stcherbatsky, it is still uncertain whether it reveals the true state of mind of
the Tibetans. Two schools of thought existed in Tibet concerning the
relation between logic and religion. Kun-dga~-rgyal-mtshan (1I82-125I,
the fifth Great Lama of the Sa-skya monastery, alias Sa-skya PageJita), the
founder of one of the schools of logic in Tibet, was of the opinion that logic
is a secular science and contains, like medical science and mathematics,
not a single element of Buddhism. The same opinion was held by the
famous historian, Bu-ston-Rin-po-che. On the contrary, the Dge-Iugs-pa
Sect (the Yellow Caps), which is the only powerful sect today, rejects this
opinion and maintains that the logic of Dharmakirti offers a firm founda-
tion to Buddhism as a religion.7
Actually, however, logic did not develop very far in Tibet. Dhar-
makirti's system was its final development. His relation to Tibetan logic
can be compared to that of Aristotle's to European logic; and Tibetan works
on logic are similar to those of Scholasticism in medieval Europe. Their
main interest was in the strict definition of technical terms, establishment
of scholastically detailed rules for their use, and the expression of all kinds
of scientific thinking by means of syllogisms.
Logic is regarded in Tibetan monasteries as the fundamental study.
School courses begin with logic. A textbook on logic used in a monastery
starts with the following sentences:
Itkha-dog yin-na clkar-po yin-pas khyab zer-na
pad-ma-ra-ga kha-dog-chos-can dkar-po yin-par thal
kha-dog yin-pas phyir
rtags ma-grub
c*i phyir--"
(If it is asked) "Must it be white if it were a color"
Proposition: (It follows:) itA ruby possessed of color is white."
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Reason: Because it is (possessed of) color.
(To this argument, the answer:) The evidence is not established.
(Questioner:) Why?
As it can be observed from the above catechism, the textbook is here going
to teach an error contained in the argument with respect to general and
special concepts. To our surprise, this textbook is used in Tibetan monas-
teries for the exercise of children of about ten years of age.
Tibetan lama-students often conduct a symposium in the same man-
ner as in India, according to the manner of the Nyaya-dialogue, and the
victors are awarded prizes. Thus logic is utilized in Tibet as the rule for
expediting discussions.
The logical and systematical way of thinking is also evident in the
way of accepting the st'inyatii-theory, the fundamental doctrine of Ma-
hayana Buddhism. The Prajiiiipiiramitii, the principal scripture of this
theory, is quite a long unsystematic one. Maitreyaniitha (4th century A.D.)
organized its contents and composed a commentary called the Abhisa-
mayiilankiira, on which Haribhadra again wrote commentaries.s De-
pending solely on the commentaries of Haribhadra, the Tibetans attempt
to understand the Perfection of Wisdom (Prajiiiipiiramita).
It was Nagarjuna (2d century A.D.) who gave a philosophical basis to
the theory of siinyatii. However, his Madhyamaka-kiirikii does not main-
tain a system in spite of the fact that it shows a sharp logical approach.
Therefore, the Tibetans rather prefer the Madhyamakiivatiira of Can-
draklrti of the Nagarjuna school to Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka-kiirikii
itself, because the former discusses the Miidhyamika theory in a more
organized manner. Moreover, it is noteworthy that those texts liked by the
Tibetans are written according to the rule of Nyaya logic. Even the texts
on grammar are explained systematically by means of the Nyayic
argument.9
According to Reverend Tada, the subjects mainly studied in the
monasteries are the Mantras, Nyaya, and Abhidharma philosophy. Works
on history are not read so much, although a fairly good number of works
on this subject are written by the Tibetans. Among the works con-
cerning Hlnayana Buddhism, the Abhidharmakosa is read and studied
in particular. As for Vijiiana (mind-only) theory, the Trisvabhiiva-nirdda is
carefully studied as they believe it to be the best to lead one to emancipa-
tion, while almost no attention is paid to the Trimsikii and the Vimsatikii
of Vasubandhu with the exception of the commentaries written on them
by Tsori-kha-pa. Every morning, the Dalai Lama recites the Abhisamayiilmi-
kiira, the Madhyamakiivatiira, and the Pramiirzaviirttika, whose contents he
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knows by heart perfectly, and he reads the texts on Esoteric Buddhism in
the evening.
The logical proclivities of the Tibetans made them decline Chinese
Zen Buddhism, at the Council of Lhasa (792 A.D.), and accept the more
logically organized system of Indian Buddhism.10
The Tibetans show their logical character in their critical attitudes
even towards the Esoteric Buddhism introduced from India. Mahayana
Buddhism in general formulates the theory of the Triple Body of Buddha:
(1) the Absolute Body (dharmakiiya) being the universal truth itself, (2)
the Body of Bliss (satpbhogakiiya) being the body endowed with perfect
virtues as the result of religious practice in the previous lives, and (3) the
Apparitional Body (nirmii1;Ulkiiya) being the incarnation manifested in this
world in order to preach the doctrine for the sake of living beings. Moreover
it maintains that to preach the doctrine to living beings is the work of the
Body of Bliss or the Apparitional Body, but not of the Absolute Body. In
Esoteric Buddhism, however, the doctrine is asserted and preached by the
Absolute Body (Dharmakiiya) as the ultimate truth, and this is regarded as
showing the philosophical superiority of Esoteric Buddhism over other
systems. The Tibetans at the beginning accepted this theory as it was
taught. (The case is the same with the Shingon school in Japan.) But the
Yellow Caps, the reformers of Tibetan Buddhism, refused to accept this
traditional theory, saying:
"The Vajrasutra of Kalacakra of the Anuttara-yogatantra school, to
which we pay our highest respect, was taught by Buddha Sakyamuni at
Dhanyakataka on the request of King Candrabhadra of SanlVara State in
the north. (The theory that the Dharmakaya itself preaches the doctrine)
is not based on historical facts. It is fantastic and quite contrary to the facts
to maintain such a theory. It is merely a product of verbal expression.
Therefore we cannot accept that theory."ll
Referring to this point, Reverend Kawaguchi commented as follows:
"If this theory (of the Yellow Caps) is acknowledged, the doctrine of
the Old Sect of Shingon Esoterics of Japan will lose its ground. The
preaching of the True Body (Dharmakaya) is one of the important ele-
ments with which they maintain themselves to be superior to other sects.
In reality, the preaching of the True Body (Dharmakaya) is difficult to
maintain unless it was preached by the Body of Bliss. As far as the
Dharmakaya is regarded as the abstract truth pervading the universe, it is
difficult to maintain, without encountering a contradiction, that it is en-
dowed with the power to preach, because the all-pervading truth is one
and absolute, while the activity of preaching requires such entities as the
subject and object."
c
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It was probably the spirit of pursuing logical thoroughness that caused
the Tibetans to assume such a critical attitude as that shown III the doctrine
of the Yellow Caps.
Not all the Tibetans can be characterized as logical, but it is at least
clear that the intellectuals among them were aiming at a logical exactness
in thinking and writing.
Above is an outline or a brief set of remarks concerning the character-
istics of the Tibetan ways of thinking, extracted from limited sources. The
author believes, however, that within these pages can be found some of the
unique characteristics of the ways of thinking of the Tibetans in compari-
son with those of other Eastern peoples.
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It is a commonplace of the history of ideas that ideas become modi-
fied in different cultural contexts. Hence, an important clue to the pe-
culiar features distinguishing one culture from another consists in dis-
cerning the modifications of ideas assimilated by each culture and
transmitted in a new form to the other. Now Buddhism, with its moral
and religious ideas for the spiritual guidance of individuals and whole
peoples, became modified as it passed from India through China to
Japan, where it has become an essential part of the cultural history of
Japan and of the ways of thinking of its millions of people.
We are going to examine some salient features of Japanese ways of
thinking in various phases of its cultural history, beginning with the in-
fluence of the older Chinese language and culture. The clearest evidence
of this influence is seen in the fact that in the past Japanese thinkers ex-
pressed abstract notions as a rule through the use of the Chinese charac-
ters. That is, the Japanese, without abandoning their native language,
had to resort to the Chinese script whenever they wished to convey ab-
stract ideas in writing. The influence of the Chinese ideas embodied in
the script upon Japanese patterns of thought was consequently enormous.
It was through the Chinese version of the sacred scriptures (sutras) of
India and other philosophical writings that the Japanese first came in
contact with Buddhism and Indian thought.1
Chinese writing was introduced into Japan about 1400 years ago. Up
to the Suiko period (6th century), Chinese had been used only by a small
group of specialists who had scarcely any influence on the native tongue.
With the beginning of direct contact with China and the advent of the
Sui and Tang civilization (6th-9th centuries), the number of those who
read and spoke Chinese increased greatly; we may well assume that Chi-
nese words were used very often in the daily conversations of the ruling
cIass.2 At this early date, however, the first Chinese words adopted in
Japanese were, for the most part, nouns. In the Heian period (897-1185)
verbs and adverbs such as nenzu (meditate), gusu (to be equipped),
kechienni (conspicuously), yuni (elegantly), sechini (acutely), and later
«
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shiuneshi (to be exquisite) and sozoku (to dress oneself) came into use
with Japanese inflections. The tendency to adopt Chinese words grew
stronger as time passed. In the late Heian and the Kamakura period
(1185-1333) which was the age of popular Buddhism, imported Chinese
words were passed down orally by the monks to the common fold, and
even the uneducated began using them.s In the Tokugawa period (1600-
1867) the number of Chinese words in the spoken language increased
more than ever before,4 but it was in the period following the Meiji Restora-
tion (1868), when the doors of Japan were opened to the rest of the
world and rapid progress was made in education, that new words made by
compounding Chinese characters were used more abundantly. A large
number of entirely new Chinese words were coined to represent the ideas
of Western sciences, techniques, and inventions.
In the world of scholarship, the most educated Japanese in ancient
times, the Buddhist monks and Confucian scholars, published their
works in the Chinese language. Only in the Kamakura period (c. 12th-
14th century) did books on religious and philosophical thought begin to
appear in the native language, and even such original 18th-century
thinkers as Nakamoto Tominaga, the anti-traditionalist, and Baien Miura,
the logician, left works written in Chinese. As specialists have recog-
nized, even Japanese Buddhism, which was practically a national religion,
was, "when viewed from the larger standpoint of Buddhist history, a mere
branch of Buddhism growing out of the Buddhism of China."5 Many
Buddhists had formerly regarded Japanese Buddhism as identical with
Chinese Buddhism, and the multifarious sects in Japan were thought to
be merely offshoots of Chinese sects of Buddhism.
Buddhism in Japan, on the other hand, exercised little or no influ-
ence upon Chinese Buddhism. In 988 A.D. the Japanese Buddhist monk
Eshin (Genshin) attempted with some success to introduce his doctrine
into China; his book djo-Yoshu (Compendium of Teachings Concerning
Paradise and Purgatory), which called "upon all persons, believers and
unbelievers alike, to join hands with the author for the purpose of attain-
ing a rebirth in the Land of Extreme Happiness," created a temporary
stir among the Buddhists of the Sung Dynasty. This, however, was one
of the few instances in which the Japanese were able to have any influence
on Chinese Buddhism. The Buddhism of Japan, then, grew up under
the domination of Chinese Buddhism. There was always a conscious
effort on the part of Japanese Buddhists to identify their religion with
that of China.
How are we to explain this prevalence of Chinese culture in Japan's
past? Shall we say it was the outcome of an urge to imitate slavishly the
superior culture of China?
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As the histories of other peoples illustrate, it is seldom the case that
a backward people willingly accepts the culture derived from a more ad-
vanced people. There are generally other conditions in the recipient
culture which will make acceptance of the foreign culture feasible. As we
shall point out in discussing Japanese statements of reasoning and judg-
ment, there existed a marked similarity among certain features of Japanese
and Chinese ways of thinking. And we find that beside certain similarities
in the social structures and economic techniques of the two countries,
other conditions help explain why the ways of thinking of the Japanese
at that time also favored the adoption of Chinese culture. It seems as if
the similar patterns of the social life of the two peoples, accompanied by
their development in a similar climate and environment, tended to pro-
duce similar ways of thinking.
Kanzan Matsumiya (1686-1780), a Japanese Confucian scholar, em-
phasized this environmental factor when he said, "China is not far from our
land, and we see that Chinese and Japanese manners and customs do not
differ greatly. Confucianism and Shintoism have therefore much in com-
mon."6 Matsumiya in this work also speaks of the similarity of Chinese
"customs and manners" as compared with those of the people of India.
Although the traditional School of Japanese Classics in the feudal period
was wont to stress the difference between the Japanese and Chinese men-
talities and their ways of thinking, we should find in a broader perspective
more points of similarity than points of difference.
In spite of its overwhelming influence, however, Chinese thought
was not accepted in its pristine form by the Japanese.7 Thus the influence
of Chinese thought on the life and thought of the Japanese was quite
different from its influence on the culture of the Chinese. The same can
be said of Indian Buddhist thought, as it affected Chinese and Japanese
culture respectively. Though Confucian scholars and Buddhist monks in
Japan had a considerable reading knowledge of Chinese, their interpreta-
tions were often distortions of the original texts. Such distortions were the
result either of ignorance of the Chinese language or of deliberate mis-
representation for the sake of making the texts conform to Japanese ways
of thinking and living.
The Chinese language differs from the Japanese language in its origin
and structure. It was a task of considerable difficulty for the Japanese to
master the Chinese language, which employed as the means of expression
elaborately developed characters. It appears that even the official students
sent to China by the Japanese court in the Heian period (9th-12th cen-
tury) were not able to understand Chinese fully.
The eight celebrated monks sent to China by the court in this pe-
riod, Saicho, Kiikai, Engyo, Jogyo, Ennin, Eun, Enchin, and Shiiei, had
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no facilities for studying the Chinese language before their departure for
China; moreover, their sojourns in China were generally too brief for
them to learn to speak Chinese. They communicated with the Chinese by
depending mainly on the written language. Consequently, they resorted to
collecting Buddhist documents and acquiring Buddhist ceremonial arti-
cles instead of listening to lectures on Buddhist doctrine. Saicho took with
him an interpreter, but others did not. They had to admit their inability
to converse orally; one of them says, "I could write Chinese, but not speak
it. Therefore, when I had a question to ask, I wrote it out"; and another
says, "I could not speak the Chinese language, but could write it. I had a
pad brought to me (whenever I wanted to ask a question) and wrote on
it."8 Hence, it is plain that the Japanese scholars had considerable diffi-
culty in understanding the Chinese language.
It is important to note that the Japanese frequently misinterpreted
the original Chinese texts. This misinterpretation of the sources for the
transmission of Chinese thought is one of the most significant phenomena
in the history of Japanese thought. The Japanese acquired many of the
best cultural and intellectual products of Chinese thought, but it seems
that they did not always feel obliged to conform strictly to the Chinese
ways of thinking. The Japanese translators of these Chinese writings
would, knowing that the Chinese language has no rigid grammar, make
very free interpretations of Chinese texts, adding ideas of their own for
their own purposes. It was natural that the more studious and disinterested
monastic Buddhist scholars in Nara, ancient capital of Japan, and Mt.
Hiei, a center of Buddhist studies, were able to read and write Chinese
with accuracy because their own thought conformed to Chinese ways of
thinking. This, however, was not the case with the preachers who propa-
gated Buddhist thoughts to the Japanese people. The closer to the Japa-
nese public the mind of the preacher was, the greater was his deviation
from the Chinese source texts. For example, Shinran,9 the great founder
(1173-1262) of the Jodo Shin sect of Buddhism, was frequently inaccurate
in his reading of the original Chinese texts, a fact pointed out even
by scholars today of the orthodox Jodo Shin sect/o upholding the tradi-
tional doctrines. Dogen (1200-1253),11 the great Zen master, also put
forth interpretations that betray his disregard of Chinese grammar.
More deliberate distortions recur in the popular versions of scholars
like Sontoku Ninomiya who, in the early 19th century, devoted himself to
preaching and working with the common masses. But we must remember
that the practice of intentional misinterpretation occurred also among
well-educated scholars who were sometimes even commended officially by
the Imperial court, as may be seen in the Religious Debates of owa
A
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(963).12 In all these cases, it is clear that the Chinese texts were seldom
understood correctly by the Japanese.
Now, what were the factors that brought about such arbitrary modi-
fications of the sources? It could not have been ignorance alone, for Japa-
nese scholars well versed in Chinese were sometimes responsible for this
practice. Nor could the cause have been always propagandistic since
misinterpretations are found in passages not important enough strategi-
cally for propaganda purposes to require such tampering with the texts.
We are obliged to believe that such cases present evidence of a distinctively
Japanese cultural background with ways of thinking that did not accom-
modate themselves to the linguistic forms of the Chinese.
There are other cases which furnish additional discrepancies between
the Chinese ways and forms of thinking and those of the Japanese Con-
fucian and Buddhist scholars who were accomplished writers in Chinese.
Where and why these discrepancies appear is one of the main concerns
of this book.
Since the Chinese texts were so often modified, the elements of Bud-
dhist and Chinese thought transmitted through these texts were not
adopted in their original form. Buddhism, in particular, underwent vast
changes after it was introduced into the life of Japan. Yet in the minds of
many Buddhists, the doctrines held by various Japanese sects are supposed
to be directly descended from those of the Buddhists of India and China,
despite the evidence that Japanese Buddhism acquired a good many new
and distinctive features. Were these new features merely developments
of original Buddhism, as many Japanese scholars still assert? Or should
they not in certain cases be regarded as a degeneration from the first form
of Buddhism? What should be said of the general opinion of Japanese
Buddhists that "only in Japan was the pure message of Sakyamuni (the
Buddha of India) revealed?" Is this opinion merely a case of national con-
ceit? Or did this development of Buddhism in Japan represent a more
culturally significant fact of its intellectual history?
CHAPTER 34 THE ACCEPTANCE
OF PHENOMENALISM
The Phenomenal World as Absolute
In the first place, we should notice that the Japanese are willing to
accept the phenomenal world as Absolute because of their disposition to
lay a greater emphasis upon intuitive sensible concrete events, rather than
upon universals. This way of thinking with emphasis upon the fluid, ar-
resting character of observed events regards the phenomenal world itself
as Absolute and rejects the recognition of anything existing over and
above the :phenomenal world. What is widely known among post-Meiji
philosophers in the last century as the "theory that the phenomenal is
actually the real" has a deep root in Japanese tradition.
It was characteristic of the religious views of the ancient Japanese
that they believed spirits to reside in all kinds of things. They personified
all kinds of spirits other than those of human beings, considering them
all as ancestral gods, and tending to view every spirit as a divine ghost.
It is such a turn of thought that gave birth to the Shinto shrines, for in
order to perform religious ceremonies the gods and spirits were fixed in
certain specified places. The most primitive form of this practice consists
in the invocation and worship of spirits in some specific natural object,
e.g., mountain, river, forest, tree, or stone. Forms of worship of ancient
times were generally of this character. Herein also lies the original signifi-
cance of the "divine hedge" and "rock boundary." Even to this day there
remain shrines that are merely of this type.1
This way of thinking runs through the subsequent history of Shin-
toism down to the present day. "Nowhere is there a shadow in which a god
does not reside: in peaks, ridges, pines, cryptomerias, mountains, rivers,
seas, villages, plains, and fields, everywhere there is a god. We can re-
ceive the constant and intimate help of these spirits in our tasks, many
courtiers are passing."2 Takasumi Senge, the priest of the Shintoism of
the Great Shrine of Izumo, praised such a pantheistic point of view as
follows: "There is no place in which a god does not reside, even in the
wild waves' eight hundred folds or in the wild mountain's bosom."3
..
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Buddhist philosophy likewise was received and assimilated on the
basis of this way of thinking. To begin with, the Tendai sect in Japan
is not the same as in China. The Tendai scholars in medieval Japan,
using the same nomenclature as that used in continental Buddhism, ar-
rived at a system of thought that is distinctly original. This is what is
called Honkaku Homan which asserts that the appearances of things in
the phenomenal world are aspects of the Buddha. The word Honkaku
or Enlightenment appears in the Chinese translation of the Mahiiyiina-
Sraddhotpiida-siistra (Daijyokishinran), a Buddhist theological work, origi-
nally composed in India. On the Asian continent, the word for enlighten-
ment meant the ultimate comprehension of what is beyond the phenome-
nal world, whereas in Japan the same word was brought down to refer
to understanding things within the phenomenal world. In this way, the
characteristic feature of Tendai Buddhism in Japan consists in emphasis
upon things rather than prinCiples. The Japanese Tendai scholars were
not very faithful to the original texts of the Chinese T'ien-t'ai, but
sometimes interpreted the original texts in a rather unnatural way, their
interpretation being based upon the standpoint of Absolute Phenome-
nalism.4
It is natural that the Nichiren sect, which is an outgrowth of the Japa-
nese Tendai, also lays an emphasis upon an empirical turn of thought,
Nichiren asserts that the crux of Buddha's thought is revealed in the
Jyuryoban chapter (Duration of Life of the Buddha) of the Lotus
CHokke) Sutra, saying, "In the earlier half of the whole sutra, the ten
directions are called the pure land and this place is called the soiled land,
while (in this Jyuryobon part), on the contrary, this place is called the
main land and the pure land in the ten directions the soiled land where
Buddha has had an incarnation."5 The Nichiren sect states that, while
the Tendai sect from China onward takes the standpoint of "Action ac-
cording to principles," Nichiren emphasized "Action according to things."
The way of thinking that seeks for the Absolute in the phenomenal
world plays an effective role in the assimilation of the Zen sect as well.
The Zen Buddhism in Dogen seems to have been influenced by the
Japanese Tendai Buddhism. This fact has often been alluded to by
specialists but has not been fully explored. Here I shall point out a few
examples which reveal the phenomenalist way of thinking. The Chinese
translated "dharmatii"6 in Sanskrit as "the real aspect of all things." This
concept refers to the real aspect of all kinds of phenomena in our ex-
perience, and therefore is composed of two distinct, contradictory ele-
ments, "all things" and "the real aspect." But Tendai Buddhism gave this
phrase the interpretation which emphasized that "the real aspect is all
things." Dogen meant to say that the truth which people search for is, in
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reality, nothing but the world of our daily experience. Thus he says,
"The real aspect is all things. All things are this aspect, this character,
this body, this mind, this world, this wind and this rain, this sequence of
daily going, living, sitting, and lying down, this series of melancholy,
joy, action, and inaction, this stick and wand, this Buddha's smile, this
transmission and reception of the doctrine, this study and practice, this
evergreen pine and ever unbreakable bamboo."1
When one asserts "all things are the real aspect," the predicate being
of a larger denotation, the real aspect seems to contain something other
than all things. But in the converse expression "the real aspect is all
things," the meaning is that there is nothing that is not exposed to us.s
For Dagen, therefore, the fluid aspect of impermanence is in itself the
absolute state. The changeable character of the phenomenal world is of
absolute significance for Dagen. "Impermanence is the Buddhahood.
. • . [9] The impermanence of grass, trees, and forests is verily the Buddha-
hood. The impermanence of the person's body and mind is verily the
Buddhahood. The impermanence of the (land) country and scenery is
verily the Buddhahood."lo
In o'ther places, Dagen says, "Death and life are the very life of
the Buddha," and "These mountains, rivers, and earth are all the sea of
the Buddhahood." In the Lotus (Hokke) Sutra also Dagen finds the same
vein of thought. "Of the Hokke Sutra.-The cry of a monkey is drowned
in the sound of the rapid river. These are preaching this sutra, this
above all." He who attains the purport of this sutra will discern the
preaching of the doctrine even in the voices on the auction sale in the
mundane world: "our Buddha's voice and form in all the sounds of the
rapid river and colors of the ridge" (Sansho-Doei, Religious Poems of
Umbrella-like Pine Tree).
The same vein of thought is found in the Chinese poet Su Tung-
p'o's poem: ''The voice of the rapid is verily the wide long tongue (of
the Buddha). The color of the mountains is no other than the pure chaste
body. At night we have perceived eighty-four thousand verses (of the
sermon in natural phenomena). How should they be later revealed to
other people?" This way of thinking is generally found in the Japanese
Zen Buddhism. In the words of Muju, "Mountains, rivers, earth, there is
not a thing that is not real."ll
Starting from such a viewpoint, Dagen gives some phrases of the
Buddhist scripture interpretations that are essentially different from the
original meaning. There is a phrase in the MahaparinirvaJ.la-sutra"2 that
should be interpreted as "He who desires to know the meaning of the
Buddhahood should survey the opportunity and conditions and wait for
the occasion to come. If the opportunity comes, the Buddhahood will be
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revealed of itself." Thus Buddhahood is here regarded as something em-
pirically possible and accessible. To this concept, Dagen gives a twist, and
reads the phrase "survey the opportunity and conditions" as "makes a sur-
vey in terms of opportunity and conditions" and the phrase "if the oppor-
tunity comes" as "the occasion has already come." His interpretation of
the original passage becomes, in this way, something like the following:
"Buddhahood is time. He who wants to know Buddhahood may know it
by knowing time as it is revealed to us. And as time is something in
which we are already immersed, Buddhahood also is not something that
is to be sought in the future but is something that is realized where we
are."13
In this manner, Dagen makes an effort to free himself from the
idealistic viewpoint held by some of the Mahayana Buddhists of India.
In the Chinese Allatmnsaka-st"itra, there is a phrase, "In all the three
worlds there is only this one mind."14 The original Sanskrit text is as
follows: "All that belongs to these three worlds is only mind. What the
Buddha discriminatingly talked of as the Twelve Existence-Relations de-
pends, in reality, solely upon the mind."15 But Dagen in Japan states
that the meaning of "in the three worlds only mind,"16 should be inter-
preted as "these three worlds are as they are regarded." He expliCitly rejects
its idealistic interpretation and asserts that "it is not that the three worlds
are verily the mind." In another place, he makes a comment that, the
mind and its object, which stand in an inseparable relation, may not be
conceived in hierarchical terms as one subordinating the other. 'The mind
rightly interpreted is the one mind which is all things and all things
which are the one mind."17 And in another place, Dagen says, "There
is not the one mind apart from all things, and there are not all things
apart from the one mind."ls
Dagen is critical of the Zen Buddhism of China. He chooses from the
Chinese Zen Buddhism only those elements which he thinks will suit his
own standpoint. The words of a Chinese Zen Buddhist, Yao-shan (751-
834), contains the phrase "at a certain time." Dagen interprets this phrase
unjustifiably as "Being Time" and comments as follows: "So-called 'Being
Time' means that time already is being and all being is time."19 From this
free-wheeling comment, Dagen goes on to develop his unique philosophy
of time, according to which the ever-changing, incessant temporal flux is
identified with ultimate being itself.
Again and again Dagen emphasizes that the true reality is not some-
thing static but something dynamiC. "It is a heretical doctrine," Dagen
says, "to think the mind mobile and the essence of things static. It is a
heretical doctrine to think that the essence is crystal clear and the ap-
pearance changeable."20 Or again, "It is a heretical doctrine to think that
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in essence water does not run, and the tree does not pass through vicissi-
tude. The Buddha's way consists in the form that exists and the condition
that exists. The bloom of flowers and the fall of leaves are the conditions
that exist. And yet unwise people think that in the world of essence
there should be no bloom of flowers and no fall of leaves."21
Dagen criticizes the Chinese Zen Buddhist Ta-hui (1089-1163)
who taught that both the mind and essence are over and above birth.
According to Dagen, Ta-hui wrongly taught that "the mind is solely per-
ception and conceptualization, and the essence is pure and tranquil."22
Here one sees the contrast between the static way of thinking in the
Chinese and the dynamic way of thinking in the Japanese. Dagen rejects
the viewpoint of the Vimalakirti-sutra. The Vimalakirti-sutra is the
scripture regarded as especially important in China and Japan, never-
theless Dagen has quite a low opinion of the significance of the silence of
Vimalakirti, which generally is highly commended.
"The reason why Vimalakirti, a virtuous gentleman, has not yet
found enlightenment and grace is because he has not entered the
priesthood.. Should he enter priesthood, he would have enjoyed grace.
The masters of Zen of the Tang (618-907) and Sung (960-1279) periods
not having mastered the doctrine of their sect, indiscriminately recom-
mended Vimalakirti, whom they considered to be good in action as well as
in speech. They are a despicable lot, not knowing the oral teachings of the
Buddha and ignorant of the discipline of the Buddha. Among them there
are even many who mistakenly conceive the ways of Vimalakirti and the
Buddha as identical. They. know neither the doctrine of the Buddha, nor
the way of the founder, nor do they even know or estimate Vimalakirti.
They say that Vimalakirti's silent revelation to Bodhisattvas is identical
with the silent dispositions of the Tathagata. This proves that they do not
at all know the doctrine of the Buddha and they are not competent in
practice .... The silence of the Tathagata and the silence of Vima-
lakirti are beyond comparison." According to Dagen mere silence or a mere
expression of negation does not have any ultimate significance.
"Evil men mostly think that speech and action are temporary things
which have been set up by illusions, while silence and non-action are the
truth. That is not the doctrine of the Buddha. That is what is conceived
by those who have heard by hearsay the teachings of the scriptures of the
gods Brahma and ISvara."23
The negative and static character of Indian philosophy in general is
rejected here. Consequently, the Buddhism preached by Dagen is
somewhat different in its content from what was emphasized by the Indian
Buddhists in general or by the Chinese Zen sects in general.
The inclination to live contentedly in this given phenomenal world
---
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appears also in modern sectarian Shintoism. The founder of the Konko
sect, for instance, teaches, 'Whether alive or dead, you should regard
the heaven and earth as your own habitation."24 Jinsai Ito (1627-1705)
criticizes and metamorphoses Chinese neo-Confucianism in just the same
way as Dagen criticized the Chinese Zen sect and changed the form of (or
emphasized some particular ideas of) Zen thought. Ito regards heaven
and earth as the evolution of great activity, where nothing but eternal
development exists, and completely denies what is called death.
"The Book of Change says, 'The great virtue of heaven and earth is
called life.' It means that living without ceasing is nothing but the
way of heaven and earth. And in the way of heaven and earth there is
no death but life, there is no divergence but convergence. Death is the
end of life, and divergence is the termination of convergence. That is
because the way of heaven and earth is one with life. Though the bodies
of ancestors may perish, their spirits are inherited by their posterity,
whose spirits are again inherited by their own posterity. When life thus
evolves, without ceasing, into eternity, it may rightly be said that no one
dies."25
According to Ito the world of reality is nothing but change and
action, and action is in itself good.
"Between heaven and earth there is only one reason: motion without
stillness, good without evil. Stillness is the end of motion, while evil is the
change of good; and good is a kind of life, while evil is a kind of death. It
is not that these two opposites are generated together, but they are all one
with life."26
Sorai Ogyii (1666-1728), worthy rival as he was to Jinsai Ito, ad-
mires Ito's activism as "the supreme knowledge of a thousand years." He
also rejects and denounces the static character of the doctrine of the School
of Li founded by the very inHuential Chu Hsi (1130-1200). Most of the
Japanese Confucianist scholars, even when they follow the metaphysical
doctrines of Chu Hsi, never choose the dualism of Li and Ch'i. All of the
characteristically Japanese scholars believe in phenomena as the funda-
mental mode of existence. They unanimously reject the quietism of the
neo-Confucianists of the Sung period.27
The way of thinking that recognizes absolute significance in the
phenomenal world seems to be culturally associated with the Japanese
traditional love of nature. The Japanese in general love mountains, rivers,
flowers, birds, grass, and trees,28 and represent them in the patterns of
their kimono, and they are fond of the delicacies of the season, keeping
their edibles in natural forms as much as possible in cooking. Within the
house, Howers are arranged in a vase and dwarf trees are placed in the
alcove, Howers and birds are engraved in the transom, simple Howers and
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birds are also painted on the sliding screen, and in the garden miniature
mountains are built and water drawn. The literature is also closely tied up
with warm affection for nature. "MakUTa no Soshi" (Pillow Books) begins
with general remarks about the four seasons and then goes into the
description of the scenic beauties of the seasons and human affairs.
Of essays of this kind there are many. If the poems on nature should
be set aside from among the collections of Japanese poems, how few
poems would be left. Seventeen-syllable short poems (haiku) cannot
be dissociated from nature.
The love of nature, in the case of the Japanese, is tied up with their
tendencies to cherish minute things and treasure delicate things. Contrast
the Japanese love of individual flowers, birds, grass, and trees with the
British enjoyment of the spacious view of the sea, the Dover Cliffs, and the
countryside.29 Such aesthetic preferences of various nations are culturally
significant traits of their respective peoples.
The Japanese have been lovers of natural beauty since ancient days.
Occasionally they sing songs in praise of grand scenic beauties. But even
then the gr.andeur of the scenery is reduced to its miniature form.
To illustrate:
"When going forth I look far from the Shore of Tago,
How white and glittering is
The lofty Peak of Fuji,
Crowned with snows!"30
"As the tide flows into Waka Bay,
The cranes, with the lagoons lost in flood,
Go crying towards the reedy shore."31
They enjoy nature as it is reflected in their compact range of vision,
which is particularly evident in the following poem.
"In my garden fall the plum blossoms-
Are they indeed snowflakes
Whirling from the sky?"32
"The nightingale sings
Playing at the lower branches
Lamenting the fall of the plum blossoms."33
In this respect the Japanese love of nature differs somewhat from the
Chinese attachment to the rivers and mountains. This point may be best
illustrated by the comparison of the following two poems. Dagen writes:
"Flowers are in Spring, Cuckoos in Summer,
In Autumn is the moon, and in Winter,
The pallid glimmer of snow."
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The meaning of the above poem coincides with what is intended by
the Chinese verse of "Wu-men-kuan" (Gateless Gate, by Wu-men
Hui-k'ai).
"A hundred flowers are in Spring, in Autumn is the moon,
In Summer is the cool wind, the snow is in Winter;
If nothing is on the mind to afHict a man,
That is the best season for the man."
In the Chinese the word "cuckoos" of the Japanese is replaced by the
"cool wind," which gives an entirely different effect. The cool wind and
cuckoos are both sensible objects, but while the former gives the sense
of inde£nite remote boundlessness, the latter gives a limited and cosy
impression.
Such a characteristically Japanese element is still better exempli£ed
by Ryokan, who composed the following poem on his deathbed.
"For a memento of my existence
What shall I leave (I need not leave anything)
Flowers in the spring, cuckoos in the summer,
and maple leaves
in the autumn."
"Maple leaves" are felt to be far closer to ourselves than "the moon."
Here is an illustration of the difference, amidst a common enjoyment
and love of nature, between the Chinese preference of the boundless and
distant and the Japanese preference of the simple and compact.
The Japanese garden typically exempli£es the Japanese attitude of
expressing natural scenery in a miniature scale. In this respect, the Indians
are quite different. They too love nature and construct gardens (udyana,
iiriima), where they plant grass and trees and layout wells and springs,
but they rarely try to imitate natural rivers and mountains on the smaller
scale.
The tender love of animals traditionally runs in the vein of the
Japanese, but that love is concentrated on minute lovable living things.
"A copper pheasant warbles out.
Listening to its voice I thought,
Could it be the father calling?
Could it be the mother calling?"
The image of the "copper pheasant" is very Japanese. In contrast, the
peoples of India and the South Asiatic countries are fond of a fantastic
story such as abandoning oneself to a hungry tiger who attacks one. But
such a story, an expression of benevolence toward living things, is not
-
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quite congenial to the poetic sentiments of the Japanese, although both
peoples wanted to express the idea of benevolence towards living creatures.
The Indian ascetics also composed poems in praise of nature. They
enjoy and extol nature as the sanctury beyond worldly sensuous attach-
ments, afHictions, and bandages. In their case, nature is conceived to be
something opposed to human elements, and nugatory to feeling.
"Before and behind, if there be none but oneself,
That is a great tranquility for the lone dweller of the wood.
Let me now go to the forest commended by the Buddha,
Since such is the place where solitary single-minded
Ascetics take their delight.
Let me clean my arms and legs
And go alone and return alone to and from
The cool forest in full bloom
And the chilly cavern of the mountain,
When the breeze is cool and fragrant,
Sitting on the top of the mount, ignorance I shall annihilate.
At th<;: chilly mountain slope, within the blossom-covered forest,
Let me enjoy the tranquility of deliverance
And take delight in it."34
In the case of the Japanese, however, priests and laymen alike are
attached to nature, which is at one with human beings, and they enjoy
that attachment to their hearts' content. Even when they sit on stones
under trees for the purpose of getting away from the afHictions of the mind
and body, they soon find flowers they enjoy and take delight in the flowers.
"Making the shades of trees
My dwelling place,
A flower gazer
I naturally become."35
Even Dagen, who took a Spartan attitude toward human desires, had
a tender heart for natural beauties.
"The peach blossoms begin
To bloom in the breeze of the Spring;
Not a shadow of doubt
On the branches and leaves is left."
"Though I know that I shall meet
The autumnal moon again,
How sleepless I remain,
On this moonlit night."
--
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The Japanese esteem the sensible beauties of nature, in which they
seek revelations of the absolute world.
"Cherry blossoms, falling in vain,
Remind me of the Treasure plants,
That adorn paradise,"S6
There is no inkling of a view that regards the natural world as
cursed or gruesome. Dagen says: "There are many thousands of worlds
comparable to the siitras within a single spade of dust. Within a single
dust there are innumerable Buddhas. A single stalk of grass and a single
tree are both the mind and body (of us and Buddhas)."s1
Relevant to such an idea was the conception prevalent in medieval
Japan that even grass and trees have spirits and consequently are eligible
for salvation. The idea that even the things of "no-heart" (the objects of
nature that have no spirits) can become Buddhas, based upon the Tendai
doctrines, was particularly emphasized in Japan. This constituted an
important theme for study in the Japanese Tendai sect, and the idea was
inherited also by the Nichiren (1222-1282) sect.38 Nichiren sought the
superiority of the Hokke (Lotus) Siitra in its recognition of the eligibility
of the grass and the trees to become Buddhas. There appear time and
again among the Japanese Buddhist writings the following lines: 'When
a Buddha, who has attained enlightenment, looks around the universe,
the grass, trees, and lands, all become Buddhas."39 In "Noh" songs we
often come across such an idea which was taken for granted socially and
religiously in those days. "The voice of Buddhahood of such a holy priest
makes even the grass and trees predestined to become Buddhas . . . .
Even the grass and trees have attained the effect of becoming Buddhas
being led by the power that mankind is bound to be reborn into the Pure
Land only if they invoke the Buddha's name and practice nembutsu
prayer . . . . Had it not been for the teachings of Buddhahood, the
spirit of the decayed willow tree which is impermanent and soulless
would not have attained the Buddhahood." ("Yugyo Yanagi.") The "Noh"
song, "Kocho" (Butterflies), relates the story of an insect becoming a
Buddha owing to the power of the Hokke Siitra; "Kakitsubata" (Iris),
'Yugy6 Zakura" (The Cherry Tree of the Itinerant), "Fuji" (Wisteria),
and "Bash0" (The Banana Tree) decribe the grass and trees becoming Bud-
dhas; and "Sessho Seki" (The Stone Destroying Life) is about the stone
becoming a Buddha by being given a holy robe and bowl. More recently,
a joruri (a ballad drama) called "Sanjusangendo Munagi no Yurai" has
for its main theme a story of a willow tree becoming a Buddha, based upon
the religious faith of the Jado-shin sect.
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"The Honganji Temple flourishes in the age of corruption,
The Tradition of Amitabha allows no regression;
For the corning of five hundred years,
The grass, trees, and soils all become Buddhas."40
The oral tradition of the medieval Tendai sect of Japan pushed the
idea of the grass and trees becoming Buddhas so far as to preach "the
non-becoming Buddhas of the grass and trees." According to this theory,
everything is by nature a Buddha-that is to say, to attain enlightenment
through ascetic practice is one and the same thing as being a Buddha
without recourse to ascetic practice. Not only the grass and trees but
also rivers, mountains, and the earth are themselves Buddhahood already
possessed intact. There is no becoming a Buddha in the sense of corning
to be something separate and different in nature. That is the reason why
the non-becoming of Buddhahood was preached.41 The logical conclusion
of the idea of the acceptance of the given reality is here definitely and
clearly crystallized.
Indian. Buddhism also admits the spirituality of the grass and trees,
along with the various schools of Indian philosophy that adopted such a
view.42 But most of the Indian philosophies maintain that all living
things attain the state of deliverance through enlightened intelligence
(vidyii), and not that the grass and trees become Buddhas in their actual
state.
Such a tendency of thinking as discussed above seems to be still
effective among the Japanese even in these days when the knowledge of
natural science prevails. For instance, the Japanese generally use the
honorific expression "0" prefixed to the names of various objects, as in
the cases of "o-cha" (the honorific wording of tea) and "o-mizu" (the
honorific wording of water). Probably there is no other nation on earth
that uses an honorific expression prefixed to the names of everyday objects.
This usage is not conceived to be anything extraordinary by the Japanese
themselves. We should not regard it merely as an honorific expression,
but rather consider it as a manifestation of the way of thinking that
seeks a raison d'etre and sacredness in everything that exists. According to
the comments made by Westerners, "everything is Buddha" to the minds
of the Japanese.
Then where do these characteristics of the Japanese to grasp the
absolute in accordance with the given phenomenal world, or to love nature
as it is, corne from? In Japan, is it because the weather is mild, the
landscape benign, and nature appears to be relatively benevolent to men,
that men love nature instead of abhorring it, and feel congenial to it in-
stead of having a grudge against it, so that nature is thought as one with
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men, rather than hostile to men? This seems to account only in part for
the prevalence of the characteristic thought tendency of the Japanese to
take the phenomenal world as absolute.
This-Worldliness
While religions of the world very often tend to regard this world as
the land of impurity and the other world as the blessed land of purity
where one seeks the Heaven of eternal happiness, primitive Shintoism
recognizes the intrinsic value of life in this world. Each one of the
Japanese people is considered a descendant of gods and goddesses. In
primitive Shintoism, one can 6nd no profound reflections either upon the
soul or upon death.
The ancient Japanese called the soul "tama." Man's tama can func-
tion independently of his body, and assist in the achievement of his work.
Various ideas about tama are nothing more than expositions of its utility
in worldly enterprises. One's tallUl is supposed to remain in this world and
to continue functioning after one's death, and essentially no distinction is
drawn between the states of one's tama before and after death.43
In Japanese mythology, nothing is said about the future world.
Indeed, there was an idea expressed that after one's death, one goes to the
land of the night, a dark place supposedly located underground. When
one dies, one is naturally buried underground and there is a common
belief in every country that there exists a Hades. And it is also natural
that death is universally abhorred. But it appears that the ancient Japanese
expressed little fear of death, and rarely worried about life after death.
Japanese mythology as a whole is attached to this world and makes much
of this life.44 Consequently, such a metaphysical concept as karma or
moral law of cause and effect (i.e., post-mortem rewards for good deeds and
punishment for bad ones) is lacking. They regarded death as impurity,
and enjoyed solely the life of this world.
As far as this-worldliness itself is concerned, the Chinese religions of
Confucianism and Taoism are also rightly called "this-worldly." Even the
Zen sect is touched with its influence. In the case of the Japanese, primi-
tive Shintoism alone was mingled with animism, Shamanism, and the
tendency to attach great importance to a limited social nexus, so that this-
worldliness in Japan came to assume a number of deviations and variations.
Once men became conscious of philosophical or metaphysical doubts,
however, they could no longer rest assured with such easy-going religious
faith. They felt an internal urge to search into some deeper truth about
Illen. It was in an answer to such spiritual demands that Buddhism flowed
into Japan. It was only natural, when Buddhism was introduced to Japan,
that there were those who rejected it and those who supported it. In the
10-,.
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first place, among those who rejected it, there was a marked predilection
for the pleasures of this world.
Tabito Otomo sang as follows:
This life of ours, let me enjoy;
In the other life, I do not care,
An insect or a bird,
Or whatever I shall become.
This was making fun of the Buddhist theory of the transmigration of
the fictitious soul. The following poem is written in an apparent mood of
defiance of the Buddhist theory of the mutabilityof phenomenal things:
Everything alive is said'
To be death-bound;
If it be so, let me be happy,
So long as I am alive.
He admired and adored the life of a hedonist and despised the Spartan
life of mor~l austerity.
It is better to drink
And to weep in drunkenness,
Than to talk like a sage;
Ugly is the man who never drinks,
But pretends to be wise;
Scrutinizing his face, I've found,
What a monkey-face he had!
It is worse to say nothing,
And to pretend to be wise,
Than to drink and weep in drunkenness.
In confronting Buddhism as an imported system of culture, the tradi-
tional Japanese culture was too weak to resist it. Was it then not improb-
able, as Buddhism was transplanted into this country and spread among
the people, that the traditional Japanese way of thinking, tending toward
this-worldliness, should have completely given way to Buddhism? Bud-
dhism, like a flood of water rushing forth from a broken dam, spread all
over Japan within a very short time. It was, however, impossible for
Buddhism to change completely the inclination to this-worldliness in the
Japanese general public. On the contrary, it was the Japanese themselves
that transformed Buddhism, which they accepted from the continent, into
a religion centered upon this world.
With the advent and spread of Buddhism, the Japanese came to think
seriously of life after death. But even then Buddhism was accepted as
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something this-worldly. All through the Nara and Heian periods, almost
all the sects of Buddhism aimed at tangible rewards in this world and they
mainly depended upon incantation and magic. (This point will be devel-
oped below in the chapter entitled "Problem of Shamanism.")
This stiipa in India and the great image of Buddha at Nara in Japan
might be called representative edifices that symbolize the prosperity of
Buddhism supported by state power in their respective countries. The stiipa
is a large mound where the ashes of great men or saints were buried. The
formative arts in India are embodied in the stiipa, a symbol of death, while
those in Japan are concentrated in the image of Buddha, a vivid symbol of
the living ideal man. While most Indians search for the truth of humanity
through the channels of death, most Japanese try to express it intuitively
through the channels of life.
The Japanese way of thinking centering upon life in this world
transfonned the basic Buddhist doctrines. According to the views of Indian
Buddhist believers, all living things repeat their life-cycles in an infinite
process of transmigration of the soul; and a life in this world is but an
infinitesimal period within that eternally circulating process. Even
Sakyamuni himself was able to practice religion in this world and to
become a Buddha only as a reward for the multitude of good deeds
accumulated in his countless lives in previous existences. Such practice as
Sakyamuni had accomplished cannot be achieved by an ordinary person
within one lifetime, but must be continued through many lifetimes. It
was not that all the Buddhist followers in India believed thus, but the
common men in India did. Buddhism, however, was at first transformed by
~e this-worldly Chinese, and then again it was steeped even more deeply
by the Japanese in the dye of this-worldliness. There are many sects of
Japanese Buddhism which emphasize the belief that even ordinary men
would be able to become Buddhas, should they attain enlightenment in
this world (Sokushin Jobutsu).
According to the ninth-eentury founder of the Tendai sect in Japan,
Saicho (Dengyo Daishi), in his classified comments on various doctrines of
Buddhism, Hinayana Buddhism is a circuitous teaching, since it advocates
the practice of religion through countless lives in an immensely long span
of time. Some sects of the Mahayana Buddhism also preach that one should
practice religion through similarly long periods of life, so that they were of
no use to the Japanese people of Saicho's time. Mahayana Buddhism in
general directs the way in which an ordinary man can become a Buddha in
a limited time (A Direct Way). And ids the doctrine of the Hokke Siitra
that gives the fullest expression to this idea (The Great Straight Way).45
Saicho used the phrase, "Sokushin Jobutsu" (to become a Buddha alive in
the human body).46 Such an idea was as old as Buddhism itself, but the use
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of such a phrase seems to have been initiated by Saicho. But in the theory
of "Sokushin ]obutsu" preached by Saicho, the doctrine of this-worldliness
was not thoroughgoing enough. It was the Japanese scholars of the Tendai
sect who later pushed the idea of this-world Buddhahood, for the Tendai
doctrine in China did not allow a man to become a Buddha through this
life alone. Even if he did achieve Buddhahood, it was supposed to be the
consequence of the ascetic practices accumulated through many lives, so
that one could become a Buddha only on reaching the threshold of perfect
religion. Hardly a hundred years had elapsed after the introduction by
Saicho of the Tendai sect into Japan, when a Tendai scholar, Annen,
began to preach not only that one could become a Buddha in this world,
but also that one could become a Buddha through ascetic practice during
one's life, and would be permitted to be a Buddha alive in the human
body.
"At the beginning, according to a sacred priest, or according to the
scriptures, learning that an afHiction is nothing but an enlightenment, one
achieves the Intelligence of a Buddha without overcoming one's afHictions.
Learning that mundane existence is nothing but Nirval)a, one becomes a
Buddha in the form of 'identity by name,' which is simply what the mun-
dane existence turns out to be. That is why it is called enlightenment and
also becoming a Buddha. If one's body does not become a Buddha, neither
does one's mind. If one's mind has already become a Buddha, so conse-
quently does one's body."4T
This-worldliness was plainly expressed by Kiikai, the founder (in 816)
of the Japanese Shingon (True Word) sect. According to Kiikai, the world
and humanity both consist of six constituent elements; earth, water, fire,
wind, sky, and intelligence. Their essence is the absolute truth (the World
of the Law) and they are so perfectly interrelated as never to obstruct (or
oppose) one another. It follows that mankind and Buddhas are identical in
their essence. Kiikai preached that if one should follow such reasoning,
then making figures with one's hands, reciting incantations, or concentrat-
ing one's mind (the three actions of man's body, mouth, and mind), would
be directly identified with those of a Buddha. He specifically wrote a book
called the "Commentaries on Becoming a Buddha Alive in the Human
Body." He supports the doctrine of esoteric Buddhism: "One can attain the
status of great enlightenment with the body that was born of one's par-
ents."48
The doctrine of Nichiren (1222-1282), a development of the Japanese
Tendai sect influenced by esoteric Buddhism, continued to stress becoming
a Buddha alive in the human body. "The gate to the truth called 'Becoming
a Buddha alive in the human body' ought to be studied as a matter of great
importance by the scholars of the world. My own disciples in particular
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should keep this matter in mind above anything else. During these twenty-
seven years between the fifth year of Kencho and the third year of Koan, I
have stated in various places a great many gates to enter the truth. But all
the gates lead up just to this one."49 "Should we recite, with the sincerity of
our hearts, 'Nammyo-horenge-kyo' (Adoration of the Lotus Siitra), the
Perfect One in the Cosmic Body (of the Dharma), the eternal fundamental
basis, . . . etc.-all of them would come and gather around us. That is the
reason why the most devoted of the devoted followers of the true practice
could become Buddhas, whether or not they take leave of their bodies."50
Running as a parallel to such a view in ecclesiastical doctrines, popular
religions are also based upon this-worldliness. As an illustration, the reli-
gious faith in Jizo, a guardian deity of children and of the wicked
(K~itigarbha-bodhisattva) became popular after the Heian period, because
the common man in Japan can always look to the great benevolence of the
holy person ready and willing to save him just as he is.
"K~itigarbha-bodhisattva, since he is unfathomably benevolent, does
not live in the Pure Land. Since his connections with human beings are so
deep, he does not call for divine death. He only makes the place of evil his
Own habitat, and makes friends solely with sinners."51
A question may be raised here. One might argue that in Japan Pure
Land Buddhism was very popular, and even the Nichiren sect, under its
influence, used the phrase "The Sacred Mountain which is the Pure
Land."52
Pure Land Buddhism in Japan, however, was not always other-
worldly. The Pure Land Buddhism of the Heian period, it cannot be de-
nied, was inclined to regard practical life as worthless and to attach prime
importance to a life of seclusion. But the founder of the Jodo or Pure Land
sect, Honen (Genkii, 1133-1212) was decidedly on the side of asserting
this world. Once a warrior came and confided to Honen what troubled his
mind: he could not reconcile his religious belief as a believer of the Jodo
sect with his duty as a samurai to fight on the battlefield. Honen answered
him as follows: "The original vow of Amitabha is not concerned whether
one's predisposition is good or evil, or whether the religious practice is more
Or less. Since it does not depend upon the purity or impurity of the body, or
time, place or opportunities, the occasion of death is of no consequence.
Even sinners, as sinners, are eligible for rebirth in the Pure Land, if they
should invocate the name of Amitabha. This is the miracle of the original
vow. As for those born into the families of warriors, who fight in war and
l?se their lives therein, if they only should invocate the name of Amitabha,
they would be assisted by the original vow and would be welcomed by
Amitabha into the Pure Land. This you should never doubt."53
Moreover, the Jodo-shin sect, from the standpoint that assures anyone
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rebirth into the Pure Land only if one has faith in Amitabha in daily life,
strives to realize absolute significance within one's life in this world. It
attaches great importance to the phase of coming back to this world in
contrast to the phase of going to the Pure Land. Such a standpoint gave
rise to more or less distorted interpretations of phrases in the Buddhist
scriptures.54
The point that the Jodo sect meant to give great significance and a
theoretical basis to positive action in this world has already been elaborated.
But according to Pure Land Buddhism in India, this world is supposed to
be the impure land smeared with dirt, where no ordinary men could ever
practice religion. In order for ordinary men to attain Nirva~a, they must be
born in the next life into the Pure Land, which is the better world, where
they should, under the guidance of Amitabha, listen to the doctrine of
the Buddha and practice asceticism. According to the Japanese Pure Land
Buddhism, especially the Jodo-shin sect, in contrast, to be born into the
Pure Land is identical with attaining Nirva~a. (To be reborn into the
Pure Land is nothing but Nirva~a.) So the upshot was that Japanese
Pure Land .Buddhism transposed the position of this world, which is the
impure land, to the position tantamount to what was considered by the
Indian followers of Pure Land Buddhism to be the delightful Pure Land.
This transposition should also be attributed to the this-worldly inclination
of the Japanese people.
It would be rash, however, to conclude that Pure Land Buddhism in
Japan is completely this-worldly. An element of escapism cannot be denied
its outlook. The attitudes of resignation and submission in every area of
life were imposed upon people under the feudal regime, since, it was told,
everything was predetermined as the consequence of the actions in one's
previous life. Yet by comparison with the Pure Land Buddhism of India
and of China, such an element of escapism from this world was relatively
weak in the Pure Land Buddhism of Japan, and became even less influen-
tial toward the modern period.
The this-worldly idea of becoming a Buddha alive in the human body
is also conspicuous in the Japanese Zen sect. Dogen (r2oo-1253), the
founder of the Soto school, straightforwardly asserts that to attain enlight-
enment is not the function of the mind but that of the body:
"Is the Way (of liberation) achieved through the mind or through the
body? The doctrinal schools speak of the identity of mind and body, and so
when they speak of attaining the Way through the body, they explain it
in terms of this identity. Nevertheless, this leaves one uncertain as
to what 'attainment by the body' truly means. From the point of view of
our school, attainment of the Way is indeed achieved through the body as
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well as the mind. So long as one hopes to grasp the Truth only through the
mind, one will not attain it even in a thousand existences or in eons of
time. Only when one lets go of the mind and ceases to seek an intellectual
apprehension of the Truth is liberation attainable. Enlightenment of the
mind through the sense of sight and comprehension of the Truth through
the sense of hearing are truly bodily attainments. To do away with mental
deliberation and cognition, and simply to go on sitting, is the method by
which the Way is made an intimate part of our lives. Thus attainment of
the Way becomes truly attainment through the body. That is why I put
exclusive emphasis upon sitting."55
Dagen recognized the uniqueness of Zen, in contrast to other doc-
trines, exactly on this point: to attain enlightenment with the body. In
parallel with this, there is Nichiren's assertion to the effect that "The
Hokke Sutra should not only be read in the mind, but should be read in
the body." Japanese Buddhism is, then, strongly imbued with an activistic
behaviorism and practical tendency, which is tied up with its this-
worldliness.
Toward the latest period of Mahayana Buddhism in India, it was
maintained that the predisposition of Buddhahood (possibility of becoming
an enlightened person) is constant and is not subject to change. Dagen,
linking his own view to that assertion, expounded it somewhat differently.
The changing and fluctuating phases of the phenomenal world, he asserts,
are themselves predispositions for a Buddha. "Grass, trees, bushes, and
woods are changeable-that is, they are predispositions for a Buddha. Men,
things, body, and mind are changeable-that is, they are predispositions for
a Buddha. Countries, rivers, and mountains are changeable-that is, they
are predispositions for a Buddha. Anuttara-Samyaksarhbodhi (the supreme
enlightenment) is changeable since it is a predisposition for a Buddha. The
great perfect NirvalJ-a is a predisposition for a Buddha since it is change-
able."56
The this-worldly character of the Zen sect is also embodied in Japanese
Zen priests in later periods. Shasan Suzuki, (1579-1655), for instance,
taught the general lay believers as follows: "To pray for a happy future
does not mean to pray for a world after death. It means to be delivered from
affiictions here and now, and thus to attain a great comfort. Then, where
do you think those affiictions come from? They spring solely from the love
of your own body. Had it not been for this body of yours, from what should
you suffer? To be delivered, therefore, from this body of yours is to become
a Buddha."57 His disciple, Echu, also states that Buddhism ought to be
What is useful to this real world. "The law of the Buddha is supposed to
serve only the future life and to be of no use for today's affairs. Followers,
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therefore, only think of their future happiness, and none of them knows
how to control evils within their own minds today, and to eliminate their
present affiictions. This is a great misconception."58
The medieval Shintoist theories adopted their terminology mainly
from Buddhist scriptures. But Shintoism accepted only the this-world
aspect which appears only in the incidental remarks at some peripheral
parts of the scriptures, rejecting the other-worldly aspect of Buddhism. The
"Hoki-Hongi"59 one of the five books of Shintoism that provided the
foundation for the Shintoist theology of the Ise Shrine in the Medieval
period, states that if men should accomplish the supreme virtues of absolute
sincerity and integrity, the result would be "living in peaceful harmony,
sun and moon shining clear and bright, wind and rain coming at the right
time, the nation being enriched and the people given security." Then, it
goes on to say, armed force would no longer be necessary. These sentences
are based upon the following part of the "Daimuryoju-kyo (The Larger
Sukhiivativyuha-sutra): "Wherever a Buddha goes, there is no country,
town, hill, or village that is not enlightened by him. Sky and earth are in
peaceful h.armony, and sun and moon are clear and bright. Wind and rain
come in due time and there is no calamity. The nation is enriched and
people are secure and no armed forces are ever used. Virtues are respected,
benevolence is promoted, and courtesy and humility are practiced in ear-
nest." Originally, the "Daimuryoju siitra" teaches the existence of the Pure
Land and the vow of Amitabha Buddha, and the essence of its teachings
is to give meaning to the activities of this world by transcending this world.
The Japanese Buddhists, on the contrary, regarded the above-mentioned
sentences as advocating "national defense" and laid great importance on
them, while Shintoists selected only this-worldly teaching from the Pure
Land scriptures.
Consequently, Shintoism and the Buddhist idea of becoming a Bud-
dha alive in the human body were easily united.
"The shrine of gods
Is the body of my own,
Inhaling breath being the Outer Shrine,
Exhaling breath being the Inner Shrine."60
This-worldliness became even stronger as the nation proceeded into the
Tokugawa period. The this-worldly and anti-religious tendencies were
already manifest among the merchants' thoughts in the early Tokugawa
period. "It is unnecessary to pray for a happy future when one is already in
one's fifties.... It is even more unbecoming to spend days and nights at
a temple on the pretext of praying for a happy future, abandoning one's
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family and boasting of worshipping at a temple. . .. In this life one
should use one's discretion, above all else not to lose one's reputation."
(The Will of Soshitsu Shimai [1539-1615] a merchant of Hakata).61 It is
not surprising that the this-worldly tendency became especially pre-eminent
during the modern period in Japan and that it "even caused the emergence
of materialism.
The Indian theory of the transmigration of the soul was also adopted,
but even this theory sometimes underwent a transformation which led into
affirming life in this world. To illustrate this point, let me quote from the
famous description of Masashige Kusunoki ( ? -1336), at the time of his
death.
"Masashige, in his seat, asked his brother Masasue: 'It is said that the
good or evil of one's future life depends upon what one desires at the time
of one's death. What is your wish among the nine worlds?' Masasue,
laughing heartily, answered: 'It is my wish to be born as the same human
being seven times in order to annihilate the Emperor's enemy.' Masashige,
looking supremely delighted, said: 'A most sinful evil wish as it is, I myself
also wish the same. Let us then be reborn into men and accomplish this
wish of ours.' Thus pledging each other, they stabbed each other and fell
upon the same pillow."62
According to the general view of most Indians, it is desirable to be
delivered from this world. But here in Japan, while accepting the theory of
the transmigration of the soul on one hand, most people wish, on the other
hand, to be reborn into this world. The concept of loyalty in China was the
loyalty of one's lifetime, in accordance with the Confucian theory. Chu-
ko-k'ung-ming (181-234 A.D.) declares, in his "Go Suishi-no Hyo" (the
second letter to the Emperor at the time of mobilizing the army): "I, Your
Majesty's humble servant, bending myself most humbly like a ball, shall
exert my best effort and shall cease only after I am dead." In contrast with
this, Masashige Kusunoki states: "I wish to be reborn seven times in order
to serve (the Emperor) most loyally." The idea of "Serving one's country by
getting born seven times" was thereby established, and it was made most of
by latter-day nationalists.
Ryokan (Ninshi) Bodhisattva, 1217-13°3), famous as a reviver of the
Ritsu sect during the Kamakura period, was a welfare worker who founded
charity-hospitals to take care of invalids. When he was at Saidai Temple,
taking pity on a ieper, he repeatedly carried him on his own back to the city
and begged for him whatever he wanted. Being deeply gratified with
Ryokan's deeds of benevolence, the invalid said to him on his deathbed: "I
shall certainly be reborn into this world and become my master's humble
servant in order to reciprocate my master's virtuous deeds. (As a mark for
my master to identify me) I shall have a scar left on my face." Sure
-
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enough, in the later years of Ninsho's life, there appeared among his
disciples a man with a scar on his face, who served him as an attendant.
People said, we are told, that he was the leper regenerated.53 Whereas
according to the Indian Buddhist view of life and death, mankind are
supposed to transmigrate through the six spheres of existence on account of
their good and evil deeds, here in Japan ordinary men are acknowledged to
be reborn into this world, should they make vows to be so.
The Japanese had been this-world-minded and optimistic long before
the advent of Buddhism. It was because the mundane view of life had long
remained with them that the idea of regarding this world as the strained
and impure land could never take root.. The theory of impurity as preached
by Buddhism, therefore, was never adopted by the Japanese in its original
form.
The first lesson of the ascetics of Hinayana Buddhism is to regard
one's body as impure. Here the body is regarded as the source of all evils,
and as a hindrance to the practice of the Way. Dagen, however, revised
this interpretation. According to him, contemplation should be realized in
one's actions in everyday life. "So-called contemplations are everyday activi-
ties like s~eeping the ground and the floor."64 That should be conceived as
exactly identical to "recognizing one's body as impure." Moreover, in that
case one is expected to transcend the dichotomy of purity and impurity. "It
is not a dichotomous argument of purity or impurity." Consequently, the
theory of impurity emphasized by Indian Buddhism was not welcomed by
the Japanese in general. "An opinion like the theory of impurity," com-
mented Nakamoto Tominaga, "is based upon the mores of the Indians. In
this land such a view is not accepted by people."65
Pessimism was another world view which never took a precise form in
Japan. After the implantation of Buddhism into Japan, there appeared in
"the Man'yoshu" some poems under the influence of Buddhist thoughts.
But even these are no more than the lamentations of the changeability and
transiency of man and things. To illustrate:
To what shall I liken this life?
It is like a boat,
Which, unmoored at morn,
Drops out of sight
And leaves nothing behind.
The fear of death, as shown in early Buddhism and Jainism, is conspic-
uously absent here. Let us listen to the confession of a Jain pessimist.
"Living things torture living things.
Behold, great fears of the world!
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Living things abound with afHictions.
Human beings cling to lust and passion.
They go to self-destruction with their frail helpless bodies."66
"It is a great fear, afHiction, I say.
Living beings are trembling in all directions."67
Such profound outcries were never heard from the Japanese. Dagen
argues even against pessimism itself.
"Mundane existence is nothing but the life of the Buddha himself.
Should one loathe and try to abandon it, that is precisely to lose the life of
the Buddha. Should one stay with it and cling to mundane existence, that
also would mean to lose the life of the Buddha."6B
There are innumerable poems composed in Japan to express Buddhist
thought, but so far as the profound sense of pessimism is concerned, there
are few expressing such a view, and they are written for a limited minority
of the people. Also lacking are philosophical poems, expressing rational
reflections that illuminate the nature of suffering, non-ego, and emptiness.
Japanese pessimism differs from that of Occidental people. In the
West pessimism means to become wearied of existence in this world. In the
case of the Japanese, by contrast, it means to be wearied only of complicated
social fetters and restrictions from which they wish to be delivered. Conse-
quently, the sense of pessimism is dispelled as soon as one comes to live
close to the beauties of nature, far apart from human society. Saigya
(1118-1190), though he had escaped from the world, enjoyed contemplat-
ing the moon, hills, streams, flowers, etc., and spending the rest of his life
travelling around on foot. Kamo-no-Chamei (1151-1213), wearied as he
was of this world, enjoyed nature and was contented, living a life of se-
clusion in his hermitage. Saint Gensei (1623-1668) of Fukakusa and,
more recently, Otagaki Rengetsu also enjoyed nature, despite the fact that
they hated to mingle in worldly affairs. Pessimism, as shown in these
cases, is given its vent in the form of attachment to nature.69
"Changeable is this world,
So may be the cherry blossoms,
Falling in my garden."70
"Brief is this mortal life-
Let me go and seek the Way,
Contemplating the hills and streams undefiled!71
Not only were they attached to nature, but they kept warm spots in
their hearts for companions and never ceased to long for humanity, in the
midst of their hermitage. Saigya, in his life of a solitary traveller, enjoyed
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tranquility and yet in his heart he yearned for life, which he had aban-
doned on his own accord.
'Weary as I am
Of this world,
When autumn comes
And the moon shines serene,
I feel I should like to survive."
"Wearied of this world
Why should I be?
Those once despised by me
Today my delight tum out to be."
Even the life of Basho (1644-1694) as a solitary wanderer was deeply
imbued with a longing for companions. "What a lazy old man I am!
Usually, being annoyed by visitors, I have pledged my heart not to see or to
invite others. Nevertheless, on a moonlit night or on a snowy mom, how
unreasonable it is of me not to long for a companion."72 In Kenko
( 1283-135.0), the author of the "Tsure-zure-gusa" (Gleanings from Leisure
Hours, or "Grasses of Idleness"), the attachment to worldly affairs is es-
pecially deep-rooted. That such a sentiment was not limited solely to
some men of letters in the past is clear enough, when we look into our own
minds a little deeper.
The Acceptance of Man's Natural Dispositions
I have already pointed out that the Japanese in general are inclined to
search for the absolute within the phenomenal world or in what is immedi-
ately observable. Among all the natures that are most immediate to man's
experience is the nature of man, so that man's natural dispositions rank
highest in the average Japanese way of thinking.
Just as the Japanese are apt to accept external and objective nature as
it is, so they are inclined to accept man's natural desires and sentiments as
they are, and not to strive to repress or fight against them.
Love was the favorite theme of ancient Japanese poetry. Love among
the ancient Japanese was sensual and unrestrained. The true meaning of
life existed for them in love. In general, the expression of their sentiments
was direct and open, without suppression, at least none that one can
observe externally.
This tendency underwent transformations which varied according to
diverse historical periods and social classes. Nevertheless, it remained as a
relatively distinctive characteristic of most of the people. Japanese poetry,
for instance, is rich in love poems, and seems vastly different from the
poetry of the Indian or the Chinese peoples.
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Norinaga Motoori (1730-1801), the great scholar of Japanese classics,
recognized the distinction of the Japanese from the Chinese in this respect:
"The fact that the Book of Poetry (Shih Ching) lacks love poems
reveals something of the customs of the people of that country [China].
They only make an outward show of manly appearance, concealing the
womanishness of their real selves. In contrast, the abundance of love poems
in our empire reveals the way to express one's genuine dispositions."73
In India there is an abundance of love poems. Nevertheless, the
Indians in general sought an ultimate and absolute meaning beyond pas-
sions of love, which many of them were taught to annihilate. So the
acceptance of natural love may be taken as a distinguishing characteristic
of the Japanese compared with most of the other civilized peoples of Asia.
How does this tendency affect the Japanese way of adopting foreign
cultures?
The ethical theories of Confucianism tended originally to asceticism,
which was no doubt inherited by the Japanese Confucianists. Among
them, however, there were those who tried to accept man's natural disposi-
tions. The Tale of Genji and The Tale of Ise were the favorite reading of
such scholars as Sorai Ogyii. (1666-1728) and Keizan Hori (1688-1757).
Ogyii recognized the intrinsic value of these old literary works, whose value
should not be obscured by the risque content.74 He also maintained that
since poetry expressed natural feelings, the farfetched moralizing on the
poems by the Chinese critics was not relevant.75 In this respect his attitude
is in conformity with that of scholars of Japanese classics.76
Accepting as he does the view that the Book of History (Shu Ching),
among the Five Books, relates the "Great Teachings and Laws of Ancient
Wise Kings," he comments upon the Book of Poetry (Shih Ching) as
follows:
"The Book of Poetry is another matter. It is composed of the language
of songs, just as the later day poetry is. Confucius edited it for its wording.
And the scholars studied it for wording. That is why Confucius says: 'If
you do not study the Book of Poetry, you have nothing to say.' In the later
day period, one has come to study the Book of Poetry in the same fashion as
one reads the Book of Writing, and they regard the former as an exposition
of the principle of punishing vice and rewarding virtue. That is why one is
at one's wits' end when it comes to interpreting the lascivious poem of
Cheng-wei. The moral teachings of justice are so rare in this Book of
Poetry that they are negligible. If the neo-Confucianists' opinion be granted
as true, then why should the sage have resorted to such a roundabout way
(of presenting the principle of punishing vice and rewarding virtue),
instead of writing directly a separate book of moral instruction? So the
opinion of these Confucianists shows that they are ignorant of the essence
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of poetry. The preface to the Book of Poetry was written in the spirit of
comprehending the proper meanings of poetry. . .. The later scholars,
having lost the original spirit of Confucianism, wrote large and small
prefaces. This is most despicable. The words of poetry touch upon all
subject matters, from the government to the street, and reach also the
countries of many a lord. Is there any place in the world where the
difference does not exist between the noble and the low, man and woman,
the wise and the foolish, the beautiful and the ugly? Through poetry, one
can comprehend the changes of the world, the customs of people, their
feelings, and the subtle phases of changing things. Its language is elegant
and gentle, and being akin to the sentiments, its expression delicate. The
subject matter of poetry can be anything, no matter how small or trivial,
and thus poetry can be humbling to the spirit of pride. Herein lies,
however, a key for the wise man to comprehend fools, for the brave man to
understand woman, for kings to know their people, and for the age of
prosperity to perceive the age of devastation."77
Shundai Dazai (1680-1747) called man's natural feelings the only
genuine 0lles, which he listed as "likes and dislikes, suffering and rejoicing,
anxiety and pleasure, etc." And he maintains: "... There is not a single
human being devoid of these feelings. Either for the great or the petty, the
noble or the low, there is no difference in this respect. Love of one's
parents, wives, and children is also the same among the noble and the low.
Since these feelings originate from an innate truthfulness, never stained
with falsity, they are called genuine feelings. . . ."78 His standpoint is
pure naturalism.
"There are no double-dealings in actions that flow from natural dis-
positions, wherein theinside and outside are so transparent that they are
one and the same thing. The natural dispositions are the innate true nature
of men. Those actions done without being taught, without learning, with-
out force but with freedom from all thoughts are the work of the natural
dispositions. This is called truthfulness. And this is the significance of the
golden mean."79
In the social realm, however, there are certain regulations of conduct,
to which one should merely conform. But within one's inner self one can
think whatever one pleases.
"According to the way of saints, one is said to be a man of noble
character, only if one does not act against propriety but observes decorum
concerning the body (regardless of), whether or not one sees a woman and
imagines her lasciviously and takes delight in her beauty. That is exactly
what it means to discipline one's mind through proper decorum."8o
Apparently this is a metamorphosis of Confucianism in Japan, discard-
ing the traditional attitude. of the ancient Chinese Confucianism which
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refused to interpret the love poems of the Book of Poetry as such, and tried,
instead, to interpret them as professing political and moral lessons. Dazai
defiantly declared: "I would rather be a master of acrobatic feats, than a
moralist."81
As to the proper behavior of a married couple, Chinese Confucianism
taught, "one should discriminate between man and wife," according to the
hierarchical order of husband and wife. Japanese Confucianists like Toju
Nakae (1608-1648), however, emphasized rather the harmony of husband
and wife. "The husband should be righteous, while the wife should be
obedient, and when both are in this manner in perfect harmony, that is the
meaning of the way of discrimination."82
Atsutane Hirata (1760-1843) as a nationalist had little use for Chinese
thoughts in general, but he interpreted the "Doctrine of the Mean"
("Chung-yung") as a doctrine of naturalism and as such he adopted it.
"Anyone knows perfectly well by nature, without borrowing others'
teachings, that gods, the lords, and parents are respectable and the wife and
children lovable. Teachings of the way of humanity, complex as they
appear to be, do in fact originate from this simple fact. . . . The 'Chung-
rung' says, 'Whatever destiny is predetermined in Heaven is called a
natural disposition. To comply with those natural dispositions is called the
Way. And to practice the Way is called teaching.' Its meaning is that at the
time of man's birth, man is provided with the inborn true feelings of
benevolence, justice, propriety, and intelligence. . .. These are called
dispositions. . . . Not to falsify or to distort them is the true way of
humanity One should train and regulate the one inborn way so that no
evil heart should result. To illustrate this with a near-by example, our
countrymen are by nature brave, just, and straight, and that is what we call
Yamato-gokoro (the spirit of Japan) or Mikuni-damashii (the soul of our
country).... Since the True Way is as facile a matter as this, one should
indeed stop acting like a sage and completely abandon the so-called mind
or the way of enlightenment, and all that are affected and Buddha-ish. Let
us, instead, not distort or forget this spirit of Japan, the soul of this country,
but train and regulate it so that we may polish it up into a straight, just,
pure, and good spirit of Japan."83
The naturalistic and nationalistic tendency described above represents
also the Japanese mode of accepting Buddhism.
Onk6 (Jiun Sonja 1718-18°4), a Buddhist of the modern period, to
whom credit should be given for propagating Buddhism among the com-
mOn people, preached that morality means to follow man's natural disposi-
tions.84 Onko accepted man's natural dispositions but also emphasized
man's ability to control his lower desires and sentiments. Naturalism in this
sense, however, never became popular among the Japanese in general, nor
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was it ever an influential guiding principle. Naturalism in the sense of
satisfying man's desires and sentiments, instead, was a predominant trend
in Japanese Buddhism.
The Ritsu sect with its two hundred and fifty precepts was introduced
also into Japan but it never became as widespread as it was in India and
China. Even the ascetic practices of the Ritsu sect (similar to those of the
early Buddhist orders), which were far from being austere when compared
with those of the Indian ascetics, had too many inhibitory restrictions of
man's natural dispositions and instinct to be accepted by the majority of the
Japanese. (These ascetic practices are still strictly observed today in Ceylon,
Burma, Siam, and Cambodia.) On the whole, Japanese Buddhism inclined
to hedonism. The practice of the ceremony of prayer, for instance, was an
occasion to the aristocrats of the Heian period for enjoying sensory pleasure.
"In front of the Prince of Spring, the fragrance of the plum blossoms wafts
faintly, mingled with the scent from inside the bamboo blind, and makes
one feel as though one were in the land of a living Buddha."85 For them, a
Buddhist mass in this world was already the Pure Land or Paradise. In fact,
it meant merely "to have a pleasant evening, before having the fine-voiced
chant siitras for them."86
Such a tendency finally led to the repudiation of disciplines: "The
Chinese monk Ganjin (Chien-chen, ca. 750 A.D.), of the Ryiiko (Lung-
hsing) Temple of Tang, propagated the Right Law of disciplines and
initiated the Buddhist confirmation of that Law, which in the course of
time came to be neglected. Since the medieval period, the Buddhist con-
firmation had become only nominal, and people gathered from various coun-
tries merely to stroll around the ordination platform of the temple. They
knew nothing of the large and small disciplines, nor did they try to learn
anything of the regulations about the infringement of these disciplines.
Instead, they merely counted the years after taking orders, and let them-
selves degenerate into priests who accepted services for nothing. The
observance of abstention and disciplines had thus come to an end."87
The repudiation of disciplines was especially popular among the fol-
lowers of the Jodo sect. "Those who practice the invocation of Amitabha
alone, say that by playing the game of go or that of sugoroku (a kind of
backgammon) they do not violate any of their teachings. Clandestine
sexual relations or the eating of meat and flesh is no hindrance to rebirth
into the Pure Land. The observance of disciplines in the age of degenera-
tion is the tiger in the street. That ought to be dreaded; that ought to be
detested. Should one be afraid of sins and shrink from evils, such a one
would certainly be a man who never believes in the Buddha."88 The pure
Realm teachings, preached by Honen (1133-1212), disregards the distinc-
tion between the observance and the infringement of disciplines. It lays
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emphasis solely upon the practice of the invocation of Amitabha. "If one
who eats fish should be reborn into the Pure Land, a cormorant would
certainly be the one. If one who does not eat fish should be reborn into the
Pure Land, a monkey would indeed be the one. Whether or not one eats
/ish does not count, but it is the one who invocates Amitabha that is bound
to be reborn into the Pure Land."89
It was Nichiren (1222-1282) who was keen enough to point out that
the Jodo sect of Japan had turned into something entirely different in
practice from that of China.
"According to Zendo's (Shan-tao) Gate to the Meditation, it is said:
'Make a vow not to touch with your hand, nor to put into your mouth,
wine, meat,and five spices. Pray that your body and mouth be attacked
instantly by the venomous pox, should you breach these words.' These
sentences mean that those men and women, nuns and monks, who try to
practice invocation of Amitabha should abstain from wine, from fish and
flesh, and from the five spices: leek, scallion, onion, garlic, ginger. Invoca-
tors who do not observe this shall be attacked by the venomous pox in this
life and shall fall into the inferno. Disregarding this warning, the men and
women, the nuns and monks, who practice invocation of Amitabha, drink
wine and eat fish and flesh to their hearts' content. Is it not like swallowing
a sword?"90
The tendency to ignore disciplines seemed also to be evident within
the Zen sect. The "Nomori Kagami" (lit. "Field-watch Mirror," by
Fujiwara-no-Arifusa, 1294) has the following passage rebuking the Zen
sect: "By abusing the precedents of those who had attained enlightenment
and by taking wine, meat, the five spices, etc., even those who have not yet
attained that stage dare do the same shamelessly."91
It is a well-known fact that after the Meiji Restoration, practically
all the sects of Buddhism broke away from the disciplines. The upshot: for
the followers of the Pure Land Buddhists, it is enough to invocate
Amitabha; for the followers of the Nichiren sect, to chant the title of
the Lotus Sutra; for some of the others, to chant certain sutras and to repeat
prayers (dhiiraJ:iis).
The most outstanding sample of the repudiation of the disciplines is
drinking. The Indian Buddhists considered drinking a very serious reli-
gious sin. That was why "no drinking" was counted among the five disci-
plines and was ordained to be strictly observed not only by priests and
aSCetics but also by lay believers in general. In India the discipline of no
drinking was well observed from the time of early Buddhism to that of the
Mahayana Buddhism. (The late degenerate period of esoteric Buddhism
was an exception.) In China also this discipline of no drinking was strictly
observed. On its arrival in Japan, however, the discipline was abandoned.92
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Honen, in reply to the question: "Is it a sin to drink?" answered: "In truth
you ought not to drink, but drinking is after all a custom of this world."93
Neither Shinran nor Nichiren considered drinking as necessarily evil.
Nichiren preached, "Drink only with your wife, and recite Nam-myi5-
ho-ren-ge-kyo (Adoration to the Lotus Siitra)!"94 The Shugen sect main-
tained that if one inserts a slip with the following magic formula, even evil
wine is transformed into good wine.
"The gods know, and
Pray gods also drink
The Pure-water wine
Of the Mimosuso River."95
Together with drinking, sexual relations between men and women
also had their place in Buddhism in Japan. As has already been recognized
in Japanese literary works, a novel such as The Tale of Genji (ca. 1000)
describes lascivious scenes and immoral characters, considered however to
be not lacking in beauty. Herein lies one of the traditions of Japanese
literature, which clearly distinguishes them from the ethical views of
Confucianism. Buddhism also is tinged with the same tendency. Toward
the period of the degeneration of Buddhism in India, certain immoral
rituals were practiced by some Buddhists, but among the Buddhists in
China such a thing almost never occurred. Even esoteric Buddhism was
transmitted into China in its purified form, which was then transplanted
by Kobo into Japan. The Japanese followers of the Shingon sect, which
was founded by Kiikai (Kobo Daishi, 744-835), kept their purity in their
daily practice of asceticism. Toward the end of the Heian period, however,
there emerged a heretical religion, in the Tachikawa group. They identified
sexual intercourse with the secret meaning of becoming a Buddha alive in
the human body. Such licentious secret rituals appear to be prevalent in
various districts from the beginning to the middle of the Kamakura period.
The decadent elements of esoteric Indian Buddhism during the era of
degeneration, once almost completely purified in Chinese Buddhism, were
revived once again in Japan. However limited that influence might be,
such a difference in the respective characteristics of Chinese and Japanese
Buddhism cannot be ignored.
A tendency similar to that of the Tachikawa sect also manifested itself
in the Jodo sect. An example of such is the so-called Sozoku-kaie no
Ichinengi (which assured salvation and expiation for those who observe the
Doctrine of One Thought). It preaches as follows:
"What is called ichinen (one thought) means that two persons become
united in one thought. When man and woman hold each other and both
feel good, they cry out once in unison Namu-amida-butsu; that is exactly
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what the Doctrine of One Thought (ichinengi) means. So those who
remained single, afraid that they were unable to be born into the Pure
Land, sought their mates."96
Even Nichiren, a priest of good conduct, says: "Internal evidence
reveals that the object and state of knowledge are two different things and
at the same time they are one and the same thing. There are extraordinarily
important Gates to the Doctrine in the meanings of the phrases: afHiction is
nothing but enlightenment; mundane existence is nothing but NirvaI].a.
Man and woman, in copulation, chant Nam-myo-ho-ren-ge-kyo (Adoration
to the Lotus Siitra)-that is exactly in line with what we call afHiction as
nothing but enlightenment, mundane existence as nothing but NirvaI].a."91
This is not what Nichiren preached in one of his books of doctrines in his
serious mood, but is quoted from a passage in his letter to a certain warrior.
This way of teaching, Nichiren seems to have thought, was congenial to
the Japanese.
Up until now, Sh6ten (GaI].eSa) and Aizen My66 (God of Love) are
widely worshipped as the objects of popular religion for the consummation
of one's love. Sh6ten, or the God of Ecstasy, who was originally GaI].eSa in
India, was adopted and metamorphosed by the esoteric Buddhists. The
images of GaI].eSa now existent in India are by no means obscene. The
religious custom of worshipping the images of the elephant-faced god and
goddess in an embrace is confined perhaps to Japan and Tibet only.
It was in a similar manner that entirely different meanings were
bestowed upon those phrases which originally signified the fundamental
ideas of Buddhism. Monzaemon Chikamatsu, the famous playwright
(r653-r724), in describing lovers on their way to committing suicide, cele-
brates the beauty of their last moments as follows: "Adieu to this world,
adieu to the night. . . . The remaining one toll is the last sound of the
bell they hear on earth; 'tranquility is comfort' is its sound."98 "Shinjii" is a
phenomenon peculiar to Japan and it is impossible to convey its real
sentiment with such Western translations as a "lovers' double suicide" or
"Selbstmord eines Liebespaares." But in any case, whereas the phrase
"tranquility is comfort" (vyupasama~ sukham)99 meant originally in both
India and China the denial of worldly afHictions, it is now used in Japan
for expressing the consummation of sexual love.
The various literary works of the Tokugawa period show that the
words which originally stood for the sacred ideas of Buddhism came to be
used cryptically to suggest scenes of lust and dissipation. Such instances of
sacrilege never occurred either in India or in China. They are phenomena
perhaps peculiar to Japan.
Whereas the majority of the Indians and the Chinese in general try to
distinguish the world of religion from that of the lusts of the flesh, there is
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a latent tendency among the Japanese to identify the one with the other. In
this way the same characteristics which appeared in respect to the form of
accepting Confucianism are also said to be present in respect to that of
accepting Buddhism.
Even the traditional and conservative Buddhists in India were aware
of the fact that the disciplines are hard to observe strictly in their original
form and that they undergo changes according to differences of time and
place. "The Buddha announced to various priests, 'Although these disci-
plines are constituted by me, it is not necessary that you should use them
all, if you find them not pure in other districts. As to disciplines that are not
established by me, you should not hesitate to practice them all, if it is
necessary to do so in other districts.' "100
In spite of these concessions made by the Buddha, the Japanese are
the only Asiatic people who have forsaken almost all of the Buddhist
disciplines. How should we account for this fact?
We shall later dwell upon the tendency of the Japanese to hold fast to
a specific and closed social nexus. The repudiation of disciplines may seem
on the surface to be incompatible with such a tendency. But these two are
not necessarily in conflict. The disciplines are not always in agreement
with customary morality. The eating of meat and flesh was permitted
under certain circumstances by early Buddhism, whereas it was prohibited
by most of Mahayana Buddhism. Drinking was prohibited both in
Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism. Marriage for the priest was not
allowed except for the esoteric Buddhists of later periods. These are impor-
tant problems from the standpoint of religion, but from the point of view of
defending the interests of the closed social nexus, they do not count very
much. Quite prevalent among the Japanese are the double-barreled atti-
tudes of ignoring the disciplines on the one hand and of self-sacrificing
devotion to the interests of the closed social nexus on the other. Such
attitudes gave rise to their idea that the assertion of natural desires and the
repudiation of the disciplines do not necessarily mean the abandonment of
the moral order.
The lack of the guiding spirit is often talked about and people fre-
quently allude to the corruption of priests. But such phenomena are more
deep-rooted than the mere responsibilities of priests: they are imbedded in
the traditional Japanese way of thinking.
We have reflected mainly upon the domain of religion, but similar
ways of thinking seem to be prevalent in other domains also.
Emphasis on Benevolence
The tendency of the Japanese to accept the facts of life manifests itself
especially in the form of the acceptance and high esteem for man's natural
il.
THE ACCEPTANCE OF PHENOMENALISM
dispositions. Buddhist ideas are preached with frank references to matters
of love, for sexual love is not considered to be incompatible with religious
matters. Not only has the signi£.cance of the human body been recog-
nized, but also the idea of taking good care of one's body has become
prominent in Japanese Buddhism.1Ol
"Question: The sutra says one could not be a Bodhisattval02 unless one
serves Buddhas by burning one's own body, elbows, and £.ngers. What is
the meaning? Answer: The burning of one's body, elbows, and £.ngers is
metaphorically used to mean elimination of the three darknesses of the
branch, the leaf, and the root. . . . If one eliminates these three dark-
nesses, one becomes a Bodhisattva. . . . If one should try to serve the
Buddhas by burning one's sensual body, would any Buddha receive it?"
Here ascetic practices actually followed among the Buddhists both in
India and China were completely denied by the Japanese Buddhists.
The Japanese lay special emphasis upon the love of others. Banzan
Kumazawa (1619-1691), a famous Confucianist of the Tokugawa period,
calls Japan "The land of benevolence."lo3 The love of others in its puri£.ed
form is named "benevolence" (Sanskrit, maitri, karutzii). This idea was
introduced into Japan with the advent of Buddhism, and special emphasis
was laid upon it in Japanese Buddhism. Among many sects of Japanese
Buddhism, the Pure Land Buddhism (Jodo sect), a religion which typically
emphasizes benevolence, enjoys great popularity. The Pure Land Bud-
dhism preaches the benevolence of Amitabha Buddha who saves the bad
man as well as the ordinary man. Most of the high priests of the sect have
especially optimistic outlooks and benign attitudes.
The emphasis upon deeds of benevolence is recognizable also in other
sects. The Japanese accepted the practice of the strict disciplines handed
down from early Buddhism in the form of the "Ritsu sect" (Sanskrit: Vinaya
sect). This 8th-century sect (one of the six Nara sects, it was introduced into
Japan by Chien-chen, a Chinese missionary monk in 754) followed rather a
seclusionist method of monastic rules of ascetic practice. Later, however,
with its development into the Shingon-ritsu sect, a priest named Ninsho
(1217-13°3) launched upon such social welfare works as caring for the
suffering and the sick. He dedicated his whole life to the service of others,
and was even criticized by his master: "He overdid benevolence."lo4 Al-
though it was a breach of the ancient disciplines to dig ponds or wells or to
give medicine and clothing to the sick or to accumulate money for them,
Ninsho never let himself be deterred from doing any of these things.lo5
Needless to say, the idea of benevolence had an important signi£.cance
in Chinese Buddhism. The Zen Buddhism, however, that was developed as
the Chinese people's Buddhism, did not seem to emphasize the idea of
benevolence too much. To con£.rm this, there is not a single reference
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made to the word "benevolence" in such well-known scriptures as Shinjin-
mei (the Epigram of Faith), Shodoka (the Songs of Enlightenment),
Sando kai (the Compliance with the Truth), and the Hokyo-zanmai (the
Precious Mirror Meditation).lo6 To go back still further, nothing is said
about it in what are supposed to be the teachings of Bodhidharma.
It is probably because the Chinese Zen sect, under the influence of
Taoism and other traditional ideologies of China, was inclined to strict
clerical seclusion and resignation, and neglected the positive approach of
practicing deeds of benevolence. Such is my general impression, though a
final conclusion cannot be drawn until we have made a thorough study of
the general history of the Chinese Zen sect.
At the time the Zen sect was brought into Japan, however, it came to
emphasize deeds of benevolence, just as the other sects in Japan did.
Eisai/o1 who introduced Rinzai-zen, put the idea of benevolence first and
foremost. In a reply to the question whether the Zen sect was too much
obsessed by the idea of the void, he says: "To prevent by means of self-
discipline evil from without and to help others with benevolence from
within, this is what Zen is."lo8 As for the rules for ascetics of the Zen sect,
he teaches:' "You should arouse the spirit of great benevolence, .. and
save mankind everywhere with the pure and supreme disciplines of the
Great Bodhisattva, but you ought not to seek deliverance for your own
sake."lo9 Soseki (Musa Kokushi), Shasan Suzuki, Shida Bunan, and other
Zen priests represent a positive repulsion against the seclusionist and
self-satisfied attitude of the traditional Zen sect. They stress, instead, the
virtue of benevolence.
Dagen (1200-1253), although he does not often use the word ''benevo-
lence" overtly, chooses for instruction the phrases "speak kindly to others"
and "words of affection" from among the various Buddhist doctrines of the
past. "Speaking words of affection means to generate a heart of benevolence
and bestow upon others the language of affection, w4enever one sees them.
To speak with the heart, looking at mankind with benevolence as though
they were your own children, is to utter words of affection. The virtuous
should be praised, the virtueless pitied. To cause the enemy to surrender, or
to make the wise yield, words of affection are most fundamental. To hear
words of affection in one's presence pleases and brightens one's counte-
nance and warms one's heart. To hear words of affection said in one's
absence goes home to one's heart and soul. You should learn to know that
words of affection are powerful enough to set the river on fire."llo
In addition, he puts emphasis upon the virtues of altruism and coop-
eration beneath which flows the pure current of affection. The spirit of
benevolence was not only preached by the Buddhists, but it also made its
way into Shintoism and was tied up with one of the three divine symbols of
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the Japanese Imperial family. It was also popularized among the general
public and came to be regarded as one of the principal virtues of the
samurai. lll The love of others by no means comes out of self-complacency.
On the contrary, it goes with a humble reflection that I, as well as others,
am an ordinary man. This had already been stressed by Prince Sh6toku at
the beginning of the introduction of Buddhism into Japan.
"Forget resentment, forsake anger, do not become angry just because
someone opposes you. Everyone has a mind, every mind comes to a decision,
and decisions will not always be alike. If he is right, you are wrong; if you
are not quite a saint, he is not quite an idiot. Both disputants are men of
ordinary mind; who is decisively capable of judging an argument between
them? If both are wise men or both foolish men their argument is probably
a vicious circle. For this reason, if your opponent grows angry, you had
better be all the more cautious lest you too should be in error. Although
you might think you are quite right, it is wiser to comply with the other
man."1l2
Out of this attitude emerged the spirit of tolerance, which will be
discussed in the next section. .
A debate once arose whether or not this tendency to benevolence is
inherent in the Japanese people or came afterwards as a famous Buddhist
scholar had indicated that there is no god of love in Shintoism. His
criticism created a sensation among the Shintoists. They presented some
counter-evidence, which seemed far from convincing. A general impression
is that the spirit of benevolence was introduced into Japan probably with
the advent of Buddhism and exerted a renovating influence upon the
mental attitude of the Japanese. And without further speculation it may be
asserted that there exists a certain element of humanism in the thinking of
the common man in Japan.
The love of human beings seems to be closely tied up with the love of
the beauty of nature, which is as old as humanity itself.
The Spirit of Tolerance
The Japanese are said to be distinguished for their spirit of tolerance
since ancient times. Although there must have been instances of interracial
conflicts in prehistoric Japan, there exists no archeological evidence that
there were any very violent armed conflicts. According to the classical
records also, the Japanese generally treated conquered peoples tolerantly.
There are many tales of war, but there is no evidence that conquered
peoples were made into slaves in toto. Even prisoners were not treated as
slaves in the Western sense of the word. Although there remains some
doubt as to whether or not there existed a slave-economy in ancient Japan,
the percentage of slave-servants was very small in the whole population. It
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may be safely concluded, therefore, that slave labor was never used on a
large scale.
Such a social condition gives rise to the tendency to stress harmony
among the members of a society rather than dominance based on power.
This is not to deny entirely the presence of the power relationship in
Japanese society since ancient times. The social restrictions and pressures
upon the individual might have been indeed stronger in Japan than in
many other countries. Nevertheless in the consciousness of each individual
Japanese, the spirit of conciliation and tolerance is pre-eminent.
Ancient Japanese society had a system of government by religious
ritual in which the sense of harmony of the community pervaded the
whole climate of social consciousness. Whereas Jehovah is the God of
Jealousy, of Revenge, and of Justice, as well as of Mercy and Compassion,
it is noteworthy that among the gods and goddesses worshipped in the
ancient Japanese festivities, harmony and love pervade the atmosphere.
The gods and goddesses called one another their "loving" ones. They are
said to have "got drunk with wine and fallen asleep," or "played together
for eight days and for eight nights."
The spirit of tolerance of the Japanese made it impossible to cultivate
deep hatred even toward sinners. In Japan there existed hardly any cruel
punishments. Since crucifixion appeared for the first time in Japanese
history during the Sengoku period or Age of Civil Wars, it was presumably
started after the advent of Christianity and suggested by it. Burning at the
stake seems to have been practiced during the reign of Emperor Yuryaku
(457-479), but it disappeared afterwards, to be revived occasionally during
the modem period. ll3 In the medieval West, condemnation of heretics to
burning at the stake was sanctioned by church authorities. This never
happened in Japan. During the Heian period (794-1185), capital punish-
ment was not practiced for more than three hundred years until the War of
Hogen (1156) took place.l14 Although this may be attributed to the inHu-
ence of Buddhism, there has hardly been any period in any other country
marked by the absence of the death penalty.
For the Japanese, full of the spirit of tolerance, eternal damnation is
absolutely inconceivable. A Catholic priest, who forsook Christianity under
the persecution of the Tokugawa Government, condemned the idea of
eternal damnation preached in Christianity. He said, regarding reward and
punishment in the other world, if God be the Lord of Benevolence, he
ought to condemn Himself rather than condemn and punish His creatures
for their sins. Among the doctrines of Christianity the idea of eternal
damnation was especially hard for the Japanese to comprehend. M. Anezaki
commenting on this point, says that this is the outstanding line of
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demarcation between Christianity and Buddhism.ll5 This also reveals one
of the characteristic ideas long held by the Japanese.
The idea of "being beyond deliverance forever" was also hard for the
Japanese to comprehend. The Hossi> sect, a school of Buddhist Idealism,
advocates "the difference of five predispositions." Among men there are five
different types of disposition, one predisposed to become a Bodhisattva, one
to become Enkaku Cpratyekabuddha, one who attains self-complacent en-
lightenment), one to become Shamon (Sravaka, an ascetic of Hlnayana
Buddhism), one who is not predisposed, and one who is beyond deliver-
ance. This idea of discriminating predispositions to salvation, like the idea
of eternal damnation, was not generally accepted by the Japanese Bud-
dhists. Generally accepted, instead, was the view, "All men are predisposed
to become Buddhas."
A question may be raised here as follows. Is not the spirit of tolerance
prominent among the Japanese due to the influence of Buddhism rather
than an intrinsic Japanese characteristic? Before the advent of Buddhism
the Japanese also resorted to atrocities. Were not Emperors Buretsu
(499-506) and Yiiryaku violent and ruthless? The reason why the death
penalty was abandoned during the Heian period C794-II85) was that the
ideal of Buddhism was realized in politics. Even in present-day Japan,
statistics have proved beyond question that in the districts where Haibutsu
Kishaku (the abolition of Buddhism by violence immediately after the
Meiji Restoration) was enforced, cases of the murder of one's close relatives
are high in number, whereas such cases are relatively few where Buddhism
is strongly supported. Conversely, however, it is believed that because the
Japanese were inherently tolerant and conciliatory, the infiltration of Bud-
dhism into peoples' lives was rapid. It is often pointed out by cultural
historians that the Chinese are no less than other people inclined to
ruthlessness and cruelty, in spite of the fact that the Buddhist influence
had a longer history in China than in Japan. In Tibet, despite its having
been the country of Lamaism flying the banner of Buddhism, the severest
of punishments were still in use. ll6 Thus I am inclined to believe that the
Japanese had originally possessed the spirit of tolerance and forgiveness to
SOme extent, which was extremely strengthened by the introduction of
Buddhism, and was again weakened in recent years by the aggrandizement
of the secular power on the one hand and by the decline of faith in
Buddhism on the other.
The fact that the Japanese manifest more of the spirit of tolerance and
conciliation than the tendency to develop an intense hatred of sins also
transformed Pure Land Buddhism. According to his eighteenth vow
Amitabha Buddha will save the whole of mankind out of his great benevo-
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lence, excepting only "those who committed the five great sins and those
who condemned the Right Law (=Buddhism)." Zenda (Shan-t'aa,
613-681) of China interpreted the sentence as meaning that even great
sinners, under the condition that they be converted, could be reborn into
the Pure Land. Introduced into Japan, these exceptions were later con-
sidered as problematic, and came to be completely ignored by Saint Honen
(1133-1212). "This (salvation) includes all that are embraced in the great
benevolence and the real vow of Amitabha, not excluding even the ten
evils and five great sins, and those who excel in practices other than that of
invocation of Amitabha are also included. Its meaning is to believe in what
is revealed in the invocation of Amitabha once and also ten times."117 "You
should believe that even those who have committed the ten evils and the
five heinous sins are eligible for rebirth in the Pure Land, and yet you
should shrink from the slightest of all the sins."l18 As far as the surface
meaning of the sentence is concerned, Honen is diametrically opposed to
the Indian theologians who compiled the Dai-mu-ryo-ju-kyo (Sukhiivati-
vyuha-sutra)' From Honen's approach to the problem of redemption there
evolved the so-called "view of the eligibility of evil persons for salvation"
(the view that the evil are rightfully eligible for salvation by Amitabha
Buddha). This view may not be what Shinran (Honen's disciple, 1173-
1262) really meant, but the fact that such a view was generally considered
to be the fundamental doctrine of the (Kodo) Shin sect cannot be denied.
Such a way of thinking amounts to this: however evil one may be, one
is always saved, provided that one is dead. The dead are calLed "Buddhas"
by the Japanese. The dead, however heinous their earthly crimes, are
completely free from all responsibility for them, and the most wicked are
sometimes considered to be extraordinary spiritual entities. This gives rise
to the curious result that the spirits of murderers and burglars are en-
shrined, and their graveyards are crowded with worshippers.
What are the rational bases for such a spirit of tolerance and concilia-
tion? The tendency to recognize absolute significance in everything phe-
nomenalleads to the acceptance of the justification of any view held in the
mundane world, and ends up with the adaptability of any view with the
spirit of tolerance and conciliation.ll9
Such a way of thinking appeared from the earliest days of the intro-
duction of Buddhism into this country. According to Prince Shotoku (ca.
600), the Hokke or Lotus Sutra (Saddharmapurz4arika-sutra), supposed to
contain the ultimate essence of Buddhism, preaches the doctrine of the
One Great Vehicle and advocates the theory "that anyone of myriad good
acts leads to one thing, the attainment of Enlightenment."12o According to
the prince, there is no innate difference between the saint and the most
stupid.l2l Everyone is primarily and equally a child of the Buddha. Prince
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ShOtoku regarded secular moral teachings as the elementary gate through
which to enter Buddhism. He uses the express~ons "heretical doctrine" and
"pagan religion" but those expressions are borrowed rather from the tradi-
tional Indian terminology. He does not mean by them the doctrines of
Lao-tzii and Chuang-tzii or Confucianism.122 His interpretation of Bud-
dhism is characterized by its all-inclusive nature. Only through taking into
consideration his philosophical background, is one able to understand the
moral idea of the prince when he says, "Harmony is to be honored." 123 It
was this spirit that made possible the emergence of Japan as a unified
cultural state.
Prince Shotoku's philosophical standpoint is represented by the expres-
sions, 'The One Great Vehicle" and "The Pure Great Vehicle," which are
supposed to have originated in the Hokke Siitra. Ever since Saicho
(Dengyo Daishi) introduced the Tendai sect in 827 based upon the Hokke
Siitra, this Lotus Siitra has come to constitute the backbone of Japanese
Buddhism. Nichiren said: "Japan is single-heartedly the country of the
Hokke Siitra," and "For more than four hundred years since Emperor
Kanmu, all the people of Japan have been single-heartedly devoted to the
Hokke Siitra."l24 These words of Nichiren are not necessarily to be re-
garded as a self-centered interpretation. Considering that the Pure Land
Buddhism (Jodo sect) and the Zen sect even, not to mention the Nichiren
sect, are evidently under the influence of the Tendai doctrine, there is
much truth in these assertions of Nichiren. Among the poems composed by
various emperors on Buddhism, the subject matter is overwhelmingly con-
cerned with the doctrines of the Hokke Siitra. The thought-tendency
characteristic of the Hokke Siitra which tried to accept the principle of all
the practices of Buddhism led to an extremely tolerant and conciliatory
attitude to various ideas.
Toward the end of the Heian period, there were those among ordinary
men who prayed for rebirth into the Pure Land on the sole merit of their
observance of the Hokke Siitra. "All those who act in accordance with the
Hokke, covering themselves with the armour of forbearance and not cling-
ing to the dew-like life of mundane existence, shall climb upon the lotus
dais."125 The idea of climbing upon the lotus dais is not to be found in the
Hokke Siitra itself. It shows rather the syncretic character of the religious
faith of the period.
Koben (1173-1232) of the Kegon sect put together various faiths of
both exoteric and esoteric Buddhism. There is no unity, no central focus in
his religion, whose content is mostly eclectic. "This high priest never
limited himself to the teaching of one saint, but practiced in turn. the
religions of one saint after another." What was the reason for this? Accord-
ing to his own interpretation, "Each attains well-rounded enlightenment
-
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according to his customary practice. Since there is not just one customary
practice (but many), well-rounded enlightenment also cannot be just
one."126 He recognized the justification of multiple religious faiths.
Owing to this spirit of tolerance and conciliation, the development of
a single continuum of various sects was possible within Japanese Buddhism.
In India today, there is no Buddhist tradition extant. In China uniformity
was established in Buddhism, where the Zen sect, fused with the Pure
Land Buddhism, was the only remaining religious sect, while the traditions
of all the rest of the sects almost went out of existence. In Japan, by
contrast, there still exist many traditional sects which can no longer be
found in China or in India.
In spite of the highly sectarian and factional tendency of the various
religious sects to keep their traditional differences intact, contempt of other
sects was mutually prohibited by Japanese Buddhists. Even Rennyo
(1415-1499) of the Jodo sect, a school supposed to be inclined toward
monotheism and exclusionism, warns: "You ought not make light of
shrines," or "You ought not slander other sects and other teachings."121
Shosan Su!,-uki, a Zen priest, ordains: "In this monastery the right and
wrong of the world or the relative merits of other sects ought not to be
talked about."128 Jiun admonishes his disciples: "The right and wrong or
the high and low of the teachings of other sects should not be discussed."l29
Such an attitude of tolerance might have been handed down from
early Buddhism. It is noteworthy that, despite the sectarian and factional
tendency of the Japanese, they did not want to dispute with their oppo-
nents. Realistically speaking, the accommodation of Shintoism and Bud-
dhism might have very well been an expedient measure taken in order to
avoid possible friction between the traditional religion and the incoming
Buddhism, which came to be accepted as a national religion. It may also be
said that it was political consideration that made Honen (1133-1212) and
Rennyo (1415-1499) warn against rejecting sects other than their own. As
far as subjective consciousness in each man is concerned, however, it is
right to assert that the spirit of tolerance was the most influential factor.
The most easily thought of instance of intolerance in Japan in the past is
the Nichiren sect. But even this sect embraces many non-Buddhistic gods
of India and of Japan and has adopted some elements of Shintoism and of
popular faiths. The Jodo sect does appear to concentrate on pure faith in
Amitabha, prohibiting religious practices other than the invocation of
Amitabha. Nevertheless, this sect commends the worship of such a human
being as the chief abbot and other fetishistic practices.
An attitude of tolerance determined the all-inclusive and conciliatory
nature of Japanese Buddhism. The ascendency of Buddhism in Japan in
the course of more than ten centuries was entirely different from that of
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Christianity in the West. Buddhism tolerated various primitive faiths na-
tive to Japan, but the notion of pure paganism was clearly absent in
Japanese Buddhism. The gods in the native Japanese popular religion, who
would have been considered pagan from the standpoint of Buddhism, were
reconciled with Buddhism as "temporary manifestations" (incarnations) of
the Buddha. Along this line of thought a theory, called Honji-Suijaku-
setsu, was advanced in which the Shintoist gods were maintained as tem-
porary incarnations of the Buddhas. Emperor Yomei is said "to have
believed in Buddhism and at the same time worshipped gods of Shinto-
isrn."13o Precisely what Shintoism means in the above quotation needs to
be clarified, since in the Nara period (710-784) the idea of the accommoda-
tion of Shintoism and Buddhism had already come to the fore. According
to this school of thought, god rejoices in the Law of the Buddha and
defends Buddhism, but since god is an entity in the mundane world just as
other human beings are and is not free from afHiction, he also seeks
salvation. The Nara period saw many a shrine-temple built. The Imperial
message of 767 A.D. stated that the auspicious signs appeared, thanks to the
Buddhas, to the Japanese gods and goddesses of heaven and earth, and to
the spirits of the various emperors.
Thereafter, during the Heian period (794-1192 A.D.), there were few
shrines that did not have shrine-temples built in their confines, where
Buddhist priests performed the morning and evening practices of reciting
siitras, and served shrine gods and goddesses, together with Shintoist
priests. The structure of the shrines was modelled after that of Buddhist
temples. At the Iwashimizu-Hachiman Shrine, whose construction was
inaugurated by the priest Gyokyo, the religious service was performed after
the fashion of the Buddhist mass, and almost all the officials there in service
were Buddhist priests. Simple offerings were offered, surplices and Bud-
dhist utensils were dedicated, and the whole ritual of the shrine was very
much akin to that of a temple. Later on the shrines of Gion, Kitano, and
Kurnano followed suit. The institution of the shrine-temple was thereby
established. Its gods were named "the gods of abstinence."
Deep-rooted, however, was the belief among the common men in the
native gods and goddesses, to which Buddhists had to reconcile their
OWn ideas. The status of gods and goddesses was then enhanced to such an
extent that they were entitled Bodhisattvas, and the recitation of Buddhist
siitras was performed in front of their altars. The gods and goddesses were
thus exalted from the status of mankind astray to that of persons on their
way toward enlightenment, or even to the status of those who save man-
kind. In the ninth century, priests like Saicho and Kiikai sought access to
the shrines and respected them, and at the same time they tried to make
their Own sects prosperous by utilizing the influence of the shrine. When
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in 827 Saicho pioneered a Tendai sect monastery on the divine mountain
of Hiei in 6mi, near Kyoto, where the spirit of 6yamagui-no-Mikoto had
rested for ages, to construct the Enryaku temple, he enshrined therein the
god of 6miwa, whom he named the god of 6hiei and entitled him Sanna
(the Mountain-God). Jikaku (784-864), known also as .Ennin, founded
the Akayama-Myojin Shrine. Kiikai, who constructed the Kongobu Tem-
ple at the divine place of the Nifutsu-shime Shrine, according to an old
folk tale, prayed for the assistance of the deity Nifu-Myojin in founding a
Shingon sect monastery on Mt. Koya.13l He is also said to have made the
Inari Shrine into the guardian god of the To Temple. These stories tell of
ancient divine areas being turned into the sacred regions of Buddhism and
include newly fabricated interpretations of the origins of the shrines in
relation to Buddhism. The motivation for these peculiar endeavors for
reconciliation, as I take it, was the building up of the security of the
confines and estates of the Buddhist temple through clever manipulation of
the popular faith in native gods and goddesses. During the years of Bunji
(1185-1189), Chogen (Shunjobo) thought it an effective gesture to confine
himself in. the Ise Shrine and thus to appeal to the people's religious
sentiments, for the realization of his great vow to solicit contributions for
the reconstruction of the Todaiji Temple.132
The idea that the Japanese native gods are the temporary manifesta-
tions of Buddhas first appeared in the classical writings of the years of
Kanko (1004-1012) in the middle of the Late Heian period. After the
reign of Emperor Go-Sanjo (1068-1°72) a question was raised as to the
fundamental basis of the manifestations of those native gods and goddesses.
During the period of the Civil Wars between the Genji and Heike Clans,
each god or goddess was gradually allotted his or her own Buddha, whose
incarnation he or she was supposed to be, until at last during the Shokyii
years (1219-1222), the idea was established that the god and the
Buddha were identical in the body. "There is no difference between what
is called a Buddha and what is called a god."133 Shogun Ashikaga Takauji
(13°5-1350), in his letter expressing a vow dedicated to the Shrine of
Gion, says: "Although a Buddha and a god are said to be different in the
body, they are the inside and outside of the selfsame thing."134 The
doctrinal organization of the theory that gods and goddesses are the tem-
porary manifestations of Buddhas or Bodhisattvas was completed during
the Kamakura period (1185-1333) and its ideological gist was kept intact
up to the Meiji Restoration in 1868.
The Buddhists of the Medieval period genuinely respected Shintoist
scriptures, which they studied with sincerity and piety. Almost all the
representative Shintoist scriptures extant today, such as Kojiki, Nihon-
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shoki, Kogo Shui, and others were copied by medieval Buddhist priests and
thus transmitted to posterity.135
What is the way of thinking that made such an accommodation of
Buddhism and Shintoism possible? The influence of the traditional charac-
ter of Buddhism cannot be denied, and it is particularly important to point
out the influence of the idea of the One Vehicle manifested in the Hokke
Siitra. The Imperial Rescript of November of the year 836 A.D. says: "There
is nothing superior to the One Vehicle to defend Shintoism." 136 It goes
without saying that Nichiren, who expressed his absolute allegiance to the
Hokke Siitra, also showed his genuine loyalty to the Japanese gods and
goddesses. Even the Jodo followers, who were originally opposed to the
gods and goddesses of Shintoism, tempered their oppositions in a more
conciliatory attitude after Zonkaku (1290-1373). The theoretical basis for
such a rapprochement was provided not by the triple-siitras of the Pure
Land Buddhism but by the Tendai doctrine based upon the Hokke Siitra.
The Japanese native gods, exalted as they were as natural deities, kept
their own distinctive existence intact. In this respect they differ completely
from the occidental counterpart in the ancient German gods, vestiges of
which remain in the form of the Christmas festivity (tree, Santa Claus,
etc.) within Christianity. The Japanese never considered it necessary to
repudiate their religious faith in the native gods in order to become devoted
followers of Buddhism. In this manner they brought about the conception
of "God-Buddhas." It is generally noticed even today that the ardent
Buddhist is at the same time a pious worshipper of Shintoist gods. The
majority of the Japanese pray before the shrine and at the same time pay
homage to the temple, without being conscious of any contradiction.
The same relationship as exists in the mind of the Japanese between
Shintoism and Buddhism also holds for the relationship between Buddhism
and Confucianism. When the continental civilization was transplanted to
Japan, Buddhism and Confucianism were simultaneously introduced, with-
out any theoretical conflicts taking place in the minds of the Japanese or
any ideological warfare occurring on Japanese soil. On the contrary, Okura
Yamanoue (d. 733), a famous poet, took the conciliatory standpoint that
despite the difference existing between Buddhism and Confucianism, they
amount to the same thing: "Although their ways of guiding are two, both
lead up to the one and only one attainment of enlightenment."137
After the dawn of the Modern era, Confucianism came to flourish
with the political backing of the ruling class, and from then on a doctrine
was widely advocated to assert the unity of the three religions, i.e. Shinto-
ism, Confucianism, and Buddhism.
During the T okugawa period (1600-1867), Kanazoshi (Tales in Easy
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Japanese, or popular novels written in the Kana characters) and other
similar writings were extremely popular among the common folk. Most of
them were written from the Buddhist point of view, with some exceptions
written from the Confucian standpoint. The most famous of those were
The Tale of Kiyomizu, The Tale of Kiyomizu Continued, The Tale of
Cion, The Tale of Daibutsu, and others, all of which were written mainly
from the viewpoint of the unity of the three religions. This was in spite
of the fact that the Shintoist and Buddhist priests were deeply involved
in sectarian and factional conflicts. The common man reconciled and
fused those religions on whose differences the priests insisted. Fujii Otoo
comments as follows: 'What a close union Confucianism and Buddhism
came to have in the Kanazoshi (Tales in Easy Japanese)! Among the
scholars conflicts and controversies multiplied in advocating their re-
spective doctrines, but among common men they were made to fuse
and compromise. The Japanese are by nature inclined to rapprochement
without threshing out an issue. No one has yet taken up a noteworthy
controversy between Confucianism and Buddhism, but, instead, there are
already mapy who advocate the unity of the three religions." 138 Such a
theoretical standpoint was represented in its most consistent form in the
school of "Learning of the Mind" (Sekimon Shingaku) which exerted the
greatest influence upon the cornman man. Scholars like Toan Tejima,
Baigan Ishida (1685-1744), Doni Nakazawa (1735-18°3), Kyiio Shibata
(1783-1839) belonged to this school, from whose standpoint they were
cynical about the conflicts of various sects.
Such a conciliatory attitude seems ultimately to form part of Japan's
cultural heritage. When the Christian civilization penetrated into Japanese
society after the Meiji Restoration, those who welcomed it were not neces-
sarily going to become Christians. For most people in Japan there was
nothing about Christianity that was incompatible with their traditional
religion. That was the reason, it appears, why the Christian culture became
considerably widespread despite the extremely small minority converted to
the Christian religion.
Perhaps social scientists will finally furnish us with statistical verifica-
tion of my suggestion that the Japanese are a tolerant people. My own
impression comes, as I have shown, from the study of historical documents
and personal observation.
Thanks to the spirit of tolerance, a massacre of heathens never took
place in Japan. In this respect, the situation differs vastly in Japan from
that of the West. As far as religion is concerned the idea of "harmony" is a
foremost quality in this country's cultural history. Some apparently excep-
tional cases have occurred: one being an overall and thoroughgoing perse-
cution of Christians, the second being the persecution of local Jodo-Shin
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believers, and the third being a severe suppression of Nichiren and the
Non-Receiving-and-Non-Giving sect139 (one of the Nichiren sects, which
has refused to receive alms from or give alms to those other than the
believers of the Hokke Sutra). These, however, were far from being
religious persecutions in the Western sense of the word. These sects were
suppressed and persecuted simply because the ruling class feared the sub-
version that might be worked by these sects upon a certain human nexus,
i.e., the feudal social order maintained by the ruling class. A mere differ-
ence of religious faith was generally a matter of no consequence for the
Japanese unless it was considered to be damaging to the established order
of the social nexus, whereas in the West a religious difference in itself
would give rise to a conflict between opposing parties.
A new problem may be introduced here. If any of the different
thoughts and religions can claim its own raison d'etre, then how can one
determine their relative value, and what is the criterion of evaluation?
As has already been pointed out, the inclination to regard as absolute a
limited specific human nexus naturally brings about a tendency to disregard
any allegedly universal law of humanity that every man ought to observe at
any place at any time. Instead, the standard of the evaluation of good and
evil is identified here with the consideration of the appropriateness or
inappropriateness of conduct judged solely by reference to the particular
human nexus to which one happens to belong.
That Japan is the supreme country of all the countries of the world
and that to defend such a country is of absolute religious significance was
maintained particularly by the Shintoist thinkers: "Our Great Japan is the
COuntry of gods. Our country is founded by a heavenly ancestry; the reign
of our country is transmitted forever by the Sun Goddess. Such things
have happened to this country of ours that nothing is comparable to
them in other countries. That is why this country is called the country of
the gods."140 These words were taken as a motto up to quite recently.
According to Kanetomo Urabe (1435-1511), who advocated Shintoist
Monism, "Shintoism is the root of all the teachings. Those two doctrines
(Confucianism and Buddhism) are differentiations of Shintoism."141 It goes
without saying that the movements of the Shintoists and the scholars of
the Japanese classical literature of the Motoori and Hirata schools had
much to do with propagandizing and convincing people of such chauvin-
istic ideas as those just mentioned. There were some, among the Shintoi~ts
and the scholars of the Japanese classical literature themselves, who ex-
pressed their opposing opinions, but such a tendency was too weak to
combat the general trend of thought.
It was not that Shintoists were completely lacking in universalistic
character. That Shintoism is not the way merely of Japan but that of all
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nations is maintained mainly by sectarian Shintoists. The Kurozumu sect
and the Misogi sect emphasize that "the four seas are brothers"; the founder
of the Misogi sect teaches, "You should regard people of the world as your
own parents and children"; the founder of the Revisionist sect (Kunimitsu
Nitta) advocates, "You should expand this sect to all nations," and "You
.should treat all nations as one family and one body." The Konko sect, in
particular, worships as its principal god "the Golden God of the Uni-
verse," which has never appeared in the classics of our country, and which
leads us to think that the Konko sect itself is a world religion. "Under
heaven there are no outsiders" is advocated by the founder of the Konka
sect. Shrine Shintoism in general, however, has not been inclined to uni-
versalism, except for those cases where the Buddhist idea of benevolence
was adopted.142
What then was the attitude of the Japanese in accepting the univer-
salistic doctrines of foreign countries? The attitude receptive to a foreign
religious thought as universal and international and the attitude of looking
up to Japan as absolute are by no means compatible. When the former
attitude is ~ccepted, the latter is rejected. In fact, however, the tendency to
think in conformity with the limited human nexus of Japan seems to be the
most prevalent.
This ambivalence and conflict of universalism and nationalism ap·
peared in the pattern of the acceptance of Buddhism. At first Buddhism
was accepted, by Prince Shotoku and a group of bureaucrats under his
control, as a universal teaching that everyone should follow. Buddhism was
estimated thereby as "the terminating end of four lives (four kinds of all
living creatures) and the ultimate religion of all nations," and among the
Three Treasures of the Buddha, the Law, and the Brotherhood (sangha),
the Law or the religious doctrine was especially esteemed. They preached,
in consequence, "Why should any period or any man not reverence this
law?"143 According to Prince Sh6toku, "The Law" is "the norm" of all
living creatures, "the Buddha" is in fact "the Law embodied," which "being
united with Reason" becomes sarlgha. So, according to this way of teaching,
everything converges on the one fundamental principle called "the LaW."144
Even among the various sects of Buddhism during that characteristi-
cally Japanese period of Kamakura (II85-1333), the sense of the univer-
sality of "the Law," as preached in Buddhism, was not lost. Dagen
(1200-1253), the Zen master, says: "Because there is the Way, Buddhas
and their forerunners are comprehended. Without the Way there is nO
comprehension. Because there is the Law, things are originated. Without
the Law nothing is originated."145 Here too the Law and the Way are used
interchangeably. Shinran (1173-1262) himself quotes a sentence by
Nagarjuna: "See, enter and acquire the Law, and live in the solid Law, and
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don't vacilIate."146 Nichiren also esteems the Hokke Siitra as the Truth
more highly than he does the Buddha. "I am asked why I should make the
prayer of the Hokke Siitra, instead of the Buddha (Shakyamuni), the prin-
cipal object of worship. I answered that. . . . while the Buddha is the
originated, the Hokke Siitra is the originator. While the Buddha is the
body, the Hokke Siitra is the spirit."147 "The Hokke Siitra is just as su-
perior to a Buddha as the moon to a star and as the sun to artifIciallight."148
Among the Japanese, however, there is a strong tendency to under-
stand such a universal law only in reference to some particular or specific
phase of things. Moreover, the Japanese sought a standard for the evalua-
tion of different thoughts by laying emphasis upon historical and topo-
graphical specificity or particularity.
In Japan, the Tendai doctrine, which laid the foundation for the
doctrines of other sects of Buddhism in Japan, puts emphasis upon
"Things," while in China the doctrine of the same sect regards "Reason" as
most important. "Things" here mean observable speci~cities or particulari-
ties limited in time and space. Shimei (Ssu-ming, 1060-1128), a Chinese
Tendai scholar, preached that the first half (Shakumon) of the Hokke
Siitra explains the perfect Truth in conformity with the Law of Rea-
son (the perfect Reason), while the second half (Honmon) of the
Siitra exposes "the perfect Truth" in accordance with phenomena (perfect
Things). Even this latter truth expresses for him the eternal Buddha. In
contrast, Eshin (942-1017), a Japanese Tendai scholar, while accepting
this two-fold interpretation, interpreted "the perfect Reason" to mean the
comprehension of the multiplicity of the phenomenal world through the
indiscriminatory Truth (Sessa Kisha), and "the perfect Thing" to mean
the revelation of the Truth through the multiplicity of phenomena.149
The tendency to attach more importance to things than to reaSOn is
one of the characteristics of the Japanese Zen sect, in contrast to that of
China, and the teachings of the Japanese priests like Dagen (1200-1253)
and Hakuin (1685-1768) prove it.
Based upon this pluralistic way of thinking, most of the Buddhist sects
in Japan teach that doctrines should always be made "apropos of the time."
Especially the idea of the age of degeneration penetrated deep into the core
of the doctrines of various sects, which admitted that they were in the age
of degeneration and religious doctrines ought to be made suitable to it.
Each of the sects ended up claiming the superiority of their respective
siitras or doctrines, as most suited to the age of corruption. This funda-
mental tendency is most manifest in the teachings of Nichiren, based upon
the Japanese Tendai doctrine. He lays special emphasis upon the particu-
larity and specificity of the truth of humanity. "The learning of just one
word or one phrase of the Right Law, only if it should accord with the time
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and the propensity of the learner, would lead him to the attainment of the
Way. The mastery even of a thousand scriptures and ten thousand theories,
if they should not accord with the time and the propensity of the one who
masters them, would lead him nowhere."15o Nichiren's evaluation of sec-
tarian doctrines is called "The Five Standards of Religion." It sets five
standards from which to evaluate the depth or shallowness and the superior-
ity or inferiority of all the Buddhist doctrines originated from the Buddha,
these five standards being the teaching (of the siitra), the propensity (the
spiritual endowments of the learner), the time (the demands of the age),
the country (where the doctrine is practiced), and the order (before and
after the propagation of the doctrine, or the preceding circumstances under
which the doctrines were practiced). Nichiren concluded, judging from
those five standards, that the Hokke (Lotus) Sutra was the superior one. l5l
Saich6 regarded the time and the country as important factors, but he did
not go so far as to establish them as basic principles. It was Nichiren
(1222-1282) who presented them in a clear and distinct form, and it was
Nichiren who first put forth "the circumstances" before and after the
propagation of the doctrine. The tendency of the Japanese Tendai sect to
lay emphasis upon actuality was brought to its extremity by Nichiren, and
such a method of evaluation has hardly been found either in India or in
China. Herein lies a reason why Nichirenism in the past was so easily tied
up with nationalism.
Such a particularistic way of thinking as discussed above seems to be a
general trend during the medieval period. The Gukansho, for instance,
often uses the word "reason," which by no means signifies the universal
reason that applies to any country of the world, but which means each of
the historical manifestations of reason peculiar to Japan. The historical
manifestations, where political and religious factors are closely entangled,
are not analyzed from a universal standpoint, but are classified according
to the particular periods of development.
This characteristic which can be found in the process of the introduc-
tion of Buddhism also applies to the influence of Chinese thought.
The doctrine of Chu-hsi (1130-1200) was said to be established by
Razan Hayashi (1583-1657) as an official doctrine in Japan, but it was by
no means in its original form that he introduced it. According to
Chu-hsi, Ch'i is the material principle that originates all physical phe-
nomena, while "Reason" (Li) is the metaphysical basis. According to Razan
Hayashi, however, "Reason" is nothing more than Japanese Shintoism,
which is a characteristically Japanese interpretation of the original doctrine.
"The Way of Gods is nothing but Reason (Li). Nothing exists outside of
Reason. Reason is the truth of nature." The Way of the Gods is the Way of
Emperors handed down from the Sun Goddess. "In our country since the
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Sun Goddess, one god has been succeeded by another god, the Emperor has
been succeeded by another Emperor. Why should the Way and the Way
of Gods be two different things? This is what is meant by saying that
Reason is identical with the Spirit."152 He shares with Shintoists the view
that "this country is the Country of Gods."153 He denies the universal law
of man as man. Instead he maintains, "I have never heard that there is
anything to be called a Way other than that of the lord and the father."I54
Such a way of thinking was not confined to Razan Hayashi, an official
spokesman backed up with governmental authority, but was also recogniz-
able in Toju Nakae (1608-1648), an early 17th-century grass-roots scholar.
He stressed that Confucianism is the absolute "Way" universally applicable
to the whole world, but at the same time he considered that the manifesta-
tions of the "Way" are relative to time, space, and the hierarchical status to
which each man belongs.
"Since Confucianism is originally the ancient way of gods, there is no
place in the world where ships and cars can reach, where human power
prevails, where the heaven overhangs, where the earth covers, where the
sun and the moon shine, where the dew and the frost fall, and where the
high-spirited dwell, that Confucianism is not practiced. The manners and
etiquette as laid down in Confucian writings cannot be observed strictly to
the letter, but it depends upon the time and the place. . . ."155
Nakae preached that "the manners and etiquette to associate with
others" should be practiced "according to the custom of the particular
country and the particular place."156 He recommended that the Japanese
follow Japanese Shintoism in order to observe the way of their gods in
accordance with a soil-rooted primordial principle.
Banzan Kumazawa ( 1619-1691), his disciple, believed the same
way. For him there is only One Way, namely the way of the gods of
heaven and earth, the manifestations of which differ according to different
countries. An unbroken line of Emperors in Japan and revolutionary
changes of dynasties in China are not the reflections of differences in the
way but in the national character. "In Japan naturally there are excellences
peculiar to Japan."151
Confucian scholar that he was, he attached great importance to Shinto-
ism as the Way of Japan. "The Way of Gods of the heaven and the earth is
called the great way. In Japan there exists the way of gods in accordance
with our climate." "The Japanese Way of Gods in accordance with our
climate cannot be loaned to, nor borrowed from, China or barbarians."158
These ways of thinking of the Confucian scholars run parallel to those
of Japanese Buddhists in their recognition of Japanese Shintoism. The
only difference between them consists in the fact that Confucian scholars
are not so strongly conscious of the historical peculiarity of the doctrine,
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(e.g., the idea of regarding the present period as the age of degeneration),
as Buddhists are, although they make much of the topographical peculiari-
ties of the doctrine. (This by no means applies to all the Confucianists.)
Shundai Dazai's attitude of contempt toward Shintoism as a form of
paganism is similar to the attitudes of the people of other races when a
universal religion is introduced. So Dazai's attitude cannot be called charac-
teristically Japanese. But the ways of thinking of the other scholars men-
tioned above may be rightly said to be uniquelyJapanese. The tendency of
Japanese Buddhism to put "Things" before "Reason," as already discussed,
also appears in the formation of late Japanese Confucianism. Sorai Ogyii
(1666-1728) emphasized facts rather than theories, and stressed the superi-
ority of the former to the latter. 1.'9
If both Buddhists and Confucianists emphasize that in Japan there
ought to be a way appropriate to Japan, and if they push that theory to its
logical conclusion, will it not become meaningless for them to remain
Buddhists or Confucianists? It amounts to believing that for the Japanese it
is enough to observe the Way of Japan, even when the equally valid claims
of both Confu.cianism and Buddhism for guiding man to the right conduct
are to be taken for granted. Such a logic was presented by Masamichi
Imbe, a Shintoist. He never rejects Buddhism or Confucianism as flatly as
Norinaga Motoori or Atsutane Hirata does. On the contrary, he recognizes
the raison d'etre of Confucianism and Buddhism by saying that they are
"both more or less different but good ways." As for Shintoism he maintains,
"Shintoism is the Right Way of this country. It respects the great value of
order and honors clear reason, and does not repudiate any principles as
principles and never ceases to move."160 That is to say, Shintoism, since it is
the Way of Japan, should be relied upon. The scholars of Japanese classical
literature in the Tokugawa period go so far as to reject entirely the values
of Confucianism and Buddhism. Mabuchi Kamo (1697-1769) maintains
that Confucianism is of no·use for Japan by saying, 'While the teachings
of Confucius have never been put into practical use even in China, where
the foundations of Confucianist teachings were laid, of what use could it
be, brought to Japan?"161 Such a view was later pushed to its extreme by the
scholars of Japanese classical literature.
Those scholars who claimed to be independent of Buddhism, Confu-
cianism, or Shintoism also followed suit. For instance, Nakamoto Tomi-
naga (1715-1746), an Osaka merchant, scholar, and freethinker, advocated
"the true Way" or "the Way of Ways" which he defined as "the Way that
should be practiced in present-day Japan."162 In order for the "true Way" to
be realized, it should be limited both in time, i.e., "the present day," and in
space, i.e., "Japan." Thus his theory evidently claims that "the Way" as the
principle of human existence manifests itself in the form inevitably deter-
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mined historically and geographically. He denounces as "the ways against
the true Way"l63 the Shintoism advocated by his contemporary scholars of
Japanese classical literature, the Confucianism taught by the Confucianists,
and the Buddhism preached by the Buddhists, because, he says, all of them
took no notice of the historical and topographical peculiarities of human
existence.
We are now led to conclude that it was a distinctive characteristic of
many Japanese scholars to use the idea of "the historically determined
present-day Japan" as the measuring rod for evaluating all systems of
thought.164 This nationalistic attitude cannot be attributed to most scholars
either in India or in China.
When such a way of thinking is pushed to its extreme, it ends up with
its emphasis on the limited human nexus, in ethno-centricism or superna-
tionalism, and with its emphasis upon the specificity of the time, in oppor-
tunism, which leads to compromise in a given particular situation. It is
easily turned into a tendency to neglect the universal law that ought to be
observed by mankind everywhere. Any system of thought inclined to
disregard the universal cannot attain a permanent place among the systems
of thought of mankind. It cannot find a sympathizer among other nations.
It is extremely difficult to find sincere friends among other nations so long
as Japanese thought emphasizes racialism or nationalism as a basis of
superiority. For that reason in the field of philosophic thought, with the
exception of the development of Zen, Japan has had very little to offer to
the culture of the world. In the field of art, especially of fine arts, however,
Japan has contributed a great deal to the world. Take, for instance, the
impressive and enduring influence that the Japanese fine arts have exerted
upon those of the West.
An objection may be raised as follows. Since works of art are appreci-
ated through intuition, their merits can be easily recognized by other
nations, but where language is the medium of communication, however, it
is difficult for one nation to understand the philosophical thought of the
other. Such an objection does not hold. In spite of the fact that a consider-
able number of works of Japanese thought have already been translated
and contemporary Japanese philosophy has partly been introduced to for-
eign countries, in some cases by the Japanese government and in some
cases by government-sponsored organizations, they have exerted very little
influence upon the thought of other countries. The militant attitude on the
part of Japan was repulsed by other nations. In the cases of traditional
Indian or Chinese philosophical thought, by contrast, no comparable efforts
for introducing them abroad by the respective governments have been
exerted. Nevertheless, their influence upon the thoughts of other nations is
pre-eminent. The spread of Buddhism over the Eastern countries was not
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endorsed by any political or military force. The same is true with the
propagation of Indian religions in the South Sea countries. Confucianism
was not imposed upon Japan by the Chinese government, but it was
voluntarily accepted by the Japanese people. The influence of Chinese
thought upon the Western trends of thought of the modern Enlightenment
and the contribution of Indian ideas to modern Romantic philosophy and
literature have left traces too deep to be wiped out. But has Japan contrib·
uted anything of that sort to the world?
Japan failed, even before the Pacific War, in her effort to propagate
Shintoism, Japan's own religion, among Asiatic countries. The cause of the
failure is quite clear: since Shintoism is the tribal religion of the Japanese,
it is an impossible enterprise from the very beginning to try to substitute it
for the tribal religions of other peoples. The various sects of Japanese
Buddhism which also sent their missionaries to other Asiatic countries were
also bound to fail. Why? It was not Buddhism itself, which originally is a
univers~l religion, but the "Japanized" Buddhism that was unanimously
rejected by the people of other Asiatic countries.
The Jar.anese inclination to lay too much emphasis upon particular
facts or specific phases amounts to the anti-intellectual standpoint of no
theory or anti-theory. It ends up with the contempt of rational thinking
and the worship of uncontrolled intuitionism and activism. Herein lies the
intellectual cause of the failure of Japan in the past, and the danger still
lies in this direction today. In order not to repeat the same failure, we ought
from now on to learn to seek universal "reason" through specific "facts."
Cultural Multiplicity (Consisting of Several Strata Still Pre-
served) and Weakness of the Spirit of Criticism
The Japanese, owing to the tolerant and more open side of their
nature, assimilated the heterogeneous cultures of foreign countries without
much repercussion. They try to recognize the value of each of these
different cultural elements, and at the same time they endeavor to preserve
the values inherited from their own past. They seek national unity while
permitting the co-existence of heterogeneous elements.
This tendency of modern Japan may be found in various fields of
culture.
First, let us take up language, which is a common denominator in any
nationality group. There are in Japanese a great many words of foreign
origin. All the important concepts are expressed in Chinese characters. A
considerable number of Western words have recently been introduced.
Even the numerals, which are not easily changed in other languages, were
adopted from the Chinese. Those words adopted from foreign languages
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are sometimes made to stand for different meanings, but on the whole the
original meanings are retained. There are often cases where the archaic
Japanese words are preserved in speech but they are represented by Chinese
characters in writing. The absorption of so many foreign words into the
system of a native language, as the Japanese have done, is quite rare among
the languages of civilized nations.
The words adopted from Chinese or Western languages are on the
whole nouns. By suffixing postpositions to these nouns, something similar
to case-declension is effected, and also the nouns are turned into adverbs or
adjectives. By adding "SU"165 to nouns, they are turned into verbs. These
operations prove that foreign words are adopted essentially as nouns and
are used as the materials of language as such. The main features of the
Japanese language have undergone no considerable change, and the old
form, in its syntax, has been faithfully preserved.
That is exactly the attitude of the Japanese in accepting foreign
cultures. They are extremely sensitive to adopting and absorbing foreign
cultures. But, in fact, a foreign culture is adopted as a constituent element
of the Japanese culture. Whatever the intention and outcry of the men in
charge of its adoption might be, as a social and cultural fact, foreign culture
is accepted insofar as its value is recognized as a helpful means to Japan's
progress. Such an attitude in the past gave rise to the conception of "the
Japanese spirit and Chinese learning." Such a traditional standpoint of the
Japanese is the key to understanding their cultural multiplicity.
There are various aspects of cultural multipliCity. In the field of
politics in Japan, no radical revolution has really taken place since ancient
times. The ruling class of one period does not end up with a complete
decline. The ruling class of the past, a class whose political hegemony has
already been lost, may still command the respect of the people as the
preserver of the ancient cultural tradition and spiritual authority. Such a
political phenomenon has never been found either in India, China, or
Tibet. This tendency appears to be found somewhat among the Ural-
Altaic peoples, but Japan is the most outstanding case.166
Multiplicity is also found in the mode of living of the Japanese, in
their clothing, eating, and dwellings. In the field of arts also, unity is
somewhat maintained by the juxtaposition of conflicting elements old and
new. In the field of religion, different modes of belief, conflicting with one
another in their respective peculiarities, not only coexist in the community,
but operate at the same time within the life of the selfsame individual
person.
It must indeed be a practical merit of the Japanese to be tolerant of
individual differences and peculiarities of conflicting elements of culture,
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aiming at the same time to bring forth a concrete unity among them. In
many cases, however, such a unity is based upon rapprochement for the
sake of convenience and in the mood of opportunism. Hampered by their
own inclination to accentuate the social nexus and their alogical mentality,
the Japanese are often lacking in the radical spirit of confrontation and
criticism.
Such a weakness shows itself in practical social behavior, as in politics
and in other fields, but the weakness is most pronounced in the field of
thought where logical confrontation is indispensable. As for Buddhism, the
life of present-day priests and believers is completely changed from what it
was before the Meiji Restoration. Consequently, there exists an abysmal
gap between the old doctrine and the reality of present-day living, but few
try to bridge that gap with reflective thinking. The resultant ideological
chaos is most revealing as to the issues within disciplines. For instance, as
long as one remains a Buddhist, drinking is absolutely prohibited, whether
one is a priest or a believer. But the breach of that discipline is taken for
granted in Japan.167 Marriage would not be permitted to the priest, except
for the prielOts of the Jodo sect, were the strict teachings and conduct of the
Japanese founders of the various sects observed as the absolute authority.
The alternatives are either to follow strictly the examples of the founders or
to repudiate their authority by becoming a priest under lay conditions, just
as was done by some of the priests of Mahayana Buddhism, the priests of
Nepal, Tibet, or the leaders of the Jodo sect. Such a decision based upon
thoroughgoing logical juagment is rarely thought out by the Japanese
Buddhists who very reluctantly do any theoretical reflection upon any
discrepancy between the doctrine professed and the actions performed.
(Such a mental phenomenon runs parallel to the intellectual-historical fact
of the lack of critical studies when Western philosophical ideas were
introduced and rashly absorbed after the Meiji Restoration.)
The lack of the spirit of criticism in the theoretical field corresponds to
the lack in the field of literature of any will to drive home to the reader's
heart a concept or an idea, however abstract it may be. Yaichi Haga writes:
"There is scarcely any inclination in the mind of the Japanese to go to
extremes in getting angry with the world, in deploring, in being cynical, or
in being snobbish. That is the reason why the literature of our country is
simple."168 Even the Buddhist works of literature, favored by the Japanese
people, are mostly lacking in thoroughgoingness.
Even in the Medieval. period, when Buddhist thought penetrated
most deeply into the minds of the people, the Japanese were not serious in
their religious consciousness. In the Ryojin Hisho, a collection of Buddhist
songs, the songs that express a gnawing consciousness of sin are extremely
rare. Instead, most of them represent moods of humor and optimism.
THE ACCEPTANCE OF PHENOMENALISM
"An insect, weaving at the Eastern Gate of the Pure Land,
Lives in the crossbeam of the Gate.
He hastily weaves a robe of prayers,
In the burning light of the Pure Land."169
An essay of Kamo no Chamei (12th-13th century), known to be a
representative work of Buddhist literature, also shows the lack of intensity
or depth.
"In the spring the fragrant wisteria waves its blossoms like the lavender
clouds that lead to the Pure Land in the west. In the summer the cuckoo
brings to my mind the journey of death to the other world. The autumnal
cicadas sing a melancholy song as if they were lamenting their fleeting life.
In the winter I gaze in meditation at the snow, as it falls and as it melts,
which reminds me of sins committed and purged. I let myself rest and relax
whenever I feel too lazy to practice nembutsu prayers or to recite siitras."170
The writer simply enjoys himself here with the changes of nature
from one season to another, and there is neither any serious sense of sin and
confession of sin, nor absolute devotion to the Buddha. In order to concen-
trate on ascetic practices the Indians made various devices to torment
themselves with, such as the "five heats"-making fires bum at four sides
around themselves under the burning heat of the glaring sun-or sitting on
the floor where splinters are placed vertically. Such single-mindedness in
the pursuit of ascetic practice has scarcely been found among the Japanese.
It is utterly inconceivable for either the Chinese or for the Indians to
recommend, as the Japanese do, as a representative work of Buddhist
literature a confession of an idle hermit who "feels too lazy to practice
nembutsu prayers or to recite sutras." Commenting on this essay, Yoshio
Yamada (1873-1958) says: "Although the author, led by the Buddhist phi-
losophy, realized the impermanence of the phenomenal world, and there-
Upon escaped from this world, he neither resented Heaven nor cursed the
world, but he simply secluded himself in a hermitage and found a kind of
passive comfort in that state of his own. Consequently, both of his views of
the impermanence of the phenomenal world and his pessimism appear to
be halfhearted. Is that because the Japanese are by nature optimists?"171
Kenka (1283-1350), an essayist, the author of the Tsurezuregusa
(Gleanings from Leisure Hours), admires the ascetic practices of Buddhism,
but at the same time he frankly expresses his desire for worldly pleasures.
"Though I know it to be a temporary abode, a congenial dwelling place
pleases me.... A man who does not cherish love's pleasures, however
excellent he may be in thousands of other things, is extremely unstable. He
is like a wine-cup which is made of precious stone but without a bottom."172
Japanese literary men seem to have a grudge against describing a hermit
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who repudiates completely all of his natural desires. In this respect they are
vastly different from most Indian Buddhists.
The lack of thoroughgoing theoretical reflection goes hand in hand
with the humorous and comic attitude of the Japanese. We need not go
into detailed discussions on this point here, since it has repeatedly been
pointed out elsewhere.173 Here it suffices to mention that even such a
serious subject as Buddhism is turned into something to be laughed at.
The fact that a Buddhist priest was made into an object of a scornful
mirth was as old as the Man'yoshu (Collection of Myriad Leaves).
"Don't tether a horse
To a stub of a whisker,
A little bit grown
On the shaven face of a monk,
Don't pull it hard,
Lest, 'ouch,' the monk may cry."174
Such a tendency to treat the affairs of Buddhism as the object of
derision became especially pronounced in the modern period. Zen priests
were then described as the heroes of comic stories. And they were supposed
to write back and forth witty poems. This may be taken as a metamorphosis
of the Zen catechism, but it was welcomed by the Japanese who love to
make poor puns. Ikkyii is the prototype of such a priest and he is described
as the hero of a series of funny stories called "Ikkyii Pieces."175 The Zen
monk Soseki, better known as the national teacher Mus6 (1275-1351), was
also made into a comic hero. This vogue for caricature was not confined to
the Zen priests, but even the austere and pious St. Gensei of the Nichiren
sect was made the author of a facetious piece of literature called the Fresco
of St. Gensei, which is an utter disgrace to such a respected man of
religion. It was neither from disrespect for Gensei nor from any positive
intention to defame Gensei that the real author tied up his own ludicrous
stories with the honorable name of Gensei. He wanted simply to make his
witticism more effective.176
In the same fashion, even a serious discussion is reported in a humor-
ous frame of mind. The Zen master Hakuin (1685-1768), who spread and
gave local color to the Zen teachings, preached in a quite vulgar way,
though full of wit and humor.
"My name is Yiisuke Odawara, and I was an apothecary before I was
born, that is, since my parents' generation. To force a sale is under the ban,
I know, but pray listen to my telling you the effect of my medicine. The
medicine I advertise is called the pill-of-becoming-a-Buddha-by-eompre-
hending-one's-own-true-nature, and contains the direct heart of man.
Should you use this medicine, you would get rid of tormenting sickness,
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and the pains of the vicissitudes of the three worlds and the sorrows of the
transmigration of the soul in the six spheres would be allayed.... To
this country, Master Senko introduced it first, and later on twenty-four
excellent apothecaries came out with it. Still later, Master Daito at Mura-
sakino was employed by the Emperor. At that time there appeared an
apothecary who made the medicine called the pill-of-revelation and the
pill-of-secrecy, that contested with the pill-of-becoming-a-Buddha for the
supremacy of effectiveness. By the Imperial ordinance, Daito debated with
the apothecaries of the Mii Temple, Nara, the Mt. Hiei and their vicinities,
to the victory of the former. Priest-Emperor Hanazono sent an Imperial
messenger to Ibuka of Mino to call for the Master Kanzan, and honorably
taking this medicine, the Priest-Emperor bestowed upon him an Imperial
wine-cup as a prize. Hanazono Shop is indeed the name of my own head
family. To tell you the recipe for this medicine, first we cut down with an
axe the oak tree of Shao-chou, beat it in the mortar of the Sixth Patriarch,
dip the Seiko water of Ma-tzu, knead it on the octagonal plate of Daito, put
on the one hand of Hakuin, make it round with the finger of Chii-ti,
wrap it up with the white paper of Hsiian-sha, and on that paper we
write the superscription of the pill-of-becoming-a-Buddha-by-compre-
hending-one's-own-true-nature, of Hanazono Shop, of the Rinzai district,
of the Zen sect. Should you gulp this pill, you would vomit something
called an empty intelligence and the poison remains in your body through
your lifetime. If you chew it well enough and then swallow it and keep it
at the bottom of your navel when you go out or come back, or when you
stand up or sit down, then you will never feel happy even if you get reborn
into the paradise or never feel pain even if you fall into hell. I am not to
talk ill of other medicines, but the pill-of-the-six-characters (Namu-amida-
butsu), recently on sale, may be nourishing for the ordinary man, if you
take it before breakfast and after supper, but it will never, I assure you, be
effective to alleviate the agony of death. It is of this kind of pill that people
call the pill-of-becoming-a-Buddha for the moment of death. This kind of
pill costs you three cents apiece. But as for my own pill, it costs you not a
cent. Let me cut the story short, but why not try it now?"177
The high priests of India or China did not preach Buddhism in such a
way.
In the earlier stage of the Edo period, a person called Nyoraishi wrote
a book named An Account of Hundred and Eight Cha.178 This book, with
Buddhism as the central doctrine, asserts that each of the three doctrines,
Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, has one ri (ri in Japanese stands
both for reason and a measure of distance). And if each of the three
doctrines has one ri, and a ri stands for thirty-six cha, then the three
doctrines together would make up one-hundred-and-eight chao Thus the
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book was named by a play on words.179 In this ludicrous way the unity of
the three doctrines was preached and accepted by the public. Such a thing
does not seem likely to take place among other peoples, but it is quite
deep-rooted among the Japanese.
It is noteworthy to point out that the Japanese turn into ridicule in-
discriminately a Buddha, the Seven Deities of Good Luck, or whatever else
is transplanted from abroad. But they never deride their own ancestral
gods.lsO Such a double-barreled wit originated, as was pointed out above,
from the lack of religious consciousness on the one hand, and the con-
fusion of the social nexus and ancestral lineage on the other.
The Japanese, with the above-mentioned characteristics, give Western
observers the impression of being far less profound than the Chinese,l81 and
while the Japanese themselves may boast that they have successfully syn-
thesized the cultures of the world, actually they seem to have simply
resorted to an uncritical and opportunistic attitude of compromise, leaving
borrowed cultures in irrelevant juxtaposition.
CHAPTER 35 THE TENDENCY TO
EMPHASIZE A LIMITED
SOCIAL NEXUS
Overstressing the Social Nexus
Great importance is attached in Japan to rules of propriety based upon
human relationships. This latter tendency of thought can be noticed in
Japanese linguistic forms. It is to be noted that today, as a consequence of
the introduction of Western thought, the uses of the passive voice and the
impersonal subject occur more frequently in Japanese writing. Originally,
however, with some rare exceptions, the subject of sentences was confined
to human beings or living beings, especially the former, and also to animals
high in the scale of intelligent crea:tures.1 Furthermore, a foreign word used
as a verb in Japanese would be suffixed with the native verb "su," which
originally indicated an action of some kind. We thus find that the operation
indicated by a verb originally represented an activity of a living being
rather than that of an inanimate thing.
A reply to an interrogation in Japanese is often the converse of a
Western reply. The proper negative reply to the question "Aren't you
going?" would be in Japanese "Yes, I am not," much the same as the
Sanskrit reply "Evam, tathii," ('That is so" or "Yes") in such a case. The
English reply here would be "No, I am not." The Japanese reply refers to
the opinion and intention of the interrogator, whereas the Western reply
refers to the objective fact involved in the interrogation. In short, a Japa-
nese replies to his interrogator, not to the fact involved. This may account
for the ambiguity which the Japanese are generally accused of putting into
their replies to questions.
The habit of attaching importance to human relations is manifested
outwardly in their practice of the rules of propriety. Generally speaking,
exchange of greetings in the West is fairly simple. Japanese greetings are,
on the contrary, highly elaborate. Forms of politeness have been observed
not only among strangers but even among family members of upper classes,
although this tendency is now rapidly vanishing. This habit gave rise to the
elaboration of honorific words and phrases in their language. It is said that
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if all such honorific words were taken out of Lady Murasaki's Tale of
Genji, the book would be reduced to one half its length.
The Japanese habit of stressing proprieties is connected historically to
their assimilation of Chinese thoughts. Confucianism, which was adopted
with especial enthusiasm, deals largely with concepts of propriety. Proprie-
ties are stipulated in great detail in accordance with social rank in such
books as the Book of Rites, etc.
These Confucian concepts of propriety were much appreciated as
soon as they were imported with Chinese civilization, as one may well
gather from Prince Shatoku's Injunctions (604 A.D.), Article 4 of which
states that if the duty of the inferior is obedience, the duty of the superior is
decorum. This does not mean, however, that the concepts of propriety were
practiced in Japan simply as they were laid down by Confucianism in
China. The practical rules in Japan were to differ considerably from the
Chinese rules. It was as social concepts-and as a means of preserving so-
cial stability and the clan system-that Confucian proprieties were appre-
ciated, and as social concepts the Japanese and Chinese proprieties had
much in cOlJlmon. And it was such points of similarity that made it easy
for the Japanese ruling class to enforce the rules of propriety upon the
people without undue resistance and friction; Confucian precepts would
not have spread so widely among the people if they had been adopted
merely as counsels of government.
Stressing proprieties also had an effect on the course of the assimilation
of Buddhism. We find this tendency clearly manifested in Dagen
(1200-1253), the founder of a sect (Sata Zen) most characteristically Japa-
nese of all the Zen sects of this country; he laid down strict rules regarding
even such minutiae of daily conduct as ablution, eating, evacuation, etc.
Many of these detailed rules are considered to have been Dagen's own
creation. Now, let us compare Dagen with his teacher Tenda Nyoja
(Ju-ching, 1163-1228). We find Ju-ching saying, in the fashion of the Zen
priests of the Sung Dynasty of China, things that certainly seem eccentric
to contemporary readers; e.g., in the following passage: "Squatting in his
private room, he gouged out the eyes of the statue of Bodhidharma. Making
balls of mud, he struck people with them. In a loud voice he cried, 'Behold,
the sea has dried up, the bottom can be seen. Waves rise up so high that
they strike Heaven!' "2 On the other hand, we find nothing which we may
call eccentric in Dagen's private life. Rather his daily conduct was strictly
in keeping with the decorous manners of the Zen school. Many others
beside Dagen were responsible for the importation of Chinese Zen Bud-
dhism, but the eccentricities of the Chinese Zen sects did not come into
general vogue in the religious circles of Japan.
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Social Relationships Take Precedence Over the Individual
Due to the stress on social proprieties in Japan another characteristic
of its culture appears-the tendency of social relationships to supersede or
take precedence over the individual. To lay stress upon human relation-
ships is to place heavy stress upon the relations among many individuals
rather than upon the individual as an independent entity.
The elaboration of honorifics in the Japanese language has already
been mentioned as one of the phenomena ascribable to such a trait. Hon-
orifics, it is true, are found in Korean, but not to the same great extent as
in Japanese; honorifics to such an extent do not exist in other Asian or
Western languages, though in the latter languages, the feeling of respect
may be expressed by the uses of certain special words and the third person
pluraP Honorifics are thus something quite peculiar to the Japanese lan-
guage. Further, personal pronouns are much more complicated in Japanese
than in other languages. The choice of the proper pronoun to fit the
particular situation is an ever-recurring problem in speaking Japanese.
Special pronouns are required for superiors, equals, inferiors, intimates,
and strangers.4 If one should confuse them, difficulties would ensue. The
Japanese, therefore, must bear in mind such social relationships as rank
and intimacy every time he uses a personal pronoun. Such discriminatory
use of personal pronouns extends to the use of nouns and verbs as well. A
distinction is made, for example, between words used in addressing persons
of superior rank and those used in addressing persons of inferior rank.
This custom of using honorific words to show respect or affection for
the persons addressed, or of differentiating parlance in accordance with the
persons addressed, may be called a "ritual in conversation." The same sort
of "ritual" is to be found in other Asian tongues under feudal reigns, but
nowhere is it as pronounced as in the Japanese language.
When this type of thinking is predominant, consciousness of the
individual as an entity appears always in the wider sphere of consciousness
of social relationships, although the significance of the individual as an
entity is still recognized; the recognition of the unique value of individuals
is lessened, when he is placed in a social class.
The fact that the first person or the second person is often omitted as
the subject in a Japanese sentence seems to be an indication of this type
of thinking. Generally in such a case the subject is implied in the whole
sentence structure, but frequently a sentence may completely lack the sub-
ject. For example, "yuki masu" can mean "I go" or "you go" or "he goes."
Or "yukai desune" can mean either "I am pleasant" or "you are pleasant."
The subject has to be determined according to the context. This means
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that the Japanese do not want to express explicitly the subject of an action,
unless necessary. The Japanese rather enjoy the sort of harmonious social
atmosphere of human relationship in which the speaker and the person ad-
dressed are placed. This indicates that the Japanese generally have tended
not to state the subject personally, or to attribute actions to an independ-
ent individual performer of the actions.
Further, we note that number is not always made explicit in the
syntax of Japanese sentences. Not always is a distinction made between the
singular and plural (as also in Chinese and the languages of the South Sea
Islanders),5 and reduplication in the Japanese language (e.g., yama-yama-
mountains, kami-gami-gods) cannot be said strictly to indicate plurality,
as reduplication requires the individual to have signification. Thus the
forms Kuni-guni (nation-nation) and hito-bito (person-person) are
not strictly the equivalents of the English plural forms "nations" and
"persons" or "people," but are actually like English "every nation" and
"every person," or as the case may be, "several nations" and "several per-
sons." Furthermore, not all nouns can be made plural in form. The plural
suffixes -ra, .tachi and -domo cannot, as a rule, be affixed to words indicating
inanimate objects, such as "book" or "stone/' though the reduplicated forms
ie-ie (Iiouse-house) and yama-yama (mountain-mountain) are permissible.
Hence, we do not say hon-ra (hon "book"/ra) or ishi-ra (ishi "stone"/ra).
Nor could we affix the plural suffixes to words meaning animals of lower
orders, such as insects, fish, birds, though we sometimes hear kemonora
(beasts) or inudomo (dogs). Plurals, however, become better indicated as
we proceed higher from domestic animals to servants. Several kinds of
plural suffixes are variously used to suit different occasions. Domo and
tachi are used for persons of equal or inferior status or for intimates, as for
example, funabitodomo or funabitotachi ("boatmen"), hitotachi ("people"),
tomodachi ("friends"). When respect must be shown, the suffix kata, which
originally meant place, is used, as for example, anatagata ("you") and
senseigata ("teachers"). In the past, hara, a word for field, was used as a
plural suffix; thus we have tonobara ('10rds") and yakkobara ("footmen,").6
In short, the use of plural suffixes was determined by the relationship of
ranks and the feeling (intimacy, hate, respect, disrespect, etc.) the speaker
entertains for the persons of whom he is speaking. This clearly evidences
the Japanese trait to think of things in terms of social relationships rather
than as impersonal facts in the objective world. The various plurals are,
therefore, not strict equivalents of Western plural forms, though in modern
times owing to the influence of Western languages and science, number
has come to be expressed in nearly the same way as in Western languages.
(An affix: moromorono can be put to any word to denote plural.)
The individual, then, is not always conceived as the unit of society.
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Consequently, it sometimes happens that a plural suffix attached to a noun
loses its own meaning, becoming simply a blank, meaningless component
of a compound, and the compound may indicate the singular number, as in
the case of the word wakaishu, which is made up of wakai ("young")
plus shu (plural suffix "people"). This word may mean both "young-
sters" and "a youngster." The words heitai (contingent of soldiers) and
soryo (monks) may mean also "a soldier" and "a monk." In order to make
plurality more explicit, there was created already in the Heian period
such a peculiar plural form as wakashudomo (young persons/plural suffix)
or kodomotaehi (child/plural suffix).T
The Japanese prefer, in general, not to represent number syntactically,
but when two people are conversing, they are clearly aware of the distinc-
tion between singular and plural. As we have seen, one of the most
distinguishing features of the Japanese language is the lack of clear indica-
tion of number. This, is not so, however, with regard to personal pronouns,
particularly, the first and second person. The first and second person are
clearly distinguished; the pronouns ware or watakushi ('1") could only be
the first person singular, and could by no means be confused with warera or
watakushitaehi ("we"). It is to be noted that the plural forms here are made
from. the singular forms. This phenomenon in their language indicates that
the Japanese who are disinclined to measure the objective world with a
certain established unit are quite sensitive to the distinction between "I"
and "you" in social relations. In this case the consciousness of the individual
Comes forward.
We note here, in passing, that in the languages of the South Sea
Islanders number is rather distinctly indicated in nouns, although it is
vague in other respects.
We have the converse of this in modern Western languages where
number, though explicit in the case of nouns, is ambiguous in the case of
personal pronouns. The second person singular, "Sie, vous, or you" are
etymologically plurals. The speaker at a lecture, or the author of a book, in
the West, customarily refers to himself as "we," when the actual number is
singular. Speaker and audience are brought closer to each other by identifi-
cation. Contemporary Japanese has a similar usage, probably due to West-
ern influence.
This tendency in their thinking may be found also in their assimilation
of Buddhism. In the course of their assimilation of Buddhism the problem
of the difference between one ego and another was never given serious
consideration,S except in cases of deep religious self-reflection, especially
when the sins committed by one's self were keenly felt. The general view
then held is represented by that of Master Dagen who, in advocating
identification of the self with other selves, taught that: "Oneself and others
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should both be benefited." Tenkei (1648-1735), his follower, said: "If you
alone comprehend your own mind, then it is evident that all other beings,
animate and inanimate, in all directions should partake of the wisdom of
the Buddha at the same time." Ryanin (1072-1132), the founder of the
Yiizii Nembutsu sect, is said to have seen, while meditating deeply, in May
1117, Amida Buddha appear and present a poem to him, saying, "One
person is all persons; all persons are one person; one meritorious deed is all
meritorious deeds; all meritorious deeds are one meritorious deed. This is
called deliverance to the Pure Land by the grace of Amida."
These views upheld by the Kegon sects in China and Japan have their
origin in the Indian Kegon Siitra (Buddha-avatamsaka-sutra). The Japanese
mind was affected by the views of the Kegon Siitra more than we realize.
And the problem of "proving the existence of others"-a problem which
Dharmaklrti, Indian logician and philosopher, was interested in-was never
given attention either in China or Japan.
But while such features of the Japanese way of thinking are mani-
fested in the linguistic phenomena of the race, good instances of their
manifestati@ in the course of the assimilation of Buddhism cannot easily
be found. Presumably, this is due to the fact that Buddhism which con-
tained from the first the idea of identification of the self with others had
little need to be influenced by traditional Japanese thought.
The lack of a clear distinction between the individual and the social
group to which he belongs has, however, brought about a number of
interesting phenomena. For example, individual monks training in a Bud-
dhist order are known by the term "so" (derived from the Sanskrit sangha)
which is itself a term for a Buddhist order. Such a linguistic phenomenon
is seen also in China. This type of thinking is apparent in Dagen where he
says: "One should be more intimate with brethren in a Buddhist order than
with oneself."9 In contrast, the primitive Buddhism of India teaches: "Sons
are no help, [nor] a father, [nor] relatives; there is no help from kinsfolk
for one whom death has seized"lo and "The self is the master of the self."ll
Thus, self-reliance is taught.12 And primitive Jainism teaches: "Friend,
thou art a friend of thyself. Why seekest thou friends beside thyself?"13
When we compare Dagen's views with those of the Indians we cannot help
being amazed by the great difference between them. Lack of individualism
is common to feudal societies of all countries, but nowhere, it seems, is the
sense of social affinity as predominant as in Japan.
The concept of universal law was not lacking among the Japanese,
and the move to conceptualize human affairs in terms of laws and concepts
which are universals has been effected by the Japanese to some extent. The
concept of universal law came into existence very early in the time (ca. 600
A.D.) of Prince Shatuku, when he said: "Sincerely revere the Three Treas-
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ures, viz., the Buddha, the Law (Dharma), and the Brotherhood (Sangha)
which constitute the final ideal of all living beings and the ultimate
foundation of all countries. Should any age or any people fail to esteem this
truth? There are few men who are really vicious. They will all follow it if
adequately instructed. How can the crooked ways of men be made straight
unless we take refuge in the Three T reasures?"14 Here we find the concept
of a universal law which is something beyond laws based on the inductively
given status of the individual in the joint family and of the family in its
respective tribe or caste. But at the same time we find a strong tendency to
esteem the social nexus.
Among the objective causes which might account for such a tendency
in the Japanese people, is the social life peculiar to their land and climate.
The primitive Indo-Europeans, being nomadic and living chiefly by hunt-
ing, were in constant contact with alien peoples. Here, human relations
were marked by fierce rivalry. Peoples moved in great migrations; one race
conquered another only to be conquered by still another. In such a society
the struggle for existence was based not on mutual trust but on cunning
and stratagem.
Japanese society, on the other hand, developed from small localized
farming communities. The Japanese early gave up their nomadic life, and
settled down to cultivate rice fields. People living on rice inevitably have to
settle permanently in one place. In such a society families continue on,
generation after generation. Genealogies and kinships of families through
long years become so well known by its members that the society as a whole
takes on the appearance of a family. In such a society individuals are
closely bound to each other and they form an exclusive social nexus. Here
an individual who asserts himself will hurt the feelings of others and
thereby do harm to himself. The Japanese learned to adjust themselves to
this type of familial society, and created forms of expression suitable to life
in such a society. And here grew the worship of tutelary gods and local
deities. Even today there is a strong tendency in the Japanese social
structure to settle closely around such tutelary gods and local deities. This
tendency is deeply rooted in the social history of the people and it has led to
their stressing human relations. The Japanese have learned to attach un-
duly heavy importance to their social ties in disregard of the isolated
individual. This question will be discussed in the next section.
Unconditional Belief in a Limited Human Nexus
On the whole (allowing always for a minority of exceptions to our
generalizations), Indians regard man as the subjective performer on a
metaphysical stage, while peoples of the \Vestern Hemisphere have, from
ancient times, inclined to be more empirical; in both cultures, however,
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men is regarded as possessing potentialities of universal significance. Most
Japanese, on the other hand, tend to look upon man as a being subordinated
to a specific and limited human nexus; they conceive him in terms of
his relations to a circumscribed society.
Thus a human event, in this way of thinking, is not a purely personal
event but an event having some value and emotional significance in a
narrowly given sphere of social relations. This characteristic way of think-
ing seems to manifest itself in the Japanese use of an intransitive verb in
the passive voice- a form expressing the subject as being indirectly affected
by some event or act; for example, "Kare wa tsuma ni shinareta" (literally,
"It happened to him that his wife died"); or, "Kare wa kodomo ni nakareta"
(literally, "It happened to him that his child wept.") An objective event-a
wife's death or a child's weeping-is here stated in its relation to one's
interests and feelings. Such a statement of the event contains an entirely
different significance from that contained in the Indo-European statement
"His wife died," or ~'His child wept."
The people to whom a human nexus is important place great moral
emphasis upon complete and willing dedication of the self to others in a
specific human collective. This attitude, though it may be a basic moral
requirement in all peoples, occupies a dominant position in Japanese social
life. Self-dedication to a specific. human nexus has been one of the most
powerful factors in Japanese history.
In the moral sense of the early Japanese, good and evil were considered
as a matter of social morality and not as a matter of fortune, as they are
generally regarded in a primitive civilization. Good was not something that
profits the self but something that profits others in a social group. Evil was
not something that harms the self but something harmful to others or the
welfare of the whole. Good and evil concern not the interests of the
individual but those of others or the whole.15 Later the highest virtue was
considered to be sacrifice of the self for the sake of the sovereign, the family
(especially the parents), or the community. This feud~l morality assumed
an extreme form after the Meiji era when it came to be expressed in the
form of sacrifice of one's life for the state or the emperor. Attachment to
one's native place and to neighbors from the same region are variations of
this attitude.
In contrast to this we find only a few cases in which sacrifices of life
were made by the Japanese for the sake of something universal, ·something
that transcends a particular human nexus, such as academic truth or the
arts. And if we exclude the persecutions of the True Pure Land sect, the
Hokke sect, and Christianity, cases of dying for religious faith are excep-
tional phenomena. Sacrifice of all for the sake of truth, when it went
contrary to the intentions of the ruler, was even regarded as evil.
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Such a tendency of thinking was an influential factor in the assimila-
tion of foreign thoughts. A good deal of Chinese thought was adopted by
the Japanese, but not all of it was readily acceptable to the Japanese.
Though Confucianism, which laid particular stress upon the proper order
of human proprieties, was enthusiastically accepted, the liberalism of some
Chinese heterodox thinkers was entirely ignored. The Taoism of Lao-
Tzu and Chuang-Tzu, which valued the welfare of individuals, never
spread widely among the people of Japan. Christianity, with its persistent
teaching of belief in God, met the fate of persecution, and was finally
uprooted by law when it came to be feared that its teachings might result in
the neglect of duties to feudal lords and parents. In the Satsuma Clan the
followers of the True Pure Land sect were put to death because of the fear
that they would be disobedient to the clan lord.
Universal religions advocate the transcending of limited human rela-
tions. This facet of religion, however, is scarcely seen in Japanese religions.
A feature common to various Japanese religions is their emphasis on group
propriety. From ancient days the importance of an established, limited
human nexus has been in the consciousness of the Japanese. As the psycho-
logical example parallel to it, we may cite the fact that the Japanese
statement of judgment (or reasoning) is severely limited to the environment
which includes the speaker and listener. Universal religions from abroad
had to be transformed to suit such a tendency of thought.
In spite of the various Western modern thoughts introduced after the
Meiji Restoration, the individual as a social entity has not come to be fully
grasped by the general public. While the Japanese are keenly conscious of
their membership in their small, closed nexus, they are hardly fully aware
of themselves as individuals, or as social beings, to the extent the Western
peoples are.
In the light of such a way of thinking, it is easy to understand why
Japanese Buddhists have tended to disregard the Universalistic Buddhist
Precepts. The traditional, conservative Precepts of Hinayana Buddhism,
which had been observed among the clergy until the Nara period (710-
784), were abandoned by Saicho (Dengyo Daishi) who adopted instead
the Precepts of Mahayana Buddhism. The so-called Endonkai, the Maha-
yana Precepts adopted by SaichO, stipulated that Buddhist novices need not
comply with the Hinayana Precepts. It was in this way that Buddhism
came to be more readily practicable in Japan. This tendency to ignore the
Precepts became stronger in Japanese Buddhist Sects, especially, in the
Pure Land Buddhism. In the True Pure Land sect founded by Shinran, it
Was thought that even violators of the Precepts could be saved by the
boundless mercy of Amitayus Buddha. Buddhism, we note, has thus been
completely transformed for the sake of practicability. Japanese society as
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the ground of Buddhist practice had rejected the religious practices of
India and China. Japanese society was too tightly formed; the restrictive
power of its secular community over religious circles was too great to permit
priests to continue their imported practices.
This hardly means, however, that Japanese Buddhism was immoral or
amoral. Monks and faithful alike observed assiduously the requirements of
their limited human nexus; they were highly moral in this respect. They
were devoted to their parents and loyal to their sovereign. They were in
every respect quite different from the monks and novices of India and
China. Moreover, Japanese monks were devoted workers loyal to the inter-
ests of the order to which they belonged. If the followers of one sect
founder are divided into a number of different orders, monks in one of the
orders become devoted to his particular order to the point of boycotting the
other orders. To them the welfare of their small separate orders are their
main concern and the doctrine to which they all adhere is reduced to a
secondary concern. Here again they are moral in the limited sense that they
are devoted to their limited human nexus. The precepts to be kept by an
individuaLas an individual in relation to the Absolute, by an individual in
relation to another individual qua individual tend thus to become neg-
lected. The interests of their own small limited nexus become the factors
determining their actions.
The antiquarianism so strong in the Japanese may also be said to be
due to the historical, temporal aspect of their attachment to a limited
human nexus. The Japanese cherish families and institutions that have a
long history. One of the national prides of the Japanese people was the
length of their history. Japanese poetry abounds with examples of their
antiquarianism; old poetic expressions, obsolete in ordinary conversation,
maintain a great role in Japanese poetry. The merits of waka poetry have
been thought to lie in the use of the words used by poets of the past.16 This
practice continues today. In the Tokugawa period (1600-1867), writing in
the archaic form was a prevalent style.
How did Japanese antiquarianism affect importations of Continental
culture? Japanese antiquarianism is apparent, rather, in the fact that nO
liberal thoughts of the Continent took root in this country. (The question
of Japanese unconditional subordination to established authorities will be
discussed in detail later.) The antiquarianism of Japanese Buddhists was
quite different in character from that of the Indians or Chinese. The Zen
Priest T6rei, for instance, idealizes ancient Japan in his Shiiman Mujinto-
ron (The Inextinguishable Lamp of the Sect) and says:
"In the pure ancient age of Japan, people were honest and upright; so
it was easy for them to attain to the Great Way in accordance with their
ability. Gods and men were unified in the primeval chaos. What need will
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there be of Buddhism? In a later corrupted age, however, people gradually
lost their moral sense. They were so addicted to outer (sensual) objects that
they were led astray by them. They have in transmigration fallen into evil
ways. Without the exquisite doctrine of the Enlightened One [the Bud-
dha], who could be saved and freed from transmigration in these days?"
One would have thought that the Buddhists would regard pre-
Buddhist Japan as a benighted nation, but here we find a Buddhist himself
giving us a statement to the contrary.
Observance of Family Morals
The prevailing atmosphere in Japanese social life, we may say, is that
of close intimacy and alliance, and this atmosphere of intimacy and alliance
is perhaps most manifest in the family, the first and most important of their
closed nexus. Under the ancient clan system, the early Japanese were
devout ancestor-worshippers and diligent observers of family devotions
conducted in compliance with Shintoism, their national religion. Large
and small clans, related by blood, having common ancestors and occupa-
tions, set up a deity which the entire clan worshipped as their tutelary deity
or ujigami!7 On fixed days clan members would gather and the clan head
would offer prayers of thanksgiving and petition for blessings before their
protector deity. This religious custom survives today in rural districts.
Festivals of tutelary deities are held today by rural villagers after a good
harvest; festival charts are pulled out from the barn and travelling players
come to present their plays. Thanksgiving for the good harvest will also be
rendered festively. The precincts of tutelary deities were regarded as the
most hallowed places, and the treasures of the clan were stored there to be
guarded by all the clansmen. Thus the clan head in charge of religious
affairs assumed the power of absolute dictatorship.18
According to the beliefs of the early Japanese, their many deities were
thought to be related by blood, and these deities were also related to the
Imperial ancestors. Blood-relationship, it is thus apparent, was considered
to be the main force for communal unity. We must note here that a specific
blood-relationship was not essential: It was not the actual ancestors who
Were deified for worship; it was that the deities worshipped were regarded
as their common ancestors.19
Even after the collapse of the clan system, reverence for the family
(although the meaning of family had changed) continued to be rooted in
the social sense of the Japanese, with the family as the dominant unit of
social organization. It was the family, not the individual, which was the
determining factor in Japanese life of the ancient past. Yaichi Haga
(r867-1927), a master of Japanese studies, for instance, says: "The unit of
Western society is the individual and groups of individuals make up the
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State. In Japan, the State is an aggregation of families. Therein lies the
basic difference." Haga asserted that Japanese ancestor-worship and rever-
ence for the family name are based on the following facts. 2o In ancient
times, one who counterfeited a surname was made to submit to the ordeal
of immersion in boiling water before the shrine of the gods. The early
genealogical work Shinsen Shoji-roku which lists many family names,
scrupulously indicates the origin of each as Imperial, divine or foreign.
Then, too, there is the poem of Otomo-no-Yakamochi (716-785), which
reads, in part: "I ponder more deeply than ever how a great office can
belong to the Otomo clan which was served by our remote divine ancestor
bearing the title 'Okume-nushi.' "21 The samurai of the middle ages, prior
to engaging in combat, would first call out his lineage. For example, "He
called out, 'I am Wada Shojiro Yoshishige, 17 years old, grandson of Miura
Taisuke Yoshiaki, not far removed from a princely house, the eleventh
generation from Prince Takamochi, descendant of the Emperor Kammu,
let anyone come, be .he general or be he retainer, I am his man.' "22 An
upstart daimyo would often attempt to acquire prestige by falsifying his
genealogy. .In the Kyogenki (Medieval Comedies) we find many so-called
"genealogical disputes."23
Hence it was natural for the religions and thought of the mainland
Chinese to become assimilated by the Japanese in such a way as to fit them
to their institution of ancestor-worship. In the assimilation of Confucianism
it was filial piety which was most stressed. Confucian students were made
to study, with especial thoroughness, the Analects of Confucius and the
Treatise on Filial Piety. In the fourth month of 757 A.D. an Imperial Edict
was issued which reads: "In ancient times the governing of people was
generally done by means of the teaching of filial piety. Nothing is more
important than this, which is the basis of all good conduct. Every house in
this country should keep a copy of the Treatise on Filial Piety. People
should study it diligently. Officials should edify them with it." The Treatise
on Filial Piety was held to be the "book of examples for a hundred
sovereigns," as it was believed that the "basic precept of a philosopher
sovereign was filial piety."24 Mter February 860 A.D., when the Treatise on
Filial Piety was presented to the Emperor for his first reading of the year, it
became a custom long thereafter for an Emperor to read this Treatise as his
first book. Filial piety came to receive particular emphasis during the
Tokugawa period, when Confucianism was at its height in Japan. Filial
piety was given a religious color by the scholars of the idealistic Wang
Yang-ming school (c. 1520); it was developed into a metaphysics by Nakae
Toju (1608-1648). The aboriginal institution of ancestor-worship was thus
further solidified when it acquired from Confucianism a theoretical basis.
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The Japanese, however, rejected other Chinese thoughts which ran counter
to their traditional customs.
Ancestor-worship and the family system, we must remember, are not
exclusively Japanese, but are the two most potent unifying factors in
Chinese social organization. Here the question arises as to the difference
between the Japanese and Chinese institutions of ancestor-worship and the
family system. This, however, is a subject which calls for separate investiga-
tion, and can hardly be discussed here in detail. It will suffice merely to
mention two or three points concerning the transformations which Chinese
family morals underwent when they were introduced into Japan.
Scholars have pointed ou.t that the Japanese family system was always
patriarchal while that of China was based upon the principle of joint
ownership. This point will become clearer when wecompare the prescrip-
tions of house registration of the Tang Code with that of the Japanese
YoroCode, which was promulgated (718 A.D.) in the Nara period. In China
joint ownership of family property had since the Chou Dynasty been in
wide practice; the typical family system, as stipulated by the Tang Penal
and Administrative Codes, was founded upon a basis called "joint living
and joint ownership of property." Each family had its family head, assumed
by the eldest patrilineal member of the family. The family head (unless he
was an ancestor) had as his authority only the custody of the family
property and not parental powers. The jointly-owned property of the
family may be partitioned under certain circumstances. When the ancestor
was the family head (this situation is called "father-children ownership")
the family property was partitioned as and when he wished, and his
descendants were not allowed to object to the way in which it was parti-
tioned. In case, however, the family head were other than the ancestor, that
is, if he were a patrilineal member of the family outside that of the
ancestors, partitioning had to be done by him in conformity with the
provisions of the Code, pending approval from the family. The Japanese
Code, while based upon the Tang Code, was altered to suit the native
institutions. While the underlying principle in the Tang Code had been
fair partitioning among the brothers, the Japanese Code provides that the
property, in the event of the death of the pater familias, shall be partitioned
in a certain proportion among the legitimate and illegitimate offspring. In
short, the object of partitioning was changed from jointly-owned property
as defined in the Tang Code to the property left by the head pater familias.
The patriarchal family system was so deeply rooted in the Japanese that
even the radical legislators of the time, who were bent upon imitating the
Chinese system, were not able to alter it.
We may add further that one of the miscellaneous provisions of the
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Tang Code stipulates that in case a descendant sells or pawns part of the
family property without the approval of the family head, the action (selling
or pawning) is considered null and void. A provision to the same effect is
found in the Japanese Y6r6 Code. But it is interesting to note that the
officially compiled annotations of the Tang Code Li-shu-i uses in this case
the phrase "the property of the family," while the official commentary of
the Japanese Y6r6 Code, Ryo no gige (Commentary on the Y6r6 Code),
uses the phrase "the property of the family head."25
We thus become aware of a very important difference which exists
between the Japanese and Chinese family systems. It does not mean,
however, that the head of the Japanese family, who was solely responsible
for the custody of the family property, ruled the members with absolute
authority in other family matters. Even in the days of feudalism, the power
to make decisions was vested in both the head and the members. Absolute
obedience of his wife and children was never enforced. This, as scholars of
the civil law point. out, differs considerably from the Roman patriarchal
family.26
The Chinese moral code, which has often been said to be founded
upon familism, puts great stress upon lineage. In Japan, on the contrary,
stress was laid upon the "family" as the unifying force of a tight human
nexus rather than upon lineage. Hence, adoption of an heir from a non-
related family, often lower in social status, was possible. Confucianism in
China, however, placed such great importance upon lineage that adoption
from a family of alien stock was impossible, though recent field surveys
indicate that this was sometimes done out of necessity. The professed rule,
however, prohibits this even today.27
It was "family name" which was most highly prized in Japanese
society. Non-consanguinity was not a prohibitive matter. Adoption was
given approval by such Japanese Confucian scholars of the Tokugawa
period as Banzan Kumazawa (1619-1691) in Gaisho (Foreign Papers) and
Shiisai Miwa in Yoshi-Benben (Treatise on Family Adoption System). The
views of their opponents, Keisai Asami (author of Yoshibensho (Justifica-
tion of Adopting Sons) and Sh6sai Miyake (author of a treatise on family-
naming, Doseiigoshokosetsu) did not spread widely enough to exercise
restrictive power over the practice of the adoption of non-consanguineous
heirs.28
Moreover, sociologists and ethnologists have pointed out that Japanese
familism allowed elements of non-consanguineous, that is, pseudo-parent-
children relations to enter into it. However, detailed investigations of such
historical changes and evolution of the family in Japan, are yet to be
made.29 Nevertheless, it is true that Japanese familism is predominant in
the ruler-ruled relationship, and there is actually little consciousness of
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opposition between the ruler and the ruled; the ruler considers the ruled as,
so to speak, members of his family and the ruled also consider themselves as
such. The whole Japanese nation has been regarded as an extended family;
the ideal basis for society has been such familism.
Then how was Indian Buddhism to change when it was brought into
such society? Buddhist Mercy, as a moral ideal, takes into consideration not
only man but also even creatures of the earth, and thus applies equally to
all living beings. Yet Prince Sh6toku, who first adopted and then tried
systematically to introduce Buddhism to the Japanese, mostly spoke of
mercy as something existing between father and child, and preached it as
such. "Falsity is not employed between father and son," he said, "Precisely
because there exists the relationship of father and son (between the Buddha
and each living being), the Buddha can engage in the work of saving them
through many, many aeons." The Mercy of the Perfect One (Nyorai,
Tathagata) is not taken here as the universal virtue of an idealized being
but as a realistic, worldly virtue-the mercy of the father in the family.30
We have already pointed out that Japanese Buddhism placed great
emphasis upon the attainment of satori, or spiritual awakening, through
bodily experience. The body, however, having originated from one's par-
ents, respect for one's body means respect for one's parents. The Zen priest
Bankei called the absolute in the individual "the Unborn Buddhahood
transmitted from parents to child." He further declared, "To change the
Unborn Buddhahood transmitted from parents to us into a vile one is an
extreme filial impiety." Now in Indian thought in general the body born of
parents is regarded as merely the fetters of the Soul, and the world of the
absolute is entered only when these fetters are discarded. But, in contrast to
this, Japanese Zen Buddhists, Priest Bankei in particular, hold that the
world of the absolute is attainable through one's parents. Buddhahood, in
him, is identified with filial devotion. "There is nothing more gracious than
the kindness of parents. They have brought us up, who are completely
ignorant, till we become intelligent and hear Buddhist sermons. It is solely
due to the benevolence of parents. You should respect them. This is filial
piety. To follow the way of filial piety is Buddhahood. Filial piety and
Buddhahood are not different."
As we have pointed out previously, Buddhism in China had to become
amalgamated with the tradition of filial piety to be able to spread among
the general public. Much the same situation existed in Japan. The Chinese
Wrote pseudo-sutras that would preach filial piety; and the Japanese spread
among the public these very sutras with commentaries and annotations, the
Bumo-onjt"i-kyo ("Sutra of Parental Benefits") being a typical example of
such.
It will be supposed from this that Buddhism, whose teachings tran-
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scend nation and family, would have to clash with the familistic morals 01
the Japanese. It was precisely this universal element, apparently incom-
patible with the familistic type of morals, that Japanese historians and
Confucians took up as the target in their criticisms of Buddhism. Some
Buddhists, on the other hand, asserted indeed that "true filial piety" may
sometimes run contrary to the worldly morals of the family. Nichiren
(1222-1282), founder of the Hokke (Lotus) Sect, declared, "Generally
speaking, we should obey our parents. However, as for the way to become a
Buddha, not to obey them would be the fundamental filial piety. Therefore
in the Shin-ji-kwan-kyo (Siitra on Insight into the Heart of Things), it is
stated: 'To get into the Trans-mundane Way, without repaying others'
kindness, is to repay it truly.' " That is, to get out of the family, without
obeying the wish of one's parents and to become a Buddha is to repay their
kindness truly. Even in worldly life, not to obey one's parents when they
want to plot a rebellion and so on, is the true filial piety. It is stated in a
Confucian canon called the Hsiao Ching (The Book of Filial Piety).
When Master Tendai was practicing the meditation of the Hokke Siitra,
his paren~s sat on his lap and wanted to disturb his performing Buddhist
practice. He said it was the Evil One in the shape of his parents who
disturbed him.31 Nichiren, as a zealous believer of the Lotus Siitra while he
uneqUivocally taught that one may turn his back on his parents in order to
follow the Siitras,32 also distinguished filial piety into two kinds, "Low filial
piety" and "High filial piety." He made it plain that he upheld filial piety
as an absolute virtue, but at the same time insisted upon the validity of
Buddhist universalism.
In Japanese traditional social life, the reverence for parents was the
same thing as the devotion to the family. This reverence for the family
affected the assimilation of all foreign religions introduced into Japan.
Japanese Buddhists resembled Chinese Buddhists in that both tended to
regard their religious orders as their "families."33
With lineage occupying so important a place in the Japanese mind, it
was natural that Buddhist monks or shukke (literally, "those who have
forsaken their worldly families"), should have instituted for themselves
what we may call a "quasi-blood relation." We recall the Chinese custom in
general vogue among Zen Buddhists toward the end of the Northern Sung
Dynasty (976-1126) in which a document called "Shisho" (literally, "A
document of inheritance") was issued to disciples from masters at certain
stages of training. This appeared to the Japanese mind to symbolize blood
succession, or establishment of blood relation, and accordingly, when this
custom was adopted, the Japanese came to write this document in cinnabar
ink which represented blood. Thus, it was natural, again, that Buddhist
orders that approved of the secular forms of living of persons actually
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related by blood to the founder, should have come to be regarded with
special respect. The Honganji sect, whose Temple of the Original Vow was
originally the mere keeper of the grave of Shinran (1173-1262), came to
receive inordinate respect and favors, and assumed the leading position in
Japan, among the numerous branches of the Shin sect, simply because it
had as its heads the descendants of Shinran.
Japanese Buddhism was thus able to broaden its sphere of influence as
a popular religion when it linked up with the native custom of ancestor-
worship. It is recorded that as early as the 2nd year of the reign of Empress
Suiko (593), higher officers of the Court dedicated temples to their Empress
and parents; the Rescript of Emperor Temmu (3rd month of 686 A.D.)
commands: "Every family in every Province should possess a temple, and
services should be conducted with the Sutras and the image of the Bud-
dha." This was the origin of the butsudan, or Buddhist shrine, found in
every Japanese home. It is not known to what extent this rescript was
enforced but, later, after the prohibition of Christianity, during the reign
(in the early 17th century) of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Buddhist services
became a family routine among the Japanese.34 Chapels with Buddhist
images have been built in homes of other Asiatic nations in the past and
present, but these, unlike the case of the Japanese, have had nothing to do
with ancestor-worship;35 and we must remember that Chinese ancestor-
worship was associated with Taoism rather than Buddhism. In Japan,
significantly, mortuary tablets of ancestors were placed in homes with
Buddhist shrines. The Japanese, thus, were made ever aware of the spirits
of all their ancestors, of the immediate ones through the Buddhist mortuary
tablets and of the distant ancestors through the presence of the Shinto
shrine. (The family Shinto shrine, however, is connected with ancestor-
worship to a much lesser degree. Shrine Shintoism does not in general
practice ancestor-worship. The coexistence of the two kinds of shrines in
Japanese homes cannot, therefore, be regarded merely as the result of the
mixing of Shintoism and Buddhism.)
Buddhism, when brought to the Japanese soil, thus became linked
with a kind of clan-consciousness. It became a vogue with aristocracies to
have family temples built; the KOfukuji, for example, was the temple of the
Fujiwara clan. Headships of these temples were assumed by the members
of the owner-families who had renounced 6ecular life to become priests.
(Temples similar to the Japanese family temple seem to have existed in
India of the later periods.) It is interesting to note that Buddhism which
had always aimed at all mankind rather than at any clan-system should
Come to be associated with clan-consciousness in Japan.
Amida Pure Land Buddhism, for instance, took root in the soil of
Japan by virtue of a doctrine which preached, not the individual's future
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happiness and peace of mind, but rather the peaceful repose of the dead.
The Sutra of Infinite Life (Sukhiivativyiiha-siitra) was explained to the
people at the lecture meetings held in the third year of Hakuchi (652 A.D.).
Amida's Paradise came to be depicted in the mural paintings of
the Horyuji's Golden Hall, the well-known ma1J4ala of the Taima-dera
showing Paradise was completed; and all of these were expressions of the
Amida Pure Land Buddhism of the time. Amida Pure Land Buddhism
flourished more and more in the subsequent Nara and Heian periods.
Yet, of course, there were those who rejoiced at the Wonderful Vow
of Amida and who, quite free of any customs of ancestor-worship, found
individual salvation in the teachings of Amida Buddhism. Shinran
(1173-1262), for example, reflected: "The vow of Amida (Amitabha) who
meditated for five aeons is, when I consider it well, meant for me alone.
Gracious, indeed, is the previous vow of Amida, who wanted to save me
from the many fetters of Karma." He also said: "I have never performed
invocation to Amida even once for the peaceful repose and benefit of my
dead parents. Why? All living beings are parents and brothers to each
other in t~e long process of transmigration. All should be saved and
become Buddhas in future life. If I could actually accumulate some men!
by my own power, I would help my dead parents by the grace of Invocation
to Amida. (But it is not I who can save me, but Amida himself.) So I should
give up the self-conceited attitude of hoping to save myself and others by
the grace of religious practice (and I should rely on the grace of Amida).
After I have been saved and become a Buddha I would save those who will
come in contact with me."3G But the Jodo sect was not able to spread among
the common people with this sort of teaching. To become the largest
religious sect in Japan, as it did, it had to adopt the traditional customs of
ancestor-worship. And today many who have lost the true faith of the pure
Land sect are stilI associated with it on the strength of this one facet of it
which has to do with ancestor-worship.
The Bon Festival was instituted in the Suiko era (592-628 A.D.).
Records have it that the Bon Festival was held in the third year of Emperor
Saimei (657 A.D.), and in 650 A.D. the "Sutra of Bon" was preached in tem-
ples in Kyoto as memorial services for expressing gratitude to the ancestors
of the seven preceding generations. The Bon Festival, with this new mean-
ing added, became widely practiced after this time, and is stilI practiced
today, commonly known as "O-bon."
The system of memorial days and anniversaries was not a traditional
feature of Buddhism. Indian Brahminism, we know, teaches a form of
ancestor-worship, and the Brahmins celebrate on new moon and full moon
nights what is known as Ancestor Festival, but these festivals differ widdv
from the memorial days and anniversaries observed in memory of any
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specilic ancestors. Buddhism does occasionally encourage ancestor-worship,
but it has never instituted a system of memorial days and anniversaries
such as that devised by the Chinese. In China memorial services were held
on the 49th day, Iooth day, first anniversary, and third anniversary. Imme-
diately after the introduction of this system the Japanese, of the remote
past, observed the 49th day, looth day and first anniversary, leaving out the
third anniversary. Many more anniversaries, however, were added later in
the Middle Ages; namely, third, seventh, 13th, 17th, 25th, 33rd, 60th,
looth, and 300th anniversaries. This was essentially the same as the system
of memorial days commonly observed today, viz. 49th day, 100th day, first,
third, seventh, 13th, 17th, 25th, 33rd, and 50th anniversaries.37 Thus we
may say that the system of memorial days and anniversaries was elaborated
in Japan, a fact which does seem to attest to the dominance of ancestor-
worship among the Japanese.
We have already made mention of funeral services. Funerals and
memorial services are the two most important functions of Buddhism in
Japan of today. How much will be left of the activities of the Buddhist
temple, if these are taken away? "Collectivity orientations have remained a
dominant part of the social environment of Japan. Such orientations are
operative in a number of spheres, including the family, occupational
groups, community life, and politics. The collectivity orientations are fos-
tered in the family situation where individual goals remain largely subor-
dinated to those of the family as a group. The traditional orientations can
still be seen in many areas outside the family. The relations of the landlord
and tenant in rural Japan or of the owner and worker in small and medium
factories are based on simulated family ties."3s
"The traditional pattern of the work collectivity in the framework of
true or simulated kinship organization appears to remain important in spite
of contractual agreements. In contemporary Japan, the traditional simu-
lated familial ties exist in various degrees, however small or large. This
factor becomes important, for it perpetuates the influence of the collectivity
interest and goals over the individual. New group patterns, in many cases
of activities such as we find in modern banking companies and in large
factories, where the employer-employee relationship is based on a purely
cash nexus, often seem to replace the older traditional scheme of organiza-
tion under a simulated family system."39
The familistic custom of Japan undeniably appears pre-modern and
even backward to the eyes of Westerners. But on the other hand, one can-
not deny its socially favorable effect on present-day life. One scholar, who is
a Japanese-American, recognizes in this respect its great importance for the
maintenance of social stability in post-war Japan: "A Japanese individual
adjusts in a social structure with strong collectivity orientations which
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stress ability and security and which can turn into stagnation; an American
adjusts in a social environment which emphasizes self-orientation with a
focus on individualism and freedom, which in excess can turn to anomie."40
Concerning such a Japanese tendency, E. O. Reischauer has observed: "It
injects a certain note of humanity into an otherwise ruthless exploitation of
labor and keeps alive the personal factor, which we are attempting to
recapture in American industry today."41 The collectivity orientation, fo-
cused on a human nexus, serves the function of providing social security
and·mutual assistance within a society beset by many difficulties.4l•
Emphasis on Rank and Social Position
As we have already seen in the section dealing with the primacy of so-
cial relations, the traditional tendency in the history of the Japanese nation
shows an emphasis upon rank and the master-servant relationship, so that
we may say that high esteem for the social hierarchy is one of the character-
istic features of Japanese cluture. The language of the people, to begin
with, reveals this tendency. The basic tenet of Buddhism-the inherent
equality of all men-VIlas modified in order to fit the Japanese way of
thinking in terms of their particular social nexus.
The basic concept of social good is thought by Buddhism to be to give
(or Sanskrit dana). (This word dana when translated into Chinese became
pu-shih, or fuse in Japanese, meaning to serve widely.) Now, it was most
difficult to find an equivalent of this word in Japanese. The Japanese words
ataeru (to give) and hodokosu (to give in charity) denote an act of giving
proceeding from a man of superior rank to a man of inferior rank. The
words sasageru (to offer) and tatematsuru (to present), on the other hand,
denote the act of giving by a person of lower rank to a person of higher
rank. In short, the Japanese were able to translate what is implied in dana
only in relation to the social status of each party.
Anukampa, another basic concept in Sanskrit Buddhism, was also
difficult to translate. Awaremi (pity, compassion) could perhaps be the
closest Japanese equivalent, but the word also implies a downward action
from one superior to another inferior. The original meaning is "to tremble
in sympathy with another person." Here again, the social hierarchy of the
culture, reRected in the language, prevented the proper rendering of one of
the basic concepts of Buddhism.
It seems that similar instances of the Japanese emphasis on rank can be
found in Japan's earliest myths. If we compare Japanese mythology with
that of the Finnish people, we are struck by the great difference between
them. The first outstanding feature of Finnish mythology is the equality of
social status of its various characters. In the tales of Kalevala we find that
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heroes have their slaves; but kings and priests do not appear as representa-
tives of the ruling classes; gods are treated more or less on an equal plane,
and heroes appear on an equal social level. Some of these heroes are
fishennen, farmers, or smiths. Japanese mythology, in contrast, is, we may
say, aristocratic, for deities and heroes appearing in the Kojiki (Ancient
Chronicle) and Nihonshoki (Chronicles of Japan) are rulers of the masses;
classes are obviously already established.
The second feature we note in Finnish mythology is its lack of con-
cern for lineage. The Finnish people have not, as the Japanese have, made
family ancestors of their mythical gods and heroes, however much they
may have looked up to them. In contrast the Japanese myths, the Kojiki
and Nihonshoki, center around the Emperor, the Imperial family, and the
nobility as heroes, and these myths serve only to give prestige to the
lineages of these families. We may suppose that Japanese myth is only a
reRection of the social behavior of the ancient Japanese.
It was thus natural enough that Confucianism, which laid stress upon
a social order based on rank, should have been widely accepted by the
Japanese, and it was natural also that other Chinese ideas that tended to be
either individualistic or democratic should have been rejected by them.
It was probably after the time of Prince Shotoku (c. 600 A.D.) that
Japan came to have what we may call culture; and it is interesting to note .
that the most important tenet in Prince Sh6toku's moral views was loyalty
to the Emperor and to one's parents.42 Judging from the Edict of Emperor
Kiitoku (646 A,D.), the political ideals of the Taika Reform claimed to be
based largely upon Confucianism.
Before Confucianism was adopted by the ruling class of the Tokugawa
period as their official philosophy, its utility as the philosophical basis of
politics had already been recognized by warrior-generals of the Civil War
period. We might cite, for instance, General ada Nobunaga's moral rule
issued to the citizens of Kyoto in 1573 (4th year of Genki): "Those who are
diligent in Confucian study in order to rectify the affairs of the state and
those who show loyalty and filial piety should be esteemed and treated in
distinction to others in all important matters, through gifts and the like."43
Thus in this time of national upheaval, Nobunaga (1534-1582)
crushed the Buddhist organization and accepted Confucianism as the guid-
ing political philosophy. Continuing this tradition, the Tokugawa Shogun-
ate Government publicly recognized Confucianism as the philosophical
ground of centralized feudalism.
Yet, not all Confucians approved of the rank system existing in the
feudal society of the Tokugawa period. Confucian Shiisai Minowa
(1669-1744) of the Wang Yang-ming school, for instance, preached the
complete equality of man. He said: "From the Emperor down to the petty
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warriors, Eta (pariah) and beggars, they are all men. From Sages down to
men of mediocrity andoutcastes, they are all men. The way of True Man is
called the Way of Ancient Sage-Kings Yao and Shun." At the same time,
however, it is apparent from the following remarks that he did not com-
pletely object to the existing rank system: "Even beggars who are not fit for
the Way of Man must not be neglected," or (concerning relief work) "We
will not take a single man from villages where there are many beggars and
outcastes."44. No Confucianists ever raised strong objections to the feudal
rank system.
Buddhists, we find, were not different from Confucians; they kept si-
lence on, or even were not aware of, the basic doctrine of Buddhism, i.e.
equality of the castes and denial of social disparity, which had been
advocated since its origin. The substance of Buddhist thought was thus
transformed upon its introduction from India to suit the native custom of
subordination. We note that it was in the spirit of gratitude for Imperial
and parental love that Buddhism came to be observed by the Japanese of
the Suiko period. The following passage from Nihonshoki (Chronicles of
Japan) seems to confirm this fact: "The Emperor called in the Prince and
the Ministers, and commanded them to promote Buddhism. Now court
people and local chiefs vied with one another to erect the Houses of the
Buddha, that is, temples, in order to reward the benevolence of Emperors
and parents."45 "Loyalty to the Emperor and devotion to the parents," two
concepts essentially alien to Buddhism, had to be attached to Buddhism in
order to make it mean something to the Japanese.
This attitude persisted down the ages. We find Nichiren saying, at the
beginning of his Kaimokusho ("A treatise to enlighten people"), "There are
three persons everybody must respect, master, teacher, parent." This, we
note, is the same as the Confucian idea of piety. However, if one abides
strictly by the Confucian idea of piety, he cannot at the same time fulfill to
satisfaction his piety toward all three. "One who does not know the past
and the future will not be able to help the future life of his father and
mother, his sovereign, and his masters, and will be called an ungrateful
wretch," said Nichiren, and asserted that one's piety toward the three
superiors could only be accomplished by believing in the Lotus Siitra. Here
Nichiren was attempting to explain Buddhism from the standpoint of a
Confucian, or native, concept.46 Further, we find him saying, "The Second
Volume of the Lotus Siitra deals with the three important matters, the
Sovereign, parents, and masters. This is the heart of the Siitra."41 But
contrary to Nichiren's explanation, we find no mention of piety toward the
three superiors in this Second Volume of the Lotus Siitra. What is figura-
tively explained there is that the merciful Buddha delivers the masses of
people as parents bring up their children. (Parable of carts drawn by
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Sheep, Deer, and Ox; Parable of the Rich Man's Stray Son.) Neither
Nichiren nor later scholars of the Nichiren sect have been able to cite exact
words from the Lotus Siitra that would serve to endorse a morality stressing
class and rank distinction. What Nichiren and his followers had done was
to assume that a book of Truth, such as the Lotus Siitra, would advocate
this kind of morality.
Now, let us take up the question of "sovereign" (Kimi).
As stated previously, Buddhism originally advocated caste equality, or
equality of people. In books of early Buddhism little or no esteem of the
sovereign, whether a feudal lord or the king of a nation, is found. As a
matter of fact in a great many Buddhist writings, kings are associated with
robbers that harass people through brute force. It is easy to see therefore
that the concept of equality in Buddhism would not only be incompatible
with, but would also threaten the very existence of the Japanese national
structure based upon the class and rank system. The government of Prince
Sh6toku, which made the fervent recommendation of Buddhism, not only
closely guarded the class and rank system in the Injunctions, but also
introduced into their version of Buddhism a class and rank morality. A new
idea of respect for a sovereign was created in their annotations of the Lotus
Siitra. While Chia-hsiang Ta-shih Chi-tsang or Kaja Daishi Kichiza (Sui
Dynasty), listed under the heading of "the Superiors" (in the Shaman
Siitra) master, father, elder brother and sister, Prince Shatoku added to
these categories kimi ("sovereign").48
Now what is meant by a "sovereign"? He is a ruler of subjects, or the
chief of a limited, closed human nexus wherever subjugation by power
prevails; he could therefore be an emperor. Reverence for a "sovereign,"
therefore, could at once turn into rank-consciousness in a feudal society
and Emperor-worship in a nationalistic state.
The attitude of absolute devotion to the master wielded inHuence even
Upon doctrines of Japanese Buddhism. Nichiren taught that there must be
only one master in a state, as in a family. Similarly, he said, there must be
One siitra which is the master of all other siitras. His choice of the Lotus
Siitra rested upon the following reasoning: "In the world there are many
who want to become powerful. But the sovereign of a country is only one.
If there should be two, the land would not be peaceful. If there should be
two masters in one family, it would certainly deteriorate. Concerning the
complete canon of scripture, things should be the same. Only one siitra,
Whatever it may be, would be the great sovereign of all the siitras."49
Absolute devotion to a sovereign has constituted the basis of morality
throughout Japanese history. The struggles of the Genji and Heike clans
Were not always motivated by hatred, or differences of interests or religious
beliefs, but by devotion to the daimyo (clan head). In India the warrior's
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gallant death on the battlefield was a source of admiration only in a
religious sense. Valor in the minds of Japanese warriors was different. The
exemplary attitude of the warrior is given in this quotation: "Besides this
bond between lord and subject, we need nothing. We will not waver at all,
even on the advice of Sakyamuni, Confucius, or the Sun God of Japan
(TenshO-Daijin) appearing before us. Let me fall into a hell, or let me be
punished by gods; we will need nothing else than to be faithful to our
lord."50 Bushid6 (the Way of the Warrior) with its most important motiva-
tion in the complete subordination to the lord was, as is well-known,
largely endorsed by Buddhism, particularly Zen Buddhism. The ultimate
aim of Zen practice became, among the warriors, devotion to the lord.
The Buddhist idea of the transmigration of the soul was also to be
revised for the sake of the Japanese stress on the master-servant relationship.
The common proverb, "The parents-children relationship is good for one
generation; the man-wife relationship for two generations; and the master-
servant relationship for three generations" was a later creation in Japan. It
was rather natural that Japanese Buddhist orders themselves came to be
organized after the fashion of secular society; a complex system of rank was
established in the orders. But, as already stated, early Buddhism conceived
all men to be equal. These ranks of monks were determined by the number
of years of service; important affairs of the order were decided by majority
(yebhuyyasikii). To realize the great difference existing between the Bud-
dhisms of early India and Japan, we have only to recall that, before the
introduction of Western civilization into this country, such a democratic
procedure as decision by majority was something entirely undreamt of in
Japanese Buddhist orders.
The most significant thing about the Japanese assimilation of Bud-
dhism, however, was the fact that original Buddhist concepts and sutras
tended to be altered, in the process of translation into simple Japanese for
infiltration among the common folk, in order to satisfy the native fondness
for the rank system. The Japanese word akirameru (to resign oneself to, to
give up) was derived, so it is explained, from the form akirakani miru (to
see clearly) under the influence of Buddhist thought. The word, however,
is used when one gives up a desire that happens to run counter to the
wishes of his superior. The Buddhist expression inga wo fukumeru (to
elucidate the cause and effect of a thing) is used when one advises another
to give up his desire and aspiration for the sake of his superior. What the
phrase actually means is "account for the wishes of the superior." Causal
relations came to be explained in terms of the rank system. This rank
system, however, the Japanese accepted as a "Divine Gift," and they were
aware that their society greatly differed even from the society of
China. We find Joken Nishikawa (1658- I 724) saying: "In China cus,tonl1s
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are such that even sons of farmers and merchants can rise to government
positions. They may become premier and conduct the affairs of the state.
They may rule the nation in such a way that the people are made happy.
There is no piety greater than this. Sons of farmers and merchants thus
apply themselves diligently to studies, and aspire to obtain government
positions, and rise in the world. In our country, however, things are
different. Although there have been many scholars since antiquity, none
has risen from the common folk, none from the common folk has managed
the affairs of the state."
With such a tendency of thinking prevailing, it was natural that the
individual as a free and independent agent should not have even been
conceived by the Japanese till modern times. And it must be said that the
retarded development of their cities was in part responsible for this. For
there hardly ever arose in feudal Japan cities that were autonomous, posses-
sing their own judicial powers. Unlike cities in China, Japanese cities were
not residences of emperors; nor had they the importance of a fort city
controlled by a feudal baron; they were without administrative organiza-
tions of bureaucrats. Japanese cities were rather nothing more than densely
populated areas controlled by warriors. Even after the Meiji Restoration of
r868, when cities expanded rapidly, their citizens did not come to possess
the self-consciousness of European citizenry. And particularly noteworthy
here was the fact that there was a constant flow of farming population in
and out of the cities. This farming population continued to be bound by
blood relation and economy to the farming village during its residence in
the city, and was free to go back to the country if subsistence in the city
became difficult. This situation formed an obstacle to the growth of a
general public morality as well as to an ethics for the individual in Japan.
The retarded development of cities allowed the social order, based
Upon feudal rank, to continue. Any movement toward equalization arising
from the masses would gradually be transformed into something else by the
prevailing rank system. Take for example the cult of tea. The cult of tea
had its place originally in the life of the great merchants of newly-risen
cities in modern times as a canon of conduct, an ideal basis of living. It
aimed to create the relation of host and guest, free of the rank system in the
current society, or as we find it stated, ". . . not based on rank as in
ordinary life." Before long, however, the ideal of the tea cult was trans-
formed through a series of compromises and made to conform with the
prevailing pattern of feudal society. We find the following words of tea
masters: "By the practice of the Tea-Ceremony, morality beginning with
that between lord and subject will be naturally carried to its highest
expression" or "Warriors will conform to their own ways. City people will
keep their families safe. The noble and those below him will be useful (in
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their own positions) and they will not hate the hierarchical order."sl
(Sekishii school.)
The Zen Priest Shosan Suzuki and his followers tried, through euphe-
mistically publicizing anti-feudalistic views, to oppose the feudal morality
based on rank, but their campaign was bound to wither away. Even the
modern rationalistic thinker Baien Miura (1723-1789) had to approve feu-
dal morality; we find him saying: "There are many vocations-warrior,
farmer, artisan, and merchant. All, from the Emperor down to the masses,
aim to obey and realize Divine Providence. What one aims at should be the
peace of the family and the state; what one discriminates should be the re-
lation of noble and low, intimate and remote."52 Baien's ethics was in the
last analysis the ideal of the Wise Man.
It is then easy to understand why Christianity, which condemned
subservience to the monarch and parents, had to confront persecution in
Japan; Christianity was thought to destroy the very foundations of the
social order. Christianity, or more specifically Catholicism in this case,
contained within itself, no doubt, a number of elements of feudalism,
being a rel.igion that prospered during the feudal ages of Europe. But
unlike Europe, where monarchs themselves were Christians of Catholic
faith, feudal lords in Japan had had almost nothing to do with Catholicism
or Christianity. It was the incompatibility of Christianity and the native
morality of self-dedication to the clan and the Emperor which resulted in
the persecution of Christianity.
In this connection we note with interest the comments on the Chris-
tian Ten Commandments by Fabian, or "Apostate Brother (iruman)" in his
book Hadeusu (Contra Deum): He says that with the exception of the
First Commandment ("I am the Lord thy God.... Thou shalt have no
other gods before me"), the Commandments are the same as the Buddhist
Five Commandments. Only the First Commandment is objectionable. For
it tells one to defy one's lord and father in order to adore the Deity. It must
be for the purpose of usurping our nation to spread such teachings.53 Thus,
in order to undermine Christianity, he adopts the following point of view:
"If one lives in this Land of the Rising Sun, one must follow the proper
way-that is, to obey the Shogun, the ruler of the country."54
And we also find the following criticism of Christianity by Hakuseki
Arai (1657-1725), one of the most progressive thinkers of the Tokugawa
period: "It is the office of the Monarch to worship Heaven. It is therefore
immoral for all people, from nobles down to the common folk, to worship
Heaven, when each class has its own gods to worship."55 Confucianism had
ascended to dominance as the philosophical basis for the political structure
of the society established by the warrior rulers. It was therefore natural that
THE TENDENCY TO EMPHASIZE A LIMITED SOCIAL NEXUS 433
Christianity, which threatened the social order based on the rank system,
should meet the fate of persecution.
To the average Japanese, accustomed to stressing rank, the tests of a
great religionist were his high birth and rank, not the truths he might
reveal in his teachings and deeds. Modern historical research has shown
that Shinran (1173-1262) was not necessarily a member of the aristocracy,
but an ordinary monk at Mt. Hiei whose family origin is obscure,56 and we
detect in his writings no proud consciousness of his origin. We have come
to know that it was his followers who dressed him up to be of aristocratic
origin. We thus find in Shinran Den'e ("Illustrated Biography of Shin-
ran"), published in 1295' A.D., 34 years after his death, the following
account regarding Shinran's origin:
"His secular name was Fujiwara. He, the son of Arinori, a court
minister of the Dowager Empress, who was the fifth descendant of Arikuni,
a Vice-Minister, who was the sixth descendant of Duke Uchimaro, a
Vice-Premier, who was the grandson of the grandson of Kamatari the
Premier, who was the twenty-first descendant of Amanokoyanenomikoto.
Therefore he could have grown old in the service of the court, the acme of
the priestly Emperor, and lived a life of luxury. However, (he
took orders ... )." A text called Gozokusho (The Holy Lineage) by
Rennyo (1415'-1499), in which Shinran's lineage is still more exaggerated,
is regularly recited at a certain "thanksgiving service" held on the anni-
versary of Shinran's death.
As a matter of fact most biographies of Shinran written by the fol-
lowers of the Honganji sect are characterized by this tendency to glorify his
birth and we are again led to believe that Shinran's religion could not have
spread among the Japanese had not his followers distorted the facts of his
origin in order to appeal to the peculiar tendency of Japanese thought.
A similar situation exists, in an even more pronounced form, for
Nichiren. Nichiren, as he himself humbly, or to be more exact, proudly,
declared that he was "the son of a Sendara (Sanskrit Carz4iila, despised
outcast),"57 "a son born of the lowly people living on a rocky strand of the
out-of-the-way sea," "the son of a sea-diver."58 Nichiren was proud of his
lowly birth.59 The Nichiren sect, however, had to fabricate a noble lineage
for him in order to attract more adherents from the common folk. We thus
find in Nitch6's Nichiren Daishonin Cht"igasan60 (published in the early
Tokugawa period) the following passage about Nichiren's lineage: "Saint
Nichiren's family name is Mikuni. His father was the second son Shigetada
of Nukina no Shigezane, Lord of T6t6mi Province. The Saint was the
fourth son. He was a descendant of Emperor Shomu. The Saint's father
was exiled from T6t6mi Province to the lonely seashore at Kominato,
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village of Ichikawa, Tojo district, Nagasa country, in the province of Awa
where he became a fisherman. The Saint's mother carne from the (famous
noble) Family of Kiyohara." The true import of Nichiren's virtue that he
was imparting the True Way in spite of his lowly birth-and this was
consistent with the traditional spirit of Buddhism-was thus forever lost.
Today most biographies of Nichiren we find in circulation speak of him as
descending from an aristocratic family, and indeed all representative and
popular religious figures have thus been made up to be sons of the aristoc-
racy or descendants of emperors.
One may, however, explain such practice by saying: "Is it not after all,
only natural that religion tries to conform to some extent to the prevailing
pattern of thought? Was it not natural that these things were so, since most
feudal societies do place emphasis upon lineage and hereditary rank?" But
let us remember that in the feudal society of India in the Middle Ages,
A!vars, Hindu revolutionary religionists, were sons of the lowliest folk,
and people, nevertheless, looked up to them. In India religious authority
outweighed rank or lineage of secular life; the caste system was in fact
based upon. a traditional hierarchical social structure. Likewise, the rank
system of the Lama priesthood in Tibet has nothing to do with secular
rank and birth. Overstressing secular rank and lineage, therefore, is a
feature, not unique to, but most pronounced, in Japanese thinking.
Problems of Ultra-Nationalism
The ultimate form in which the Japanese concept of emphasis upon a
specific limited human nexus manifested itself was ultra-nationalism. Japa-
nese ultra-nationalism did not suddenly appear in the post-Meiji period. Its
beginnings can be traced to the very remote past.
The boast that Japan was the best country in the world has existed
from very early times. It, no doubt, began at first in a love of the native
country, pure and simple, without ambitions for expansion and conquest.
Probably the earliest use of the phrase Dai Nippon (Great Japan) is found
in some writings by Dengyo.61 Dengyo (767-822), who had studied in
China, was more keenly aware than his contemporaries of the fact that
Japan's territories were smaller and her wealth and resources much more
limited than China's. What Dengyo actually meant by "Great Nippon"
was that Japan was a land most suitable to Mahayana Buddhism (Bud-
dhism of the Greater Vehicle). Many Buddhists of later date believed that
Japan was superior to all other lands, as we can see clearly in the following
line from a poem by Ean (1225-1277), a Kamakura Zen monk:
"To the end of the end of the last generation will
This land of Ours surpass all other lands."
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The notion of Japanese superiority is most boldly expressed in the
concept of the Divine Nation. We find the following statement in the
introductory manifesto of the Jinno Shoto-ki (Record of the Legitimate
Succession of the Divine Emperors), of the 14th century, by Chikafusa
Kitabatake (1293-1354), a Shintoist writer: "Our Great Nippon is a Divine
Nation. Our Divine Ancestors founded it; the Sun God(dess) let her
descendants reign over it for a long time. This is unique to Our Nation; no
other nation has the :like of it. This is the reason why Our Nation is called
'Divine Nation.''' This concept of "Divine Nation" is accepted in the No
plays,62 and Buddhists such as Nichiren adopted it. We find the following
statements by Nichiren: "Japan is a Divine Nation,"63 "This Nation is a
Divine Nation. Deities do not respond to those lacking respect. Seven
generations of Heavenly Deities, five generations of Earthly Deities, and a
multitude of Good Deities support the Buddha's All-embracing Teach-
ings."64 A concept similar to this is found in Zen Buddhists. "Though Our
Land is situated out of the Way, everlasting is its Imperial Rule, noble are
its people. Thus Our Land surpasses others by far. . . . This Land of
Ours is pure and divine." This shows us that Hakuin (1685-1768), the Zen
master, respected Shinto concepts.
Confucianism, however, was the best system to provide a theoretical
basis for the theory of ultra-nationalism. It will be remembered that Con-
fucianism, which the Chinese had earlier adopted as their official theory of
state government, was accepted by the Japanese with hardly any trouble.
(The only controversial point, however, was the problem of "changing
unsuitable emperors"; even this, however, caused no special friction. This
point will be discussed in a section below dealing with Emperor-Worship).
When Confucianism was introduced into Japan, the ruling class took to
studying it so that they could "become government officials and Confu-
cians, and serve the country."65 This attitude toward Confucianism was to
persist among the ruling classes, and in the Tokugawa period Confucianism
was taught with special reference to the concept of the state (Kokutai) by
almost all the schools and individual scholars of Confucianism including
Jinsai Ito (1627-17°5), Soko Yamaga (1622-1685), Ansai Yamazaki
(1618-1682), and the Mito school.
We further note that Japanese Confucianism, associated with the
ultra-nationalism or the authority-consciousness of the Japanese people,
asserted its own superiority over foreign systems of thought. The Confu-
cianist Sazan Kan (1748-1827), for example, declared:
"It is only because Confucianism exists that Buddhism is practiced
here. If there had been no sovereign, those saints could not have acted
independently. As it is said that Buddhism avoids countries with wicked
monarchs, and as it is moreover said that the Benefit of the State is one of
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the Four Benefits, it is obvious that it (Buddhism) could not have been
founded here if it were not for the influence of Confucianism. . . . The
Catholics, it is said, would willingly give their lives for their Deity. This is
most outrageous. It is only because the Sovereign rules our Land that we
would go through fire and water in an emergency. Besides this, there are
religions of many different kinds, called by various names, in different
countries and generations. They may have different names, but they are all
alike in practicing the trick of setting up a master above the lord. It is most
apparent that this is harmful to our political ideology."66
But, since the Confucian concept of the state was formulated in
accordance with the needs of Chinese society, it naturally contained a
number of points with which the more thorough-going of the Japanese
nationalists could not agree. The state conceived by Chinese philosophers
was an ideal or model state; on the other hand, the state that the Japanese
nationalists had in mind was the actual Japanese state. This was the reason
why Japanese nationalism, nurtured, so to speak, by Confucianism had
ultimately to deny the authority of Confucianism. Shain Yoshida (1831-
1859), the most influential leader of the movement to establish the mod-
ern state of Japan, declares in his criticism of Confucius and Mencius:
"It was wrong of Confucius and Mencius to have left their native states
and to have served in other countries. For a sovereign and a father are
essentially the same. To call one's sovereign unwise and dull, and to
forsake one's native state in order to find a different sovereign in another
state is like calling one's father foolish and moving from one's house to the
next house to become the son of the neighbor. That Confucius and Men-
cius lost sight of this truth can never be justified."67
A similar tendency can easily be discerned in the process of the
Japanese assimilation of Buddhism; Japanese Buddhists carefully picked
out such doctrines as would be convenient for, or not inconsistent with,
their nationalism.
The attitude which Indian Buddhism assumed toward the State was,
from the time of its origination, one of cautiousness. For instance, it placed
monarchs in the same category with robbers-both being thought to endan-
ger people's welfare-and it taught people to avoid both dangers as much as
possible. Indian Buddhists aimed to realize, through their concept of spir-
itual unity, an ideal society free of the authority of monarchs, and this was
but the logical conclusion derived from their idea of Compassion. The
Sangha, the collective body or brotherhood of followers, was the main
agency for this cause.
Such a way of thinking was unacceptable to the Japanese, according
to whose realistic, nationalistic view the Japanese state was absolute, and its
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sovereign, the Emperor, sacred. The traditional and conservative Buddhism
of the primitive type came hence to be called the "Lesser Vehicle"
(Hinayiina) in Japan and looked upon with contempt; the Buddhism which
came to be called the "Greater Vehicle" (Mahayana), which allowed the
Japanese to pursue their religious ideals in conformity with their view of
the state, was adopted by them.
Nor did the Japanese accept the view of the traditional, conservative
Buddhism of the early type that the State originates in a social contract.
The concept of state as held by early Buddhists was as follows: 68 Farmland
was divided among individuals in remote antiquity, but there still existed
individuals who encroached upon the properties of others. To prevent this
sort of thing, the people elected a common head ("an equal leader") who
would see to it that the people were protected, good people rewarded, evil
people punished. The sovereign originated from this protective police
function of the ruler. A tax was "something that was paid" to the sovereign
by the people; the sovereign was "employed" by the people.G9 The sovereign
thus was "the selected master of the people." This concept of sovereignty
was afterwards held persistently by the traditional and conservative schools
of Buddhism.
It is to be noted that scriptures of primitive Buddhism tell of the
Buddha Sakyamuni praising the republic of the Vajjis as the ideal form of
the state. 70 But the Japanese who accepted Buddhism on a large scale
refused nevertheless to adopt its concept of the state, which to them
appeared to run counter to the native idea of the "state structure" (Kokutai).
We thus find the 14th-century Shintoist, Chikafusa Kitabatake, ready, on
the one hand, to accept Buddhism in general but eager, on the other hand,
to emphasize the importance of the Japanese Imperial Family in the follow-
ing way: The Buddhist theory (of the state) is merely an "Indian theory";
Indian monarchs may have been "the descendants of a monarch selected
for the people's welfare," but "Our Imperial Family is the only continuous
and unending line of family descending from its Heavenly Ancestors."71
Atsutane Hirata (1776-1843), on the other hand, discredits the whole In-
dian theory of the origin of the state as merely an explanation of the origin
of "Indian chieftains."72
The Siitra Konkomyo-kyo (Suvan:zaprabhiisa-siitra-The Golden Ra-
diance Siitra) and some later scriptures of Mahayana Buddhism, unlike
those of early Buddhism, advance a theory that a monarch is "a son of di-
vine beings" (Tenshi, devaputra) to whom has been given a mandate of
Beaven, and whom Heaven will protect. This theory which came greatly to
be cherished had had its origin in the Brahmin law-books which regulated
the feudal society of medieval India. Later Buddhists came to mention this
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theory merely as a prevailing notion of society. It was not characteristic of
Buddhism. However, this idea came especially to be stressed by the Japa-
nese.
Buddhism was thus accepted by the Japanese as significant for the
support of the state. The spread of Buddhism in this country began, as is
well known, with the presentation by a Korean monarch (of Paikche)
Seimei to the Japanese Emperor Kimmei in 552 of a gilded bronze image of
Sakyamuni, several religious flags, umbrellas, and several volumes of the
siitras. IUs particularly notable here that the adoption of Buddhism was
begun in the diplomatic relations between nations, or more specifically, in
the relations between the Imperial Family and a foreign country. The
situation here differs widely from the acceptance of Buddhism by Later
Han Emperor Ming-ti from the Yiieh-chih. In Japan a state-to-state relation
brought about adoption of a universal religion. According to the Nihon-
shoki (The Chronicles of Japan), King Seimei, King of Paikche, attached
to his gifts a letter, a passage from which reads as follows:
"The doctrine (of the Buddha) is the most excellent of all the various
doctrines. It is difficult to comprehend and penetrate. Even the Prince of
Chou and Confucius were not able to grasp it. This doctrine brings about
boundless virtue and happiness, thus giving the highest salvation."
'When the Emperor learned of it, His joy was great. Summoning the
Ambassador, He said: We have never heard to this day a doctrine as
wonderful as this.''' These passages in the Nihonshoki are in fact, as
scholars73 have pointed out, a fabrication based upon passages from the
Siitra Konkomyo Saisho-o-kyo translated by I-Ching and the Siitra
Konkomyo-kyo translated by Dharmarak~a. I-Ching translated this Siitra
into Chinese in 703, some 151 years after the 13th year of Kimmei (552).
The above-mentioned letter of Paikche's king is in fact a pure fabrication
by the author of the Nihonshoki based upon the Konkomyo-kyo, and it is
quite uncertain to what degree it conveys the true content of the letter of
King Seimei. What interests us here is the fact that the significance of the
adoption of Buddhism was understood by the Japanese, or, at least, by such
court scholars as the author of the Nihonshoki, in accordance with the
thought expressed in the Konkomyo-kyo.
The Siitra Konkomyo-kyo as distinguished from other scriptures of
Mahayana Buddhism contains considerations for the protection of the state
and references to worldly Shamanistic practices. Shamanism will be dis-
cussed later; we shall therefore examine here its ideas regarding the protec-
tion of the state. It is evident from the preceding reference to the reasons
for adopting Buddhism that considerations for the protection of the state
constituted a factor dominant in Japanese Buddhism from the very begin-
ning.
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The memorial tablet of the Sakas in Northwest India tells us that, in
the first century B.C., the Sakas already cherished the view that Buddhism
manifests its divine inHuence for the welfare and prosperity of a monarch
or state. A certain Patika, a relative of the chieftain (K~atrapa), it is said,
erected in Taxila in the heart of Northwestern India a stupa (sacred burial
mound of Buddhists) and a building for a religious order (Sanghiiriima)
"for all the Buddhas, and in memory of my parents and for the long life
and power of the K~atrapa, his wife and children." The lion-bearing capital
discovered at Mathura also tells us in inscription that the column is dedi-
cated to the· Three Precious Things (The Buddha, the Law, and the
Priesthood), as well as to the Saka state (Sakastana-Sakasthiina). The
inscription found on the small stupa erected by a lady Buddhist by the
name of Bhadravala, in the 134th year of the Azes era, also states: "This is
dedicated to all sentient beings and to the City-State (raphanikama-
rii~tranigama):'74 Such a view regarding the state came to be theorized in
numerous scriptures of Mahayana Buddhism, and it was from these that
the Japanese came to have their ideas concerning state protection.
In Japan Buddhism came to be propagated as a national religion
during the reign of the Empress Suiko (enthroned 592 A.D.), in accordance
with Article II of Prince Shotoku's Injunctions, which enjoins "reverence
to the Three Precious Things." With political and economic aids from the
state Japanese Buddhism became very active. After the Political Reform of
Taika, the state's control over religions became gradually solidified. With
the decline in influence of the clan aristocrats, now made bureaucrats, the
government abandoned its vague protection of Buddhism as a whole and
the attempt to convert it to a state religion. Instead, it adopted as a basic
religious policy the positive protection of pure state Buddhism alone which
would cooperate in the overall task of government. Thus the protection of
Buddhism was strengthened and the government not only furnished emer-
gency building funds, but did not hesitate even to provide vast sums for
running expenses.75
Most Japanese monasteries in those early days were thus state-operated
places of worship, as is clear in the Rescript of the Emperor Shomu (first
day of the fourth month, 749 A.D.): "Now, We, hearing that of all the
various doctrines the Great Word of the Buddha is the most excellent for
protecting the State. . . ."76 Buddhism was adopted by the Court with the
first regard for the protection of the State, and indeed, the most profound
and difficult doctrines of Buddhism were studied for this purpose. In the
Nara period (710-784), the Kegon Sect, which put forward a philosophy
regarded as the highest of Buddhist philosophies, came to be given the
position of a national religion. A Rescript of the Emperor Shomu (749 A.D.)
states, 'We consider the Kegon Sutra to be the most authoritative Scrip-
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ture." The Todaiji, the Central Cathedral of the Capital, was also known
as the Dai-Kegonji, or the Great Kegon Temple. Then, what in the Kegon
, , Sect appealed so much to the Japanese to win for it the position of a state
religion? According to the scriptures of the Kegon sect, each petal of the
thousand-petalled lotus Rower upon which the Vairocana Buddha dwells
represents a universe, and in each universe there are millions of jambud-
vipa (buds of actual worlds). In each universe of a lotus petal is a Sakya-
muni-Buddha that is a manifestation of the Vairocana Buddha, and in each
of the millions of jambudvipa (buds) is a small preaching Buddha that is, in
tum, a manifestation of Sakyamuni. Such symbolism was most suitable for
the requirements of the State. For it was thought that the officials of the
government should be manifestations of Vairocana, and the people should
be manifestations of the government official, just as Small Buddhas of
jambudvipa are manifestations of Sakyamuni-Buddha. As long as there is
harmony among the state, the government officials, and the people, as in
the cosmology of Kegon, there will be peace in the land, and the nation
will be safe.77
The n:inds of the Buddhists of the time were adjusted to the govern-
ment's religious policies based upon this cosmology. Zenju (723-797), a
great and celebrated scholar, of the Akishino Temple in the Nara Period,
asks in the Introduction of his Hongan Yakushi-Kyo Sho ("Commentary
upon the Bhai~ajya-guru-vai4urya-tathiigata-sutra"),"Unless it be by re-
penting one's sins with a holy heart and seeking the Commandments with
sincerity, how else ought one to repay for the benevolence of the sovereign
and express thanks for his goodness?" And he hopes ceremonies of repent-
ance and reception of the commandments will be conducted in order to
"abide by the Great Desire of the Sovereign, and compensate for the favors
of the State." And he further hopes that through these good deeds all kinds
of calamities will be eliminated; "The Imperial body will be as steady as
Heaven and Earth; the Imperial life be as everlasting as the sun and moon;
the Imperial Family will prosper for a thousand and myriad generations;
next, peace will reign in the land; all government officials will be loyal to
the throne; the people of all walks of life will be happy; all merits accumu-
lated by sincere actions in body, speech, and mind should be converted to
that end."78 Here, beyond doubt, the first object of Buddhist prayer, i.e.,
"happiness of all sentient beings," has now been "supplanted" by "pros-
perity of the Imperial Family"; Buddhist thought has been altered to suit
the rank system prevailing in Japan.
"Protection of the state," one of the most dominant concerns in the
Japanese mind, was thus firmly established in religion. Buan (+840) of the
Ritsu sect, a staunch believer in discipline and the precepts of Buddhism,
declares: "The Precepts are the basic and most important thing which
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promises attainment of Nirvat;la and Salvation." "Therefore, Precepts (sila)
make up a small ship for crossing the sea of sufferings; discipline (Vinaya)
is the only vehicle for attaining the Other Side. It is clear, therefore, that
discipline is most important for the protection of the State."79
The situation was similar in the case of the Tendai (T'ien-t'ai in
Chinese) sect, founded by Saicho, and the Shingon (Chen-yen in Chinese)
sect, founded in 816 by Kiikai, which are known as the Buddhism of the
Heian period (9th century). Saicho (posthumously named Dengyo Daishi)
of the Tendai sect, in founding the Enryakuji Monastery in 827, selected
the site of Mt. Hiei which was in the Ox-Tiger direction (Northeastern
direction) from the Palace. This was done with the idea of protecting the
Palace. Here his efforts were exerted to the training of monks who were
sincere seekers of the truth, and he called these sincere novices "treasures
of the nation." His purpose in training these young Buddhist scholars was
to "uphold the Buddhist Doctrine and protect the State."80 We find in his
works, say, Kenkairon (Elucidation of Rules of Discipline) or Shugokok-
kaish6 (Treatise for Protecting the Domain of the Country), such phrases
as Shugokokkai (Protection of the Country), Gokoku (Protection of the
nation), Gokoku Rimin (Protection of the State and benefitting people),
Kokka Yoko (State Forever), Kokka Annei (Peace and prosperity for the
State), etc. Kiikai (posthumously named Kobo Daishi) (774-835), who
frequently practiced prayers at the Court, said he was doing this for the
benefit of the State. Kiikai, moreover, had his special names for temples; for
example, Kyo-o Gokokuji (The temple to teach kings how to protect the
nation) for the Toji and Jingokokuso Shingonji (The Temple of Esoteric
Buddhism to protect the national fortune by grace of gods) for
the Takaosanji.
"Protection of the State" was not the slogan only of the early Buddhist
sects, a mere attempt to curry favor with the state authorities, for we find
the same concern in the official documents record of the state which
constitute the authoritative history of Japan. Kiikai propagated Buddhism
under the slogan, "Practice virtue for the State, and thus benefit man and
gods."8l Shinnen (812-891) said that Kiikai built the Kongobuji "to safe-
guard the nation and protect the Law of Buddha."82 In the Rescript of the
Emperor Nimmyo we find it said: "The Buddhist Doctrine is the foremost
and the most excellent for protecting the state and benefitting the people.~'83
It was in order to "compensate for the August Goodness and protect the
State" that Discipline Master Shinsho (821-873) erected the images of the
Vairocana and the Buddhas of the Four Directions.84 The raison d'etre of
the Enryaku Temple lay in the "Protection of the Imperial Family."8s It
Was also to "protect the State and promote the August Throne" that the
monks of the Anjo Temple adopted the tendoku method of reading the
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siitras of various sects.86 In his address to the Throne, Ennin or Jikaku
Daishi (784-864) says, 'With all our efforts we will propagate it, thereby
protecting the State, benefitting the masses and repaying the favors of our
teachers."8T Discipline Master Joan (+878) is said to have announced:
"The work of copying siitras will be done in order to protect the State."
Concerns for protection of the state are seen also in newly-risen sects
of the Kamakura period. In the field of the newly imported Rinzai Zen
Buddhism was Eisai (1141-1215) writing his KazengokokuTon (A Treatise
on Protecting the Nation by Spreading Zen Buddhism).88 There were at
that time the Six sects of Nara, and the Tendai and Shingon sects already
established as state-authorized religious schools, and for any rising Zen sect
it was necessary to stress its concern for protection of the state in order to be
state-authorized. This motive is apparent in such works as Nihon Bukkyo
Chuka Ganmon (A prayer to make Japanese Buddhism prosper again) or
Kazen GokokuTon. The full names of the Nanzenji in Kyoto and the
Kenchoji in Kamakura are respectively, ZuiTyuzan Taiheikokoku Nan-
zenzenji (A Temple to make the country peaceful and prosperous) and
Kofukusan Kencho Kokokuzenji. KoshOji in Uji which Dogen founded
upon his return from China was called Kannon DaTi-in Koshagokokuji (A
Temple to protect a nation by propagating the Holy Practice).89 Soseki
(1275-1351), Buddhist priest of the Rinzai Sect, erected the Ankokujis
(Temples to make the nation peaceful) in different provinces, and there are
the Gokokujis (Temples to protect the nation) throughout Japan.
Now, in China, it was the rise of the Mongols that stirred state
consciousness in Zen schools of the Southern Sung Dynasty (1127-1279),
and this attitude of Chinese Zen schools was, no doubt, reflected in the
Japanese Buddhism of the Kamakura period (1185-1333). But significant
here is the fact that while in China state consciousness was soon to wither
away, it persisted in Japan down to recent times.
The concern for the state, as an idea, however, did not belong logically
to the doctrines of most sects. It was with the Nichiren Sect that it carne to
constitute an essential motive. To understand this situation we have only to
observe what position it is given in Nichiren's work, Rissha AnkokuTon (A
treatise to establish righteousness and to make the country peaceful). Reli-
gion, according to Nichiren, must serve the state. He said: "Thirteen
thousand thirty-seven Buddhist temples and three thousand one hundred
thirty-two Shinto shrines are revered for the sake of the safety of the
state."90 To him the existence of the state was the prerequisite for the
flourishing of Buddhism. He says, again: "The Nation prospers because of
Buddhism; and Buddhism becomes precious because people revere it. If the
Nation perish and people disappear, who will revere Buddhism? Therefore,
say prayers first for thy State, then presently Buddhism will be established."
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Again: "If there be no overthrow of the State and no destruction on Earth,
thy body will be safe, thy mind will be at ease."91
Nichiren's first and last concern was Japan. In his Commentary on the
Lotus Sutra (in the fifth chapter, yakusayubon)} he cites the passage, "The
Buddha appears in the world," and Nichiren says, "By 'world' Japan is
meant." He also cites a passage which reads: "And this personage came to
the world," and comments, "This personage is the Bodhisattva Jagya
(ViSi~~aciirita-Excellent Practice). The 'world' is Japan.... It is a per-
son like Nichiren in the present." He, again, interprets the passage in the
commentary by Master Myoraku (Miao-Io, 71 1-782). "When the son propa-
gates the teachings of his father, it is beneficial to the world," in the
following way: "By the 'son' is meant the Bodhisattvas who are said to have
appeared from the earth when the Hokke Sutra was preached. By the
'father' is meant Buddha Sakyamuni. By 'the world' is meant Japan. The
'benefit' means becoming a Buddha."92 Now, what Indian Buddhists meant
by the 'World" (or lokadhiitu) was the area on which the light of the sun
and moon shines, i.e., the four Continents around Mt. Sumeru.
But Nichiren narrowed this "world"-the world that is eventually to attain
salvation on the strength of the Lotus Sutra-to Japan.
In the case of the Pure Land (Jado) Buddhism, however, there was
comparatively less state-consciousness. Since Hanen, for instance, was not
concerned with state structure (kokutai) , the Pure Land doctrines were
therefore disapproved until recently by a group of ultra-nationalist philoso-
phers. Indeed, the state was not a thing of great concern in the minds of
Honen or Shinran. But as the Pure Land Buddhism broadened its sphere
of influence, it became necessary, in order to protect itself from
the onslaughts from outside, to compromise with the ultra-nationalists. In
the sequel we shall briefly examine the case of the Pure Land (Jado)
Buddhism.
Shinran (1173-1262), the founder of the True Pure Land (Jado Shin)
sect, held no particular view regarding the state. His only concern was the
relation between the sinful mortal, such as he regarded himself to be, and
Amida Buddha the Savior. Shinran apparently had no thought of compro-
mising with secular authority. But as the True Pure Land (Jodo Shin) sect
spread among the people through the efforts of Rennyo (1415-1499), its
attitude toward the contemporary feudal authority became one of compro-
mise. We see Rennyo saying: "Now you should in no wise neglect your
duties to constables (shugo) of provinces or to stewards (jita) of local
communities on the grounds that you revere the Law of Buddha and are
believers. Indeed, you should devote yourselves all the more to public
affairs, so that you will be pointed out as men who know what you are
about. and will be models of conduct to the nembutsu believer who has
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faith and who prays for future happiness. That is to say, you will be looked
up to as men who make a point of keeping both the Law of Buddha and the
Law of the Sovereign."93 Rennyo also admonishes: "Bear in thy head the
Law of the Sovereign; bear deep in thy heart the Law of the Buddha."94
The True Pure Land (Jodo Shin) Sect developed this idea, and brought
out the dualistic theory of Truth. Originally the Buddhist paramartha-
satya (Japanese shintai) meant Absolute Truth, whereas samvfti-satya
(Japanese zokutai) meant a lower order of truth. The meaning of these
terms was altered by the Shin sect, so that shintai represented the Law of
Buddha and zokutai the Law of the Sovereign, thus resolving the problem
of the two conflicting authorities.
In the Meiji era (after 1868), when feudal regimes had collapsed and
the central authority had been established, great stress came to be placed
upon the sanctity of the Emperor, and the Honganji Order came to adopt
the ethics of nationalism. We find the following passage in Konyo's Goikun
SluJsoku ("A Letter written by the late Chief Abbot"), dated the Fourth
Year of Meiji (187 I), and made public by Myonyo in the following
vear:
- "There"is no man born in this Empire who has not benefitted from the
Imperial Favor. At this time especially, when His Majesty devotes himself
night and day to the furtherance of good government and the safety of his
people at home and to holding his own with countries abroad, who among
us, whether priest or layman, will not aid the spread of his kingly rule and
cause the Imperial authority to shine with its true brilliance? What is more,
since the spread of Buddhism in the world is due solely to the protection of
the Sovereign and his ministers, how can the faithful Buddhist neglect the
prohibitions of the Law of the Sovereign? Therefore in our sect it has
already been resolved that the Law of the Sovereign should be funda-
mental, that benevolence and justice should be foremost, that the gods
should be revered and morality observed."
Buddhist scholars, upon mentioning Shinran, are wont to argue that
Shinran did have concern for the state, and they invariably cite one single
passage as evidence. That is the letter that Shinran wrote to Shoshimbo:
"It would be a happy thing if all the people who recite the nembutsu,
recite it not for the sake of their own welfare but for the Sovereign and the
people. But those who are uncertain of reaching Pure Land, let them recite
the nembutsu (name of the Buddha) for their own rebirth in Pure Land.
But I think people who are certain of attaining Pure Land should bear in
mind the Buddha's mercy, and, in order to repay his mercy, with all their
heart recite the nembutsu for peace among the people and the propagation
of Buddhism."
Now obviously this is not a logical piece of writing. If we were to
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examine it objectively, we find that the first and second sentences are really
antithetical to each other in form and ironical in content. What Shinran is
saying here is that happy are the people who are able to say the nembutsu
for both the Sovereign and themselves, for their attainment of Pure Land
has been assured, and so let them do so. But, he says, those who in their
self-reflection are uncertain of attainment of Pure Land-that is, those who
are Shinran's followers-should recite the nembutsu in order to attain their
own salvation. I think that what Shinran is advocating here is not that the
Sovereign be considered as the paramount concern but rather that faith be
considered most important.95
Surprisingly enough, however, this passage by Shinran has hitherto
been grossly misinterpreted. Japanese scholars in most cases believed that
Shinran was here teaching nationalism. Through misinterpreting the words
of the very founder, the present leaders of the sect compromised with the
ultra-nationalist leaders of the military clique and were thus able to mitigate
their attacks. In the case of Saint Honen (1133-1212), not a single refer-
ence to the state is found; this was the ground for ultra-nationalists' criti-
cisms of Honen or Genku, founder of the Jodo or Pure Land sect.
We note here with interest that of the numerous scriptures that exist
in Buddhism those which were thought to have state-protecting efficacy
were especially favored, the Lotus Sutra, the Konkomyo-kyo (Golden Radi-
ance Sutra) and the Ninno hannya-kyo (Sutra of the Perfect Wisdom of
Benign Kings) being just such. The Lotus Sutra itself, however, embodies
no thought for "state-safety"; on the contrary, it teaches that the true
devotee of Buddhism "remains at a distance from monarchs and state
ministers,"96 But if we were to look for the part in the Sutra which led the
Japanese to link their concern for state-safety with the Lotus Sutra, we
shall find it to be the part in which it is stated that if things are carried out
in accordance with the Lotus Sutra, there shall be peace and happiness in
the world. As an example, Masashige Kusunoki ( ? -1336), was a believer
in the Lotus Siitra. In the colophon of a Lotus Siitra (in the library of the
Minatogawa Shrine), copied by his own hand, he says:
"The Hokke Sutra is the essence of all the doctrines preached by the
Buddha, and the heart of the One Vehicle. Therefore all spiritual leaders
in the past, present, and future, regard it as the true purport of their birth,
and eight kinds of divine beings regard it as the authority for the protection
of the country. Especially, the capacity of this country for the fullness of
the Mahayana doctrine is great and the solemnity of the Ise Shrine will
protect us and answer our prayers. This fact is fully written down in
clerical histories. I, who have been ordered by the Emperor to destroy the
rebels, have made this vow; if peace comes to the world and what is in my
heart be granted, one chapter of this sutra will be read every day before the
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god in this shrine. So I have made a copy of it by myself and fulfilled my
long-cherished desire. On the 25th of the 8th month of the 2nd year of
Kemmu (1335 A.D.).
"(Signed) Kusunoki Ason Masashige, Major General of the Left
Palace Guard and Governor of Kawachi."97
We are also told in the Taiheiki that Emperor Godaigo passed away
"with the fifth scroll of the Lotus Siitra in his left hand and a sword in his
right."98
The same attitude is noticeable in the way the teachings of the
Avatamsaka (Kegon) Sutra are observed by the Japanese. The Siitra de-
scribes the ideal monarchical government. It contains, at the same time, a
number of passages where monarchs and princes are admonished to forsake
their states and become Buddhist ascetics.99 Nevertheless, in Japan of the
Nara period the Siitra was considered to be a philosophy that promised the
prosperity of the state. Behind the great efforts exerted for the casting of
the Colossal Buddha of Nara was this understanding. And although there
is clear evidence of state-consciousness in the Siitras Konkomyo-kyo and
Ninno Hannya-kyo, it is not an ultra-nationalistic state-consciousness. Ac-
cording to tliese Siitras, the eternal and universal dharma is the only way
upon which we may rely; this is the doctrine of the Perfect Wisdom
(prajiiiipiiramitii, Hannyaharamitsu) which enlightens us on the right hu-
man conduct, that only through the application of the Perfect Wisdom
doctrine to the activities of the state, will the state be protected and
prosperous: Thus the state is not regarded as absolute. On the contrary it is
emphasized that a state wherein the Law is not observed will perish. But
the Japanese, inclined to nationalism, found these siitras particularly agree-
able and adaptable.
The notion that Buddhism protects the state spread eventually among
the warriors and the common people. In the period 386-589, known as the
Age of the Northern and Southern Dynasties, wheJ? Kyushu rose to assist
Takauji Ashikaga (1305-1358), the clan of Taketoki Kikuchi (1291-1333)
alone sided with the Southern Court. When Taketoki Kikuchi erected a
temple in Tamana-gun, Province of Higo, and received the Zen Master
Daichi as head of the temple, he presented a dedicatory address of which
the following is the final part; "If the principles contained in this address
are carried out, and the True Law observed with pure faith we shall receive
the unseen protection of the Three Treasures and various Deities; our
descendants for generations to come shall live up to the warrior ideals of
our family, and be able to protect the prosperity of our State. I therefore
shed my own blood, mix it with cinnabar ink, and present this address
sealed therewith to admonish my descendants."H)()
Emphasis upon the state is noticeable even among Buddhists who
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were in close touch with the common folk. For example, we find in Jiun's
Regulations of the Koki Temple an article which enjoins "Sincerity and
diligence in praying for the State."101
We find the case of a state assuming the character of a religious order
in ancient Greece, and we also know that the religious order of Sikhism in
India took on the character of a state. In Japan, however, religion was
thought to constitute the foundation of the state, and the state would be
protected by it. Just as Buddhism was thought to contribute to the govern-
ment of the state, so, at the lower level, it was regarded as contributing to
the government of the feudal fief. As has been frequently pointed out,
the world-outlook of Zen Buddhism underlies the spirit of the so-called
"Hagakure" warriors of the Sage clan in Kyiishii. The intention to assist
clan politics with Buddhism is expressed in the Gohoshijiron (A Treatise
on the Application of Buddhism to Politics) by Shaken Mori (1653-1721)
of the Mito clan.
As we have pointed out before, there was hardly any political coloring
or emphasis on the state, in religions in India. And in ancient China, too, it
was observed that "A monk will not respect the monarch." But in the Uu
Sung dynasty (420-478) monks did come to "respect the monarch." Al-
though in the end Chinese religion became subordinated to the state,
state-consciousness was never stressed by Buddhists themselves. In Japan,
however, Buddhism, which is a universal religion, was adopted and spread
as a religion serving the interests of the state.
We are now ready to draw some conclusions from the above examina-
tion of Japanese nationalism, and this we must do with some reservations.
For religion, with which we have mainly been dealing, is merely one of
many facets of culture. The outstanding features of Japanese nationalism,
however, may be summed up as follows: '
The Japanese people of the past dedicated a large and important part
of their individual lives to their state. In this respect, the Japanese went to
an extent to which no other Eastern peoples have ever gone. The great
intensity of such dedication is itself the first feature of Japanese nation-
alism.
The second feature is that Japanese nationalism was developed from
the limited exclusive concern for the particular state of Japan. Now, there
are different ways in which nationalism is applied to practice. We know
that nationalism has been expounded a number of times by thinkers in
India and China, as well as in the West. But their nationalism was
theoretically concerned with the state in general, not with their particular
states. Now, nationalism tends, from its very nature, to be applied to a state
in particular, but nationalism and concern for a particular state are not
quite identical. In ancient India and China nationalism was rather theoreti-
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cal. In Japanese nationalism, on the other hand, the particular state of
Japan came to be the sole standard upon which all judgments were based.
This, without doubt, has a close relation to the general tendency in Japa-
nese thinking, especially in the past, to overlook the universal and to lay
stress upon an exclusive human nexus. The natural basis for Japan's
exclusive concern for herself is, I believe, the insular position of Japan,
isolated from the Continent by water; there is also the historical fact that
Japan has known the existence of foreign nations only indirectly, as in the
cases of the Mongolian Invasion and World War II.
Certain feelings of apprehension may arise here. Some readers may
ask: Is not Japanese state-consciousness already a thing of the past? Is she
not being rapidly modernized? Has not the experience of defeat in World
War II brought the Japanese people to consider themselves as individuals
who can shape the future of their society, and participate in the sovereignty
of the State, rather than be merely "subjects" of the emperor? We are,
however, inclined to give only a tentative "yes" to these questions. For
although it is true that changes are being made rapidly in that direction, it
is also true ~hat it is no easy task for the Japanese to do away with their
traditional thinking. We must remember that the country is overflowing
with people. The network of tightly-formed village communities covers the
land. Many of them are rapidly becoming industrialized, and the villagers
now commute to factories of heavy industry, or move to the cities. The
nation's economy is such that the state must still exercise controls over a
large portion of individual life. Above all, since its antiquity the nation's
progress has always had its motivation in the Imperial Family, although it
is now not so powerful as before. Furthermore, we may say that the
Japanese sentiment toward the Imperial House has been friendly rather
than hostile and, as in some foreign countries, the ruling class has often
been benevolent in its dealings with the people.102 All in all we may say
that an atmosphere of family-like intimacy still pervades the country.
(Such a term as "family-state," for instance, would have been rejected by
Westerners, and even by the Indians, or the Chinese, as self-contradictory.
The Japanese, however, felt no inconsistency in the term, but found it
good and valid.) Now, after these considerations, would it really be possible
to put an end to the Japanese way of thinking about the state? This is not
a trait in which we can take pride before other nations, but, just as religion
was the basis of the ethical thinking of the Indians, and family the basis of
the practical morals of the Chinese, so the state was the basis of all thought
in the Japanese. The Indians will be Indians; the Chinese will be Chinese,
and we do not look down upon them or criticize them for it. The Japanese
way of thinking is undergoing a change, but their thinking is an historical
inheritance; it is a national cultural tradition. We feel that it is our part to
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see to it that this tradition never again gives rise to an inhuman ultra-
nationalism.
Absolute Devotion to a Speci~c Individual
Symbolic of the Human Nexus
The tendency to confine values to a limited human nexus reveals itself
in Japan in absolute devotion to a specific individual as a concrete symbol
of Japanese social values. The Japanese, unlike the Indians and Chinese,
prefer not to conceive of a human nexus in an abstract way. They are apt
rather to follow an individual as a living representative of that nexus. As I
have previously indicated, the "family" in ancient Japan was not an abstract
concept, but was embodied in the person of the living family head. There
is also a tendency to identify the shogun with the hakufu (shogunate
government), the Emperor with the State. In the feudalism of the West,
relations between lord and vassal were extremely complex, and the notion
of contract played an important part in such relations. In feudal Japan,
however, this relationship was a simple one; the vassal devoted his entire
existence to his lord. This gave rise to the motto "a loyal vassal does not
know two masters." This way of thinking, characteristic of Japanese society
in general, manifests itself among Japanese thinkers in an attitude of
absolute devotion and obedience to a specific individual.
Most Japanese thinkers of the past were either Buddhists or Confu-
cianists. Now, of course, religion is apt to base itself upon some authority.
However, Indian and Chinese thinkers do not rely on a specific individual,
but tend rather to establish and follow universal laws. Japanese thinkers,
on the contrary, were likely to disregard universal laws in favor of the
authority of a specific individual.
For some 700 years after the adoption of Buddhism, it was customary
for Buddhists to explain the doctrine and expound their theories in the
Chinese language. Japanese Buddhism, therefore, was in a sense an exten-
sion of Chinese Buddhism. This does not mean, however, that the Japanese
merely took over the universal teachings of Buddhism as it was practiced in
China at the time of adoption. Japanese scholar-monks received their
doctrines from one specific Chinese teacher, and that is precisely what they
wanted to do. Saint Dengyo (767-822), for example, wished to travel to
China so that he might discover the true significance of the Lotus Sutra
(Hokke-kyo). In his letter requesting admittance to China, he writes as
follows: "I have long regretted the absence of a commentary which would
explain the profound import of the Lotus Sutra. By good fortune I have
procured a copy of the excellent discourse of the T'ien t'ai sect. I have
studied it a number of years, but errors and omissions in the text make it
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impossible to grasp the nne points. If I do not receive instruction from a
master, then, even if I were to get (the meaning), I should be unable to
believe in it."lo3 Thus, he went to China, studied under Tao-sui (c. 800),
and returned to Japan.
The attitude of absolute devotion to a specincindividual became still
more pronounced in Kamakura Buddhism, which is especially representa-
tive of Japanese Buddhism. The Pure Land doctrine of Honen (1133-1212)
was based exclusively upon one master, Shan-tao (613-681). At the same
time Honen exalted the authority of the teacher. He says, "To view the
doctrine of the Pure Land without the aid of oral tradition is to lose sight of
one's share in the rebirth."lo4 Shinran (1173-1262), too, was absolutely
devoted to his master, Honen. "As far as I, Shinran, am concerned, the sole
reason I have faith is that a good man explained to me that in order to be
saved by Amida I had only to recite the invocations (nembutsu). I do not
know whether the nembutsu is actually the means to rebirth in the Pure
Land, or whether perhaps it is the road to Hell. Even though I were cajoled
by Saint Honen that I should go to Hell through the nembutsu, I should
do so and not regret it."lo5
Wishing to establish rationally the authority of his personal interpreta-
tion of Buddhism, Shinran makes the major premise of his reasoning rest
on the absolute authority of the teacher. "If the original view of Amida is
true, then the teachings of Sakyamuni are true, and the commentaries of
Shan-tao cannot be false; if the commentaries of Shan-tao are true, the
teachings of Honen cannot be false; if the teachings of Honen are true, how
would it be possible for me, Shinran, to utter a falsehood."lo6
This is cast in the form of a complex syllogism, but in each of the
component syllogisms there is a hidden premise, namely, "the word of a
disciple faithful to his teacher is as true as that of the teacher." Such a
proposition is very questionable. The Japanese, however, consider it per-
fectly natural. They even pass over it in silence as not requiring overt
explanation.
The watchword here is absolute docility before authority. This sort of
reasoning is substantially the same as that which produced the notion, a
few years back, that "the command of a superior is the command of the
Emperor." Apparently this authoritarian viewpoint is also found in other
oriental countries. Scholars and students of religion pretend that they have
inherited the orthodox doctrine from ancient time, and cite the genealogy
of their teachers to prove it. It appears, ho\yevcr, that in the other oriental
countries these thoughts were not expressed in the form of a sorites.
At any rate, Shinran himself had not the slightest thought of origi-
nating a new sect. His proposed aim was merely to elucidate the true
purport of his master Honen's teachings. "My master Genkii. (Honen),
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being well versed in Buddhism, took pity on common people, both good
and bad. He began to teach the doctrine of the true religion (shinshu) in
the provinces, and spread the chosen original vow (of Amida) throughout
this corrupt world."l07 By "true religion" Shinran refers to the Pure Land
sect (jodo-shu) of Honen, and not to the so-called True Pure Land sect
(jodo-shinshu).lOS The attitude of dependence upon the master was also
influential among the followers of Shinran. 'When I take council with
myself and consider in my fumbling way the past and the present, I must
regret the differences (that have sprung up) in the true faith as taught orally
by our master. I fear that future students will fall into an unbroken series
of errors, for, unless one is fortunate enough to be grounded upon knowl-
edge derived from the original source, how can he possibly gain entrance to
the Easy Way (Amidian nembutsu)? One's own insight of one's own
private views should in no wise be confounded with the doctrine of
Another's Strength (tariki).109 Therefore I shall note down here the gist of
the sayings of the late Saint Shinran, which remain in my mind. I hope
thereby to dissipate the doubts of my coreligionists."llo
This tendency is also apparent in Nichiren (1222-1282), who at-
tacked the Pure Land teachings. At the end of the scriptures of Mahayana
Buddhism, it is said that Siikyamuni entrusted the scriptures to various
persons, but according to Nichiren the true transmission of the Lotus
Siitra depended on blood relationship.11l Thus the true spirit of the Lotus
Siitra is revealed only by the specific person who had received its guardian-
ship. It is for this reason that Nichiren called himself the reincarnation of
the Bodhisattva Jogyo to whom the Lotus Sl1tra had been entrusted.1l2
It is especially Nichiren's conviction that he was a reincarnation of
Buddha which distinguishes him from the other Chinese and Japanese
who studied the Lotus Siitra. "I, Nichiren," he says, "am like the messenger
of the Bodhisattva Jogyo. . . . Indeed I teach this doctrine. . . . I feel
that I must be a reincarnation of the Bodhisattva JogyO."1l3
This differs considerably from the interpretation of the Lotus Siitra by
Chinese Buddhist commentators. Master T'ien-t'ai, for example, has this to
say on the subject: "Thus entrusting the siitras to innumerable Bodhisattvas
of the thousand universes, he had the siitra propagated in the sphere of the
cosmic body of Buddha. Is not this teaching far superior to that which
would have the siitras spread here and there by humble mortals? May the
substance of the Ten Spheres1l4 penetrate the different countries of the
earth, and may there be obtained the double advantage of darkness and
light."115
Elsewhere Master Chia-hsiang (549-023), at the beginning of his
interpretation of the 14th chapter of the Lotus Siitra, says: "This chapter,
like the llth, indicates that the ensemble of the Bodhisattvas emanating
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from the earth, should be taken as an expression of the cosmic body of the
Buddha."116
Whereas Chinese Buddhist commentators gave absolute value to the
absolute taken as a basic principle, in Japan, Nichiren attributed this
absolute authority to a specific person in certain particular circumstances.
Thus, to believe Nichiren, he himself had actually received, two
thousand years before, the store of the wisdom of the Buddha, which he
now in turn transmits to mankind. "On the 24th day of the second month
of the eleventh year of Bunei, on Mount Ryazen (Grdhrahipa) of the Pure
Land, Nichiren, to whom Buddha entrusted the store of the essential
verities, respectfully received priestly ordination."117 "More than 2000
years ago Nichiren, as chief of the Bodhisattvas of the thousand worlds
emerging out of the earth, received from the very mouth of the Buddha the
three great secret doctrines."1l8 In the Zen sect, too, Dagen (1200-1253),
for example, teaches absolute devotion to the master. "In order to embrace
Buddhism, one must abandon his own judgments of good and evil. Rather
must one follow the words and examples of our Buddhist predecessors,
regardless of god or evil. What one regards as good, either in his own
opinion or in that of other men, is not necessarily good. Therefore, heedless
of the world's gaze, and oblivious of one's own opinions, one should follow
the teachings of the Buddha."1l9 "We recognize immediately and instinc-
tively that such persons as Sakyamuni and Amida are Buddhas, for their
features are endowed with radiance and they are remarkable for their
preaching and their grace. If, however, a learned priest says that a toad or a
worm is the Buddha, then one must abandon ordinary knowledge and
believe that a toad or a worm is the Buddha. But if one seeks in the worm
the radiance of countenance or the various virtues with which the Buddha
is endowed, then one still has not modified his prejudices. One must
recognize as the Buddha only that which can be seen at a given moment.
Thus if one goes along modifying his prejudices in accordance with the
words of the master, one will naturally reach agreement. The scholars of
recent days, on the contrary, cling to their own prejudices and think that
the Buddha must be such and such, according to their private opinions. If
anything should differ from their opinion, they say that it cannot be so, but
wonder if it may be something similar to their own preconceived notions.
Thus in the main they are not devoted to the way of the Buddha."120
Then he explains that one should conform absolutely to the various
ascetic practices, precepts and rules of the Zen sect, because they represent
the continuous tradition of the past. "It is false to insist upon ascetic
practice as essential, believing thereby that one may reach enlightenment,
on the grounds that one should keep commandments and observe the fasts.
One observes such things because they are the routine of a monk and the
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customs of the house of the sons of Buddha. One should not necessarily say
that such things are essential because they are useful."121
For this reason, Dagen planned to establish rationally each of the rules
and doctrines of the Zen sect. However, he abandoned his plan before
completing it, and gave precedence to authority and tradition over rational
thought. For example, BuddhIsm recognizes four attitudes among the
various daily activities of mankind, namely, walking, standing, sitting, and
reclining. One speaks of "Zen," however, only in connection with the
sitting position. Explaining the reason for this, Dagen says: "It may be
asked, 'Why do the priests speak of meditation and enlightenment only in
connection with the sitting position?' and I answer, 'It is difficult to know
the way by which all the various Buddhas achieved enlightenment. If you
seek the reason, you must know that it is just because the priests employed
(this way). You should not question further. Our masters before us praised
sitting in meditation (Ulzen) as the gateway to bliss. This is why we know
that of the four attitudes sitting is the way to bliss. What is more, it was not
the practice of one or two Buddhas, but of all the Buddhas before us.' "122
Because of this deference to tradition, Bogen teaches that ascetics
shoulcl practice under the direction of an eminent teacher. "By practicing
asceticism in a group, one attains the Way. It is like boarding a boat
without knowing how to row. Since one trusts a good boatman, it makes no
difference whether one knows how to row; one gets to the other side. Thus
one should follow a good teacher and practice in a group. Then, since one
is not relying on one's own resources, one naturally attains the Way."123
However, the one who decides who is an "eminent teacher" is the
ascetic himself. The basis of this value judgment is the consciousness or
experience of universal law within the ascetic himself. It is a rational
consideration within the subjectivity of the ascetic which operates here.
Thus, when we analyze Dagen's advice to follow a good teacher without
regard for any further rational considerations, one ends up in a vicious
circle. Dagen, however, never touched upon this question. He simply
ordered that one was to devote himself absolutely to a venerated person.
It may be objected at this point that absolute devotion to a teacher is
merely one of the social phenomena of a feudal society and that we simply
have here a reflection of the feudal character in Dagen's attitude. This is,
perhaps, a plausible explanation, but I hesitate to dispose of the question so
Simply. One hardly finds, in the feudal societies of India or China, this
advocacy of absolute devotion to a specific person. One does, to be sure,
often come across the phrase "become intimate with a zenchishiki" in the
scriptures composed in India, but here zenchishiki is a translation of
kalyii,,!amitra which means "good friend" or "intimate friend." In Japan, on
the contrary, zenchishiki is taken in the sense of "religious teacher." It is
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the Japanese way of thinking which we find in this socia-hierarchical
interpretation. For the·Indians (and for most Chinese Buddhists) the "law"
in the religious sense was not something transmitted to the pupil by the
teacher as a specific individual, but rather something which the ascetic
himself mastered. Indians would never dream of making such a statement
as "I would not mind being cast into hell if I were led astray by Saint
Hanen." Thus this characteristic of the thought of Shinran and Dagen is
not attributed to traditional Indian or Chinese Buddhism, and it is, further-
more, difficult to attribute this attitude to feudalism in general.
In the case of Dagen, one cannot say that he acquired the character-
istic in question from his Chinese master Ju-ching (1163-1228). The latter,
in fact, teaches the opposite of Dagen. Ju-ching was very prone to heap
scorn on authority. He called Yuima (Vimalakirti, the wealthy gentleman)
a "bandit" and Lin-chi 0-867) an "ass"; of Bodhidharma's expression
"Nothing can be called holy," he says, "He himself created it, he himself
destroyed it." He even goes so far as to say, "To practice true Zen, one does
not think about the masters."124 Moreover, in keeping with the general
tendency of Chinese Zen Buddhism, he denies the authority of specific
doctrines. For example, he says, "Atop Mt. Grdhkraku!a, there are no
words of the Master; at the foot of Mt. Shaolin no mysteries are trans-
mitted."125 (Mt. Grdhraku!a is the place where the Buddha explained the
Lotus Sutra: Mt. Shaolin is the place where Bodhidharma sat for nine
years in meditation, facing a wall.) Dagen himself claims to have trans-
mitted very faithfully the teachings of his master Ju-ching, but the fact is
that Dagen opposes him when it comes to the question of the authority of
tradition.
One result of this absolute devotion to a specific person is that the
faithful of the various Japanese sects are extreme in the veneration with
which they acknowledge the founder of the sect and perform religious
ceremonies around him as the nucleus. One has absolute faith in the
master as well as in the Buddha, without feeling that there is the slightest
contradiction. It is not that one pays less attention to the Buddha, but the
idea is perhaps that a profound faith in the master and devotion to the
Buddha have the same significance.126
The Japanese then exhibit an attitude of complete devotion to a
specific person-the emperor, the feudal lord, the superior, the boss. In the
field of religion this attitude appears in the manner we have just outlined.
One may say that a similar religious attitude is present in other countries.
The attitude of the medieval Catholics toward the saints or that of the
Hindu toward the guru are two instances. In these cases, however, the
religious qualities of the various saints are revered; the question of gene-
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alogy barely comes up. Japan differs from these other countries in the great
importance attached to genealogy.
This attitude, aided by the Japanese tendency to emphasize blood
relationship, is responsible for the veneration of the founder in the True
Pure Land sect. As this sect develops, this attitude becomes more and more
conspicuous. Already in the Gaijasho (Correction of Heresy) of Kakunyo
(1270-1351), there appears the tendency to venerate a living monk as if he
were Amitabha. Kakunyo himself appears to consider himself "the pure
stream of Buddha's incarnation."127 The tendency becomes still stronger
when there develops an intense veneration of the chief abbot as the
concrete individual leader of the Honganji order. Indeed the order main-
tains itself and develops around this veneration of the abbot. Intellectual
comprehension of doctrine is neglected. Thus the Honganji order itself
prohibited the faithful from reading the Tannisho, that frank and clear
exposition of the essence of the True Pure Land faith. The order openly
preached faith in the chief abbot as the principal consideration.
Not only is there no relation between the teachings of Shinran, as
they affect the conscience of the ordinary mortal, and this devotion to the
abbot which makes a specific person an absolute, but indeed the two are
logically contradictory. Although Luther preached a faith very similar to
that of Shinran, nobody in Germany ever thought of venerating the de-
scendants of Luther. In Japan, however, such a religious peculiarity did
develop, and this tendency, moreover, still persists in modern times. It can
be seen in certain sectarian divisions of Shintoism which have flourished
since the beginning of the Meiji era.
We must recognize that we are dealing with an attitude which is
deeply rooted in the traditional habits of the Japanese people. This sort of
socio-religious phenomenon did not appear in India or China. Sectarianism
does occur in India and China, but the sects for the most part emphasize
SOme universal law. The consciousness of the founder of the sect is often
vague, and veneration of the founder hardly existed in antiquity. Needless
to say, nothing comparable to the veneration of the chief abbot had ever
arisen, except in sectarian Hinduism.
The attitude of absolute devotion to a specific person manifests itself
as a sublimated attitude of complete devotion to the Buddha as an ideal
person, and thus faith in Buddha is emphasized.
In this connection the Japanese Pure Land sect shows a remarkable
development and lays much stress on the purity of faith. This sect esteems
the 18th of the 48 vows of Amitabha, which, it teaches, must be believed
with all one's heart. Honen did not believe with traditional Buddhism that
the individual ascetic could obtain salvation through his own practices; but
i
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maintained that one would be delivered through faith in Amitabha and
reliance on his vow. Among the disciples of Honen, Jokakubo Kosai (c.
1250), although regarded as a heretic for having preached the efficacy of a
single utterance of the Buddha's name (nembutsu), placed special emphasis
upon faith in Buddha. "The believer is reborn there (the Pure Land) only
by virtue of the vow (of Amida), and not through his own efforts. The
reason is that the sinful mortal, burdened as he is by worldly distraction, is
separated by an abyss from the Pure Land. But, relying on the vow of the
Buddha, he will at once succeed."128
Then with the evolution of the True Pure Land sect, the significance
of faith came more and more to be stressed. 'To be reborn in the Pure Land,
one must have faith above all and not concern himself with anything else.
A matter of such magnitude as rebirth in Pure Land cannot be arranged by
the ordinary mortal. He must yield absolutely to the Buddha."129
In the Chinese T'ien t'ai sect, Buddhism was generally considered
under three aspects: doctrine, practice, and illumination.130 The Tendai
sect in Japan also accepted this point of view.l3l The doctrine of the True
Pure Lanq sect is an off-shoot of this essential Tendai doctrine. For this
reason the basic scripture of the True Pure Land sect is called Kenjodo-
shinjitsu Kyogyosho monrui (abbreviated title, Kyogyoshinsho/32 Kyogyo-
sho-doctrine, practice, enlightenment or illumination). In the short title
the shin, "faith," is added. That the word faith is absent from the complete
title is due to the relationship with the old Tendai doctrine. However, in
the book itself, faith is the principal matter considered. In Buddhism as a
whole, after "faith" has been affirmed, one devotes himself to "practice";
while in the True Pure Land sect, the two are identical: faith accom-
panied by practice, and practice accompanied by faith. The believing heart
is the "true heart." In this way faith comes to stand at the very center of
Buddhism. Shinran, consequently, tends to regard a skeptic or one who
relies upon his own resources as more despicable than a great sinner.
Rennyo (1415-1499), who popularized the True Pure Land sect, expresses
absolute devotion to Amitabha in terms which still more call to mind
human relationships. The use of such expressions as "rely upon" and "help
me!" seem to date from Rennyo. Such expressions appeal to popular senti-
ment.
That the Japanese Pure Land sect emphasizes faith and esteems the
18th of the 48 vows of Amida, i.e. the. vow which exalts faith, is a
peculiarly Japanese phenomenon, completely different from the case of the
Pure Land sect in China. Yang Jen-shan (1837-191 I), the promoter of the
Buddhist revival in modern China, criticized the exclusive emphasis on
the 18th vow characteristic of the Japanese True Pure Land sect. He main-
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tains that this is an affront to Amitabha, for each and everyone of the
48vows is true.133
Here a problem arises. It is natural that the Pure Land sects, which
preach absolute dependence upon another's strength, should emphasize
faith in a specific individual or in Buddha. However, this should not be
true of the Zen sect, which maintains a contrary (doctrinal) position.
Nonetheless, Dagen does emphasize the significance of faith just as do
the partisans of Pure Land Buddhism. The very name, Dagen, comes from
Volume XIV of the Chinese translation of the Avatamsaka-sutra, which
reads: "Faith is the origin of the Way (dogen), the mother of virtue; it
nourishes all the various good practices."134 "Therefore it is said, 'Faith
permits us to enter into the great sea of the Buddha-law.' The actuality of
faith is the actuality of the Buddha himself."135 Without faith it is difficult
to achieve perfection in the practice of Buddhism. "One may teach a man
who has not faith, but it is difficult for such a one to accept the teach-
ing."136 According to Dagen, rather than achieve enlightenment through
one's ascetic practices, one should, in the final analysis, have absolute
devotion to the Buddha as an ideal person, and be saved by him. It is better
to rely upon "another's strength" than upon one's Own. "One detaches
himself from his body and mind and flings himself into the house of the
Buddha, there to be activated by the Buddha and follow in his footsteps.
Then, without effort, physical or mental, of one's own, one escapes the
cycle of rebirth and becomes a buddha."131
Dagen's teaching in this regard is the exact opposite of that of the Zen
sect in China (or at least of its principal representatives). Chinese Zen
priests are continually pointing out that illumination is achieved through
one's own efforts. Hui-hai (550-686) says: "This you should know: sen-
tient beings save themselves; Buddha cannot save them. Strive hard! Strive
hard! Perfect yourselves, and depend not upon the Buddha. In scripture it
says, he who seeks the law does not seek it in the Buddha."138 In other
words, one must not rely even upon the Buddha. Nonetheless, Dagen fer-
vently depends upon Buddha's strength. The following is Dagen's prayer:
"Even if my past sins are piled high and there are obstacles to my enlighten-
ment, I beg all the Buddhas and Boddhisattvas who have achieved perfec-
tion through the way of Buddha to take pity on me, deliver me from the
chains of Karma, remove the impediments to my enlightenment. May their
virtue fill and embrace the infinite world of the Buddha-law. May they ex-
tend to me their pity."139
In the Chinese Zen sect, faith is merely the portal of Buddhism.
Therefore one must not become attached to the Buddha. Thus, the Chinese
Zen monk Tan-hsia 0-834) in order to combat the deplorable tendency to
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become over-attached to an image of Buddha and regard it as the Buddha
himself, burned a wooden statue of the Buddha as firewood.140 This story is
highly lauded by Chinese devotees of Zen. To the Japanese, however, it is
outrageous. Dagen teaches, "A clay, wood, or plaster image of Buddha,
however poorly done, should be venerated. A scroll of scripture, no matter
how battered, should be respected. A priest, even if he be a hardened
sinner, should be respected for his sacerdotal character. If one respects
these with faith in his heart, he is surely blessed. If one is disrespectful of a
priest because he is a hardened sinner, a statue because it is poorly done, a
copy of the sutras because it is battered, then he certainly commits a sin.
For according to the Buddha's teaching, the statue, the scroll of scripture,
and the priest contribute to the happiness of men and gods. Therefore, one
certainly profits by respecting them. One who treats them without faith is
guilty of sin."141 Yet when Dagen is asked why Tan-hsia burned the
wooden Buddha, he explains, ''That was a common means of preaching the
Law." Even Shasan Suzuki (I57~I655), a Zen priest who had many
ideas worthy of comparison with those of modern Western thought, con-
demns as :'the height of immorality" the notion that "A wooden statue is
nothing but wood, and an icon is merely a few strokes of the brush; there
is nothing sacred in them."142 He teaches: "Being born among men and
hearing the teaching of the Buddha, one should be happy to represent the
sacred form in painting and in sculpture and place them in a pagoda or
temple to worship. Then, with the thought that the Buddha is actually in
the world among us, we should offer our lives in homage. If our faith is
not strong enough to make us willing to offer our lives, then there is no
merit in it."143
There is also a strong emphasis on faith in the Nichiren sect. Accord-
ing to Nichiren, philosophical comprehension is not necessary for salvation.
A robust faith is sufficient. "The Buddha, setting aside the keeping of the
commandments and contemplation, addressed himself to the intelligence
alone. If intelligence is lacking, faith makes up for it. The single word
'faith' is a pillar of truth. Lack of faith is the root of disrespect for the Law;
faith is the cause of intelligence. . . ."144 "For the man of superior gifts,
study and contemplation are suitable. For the less gifted, faith alone is
important." "He who understands the doctrines yet does not believe cannot
become a buddha. He who believes, although he does not comprehend,
can become a buddha."145 "The root of the Law of Buddha is faith."146 Thus
we can say that Nichiren, in this regard, is in agreement with the views of
Shinran and Dagen. We likewise recognize here one of the characteristics
which differentiates the Nichiren sect from the Tendai sect to which it
owes its origin.
It is not only the new Kamakura sects which place this emphasis upon
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faith. The Indian or Chinese sects transplanted to Japan also preached
faith in the Buddha. The Ritsu sect, for example, attempted to observe in
Japan the precepts of traditional, conservative Indian Buddhism. In these
precepts, there is no mention of a cult of the image of the Buddha, yet in
the Ritsu temples in Japan, images of the Buddha were erected and
siitras recited before them.u7 Even the Tendai and Kegon philosophies,
high points of Chinese Mahayana philosophy, had to accept faith as
their basis, once they became acclimatized in Japan. Thus, in the
Tendai sect, Ennin (792-862), emphasizing the importance of faith, says:
"To enter into the sacred mysteries, one must go by the direct road of faith.
He who has not faith is like a man without hands who, though he gain
entry to the treasure room, can take nothing."uB This emphasis on faith is
one of the criteria by which Japanese Esoteric Tendai (Taimitsu) can be
distinguished from the Chinese T'ien-t'ai sect. And a similar change in the
concept of faith can be observed, though it is not so remarkable in this case,
in the Shingon sect. Master Kogyo (1°95-1143) emphasized "the innocent
acceptance of faith," saying that it is by far superior to the preparatory
practice which appeals to intellectual power in order to follow what the
scriptures teach.
Further, as regards the Kegon sect, Saint My6e (alias Koben,
1173-1232) says: "Knowledge without faith is not only not in accordance
with the Law of Buddha, but is actually inimical to it. Wisdom will be
founded upon faith."u9 This is a complete reversal of the rationalist posi-
tion of Kegon philosophy.
In general, Indian religions and Chinese Buddhism are contemplative,
focused on the vision of truth. In such religious, faith is merely the first
step toward entering the innermost recesses of the religion. It is simply
preparatory. However, when these sects were introduced into Japan, faith
came to be recognized as the very essence of religion. Therefore, Japanese
Buddhism is, above all, a Buddhism centering around faith. The Japanese
emphasize purity of faith. (Even the Zen sect, in which faith is compara-
tively less esteemed, exhibits this trend in Japan.) This faith is of two
kinds: (I) faith in a certain real person (founder, teacher); (2) faith in an
ideal person (a specific Buddha or Bodhisattva). In practice, however, both
appear so commingled that it is difficult to differentiate them. In either case
the focus is on a specific individual.
The following criticism is offered by Enjo Inaba apropos of these
differences between Chinese and Japanese Buddhism: "The defect of Chi-
nese Buddhist thought is the acceptance, as its guiding religious principle,
of an abstract 'law' such as a truth or a law divorced from the concrete
'person.' Buddhism, as a religion which is the life and strength of all men,
certainly cannot center around such a law of truth. Only when this law is
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embodied in a person of flesh and blood can it be beneficial to us human
beings. . . . It is nonsensical for a religion whose worship is directed to a
law to demand religious fervor. Only by absolute devotion to a person can
one savor the joy of prostrating oneself in reverent worship and of praying
with all one's heart."15o
Dr. Ryotai Hatani (1883-) has offered the following characteristics of
Japanese Buddhism: "In India and China, the speculative and practical
sides of Buddhism were fully developed. However, the aspect of faith,
which is the life of a religion, was never completely developed in India and
China. Only in Japan has this aspect of Buddhism been fully explored.
Japan had nothing particularly new to add to the speculative and practical
aspects of Buddhism as developed in India and China. Japan's special
contributions were in the field of faith."151
Japanese Buddhism does indeed exhibit the characteristics pointed out
by Inaba and Hatani. However, the assertion that the "very soul of Bud-
dhism" appears for the first time in Japan, and not in China and India,
requires some further comment. Faith as it is understood by the Japanese is
not a cOIlJ.plete faith in the view of Indian Buddhists, but merely the
gateway to faith. Compare, for example, the following passage of a siitra:
"Oh, good man! There are two kinds of faith. The first is 'simple faith'
(reliance), the second is 'seeking.' A man may have simple faith, yet be
unable to aspire; therefore his is insufficient faith. There are two further
categories of faith. The first arises from hearing the teaching, the second
from contemplation. A man whose faith is based on hearing the teaching
and not on contemplation, has insufficient faith."152
The Indian concept of faith is extremely intellectual. Therefore,
simple faith is of little significance, but an intelligent faith is of great value.
Thus the criterion of the weight given to faith changed completely in the
passage of Buddhism from India to Japan. Faith in Japanese Buddhism,
then, is essentially faith in a specific person, ideal or real. In Indian
Buddhism, on the contrary, it is devotion to a universal law. The traditional
view of Indian Buddhism was "depend upon the law, not upon man."153 In
Japan, however, the exact opposite was followed. Related to this view is the
Indian and Chinese tendency to venerate the Buddha as an embodiment of
eternal law, whereas the Japanese tend to worship the Buddha as the
person who achieved all the ideal virtues through his ascetic practices.
Broadly speaking, emphasis on faith appeared even in Indian Bud-
dhism shortly before the Christian era, as it did also successively in Hindu-
ism and Jainism in roughly the same period. Thus they developed along
with the Western religion which emphasizes faith. It is a Japanese peculi-
arity that a specific person should be made the object of faith. With
reference to this last point, there is some resemblance between Japanese
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faith and certain faiths in Western religion. For example, the faith of
Shinran and that of Saint Paul appear very similar. In Saint Paul, however,
there is an absolute distinction between God and man. Man always assumes
a pious and prayerful attitude toward God, and begs his forgiveness. For
Shinran, however, there is no gulf between Arnida and the ordinary
mortal. The sinful mortal will be saved through the mercy of Amida. If he
repeats nembutsu, it is an expression of his joy and gratitude that he is
saved by the great mercy of this Buddha. And an authentic master who
understands the true meaning of nembutsu never utters it as a prayer.
Whether it is about a secular matter or a religious one, he rejects any
supplicating attitude toward him for the reason that supplication is not
what this Buddha of the great vows wishes.
Generally speaking, the Japanese who devote themselves whole-
heartedly to their religious teachers are inclined to assume an attitude of
total submission to authority in other forms. In the first place, it can be
clearly observed in their attitude to the scriptures. The Chinese Buddhists
claim that it is not sufficient only to accept blindly what is said in the
scriptures unless one tries to seek after truth by oneself with the help of
those holy books.154 The Japanese Buddhists, on the other hand, hold the
authority of the scriptures as absolute and inviolable. And in the case of
China, the number of the Kyo-shu (the sects established on the authority of
specific sutras) is almost equal to that of the Ron-shu (the sects based on
particular Abhidharma treatises). But in Japan, especially after the Heian
period (794-857), almost all the Buddhist sects, except for the Zen sect
which claims not to rely upon any particular canon, are in the Kyo-
shu in the sense that each one of them regards a particular sutra as absolute
authority.
When he introduced the doctrines of the Chinese T'ien-t'ai sect into
Japan, Saint Dengyo (Saich6), whom we can properly call the first founder
of Japanese Buddhism, strongly emphasized the fact that the sect pay
special regard to the Lotus Sutra. Such an emphasis on scriptural authority
is one of the unique features of Dengy6 that distinguished him from such
Chinese teachers of the T'ien-t'ai sect as Master T'ien-t'ai or Master
Miao-Io.155
In the Kamakura period, Shinran wrote his chief work Kyo-gyo-
shin-shoo The full title of this work is Ken-jodo-shinjitsu-kyo-gyo-sho-
monrui or "an anthology of the scriptural passages teaching the true doc-
trine, practice, and illumination of the Pure Land." As the title of this book
indicates to us, Shinran claimed authenticity for his teaching for the reason
that his faith was based on the authority of the scriptural statements.
In the case of Nichiren, too, he tried in his abundant works to
demonstrate theologically, on the basis of numerous scriptural statements,
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that the diffusion of the Lotus Sutra in Japan at the very time that
Nichiren lived is in keeping with the true intention of the Buddha. The
philosophical system of Nichiren's theology is founded solely upon the
Tendai doctrine of Ichinen-sanzen (the doctrine that teaches that all of the
three thousand spheres of existence of living creatures are embraced in one
thought). And as to another important doctrine of the Tendai theology
which Nichiren relied upon to establish his own, "kyo-gyo-sho" or "doc-
trine, practice, and illumination," the following is asserted among his
followers and is approved as authentic by the doctrinal authority of the
Nichiren sect: "While the Chinese Master T'ien-t'ai and his Japa-
nese successor Saint Dengya both paid special regards to "practice" and
"illumination" encouraging the exercise of meditation with a pacified and
concentrated mind, Nichiren emphasized the importance of 'doctrine' as
preceding the other twO."156 Generally speaking, the Japanese Buddhists
were busy in demonstrating their authenticity on the basis of scriptural
authority, and seldom sought to establish a grand philosophical system of
their own creation.
Even t~e Zen sect, which had claimed it was originally free from any
fixed traditional doctrine, was transformed in Japan into one that is sensi-
tive to authority. It is worthy of note that Eisai, the introducer of the
Rinzai Zen to Japan in 1191, thought that the inauguration of the Zen sect
in Japan would cause no infringement upon the faithful observance of "the
ancestral way of Mt. Hiei" or of the traditional theology of the Tendai
sect.151 In his masterpiece Kozen-gokoku-ron (Treatise for the Spread of
Zen and the Protection of the Country), he made many quotations from
various Mahayana sutras. Especially the Yuima-kyo (the Vimalak'irtinir-
deSa-sutra, on a wealthy gentleman) and the Kongo-kyo (the Vajracche-
dikii-prajiiiipiiramitii-sutra, the Diamond Sutra) were his favorite scrip'
tures. In the final analysis, Eisai was not an exception. He, too, recognized
scriptural statement to be the absolute authority, and for verification he
went to the scriptures.
The attitude of reliance on scriptural authority is more manifestly
observed in the case of Dagen. At the time of the Sung Dynasty, almost all
Chinese Buddhists were adherents of the Zen teaching. And they attached
little significance to the sutras claiming themselves not to be slaves to
books. Dagen, however, called those Chinese Buddhists "the followers of
the masters who missed the right course" and denounced them. He said as
follows: "Recently in Sung [China], there are many who presume to be the
Ch'an-shih or the masters of Zen.... Those people are too stupid to take
in the profound meaning of the sutras. Ignoring their own faults, they
abuse unduly the sutras and never study them."15s Dagen emphasized the
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absolute value of the scriptures. According to him, the true intention of the
Buddha can be found only in the sutras. Since the earliest times, the
Indian Buddhists held that the teaching of the Buddha consists of twelve
portions. Following this view, Dagen expounded it as follows: "One who
sees the Doctrine of the Twelve Portions is a man who finds the Buddhist
masters. One who accepts the Buddhist masters is a man who accepts the
Doctrine of the Twelve Portions." Or in another part of the same work, he
said, "The Three Vehicles and the Doctrine of the Twelve Portions form
the core of the teaching of the Buddhist masters. Without understanding
them, who can rightly call himself the descendant of the Buddhist masters?
Without that understanding how can the true essence of the teaching of
the Buddhist masters be properly transmitted from one master to
another?"159 It is natural that Dagen encouraged the study of the siitras. He
said, "An ascetic, whether he is an independent ascetic or only a beginner,
should never fail to keep the siitras with the intention of becoming a son of
the Buddha,"16o or "An uninitiated ascetic, whether he has any distinct
intention to follow the Buddha or not, should read and study the scriptures
scrupulously."161 The Chinese Zen monks paid so little regard to the
scriptures that one of them dared to say, "The siitras are good as toilet
paper."162 This Chinese attitude toward the scriptures presents a sharp
contrast to the attitude of Dagen.
From of old, "kyo-ge-betsu-den" (teaching transmitted without scrip-
tures) is one of the fundamental principles of the Zen sect. It means that
the essence of the Zen doctrine introduced to China by Bodhidharma
should be transmitted intuitively from the heart of the master to that of the
initiated without relying upon speech or writing. And its meaning is the
same as what is signified by the expression "non-reliance on letters."
Dagen's method of teaching, as we have seen above, is undeniably in-
consistent with this orthodox standpoint of the Zen sect. Since he be-
lieved in absolute obedience to traditional authority, he could not ignore
the old principle of "kyo-ge-betsu-den," and as a desperate measure, he
made a perverted interpretation of this principle.163 According to him,
the word "kyo (doctrine)" designates the Buddhist teaching introduced
by Kasyapa Matanga and Dharmarak~a to China for the first time in
67 A.D. in the days of the Later Han Dynasty. And "betsu-den (different
transmission)" means the Buddhist teaching bought newly by Bodhidharma
apart from ("ge") the former one. The principle originally meant the
impossibility of expressing the absolute religious truth by means of speech
Or writing. But this old principle was thoroughly transformed in the hands
of Dagen to mean that the absolute truth is transmissible only by oral or
literal teaching based on the authority of the authentic tradition. Thus, the
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principle established primarily in China of refusing acceptance of the
authority of any specific doctrine was brought to Japan and changed to
mean absolute obedience to it.
As a result of his special regard for authority, Dagen sometimes went
to extremes to repulse the rationalism that forms one of the unique charac-
teristics of the Chinese Zen sect. One of the traditional principles of the
Zen sect teaches kensho-jyobutsu, which means that a man can achieve
NirvaI)a with penetrating insight into the inner nature of his existence.
Dagen made a frontal attack upon this traditional view.. He said: "The
essence of Buddhism is not in kensho or the intuitive grasp of innate
human nature. Among the Seven Buddhas and the Twenty-eight Masters
of the Zen sect in India and Central Asia, who advocated such a view?
Indeed, in the Dan-gyo (which claims itself unduly to be the work of the
sixth patriarch of the Zen Buddhism) the word kensho is found. But, this
work is a forgery; None of the five Indian successors of the Buddha's
teaching wrote this siitra, nor did the sixth patriarch. None of the followers
of the Buddha's teaching have regarded it as a suitable authority to rely
upon."164
While Dagen respected the authority of the masters as well as of the
scriptures, Nichiren did not pay particular regard to the authority of the
masters. He was a man who concerned himself with the culling of a
reliable doctrine from the various teachings of the diversified and at times
contradictory Buddhist sects which existed at that time. He called himself
"one who has sought the Buddha's teaching without the aid of parents or
masters." What ruled his selection finally was not a philosophical considera-
tion but his belief in the authority of a siitra. Having found in the fifth
volume of the Lotus Sutra the following statement: "This Lotus Sutra, the
secret treasury of all the Buddhas and the Tathagatas, stands the highest of
all among the sutras," Nichiren believed it and developed his unique
theology on the authority of this sutra.165 Thus, Nichiren submitted himself
unconditionally to scriptural authority. In one of his letters, he wrote: "It is
of no use to try to overwhelm me with worldly authority; just show me the
proper scriptural statement to verify your point."ls6
In India, many sutras were forged with the title of "the Buddha's own
teaching." The number of such spurious writings is by no means less in
China. But, in Japan, few such works were made. One of the probable
reasons for this is that special honor is paid in this country to the authority
of the sutras. This respect for the scriptures, however, did not necessarily
lead the Japanese to the ardent study of what those sutras teach. On the
contrary, the Japanese condensed the sutras into some simple symbolic
representations and regarded these symbolic formulae as absolute and
inviolable.
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The obedient Japanese attitude toward the regulations that tradition
imposes upon it can also be observed in the field of Japanese Buddhist art.
The Chinese sculptors, disregarding the iconographic prescriptions estab-
lished by the Indians, made statues of the Buddhas, by following freely
their own imagination. The Japanese artists, on the other hand, adhered
faithfully to the Indian prescriptions that they came to know through the
books imported from China at the time of the Tang Dynasty.
Those features that we have referred to in our study of the Japanese
way of adopting Buddhism can be observed similarly in their reaction to
Confucianism or Chinese thought in general. The Japanese were very
much surprised to learn for the first time that the Chinese civilization was
far superior to their own. Everything imported from China was an object
of their admiration. They were overwhelmed by the splendor of the Chi-
nese civilization to such a degree that they were inclined to accept all
things Chinese without due criticism. Their inferior cultural standard did
not allow them to assume a critical attitude toward the Chinese civilization.
They believed any statement contained in Chinese books to be absolutely
true, authentic, and infallible. They adopted Chinese letters and concepts
and tried to interpret conditions in their own country by following these
Chinese principles. They did not consider whether or not these Chinese
principles would be appropriate for the explanation of the social conditions
of Japan or of their own thought and life. And as a result, adopting the
Chinese classification of the divinities into two groups, gods of heaven and
gods of earth, the Japanese sorted out their own objects of worship, kami,
into the same two categories. In another case, regarding their tenno (liter-
ally, Heaven-Emperor) in the same light as the Chinese Emperor, they
borrowed from the Chinese the idea that the Imperial dignity is conferred
by heaven.167
As a result of such a blind acceptance of Chinese civilization, it is
natural that "the way of the ancient sages" played the role of absolute
authority among the Japanese Confucianists. Though the critical studies of
the classical works of Confucianism were started in Japan in the early years
of the modern age, even the most radical mind in this field, Sorai Ogyii
(1666-1718), advocated "the way of the ancient sage-kings" as the highest
moral principle. In one of his books, he wrote: "To say nothing of the
ancient sage-kings, those who would work for the benefit of the people and
save them from miseries should also be called 'good.' For they do what the
people long for. The way of the ancient sage-kings is the highest good.
Under the sun, there is no principle more excellent than this one. 'The
highest good' is, therefore, the word to praise the way of the ancient
sage-kingS."168
And we can find the Japanese inclination of total submission to
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specific masters also in the case of the Confucianists. For instance, Ansai
Yamazaki (1618-1682) admired Chu-hsi (1130-1200) so enthusiastically
that he tried to propagate the latter's teaching with a missionary zeal. He
even went so far as to declare, "If I fall into error studying Chu Hsi, I shall
be in error with Chu Hsi and shall have nothing to regret."169 These words
of Yamazaki remind us of Shinran's wholehearted devotion to Honen.
The attitude of absolute devotion to authority can be observed even
among the nationalistic scholars of the Japanese classics who rejected both
Buddhism and Confucianism. For Norinaga Motoori (1730-1801), science
is nothing other than the study of "the way of the past." He said: "A scholar
should confine himself in the field of study only to reveal the way. He
should not try to carry it into practice at his own discretion. But, he should
study well the way of the past, teach the result of his study to others, take
notes of it in book form, and wait for the opportunity, though it is not
known whether such an opportunity will arise five hundred years or a
thousand years later, when the authorities adopt it in their ruling policies
and carry it out throughout the country."170 Though the study of the
national clas~ics in the Tokugawa period was a field of science newly risen
at that time, still it was not free from the trend toward over-attachment to
the authority of the specific masters. It will be enough for this account only
to mention the naive devotion of Norinaga Motoori to his master Kama
Mabuchi or the case of Atsutane Hirata (1776-1842) who on every occasion
claimed himself to be a disciple of Norinaga. (It is doubtful whether Hirata
actually received the instruction of Motoori.)
The attitude of absolute submission to a specific person is one of the
distinct features of the way of thinking that can be commonly observed
among the Japanese of the past. And, as we can see in the warrior's motto
"a loyal vassal does not know two masters" or in the code of "morals" even
among gamblers, the actual mores of most Japanese people reflect this
feature of their way of thinking. As we have seen above, this can be by no
means treated simply as a social phenomenon of a feudal society.
The attitude of total submission to a specific authority is not restricted
to the Japanese of the past, but can still be clearly observed among contem-
porary Japanese. Even in those self-styled "progressives" who are very
severe toward conventional ideas, this trend is tenaciously adhered to. One
reason for this is that the Japanese are always sensitive to efforts to establish
compact relations among the individuals within a small closed community.
This endeavor for mutual relationship serves to create a sense of unity and
sympathy among the Japanese. But, at the same time, it sometimes leads
them to accept blindly the principle of authority at the expense of indi-
viduality.17l
Although not an exhaustive study, my discussion opens a way, I hope,
rHE TENDENCY TO EMPHASIZE A LIMITED SOCIAL NEXUS
to a deeper understanding of the great influence which leaders, especially
religious leaders, have had on the Japanese people in the past and are still
having in the present. The figure of the kyoso (founder or foundress) of
modern religious movements is one instance of the fascination which a
certain type of man or woman can have for the masses.
Emperor Worship
The Japanese way of thinking, which pays the highest respect to some
particular living person and at the same time bows down to hierarchical
distinctions of social status, culminates in ascribing absolutely divine attrib-
utes to the individual at the top of the hierarchy of Japanese society.l12
Emperor worship is thus established. Emperor worship, however, is not the
only product of this tendency of thought. At times shoguns or their ances-
tors were recognized as having a claim to divine authority. For example, in
the Tokugawa period, Ieyasu Tokugawa (1542-1616), the founder of the
Shogunate Government, was given the appellation "tosho daigongen" (liter-
ally, "great incarnate Deity of the eastern light"), and was referred to often
as "Gongen-sama" ("The Incarnate God"). At the same time the Dutch
referred to the Tokugawa Shogun as the "Kaiser." Therefore we ought to
treat Emperor worship and Shogun worship as a single tendency, examin-
ing it first as ruler worship (Kaiserkultus) and subsequently examining it
in the special sense of Emperor worship. But while an account following
such a course would be logically most satisfactory, because of limitations of
space we shall now merely make a few remarks about Emperor worship
itself.
When the attitude of absolute loyalty to a particular person, which we
have already described, is directed toward the head of the state, it becomes
Emperor worship. After the Meiji Restoration and until the defeat in the
recent war, the attitude of absolute self-sacrifice, which in the feudal era
had been directed toward the feudal lords, was redirected toward the
Emperor. "The spirit of bushido, which has been developed by the warrior
class over a long time,"173 Yaichi Haga (1867-1927) said rightly in 1907,
''has now come to be directed solely toward the imperial throne."
The Japanese comment has even been made that Louis XIV's remark,
"L'Etat, c'est moi" ("I am the State"), "is a statement which could most
appropriately have been uttered by the Emperor of our own country."174
The statement, "The kingdom is nothing but the king,"175 is found in the
most famous of ancient Indian political treatises; but among the Indians no
such custom as Emperor worship ever arose to any striking extent. It goes
without saying that ultra-nationalism developed in close relation with the
worship of the Emperor as a living god. In fact, Emperor worship has been
-
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the most influential form of belief in Japan up to 1945; and even today
after the defeat, the Emperor holds his position by virtue of his significance
as a symbol of the unity of the Japanese nation. The Japanese like to see in
the Emperor as a living individual a condensed representation of the
Japanese nation. Although this is not a phenomenon which is unknown to
other nationalities, it has a special significance in Japan. In this matter
Yaichi Haga has remarked: "There is a golden image of the goddess
Germania at the top of a triumphal tower many feet high at the end of the
Siegesallee in Berlin. The goddess was intentionally created as an imagi-
nary person and designated 'Germania' to represent the German state. And
in England in like manner an imaginary person called 'Britannia' has been
fashioned, and in France one called 'Gallia.' In foreign countries where the
form of government has often changed, or where one royal house fre-
quently succeeds another, such artificial symbols are naturally devised from
the need to cause people to think of their past history and to cultivate the
concept of the nation. Only in our country have the soil of the nation and
the Imperial House been inseparable since the age of the gods. The
expressions :ror country' and 'for ruler' are to be understood as having the
same meaning." Whether the Emperor is to be thought of as simply
equivalent to the state, or is to be interpreted as a symbol of national unity,
the Emperor-institution is a thing unique to Japan, for it must be noted
that it is not to be found among other peoples. Not concerning myself here
with the problem of the political and economic basis of the Emperor
institution, I should like to examine the question how Emperor worship
has directly molded the way of thinking of the entire Japanese people.
Such a tendency of thought did not appear suddenly after the Meiji
restoration (1868); on the contrary, an incipient tendency of this kind had
existed since ancient times. According to the tales of the gods in the Kojiki
(Record of Ancient Matters), after the heavens and the earth were sepa-
rated, the two divinities Izanami (Female) and Izan~gi (Male) descended
to the island of Onokoro, and then gave birth to the various islands of
Oyashima (i.e. the territory of Japan). After that they gave birth to various
other divinities; the gods of the wind, of trees and mountains were born,
and at the end the goddess (lzanami) died from burns, because she gave
birth to the god of fire. Thereupon, the god (lzanagi) wanted to meet his
spouse, and went to the land of night and saw her. Then, after returning to
this world, when he washed the filth (of the land of death from himself),
from his eyes and nose were born the three divinities Amaterasu Omikami
(Sun Goddess), Tsukiyomi no Mikoto, and Susana no Mikoto. It is said
that this Amaterasu Omikami was the ancestor of the Imperial House.176 In
this way the legend of the ancestors of the royal house is connected with
the legend of the creation of the universe. This account is without parallel
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among other nations. At least among other civilized people of the East
these two types of legends-political and cosmogonic-generally are
separated. Thus, the divine authority of the Imperial House is enhanced by
the fact that its lineage is connected with the legend of the creation of
heaven and earth.
Further, in the older language, the word oyake ("public") originally
had the sense of "the principal family,"177 which meant the Imperial
House. In contradistinction, all the people were called koyake (minor
families). Thus the Imperial House came to be regarded as the principal
ancestral family of all the Japanese.178 Consequently, in Japan there was
originally no conception corresponding to "public." Among the Japanese,
public affairs consisted in nothing but relations with the Imperial Family.
It would seem that the tendency to regard the Emperor as divine has
existed in Japan since very ancient times. When one looks at the many
legends related in the Kojiki and the Nihonshoki (History of Japan), one
finds that stories of the gods are not told for the purpose of demonstrating
the greatness of the divinities believed in by the ancients; on the contrary,
it is only for the purpose of showing the divine character of the Emperor
that accounts are given of the gods and of the historical blood relations of
these gods. To be sure, in the Occident it is a historical fact that Alexander
the Great and the Roman emperors were deified, but this was a matter of
the deification of these men as individuals; this is quite a different thing
from a national legend rooted in the primitive faith of a people. The theory
of the divine right of kings in modern Europe has as its premise the
Christian conception of God, and aimed at giving a basis to the power of
princes in the will of God.119 And the theory of divine right in medieval
India is to be understood in the same way. Thus, in archaic Japanese
religion, the living totality of the nation is embodied symbolically in the
Imperial ancestral sun-goddess and in the divine authority deriving tradi-
tionally from her. Here we find the unifying idea in the traditional stories
of the historical age of the gods. Consequently, the people, united into one
nation from various familial or political groups, give concrete expression to
their corporate will through the Emperor or the divine Imperial ancestor
who directs the government.180 Thus, in the society of that time, bound
together by ritual, the distinction between submitting to or opposing the
authority of the totality of society is a distinction between submitting to or
refusing to submit to the ruler who is the concrete manifestation of that
authority-and this in the last analysis is reducible to submission or non-
submission to the authority of the Imperial ancestor goddess. Therefore, it
has been felt that the moral distinction between goodness and wickedness
is nothing but the distinction between submission or non-submission to the
divine authority of the corporate whole, and this' means the distinction
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between submission and non-submission to the Emperor.l8l Therefore the
Japanese people have generally felt that the rule of Japan by the Imperial
House, generation after generation, has been maintained on the basis of
the general will of their ancestors since antiquity.182
Since the Imperial House was originally conceived as having the
position of ruling the entire Japanese people, the Imperial House has no
surname. Consequently there has almost never appeared anyone aiming at
becoming the highest ruler in place of the Imperial House. Of course, in
Japan's long history, it is not the case that there were no persons at all who
had undertaken to rebel against the Imperial House. Taira-no-Masakado
(d. 940), Minamoto-no-Yoshitomo (1123-1160), and Minamoto-no-Yoshi-
naka (I 154-II 84) are generally regarded as rebels. However, even these
men did not attempt to supplant the Imperial House. They desired to have
some position at court, and raised rebellions through dissatisfaction at
being unable to obtain it. Thus it is said that even rebels have recognized
the Imperial authority. Perhaps the only exception is the case of Yuge no
Dokyo (d. 772), the Buddhist priest Prime Minister (765). Even Takauji
Ashikaga (1305-1358) was able to establish his shogunate only by installing
the Emperor of the northern court, at the beginning of the Muromachi
Period (1338-1573).
Subsequently, also, the concept of the divinity of the Emperor became
a religious tradition. In an edict issued immediately after the Taika Reforms
(c. 650), the Emperor was called the "bright god" (akitsumikami). When
the Emperor's power became stronger, there even appeared in an Imperial
edict the following sentence: "We are the possessor of the wealth of the
world; we are the possessor of the power of the world."183 The divine-
nation-concept and the principle of ultra-nationalism have thus a close
connection with Emperor worship. In the fact that Japan has been ruled by
Emperors belonging to a line unbroken for countless generations, we
recognize a unique historical characteristic of the Japanese state.
Although in the past the Japanese adopted Chinese thought and
culture on a large scale, still they have exercised particular care not to
injure the distinctive characteristics of the Japanese state. The law codes
which formed the basis of administration and justice in ancient Japan were
for the most part imitations of Chinese models; however, the traditional
Chinese idea of revolution was rejected.184 In regard to the government of
the,state, although reference was made to the twenty-one Chinese dynastiC
histories, the political practices of abdication and righteous rebellion were
not initiated. There is a tradition that when the book of Mencius was
brought in a ship to be introduced into Japa~, the ship was wrecked in a
storm at sea, and consequently The Mencius was transmitted to Japan only
with great difficulty.ls5 What this means is that the notions of the ruler's
THE TENDENCY TO EMPHASIZE A LIMITED SOCIAL NEXUS 471
abdication and righteous rebellion against the ruler, as expressed in The
Mencius, were incompatible with the Japanese concept of the Emperor
and the traditional Japanese pattern of government. The legend of the
shipwreck was produced by the fear of men who did not want The
Mencius popularized.
"Also, I have heard it said that the book of Mencius contains the
following argument: at the beginning of the Chou dynasty, King Wu with
one burst of anger gave response to the needs of the people; he is not to be
spoken of as a subject murdering his ruler; rather he executed the villain
Chou (-hsin) who was a desecrator of benevolence and righteousness.
Consequently, although Chinese classics, histories, and even books of
literature have all been brought over to this country, only that book of
Mencius has not yet been brought to Japan; for, it is said, the ship which
carries it is always sunk by a storm. If we ask why, the reason given is that,
while there has been no break in the Imperial line since our country was
founded and ruled by Amaterasu Omikami (Sun Goddess), if such a teach-
ing were transmitted there might appear in the future an adversary who
would despoil the descendants of the gods and claim to be blameless; and
detesting this possibility, all the gods raise up a divine wind (kamikaze) and
overturn the ship. Thus, even among the sage teachings of that country,
there are some which are inappropriate for this land." (Ugetsu Mono-
gatari, Bizarre Stories)
The introduction of Chinese Confucianism into Japan caused almost
no friction or disharmony; only the doctrine of abdication and rebellion
presented difficult problems. This doctrine maintains that the Emperor
holds his position of Emperor so long as he receives the mandate of
Heaven; if he should lose the confidence of Heaven he will inevitably lose
his position; such a doctrine is under any circumstances hard to reconcile
with the traditional Japanese concept of the Emperor. Therefore, this point
became a problem for scholars. The following admonition to posterity is
ascribed to Sugawara-no-Michizane (845-903): "The mystery of the eternal
existence of our divine country is something we dare not try to understand.
Although we study the Chinese classics of the three royal dynasties, of
Chou King, and of Confucius, the Chinese national tendency of revolution
is something we should be deeply concerned about."186
Thus, even Confucianism has definitely not been introduced into
Japan uncritically. Toko Fujita (1806-1855), a Confucianist of the Mito
school, argued that among the doctrines of Confucianism, there are two
which are "definitely not applicable" to Japan, "namely, the doctrines of
abdication and of righteous rebellion. The gaining of the throne by abdica-
tion is exemplified by Shin and Yii, while the attaining of the throne by
rebellion is instanced by Tang of Yin and Wu of Chou. Since the Ch'in
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and Han Dynasties, those who arrogated the throne by deceiving the
Emperor's orphans and widows always based their arguments on the ex-
amples of the sage-emperors Sun and Yii, while those who usurped the
throne by destroying their royal houses and murdering their rulers always
pretended to be following the examples of Tang and Wu. There have
been more than twenty dynasties in Chinese history, and not only have
those in high and low position changed places, but even the distinction
between Chinese and barbarian has been lost." In China, if the Emperor
loses the virtue requisite of an Emperor, he must lose his throne; but in
Japan, the Imperial throne has been for ages regarded as eternal, available
only to those in the same blood lineage. Consequently, here the Emperor's
possession of virtue has been irrelevant. "In our bright divine land, the
unbroken Imperial succession has been transmitted without end, ever since
the heavenly ancestor gave the heavenly descendants the commission to
rule, the augustness of the heavenly throne is just as unsurpassable as the
sun and moon. Even if there were in the world someone comparable to
Shun or Yii in virtue or equal to Tang or Wu in knowledge, still the only
thing he co~ld do would be to support the Emperor with complete devotion
and assist the work of the throne. If it should chance that someone should
proclaim the theory of abdication, it would be quite justifiable for any of
the people of Oyashima (Japan) to rise in indignation and attack him."181
Of course, most Confucianists did not express themselves so clearly.
Even these were aware that there was a contradiction between the ancient
Japanese form of government and Confucian theory, but they kept silence
and avoided coming to grips with this contradiction. Once this contradic-
tion was taken up and became a problem, there was no other course than to
interpret it as did Tako Fujita.
To be sure, among Confucianists there were people who were ex-
tremely absorbed in Chinese culture. Nevertheless, even Sorai Ogyii
(1666-1728), who called himself "one of the Eastern barbarians," after all
had an attitude of reverence for the throne.188
If we reason along the line of thinking which has been described
above, we come to the conclusion that Imperial authority is not derived
from abstract principles like the divine-right theory, but that his authority
is regarded as inhering in his very person. For example, Banzan Kumazawa
(1665-1691) emphasizes the divinity of the Japanese Emperor. "It is not to
be doubted that the Japanese Emperor is the august descendant of the
heavenly god." "Only in Japan has the imperial house continued without
change. Even in the age of the samurai, a man who conquered the country
could not become ruler. This is because divine authority is naturally
inherent in the three sacred treasures."189 Again, Ansai Yamazaki
(1618-1682), in spite of his profound understanding of Confucianism, did
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not try to understand Shinto from a Confucian standpoint, but, even while
using various Confucian concepts, endeavored to understand Shinto in its
own terms. According to him, the god of creation is a divinity with a
human body-that is to say, he is the ancestor of the Imperial family.
The phrase shinsei (divine sage)-as applied to this god-means that
in him the divine and human are combined. He is the venerable god of the
primordial universe; he is revered as the ancestor of the Emperors, and as
the source of their body and blood. The concept of "Emperor" ("tenno" in
Japan is different from the Chinese concept of the "son of Heaven"). "In
foreign countries (sc. China), above the chief ruler there is the heavenly
sovereign; above the edicts of the Emperor there is the mandate of high
Heaven. In Japan, however, the ruler is himself this 'heavenly sovereign';
and the edicts of the Emperor must be regarded as the 'heavenly mandate'
itself."190 The Emperor is not the "son of Heaven" who receives the "man-
date of Heaven," but is himself taken to be the heavenly sovereign who
issues the mandate.
And so, while enthusiastic proponents of reverence for the throne
study Confucian doctrines, still there are cases where they completely turn
these doctrines around. It is a problem whether or not there actually is in
Mencius democratic thought, but at any rate Mencius did refer to the ruler
of the state as the "people's ruler" and took the position that he should be
concerned with the people's living conditions. But Shoin Yoshida
(1831-1859), in lecturing on Confucianism, attacked the statements in
Mencius which had any democratic nuances. In considering the passage in
Mencius that "The people are most valuable, the altars of the land and
grain come next, and the ruler is least" (The Book of Mencius, Chin hsin
p'ien [section on Mind] II, chapter 14), Yoshida would not accept Men-
cius' thought as it stood. He interpreted this passage in Mencius as meaning
that "the people are most valuable from the point of view of the ruler." In
this way he attacked Western democracy, and aimed at a complete overturn
of Chinese thought.
"If we read this passage without understanding this meaning, we will
utter, in imitation of the Western barbarians, the evil notions that the
world is not the property of one man, but belongs to itself, and will come to
forget the idea of state structure (kokutai). This is greatly to be abominated.
It has recently been reported that students at Meirinkan school were asked
to write an essay on the theory that the world is not the property of one
man. Therefore, I reflect that, while this theory that the world does not
belong to an individual appears191 in the Liu-tao-san-lUeh (a work on
strategy), it does not necessarily come from the classical scriptures. It is not
a general notion in China. It sould seem to be held in connection with the
idea of abdication and justified rebellion. But the proverb, 'throughout the
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world there is no land which is not the king's; throughout the world, there
is no one who is not the king's subject,' clearly assumes that the world
belongs to one person."l9Z
The Chinese idea that "the world is not one man's" has now been
changed to the contrary thesis that "the world is one man's (viz. the
Emperor's) ."
Hence, in spite of the widespread acceptance of Confucianism, the
Chinese and Japanese forms of it have differed in their emphasis. The
basis of Chinese Confucianism was the virtue of filial piety. Thus, since a
basic element in their thought was the idea of the change of dynasties, the
idea of loyalty to the state could not occupy the central place in their
ethical scheme. However, in Japan, due to the hierarchical structure of
society, the particular virtue of loyalty to the Emperor occupied the highest
place among all virtues.
This difference in ways of thinking between China and Japan on the
matter of the authority of the Emperor was manifested in a difference in
ways of compiling histories. In China, the practical motivation for the
compilation.of most histories, especially "standard histories," was to serve as
a mild check on the power of the ruler in advance, and not to let it out of
control. Therefore, the official Chinese historian recorded both the good
and the bad actions of the Emperor, in order to encourage the reader,
whether he was the Emperor or an official, to become reflective and critical.
In Japan, however, this kind of intention is lacking. If we examine the
motives for the work of compiling histories in Japan, the reason for the
Kojiki and Nihonshoki was to make clear "the rule of the Imperial family
and the broad basis of its royal influence."193 In other words, the intention
was to record selectively, on the basis of Japan's consciousness of itself as a
state distinct from the rest of the world, the facts of Japanese history,
emphasizing as central the genealogy of the Imperial House. Consequently,
a critical spirit was not apparent in these books.
The absence of a critical spirit based on universal human reason was
too often in the past a conspicuous characteristic of the Japanese way of
thinking, and this uncritical attitude appears in the way of thinking which
reveres the living Emperor as divine. It is instructive to inquire into the
influence exerted upon the form of adoption of Buddhism by the idea of
Emperor worship, which has had such a firmly rooted existence throughout
the Japanese nation since antiquity. In the case of Buddhism, in spite of
the fact that it is theoretically difficult to join it to Emperor worship, in
Japan a union between the two was ultimately achieved.
The idea of emphasizing the prestige and benevolence of the ruler
appears in India in the Brahmanistic legal codes, but Buddhists universally
rejected it. Only in a few cases, in later Mahayana Buddhism, has this
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Brahmanistic idea been picked up. Nevertheless, the Japanese have particu-
larly noticed these exceptional ideas in the Buddhist sacred texts. In Book
Two of the Daijo Honso Shinji-Kan-gyo (Siitra of Meditation on the Real
Aspect of Mind of the Mahayana), the "four benevolences"-of "parents,"
"all sentient beings," "the ruler," and "the Three Treasures"-are explained
one by one. In the passage on "the benevolence of the ruler," the scripture
teaches that "the happiness of the people depends on the ruler, mountains
and rivers, the earth within the state, all are the possessions of the ruler.
The ruler's authority is the same as that of the Buddha. He enjoys the
special protection of the gods (the celestial beings of the thirty-
three heavens). Therefore we ought not to try to rebel against the ruler."
Such a concept of the ruler is quite exceptional in the Buddhist texts.194
King Asoka (3d century B.C.), who devoted himself body and soul to the
realization in India's political activity of Buddhist ideals, even went so far
as publicly to declare in his edicts that the ruler receives benevolence from
the people. Yet this doctrine of four benevolences, which is exceptional in
Buddhism, was regarded as especially important by the Japanese. Although
in the Buddhist sacred texts these four benevolences are only dealt with
together, and although the benevolence of the Three Treasures is recog-
nized as having paramount significance, in Japan the benevolence of the
ruler is especially emphasized, and is accorded the highest position. For
instance, on the seventh day of the tenth month of 862, under the Emperor
Seiwa, Yoshio Tomonosukune, who was Chiinagon and concurrently min-
ister of the bureau of the populace and grand officer in the palace of the
Imperial mother-in-law, submitted a memorial expressing a desire to con-
tribute a villa near Fukakusa to a temple. In this document, after citing the
doctrine of four benevolences in the Daijo Honsho Shinji-kan-gyo, he
concluded by saying, "we ought first to repay the benevolence of the holy
ruler in protecting and sustaining us, and second, to requite the virtue of
the sphere of Truth for favoring US."195 Again, in Taira no Shigemori's
(1138-1179) admonitions to his father, Taira no Kiyomori, there is the
passage "I have recently read in the Shinji-kan-gyo that the first benevo-
lence is that of heaven and earth, the second that of the king, the third that
of parents, and the fourth that of all sentient creatures. By knowing this we
are human beings; by not knowing it, demons and animals. Among them
the most important is the benevolence of the Emperor."196 But the idea that
the "benevolence of the Emperor" is most important is not a doctrine of the
Shinji-kan-gyo, but is something which the Japanese have asserted using
this text. Following this common point of view, later Zen masters also, for
example Takuan (1573-1645), emphasized that "No one ought to slight
the benevolence of the ruler."196a
The national Japanese idea of Emperor worship has, contrary to what
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one would expect, exerted an influence on Buddhists. A religionist such as
Shinran, who advocated absolute devotion to the Amida Buddha, did not
have at all in mind anything like Emperor worship. Nonetheless, he calls
the Amida Buddha's compassionate summons of living creatures, in order
to save them, an "Imperial order."197 Nichiren also, referring to the pro-
nouncements of the Buddha, used the phrases "edict of the Buddha" and
"Imperial declaration."198 These sectarian Buddhists preferred to use such
expressions as an appropriate way to express themselves to the Japanese.
(In recent years Buddhists were forbidden by the militarist government
to use such expressions.)
In the case of Nichiren, in particular, the concept of Emperor worship
seems to have influenced slightly the structure of his religious ideas.199 He
related that when he was young he harbored a doubt as to whether the
retired Emperor at Oki or the Hojo regent was the true ruling authority in
Japan; and the same sort of doubt caused him to select the Lotus from
among the many Buddhist sacred texts. "Even though when one looks
about the land, one finds that each man says, I am the ruler, yet the ruler of
the country is but one man. If there were two, the land would not be calm.
If a family were to have two heads, that family would surely be tom apart.
Isn't the Buddhist canon also just like this? Whatever Sutra it may be,
surely it is just one Sutra that is the 'great king' of the canon! But if seven
out of ten sects struggle with one another without coming to agreement,
this would be as bad as if there were seven or ten kings in a country-the
people would not be at peace. What could be done then?"200 In this frame
of mind he proceeded to evaluate and compare Buddhist texts, and finding
in the Lotus Sutra the statement, "This Lotus Sutra is by far the greatest of
all Sutras," he finally declared his utter devotion to the Lotus Sutra.
While Buddhism was being propagated in Japan, Emperor worship
likewise shortly came to be generally recognized as common sense even
among Buddhists. Even the Gleanings from Leisure Hours (Tsurezuregusa,
1331) by the priest Kenko (1283-1350) declared: "The great position of
the Emperor is awesome indeed. Even the last leaves growing in the bam-
boo garden (i.e. all members of the Imperial family, to the end of time) are
not of the race of ordinary men; they are noble!" We have already noted the
fact that Japan-minded Confucianists recognized a special excellence of
the Japanese nation in the unbroken continuity of the Imperial line; but a
number of Buddhists mentioned the same thing. Shiren Kokan (1278-
1346), the author of the Kenko Shakusho (Buddhist work written in the
Genko Era) which is the most important history of Buddhism in early Ja-
pan, recognized in the tradition of the transmission of the three sacred treas-
ures to Japan, the reason for the superiority of the Japanese state over other
countries. "Although China is called a great country and its territories are
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vast, still its seals of authority are all human artifacts and are not made by
Heaven. Although our country is small, it was founded by gods and has
been given sacred treasures by spirits. China is not even to be compared
with it." (Book 17,) Again, K6sen (1816-1892) said, "In our state there is
the Way of the Emperor. This is the great way of the heavenly ancestor
Gods, and is the orthodox way of the ruler. Its continuity has been endless,
for divine descendants have continued in one line and have not mixed with
other families.... Although it has been almost three thousand years
since the Emperor Jimmu ('Divine Warrior') succeeded to the rule, no one
yet has ever dared to usurp the heavenly throne and break the divine line
of succession. The majestic virtue of the Imperial House is vast. This is
why our Kingly Way is unique among all countries." (Zenkai Ichiran,
"One wave in the sea of Zen.") These men constantly looked Up to the
authority of the Imperial House.
When this idea was reached, soon the theory was advanced that "The
Emperor actually is the State." T6rei (1721-1792) says, "Although heaven
and earth are vast, there are only one sun and one moon. Likewise the
fortunes of the state depend upon one man, the Emperor" (Shumon
Mujinto-ron, A treatise on the undying light of the [Zen] sect). We have
already noted the tendency toward naturalism among the Japanese, and
this is closely connected with the concept of esteem for lineage and with
Emperor worship. Buddhists have even made the curious statement that
the word "nature," in its ultimate sense, means the everlasting continuity of
the Imperial line. Shiren Kokan (1278-1346) says: "Japan is an absolutely
pure entity. The basis of the state is rooted in nature. No Chinese dynasty
has ever been like this. That is why we praise our country. This 'nature' is
the three sacred treasures. The three treasures are the sacred mirror, the
sacred sword, and the sacred jewel. These three are all natural, heaven-
made products. The fact that our country has one Imperial line which
reaches far back in time and is unbroken over the ages is surely due to these
treasures, which are natural and heaven-made. Therefore, even after count-
less generations, there is no danger that the throne will be menaced.
Surely, these heaven-produced sacred treasures will not become the play-
things of another clan or of foreign arms."
This point of view corresponds exactly to that urged by Ansai Yama-
zaki, mentioned earlier, but such a concept of nature is absolutely not
found among Indian or Chinese Buddhists, and would perhaps seem
strange to Westerners as well. Reasoning along a line identical with that
just illustrated, Buddhists themselves came to advocate the thesis that the
Imperial ancestor, "Amaterasu Omikami (Sun Goddess)" denotes the abso-
lute. Master T6rei (1721-1792) says, "The general meaning of 'shin' (god,
spirit) is also 'mind.' When all dirt is cleaned from the mind, and it
....
JAPAN
becomes as clear as a mirror, then it is called 'spirit.' For this reason, the
vehicle of spirit is symbolized by the mirror. . .. The mirror of the mind
is always round and clear, and reflects all things whatsoever. This is called
'Amaterasu Omikami' (Mujintoron, Ruzii No. 10). Here there is not the
slightest trace of a conception of a pagan god. Nonetheless, Emperor
worship has introduced a subtle modification and twisting of various con-
ceptions.
Among the Five Injunctions of Buddhism there is an injunction
against stealing. The original meaning of this in India was, "Do not take
things that have not been given you by someone else." However, among
Japanese Buddhists, a tendency appeared to interpret even this precept in
connection with Emperor worship. Jiun-sonja Onko (1718-18°4), founder
of the Shingon Shohoritsu Sect, interpreted it as follows: "There are bound-
aries between countries just as mountains and rivers are distinct from each
other.... the line of the Emperor of our country has been unbroken
since the age of the gods. This signifies that the injunction against stealing
has a natural basis. In China, the lines of Emperors are in disorder, and in
the course of ·time even a man of lowest estate can become ruler of the
world."201
The idea that the Emperor is divine has brought about a modification
of old Buddhist conceptions regarding the relation between the "ten vir-
tues" and the ruler. The laws which are to be especially observed by all
men have since early Buddhism been called the "ten goods" or the "ten
injunctions to goodness." These are the virtues which are the opposites of
ten evils, namely, not killing, not stealing, non-license, not telling a lie, not
breaking faith, not backbiting, not using lascivious language, not being
greedy, not being angry, not holding wrong ideas. It is frequently stressed
in Buddhist texts that the ruler must bring home the importance of these
ten goods to the people. In regard to the true law of the ten goods which
was expounded by the Buddha, the ruler ought to uphold and practice
them, and by means of this law to govern the world.202 In addition to
diligently practicing the Ten Goods himself,203 the ruler must put them
into practice among all the people. "If the ruler causes (the people) to
cultivate the Ten Goods, he will be called a blessed and virtuous ruler; but
if he does not do so, he will be called an evil ruler."204 ''The ruler ought,
like the sage king, the universal monarch (Cakravarti) of antiquity, to
educate the people in the way of the Ten Goods."205 A king under whom
the youth Sudhana studied, is said to have "forever put an end to murder,
robbery, and license, to have forbidden false talk, faithlessness, slander,
and lascivious language, and banished avarice, anger, and wrong ideas.''206
This conception exerted a considerable influence upon the general concep-
tion of the Emperor among the Japanese. In old Japanese books, the
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Emperor is often called, "master of the Ten Virtues" (Masu Kagami,
Fujigoromo). "The ruler in whom the Ten Virtues are unlimited" (Eiga
Monogatari, Hikage no Katsura); and the imperial throne is called "The
seat of the Ten Virtues" (Masu Kagami, Kusa-makura), or "the imperial
throne of ten thousand chariots of the ten virtues" (i.e. the throne of
boundless virtue: Heike Monogatari); and the Emperor is regarded as one
who ought to realize the Ten Virtues in human relationships. "He rules the
land by putting into effect the correct law of the Ten Virtues" (Jinno
Shotoki, 1).207 Such concepts presuppose the Buddhist political theories
already explained.
When these ideas came to Japan, they brought about still other inter-
pretations. The Japanese, coming in contact with Chinese thought, identi-
fied the Japanese tenno (Emperor) with the t'ien-tzu (Emperor) as con-
ceived by the Chinese, and accordingly thought of him as the "Son of
Heaven"; but in Buddhist texts it is taught that all men will be born in
heaven if they practice goodness; these two conceptions being combined,
the Emperor came to be thought of as having kept the rules of the Ten
Virtues in past existences and consequently having been born Emperor in
this life because of his past merit. Thus, e.g. "By the grace of the Ten
Virtues he has become Emperor (tenshi)." CJinno Shotoki, 4,) The theory
that the Emperor is born ruler of the land because of his practice of the
Ten Virtues is probably without authority in the Buddhist sacred texts. 20B
The general tendency to regard the Emperor as divine has produced this
sort of conception. Although, according to Buddhism, the ruler must realize
the Ten Virtues, and the true significance of the ruler is realized in just
this way, in the Japanese view the Emperor has already done this. While
according to Buddhism the divine nature of the ruler is to be realized in the
future as a moral "ought," in the Japanese view this is reinterpreted as
already given to him, and as being an accomplished fact. We can detect, in
the tradition of Prince Shotoku (573-621), a characteristic way of thinking
similar to this. Prince Sh6toku, in the general conception of later Japanese,
was a reincarnation of the Bodhisattva AvalokiteSvara.209 But this sort of
tradition has not appeared in India.210 The patronage of Buddhism by King
Asoka was, with respect to its influence on world history, so great that he
is not to be compared with Prince Sh6toku; but in the many traditions
about King Asoka transmitted among the Indians, he is merely thought to
have acquired virtue through having presented sand playfully to the Bud-
dha as a child in a former life. And likewise among other kings and
emperors in India who have protected Buddhism, we cannot discover any
such traditions. Beneath the way in which Prince Sh6toku is venerated lies
the particularly Japanese tendency to Emperor worship.
The authority of the Emperor has been supposed by most Japanese to
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be superior to that of the Buddha. In fact Y. Haga declared: "It is a
universal proverbial belief that the Buddha is of nine virtues, while the
Emperor is of ten virtues." Moreover, prayers are said in Buddhist temples
for the longevity and good health of the Emperor, while tablets are usually
enshrined therein for the same purpose.
Since antiquity the nationalistic tendency to Emperor worship has
persisted among the Japanese, and various religions in Japan have made
both conscious and unconscious attempts to adapt themselves to this tend-
ency. It is to be noticed, however, that on the part of the members of the
Imperial family, efforts have been made to de-sanctify themselves. Those
who became devout believers in Buddhism, in particular, were least inter-
ested in their deification. Emperor Shomu (7°1-756) declared himself to be
"a servant of the three trea3ures of Buddhism" (the Buddha, the law, and
the priest). Upon finding a passage in Volume 16 of Daiju-Kyo (Siitra on
Great Collection) which reads: 'We are allowed to take neither family nor
property nor throne with us when we die. Only commandments;. alms-
giving, and no licentiousness are to be our companions in our present as
well as in ourJuture lives." Emperor Kazan (968-1008) left his throne and
became a devout believer of Buddhism, "because he understood that even
the Imperial throne and the treasures of the state were nothing but illu-
sions."2l1 He was aware of the austere fact that even the monarch must die
alone, just as commoners do. Some members of the Imperial family ex-
pressed their feeling of equality before the judgment of Hell. They, there-
fore, thought it necessary to become devout believers of Buddhism in order
to prepare themselves for that judgment. Emperor Daigo (885-930) is said
to have composed the following thirty-one-syllable ode: "At the bottom of
Hell there is no real difference whatsoever between the members of the
Imperial family and slaves."212 This is the statement of a believer in the
equality of men. There are also fairly many odes to the same effect com-
posed by other Emperors.213 In April 1859, owing to a supplication of the
Empress Dowager, three pensionaries were instituted at the Anshoji
Temple. The petition reads: "Even those in Heaven cannot escape their
decline, not to speak of ordinary men on the earth. Crossing the bourn
before Hell, we cannot take property with us. Dragged into Yama's
judgment-hall, there is no difference between the ruler and the ruled. We
have come into the world alone to die alone."214
There are many poems composed by Emperors expressing their con-
sciousness of wrong-doing as well as their delight in the vow of AmWibha
that evil men may be saved.
"How many might the sins of my body reflected in the mirror be, I
only wish my mind to look toward the Pure Land." (Emperor Goka-
shiwabara, 1464-1526).
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"The most sinful of all sinners are we who commit sins, knowing
that we shall certainly be saved. How should Amitabha leave us out of
this gracious vow!" (Emperor Gotsuchimikado, 1442-15°0.)
"AfHicted as I am, I will not complain,
Since I trust the marvellous vow of Amitabha." (Emperor Tsuchimikado,
1195-1231.)
In these poems the Emperors are well aware of being ordinary men.
Motivated by such a humble consciousness, these Emperors and mem-
bers of the Imperial family were led to enter the priesthood. Mter the death
of Emperor Junwa (786-84°), his bones were smashed to pieces to be scat-
tered on the summit of Nishiyama at Oharano (The Western Hill of the
Great Field)m in accordance with his will. There were fairly many Emper-
ors who stipulated in their wills not to have any tombs made for them. One
of the Imperial edicts, issued in the name of Emperor Seiwa at the time of a
drought, reads, "It's my fault, not the people's. My clothing and provisions
should be curtailed." At the end of the Kamakura period, Ex-emperor
Kameyama (1249-13°5) entered the priesthood himself and prepared meals
in the kitchen for those priests who visited the temple on the occasion.216
In these cases we cannot discern any intention on the part of the
Imperial family to present themselves as living gods. Such was the general
attitude of the Imperial family toward religion before the Meiji Restoration.
At the time of the Meiji Restoration, Emperor worship was instituted by
force under the influence of the movement of "reverence for the Emperor
and expulsion of foreigners." Only in recent years did it come to be the
only and absolute form of religion in Japan. It is not true, therefore, that
Emperor worship was motivated by a subjective intention on the part of the
Imperial family itself. On the contrary, it represents a way of thinking
peculiar to the Japanese which assumed an extraordinary form of expression
at a certain period of Japanese history. As has been pointed out already,
this way of thinking modified the introduction and development of Bud-
dhism in Japan. There is almost no analogue of such a tendency in India or
in China. Indeed it is certain that such a form of living-god-worship is a
result of neither the various conditions peculiar to Eastern societies in
general nor "feudalism" for the most part. In fact, there still remain various
problems to be studied in connection with Emperor worship in the ancient
Orient and in the Roman Empire.
Sectarian and Factional Tendencies
In Japan there exists a strong tendency toward sectarianism and fac-
tionalism, which is another manifestation of the tendency to regard as
absolute any limited and specific human nexus. It is a fact generally
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observed today that this tendency to clannishness is still prevalent in Japan
even though it is not a phenomenon of recent origin, but has its deep roots
in ancient Japanese history.
I should like to dwell upon this tendency first in reference to the
constitutional make-up of the Buddhist order and the mode of worship
among the believers. In Japanese Buddhism, for the most part, it is not the
universal creed that is counted as most important. But rather, the emphasis
has been placed upon the specific religious order itself as a limited and
concrete human nexus.
In the process of the establishment of the Honganji order, which has
become the largest BuddhIst order in Japan, we can find historical evidence
of this sectarian factionalism which is conspicuous among the Japanese.
Shinran (II73-1262) himself, the founder of Jodo-shin-shii (True Pure
Land Sect), never had any thought of establishing a new sect of his own.
He firmly believed, as has already been pointed out in the preceding pages,
that it was his mission to follow faithfully the teachings of his master,
Honen (1133-1212), and to reveal their true essence. Besides, Shinran
recognized tqe universality of religious doctrine. "The teaching of the
Perfect One (Buddha) is something that permeates everywhere."211 It was
just upon the basis of this belief that he could make the outright assertion
that "I, Shinran, have no disciples to be called mine."21B And he believed
that "everyone of them is a disciple of the Perfect One(Buddha)" and "we
are all fellow-disciples practicing religion together."219 It was otherwise,
however, with the Buddhist priests of his time. They would say, "This one
is my disciple," or "That is someone else's disciple," and they vied with one
another for the acquisition of more disciples of their own.220 In spite of
Shinran's strenuous effort to warn against such sectarian rivalry, it became
a strong tendency even within the Shinshii order, until at last the entire
group of followers of Shinshii became transformed into "those who are
known to be the disciples of the Saint of the Honganji (Original Vow)
Temple."221 Since then the Honganji order has developed into a large or-
ganization on a nationwide scale, not as a free and open association of the
believers, but rather as a closed order with the "pope" as its central authority.
It came to be a life-and-death problem for the followers to be admitted into
or expelled from the order. Rennyo (1415-1499), eighth abbot of the
Honganji, in his effort to avoid an insurrection, warned the followers: "It
has been rumored that the disciples are up to some evil deeds. That would
be preposterous. From now on, anyone who would contrive such an in-
trigue should certainly be excommunicated forever from the followers of
the gate of the saint."222 The disciples of this order, as the quotation shows,
were called "manto" (followers of the gate), and henceforth this appella-
tion suggested the rigidity with which the closed-door policy of the order
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was maintained. Each temple then came to function as "an intermediary
temple" for the followers, up to the central temple.
It has been generally thought that Shinran advocated that Buddhism
should be practiced under secular conditions. But "neither ecclesiastical
nor secular"223 was the way he described his standpoint, which permitted a
priest to marry and raise a family. Thus he was not advocating a lay
religious movement in which the priesthood would not be recognized at all.
In this respect, it was not quite the same as the religious movement of the
Quakers in the West, in spite of their close resemblance. The Shinshii
order has centered on hereditary professional priests. It is to be admitted,
however, that in its rudimentary form it resembled closely a movement for
the secularization of religion. There even seemed to be no such things as
temples in its earliest stage of development.224 But in spite of this, the
Shinshii order gradually acquired a pre-eminently sectarian form, and in
this we can perceive a tendency of thinking characteristic of the Japanese
at large.
Such exclusive tendencies are also evident among other sects of Kama-
kura Buddhism said to be characteristically Japanese. It is widely known
that the most violently sectarian of all is the Nichiren sect, as is indicated
by the four-point maxim of its founder: "Those who practice invocation to
Amitabha are due to suffer continuous punishment in hell; the Zen sect is
the devil; the Shingon sect is the ruiner of the country; the Ritsu (Disci-
pline) sect is the enemy of the country." Originally the Hokke (Lotus)
SlUra taught that even the most ignorant and the stupid, should they
practice Buddhism faithfully, would all attain the status of absolute perfec-
tion. That was a most generous expression of the spirit of tolerance and
magnanimity, which used to be the characteristic attitude of almost all the
devotees of the Hokke Scripture. When it came to Japan, however, the
Nichiren sect, which took the attitude of placing absolute reliance on the
Hokke Siitra, unfailingly became sectarian and closed, and one faction of it
even displayed a tendency toward extreme exclusionism. In the case of "the
non-alms-giving-or-taking faction" of this sect the giving or taking of alms
to or from non-believers of the Hokke Siitra was prohibited.
If we go from Kamakura to Ashikaga, a great majority of the followers
of the Jodo sect had, not respect, but contempt for various Buddhas,
Bodhisattvas, or gods and goddesses other than Amitabha.22; This trend
also came to the fore in the Jodo-shin sect. That was precisely why Rennyo
repeatedly warned his followers against showing contempt for Buddhas
and gods, though they might not owe them any special obligation of
respect.226 Such a tendency is scarcely present in the Zen sect. A person like
Dagen (1200-1253), however, displayed an attitude of extreme aversion to
the ideas of other sects. Being confident that he himself was the faithful
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propagator of the gospel of his master, Ju-ching (Nyoja, 1163-1228), he
hated to adopt or compromise with ideas other than his own.227 When we
look at Ju-ching's own teachings, nevertheless, we find that he is to some
extent close to the theory of the compatibility of Confucianism, Taoism,
and Buddhism, which has generally been accepted in China.228 It is correct
to say, therefore, that it was Dagen's own version of his master's teachings
based upon his own method of selection, which might have very well been
unconscious but which was apparently quite contrary to his avowed and
conscious assertion that he was the faithful spokesman for his continental
master. It amounts to this: that in Japan there has never been any official
religious doctrine such as the doctrine of Three Stages, in the Sui and
Tang periods (600-9°7) in China, that preached the universality of the
Buddha and the established religious doctrine without discrimination.
It was the Japanese tendency to emphasize the limited human nexus
rather than religious faith that gave rise to the segmentation of quite a
number of religious sects, each with its exclusive and closed order, in line
with the general Japanese propensity for cliquism or clannishness. Among
the Zen sect, as an example, it is not the difference in the religious faith or
doctrine but merely such specific factors of human relationship as the
inheritance of the master's "endowments" that account for the split of the
religious school into multitudinous sects and factions. 229 The Master-and-
disciple relationship has been jealously maintained. It is one of the charac-
teristics of Japanese Buddhism to make much of the inheritance of the
lineage of religious doctrines.23o Today the communication media are so
well developed that any single individual is susceptible to the influence of
various ideas of many individuals. Should one insist, under such circum-
stances, on maintaining the absolute authority of just one master toward
his disciples, that would inevitably foster the sectarian relationship. And
nothing is farther removed from this idea than the original Buddhist stand:
"Do not depend upon men, but upon the law."
The emphasis upon the inheritance of the master's endowments
naturally gave rise to the system of secret and oral instruction. The Tendai
sect, after being transplanted from China into Japan (c. 805), introduced
later an eclectic book called Sanjii-shichika no Homon or the "Three-
fold-seven-point Gates to the Law" which is a secret oral instruction trans-
mitted from the master to his disciples. It was conceived to have been
established during the period before Taya Chiijin (1065-1138) and after
Kakucha (960-1°34), and it is of great significance in Japanese Tendai
theology.
"Some of the so-called orally instructed gates to the Law are," accord-
ing to the Buddhist scholar and priest Daito Shimaji (1875-1927), "un-
known in respect to their origins, authors, and the date of formulation.
THE TENDENCY TO EMPHASIZE A LIMITED SOCIAL NEXUS
Nevertheless, herein lies the essence and the rudiments of the Tendai
theology in medieval Japan."231 The fact that their authors are unknown
shows that their genesis was in no way connected with the authority of any
particular individual, but rather that it was the Japanese esoteric way of
thinking itself that was responsible for such a formulation.
This esoteric trend is also present among the Zen sect. According to
the Rinzai sect, one is expected to contemplate a great number of catechetic
questions for meditation, which requires the mastery of innumerable
phrases and precedents, in a language other than the native tongue of the
Japanese Zen priests. This meant a tremendous effort on their part. Those
who were not up to the task were apt to confine themselves to the intensive
reading of just one particular book out of many, and to contrive some
comments of their own, which were then regarded as a "family inheritance"
to be taught in secret.
This trend for emphasizing secret oral instructions became particularly
distinctive among the Zen sect. "Inka," the master's recognition of his
disciple's attainment of enlightenment, certainly existed in China, where it
meant merely a practice exercised at the moment of having attained enlight-
enment. In Japan, however, it came to be stressed according to the idea of
inheritance. The Myoshin Temple sect reveals its inclination for secret
instruction in the form of a certificate for having entered enlightenment.
Moreover, all the factions of the Zen sect attached special importance to
the forms of comments or footnotes given to catechetic questions for medi-
tation and these forms were transmitted in an oral and secret way.
In any sect much is made of the relationships between the central and
peripheral temples, all of which are ultimately subordinated to the head
temple. Such a systematic hierarchy was also introduced into the newly-
risen Buddhist sects and Shinto orders. There also existed political factors
that gave rise to the split among sects. The divide-and-rule policy of the
Tokugawa government was, for instance, responsible for the separation of
the Hongan (Original Vow) Temple into Eastern and Western sections,
whose differences in doctrine were later evolved but were of little signifi-
cance.
Splits among sects in this sense of the word never occurred either in
India or in China. Indeed, there were a number of different schools of
Buddhism in India, which may correspond to what we call sects in Japan.
But the situation was vastly different from what exists in Japan. There,
distinctions among different schools stood for differences in the doctrines of
respective schools. After the Maurya Dynasty (about 317-180 B.C.), each
temple or monastery came to be affiliated with this or that school for the
purpose of effective management. Even then the essential function of those
bUildings, namely "to lodge priests from all four directions," was main-
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tained, and no priest from another school was ever refused accommodation.
It often happened that people of different schools lived under the same
roof. The same thing seems to have happened in China also.232 Almost all
the temples in modern China belong to the Zen sect, where the invocation
of Amitabha is also practiced. Within the same temple a person may sit in
religious meditation and at the same time practice invocation of Amitabha
( with the hope of entering the Pure Land). The practice of meditation and
that of invocation of Amitabha are considered compatible.
Contrary to those situations in India and China, a great number of
sects in Japan are segregated. For illustration, the Zen school and the Jado
school, which in China are in complete harmony without any sense of
conRict, in Japan form separate sects, which are incompatible with each
other.233 (Incidentally, these two schools were not clearly distinguished
from each other in India.) In Japan also, a person like Dagen, for instance,
violently disliked sect-names and refused to call his own sect the Zen sect.
In reality, however, the Zen sect brought forth segmentation of factions
and sub-factions.
It follows that in China, if distinction among sects is required, it is
made according to the person in charge. In Japan, by contrast, each temple
has its own denomination. In China, the denomination of a temple depends
upon the resident priest and is consequently submitted to change from time
to time, but in Japan the denomination of a temple never changes.234
Such denominational distinctions as exist in Buddhism in Japan,
might very well be attributed to the religious policy of the Tokugawa
government ( 1600-1867) with the situation still persisting today. But it can
also be suggested that had it not been for the existence of the Japanese way
of thinking to serve as a basis for the establishment of such social institu-
tions, the enforcement of such a system would not have been possible.
Japanese Buddhist orders, with their characteristically sectarian exclu-
siveness, on the one hand, and the followers in general with their family
system firmly established on the other, together gave rise to the system of
allotting families to each temple. That system means a relationship, stabi-
lized into an institution, between the temples and the families of their
followers. The latter would entrust a particular temple with the perform-
ance of the funeral and other Buddhist services of their families and the
management of their family cemeteries, and the temple leaders would take
it for granted to expect, in return for those services, not only remuneration
for those services but also contributions of money to cover the building,
reconstructing, repairing, and other maintenance expenses of the temples.
Such a system emerged voluntarily toward the end of the medieval age,
and was later adopted and enforced by the Tokugawa government. More-
over, during the Tokugawa period, a system was established in which each
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individual's religious faith had to be guaranteed by his temple. Those who
were confirmed as not pagan were registered in "the denominational census-
register."
Thereupon the Japanese family, as a unit, came to be affiliated with
one or another temple, and accordingly they submitted to this or that
denomination. It follows that, in traditional Japan, it was not the individual
but the family which determined religious faith. The individual faith of a
person is indistinguishable from that of his or her family. The relationship
between the temple and its parishioners was not always established accord-
ing to the choice of a religious faith on the part of the parishioners. Mostly
their relationship was based purely on customary habits of the family, not
usually accompanied by the sense of joy accompanying individual con-
version or redemption. The lack of freely chosen individual religious faith
prevalent among the Japanese today has its socio-historical roots in this fact.
The attitudes of exclusiveness and closedness were the characteristics
not only of the Buddhist orders. A similar situation existed among various
Shinto sects, as has been admitted by the Japanese themselves. "Those who
advocate Shintoism," criticized Kanzan Matsumiya, "mostly boast of their
Own secret teachings, occult instructions, and conceited bigotry, and do not
wish to impart their knowledge to the people in general. They are all
Concerned only with trifles...."235 The fact that such an attitude prevails
not only in Shintoism but also pervades various arts and crafts was pointed
out by Nakamoto Tominaga as follows:
''The habits of Shintoism, to begin with, are occultism and secret-
instruction, both being tantamount simply to hiding everything. Hiding
is the beginning of lying and stealing. Witchcraft and figures of speech
may be permissible as being interesting to look at and listen to. But
depending on those habits alone is extremely harmful. In the old days
when people were honest there must have been less harmful means for
teaching and guiding them. Our age today is one of corruption by liars and
robbers. So it is wrong on the part of the teachers of Shintoism .to defend
those evil doings. Even those ignoble businesses like Sarugaku [a medieval
Noh-dance] and tea-ceremony, all following the example of those habits of
Shintoism, fabricate secret instructions and certificates for having attained
enlightenment, and even set a price on them for huge profit-making. This
certainly is deplorable. When one asks why such things come about, they
answer that it is because their instructions are not easily transmitted to
those who are not ripe for them. That appears to be somewhat reasonable.
But one needs to be reminded that a way, which is to be kept in secret,
which is not to be readily transmitted, and for which a price is set for
instruction, cannot in any sense be called genuine."236
A sectarianism not quite so closed, but still exclusive, was pushed to its
-
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extreme in Hirata Shintoism. After the Meiji Restoration (1868), sectarian
Shintoism spread with enormous rapidity. In spite of the fact that state
interference or guidance was no longer exerted upon Shintoism, curiously
enough, there appeared symptoms almost identical to those of the Buddhist
orders under the control of the Tokugawa government. Moreover, it should
be noted in particular that the Honganji Temple order and the newly-
emerging Shinto orders were once organized according to the prototype of
the Emperor-system.
Such a tendency as exists in the religious life of the Japanese cannot
be defended simply as a token of respect for the purity of faith. It is
attributable rather to the social inclination of the Japanese in general
toward the establishment of some form of limited and closed human nexus.
To say the least, the segmentation of closed religious sects cannot be
ascribed to a difference of religious convictions in these respective sects,
since the Japanese in general are so markedly indifferent to religious
dogmas, apart from family-affiliation to a sectarian temple and the devotion
to the clan and Emperor.
Even scientists and mathematicians were not free from the tendency
to form a closed society. The results of the studies by the mathematician,
Yoshihiro Kurushima (died 1753), were not transmitted as his work, but
were mostly mingled with those of the preceding mathematical school of
Kowa Seki (1642-c. 1700), because the leaders of this school wished to
credit them to be their own or their master's productions, in order to add to
their fame or influence.231 In such a secluded society Japanese mathematics
developed only to a limited extent. The concepts of differential calculus
and integration were found by the Japanese a century after Newton and
Leibniz, but Japanese mathematics did not develop greatly till the time of
the introduction of Western mathematics. "The usage of keeping inven-
tions in secrecy must have considerably delayed the progress of science, for
those to whom the secret subjects were imparted were not, and could not
be, always the best minds of their times. Unfortunately, the spirit of vested
interests ruled the conduct of scholars."238
Then a question should be raised as to why the tendency toward
sectarian clannishness is conspicuous among the Japanese in general. It
might be tied up with the Japanese inclination to love and enjoy the
small-scaled and closed way of communal living. In search of the empirical
basis of the tendency to exclusiveness among such small-scaled communi-
ties, we have to take into consideration the factor of a social mode of living
adapted to the topographical elements of the environment. The density of
population of the narrow island since ancient days might be taken as a
proof that life here used to be comparatively easy and peaceful. On the
other hand the same fact may account for the formation of the traits of
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exclusiveness. Such problems ought to be discussed independently. Suffice
it to point out that these characteristics are distinctive of the Japanese in
general, as cultural manifestations.
As pointed out in preceding sections, the Japanese attach great impor-
tance to a limited and specific human nexus, and the family, the lord-
and-vassal relationship, the clan, the state (or the Emperor), and even
universal world religions, once transplanted into this country, were trans-
formed to fit their clannish propensity. Scarcely any thought has been
given to any universal external law which every man should follow beyond
the confines of this limited human nexus. Generally speaking, the Japanese
mode of adopting a foreign religion was confined to those cases which were
considered helpful to promoting and developing some concrete human
relationship which the Japanese regarded as absolute. For those individuals
who took religious faith seriously, it might have implied "devotion and
obedience," but for the Japanese society as a whole it only meant "absorp-
tion and adoption." Consequently, although Buddhism has been the flesh
and blood of Japanese culture for more than the past ten centuries, the
people by and large still regard it as "an imported system of thought." In
this respect, our attitude differs fundamentally from those of Western
nations in regard to Christianity and from those of southern Asiatic nations
in regard to Buddhism. As for those nations, universal world religions are
conceived to be such integral parts of their own culture that they are linked
to the formation of the respective nations themselves. But for the Japanese,
in contrast, such a conception is totally absent. What is called the non-
religious character of the Japanese is explicable partly by their attachment,
on the one hand, to the limited concrete human nexus and partly by the
conscious or unconscious indifference, on the other, to the dogmas of
universal religion.
In order to interpret these cultural and social phenomena of Japan,
one might refer to the deficiencies of modern bourgeois society. Indeed,
that is also one of the causes. But an economic interpretation is not enough
to explain away all the characteristics mentioned above. An oversimplified
ascription of these phenomena to the facts of immaturity of capitalism, its
unbalanced development, and the cultural lag of feudal social institutions
is far from satisfactory, since those socia-economic factors are commonly
shared by other Asiatic countries and are not the unique properties of
Japan alone. With respect to the mode of production in agriculture also
there exists a distinct similarity among Asiatic countries. In regard to
religious thoughts, however, there exist some characteristics unique to
Japan, which are rather absent among other Asiatic peoples.
One cannot but attribute these characteristics, therefore, to the ways
i of thinking arising from the historical traditions still alive in the minds of
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the Japanese. And without the Japanese subjecting these mental propen-
sities to a thorough-going examination and radical criticism, and without
their taking strong measures to do something about them, it would be
difficult, as I see it, to predict an overall change of outlook among the
Japanese in the future.
Defense of a Human Nexus by Force
THe view that a specific and concrete system of human relationships is
absolute tends to carry with it the notion that the defense and development
of the system is also an absolute. When the existence of the system of
human relationships to which one belongs is endangered, one is apt to
defend it even by recourse to force. In the Japanese way of thinking, the
use of force was not generally discussed as ethically good or evil, or as
justified or not under various particular conditions. One is inclined, instead,
to seek a sacred cause in the mere act of defending a specific human nexus.
High esteem for arms had a very important place among the thought-
tendencies in Japan, at least in the past.
Such a tendency was already obvious in the ancient mythology. This
land was then called "the country of one thousand fine halberds," the name
suggestive of the fact that the Japanese were, since ancient times, a nation
of military prowess. A comparison of the Japanese myths with those of
other nations reveals some characteristics of the Japanese people. For in-
stance, Finnish mythology, as represented in the Kalevala, is said to be
rather lacking in the concept of respect for military power. In Japanese
mythology, however, instances of conquest by arms occur very frequently,
and the concept of respect for military power is consistently followed. It is
noteworthy, as archaeological remains prove to us, that no violent inter-
racial conflicts seem to have occurred on Japanese soil. Nevertheless, on the
conceptual level there is a strong tendency toward respect for military
power, which constitutes a distinct characteristic of Japanese mythology.
In later periods other nations admitted and the Japanese themselves
boasted that they were brave and superior in military matters. Kanzan
Matsumiya (1686-1780) writes: "The Japanese are high-spirited and fond
of arms. Valour and dauntlessness make up their distinctive style."239
Atsutane Hirata (1776-1843) also comments as follows:
"The Japanese are endowed with extraordinarily courageous spirit,
which one may as well call either fearlessness or heroism. Which is it?
Being defeated by their enemy or having a grudge against their enemy, and
yet having failed to take their revenge, they calmly commit harakiri without
flinching. Such is the way of the Japanese who, faced with an emergency,
are never afraid of death.240
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The underlying motivation for such prowess is an absolute devotion to
one's lord.
"I will not from today
Turn back toward home.
I who have set out to serve
As Her Majesty's humble shield."241
Whether in devotion to one's feudal lord or in loyalty to the Emperor,
the identical way of thinking is present. It is a vastly different matter in the
case of the Indians. The Indians, indeed, also have their own epics of wars.
But they always use religious teachings to encourage their heroes. Indians
are taught that those brave soldiers fallen on the battlefield will be reborn
in the Heaven of Indra242 or that they will dwell with the god Vi~ttU.243 It
would be totally inconceivable to the Indians that one should march to the
battlefield with the conviction that: "Into hell may I fall; punishment by
the gods may be upon me. I pray nothing but to serve my lord, with utmost
loyalty."244
A question may be raised here. We have already said that among the
Japanese there is a familial inclination to affection. Is it not incompatible
with the propensity for military prowess? Banzan Kumazawa (1665-1691)
was already conscious of this problem: "An old friend asked: 'Japan is a
land of military prowess. Why is it then that she is also said to be the land
of benevolence?' I answered: 'It is exactly because she is the land of
benevolence that she is the land of military prowess. Is it not obvious that
the benevolent are always brave?' "
The fact that the Japanese of the past esteemed military force does not
imply that they used violence merely for the sake of destruction. Insofar as
they had to maintain and defend the interests of a specific system of human
relationship-a feudal clan, the state, a group of gangsters, or whatever-
they appealed to force. In combat they were brave. The virtue of self-
sacrifice was always manifested. But if the leader of the system to which
one belonged should ever order cease fire, they would stop using force at
once, and instantaneously establish peace, as was seen at the end of World
War II. The reason is that their objective was not to kill men and destroy
thiI1gs but to defend the human nexus by force.
If this way of thinking among the Japanese is once understood, it
would also be possible to comprehend the fact that the dauntless generals
of old Japan were at the same time refined gentlemen of gracious heart,
who composed poems, appreciated the beauties of nature, were well-versed
in the tea-ceremony, and were considerate to other people. In almost all the
books on the way of the samurai, the virtue of "benevolence" is recom-
mended. It was possible for daring brave generals and soldiers to be follow-
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ers of Buddhism, which ordained against killing even a single insect
without cause. Herein lies, I take it, the key to the paradox that the
Japanese are in religion peaceful, but brave in combat. In order to be brave
on the battlefield, soldiers were expected to get rid of their fears and
worldly concerns. For that purpose, Buddhism, Zen in particular, was ob-
served as a guiding doctrine.
The fact that among the attitudes of the Japanese as warriors such
traits were pre-eminent might very well be attributed to the way of thinking
common to the Japanese in general. If such had been the thinking pattern
transmitted and maintained only among the samurai-class, it would not
have been possible that among the chivalrous outlaws, coming from the
common people, and among the rank-and-file soldiers after the Meiji
Restoration, the same traits should appear in just the same fashion as in the
samurai of the earlier days. These attitudes cannot be interpreted merely
by means of Communistic theories of class-ethics or of the mode of produc-
tion. The effort to maintain and defend the human nexus even by recourse
to force naturally increased the influence of the military in Japanese society
and made them the ruling class for so long a time.
Japanese society has never firmly established a class comparable to the
literati in China or to the caste of Brahmin-priests in India. It cannot be
said that the socio-economic situation in Japan prevented such a class from
emerging. It was rather the Japanese inclination to emphasize the order of
human nexus that enabled the soldiers, whose essential function was the
use of force, to rise to high positions as the rulers of the society. This
tendency persisted from antiquity down to very recent days. Men of letters
were, generally speaking, given only minor positions as aides and advisers.
These characteristics made Japan vastly different from other Asiatic coun-
tries. In reference to this point, Max Weber explains: 245 "The contrast of
Japan with China came from elements intimately associated with the
cultural features of feudal Japan, particularly in the following aspects. In
Japan it was not the unmilitary literati but the class of professional soldiers
that were most influential socially. As in the Medieval West, it was the
custom and culture of the knight that regulated practical conduct, not the
certificate of passing an examination or scholarly refinement as in China. It
was also a this-worldly (innerweltlich) culture that regulated practical con-
duct as in the ancient classical West, not the transcendent philosophy of
deliverance as in India." As far as this aspect is concerned, the comment of
this German sociologist seems to be valid.
Within Japanese society a pattern of conduct had thus been estab-
lished, in which the soldiers took pride in their position as soldiers, pledged
loyalty under any circumstances to their lords, and readily died for them.
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Readiness to defend the human nexus even by force, and the conse-
quent dominance of the soldier, also determined modes of acculturation. In
transplanting Confucianism, the Japanese ruling class equated the Con-
fucian bureaucracy and the samurai class in Japan. The two, however,
were essentially different; therefore, the way of the high officials was not
immediately identified with the way of the samurai. Consequently, they
had to wait until a scholar like Soko Yamaka (1622-1685) appeared and
formulated the theory of the way of samurai availing himself of Confucian
theory. Most of the books on the way of samurai were written in a spirit
apparently independent of Confucian theory.
What changes did Buddhism suffer in this regard? Buddhism origi-
nally abhorred control by force and aimed at the achievement of an ideal
society not based upon the relationship of dominance-submission due to
power. Consequently, both in India and in China, followers of Buddhism
regarded benevolence and forbearance as particularly important virtues.
Laymen might resort to violence, but never the clergy. In any monastic
order of any world religion in past history, it would be hard to find men so
far removed from military power as the Buddhist believers in India and
China. Even after the advent of Buddhism to Japan, among the earliest
Buddhist orders such virtues were still kept intact.
It was impossible, however, that a religious order should alone escape
from the general way of thinking prevalent among the Japanese. After the
Heian period, various large temples, which owned large estates, supported
priest-soldiers, whose force was utilized to achieve the temples' demands.
There were also armed conflicts between temples and shrines. At the time
of the feud between the Genji and Heike clans, old shrine families affiliated
themselves to one or the other clan and fought. The fleet of the Kumano
Shrine, for instance, assisted Genji, while the head priest of the Usa Shrine
belonged to Heike. Originally the ideal of shrines and temples was to stand
aloof from political conflicts and to keep their estates intact, as sacred
neutral zones, against invasion from all directions. But the attitude that
men of religion are justified in using armed force naturally led the priests
of temples and shrines to take up arms for self-defense. According to the
reports of Christian missionaries in Japan, the monasteries at Negoro
always supported a host of priest-soldiers and let them train themselves in
military affairs. Once a giant bell was rung, it was said, 30,000 soldiers
could be summoned in just three or four hours. 246 In the 15th and 16th
centuries and the Age of Civil Wars, the followers of the True Pure Land
sect and the Nichiren sect rose to arms against the pressure of feudal lords.
At the time the chief abbot Rennyo was in Yoshizaki; he summoned the
priests and their families, belonging to the central cathedral, and forced
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them to decide a few days in advance. "Our destiny is predetermined by
the deeds in our previous lives, so you should not be afraid of death. Yau
should fight."247
No precedent has ever been recognized in India or in China sanc-
tioning the use of force by a Buddhist order. In India the Sikhs, Naga, and
Saiva ascetics were once armed but those were rather exceptional cases. In
Japan, at an early stage of the modern period, there occurred a war based
upon the conHict of religions in the case of the insurrection of Japanese
Catholics at Shimabara. Compared with the Catholic-Protestant religious
strife in the West, this insurrection is hardly worth mentioning. But it is
noteworthy that such a phenomenon appeared at a considerably early date
solely in Japan and not in other Asiatic countries. It was a manifestation of
the effort of devotion to defend one's own religious order even when
recourse to force was necessary. This is why, once the security of the
religious order was assured, the order instantly ceased fighting. After na-
tional unification was brought about by Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1536-1598),
all the Buddhist orders abandoned arms. Subsequently, however, the
inclination .to maintain and expand Buddhist orders by force persisted.
This is, according to my view, mainly based upon the "sectarian-factional
tendency" already discussed.
The Japanese respect for arms in the past inHuenced the mode of
acceptance of Buddhist thought; the fact that the worship of Acalanatha is
considerably popular among the Japanese people is an illustration.
Acalanatha, wearing the features of indignation, living in the midst of
blazing Harne, with a sharp-edged sword in his right hand and a rope in his
left hand, is the scourge of all troubles and disturbances, both internal and
external, and defeats and annihilates devils. Acalanatha is a divine being
who made his first appearance toward the last stage of Buddhism when
esoteric Buddhism was founded and popular religion was adopted. He
scarcely appears in the extant Sanskrit Buddhist Scriptures.24s His place in
Indian Buddhism was therefore dubious. In China he was hardly respected
either.249 There are five great Buddhas portrayed in the Diamond Realm
(Kongo-kai) and Realm of the Womb (Taizo-kai) ma1J~alas, introduced by
Kobo (Kiikai, 774-835), and thereafter, in Japan, Acalanatha and other
Myoos (Vidyiiriija) or Sage-Kings were very often represented in painting
and sculpture. So in the T'ang dynasty (618-907) in China, Acalanatha
and other Myoos might at first have been worshipped. But the fact that they
ceased to be worshipped later seems to be a proof that the idea of the
conquest of devils with swords, which is the intrinsic virtue and merit of
Acalanatha, was not congenial to the Chinese view of religion. Benevolence
characterized by Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva was the religious ideal of the
Chinese. In contrast, the feature of defeating enemies and conquering
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devils is embodied in Acalanatha and is better suited to the minds of the
Japanese. For the same reason the worship of the great commander
(Atavika) was widely practiced in Japan. Even Amitabha, who is benevo-
lence itself, was supposed to use armed force. The expression, "the sharp-
edged sword of Amitabha," is often used in Japanese literature. It was
originally derived from a phrase in the Hanju Panegyric, written by
Shan-tao of the Tang period in China; "The sharp-edged sword is another
name for Amitabha. An invocation of the name absolves one from all sin."
The sharp-edged sword in this case, however, is a mere figure of speech.
The Japanese took it as if Amitabha had used the real sword to punish the
wicked.250 And they sought in this interpretation of Amitabha for the
justification of using armed force in war.
The Japanese respect for arms is manifested in the rigor and relent-
lessness with which Zen priests trained their disciples. Jakurei Tsiigen
(1322-1391), whose teaching was most widely inherited in the SoW sect, is
famous for his "pit of burying-alive." When an itinerant priest came to him
in order to receive training, it was said, he tested the newcomer and if he
perceived in the latter any impurity of motivation, he then simply threw
him down into the pit.251 In India there were many who performed reli-
gious austerities upon themselves, but no such atrocity was perpetrated
upon others. Shosan Suzuki (157~1655), a samurai by origin, advocated
what is called the Zen of the Two Kings. The gist of his teaching is to
practice Zen with the spirit of Two Kings, the fierce and the brave. "In
these days," he preaches, "it has been overlooked that the Buddhist Law is
saturated with great strength of prowess and solidity. It has come to be soft,
gentle, disinterested, and goodnatured, but none has trained himself to
bring forth the spirit of a vengeful Ghost. Everyone should be trained to be
brave, and to become a vengeful Ghost of Buddhism."252 He taught his
followers to practice religion, face to face with high-spirited images of
Buddha. "Observing the features of the construction of Buddhist images,
one would see at the gate an image of Vajra Sattva, in the parlor, Twelve
Divinities, Sixteen Good Gods, Eight Attendants of Vajrasatta, the Four
Kings of Gods and Five Great Buddhas, all displaying their strength,
dressed in suits of armour, and armed with halberds, swords, sticks, and
bows and arrows. Those who do not grasp the meaning of such display
would be unable to heal the six affiictions which should be regarded as
enemies. Pray, observe Buddhist images well and practice religion."253
Such a violent way of preaching as the above seems never to have occurred
among Buddhist followers in either India or China. That was the way in
which Buddhism, particularly the Zen sect, was made to bestow upon
swordsmanship its spiritual basis. The Zen priest, Takuan (1573-1645),
preached to a swordsman, Yagiu Tajima-no-Kami: "What is called the Bash
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of striking fire with stones means to be as quick as a lightning. If one's
name is called out, 'Emon!' [like 'Jack!' in English], he answers, 'Aye.' That
is intelligence. But if he is called 'Emon' and asks back, What do you
want?' after stopping to think about what the caller wants, that is an
affliction characteristic of the mind of a mediocrity, which stops to be
moved by things and to go astray. That is called an affliction that is prone
to stay. To answer 'Aye,' at the moment he is called 'Emon!,' is the wisdom
of Buddhas. Buddhas and living beings are not two different things; gods
and men are not two different things. Such a mind as described above may
be called either god or Buddha. Though there are many ways such as the
way of Shintoism, the way of poetry, or the way of Confucianism, all
amount to the lucidity of such a mind." The act of killing in combat is here
justified by Buddhism. It is the distinctive feature probably of Japanese
Buddhism alone to aim at the vindication of Buddhism by fighting.
Emphasis upon Human Activities
The elllergent and fluid way of thinking, i.e. the way of thinking that
asserts that reality is becoming or is in flux, as previously explained, is
compatible with the Japanese tendency to be anchored to a particular
human nexus. These two factors are combined to bring about an emphasis
upon activities within a concrete social nexus. The variety of religious
movements in Japan's history illustrates this social emphasis.
It is a well-known fact that primitive Shintoism was closely tied up
with agricultural rituals in agrarian villages, and that Shintoist gods have
been symbolized, even today, as gods of production.
Coming into contact with foreign cultures and getting acquainted
with Chinese religions, the Japanese selected Confucianism in particular,
although they were somewhat influenced also by the thoughts of both
Lao-tsu and Chuang-tsii. In other words, out of diverse Chinese philoso-
phies, they adopted and absorbed Confucianism, in particular, which in-
structs one in the way of right conduct within a concrete human nexus.
The thoughts of Lao-tsii and Chuang-tsu favor a life of seclusion in which
one escapes from a particular human nexus and seeks tranquility in con-
templative solitude. Such a way of life was not to the taste of most
Japanese. In contrast, Confucianism is essentially a doctrine whose secular
concerns make it rather hard to call it a religion, for it principally deter-
mines rules of conduct according to social proprieties and political prin-
ciples. In this respect, Confucianism never caused any serious conflict with
the existing Japanese thinking-pattern at the time of its importation.
In the case of Buddhism, however, there arose many problems. Bud-
dhism declares itself to be a teaching of the way to transcend worldliness.
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According to Buddhist philosophy, the positive stage of "transcending
worldliness" is attained by renouncing "this world." The central figures in
Buddhist orders were all priests, who had freed themselves not only from
their families but from any specific human nexus. In China, Buddhism was
severely criticized by Confucians on the ground that by commending
priesthood the Buddhists were destroying the family and civic basis of the
human nexus.254 In the same manner, Buddhism was condemned in Japan
in the modern period by scholars of Japanese and Chinese classical litera-
ture. It is a well-known fact that at the time of the advent of Buddhism
there arose various conflicts. Nevertheless Buddhism rushed in like a
torrent and, before the Meiji Restoration, Japan appeared to be entirely a
country of Buddhism. How was it then that the Japanese, who had a high
esteem for a concrete worldly human nexus, accepted Buddhism, which
was condemned for tending to destroy this nexus? Let us dwell a while
upon this question.
In early Indian Buddhism the central figures of the orders were
bhik~us (monks) and bhi~nis (nuns). The lay followers assisted and
protected the monks and nuns, and became devotees under their spiritual
guidance and education. Not only in Buddhism but in the religious orders
of the time in general, except for Brahmins, the central figures were monks
(ascetics). Early Buddhism merely followed the modes of the day. The
monks of early Buddhism at first formed an exclusive community, the
Samgha (the ideal society), keeping themselves aloof from the impurities of
the secular world; and then they tried to guide laymen with their religious
and moral influence. So it is too rash to conclude that to become a monk
was to destroy the human nexus. Moreover, in those days there existed
good social reasons that made it necessary for a great many people to
become monks.
The topographical characteristics of Japan, vastly different from those
of India, required men to serve humanity within a specific human nexus.
The doctrine of early Buddhism is not quite compatible with such require-
ments. So it came about that early Buddhism, together with traditional
conservative Buddhism which inherited the former teachings, was despised
and rejected under the name of "Hinayana" (Forsaken or Lesser Vehi-
cle),255 whereas the Mahayana (Greater Vehicle) form of Buddhism was
particularly favored and adopted. Mahayana Buddhism was a popular
religion that came to the fore after the Christian era, after the period when
the Ku~a1!a people were in power in Northern India. Some schools of
Mahayana Buddhism, if not all, advocated comprehending the absolute
truth within secular life, and in accepting Buddhism, the Japanese selected
a school of just such a nature. And even in accepting those doctrines
originally devoid of such a secular nature, they deliberately bestowed such
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a this-wordly character upon them. The phrase, "Japan is the country
where Mahayana Buddhism is in practice,"256 should be understood espe-
cially in the light of these basic facts.
This attitude of accepting Buddhism is clearly shown in the case of
Prince Sh6toku. His "Commentaries upon Three Sutras" are those upon
"the Shaman Sutra," "the Yuima Sutra," and "the Hokke Sutra." The
selection of these three Sutras out of a multitude was entirely based upon
the Japanese way of thinking. "The Shaman Sutra" was preached, al-
legedly in compliance with Buddha's command, by Sh6man (srImaladevi),
who was a queen and a lay believer during the life-time of the Buddha.
"The Yuima Sutra" has a dramatic composition, in which Yuima, a lay
believer, gives a sermon to monks and ascetics, reversing the usual order
because it commends grasping the truth in secular life. And according to
"the Hokke or Lotus Sutra" all laymen who faithfully follow the teachings
of the Buddha are expected to be delivered. The Crown Prince himself, all
through his life, remained a lay believer. It is said that he called himself
"Shaman, a Child of the Buddha."257 The intention of Prince Sh6toku was
to put emphasis upon the realization of Buddhist ideals within a concrete
human nexus and to remain himself in secular life.258
All through the "Commentaries" by Prince Sh6toku, the author seeks
an absolute significance, in each instance, of practical conduct in everyday
life. He asserts: "Reality is no more than today's occurrence of cause and
effect." And he interprets: "The ten thousand virtues are all contained in
today's effect."259 Such an interpretation has something in common with
the doctrines of the Tendai and Kegon sects, but the particularistic expres-
sion "today's" makes it distinctly Japanese. Since it attaches great impor-
tance to action in actual human conditions, for those who have gone
through Buddhist reflection, this world of impurities and sufferings in
itself turns out to be a place of blessings. "Since a sage wishes to enlighten
mankind, he regards life and death as a garden."26o All the good deeds
practiced in the world of life and death are eventually turned into the
causes that lead men to the rank of a Buddha. "Uncountable or myriad
good deeds equally lead to becoming a Buddha."261 It is worth noting that
the ultimate state of religion is not bestowed upon men by divine entities
that transcend them, but is realized through practice within the human
situation. "The result of becoming a Buddha springs from myriad deeds."262
Mahayana Buddhism stressed altruistic deeds. Prince Sh6toku put a
special emphasis upon the belief that Buddhas and Bodhisattvas should
serve all mankind (or living beings); this is the reason for certain distorted
interpretations given by the Prince to phrases in the Buddhist scriptures.263
According to the "Hokke Sutra" one is advised to sit always in religious
meditation. This sentence was revised by Prince Sh6toku to read: "Do not
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approach a person who always sits in religious meditation."264 The meaning
is that unintermittent sitting in meditation prevents a man from practicing
altruistic deeds.
A similar idea underlies the later teachings of Japanese Buddhism.
According to Saicho (Saint Dengyo), both priests and laymen should
achieve the self-same ideal (the consistency of priesthood and laity). Ac-
cording to Kiikai (Saint Kobo), absolute reason should be realized through
actuality (Reality is revealed in accordance with things).
That famous poem of the alphabet (lroha-uta) is said to have been
written by Kobo, but in fact it is a Japanese version of a Chinese poem
which in turn is a translation of a Sanskrit poem.
(The Japanese version:)
Although fragrant in hue,
(blossoms) are scattered
For everyone, life is impermanent.
This morning I crossed the uttermost limit
A shallow dream I will not dream, nor will I become intoxicated.
(The Chinese poem:)
Whatever is phenomenal is impermanent;
Their essential characteristic is appearance and disappearance;
When these appearances and disappearances come to repose,
tranquility is comfort.
In the poetry quoted above, the Indians said, "Peoce of mind consoles"
(Vupasamo sukho); the Chinese translated it: "Tranquility is comfort." But
the Japanese, not being satisfied with these expressions that give impres-
sions of passivity and negation, revised it: "A shallow dream I will not
dream, nor will I become intoxicated." In this translation there is an
expression of positive determination. (It is to be noted that while the
original Indian poem contains only very abstract concepts, the Japanese
revised them into concrete and intuitive symbols.)
Some people might argue that the Pure Land (Jodo) sects advised
their believers to abandon this world and induced them gladly to seek the
other world. But that is a serious misconception of the essence of the Pure
Land teachings. According to the Pure Land Buddhism, this world is
subordinate to the other world, and the other world reveals itself in this
world, the land of impurity. The practice of the most pious among the
believers is to realize what is beyond this world within this very world.
"The Larger Sukhiivati Sutra" (Dainmryo-ju kyo) praises the splendor and
grandeur of the heavenly world (Sukhiivati-lokadhiitu), and at the same
time it puts emphasis upon the noble meaning of moral deeds in this world.
I
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The maintenance of abstention and purification of one's self with sincerity
and determination in this world even for a day and night would excel a
hundred years of good deeds in the heavenly world. The reason is, it is
taught, that this world abounds with evils and men suffer from afRictions.
The idea that he who believes in the true wish of Amitabha would be
delivered even though he remained a layman, persisted all through the
Heian period (794-1185) as an influential current of thought. From court
nobles, warriors, and hunters, to prostitutes and robbers, they all expected,
even if they remained laymen, to be born again in the Pure Land.265 It was
Honen (1133-1212) who gave a theoretical basis to such a tendency of
thinking. And this idea of becoming a Buddha, although one was a layman,
was handed down to Nichiren (1222-1282).266
It was Shinran (II73-1262) who pushed this secularism to its ex-
treme. He completely denied the life of an ascetic. He advocated becoming
a Buddhist as a layman, and put it into practice himself. He worshipped
Prince Shotoku, who was a layman, as "the founder of the religion of
Japan." And he maintained that the absolute state commended by the Pure
Land Buddhism can be attained in the secular life. Let us compare his idea
with that or'the Chinese Pure Land Buddhism. The Chinese Pure Land
teachings attach great importance to the significance of the moment of
death. According to Tao-ch'o (562-645) of China, at the moment of death,
a man's whole existence is revealed by way of overall settlement of the
accounts of his conduct not only in this world but also in former existences.
"Should a streak of evil thought come to one's mind at the moment of
death, that being by far the most evil of all evils, one should certainly fall
into the road of agony (hell, the inferno of starvation, and the world of
beasts), making nil all his blessings in the three worlds, i.e. carnal, material,
and non-material."267 This Chinese Buddhist's view was inherited
by Honen.
According to Shinran, however, one puts an end to this life of delusion
at the moment of the attainment of faith, and a new life begins thereupon.
In his view, therefore, the moment of death does not count much. "The
true believer of the Buddha, since the Buddha accepts and never abandons
those genuinely devoted to nembutsu prayers, is to stay in the rank of those
already destined to be saved. Such a person, therefore, does not need to
wait until the moment of death to pray for the welcome of the Buddha.
When one's faith is settled, one's birth in the Pure Land is also deter-
mined."268 At the moment when one attains religious belief even in an
everyday situation, he preaches, the cause for one to be reborn into the
Pure Land has already been established.
Right along with such a point of view, Shinran, following the Taoist
writings of Shan Tao (613-681) of China, gives a somewhat different
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interpretation to them. Shan Tao says in his "Praise of Birth in the Pure
Land"269 as follows: "Those who wish to be reborn into the Pure Land now
ought constantly to exercise self-denial and ought not to cease to do so even
for a moment till the end of their lives. Should they keep practicing
nemhutsu all through their lives, hard as it might be, if at one moment
their life comes to an end, then in the next moment they will be reborn
into the Pure Land. And they would receive celestial blessing that would
never come to an end." These lines mean that one who practices the
nemhutsu prayer (reciting the name of Buddha) can be reborn, the moment
after his death, into the Pure Land. But according to the }odo-shin sect,
which maintains that one is saved at the time when one establishes one's
belief, without waiting until the moment of death, the former moment is
interpreted as the moment when one attains belief, and the latter as the
moment after one is saved.270 "What is called Rebirth in the Pure Land
does not necessarily designate the moment when life ends, but it means
that the delusive causes in the six roads, where souls are transmigrating
from time without beginning, are annihilated by the power of the vow
(grace) of the Buddha on which one relies by once invoking his name,
'Namu-amida-butsu.' And it means that the true cause, which inevitably
brings forth Nirvary.a, for the first time begins to emanate. This is exactly
what is to be interpreted from being reborn into the Pure Land and not
regressing into the realm of the transmigration of the soul."271
In similar fashion, the }odo thought of Tao-ch'o underwent trans-
formation when it was accepted. He says: "If one is able to be reborn into
the Pure Land, the cause-and-effect linkage of the three worlds comes to its
end. This is nothing but attaining the status of Nirvary.a, without being
delivered from affiictions. Why should we speculate on it?"272 This means
that after one is reborn into the Pure Land, then one is entitled to enter
NirvaQa. Basing himself upon this sentence, Shinran asserts: "Without
being delivered from affiictions, one attains Nirvary.a."273 According to the
doctrine of the }odo-shin sect, to be reborn into the Pure Land is itself
Nirvary.a, to be entitled to enter Nirvary.a is a divine favor given to one in
this world. 274 Rennyo (1415-1499) is said to have declared: "When one
once comes to rely upon the Buddha, one is disposed to the condition of
being reborn into the Pure Land. This is the secret of rebirth into the Pure
Land. This predisposition is what is called the preliminary state of getting
into Nirvary.a."275
The }odo-shin sect emphasizes not only that all living creatures are
saved through their religious faith (the turning towards the Pure Land),
but also that the Great Benevolence saves all those who are lost (the
returning from the Pure Land).276 Pure Land Buddhism was originally full
of justifications for realistic and practical activities, which were particularly
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accentuated in Japan. During the Tokugawa period (1600-1867), the mer-
chants of Omi province, who peddled their wares assiduously all around the
country, were mostly devoted followers of the Jodo-shin sect, and travelled
around in a spirit of service to others.211
A similar tendency is also present in the Zen sect. Eisai (I 141- 1215)
who inherited the Zen of the Rinzai school somewhat compromised and
fused with other sects. But Dogen (1200-1253) who inherited the Zen of
the Soto school emphasized: "Concentrate on sitting in meditation." This
concentration on sitting in meditation was spread among the people not as a
method for each monk to attain tranquility of mind, but rather as a method
for warriors and other laymen to acquire their mental training.
Among the Japanese advocates of Zen, in contrast to the Indian and
Chinese Zen masters, there arose an opinion that even monks should
perform religious practices in the midst of the tumult of secular life. A
didactic poem by Myocho (National Master Daito, 1282-1337) says:
"Sit in meditation, and behold the pedestrians,
On the Shijo Bridge, on the Gojo Bridge,
"Emerging like trees on the mountain ridge."218
The Zen monks traditionally lived in seclusion in the steep mountains
and dark valleys and concentrated upon their ascetic practices, severing
their ties to the secular world. But here the poem preaches that one should
attain the mental atmosphere of Zen practice in the midst of secular life,
amidst the clamor of the city. It was inconceivable for the Chinese Zen
priests to make such a statement.
Shosan Suzuki (1579-1655), a Zen priest of modernistic learning,
pushed this point still further, and advocated sitting in meditation just as
though one had been on the battlefield. "Once I told a certain warrior that
it was good to train oneself from the very beginning to sit in meditation in
a whirl of business. Warriors especially ought to practice sitting in medita-
tion, which means to be fit for action in the midst of a battlecry. It should
mean fitness for sudden action amidst the clamor and tumult of the roaring
of guns, the exchange of fights with spearheads and battlecries. How could
the kind uf sitting in meditation that is only fit for tranquility be of any use
under such circumstances? However excellent a Buddhist doctrine may be,
you had better leave it, if it be of no use amidst the battlecry. You should
always try to live up to none other than the Two Deva kings."219
According to the regulations of the order of the monks of early
Buddhism, the monks who have taken orders are not allowed to look upon
soldiers on march to the battlefield. They may sojourn a few nights with
the army, if there be some special reasons to do so, but even then their
sojourn with the army ought not to be prolonged any further. While they
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are staying with the army, as the regulation goes, they are prohibited from
viewing the lineup, arrangement, and inspection of the troops.280 "A battle-
cry sitting in meditation," as advocated by Shi5san Suzuki, is completely
against the tradition of the Zen practice as handed down from early
Buddhism. He approached Zen in the spirit of a warrior, and he was
not satisfied with the attitude of the Chinese Zen priests. He criticized
them as being halfway Zennists. "Ta-hui (1089-II63) showed that one
should put the two characters, Life and Death, on the point of one's nose
and should not forget about them. Po-shan (1575-1650) taught that every-
one should paste on his forehead the character Death. These teachings
do not have strength. To preach putting the words on the point of one's
nose, or to paste them on one's forehead is a borrowed thought and not
one's own thought. Persons like Ta-hui and Po-shan do not seem to have
mastered the problems of life and death, or have felt in their own hearts
the importance of these matters. What they say is too weak. On my part I
would teach to hold on to these matters, making this one word Death the
lord of your mind and placing it above everything eIse."281
Buddhist morals were also metamorphosed. The Indians considered
alms-giving a virtue of principal importance for Buddhists, as something to
be strictly observed. Most of the Buddhist scriptures extol the deeds of
those who abandoned not only their country, castles, wives, and children,
but also their own bodies and gave them most generously to other human
beings (or animals).282 Such a life of abandoning everything and possessing
nothing was an ideal life for the Indian ascetics. Recourse to such a drastic
measure, however, was not allowed by the Japanese, who attached more
importance to the concrete human nexus. Prince Shi5toku, therefore, con-
fined the meaning of "alms-giving" to "the abandonment of property other
than one's own body."283 In this manner, the inclination of the Indians to
go beyond the ethics of mundane human relationships underwent revision
when Buddhism was accepted by the Japanese.
The emphasis upon social and economic conditions runs parallel to the
stress upon all the productive activities of men. In a country like India
where the intensity of heat, the abundance of rainfall, and the fertility of
the soil together bring forth a rich harvest, without much human labor
exerted on the land, the ethics of distribution rather than that of production
is naturally emphasized. That is a reason why alms-giving comes to be
considered most important. In a country like Japan, by contrast, production
is of vital importance, hence stress is placed upon the ethics of labor in
various professions.
The Hokke (Lotus) Siitra, the most important of all the Japanese
Buddhist scriptures, was accepted by the Japanese as something that gives a
theoretical basis for such a demand. The nineteenth chapter of the Hokke
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Siitra says as follows: If one preaches with the comprehension of the true
meaning of the Lotus Siitra, "when one preaches the laws of various
teachings, they all coincide with the true meaning and nothing shall
contradict the True Aspect. When one preaches the scriptures that are
secularized, the words of this-worldly government; or the deeds of produc-
tion, they all accord with the True Law."284 This sentence was interpreted
by the Japanese to mean that everything is true as long as it comes from a
man who has once comprehended the truth of the Hokke Siitra. The same
sentence was interpreted by the Chinese, however, to mean that all activi-
ties in the fields of politics and economics were to be subjected to the
Absolute One. The Chinese Buddhist Ch'ang-shui Tsu-hsiian (d. 1038)
says: "The One mind, the Eternal Truth, and the aspect of appearance and
disappearance are not separate things. That they are one is revealed in
accordance with the fact that they are three; that they are three is discussed
in accordance with the fact that they are one. Government and production,
therefore, are not in contradiction with the True Aspect."285 This idea of
Ch'ang-shui came to be taken by the Japanese as the original idea of the
Lotus Siitra.286
Some of the Japanese Buddhists were thus led to recognize the particu-
larly sacred significance of physical labor. And the Lotus Siitra came to be
accepted as a scripture to commend physical labor. The following poem,
known to have been composed by Gyoki, says:
"That I have attained the Lotus Siitra
Was possible only through
Making firewood, gathering herbs,
Drawing water, and laboring thus."287
This idea comes up in the tale of the Lotus Siitra, which relates the
story that in the past the Buddha entered priesthood and lived in seclusion,
practicing asceticism with a hermit. "I followed a hermit, supplying daily
necessities, gathering fruits, drawing water, picking up firewood, cooking
meals, and making my own body a place of repose, but I never felt tired."288
This story, which is only slightly touched upon in the Hokke Siitra,
appeared to Gyoki (668-749) as something very important, and gave him
the impetus to carry out his meritorious works of social welfare.
It is a historically well-known fact that the Buddhists endeavored to go
directly to the people through various works of social welfare. To illustrate,
during the Nara period, Dosho (629-700) spent his last years in travelling
around the country, providing ferryboats, building bridges, and doing
many other things for the good of the people. The social welfare works of
Gyoki are said to have resulted in the construction of "six bridges, three
water tanks, nine charity houses, two ferry depots, fifteen ponds, seven
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canals, four conduits, and one straight road."289 It is also well known that
Klikai, early in the ninth century, had a reservoir constructed and built the
university Shugei Shuchiin. After that a tremendous number of roads,
harbors, and lodging places were built by priests and productive activities
were carried out by them. During the Kamakura period, the Ritsu sect was
particularly popular among common men and women on account of their
endeavors in social welfare works. Eison (1201-1290) of the Saidai Temple
and Ninsho (1218-1303) of the Gokuraku Temple had roads opened up,
bridges constructed, wells dug, rice fields cultivated, bathrooms, hospitals,
and homes for beggars built, not to speak of the construction of temples
and towers, giving commandments to men and women ecclesiastical and
secular, copying scriptures and drawing the images of Buddhas. That some
Buddhists are enthusiasts in social welfare works is a phenomenon common
to India and China. So it would be too rash to conclude that it is a
manifestation of the characteristics only of the Japanese. It is noteworthy,
however, that the Ritsu sect, which originally belonged to Hinayana Bud-
dhism, should plunge into such practical and positive activities. It was
particularly against the traditional disciplines that Ninsho carried out
public works which were deeds of altruism. But it was not considered to be
a breach of discipline either by himself or by his contemporaries. Japanese
Buddhists came to maintain the view that one should repudiate traditional
disciplines in the name of disciplines for the promotion of productive
activities. According to the traditional discipline of early Buddhism, monks
were not allowed to accumulate gold and silver, but on this point Tainin
(d. 1786) of the Yagotozan Temple says:
"It is an infringement of discipline not to receive or accumulate gold
and silver, being satisfied with small things, small deeds, and small ambi-
tions, and coveting the fame of petty complacency. Now that you are
already a priest who observes the three disciplines of the Mahayana
Bodhisattva, you should live in the vow of boundless altruism and receive
and accumulate gold and silver, in order to make the Three Precious Ones
(The Buddha, Dharma, and Samgha) prosper and to benefit mankind."290
This way of thinking leads one to esteem highly the commonplace
everyday life of men. It is to be expected that the Pure Land and Nichiren
sects, which are closely connected with people's ways of living should be
strongly imbued with such a tendency. But it is noteworthy that even
Dagen and his order are tinged with the same characteristics. Dagen says
that people commonly believe that an occult power is nothing more than
exhaling water and fire from the body or absorbing water from the ocean
into the pores. These may be called "small occult powers" but they are not
worthy of the name of the true occult powers. The true occult powers, that
is to say, "great occult powers," exist within and only within simple every-
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day occurrences of "drinking tea, eating rice, drawing water, and carrying
faggots." This "great occult power" is called "the Buddha's occult power" or
"the occult power that aspires to be a Buddha," and one who practices the
Buddha's occult power will eventually become "an occult-power Buddha."
"The occult power" is, therefore, nothing but what is experienced in
everyday life. On the contrary, it is nothing but living righteously one's
own daily life. It is the plain practical life that grows into the wonder of all
wonders. If one lives up to this truly enough, one should be able to become
a Buddha (an occult-power Buddha), immediately in his own mundane
existence.291
Dagen also thought that Buddhism could be realized within the
vocational lives of the secular society. "One who thinks that mundane
affairs hinder Buddhist practices only thinks that there is no Buddhist
practice possible in mundane affairs, but knows not that there is no concern
for mundane affairs within Buddhism (every activity is Buddhist)."292
Being asked whether or not a man in the lay condition obsessed with daily
business would be able to become a Buddha, and should practice asceticism,
Dagen replies: "In the great Sung country, there are no kings, ministers,
warriors, co~moners, and men and women who did not take note of the
way of the ancient masters. Warriors and men of letters alike aspired to
Zen practice and learning. Those who aspired mostly attained enlighten-
ment. This naturally proves that mundane affairs are no hindrance to Bud-
dhist laws."293
Thereafter Dagen discarded this viewpoint and came to emphasize
entrance into priesthood as a necessary condition for practicing Buddhism.
It is noteworthy, however, that there was once a time, temporary as it was,
when he held the secular view.
Tettsii Gikai (1219-13°9), the third chief priest of the Eihei Temple
says: "The dignity of a Buddha today lies within the daily movements of
one's arms and legs. There is no natural law, no reality or profound reason
without them."294 The way is realized when and only when the chief priest
and rank-and-file priests "are in one mind to perform actions."
The principle characteristic of Eihei Shingi, the regulations of life at
the Eiheiji Temple Order (ordained by Dagen), lies in the fact that they
are not only a collection of prohibitory articles of conduct as the disciplinary
regulations of Indian Buddhism (pii~imokkha) are, but in the fact that they
are the clear statements of the positive forms of action through which one
may participate in the activities of a community.
At Zen temples, such daily jobs as cleaning, weeding, mending, and
carpentry are generally called samu (doing service). That Buddhism should
serve as the foundation for secular life was, for Nichiren, a necessary
conclusion to be deduced from the theory in the Hokke Siitra of the True
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Aspect of all Existences. Nichiren says: "When the sky clears, the features
of the earth are distinct. The man who knows the Hokke attains the law of
this world, does he not?"295 According to him, the secular society where
men live may in itself become the Pure Land. "These days of degeneration,
the place where the Hokke Siitra lies, the place where the ascetic lives, and
the place where people, lay or priestly, male or female, and rich or poor,
may live-these are the very elements of what is none other than the Pure
Land. Where these things are there the Pure Land is. Then could it be
possible that the one who lives there should not be a Buddha?"296
Such a view was upheld also by the Imperial family. Emperor Hana-
zono writes in 13 10 as follows:
"Among good deeds, not to inflict evil upon people is the most impor-
tant. One should not seek the reason of Buddhism outside of this. To reign
over the country and to feed the people are the acts of redemption of the
warrior clan. Why should one practice the affairs of the Buddha outside of
all these? It is a corrupt custom of the time to practice the affairs of the
Buddha outside of the affairs of the king. On my part, I do not seek the law
of the Buddha except for what is within my own mind. One should not
necessarily wait for the scripture which is set forth lawfully. . . . What is
called the law of the mundane world and what is called the Law of the
Buddha are not separate things. The Hokke says that all the words of the
government of the mundane world accord with the True Law....297
Emperor Wu of Liang in China was a devoted follower of Buddhism,
who endeavored to govern the country with Buddhism. Having had many
temples built, he came across Bodhidharma and asked him whether such
good deeds of his were meritorious. He expected praise from him. Bodhi-
dharma's reply was contrary to his expectation. He answered that no merits
could come forth therefrom. Bodhidharma is then said to have gone to the
Chao-lin-ssu Temple of Sung-shan Mountain and is said to have continued
sitting on the floor, facing the wall, for nine years. It is needless now to go
into a discussion as to the credibility of this story. But in it we recognize the
religious ideal of the Chinese Zen priests. By contrast to their ideal,
Emperor Hanazono of Japan asserted, that Buddhism was nothing but
practical and secular activities.
Toward the modern period there appeared a theory that if a man put
his heart and soul in his own secular profession, then he was practicing
nothing but the ascetic practice of Buddhism. The Zen priest, Takuan
(1573-1645), teaches: "The law of the Buddha, well observed, is identical
with the law of mundane existence. The law of mundane existence, well
observed, is identical with the law of the Buddha. The Way is practical
only. Except for being practical, there is no Way." (Ketsujo-shu) This
point was especially stressed by the Zen priest Sh6san Suzuki, who says:
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"Many are the ascetics, lay and priestly, from olden times, who are well
versed only in the law of the Buddha; but there is none who advocates
applying it to matters of the mundane existence. Am I the first to advocate
this?"298 He writes a book called "The Significance of Everyman's Activi-
ties" (Banmin Tokuyo), in which he discusses the problems of vocational
ethics. He finds absolute significance in the pursuit of any profession,
whether one is a warrior, a farmer, a craftsman, a merchant, a doctor, an
actor, a hunter, or a priest, Because it is the essence of Buddhism, according
to him, to rely upon the original self or upon "the true Buddha of one's
own," and because every vocation is the function of this "one Buddha," his
teaching amounts to saying that to pursue one's own vocation is to obey the
Absolute One. So he preaches to farmers, "Farming is nothing but the
doings of a Buddha."299 To merchants he teaches, "Renounce desires and
pursue profits wholeheartedly. But you should never enjoy merits of your
own. You should, instead, work for the good of all others." Since the
afRictions of this world, it is said, are predetermined in former worlds, one
should torture oneself by working hard at one's own vocation, in order to
redeem the sins of the past,300 It is noteworthy that immediately after the
death of Calvin, an idea similar to his appeared almost contemporaneously
in Japan. The fact, however, that it never grew into a religious movement
of great consequence ought to be studied in relation to the underdevelop-
ment of modem bourgeois society in Japan.
Thereafter, similar ideas appeared from time to time from among the
Zen sect. Hakuin (1685-1768), who revived the Rinzai-zen sect in the
modem period, maintained that Zen ought to be lived even in secular
life.30l Bokuzan Nishiari (1821-1910), a high priest and superintendent
priest of the S6t6 sect says as follows: "There is nothing mundane not
within the practices of the Buddha. In governing a country as a ruler, in
taking part in civil life as a subject, in engaging in business, in tilling the
land as a farmer, and even in the falling of the rain and in the blowing of
the wind, if one opens up one's eyes wide enough and sees through them,
there is nothing that is not the law of the Buddha. So to say that this is a
matter of the Buddhist law or that is a matter of secular life is the saying of
those who have not yet attained the law of the Buddha. In the world of the
Law, there is no otiose piece of furniture. Even the otiose piece of furniture
is the law of the Buddha."302
Such a theory of religion also lends itself to religious movements
outside of this particular sect. One instance of those is the H6toku-sha, a
kind of social service activist movement of Sontoku Ninomiya (1787-
1856), the main current of whose philosophical background seems to
consist of the Tendai doctrine and the doctrine of Sung Neo-Confu-
THE TENDENCY TO EMPHASIZE A LIMITED SOCIAL NEXUS
cianism. It is worth noting that, while all the monistic philosophies of the
past and the present, of the East and West, tend to produce the attitude of a
resigned and indifferent spectator, his philosophy of the One Round Aspect
inclines to be practical and activistic. Sectarian Shintoisms also assume the
similar tendency. The founder of the Tenri religion teaches, "Keep your
heart pure, busy yourself with your vocation, and be true to the mind of
God."303 The other sectarian Shinto movements nearly all fall into a similar
pattern.
A vocational ethical theory of this sort naturally transforms the concept
of freedom. To use the word "freedom" and to aspire to the state of freedom
are parts of the ancient tradition of Zen Buddhism. The concept of free-
dom, however, was metamorphosed by some of the Japanese Zen priests.
Shosan Suzuki was an admirer of P'u-hua (9th century) of China. He had
something in common with P'u-hua, in respect to his aspiration to the state
of freedom, rampant and unmolested. P'u-hua was a free man, and Shosan
also thought freely. The difference, however, is that P'u-hua sought the
state of freedom by delivering himself from the human nexus, always
gadding about like a madman, constantly ringing his bell; whereas Shosan
sought his "freedom" in compliance with the human nexus, busying him-
self with his secular vocation.304
Respect for labor in vocational life resulted in a high esteem for
things produced as the fruits of labor. Reverence for foodstuff is especially
manifest. Dogen, for instance, recognizes the sacred significance of food
and says that each item of foodstuff should be called with honorifics.
"So-called rice-gruel (kayu) ought to be called honorable gruel (o-kayu), or
you may call it morning gruel, but just gruel, never. You should say
honorable offerings or you may say the time of the offering, but just
offering, never. You should say, 'honorably whiten rice,' but 'polish rice,'
never. You should say, 'honorably purify rice,' but 'rinse rice,' never. You
ought to say, 'Honorably select something of the honorable material of an
honorable side dish,' but 'choose a side-dish' never. You should say,
'Honorably prepare some honorable soup,' but 'Boil some soup,' never. You
should say, 'Honorably prepare some honorable broth,' but 'Prepare broth,'
never. The honorable offerings and the honorable gruel ought to be said to
be most honorably taken." Indeed, Dogen intended to "prepare offerings of
steamed and grueled rice, revering them with the use of utmost politeness
and supremely august wordings."305 The regulation that one should call the
names of foodstuff with honorifics has never been found in either an
Indian monastery or in any Chinese temple. Menzan Zuiho (1683-1769),
One of the revivers of the Soto theology during the Tokugawa period, wrote
a book called "Instructions on The Five Views of Receiving Food," in order
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to teach people how to take good care of food. "You should calculate and
measure how much of the hard work and toil have been put into this food
before it comes to you, in order to comprehend the Reason."306
The way of thinking which prizes all the products of labor, however
trivial they may be, is also manifest among the Jodo-shin sect, which is
diametrically opposed, in other aspects, to the Zen sect. Let me refer to the
following anecdote. "Rennyo, passing through the corridor, found a piece
of paper thereupon. Murmuring that one should not waste a thing of the
Buddha's possession, he took it into his hands and raised it above his head,
etc. It was said that even such a trifling thing as a piece of paper was
considered by Rennyo as a property of the Buddha, and that was why he
did not waste it."301
The doctrine not to waste but to respect the fruits of human labor, is
not necessarily confined to Japanese religions only; it seems to be common
to most of the universal religions. But in India or South Asiatic countries,
where men are not required to labor too hard in order to produce daily
necessities, relatively little has been preached about not wasting things.
The fact that it is particularly emphasized in Japan should be considered in
the light of tne topographical peculiarities of Japan.
Japanese Buddhism, which tends to recognize religious significance in
secular professional life or rather in everyday life in general, is apt to
spread among the common people. Indian Buddhism, by contrast, never
was able to become a religion of the whole nation. Besides Buddhism, there
was Jainism as its rival, and stronger and more deep-rooted than either of
them was Brahmanism. It is also doubtful how prevalent Chinese Bud-
dhism was among the people. Chinese Buddhism had a strong tendency to
become a religion of literati and of hermits. That Buddhism penetrated
into people's lives was also true in Tibet and South Asiatic countries, just
as it was in Japan, but the secularization of it was something unique in
Japan.
The inclination to recognize religious significance in secular life gave
rise to the tendency to seek the ideal "way" in everyday arts and crafts.
Hence emerged appellations such as the way of tea-ceremony, the way of
flower-arrangement, the way of calligraphy, the way of painting, the way
of military arts, the way of fencing, the way of jujutsu (i.e., judO), the way
of archery, and the way of medicine. Their origins seem to be in the 16th
century between the Muromachi and Tokugawa periods. Such appellations
as these do not find their correlations in the West. In this respect, there
seems to be some affinity between the Japanese and the Indians, who
developed the theory of art and the theory of technology with religious
justification. Even then, for the Indians, art was a medium for personal
deliverance, but for the Japanese it was hardly conceived as such.
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The Japanese thought that to propagate Buddhism was to profit their
particular human nexus. Tetsugen (1630-1682) says: "That is why it
(Buddhism) turns out to be prayer for the state, service to the gods of the
heaven and earth, repayment of one's debt to one's lord and father, and
compensation for the subjects' services."308 "All phenomenal things will
end up with tranquility; all the doctrines will have their proper status,
heaven and earth will be in their places; everything will grow; peace will
reign; and heaven and earth and the order of the state will long be
secured."309
As long as religion in Japan tends to realize itself within secular life, it
will naturally lend itself to the practical and active. Among the various
Buddhist sects, the Nichiren sect is the most pronounced in such a tend-
ency. In spite of the fact that the Hokke Siitra itself commends ascetics to
live tranquilly in a life of contemplation, the Nichiren sect which sub-
scribes to it tends towards action. Nichiren, at the inauguration of his sect,
recited "Nammyohorengekyo" (Homage to the Lotus Siitra!) sonorously
toward the rising sun in the forest of Asahi on Kiyosumi Mountain. The
"sun" is a favorite character of the Nichiren sect, which often uses it for
priests' names. The Nichiren followers long for the effulgent sun. The
religious custom of making a procession while repeating the Nichiren
prayer and beating drums would never have taken shape among the Bud-
dhist orders of India or China. (The only thing which may possibly be
comparable to this is the religious movement of Caitanya in modern
India.)
For a supplementary remark, the form of the acceptance of Chinese
thought was also tinged with an activistic tendency in interpreting the Way
of human beings. Jinsai Ito (1627-1705), in particular, understands what is
called the Way as being active and as representing the principle of growth
and development, and on that basis he rejects the nihilism of Lao-tzii. He
says: "Lao-tzii thinks that everything emerges out of nothing. But heaven
and earth cover all from time immemorial; and the sun and moon always
shine from time immemorial. The four seasons constantly shift from time
immemorial; what changes with form always changes with form from time
immemorial, and what changes with material always changes with material
from time immemorial. Things inherit and ferment one another, and
things go on living endlessly. How can one see what is called emptiness?"310
For him the universe is one big living thing, and its incessant life is what
the essence of the universe actually is. And he sought the basis for such a
view of looking at the universe as a living thing in the phrase, 'The great
virtue of heaven and earth is called life," in The Book of Change.311
In this manner Ito bestows a characteristically Japanese interpretation
even upon the words of Confucius. Confucius says in the Analects: "On
d
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the river, the master says, What passes away passes thus. It never ceases
day or night.' " The medieval Chinese interpreted the saying as words of
lamentation that "What passes away is like the water of a river, which,
once gone, never returns." According to Chu-hsi (II30-I20o), they are the
reflective observation of an objective spectator in which the water of the
river is made to symbolize everything that is in incessant motion and flow.
The Japanese Confucian scholar, Jinsai Ito however, gives these words an
interpretation entirely different from the Chinese. According to him, the
river stands for "the virtue of the wise man that is everyday made new, and
never becomes stagnant," and the whole sentence is the expression of the
exuberance of human vitality.312 In contrast to the negative, resigned, and
indifferent character of the Chinese interpretation, Ito's is positive, active,
and full of hopes. He has great confidence in human activity itself.
Sorai Ogyii (1666-1728), diametrically opposed to Jinsai Ito in every-
thing else, extols him as far as this ethics of activism is concerned. He says,
"Master Ito's theory of things alive and dead is indeed the supreme wisdom
of a thousand years."313 He positively advocates activism, and rejects the
static tendency of the Confucianists of the Sung period in China. "Heaven
and earth a're living things, and so is man. Those who regard them as
though they were tied up with a rope are only snobs poisoned by useless
learning."314 Quiet sitting and having reverential love in one's heart are the
methods of mental training made by most of the Confucianists of the Sung
period; these are ridiculed by Ogyii: "As I look at them, even gambling
appears superior to quiet sitting and having reverential love in
one's heart."315 (This corresponds to the view of Shosan Suzuki, who, Zen
priest thought he was, rejected the ascetic practice of sitting in meditation,
and, instead, recommended labor in secular professional life.) A necessary
conclusion drawn from such an attitude was the recommendation, as was
made by Ogyii, of practical learning, useful in practical life. And such was
the mental climate which nurtured the economic theory of Shundai Dazai
(1680-1747) and the legal philosophy of Chikukei Miura (1689-1756)
both of whom were Ogyii's disciples.
It is one of the pronounced characteristics of Japanese Confucianism
to commend activist ethics, on the one hand, and to reject the thoughts of
passive quietism, on the other. The most distinctively Japanese scholars
stand for the monism of matter, repudiating the dualism of reason and
matter. Soko Yamaga (1622-1685), Jinsai Ito, and Ekken Kaibara
(1650-1714) are all monists, believing in matter as the first principle of
existence. The second characteristic, running parallel to the first, is that
Japanese Confucianism directs its attention to politics, economics, and law,
the practical aspects of human life. Although Chinese Confucianism sur-
passes the Japanese in thinking upon metaphysical problems, Japanese
Confucianism is superior in practical matters.3IG
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The characteristics of Japanese thinking, as revealed in the form of
the acceptance of Confucianism, exactly correspond to those revealed in
the form of the acceptance of Buddhism.
That Japan alone was rapid in the process of modernization in recent
years, while the other Asiatic countries were generally slow in the process,
may partly be attributed to the emphasis laid by the Japanese upon practical
activities within the social nexus.317
A great danger lies, however, in the fact that the religious view of the
Japanese, as discussed above, may easily degenerate into the sheer utilitari-
anism of profit-seeking activities, should it lose sight of the significance of
the absolute, which underlies the productive life of all vocations. It is
especially true with a people like the Japanese, who are not too preoccupied
with religious matters. But at the same time credit should be given to the
tendency to find values in the human nexus. If the religion of Japan were
enhanced to such a height where religious truth might be realized in
accordance with a human nexus at once universal and particular, transcend-
ing all limited social loyalties and at the same time embracing all of them,
then and only then will it acquire a universal significance.
Acuteness of Moral Self-Re~ection
The emphasis put upon practice within the actual human nexus and
the stress laid upon the relationships among individuals rather than upon
the existence of the individual person increase the sensitivity of man to his
relationship with other men. First of all, given a way of thinking which
emphasizes social cooperation as the basic structure and the ground of the
individual's life, it becomes a matter of vital importance for a man what
others in the group may think of him. We should not fail to consider, for
example, the keen sense of social prestige of the Japanese. In the sixteenth
century, European missionaries came to Japan and reported that the Japa-
nese placed social prestige before wealth, a trait not so strong among
Europeans.3l8 What influence this tendency exerted upon Japanese Bud-
dhism is an interesting question to pose. It would seem that the keen sense
of honor of the Japanese is closely tied up, externally, with the high esteem
for the hierarchical order. And internally, in some cases, it motivates the
moral faculty of self-reflection. It posits before man the ideal of the infinite
good that he should strive for, it induces him to reflect, by contrast, upon
the sorry fact that he himself is too weak and helpless to refrain from doing
evil; and thus it awakens within him the consciousness of man's sinful-
ness.
The Jodo sect, introduced from China, reached the zenith of its
development with Shinran (1173-1262), in whom the anguish of moral
self-reflection was extremely acute.
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"Truly I have come to realize, and it is deplorable, that I am an idiotic
vulture, drowned in the boundless sea of carnal desires, lost in the enor-
mous mountains of worldly ambitions, not being pleased with becoming
entitled to be saved, and taking no pleasure in approaching the True
Evidence. Shame on me; woe is me!"319
These sentences ought not be understood as owing to the fact that
Shinran was a monk under the lay condition, married and eating meat, and
that he therefore wished to make a confession. There are instances, in the
Indian320 as well as in the Chinese321 Buddhist scriptures, of monks who
were married and ate meat. But moral self-reflection as acute as Shinran's
seems not to be indicated in the Buddhist literature of other countries.
Monks who broke their vows in India appear to have held the notion that
sins could be expiated by reciting magical formulae CdharaJ;l'i).322 Little has
been said about the pangs of conscience of renegade monks in China.
Shinran, on the contrary, could not but face the shameful reality of man.
Shinran, who looked into the deeper self of man, turned to the Buddha,
the Absolute One. He was thus led to advocate "the discipline of non-
discipline," 'Yhich was underlined by self-reflection of great moral intensity.
(It is a pity that "the discipline of non-discipline" should now come to be
interpreted by most of the Shin-sect followers as doing without discipline,
and that thus it should now be identified with the lack of moral self-
reflection. )
The motivation for the ascetics of India and China to enter priesthood
was, in most cases, the realization of the impermanence of the phenomenal
world, rather than the realization of man's sinfulness. In the case of
Shinran, however, little is said about the impermanence of this world. The
controlling motivation for Shinran is the sense of sinfulness in man's life
rather than that man is simply variable. The fundamental thing about man
is that he is a sinner, obsessed with afHictions, yielding to evils. Realizing as
he does that things are impermanent, he still clutches at these impermanent
things. Man is so deeply immersed in sins that he could never be saved but
for the miraculous power of the vow of Amitabha. That was what Shinran
preached. In his writings, he reflected upon the nature of evils and went so
far as to classify the categories of evil.
The Jodo doctrine of China was transformed by these factors of moral
self-reflection into the Jodo doctrine of Shinran. The Chinese Buddhist
Shan-tao (613-681), in explaining "the heart of sincerity" which the ascetic
should always observe, says: "You should not assume outwardly the appear-
ance of wisdom, goodness and religious abstinence, while embracing decep-
tions inwardly."323 According to Shinran, the deceptions such as "avarice,
anger, injustice, falsehood, mischief, fraudulence, and a hundred others"
make for "the evil nature" of man, which is so intrinsic to man that ascetic
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practice even of the utmost austerity could not possibly purify him of these
evils. Such a belief of Shinran led him to read Shan-tao's words differently
from the way they originally stood: "You could not assume outwardly the
appearance of wisdom, goodness and religious abstinence, since you em-
brace illusions inwardly."324 Shinran, whose profound moral self-reflection
made him cry, "There is no end of evil nature, Man's mind is as abominable
as a viper";325 could not accept the teaching of Shan-tao without the
transformation of its meaning into what he himself thought fit.
Here clearly is a theory of the redeemability of man's wicked nature.
Man is by nature evil, and because he is evil, according to that theory, he is
entitled to be saved by the great benevolence of Amitabha. He is not
expected to be saved through any other doctrine. Although this theory of
the redeemability of man's evil nature is generally recognized to have been
originated by Shinran, similar views were upheld by others. The book,
Verbatim notes on the Tales of the Future Life says: "Since the so-called
Original Vow of Amitabha, it ought to be remembered, exists solely for the
sake of sinners and men of evil dispositions and not for the sake of saints
and sages, it is the meaning of faith to believe, without any shadow of
doubt (in the redeemability of oneself), even if one finds oneself to be of
evil disposition." A statement, presumably of Saint Hanen's, goes as fol-
lows: "Even a good man is reborn into the Pure Land, and how much more
so with a wicked manJ326 This is an oral instruction transmitted to me."
These two instances have much in common with the following assertion of
Shinran: "Even a good man is reborn into the Pure Land, and how much
more so with a wicked man! But people generally think that even a wicked
man is reborn into the Pure Land, and how much more so with a good
man! Though this latter way of thinking appears at first sight reasonable,
yet it is not in accord with the purport of the Original Vow, the faith in the
Other Power."321
The vehement demand for the redemption of the wicked was a consist-
ent undercurrent all through the Heian period, and the tales of death and
various other stories of the period have recorded instances that heinous
criminals and those who made slaughter a trade constantly practiced nem-
hutsu prayers. By the latter half of the Heian period (ca. 850), at least, the
idea of the salvation of the wicked was firmly established in theory, and
was socially acknowledged by believers in the doctrine that nembutsu
practice enabled one to be reborn into the Pure Land.328 At that time the
systematization of the idea was not yet complete, but such a current of
thought gradually developed, with theoretical refinements, into an intrinsic
part of the Jado-shin doctrine. This is not to say that all the Jado sects of
Japan held to this view. But it is significant that this assertion of the right
of the wicked to be reborn into the Pure Land came to be explicitly stated
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in Japan only. The Jado sects of India and China, broadly speaking, with
due allowances for exceptions, took a view similar to that of Hanen,
namely, "Even sinners are reborn (into the Pure Land), and how much
more so with good men!"329
It is noteworthy that profound religious self-reflection, based upon the
Jado doctrine, was professed by some of the Emperors of Japan.
"Though the mind's moon shines,
To show the way to the Pure Land,
Woe be to the clouds still uncleared."
(By Emperor Gotoba, 1180-1239)
The poem means that ardent as my desire is to be reborn into the Pure
Land, trusting and relying upon the vow of Amitabha, the sins I have
committed weigh so heavily upon my heart that they make me haunted by
doubts about the vow; and how far beyond, how far beyond comprehension,
the poem laments, is the state of true salvation.
"I wish to be awakened from a dream,
Only to enter another dream;
Beyond my vision, lies the world of Reality."
That one wishes to be awakened from a dream is a proof that one is
still in the dream, the poem asserts, and to be really awakened from the
dream is the state that lies still far beyond one's experience.
The idea that the wicked are eligible to become Buddhas was accepted
by Nichiren and was incorporated into his religious doctrine. He recog-
nized himself to be one of "the ordinary men as idiotic, ignorant, and
unenlightened,"330 and he reflected that "we are fools and dullards un-
worthy to become disciples of the Buddha, who have fallen into evil deeds
in the age of corruption."331 Unworthy as a man such as himself was, he
still believed man would be saved through and only through the Hokke
(Lotus) sutra. "Even he who has committed ten evils and five heavy sins, as
long as he does not violate the Lotus sutra, shall without doubt be reborn
into the Pure Land and become a Buddha."332
Is it not true, however, that religious and moral self-reflection as
profound as the above, is confined mainly to the Jado sect? Is it not a fact
that so-called enlightenment in the Zen sect has nothing to do with moral
considerations? Such questions may naturally occur to a critical reader. The
question about the relationship between Zen and morality requires a chap-
ter of its own. Suffice it to state here that the form of the Zen doctrine
accepted in Japan, as in the case of Dagen, reveals a profound moral
self-reflection. He attaches great importance to the act of making a confes-
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sion. "Should you confess in this manner, the assistance of the Buddha
would assuredly be yours. Make a confession to the Buddha with your soul
and body, and the power of the confession will eradicate all the roots of
your sins."333 He commends good deeds and preaches that one will be able
to become a Buddha through one's good dOings. "In order to become a
Buddha, one needs only a simple way: Not to do evil deeds, not to be
obsessed with the matter of life and death, but to take pity upon mankind,
to revere one's superior, to be considerate to one's inferior, and to keep one's
mind free from hatred, desires, afHictions and anxieties is exactly what is
called being a Buddha. One should not seek Buddhahood anywhere
else."334 He emphasizes the observance of injunctions.335 Let us compare his
attitude with that of his Chinese master, Ju-ching (1163-1228). As far as
the records of Ju-ching's teachings are concerned, there is no evidence of
any deep consciousness in him. On the contrary, he keeps himself aloof
from the distinction between good and evil, toward which he assumes an
attitude of nonchalance and dispassionate regard. "I have heard that all
good deeds are like a fly eyeing blood. I have heard that all wicked deeds
are like a crab falling into boiling water."336 In the records of his teaching
one finds the characteristics of the later Chinese Zen priests who used to
invent nonsensical phrases.
The emphasis upon introspection among Japanese priests is apparent
also among laymen. Minamoto-no-Sanetomo (1192-1219) says:
"There's no way out
Of this agonizing hell,
Whose empty vault
Only flames can fill."
(A poem reflecting upon one's sins.)
"The founder of a temple,
The erector of a tower,
For their acts get credit;
But none gets merits,
So rewarding as a repentant sinner."
(A song of confession)337
On the whole, when and only when one reflects upon one's deeds
sincerely enough is one awakened to one's own sinfulness.
(The consciousness of man's sinfulness is also a distinctive feature of
Christianity, and a comparison between Christianity and Buddhism in this
respect opens a new theme which cannot be dealt with here.)
It may be argued that the psychological unrest caused by the social
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disturbances during the medieval period, together with the introduction of
Buddhism, gave rise to the consciousness of man's sinfulness; and that the
Japanese were originally lacking in such a consciousness. It is true that the
Japanese of antiquity regarded sin as a kind of material entity, which could
easily be purged by means of a ritual of purification. (In this respect, the
Japanese have much in common with the Brahmanists of ancient India.)
The lack of sin-consciousness is also noticeable among present-day Japa-
nese. It may be rightly asserted that, generally speaking, the Japanese are
not at all very sin-conscious and that this fact is closely tied up with the
this-worldly tendency of the Japanese, which we have pointed out in
an earlier chapter. And there are features in the history of thought in Japan
which disprove the points we have just made. Take, for instance, the case
of the acceptance of Confucianism. Sorai Ogyu, a Confucianist with
characteristically Japanese attitudes in some respects, supported the theory
that the good or evil of a deed is judged by its results as against the theory,
as held by the Chinese Confucianists of the Sung period (960-1126), that
it is judged by the motives of the doer.33s
Whether or not the Japanese in general were acute in religious and
moral self-rellection is difficult to decide. But one thing at least is clear, that
in accepting the Buddhist thought of China, such moral transformations as
have been discussed above were effected by some of the Japanese Buddhists.
It was also reported by the European missionaries, who came to Japan in
the sixteenth century, that crimes were relatively few, and order reigned
among the Japanese.339 In any case, although they are weak in
"sin-consciousness" in its religious sense, they are sensitive in "shame-
consciousness" in its practical and moral sense. For the Japanese, whether
or not one infringes religious disciplines is a matter of little consequence. A
matter of vital importance for them traditionally has been whether or not
one conforms to the mores· of a particular social nexus to which one
belongs. A question may be raised as to whether the presence of moral
consciousness, as just mentioned, may be inconsistent with the lack of the
spirit of criticism, as discussed earlier. But the inconsistency disappears
when one understands "the moral consciousness" to be applicable only to
those acts within one's own immediate group.
Let us now consider how the Japanese themselves think of this repu-
diation of Buddhist discipline in general, on the one hand, and the observa-
tion of moral practice within a particular human nexus, on the other.
Onk6 (1718-18°4) was the most prominent among the high priests
of the Shingon sect of the past who instructed and enlightened common
people without recourse to magical practices but by means of preaching
only. And it was the discipline of Ten Good Vows which was ordained as
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follows: love and save all living creatures with a heart of benevolence; do
not deprive anyone, from the highest officials down to common men, of his
proper due but let him be in his proper place; observe decorum in man-
woman relationships; do not utter a falsehood; do not use flowery words,
which impair the virtues of adults and go against the way of heaven and
earth; do not insult others, or do not put others to shame; do not use
double-tongued speech; do not be avaricious; do not yield to anger, which
nullifies all good deeds; do not have a "wrong view," i.e., believe in the
Buddha, in the Law, and that the virtuous power of gods is not futile. 340 He
wrote many books on the subject of the Ten Good Vows, and often
preached about them at various places.3u He was interested neither in the
abstract thinking of Indian Buddhism nor in the doctrines contained in the
labored commentaries of Chinese Buddhism, but he was mainly concerned
with the direct approach of preaching practical virtues. Surprisingly erudite
as he was, remarkably well versed as he was in Buddhist philosophy, and
especially, forerunner though he was in the modern method of studying
Sanskrit, he thought that the discipline of the ten good deeds was enough
so far as the enlightenment of the common people was concerned. Those
who wished to listen to Onko's preachings-from the Emperor to the
COmmon people-were not interested in metaphysical discussions, but solely
in the moral teachings that would be of immediate use in concrete acts of
everyday life. (That was why only his philosophical and doctrinal disserta-
tions were written exclusively in Chinese.)
Onko followed the tradition of Indian Buddhism when he tried to
realize Buddhism within everyday acts through the discipline of the Ten
Good Vows. The listing of virtues after the fashion of Indian Buddhism,
however, was not to the liking of the Japanese in general, who looked for
the one central virtue directly posited. It is the virtue of "honesty" or
"truthfulness" which was originally adopted from Buddhism, that emerged
from such a demand and came to be generally recognized as the central
virtue by the Japanese.
The word "honesty" has come into use since the Nara period
(710-784).342 The Imperial rescripts, issued at their several enthronements,
of the Emperors Ninmei, Montoku, Seiwa, and Yozei during the Heian
period (794-857) unanimously state "an honest heart" to be the virtue that
alI the subjects should strive for. 343 Probably influenced by them was the
doctrine of the Ise Shrine instituted by the Five Books of Shintoism during
the Kamakura period (II85-1333), according to which the Sun Goddess
was supposed to have said: "Divine protection is based upon honesty."
During the Muromachi period (1336-1573), the virtue of "honesty" as the
doctrine of the Ise Shrine came to prevail among the entire populace.
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According to Chikafusa Kitabatake (1293-1354), the three divine treasures
of the Japanese Imperial family symbolize the virtues of "honesty," "benevo-
lence," and "wisdom" respectively.
Although a concept corresponding to the virtue of "honesty" may very
well have existed since primitive Shintoism, the term itself was adopted
from Buddhism. The word "honesty" may have come also from the Con-
fucian classics,344 but it appears in Buddhist scriptures as well.345 It was
generally ,recognized by the Japanese of those days that the virtue of
"honesty" in later Shintoism originated from Buddhism.346
The Jodo doctrine esteems, in particular, the three states of mind,
namely, sincerity, belief in the efficacy of prayer, and wishing to be reborn
into the Pure Land, which are requisite for rebirth in paradise. It was
Shinran who made these three states of mind converge upon one, "a heart
of truthfulness, not mingled with illusion; a heart of honesty, not adulter-
ated with falsehood."341 According to Shinran, a religious faith ultimately
amounts to honesty, or being loyal and truthful. Many other Japanese
priests also extol the virtue of honesty in this sense.343
The virtue of honesty was especially emphasized by Nichiren, who
considered that it was for honesty of heart that the Hokke Siitra preaches
the Truth, and therein he recognized the ultimate significance of the Lotus
Siitra. "The Hokke Siitra teaches one 'to be honest and to avoid trickery,'
and talks about those who are 'completely truthful,' 'straightforward in
nature and flexible in intention' or 'gentle and straightforward.' It is the
siitra to believe, for those who are as honest as an arrow shot straight from a
bow-string, and as a string drawn straight by a carpenter."349 Thus he traces
the authentic source of the virtue "honesty" to the Hokke (Lotus) Siitra.
He then divides "honesty" into two categories, i.e., "the honesty of this
world" and "the honesty beyond this world,"350 and maintains, "Nichiren is
the only individual in Japan who is honest both in this world and beyond
this world."351
At the beginning of the Tokugawa period in the 17th century, Zen
Master Shosan Suzuki, developed a theory of professional ethics of his own
in his book, "Rules of Conduct for Every Citizen," in which he urged that
Buddhism put into practice was nothing but the virtue of "honesty" acted
upon.352 Neither in India nor in China was an assertion made so explicit
that Buddhism was nothing but honesty put into practice, although Bud-
dhist teachings in these countries had similar implications.
Thus, both Shintoists and Buddhists in Japan attached great impor-
tance to the word "honesty," which had appeared only sporadically in
Buddhist scriptures, and finally accorded it the position of the central
virtue in the general scheme of Japanese ethics.353
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The virtue of honesty seems to be in harmony with the Japanese pro-
pensity to loyalty.354 Such a moral consciousness probably emerged from the
tendencies of the Japanese to make much of limited human relationships,
their fondness for fashioning a closed social nexus, and the tendency to
demand complete loyalty and mutual trust among those who belong to that
nexus.
These characteristics seem to be manifest also in the forms in which
the Japanese accepted Chinese thought. Chinese learning was accepted by
the Japanese in the past as ethical teaching. From among various Chinese
types of thought, the Japanese selected, in particular, Confucianism,
strongly imbued with a moral set of precepts appropriate to a closed social
nexus. This Confucianism itself was then interpreted in terms of "loyalty
and fidelity," by Jinsai Ito (1627-17°5), who made these notions the two
central virtues of his doctrine, while the virtue of "sincerity" was stressed in
the Kaitokudo school; and this line of interpretation was carried out thor-
oughly by the Mito school.355 All of these three schools of Japanese Confu-
cianism aimed at "no falsehood, no deception," as their ideal. Herein lies
one of the characteristics of Japanese Confucian doctrine.
A tendency such as this emphasis on loyalty and fidelity also charac-
terizes the Japanese acceptance of Christianity. It is pointed out that
Christianity during the Meiji period (1868-1912) was fundamentally ethi-
cal and cultural in nature. Different systems of thought-Buddhism, Chi-
nese ideas, and Western religions-met with different forms of adaptation
in Japan, and each of these forms has distinct significance. But at the same
time the common denominators among all of these forms of adaptation
ought not to be overlooked.
Those who observed the moral confusion in Japan immediately after
World War II may be led to doubt the proposition that the Japanese in the
past were moralistically inclined. As far as the observance of honesty
within a closed social nexus is concerned, however, little difference seems
to be discoverable between traditional and recent Japanese morality. The
difference seems to lie rather in the fact that what was considered to be
morally tenable in Japan's "closed-door" past becomes untenable under
rapidly changing worldwide social and economic conditions to which Japan
is adapting itself. The traditional concept of honesty as loyalty to the clan
and Emperor is applicable only to the conduct of man as a member of the
particular and limited human nexus to which he belongs; it is not appli-
cable to the conduct of man as a member of human society as a whole. This
shortcoming of the traditional moral concept suddenly proves to be a
weakness that needs to be overcome at a time of social confusion in the
rapidly changing relations of Japan to the rest of the world.
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Weak Awareness of Religious Values
There was no distinct concept of god among the primitive Japanese.
As to the origin of the word "kami" (God), there are conflicting views
among scholars, and none of them has yet produced any conclusive evi-
d "K'''' J "b "'" ." ''h'"ence. amt In apanese may mean a ove one s superIor, or air,
and the political ruler was once called "okami" (the one that is above us).
Everything placed above one both in space or in the hierarchical order is
called "kami." Even if the etymological origin of each "kami" is different,
the difference is not discernible in daily usage. For the Japanese, therefore,
God was not a distinct entity complete in itself, but was diffused in all, that
is, above and beyond ordinary human beings. It was the custom of Shin-
toism from antiquity to deify those persons who rendered distinguished
services to a particular human nexus such as a family, a village, or a native
community.
"I do not understand the meaning of the term kami. Speaking in
general, however, it may be said that kami signifies, in the first place, the
deities of he'aven and earth that appear in the ancient records and also the
spirits of the shrines where they are worshipped.
It is hardly necessary to say that it includes human beings. It also
includes such objects as birds, beasts, trees, plants, seas, mountains, and so
forth. In ancient usage, anything whatsoever which was outside the ordi-
nary, which possessed superior power, or which was awe-inspiring, was
called kami. Eminence here does not refer merely to the superiority of
nobility, goodness, or meritorious deeds. Evil and mysterious things, if they
are extraordinary and dreadful, are called kami. It is needless to say that
among human beings who are called kami the successive generations of
sacred emperors are all included. The fact that emperors are also called
"distant kami" is understandable, because from the standpoint of common
people, they are remote, majestic, and worthy of reverence. In a lesser
degree we find, in the present as well as ancient times, human beings who
are kami. Although they may not be accepted throughout the whole coun-
try, in each province, each village, and each family there are human beings
who are kami, each one according to his own proper position. The kami of
the divine age were for the most part human beings of that time and,
because the people of that time were all kami, that era is called the Age of
the Gods (kami-yo )."356
This interpretation, which is that of Norinaga Motoori, was accepted
also by Atsutane Hirata.357 As long as such a view of gods is held, the
conception of God, whether transcendental or immanent, which sets down
a categorical imperative, transcending the limitation of any particular
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human nexus, is impossible. That was why even after the introduction of
Buddhism into Japan, the Japanese never discarded their traditional stand-
ard of evaluation, that of judging things in terms of a particular human
nexus. They regarded as absolute the authority of ancestors, parents, lords,
the state, and the Emperor, to whom religion was subjected and made to
serve. It follows that a religious order in the Western sense was never
firmly established in Japan. Shrine Shintoism never gave rise to a closely
knit religious order and neither did Confucianism. The same was true even
in the case of Buddhism, which claims to be a universal religion.
The ecclesiastical authorities of Buddhist orders and sects in Japan
were subjected to the secular authorities of the state and feudal lords, and
the former assumed an attitude of compromise towards the latter to the
point of subservience. The Indian Buddhist tradition that "the ascetic
never pays homage to the king"358 was neither put into practice, nor even
given any attention. The Buddhists in Japan regarded honor bestowed on
them by the Imperial family or by feudal lords as of supreme value. Under
these circumstances the Buddhist orders in Japan, even in the medieval
period, never wielded a power comparable to that of the religious orders in
medieval Europe.359 They were even less respected than the Buddhist
orders in South Asiatic countries.
The orders were often placed under the control of political powers.
The hierarchical structure of secular society was brought directly into the
orders. In India, on the contrary, the hierarchical structure of secular
society never penetrated into the religious orders, and the ranking of
ascetics was determined solely according to the number of years of priest-
hood. Even the king of a great country, one having entered priesthood, had
to accept the lowest rank,360 Such a tradition appears to have been observed
also in China. Even a rich man's son, once having entered priesthood, put
on a plain raiment. It was with some surprise that Dagen recounted the
story of a rich man's son in China, who, being asked why he was dressed so
plainly, answered simply, "Because I have become a monk."361 By contrast,
a son of the aristocracy in Japan, after having entered priesthood, was
given a privileged status. This fact is proved by the existence of a great
number of temples which the "monk-princes" made their places of resi-
dence. The status of the "monk-Emperor" or of the "monk-prince" has
never been recognized in any other country than Japan. If one studies from
what families the successive chief abbots of the Tendai sect came, one can
better understand the close interconnection established between the secular
and ecclesiastical authorities. The Honganji Temple order, which origi-
nally aimed at a religion of and for people, finally acquired the privileged
status of a temple of a monk-prince. The head-temples of various branches
of the Jodo-shin sect succeeded in establishing a close connection through
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both economic and kinship relations with the Imperial family and aristoc-
racy. The popes of the head-temples of the various Jodo-shin sects exer-
cised their authority as an aristocracy and as the heads of the orders over
common believers. Although their status within the hierarchy of the secular
aristocracy was not high, still they enjoyed the privilege of being members
of the aristocracy. This is not to deny the existence of those (and their
number is by no means negligible) who kept their pride as impeccable men
of religion, standing aloof from worldly privileges. Dagen, for instance,
never put on the purple robe, saying that even the monkey and the stork
would laugh at him, should he ever wear it.362 The SoW sect, however,
which continued his teachings, took to the custom of receiving the title of
Zen master from the Emperor for the chief abbot of its head temples.
The transplanting of the hierarchical system of the secular world
transformed the religious order into a secular community. Many of the
priests of the Heian period entered temples not necessarily in order to
search for the truth but in quest of worldly honors, riches, and privileges.
"Goro is a scholar and great high priest of the Tendai sect. He is a great
master in I:p.dian logic and Buddhist philosophy. He is also well-versed in
the Buddhist scriptures and the canons of other schools. He has the Ahhid-
harmakosa and Buddhist idealism at the tip of his tongue, and keeps the
profound teaching of the T endai doctrine at the depth of his heart. . . .
No clerical position, high or low, is good enough for him. He aspires
only to be chief abbot of the Tendai order."363
The surest way to acquire riches and honors as a priest was to become
intimate with the aristocracy, who concentrated the greatest power and
wealth of society in their hands. Consequently, priests availed themselves
of all means and opportunities to gain access to the aristocracy.
With the decline of the power of the Fujiwara clan, an increasing
number of its members entered temples and became priests, since high
official positions in the secular world were no longer guaranteed to them.
When the migration of the Fujiwara members into Buddhist temples took
place, practically all the key positions within the temples came to be
monopolized by the clan. In those days the most promising students went
into temples and worked hard in order to attain high positions therein. But
they were no longer able to do so, now that those positions were reserved
only for the members of the Fujiwara clan. None but the clan of the
Fujiwara could advance to the ranks of "Ajari" (acarya, Esoteric Master)
and "Sago," (Superintendent of Monks), unless one was endowed with
prodigious learning and extraordinary longevity. On the other hand, even a
man of mediocre ability, if he were connected to the Fujiwara family,
could rise, immediately after he entered priesthood, to the rank
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of "Gondaisozu" (Acting Chief Superintendent) at best, or to that of "Gon-
SMSOZU" (Acting Assistant Superintendent) at second best, or.at least to
the rank of "Hogen" (Deacon).364 For the key positions of the religious or-
ders to be monopolized by the royal family and the members of the aristoc-
racy would never have been possible in Buddhist countries other than Japan.
Such a sacrilege wrought by the secular powers upon the Buddhist
orders up to the Heian period (794-857) seems to have its origin in the
process by which those orders were instituted. The Buddhist orders of those
days in Japan were not necessarily generated by any intense religious and
spiritual demands of the people. On the contrary, they were instituted to
meet the demands of the Imperial family and aristocracy, and developed
under their protection. So it seems only natural that they were desecrated
by their own originators.
The religious orders after the Kamakura period (I 185-1333) stand out
in contrast; they arose from genuine religious needs of the people, and
developed, for the time being, independently of secular authorities. But
even those orders were placed under the control of the secular authorities
with the inception of the centralized government of the feudal regime at
the beginning of the modern period. Even the Honganji Temple, once the
stronghold of resistance against the secular power of feudalism, submitted
to interference by Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1536-1598), who succeeded in
unifying the country.365 Finally the Temple was divided into the West and
the East Honganji Temples by the astute policy of Ieyasu Tokugawa.
When religious orders finally yielded to the secular authority, the
feudal political power established overall religious control. In the Toku-
gawa period, the Office of the Administration of Shrines and Temples
CShaji Bugyo) was established within the central government, and similar
offices were established within the governments of the various daimyo; an
Office of Issuing Orders (huregashira) was instituted within the central
government. The function of the latter office was to convey the orders of
the central government to the temples under control, and to transmit to the
government petitions from the subordinate temples. To this office, priests
were appointed. But the Office of the Administration of Shrines and
Temples was open only to the vassals of the shogunate or to the feudal
lords in hereditary vassalage to the shogunate. In medieval China also,
overall religious control was set up by the government. But in medieval
China, priests were appointed to the office of religious administration. In
Japan, however, the secular warriors, qua warriors, were appointed to the
office and administered religious matters. It was not a religious order itself,
but the secular authority, that settled any controversy over a religious
doctrine within the order. (It was the Tokugawa Government, for example,
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that worked out the final settlement on the controversy on the three kinds
of deed~fmind, body, and speech-the most important of all the doctri-
nal controversies in the Jodo-shin sect.)
The gradual formation of the relationship between the main temple
and sub-temple, based upon the principles of the lineage of teachings and
of master-disciple relationship, corresponded to the development of the
feudal hierarchical relationship within secular society at the beginning of
the Tokugawa period. The Tokugawa Government, when it came to
power, enforced this main-and-sub-temple relationship, making it a fixed
system of hierarchy. It determined the control-and-submission relationships
among the headquarters of main temples, and a descending order of several
kinds of hierarchical sub-temples. In the religious ordinances, strict adher-
ence to the regulations about the relations of the main-temple to the
sub-temples was ordained, and it was stipulated that the infringement of
the regulations would be severely punished. For those temples which did
not belong to any main temple, the succession of the resident-priesthood
was not allowed and the temples were even confiscated.
The history of religion in Japan shows, just as Max Weber rightly
pointed out, that the state functioned not as a patron CSchutz-patronat) but
as the religious police (Religionspolizei) of Buddhism.366 And only on such
a historical basis was the government after the Meiji Restoration able to
attain complete religious control, and to push it to such an extreme that no
parallel can be found in any other modem nation. Buddhists during the
Meiji period resisted the tendency to destroy their religion with violence,
by arguing that Buddhism was not in contradiction with Nipponism, and
that in the West freedom of religion was guaranteed. The pressure of the
state, however, was too great for them to cope with. "Freedom of religion"
was at Potsdam proclaimed one of the "Four Freedoms," and it reminds us
of the solitary outcries of our forebears.
Under these circumstances, religious orders in Japan have never had
much authority, nor were the men of religion as highly respected as they
were in the West. This lack of social status is not a phenomenon of recent
origin. The Buddhist Hymns on the Reminiscences of Grief, by Shinran,
deplores the fact as follows:
"Tokens are these, that Buddhism they despise:
Nuns and Monks are made their slaves,
The names of priests are given to knaves."
Such was the situation even in the medieval period when religion was
supposed to have flourished. Kenko writes: "There are perhaps none less to
be envied than monks. Lady Seishonagon rightly says, 'People regard them
as trifling as a chip.' "367 In this, we find a man who was a priest himself
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deprecating the priesthood. Such attitudes were fairly typical of the Japa-
nese in general and have continued up to the present.3G8 Such attitudes
would have been inconceivable to the Buddhists of either South Asia,
including India, or of Eastern Asia, including China.
To illustrate this point, Yorinaga Fujiwara (1120-1156), the fighting
Minister of the Left, who was exceptionally well versed for a layman in
Indian logic, invited Egyo and Zoshun, priests of the K6fuku Temple, to
teach him Indian logic. The case is exactly reversed in India, where kings
drove their chariots by themselves to pay homage to men of religion, and
graciously asked them to teach them their teachings. In Japan, the status of
the Minister of the Left was placed far above the learned priests of the
time.
The reason why nuns and monks were despised may be attributed to
the fact that in antiquity, even outcastes were able to become nuns and
monks, and to the fact that since nuns and monks were exempted from
taxes, there were many who secretly entered the priesthood, despite the
laws to prohibit such a practice. But in India, where religious ascetics were
highly respected, priests even of outcaste origin were never looked down
upon, at least among the believers of the same sect. So we are led to
conclude that this tendency to ridicule nuns and monks is associated with
the Japanese inclination to lay greater emphasis upon mundane affairs.
Throughout the feudal age in Japan, the class of warriors preserved
their pride and power as the ruling class, and consequently never submitted
to the guidance of Buddhist priests with absolute obedience, to say nothing
of Shintoist priests. Nothing like the spiritual guidance of the Guru of
India ever prevailed. Although the number of Buddhist temples increased
during the Tokugawa period, the social influence of Buddhism decreased.
Temples degenerated into places simply for issuing certificates to their
followers to prove that "they were not Christians." The ruling class did not
wish to recognize in the temples any greater social significance. Since the
Buddhist ideal of non-discrimination of classes was not compatible with the
hierarchical order of feudal society, it was against the intention of the
ruling class to have this ideal pushed too far. When the country was
opened to foreign intercourse after the Meiji Restoration, the non-Christian
certificates formerly issued from the temples were no longer necessary.
Thenceforward funeral and memorial services came to be almost the only
function of the Buddhist temples.
A salient feature of Japanese religions is that members of religious
organizations were customarily not individual persons but families, and
even now this feature can be noticed in many cases. "The importance of
the family group orientations appears even in religion. Here the unit of
worship is not the individual but the family group. Instead of being
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concerned with personal creed or individual salvation, the religion of Japan
has traditionally supported the social system based on familial value. The
basic group orientations of the Japanese were reinforced by the Buddhist
Confucian doctrines; general life views differ profoundly from those of
Puritan or Protestant religious teachings."369
It is very difficult to say whether or not the Japanese were devoted to
Buddhism from the bottom of their hearts and recognized its intrinsic
value. Often they simply followed it, even travestying the teaching or
character of Buddha, as in such common sayings: "Not knowing is the state
of Buddhahood" (Ignorance is bliss), or "Even the face of a Buddha
changes (shows anger) after the third time" (There are limits to one's
endurance). A Buddha is represented as something extremely close and
familiar to man. Still another saying goes: "Borrowing with a Jiza-face,
repaying with an Emma-face" CJiza is the guardian deity of children while
Emma [Yama] is the King of Hell). A children's toy (which is contrived so
as to recover its upright position when thrown down) has the figure of
Bodhidharma, and a lottery is named after Amitabha.370 Buddhist termi-
nology is quite commonly parodied in vernacular expressions of everyday
language. .
Degenerative as these characteristics are, Buddhists after the Meiji
Restoration misconceived them as merits and virtues of Japanese Buddhism,
and they emphasized the peculiarly Japanese characteristics of Buddhism,
even though Buddhism is essentially a universal religion. They even went
so far as to assert that the true essence of Buddhism for the first time came
into actual fruition in Japan. It was within the framework of their own
peculiar nationalistic standpoint and orientation that the Japanese accepted
Buddhism. They were inclined to utilize it as a means and an instrument to
realize a certain socio-political end. They were not converted to Buddhism.
They converted Buddhism to their own tribalism.
One cannot deny, of course, that there were some contrary instances,
as when the Japanese' paid unqualified respect to a foreign culture and
earnestly tried to accept it as it was. It is especially true of intellectuals in
Japan that they are apt to become vehement admirers of foreign cultures,
despising their own in every respect. It is even said to be a tradition with
the Japanese completely to abandon their own tradition in their enthusiasm
for a foreign culture newly adopted. The Japanese are acutely susceptible
to the excellence of a foreign culture, and once inspired by it, they become
extremely humble and self-effacing in learning what they believe to be fine
and good. Had it not been for such an attitude, the Japanese would not
have been able to absorb so quickly the diverse cultures of Asiatic countries
and to cultivate them on their own soil, despite the fact that the range of
actual foreign intercourse, for geographical reasons, was so limited, and the
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period when such intercourse was allowed, for historical reasons, was so
brief.371 Yet, so great a faculty for assimilating cultures other than their
own constituted merely a subjective phenomenon in the Japanese, in the
sphere of conscious choice. Objectively speaking, the Japanese never assimi-
lated other cultures in such a way that all their values and their entire
outlook might attain a completely new configuration. They always ada-
mantly kept to their own traditional values and outlook, while assimilating
some aspects of other cultures.
These facts being taken into consideration, it is easy to understand
how Buddhism in its Japanized form was so quickly accepted. Modern
nations like Germany, France, or England accepted Christianity in such a
way that it became an acknowledged part of their own cultures. In Japan,
by contrast, Buddhist thought is still an alien thought. Buddhism is so basic
and prevailing a factor in Japanese culture of the past that it may very well,
in many respects, be regarded as a Buddhist culture; nevertheless Bud-
dhism, in fact, is still regarded by the Japanese as an imported religion.
This is vastly different from the attitude of Westerners in regarding Christi-
anity as their own religion. The Japanese accepted Buddhism without
changing their own original standpoint an iota. That was why Buddhism
spread with such speed.372 The same seems to apply to the form of accepting
Christianity after the Meiji Restoration. For most of the Japanese, Christi-
anity as a religion was a matter of little consequence. They were more
concerned with the Japanization of Christianity, just as they once suc-
ceeded in the Japanization of Buddhism.
Since the Japanese accepted Buddhism from the standpoint of Japan
as a national state and of the Japanese as a people, it naturally follows that
hardly any conscious attempt has been made to propagate Buddhism as a
universal religion, transcending the interests of Japan as a particular nation.
Even after the Meiji Restoration when the country was opened to interna-
tional intercourse, no universal religious movement of any consequence
ever took form in Japan. Let us compare this with the case of China, our
neighbor. In China, a group was formed in 1922 under the leadership of
T'ai-hsil, to establish in Wuchang "The School of World Buddhism" and
to promote a 'World Buddhist Movement." Their aim was to launch a
Buddhist movement on an international basis, to renovate the world, and
to create a new world culture. Although the realization of their intentions
was blocked by internal and international wars in subsequent years, the
historical significance of their movement, which inspired a great number of
people inside and outside of their own country, is very great. In Japan,
supposedly the vanguard of modernization in Asia, Buddhist leaders were
engrossed in arguing the superiority and uniqueness of "Japanese Bud-
dhism," in order to win the favor of the authorities, such as the Imperial
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family and the military clique. There was virtually no appearance of such a
vision as a "World Buddhist Movement" in Japan before World War II;
but the movement has been revived recently.
The weakness of the religious consciousness of the Japanese seems to
have molded many Japanese into philistine materialists. They are, generally
speaking, lacking in the desire for profound confession and severe com-
punction. Religion, in the true sense of the word, never deeply took root on
Japanese soil. From this fact arises the weakness of religious orders. Thus,
as religion had no strength, anti-religious movements which aim at the
overthrow of religion are almost not to be found. Let us ask ourselves how
many conscious atheists there were before the Meiji Restoration, apart
from such people as Hant6 Yamagata (1748-1821). In spite of the fact that
the intellectual climate of the Japanese was extremely materialistic, atheis-
tic materialism has never had a lucid and conscious formulation in Japan.
In India, not to speak of the West, materialism developed in such a way as
to rival religion. In Japan, the fact that religious thinking was not fertile
kept materialism from becoming evident as a .critical weapon.
The teJ}dencies of the Japanese, as discussed above from various
angles, to emphasize the human nexus, seem to be attributable to the social
mode of living, peculiarly adapted to Japanese topography. Japanese my-
thology, for instance, clearly shows that collaboration among farmers was
generally practiced in irrigation and the cultivation of the soil. To disturb
cooperation in cultivation (such as "destroying the footpath between rice
fields," "destroying the ditch," or "sowing the soil already sown") was a
serious crime. In Indian mythology, there is no suggestion of this. The
topographical conditions of India do not require such strenuous human
labor as was required in Japan. In India, one can leave the crops alone and
they will yield harvest. Irrigation is hardly necessary. Farmers can reap a
harvest of the same kind of crops twice a year. This is vastly different from
the farming conditions of Japan. In India, collaboration in farming is not
practiced to such an extent as is the case in Japan. For these reasons, the
Indians can afford to live in isolation and enjoy it. Since their conditions of
living are mostly under the influence of nature, they tend to attach impor-
tance to magical rituals with which they believe they can influence nature.
That was why Brahmanism came to exert a strong influence upon the
whole society. In Japan, however, the topographical conditions are such as
to require a greater human effort than in India to combat the conditions of
nature; hence the social nexus is made to play an important role in agricul-
tural labor, and consequently the pressure of the social nexus weighs
heavily upon individuals. This would seem to be the origin of the principal
characteristic of the Japanese, namely the high esteem of a particular social
nexus, and other characteristics seem to be derived from it.
CHAPTER 36 NON~RATIONALISTIC
TENDENCIES
....
The Tendency to Neglect Logical Rules
We have already indicated the marked tendency of the Japanese
people to give special attention to those subjective and social relations and
actions which form the basis of mutual understanding and loyalties to the
family, clan, and nation. Upon this limited basis, there is little intention to
make each man's understanding and expression universal or logical, so that,
in general, the thinking of most Japanese tends to be intuitive and emo-
tional. I should now like to discuss this aspect of Japanese ways of thinking.
As a preliminary step for discussing the main problem, we should call
attention to some logical characteristics perceived in common Japanese
linguistic usage which provide insight into the daily thinking of the Japa-
nese. As is often pointed out by linguistic scholars, the expressive forms of
Japanese sentences put more emphasis upon emotive factors than on cogni-
tive factors. The forms of expression of the Japanese language are more
oriented to sensitive and emotive nuances than directed toward logical
exactness. The Japanese language does not tend to express precisely and
accurately the various modes of being, but is satisned merely with vague,
typological expressions. As for nouns, we have no clear distinction between
singular and plural, nor is there a distinction between genders, and no
articles are used. For verbs, also, there are no distinctions of person and
number. In these respects, Japanese resembles Chinese. But what is differ-
ent from classical Chinese, giving Japanese its distinctive atmosphere, is
the so-called "te-ni-o-ha," or the postpositional particles. This part of speech
corresponds to case declensions or prepositions in other languages, and has
the characteristic not only of expressing cognitive, logical relations, but also
of expressing to some degree various delicate nuances of emotion. Thus this
aUxiliary part of speech, making its appearance amidst all kinds of words
and sentences, plays the role of emphasizing some specinc meanings, evok-
ing attention to certain subjective aspects of things, distinguishing delicate
variations of emotion, and leaves rich overtones of meaning just because of
this ambiguity. Moreover, the abundance of auxiliary verbs and their
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complex usages show that the Japanese language is peculiarly sensitive in
its grasp of emotion.
The original Japanese language, as clearly revealed in its classical
literature, has a rich vocabulary of words denoting aesthetic or emotional
states of mind. On the other hand, words denoting intellectual, inferential
processes of active thought are notably lacking. In the original Japanese
language, where words were for the most part concrete and intuitive, the
construction of abstract nouns was lacking. Hence it is extremely difficult
to express abstract concepts solely in words of the original Japanese. When
Buddhism and Confucianism were later introduced to Japan and philo-
sophical thinking developed, the vocabulary which was the means of
expressing these philosophical thoughts was entirely Chinese, written the
same way, but pronounced differently. Although Buddhism was so widely
propagated among the people, its scriptures were never translated into the
Japanese language. "In our country, there is no attempt to translate [Chi-
nese versions of Buddhist scriptures]"! said Kokan Shiren (1278-1346), in
his Genko Shakusho (a History of Japanese Buddhism), and he cited this
fact as a characteristic of Japanese Buddhism. Furthermore, we hardly had,
before the K~makura period (II85-1333), any original writing by Bud-
dhists in Japanese. Even after the beginning of Kamakura, in the over-
whelming majority of cases, Buddhist works were written in the Chinese
language. Although the Japanese Confucians began to write some of their
works in Japanese from the Tokugawa era onward (after 1600), such
writings never ceased to be viewed as merely an avocation of the Confu-
cians, and even in such works, they followed the Chinese language as far as
technical terms were concerned. Now, Western philosophical ideas are
widely diffused in Japan, but the linguistic means by which they are
expressed are, in most cases, words coined by properly connecting two
Chinese characters, which are, by convention, made to correspond to the
traditional Occidental concepts. The words gainen and risei, for instance,
are the present day Japanese terms for "concept" (Begriff) and "reason"
(Vernunft) respectively. Sometimes such words are constructions of three
or four characters. The pure original Japanese has never been able to serve
as a medium for expressing philosophical concepts.
In this connection, it might be said that, as philosophical thinking
gradually began to develop among the Japanese people, suddenly foreign
philosophical thought carne in, with the result that the opportunity to
shape the Japanese language philosophically was lost; and that is why, to
the present time, Japanese has been at a loss to form philosophical con-
cepts.2 Yet in the case of the German people, although clerics in medieval
times carried on their philosophical thinking in Latin, in modern times, the
Germans carne to build up philosophical systems by means of the German
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language alone. Such attempts can even be traced back to Eckhart in the
Middle Ages. On the other hand, even in very recent times, no philosophy
expressed in purely original Japanese words has so far been developed in
Japan. We are, therefore, forced to conclude that Japanese has not been as
fit for philosophical thinking as Sanskrit or Greek was or as German seems
to be.
The greatest obstacle seems to lie in the fact that the Japanese lan-
guage does not have any fully established method of composing abstract
nouns. The language does not have the infinitive form of the verb, the
special character of which is to express abstract ideas, an indefinite situa-
tion, a "relation" itself rather than a "thing." Although we do have what is
called the "nominal use" corresponding to the infinitive, this is completely
identical in form with a verbal form which, in conjunction with temporal
verb endings, indicates the past, or which, when joined to another verb, a
noun or an adjective, forms a compound word. For example, the so-called
nominal form warai, which is completely identical in form with the form of
the verb warau ("to laugh") appearing in waraitari ("laughed"), waraite
("laughed and...."), waraigoto ("laughing matter"), etc., signifies the
act or fact of "laughing." Moreover, this verb form in time has tended to
lose its special significance as an expression with a compounding function,
and has also come to be used as a noun. For instance, warai has the senses
both of warau kato (the act or fact of laughing) and of warai to yii nwno
("laughter"); consequently the distinction between the two (as in German,
"die Lache" and "das Lachen") is not made.3
Furthermore, the Japanese have no established method of turning
adjectives into corresponding abstract nouns. As may be seen in such
examples as fukasa ("depth"), or fukami ("deepness"), the suffixes -sa or
-mi make abstract nouns out of adjectives to some extent. But this manner
of transformation or noun-building is available for only a limited range of
adjectives. In Greek, for example, Plato coined the noun poiotes out of the
adjective poion, which, literally translated, means "of what sort." And
Cicero, in attempting to translate the Greek, coined the abstract noun
qualitas out of Latin qualis, meaning "of what sort." Both poiotes and
qualitas are invented words meaning the quality of a thing, or a thing's
"of-what-sort-ness." Literally translated into Japanese, the word dono-yo-
na-sa would give an unnatural sounding expression. This Latin translation
qualis was current in the Middle Ages, and in modern Europe was used
without change, as in the words Qualitiit, quality, qualite. But the Japanese,
in translating this concept, have made use of the two Chinese characters
sei-shitsu. This is because in the Japanese language the translation term
dono-ya-na-sa conveys a somehow inappropriate, unnatural feeling. 4
As the existence of too many Chinese characters in the Japanese
534 JAPAN
language causes inconvenience, the Japanese are going to eliminate infre-
quently used Chinese characters and thus lessen the total number of
Chinese characters; the language still keeps many of them,5 and people
cannot immediately get rid of the bondage of Chinese characters.
In short, the Japanese language has had, at least in the past, a structure
unfit for expressing logical conceptions. Consequently, when the Japanese
adopted the already highly advanced conceptual knowledge of Buddhism
and Confucianism, they made no attempt to express it in the original
Japanese language, but used Chinese technical terms without modification.
Again, in translating the concepts of Western learning, the Japanese used
Chinese characters and did not render these concepts into Japanese directly.
Consequently, even today, any marked tendency to logical expression is
hardly apparent in the Japanese language.
Some abstract concepts, which have been introduced from India, have
been unable to take root intact among the Japanese people in general. The
words anyatara (one between two) and anyatama (one among many) were
translated into Chinese as sui-i. The ancient Japanese intellectuals used
this concep~ in its original meaning, whereas common people since the
Tokugawa period6 have taken the word "zuiichi" to mean "the first" or "the
most excellent." There has been no single native Japanese word represent-
ing "one between two" or "one among many."
When we pass from the realm of syntax to that of word construction,
the Japanese language manifests its non-logical character all the more
clearly. The language lacks the relative pronoun, "which," standing for the
antecedent, that helps develop clarity of thought. The absence of such a
relational word makes it inconvenient to advance closely knit thinking in
Japanese.1 It is difficult to tell what modifies what, when several adjectives
or adverbs are juxtaposed. Because of these defects, Japanese presents
difficulties for exact scientific expression and naturally handicaps the devel-
opment of logical, scientific thinking among the Japanese people, which
has actually brought about grave inconveniences in their practical lives.
Indian books of Buddhistic philosophy were originally written with logical
accuracy, but, as was already pointed out, Chinese versions of them became
remarkably illogical. Thereafter, the Japanese continued the ambiguous
and obscure interpretations of the Chinese without change, and as a result,
they did not attempt to analyze them logically.
The same ambiguity can be observed in Japanese expressions of se-
quences or inferences made up of successively related judgments. For
instance, the following is one of the well-known examples of such a loosely
linked chain syllogism: "When the wind blows, it becomes dusty. If it
becomes dusty, it becomes injurious to the eyes. If it becomes injurious to
eyes, many people become blind, and then there appear many samisen
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(string-instrument) players. If there appear many samisen players, samisens
are in great demand. If samisens are in great demand, cats are killed (to
make the strings for this musical instrument). If cats are killed, rats increase
in number. If rats increase in number, boxes are chewed, and become
articles in great demand. Therefore, boxmakers become prosperous."8
Although special phraseologies have been worked out in legal jargon,
etc., for technical considerations, to avoid ambiguity, such a practice is by
no means universal.
Again, complicated expressions of Indo-European languages can
hardly be translated, in corresponding forms, into Japanese. For instance,
such causative passive constructions as priipitas ciirtha~9 ("[by some means,
either a person or a thing, an individual] has been made to reach an
object") can only with great difficulty be put into Japanese in like form.
In the same way, Japanese frequently omit the subject, and this too
may have something to do with the inexact character of the Japanese mode
of thought in general. In such a case, even though the subject is omitted,
we usually find it naturally suggested or can easily infer what it is by
referring to the linguistic context, or by looking at the situation in which
the utterance is made. But it cannot be denied that at times, when the
situation is not completely clear, the omission of the subject makes the
meaning ambiguous and causes misunderstanding. This shortcoming could,
of course, be overcome if the Japanese would try to make their forms of
expression logical, by constructing sentences always accompanied by sub-
jects. Nevertheless, up to the present at least, actual Japanese usage is still
very inaccurate in this respect.
In connection with the omission of subjects, we must note that anaco-
luthon very frequently occurs in Japanese sentences. While it is to be
found also in Indo-European languages, examples are few/a whereas the
Japanese not only has abundant examples of it, but also even the fact that
the subject has changed within a single sentence is not clearly noticed. For
example, in literary works of the Heian period, instances of anacoluthon
are very frequent. And this characteristic of the Japanese way of thinking
appears also in the annotations to Chinese Buddhist texts.ll That the
Japanese people can dispense with the subject of their linguistic expression
is, I think, due to the fact that the intuitive understanding of the scene
referred to in their discourse is usually attained beforehand by the close
personal bonds and nexus with others. Therefore, the necessity of clearly
indicating the subject occurs only in those cases where some doubt about
the intuitive understanding of the subject arises. (In other words, a logically
correct assertion of the "obvious" sounds harsh to the Japanese people.)
Generally speaking, logical consciousness begins with consciousness
of the relation between the particular and the universal; and the Japanese
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on the whole have not been fully aware of this relation, or have been poor
in understanding a concept apart from particular instances. This exactly
corresponds to the tendency, characteristic in the Japanese way of thinking,
not to make a sharp contrast between subject and predicate in the expres-
sion of judgment.
Keizan Hio (1789-1859), in his two-volume work Kunten Pukka
("Restoration of Kunten"), criticized the usages of kunten (marks used in
paraphrasing Chinese into Japanese) prevalent in the Tokugawa period.
According to his view, for example, scholars at that time misread the
Chinese passage Yen Hui che, which means "a man called Yen Hui i.e.
Gankai," as Gankai naru Mono, which is an abridged form of Gankai ni
aru Mona (strictly, "the man exemplified in Gankai").12 In so doing, he
argued, they committed an error in the indication of the meaning. However
this may be, such a distinction is generally not recognized by the Japanese,
and this confusion continues to the present time. Whether or not Hio's
theory is right is a question to be entrusted to experts, but in any case one
could say that there was no method fully established in pure Japanese for
expressing universal concepts.
Therefore, the Japanese people are not inclined to present the univer-
sal concept as a predicate in a judgment, so as to make the expression of it
concise. They are not usually content until they have presented a set of
particular instances. Dagen (1200-1253), who has been called one of the
greatest philosophers Japan ever had, for example, wrote:
"The Acting Buddha is neither a Buddha in the perfect figure nor a
transformation-Buddha. It is neither a Buddha in itself nor a Buddha in
other selves. It is neither the initial enlightenment nor the ultimate enlight-
enment. It is neither the realization of one's own nature, nor the realization
of nothing. All these Buddhas together are not equal to the Acting Bud-
dha."13 Where an Indian philosopher formulated an idea simply and defi-
nitely in a universal proposition, e.g., "The Three Worlds are but one
Mind,"14 Dagen explained the thought by enumerating various particulars.
Thus: "The mind is neither one nor two. It is neither in the Three Worlds
nor beyond the Three Worlds. It is infallible. It is an enlightenment
through contemplation, and it is an enlightenment without contemplation.
It is walls and pebbles; it is mountains, rivers, and the earth. The mind is
but the skin, flesh, bones, and marrow; the mind is but the communication
of enlightenment through the Buddha's smile. There is a mind, and there
is no mind. There is a mind with a body; there is a mind without a body.
There is a mind prior to a body; there is a mind posterior to a body. A body
is generated from the womb, the egg, moisture, or fermentation. The mind
is generated from the womb, the egg, moisture, or fermentation. Blue,
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yellow, red, and white are nothing but the mind. Long, short, square, and
round are nothing but the mind. Life and death are nothing but the mind.
Years, months, days, and hours are nothing but the mind. The bubbles of
water and the flames of fire are nothing but the mind. The flowers of the
spring and the moon of the autumn are nothing but the mind. Confusions
and dangers are nothing but the mind."15 Although Dagen ardently ad-
mired Bodhidarma, he never referred to the systematic doctrine of "two
entrances and four practices"16 which was the central theme of Bodhi-
darma's thought.
A similar way of thinking may be noticed in Japanese Confucianists.
Sorai Ogyii (1666-1728), for example, did not like the sort of abstract
speculation found in the Sung school; he made more of particular "things"
(wu) than of universal "principles" (li): "The great sage kings of the past
taught by means of 'things' and not by means of 'principles.' Those who
teach by means of 'things' always have work to which they devote them-
selves; those who teach by means of 'principles' merely expatiate with words.
In 'things' all 'principles' are brought together, hence all who have long
devoted themselves to work come to have a genuine intuitive understanding
of them. Why should they appeal to words?"17 Therefore, learning consists,
to him, in knowing as many particular things as possible: "Learning consists
in widening one's information, absorbing extensively anything and every-
thing one comes upon."18 But because Ogyii ignored the science of nature,
"learning" meant to amass a knowledge of particular facts, and culminated,
for him, in the study of history-a preference which is closely related to the
ethical character of his "learning": "Since learning is to have wide informa-
tion and to have experience with realities, it culminates in history."19
Even the scholars of the Japanese classics, who tried to repudiate
Buddhism and Confucianism, exhibited the same way of thinking. The
nationalist Atsutane Hirata (1776-1843), for example, rejected the concept
of abstract, universal "principles," and declared that we only had to know
"actual things," or concrete particulars: "In fact, that which is called the
'true way' is given in actual things, whereas conventional scholars are
erroneously inclined to think that the 'way' cannot be found out except by
reading doctrinal books. For if we can appreciate actual things, doctrines
are dispensed with; and it is only when actual things, in which the 'way' is
given, are lacking, that doctrines arise. Therefore, doctrines are far less
valuable than actual things. Lao Tzu recognized this fact when he said,
'When the Way decays, the doctrines of humanity and justice arise.' "20
As shown by the historical development of Japanese thought-al-
though so far only several representative thinkers have been considered-
the ability to think in terms of abstract universals has not fully developed
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among the Japanese people. They have been very poor in ordering various
phenomena on the basis of a universal pattern.
[There might be a question as to how to reconcile this alleged Japanese
preference for the particular with the commonly observed modern prefer-
ence of Japanese scholarship for theoretical learning rather than concrete
approaches. Among Japanese intellectuals there was, not long ago, a
marked fondness for abstract German philosophy. We consider this tend-
ency among our intellectuals not so much a preference for theoretical
thinking as an attraction for things abstruse and productive of imaginative
impressions upon them. Their alleged fondness for theoretical learning is
not always based upon the process of induction and deduction in the
logical sense.]
Of course, the Japanese do sometimes criticize themselves in such a
way as to contradict what we have just said. For example, we hear it said
among the Japanese themselves that "It is bad for the Japanese habitually
to concern themselves with plans on paper and deal with abstract theories."
Such criticism, however, confuses abstraction with fantasy (unreality), and
the prevalence of such criticism in fact points up the absence in the
Japanese of self-criticism in the matter of abstract thinking.
Nowadays, however, things are changing. People want to be more
accurate and clear with regard to expression. This is already noticeable
among novel writers.
'Writers of the present Sh5wa era [1926-] who specialize in natu-
ralism generally do not regard themselves as belonging to the writing school
that follows the kanji style of Meiji writers or the rhetorical styles of old.
Those who can read and easily digest the Chinese classical style and adopt
this in their own writings belong to the older generation of Nagai, Tani-
zaki, and Sat5. In other words, even where kana is concerned, the writers
of the generation after Yokomitsu [1898-1947] and Kawabata [1895)-] do
not utilize hentaigana and are far removed from the refinements found in
Chinese poems and classic compositions. The tendency is toward simplicity
and the dialogue styles of composition. Instead of subjectivity or rhetorical
flourishes, more emphasis is placed on objective delineations. It may safely
be said that there is no writer after Yokomitsu and Kawabata who gladly
displays in his work a knowledge of Chinese poetry and classical composi-
tions. The Sh5wa era writer, as is commonly known, depends on a healthy
mode of national expression; his thoughts are conveyed as clearly and
simply as possible, without sacrificing perspicuity or intelligibility. In fact,
his manner in all probability reveals a deep repugnance for eccentric and
ambiguous forms of expression."21 This phenomenon noticed among novel
writers will, as their influence spreads, have some effect on the ways of
thinking of people who read them.
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...
Lack of Logical Coherence
Even in ancient times, Kakinomoto-no-Hitomaro (c. 700 A.D.) com-
posed a famous poem which said: "In our land covered with reed and rice-
ears, they have not argued since the time of the gods." From such a poetic
point of view, the technique of constructing universal laws reducing
individuals to order was not likely to develop. Norinaga Motoori
(1730-1801), a scholar who claimed to have made clear the spirit of ancient
Japan, said: "In ancient times, we had no talk at all even about the Way.
The classic declares that in our land covered with reed and rice-ears, they
haven't argued since the time of gods. Not to argue means not to expatiate
or indulge in much talk, as is the custom in foreign countries."22
"In ancient times in our land, even the Way' was not talked about at
all and we had only ways directly leading to things themselves, while in
foreign countries it is the custom to entertain and to talk about many
different doctrines, about the principles of things, this 'Way' or that Way.'
The Emperors' land in ancient times had no such theories or doctrines
whatever, but we enjoyed peace and order then, and the descendants of the
Sun-goddess have consecutively succeeded to the throne."23
What was the situation, then, after philosophical theories were intro-
duced from the Chinese continent? It seems that Japanese scholars who
first acquainted themselves with these theories were so hard pressed merely
in learning to use Chinese ideographs that they did not get to the point of
understanding and assimilating the thought expressed therein. The
Keikoku-shu ("Anthology on the Arts of Governing the State"), which
was compiled in the early Heian period, records several sets of examination
questions and answers given to students around the Nara period; the
questions are, e.g. "Of loyalty and filial piety which should take preced-
ence? What is the difference between the doctrines of Confucius and those
of the Taoists and Buddhists? Which of them is true? Discuss the merits
and demerits of Confucianism, which declares the heaven and earth have a
beginning but no end, and Buddhism, which preaches the cycle of worldly
events in the order of emergence, subsistence, destruction, and emptiness."
The answers entered in the work, however, are merely fraught with flowery
words, and the points of arguments are so superficial and vague that
consistency is hardly found. A certain answer even asserts that the two
doctrines cannot be distinguished from each other, and the truth and
falSity of the two cannot be judged. We are surprised at the words and the
lack of logical relevance. 24
The way of thinking on the part of the Japanese in general could not
easily be changed by the introduction and dissemination of Buddhism. It is
54° JAPAN
true that great efforts were made to understand and assimilate the philoso-
phy of Buddhism as well as its artistic by-products. Those who made the
efforts, however, were confined to learned monks; the Japanese in general
were indifferent to philosophical argument. Since the works by the monks
were nearly all written in Chinese, they made no contact with the general
public. Although the founders of various Buddhistic sects which arose in
the Kamakura period wrote also in the native Japanese language, their
central works, which deal with the essentials of their doctrines, were all in
Chinese. Some Buddhists keenly felt the necessity of disseminating Bud-
dhistic thought among the people and produced writings in the original
Japanese especially for that purpose, but such cases were remarkably few in
number and small in scope.25
It is commonly said that Japanese Buddhism reached its maturity in
the Kamakura period (II85-1333). "Kamakura Buddhism," however, did
not develop much systematic philosophical thinking. As we have already
learned, such prominent figures as Hanen, Shinran, and Nichiren chiefly
concentrated their efforts upon demonstrating the orthodoxy or validity of
their own interpretations of Buddhist Sacred texts. To cite an extreme
instance, Chlshin (1239-1289), who is also called the Itinerant Sage Ippen,
declared on his deathbed that the people of this world should be content
with the one phrase, "Pay homage to Amitabha Buddha," (Namu-Amida-
Butsu) and ordered his books destroyed by fire.
On the other hand, some contemporary philosophers in Japan have
tried to see in Dagen, who continued to write philosophical works through-
out his lifetime, the pioneer of Japanese philosophy. Though it is doubtless
true that Dagen was a distinguished thinker as well as a high-minded
spiritual leader, he was not the sort of thinker who developed a logically
coherent system of thought. In spite of the fact that he cherished deep
philosophical ideas which were gem-like in character, he was not inclined
to elaborate his thoughts-his "dotoku"-in a strictly logical system.
Dagen commented upon a passage "Inhabitants of Ling-nan not hav-
ing Buddhahood" as follows:
"This passage means neither that inhabitants of Ling-nan Peak do not
possess Buddhahood nor that they possess Buddhahood. It just means
inhabitants of Ling-nan not having Buddhahood."26 Probably Dagen
thought that the judgment that they either do or do not have Buddhahood
is based upon too abstract and sharp a distinction, which is foreign to
Buddhahood, in which the realm of absoluteness, of All-Being (Dagen's
peculiar term) or nothing, is approached when being and non-being are
transcended. Dagen, however, did not like to expound such a principle in
abstract, universal propositions, and was satisfied with the terse but obscure
expression, "Inhabitants of Ling-nan not having Buddhahood."
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In another place, Dagen opined as follows, referring to the problem of
life and death: "Life and death matter little because the Buddha exists
therein. And one is not perplexed by life and death because the Buddha
does not exist therein."27 We have here two formally contradictory asser-
tions about the Buddha's existence. But the gist of what he meant by the
two sentences was quite the same: Be resigned!
The teacher Musa (or Soseki, 1275-1351), Buddhist priest of the
Rinzai sect, declares, very clearly, that he does not aim at fixed logical
coherency: "Clear-sighted masters of the Zen sect do not have a fixed
doctrine as something to be cherished for all time. They present any
doctrines as occasion demands, and preach as their tongues happen to
dictate. They do not have a fixed source to rely upon. If one asks them
what Zen is, they sometimes answer in terms of the sayings of Confucius,
.Mencius, Lao-Tzu, or Chuang-tzu, Non-Zen Buddhist teachers, sometimes
with popular proverbs, or sometimes they explain what Zen teaches, point
out a particular situation in front of them and simply swing their mace or
shout in a loud voice. Or they simply raise their fingers or fists. All these are
means used by the masters, and called 'the vivacious ways of the Zen
sect.' "28
Buddhism originally embraced the idea of expediency, and among the
expediencies Buddhists were allowed to use as their means of preaching, a
certain system of successive ranking was thought to exist. In case of the
Zen Buddhists, however, no consideration is paid to the logical relations
among expediencies. Musa's saying quoted above indicates the ways of
instruction employed in the Zen sect since its foundation in China, and it
was through the appreciation of this aspect of it that Japan welcomed the
Zen sect.
From the Tokugawa period (1600-1867), the schools of the Neo-
Confucians, Chu-hsi and Wang Yang-ming, came to be energetically stud-
ied in Japan, but it is a question as to how far Japanese scholars understood
them. In this connection, some examples will be given to show that Japa-
nese Confucianists did not like metaphysical speculation.
The Chu-hsi school made a distinction between li (principle) or tao
(way) which was held to be "above form" and chi (matter) or ch'i (recep-
tacle) which was "below form." Western students of the school sometimes
translate the former as "form," and the latter as "material." Roughly speak-
ing, the world "above form" and the world "below form" as expressed in the
Sung school correspond to the world of ideas and the world of phenomena
respectively. This is the reason why the Japanese in modern times have
translated "metaphysics" as "keijijo-gaku" (the study of what is above
form). However, Ekken Kaibara (1650-1714), having tried to understand
Confucianism from the viewpoint of Japanese practical life, did not under-
542 JAPAN
stand the distinction between the realms "above form" and "below form."
He was disposed to understand the two as belonging both to the realm of
the senses and the concrete: "In my opinion," he said, "the 'form' means to
be corporeal, 'over' means to be in the heavens, and 'below' to be on the
earth." Referring to what the "heaven" and the "earth" are, he continues:
'Those things which 'form shapes in the heaven' are simply the sun, moon,
the stars and constellations."29 "The phrase 'below form' refers to those
things which form shapes on the earth, and all that have any shapes
whatever, such as mountains, rivers, the ground, and men, are 'receptacles
(ch'i).' " Thus Kaibara was never inclined to recognize the realm which
transcends and underlies the natural world of the senses. Such a way of
thinking quite naturally makes it impossible to develop a conception of the
intelligible world, of the world of ideas. This is the reason why he could
not understand the philosophical significance of the Kegon doctrine, for he
often accused the Sung school of being influenced by the Kegon view of
Dharma-dhiitu (the view of the super-mundane law of the interdependence
of things).
As anoth.er instance, Sorai Ogyii, who made much of the will of
Heaven, could not grasp the idea of Heaven as an abstract concept. He
could not conceive of it as distinct from the visible heaven of the natural
world. Thus, he said: 'We need not wait to understand Heaven. We all
know it. When we look at Heaven, it seems blue and boundless, and
beyond any means of measuring it. It embraces the sun, moon, stars and
constellations, and is the source of rain, wind, and cold and hot weather.
Heaven is the place where all things receive their destinies, and it is the
god of gods, holy beyond any comparison, and nothing can rise to its
height."30
In theoretically denouncing the doctrines of Christianity, most Japa-
nese did so on the ground of no particular philosophy. Habiyan (Fabian, c.
1650), for example, became a priest of the Nichiren sect after he forsook
the Christian faith, but he did not make use of the dbctrine or philosophy
of the Nichiren sect in criticizing his former faith. All he had to do, as he
saw it, was to point out weak spots of the Christian doctrine and repudiate
it in any way whatever. Hence no logical consistency can be found in his
attitude. He said he had never witnessed a Christian miracle, and then
praised most highly, as a genuine miracle, Nichiren's escape from death.
Controversies between a Catholic Father3! iruman and Razan Hayashi
(1583-1657), the Confucianist, descended also to a mere exchange of
contemptuous shouts, "You blighter!" and "You idiot!"32
Absence or neglect of theoretical and systematic thinking is equally
characteristic of former scholars of Japanese classics. Norinaga Motoori, for
example, had no concrete conception of method in his learning: "In final
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conclusion, to make strenuous efforts consecutively for long years is most
essential to those who are engaged in learning, and it does not matter how
they learn. The How is the question about which they need not worry so
much."33 Motoori exhorted all students just to be diligent in their study,
and did not develop any constructive thinking about the method of learn-
ing itself.34
Of course, it is possible to express one's self as clearly in Japanese as in
any other language, if one has the disposition as well as the logical clarity
and habits of thought to do so. We must not forget the important condi-
tioning of ways of thinking by the cultural customs ingrained in the habits
of people, and according to one school of thought, such customs are more
important than the temporal limitations of the language in which they are
expressed. Since we do not wish to advocate any single-factor theory of
cultural or historical determinism, we must admit the working of many
influences that have brought it about that the aesthetic aspects of Japanese
life and thought are far more dominant than any concern for exact logical
modes of expression. At least, it is historically true that the neglect of logic
is One of the salient features of traditional Japanese ways of thinking.
Concrete intuitions are favored much more than abstract concepts devoid
of any tangible connection with the humanly perceived world.
Slow Development of Logic in Japan
The logic of Buddhism, Inmyo, was introduced into Japan at a very
early date. In 653 A.D. during the reign of Emperor K6toku, D6shO went to
study in China, and, together with the monk Jion (Tz'u-en), personally
studied under Hsiian-tsang the doctrine of idealism (wei-shih, vij-
naptimiitratii) , which was the newest philosophy of the time, and also
schooled himself in logic (inmyo). In 661, during the reign of Saimei, he
returned to Japan and introduced Buddhist logic to Japan. After Hsiian-
Tsang's round trip to India (62~45), he translated 74 Buddhist works in
1338 volumes. His Hsi-yu chi (Record of the Western Regions) "is the
most important work of its kind" (Reischauer and Fairbanks, 146).
Since D6sh6 disseminated his newly acquired knowledge at the Gang6
Temple, the scholarship which he originated is generally referred to as "the
tradition of the Southern Temple," and also, as "the Asuka tradition." It
was only sixteen years after the Buddhistic logic was introduced to China
that it was further conveyed to Japan. Later on in 716, Gemb6 went to
China to study the Buddhistic logic under Chishii (Chih-chou), the third
patriarch of the Hoss6 sect. After he came back to Japan, he propagated
learning at the K6fuku Temple; this is referred to as "the tradition of the
Northern Temple," and also as the "tradition of Kasayama." Since that
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time, this system of logic came to be studied in the Hosso sect as a
discipline supplementing Buddhistic idealism (vijfiaptimatratasiddhi), and
the· Abhidharmakosa-siistra. The number of books written in Japan on
Buddhistic logic amounts to a considerable figure, and even the bibliog-
raphy entered at the end of the Inmyo Zuigenki ("The Origin of the
Buddhistic Logic") written by Hotan at the middle of the Tokugawa
period, comprises eighty-four Japanese works of the kind.
In looking into the characteristic way in which the Buddhist logic was
disseminated in Japan, we find in the first place that this· logic was em-
ployed as a technique of expression in questions and answers at Buddhist
meetings. Logic was then likely to be studied not as a subject matter in
itself but as a technique of oral expression. At the very beginning, in places
like the Yuima (Vimalakirti) meetings in the Kofuku Temple, where the
essential doctrine of that sect was propounded, a "confirmer," an "assertor,"
and a "questioner" were designated, and argument was conducted accord-
ing to the forms of Buddhist Logic (inmyo). Later it was employed at the
Jion-meeting, where the use of logic came to be ritualized.35 Still later, the
Enryaku Temple and the Onjo Temple held regular Hokke-meetings in
which the catechism of the Lotus Slitra was discussed, and those who did
not know the Buddhist logic were not allowed to join such meetings.
Buddhist logic was at that time considered a common subject to be mastered
by monks of any sect. Further in the Great-transmission-meetings (Dai-
denbo-e), in the Kongobu Temple in the Muromachi period (1336-I573),
the Chishakuin Temple, the Hase Temple, and other places in
the Tokugawa period (1600-1867), the subjects of Commentaries were
discussed according to the forms of Buddhist logic, and ultimately even the
Jodo and Zen sects came to hold such meetings. These were called "discus-
sions" (rongi), and in the Zen sect, because of their special form, they were
called "questions and answers" (mondo). In these uses the inmyo deterio-
rated to the point of extreme formalism.
In the Tendai sect the periodic examinations of state-supported stu-
dent priests were conducted according to this form of argumentation. The
official gazette of the Enryaku period (782-806) informs us that five ques-
tions and ten problems were put and all of them were answered aloud. This
was the first step toward ritualization of logical argument. Further, it is
held that this is the origin of the argument in the Noh-drama.
In this situation it goes without saying that the forms of Inmyo, as well
as the discussion-style of rongi, were used, and further both questions and
answers were recited, and moreover were accompanied by a certain gracious
rhythm. Finally, outside of Buddhism, the practice of holding public
discussions of lyric verse and of The Tale of Genji developed in various
places; also there came into being the utaawase, or form of poetry discus-
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sion, in which poems were discussed with questions and answers. More-
over, the ritualized debate continues to be held at Mt. K6ya, even to this
day. In this ritual, the answerers (Rissha), the questioners (Monja), the
judge (Tandai), the stenographer (Chuki), and the manager (Gyoji) sit in
pious attitude around the statue of the Buddha, according to fixed rule;
Buddhist hymns are sung and the siitras are read. Thus, in Japan, logical
debate was reduced to a mere Buddhist meeting, a decorum of the most
pious form. Further, the form of the ritual was extended without change to
the poetic debate or utaawase.36 Therefore, the meeting of debate, in which
logic was applied to concrete cases, was completely transformed into a
formalized ceremony, then into the arts in the manner peculiar to the
Japanese culture. Surely, we may say that this phenomenon reveals the
artistic, as well as non-logical, character of the Japanese educated or literary
class and people influenced by them.
It is relevant that the formula of reasoning or syllogism of Indian logic
was introduced into Japan in a modified form.
One of the original Indian formulae runs as follows:
( I) the conclusion:
(2) the reason:
(3) the explanatory ex-
ample:
Words are impermanent.
Because they have been made.
It is a fact of experience that whatever has
been made is impermanent, as are jars, etc.
It is a fact of experience that whatever is
permanent has not been made, as with
space.31
In the above-mentioned formula, the conclusion was not regarded by
the Japanese as an assertive sentence, but was interpreted as an exhortation
for persuading others. Therefore it has been usually read in Japanese: "Koe
wa mujo naru beshi." (Words should be regarded as impermanent.) That is
to say, Japanese logicians understood the assertion as one to be made in
debating. Classical Indian logic also was essentially a logic of dialogue. The
distinction between inference for one's self and inference for others was
there from the beginning, and the five-membered syllogism belongs to the
latter class which was used in argument and debate. But Japanese logicians
of antiquity were more interested in the human relations in which debate
was conducted than in abstracting the subject of the debate from the
surrounding human situation. Further the statement of the example is
usually read:
"Jo so tso, chien pi wu ch'ang"
"Consider whatever has been made as impermanent!"
"Consider whatever is permanent as not having been madeJ33
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Nevertheless the word "chien" which has been translated as the im-
perative "Consider!" does not have the meaning of imperative in the
Chinese translation. Moreover, according to the Sanskrit original, it means
"by experience (dr~tam)." Therefore, the statements in question originally
mean "Everything which has been made is known to be impermanent by
our experience. For instance, it is similar to a thing like a vase," and "what
is permanent is by experience known to be that which has not been made;
for instance, it is like space."
As is seen here, the Japanese have not been interested in abstracting
universally valid sentences from their social relations. As scholars of Bud-
dhist logic always thought of meetings at which debates took place, they
made much of the practical side of Buddhist logic, especially deliberation
on fallacies. Such works as "the Treatise on Thirty-three Fallacies"
(Sanjiisan-kahon-saho) were composed. They have always been considered
to be useful for discussion among scholarly clergymen.39
In the second place, Indian logic, ever since it was introduced from
China, has been studied in a dogmatic spirit. The interpretation of logical
scriptures givep by Jion (Tz'u-en, 632-682), the founder of the Fa-hsiang
(Japanese, Hosso) sect, was respected as the highest and absolute authority,
which should be studied with the spirit of a defender of the faith. Under
Gembo 0-746 A.D.), the importer of logic, Zen-shu, of the Akishino
Temple, studied various commentaries on logic and wrote his own com-
mentary in twelve volumes, "Inmyo Ronsho myotosho" (Explanatory Lamp
for the Commentary on the Introduction to Buddhist Logic). Not only was
this work written in the form of an annotation to Jion's commentary,
Nisshori-ron-sho (Commentary on the Introduction to Buddhist Logic),
but he also studied logic from Jion's viewpoint, defending his comments
and denouncing those of others. This book is the best example of those
books which were written with the spirit of a defender of the faith. Thus,
as a whole, logic, in Japan, was traditionally studied as one of the auxiliary
disciplines of the study of the idealistic doctrines of the Hosso sect. This
was presumably due to the fact that the Buddhist logic was the essential
preparatory discipline for understanding the texts of the Indian idealistic
philosophy. The other sects of the Nara period, for example, the Kegon
and Sanron sects, also studied logic. They were inHuenced by the Hosso
sect's keen interest in it, though it was not indispensable to the under-
standing of their own doctrines. But this tendency did not permeate all
sects of Japanese Buddhism. Dengyo (767-822) especially resisted this
tendency, owing to his hostility toward the Hosso sect, the strongest enemy
of his new religious movement. He declared that logic was necessary to
preach the doctrine of "Three Vehicles" of the Hosso sect, but that this sect
was, after all, nothing but a second-rate Buddhism. In his opinion, no
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system of logic has any value for the doctrine of "One Vehicle" (ekil-
yana) of the Tendai sect, which is the highest type of Buddhism. Ever
since then, the followers of Dengyo on Mt. Hiei attached no importance to
logic.
Of course, there were exceptions. For example, Genshin (Eshin
942-1017), though he had the same views in all respects as Dengyo, was
well-versed in logic and wrote a book to comment in detail on one of its
most difficult problems, the doctrine of Four Types of Contradiction (Shi-
so-i). Though this was one of the most important events in the history of
logic in Japan/o it was an exceptional phenomenon in the Tendai sect
itself. In a word, the study of logic has never been extended to the whole
Buddhist world of Japan. This was because of the fact that logic, defended
by the Hosso sect as its essential discipline, was ignored by other sects41 just
because they, too, had this same dogmatic sectarian spirit.
In the third place, we must mention the tendency of the study of logic
to become an esoteric tradition. This tendency was conspicuous especially
at the zenith of prosperity of logic, that is, from the end of the Heian
period to the middle of the Kamakura period. In Nara of those days the
study of logic centered in the Kofuku Temple of the Hossa sect, and
extended to the other two big temples, Tadai and Haryu. The Ganga
Temple, called Nan-ji (the Temple of the South), had already decayed.
Only the school of the K5fuku Temple, called Hoku-ji (the Temple of the
North), prospered, because it was protected politically and financially by
the Fujiwaras, the ruling clan at that period. The study of logic, however,
gradually showed a tendency to decline after the middle of the Kamakura
period, just as did Buddhist idealism, and counted only a few generations
of students after Jokei (1155-1213).
It is true that some of the Japanese scholars had tried to give an
international and universal character to the study of logic. For example,
Genshin sent his work, "Short Commentaries on the Four Types of Con-
tradiction in Logic" (Inmyo Ronsho Shis6i Ryakuchiishaku) through Sung
merchants to disciples of Master Hung-tao of the Tz'u-en Temple in
China, and wished "to distinguish, in detail, between right and wrong, and
to enlighten them."42 But this was an exceptional case. In Japan, logic was
transmitted from a master to only one disciple, and it was forbidden to
communicate it to others. For example, in the Kamakura period, when
Jakei gave his work "Short Commentary on Logic" (Myo hon-sho) to his
disciple, Rya-san, he wrote: "I made only one copy. But, because I cannot
disappoint those two people, I gave the first half (seven volumes) to the
Vicar-General of the Tahokuin, and the second half (six volumes) to the
Preceptor of the Komyoin. By mutual agreement each can borrow the other
half and make a copy of it. While any of the two is living, the number of
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copies should not be increased. When you transmit it in the future, you
must choose a person who has the same religious disposition as you." In
answer to these instructions, Ryo-san pledged: "So long as I live, not even
two copies, to say nothing of many, will be permitted to be made of this
book. Even if a noble lord orders it, or if an influential man of the world
urges it, there will never exist many copies. In short, other men will not be
allowed to copy it. And, after my death, it will be transmitted to a man of
religious disposition among my disciples, and even to such a one I will not
transmit it, if he is a worldly, unlawful, or unjust man." Moreover, if he
breaks this pledge, "may all of the punishments of the God Kasuga affiict
me in every pore of my body." Since then, this Commentary was kept in
the secret treasury-box of the Kasuga Shrine in the Kofuku Temple and
transmitted to chosen disciples only under very strict rules. A later docu-
ment dealing with the transmission of this book (dated 25/12/1256) said
that "This book should be the secret of the Temple, inaccessible to out-
siders."
Also, Shinken (1145-1225) closed the postscript of his "Short Account
of the Real E.ssence of the Predicate" (Hojisa-yomonsha) with the follow-
ing words: "My disciples to whom this book will be transmitted should
keep it in greatest secrecy."43 And Ryoben (-1252) has among his writings
a book the title of which is "Of the Secret Account of the Transmission of
Logic" (Inmya Soja Himitsusha). We know therefore that the Buddhist
logic was transmitted secretly. On the mark-papers inserted into copies of
these books, we can sometimes see the names of the people to whom the
book was transmitted, and we sometimes find on these papers the warning
"Absolute Secrecy." In Japan, therefore, logic was adopted as a secretly
transmitted catechistic technique not to be generally disseminated. This
prevented logic from becoming disseminated as a universal science.
We must pay particular attention also to the social fact that Indian
logic, in Japan, had been studied only by learned Buddhist priests, not by
the Japanese people in general. Even these learned priests applied logic
only to the interpretation of Buddhist philosophical works. These learned
priests did not use logic for other subjects. It goes without saying that the
mass of the Japanese people and many Buddhist priests were unacquainted
with the Buddhist logic. In short, the sacred writing of logic was reduced to
an apparatus for the interpretation of scriptures.
In the fourth place, because the Japanese inmyo was a continuation of
the Chinese version of logic, it was consequently exegetical in character,
and did not have the character of formal logical inquiry. Nineteen books
were written, in Japan only, to comment on the Four Types of Contradic-
tion, working from just that part of Tz'u-en's "Great Commentary on
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Logic" (Inmyo Daisho)44 which had dealt with them. None of these books,
however, was a logical interpretation of this problem.45 This was probably
inevitable, because the commentary of Tz'u-en itself did not offer a logical
interpretation of the Four Types of Contradictions, and it had been re-
spected as the highest authority by Japanese students. These commentaries
on logic had, in general, fallen to the level of exegetic commentaries on
words, and hundreds of commentaries, produced during more than one
thousand years, had almost nothing to contribute to the development of
logic. None of them has made efforts to set forth a well organized logical
system based upon the author's own thinking.
In the fifth place, the study of logic in Japan, as in China, did not
treat the problem of the critical study of knowledge. On this point, it was
quite different from the highly rationalistic logic of Dharmakrrti and others
in India. Because the Japanese studied logic only through the Chinese
translation, the Indian ideas that had not been introduced into China were
inaccessible to the Japanese.
Japanese scholars, like their predecessors in China, scarcely studied
the logical works of Dignaga (c 400-480), founder of Buddhist logic in
India. His principal work, the PramiiJ;Zasamuccaya, once translated into
Chinese, was lost very soon without ever being utilized. Hsiian-tsang
translated a compendium by Dignaga, called the Nyiiyamukha (A Primer
of Logic), into Chinese, but few Chinese and Japanese scholars seem to
have ever studied this work. The Nyiiyapravesaka (Introduction to Logic),
which Japanese scholars looked upon as their exclusive authority, is only a
poor synopsis of the NyiiYamukha. Tibetan Buddhists, on the other hand,
continued the study of the more important and more voluminous works of
Dharmakrrti, the brilliant successor of Dignaga. We owe to the Tibetans
the important information about Buddhist logic in India.
Thus in Japan, just as in China, the logic of Indian Buddhism could
not take root and develop. Apart from the translations and commentaries,
no original books on logic were written in the native Japanese language.
Cursed by secret transmission, also, a knowledge of logic could not have
spread widely among the Japanese. Another point to be noted is that in
Japan logic as a discipline had nothing to do with mathematics and natural
sciences. Even in native Japanese mathematics, we cannot find any trace of
the influence of traditional formal logic. It was not simply that logical
thinking was not developed among the Japanese people; the significance of
exact logic was not realized by them at all. And it was far more difficult for
them to develop their own logic, independently of Indian logic. It is
asserted frequently that, in the Tokugawa period, logical thinking appeared
in some Japanese scholars, for example, in Baien Miura (1723-1789), but
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all that we can discern in him is a way of thinking similar to Hegelian
dialectics.46 Miura did not know formal logic. He had no connection with
the tradition of the Indian logic.
Since the Meiji era, Western formal logic has been introduced into
Japan, and included in the curriculum of junior college education. But, in
Japan, the study of logic has made rather poor progress, compared with
developments in other fields of culture. While an enormous number of
philosophic works have been produced since the Restoration, they are
mostly of the essay genre and consequently not always written with logical
precision. Excellent works of formal logic written by Japanese have been
very few and little philosophical thought has appeared which exhibits
logical thinking in the sense of the formal structure of deductive systems.
Hopes for Development of Exact Logical Thinking in Japan
We need not despair completely, however, of the capacity of the
Japanese people for logical thinking; a way of thinking of a people is
simply a customary tendency and is capable of being reformed. There is
evidence for this in the fact that modes of expression in the Japanese
language have gradually been growing more and more strict and precise in
recent years. Although it is true that the Japanese language has not been
very suitable for philosophical thinking, it may improve in the future in
this respect. On the other hand, it must also be remembered, that Leibniz
himself chose not to compose his chief philosophical works in German. He
wrote in a more logical style in Latin and French; that is to say, the
German language became philosophically significant only after the efforts
of a few later scholars, such as Wolff, Kant, and their followers. We cannot
also forget that the middle high German poets, e.g. Wolfram von Eschen-
bach, had to express their ideas far more concretely, and consequently less
philosophically, than the modern German poets, such as Goethe, Schiller,
Novalis, and others. In other words, the German language was not fit for
philosophical thinking at the beginning, but was elaborated by some emi-
nent persons, including Meister Eckhart in the thirteenth century. Terms
such as "Begriff" (concept) or "Vernunft" (reason) would never have
gained their philosophical implications without the systems of German
idealism. In the same way the Japanese may make progress in logical forms
of expression. This hope finds support in the Japanese linguistic trend of
recent years toward more and more precise expression. Japanese adaptation
to Western ways of expressing thought is remarkable, although it is ques-
tionable whether it always means improvement.
The fact that Buddhist logic did not fully develop in the past can be
ascribed to the poor logical character of its immediate source, the Chinese
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inmy6. In spite of this limitation there were Japanese who tried on several
points to initiate a development in Japan beyond the Chinese logic. We
can mention an interesting, if rather trivial, example. In the Chinese logic,
the word shuh6 (tsung-fa, pak~adharma) represents the predicate of an
assertive proposition (tong, major term, sadhya) as well as the predicate of a
causal proposition (yin, middle term, siidhana). The Chinese technical
terminology did not distinguish between the two. Even if there were at first
a distinction made between the two uses through pronunciation, this
distinction could not be preserved for a long time in a country using the
Chinese language in which pronunciation rather frequently changed.
The Japanese, distinguishing the two terms in pronunciation, read in
voiceless sound Shuh6, in one case, where it means the predicate of an as-
sertive proposition, and in voiced sound (Shubi5), in the other case, where
it means the predicate of a causal proposition. Moreover, before the Meiji
era, there were several scholars who had mastered47 the Indian formal logic
and had actually applied it to the study of Buddhist ideas-for example,
Rinjo (1751-1810) and Kaijo (died 1805), of the Buzan school of the
New Shingon sect. Surely logic can be disseminated and developed among
the Japanese people, if we endeavor seriously to study it.
There are some cases of Japanese in the past who were willing to use
the terms of Buddhist logic, even if with changed meanings. For example,
it has been asserted that the word "rippa" (magnificent, splendid) is a
phonetic equivalent to "ryuha" (assertion and refutation in a debate),
and that "mutai" (unreasonable) also is due to Buddhist logic.48 Al-
though it is doubtful whether this assertion or conjecture is correct, it is
an established fact that there were some men of letters who explained it
that way. It means that some ideas related to logic were not alien to laymen
although they were not fully aware of the exact meaning of them.
Taking these facts into consideration, we believe that logic can be
disseminated and developed among the Japanese people, if studied seriously
in an exact way. Logical improvement will not be impossible for the
Japanese in the future, although it is fraught with many difficulties.
Intuitive and Emotional Tendencies
Although the Japanese language, as already explained, is unsuitable
for logically precise expression, it is well adapted to the expression of
intuition and of individual emotion. On this point, Dr. Watsuji says: "In
Japanese, the expression of feeling and will comes to the foreground. And,
owing to this characteristic, what man understands in his direct and practi-
cal action is extremely well preserved [in language]. One of the modes of
expression conspicuous in Japanese literature, surely owes its high degree
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of development to this characteristic of the Japanese language. This mode
consists in connecting together words and phrases which exhibit no connec-
tion of cognitive meaning, simply according to identity or similarity of
pronunciation, and moreover through the connection of their emotive and
affective content, achieving the expression of one complete concrete emo-
tion. It seems to me that this characteristic is nothing more or less than a
characteristic of the Japanese spirit."49
The Japanese themselves have been conscious of this characteristic for
a long time. The Waka poet Yamanoue-no-Okura (660-733) called Japan
"the land where the spirit of language prospers." In Japan, almost every-
body is a poet, and can compose and criticize tanka (the verse of thirty-
one syllables) or haiku (the verse of seventeen syllables). But between the
Japanese and other peoples there is a great difference in the significance of
poetic expression.
The non-logical disposition of the Japanese and their emphasis on
emotional moods are revealed in the form of their poetic expression. A
conspicuous difference appears when Japanese poetry is compared with
that of anotper Eastern people, the Indians, to say nothing of poetry in
Western language. In Indian poetry, the subject and the predicate of
sentences are distinguished, and also the relation between the principal
and subordinate clauses is clearly recognized. And these characteristics are
probably due to the special character of the Sanskrit language. Accordingly,
so far as the linguistic materials used in it are concerned, it is almost not
different from prose, except for a flavor of poetical emotion produced by
rhyme. In the Japanese tanka, on the contrary, the subject and the predicate
are hardly ever distinguished, and the relation between the principal and
the subordinate clauses is not clear. Although some tankas are composed
with logical precision,50 they are, in the aesthetic opinion of the Japanese,
rather poor in artistic value. And in haiku, where the abridgment of
wording is carried to an extreme, words are cut down to a still shorter form;
consequently the emotional mood which is conveyed by each single word
has greater importance.
In Japanese, the same judgment can have various expressions, and
among these expressions there are very delicate nuances of emotional
implication. And as has been pointed out, in Japanese the use of honorific
expressions has become very complicated; it is an error, furthermore, to
think that honorific language reflects only social status in the linguistic
vestiges of a feudal hierarchy. Rather it is often used in order to lend an air
of grace and courtesy to the expression. For example, miso (bean) soup is
called "o-mi-o-tsu-ke," and the foot "a-mi-ashi," through the addition of two
or three honorific particles. Furthermore, in some cases, for example, "0-
shirai" (face powder), and "a-mocha" (toy), the honorific expression merges
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into the word and becomes an integral part of it. On this point, Yaichi
Haga (1867-1917) gives the following explanation: "Essentially, an honor-
ific expression is not always used to show reverence. In some cases it is used
to express affection, or to speak gracefully. Moreover, so long as there are
honorific words available, if we do not use them, we are regarded as vulgar.
Consequently, men of upper classes and men of refined manners use polite
words even toward their inferiors."51
Owing to this way of thinking, Japanese thought did not shape itself
in the form of intellectual and systematic theories; rather it was apt to be
expressed in the intuitive and emotional style of the arts.
Ancient books of Japanese history written in the Japanese language,
for example, O-kagami (Great Mirror), Mizu-kagami (Water Mirror),
lma-kagami (contemporary), and lastly Masu-kagami (Additional Mir-
ror) are literary works rich in feeling. On this point, Japanese historiogra-
phy is quite different from that of the Chinese. The Chinese interpret and
criticize historical facts from moral and political standpoints. The Japanese,
however, describe the historical facts with artistic feeling. And, while the
Chinese word "Chien" (mirror), used frequently in the title of the books
of Chinese history, for example, in Tzu-chih-t'ung-chien (A Mirror for
Helping Government), means a reaection of moral and political principles,
the Japanese word "kagami" (mirror) has no such moral connotation.
This characteristic way of thinking was revealed also in the process of
the assimilation of Buddhism in Japan. When Buddhism came to Japan as
a synthesis of religion, art, and philosophy, the Japanese people adopted a
very peculiar emotional attitude toward it. The Japanese of those days took
in only what was congenial to them. They were particularly charmed by
the aesthetic impressions of the statues of the Buddha, and, above all, were
struck by their solemn magnificence. Accordingly, they devoted themselves
chieay to plastic arts. Since then, in the Nara and the succeeding periods,
the Japanese find religious inspiration in the arts of Buddhism. In Buddhist
meetings, arts of all kinds, music, dancing, literature, etc., are apt to be
used synthetically. Here, the Japanese seem enraptured in an ecstasy, as if
they were in the Pure Land of Amitabha (Gokuraku) without taking leave
of earthly existence.
Saint Myoe (Buddhist priest, 1173-1232) used the word "sukigokoro"
to express the ecstatic yearning for the beautiful and the pure. This
yearning, coming in contact with objects and driven by inspiration, ex-
presses itself in poetry. Consequently, for him, poetry was almost Buddhism
itself. "Considering the men of all ages," he said, "there exists not a single
case of a vulgar and shameless double-dealer becoming a Buddhist. This
fact was stated clearly by the Buddha in siitras, and further it was ex-
pounded in treatises. Therefore, there is no doubt about it. I have never
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seen the books of physiognomists, but, when I judged the character of
other people by their faces by surmising from the sayings of the Buddha, I
was right eight or nine times out of ten. Through all ages eminent Bud-
dhists emerge from men of taste. Although the poems both in Chinese and
Japanese and the poetical dialogues in Japanese are not Buddhism in
themselves, those who have taste for these things are certain to extend their
taste to Buddhism and become wise and very kind men. Even if men of
worldly mind succeed in having the appearance of virtuousness through
their study, there remains some flavor of baseness, for they always look
after their own material interests and suffer from excessive attachment to
them. Buddhism should be taught to those who, from childhood, have
delicate taste and truthful heart."52
Of course, the unity of literature and religion was protested by many
traditional Buddhists. According to one of them, Dagen, Buddhism should
be practiced for its own sake and not as literature, which has no value for
genuine devotees of Buddhism. "The people who pursue the Way should
not read the books of doctrinaire sects and other religions. If they should
like to read s.omething, they should read the collection of sayings (Goroku).
The other books must be put aside for the time."53 Accordingly, he pro-
hibited keeping any other books than those relating to Buddhism in the
dormitories of Buddhist temples. "In the dormitories, the books of mundane
affairs, astronomy, geography, other religions, poems and verses, should not
be kept."54 Herein we can hear the voice of the traditional spirit transmitted
from the days of early Buddhism in India. But, in spite of this declaration,
Dagen was a great poet. His Chinese poems are lofty and elegant, while his
tankas vibrate with warm sympathy for the beauties of nature.
The monk and Zen Master Shasan Suzuki (1579-1655) defended and
admired Dagen's poetical talent. A man asks: "Dagen wrote a tanka at
Kitano on the night of August the fifteenth, 'Although I hope and expect
to live and enjoy autumn again, I cannot sleep this night for the beauty of
the moon.' Isn't this tanka unworthy of such an eminent devotee, for it
expresses an attachment to the moon?"
Master (Suzuki) answers: "You are wrong. Dagen diverted himself by
writing tankas, for he was well versed in the Way of tanka. We should sing
of the moon and flowers from the bottom of our heart. You seem to think it
will do only if you say 'No delusion should be harbored; everything should
be relinquished.' "55
It should be unnecessary to cite many more illustrations. In Japan,
eminent religious men wrote Chinese poems and Japanese tankas. (This
phenomenon contrasts with the case of Buddhist philosophers in India. For
example, Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, and Dignaga did not leave any lyrical
or pastoral poems. They only amused themselves by expressing abstract
NON-RATIONALISTIC TENDENCmS 555
theories of their philosophy in verse.) Thus, the tanka is particularly
important as the expression of Buddhist thought in the Japanese language,
because it reveals clearly the characteristic aesthetic way of thinking of the
Japanese people. Among the Buddhist tanka, some are nothing but an
expression in thirty-one syllables emotionally equivalent to some one sen-
tence in siitras,56 but most of them use intuitive and concrete modes of
expression, that is, they use particular illustrations in order to express the
universal, abstract ideas and general propositions of Buddhism. This fact
will be shown clearly by the following examples.
"The Three Worlds are but One Mind" is transfigured in Japanese as:
"The dews fall on thousands of grass leaves of every field, but they are the
same dew of the same autumn."
"The Meditation on the Doctrine of the Middle Way" is transformed
to: "In contemplation, the clouds clear away from the sky of my mind, and
there, in its void, remains only the moon."
"Eternal time has passed since I really became the Buddha" is trans-
posed to "By t~e river flowing far and long, we may know of its inexhaust-
ible source."
"The Precept that Thou Shalt Not Steal" is illustrated by "Along the
white wave-swelling (shiranaminotatsu) stream of Mt. Tatsuta, you should
not break even a twig of a maple tree, if you are not permitted by its owner.
Or else you shall have the bad name (naga-tatsu) of a shameless robber
(shiranami)."
"The Precept that Thou Shalt Not Commit Adultery" is illustrated
by: "You must content yourselves with enjoying the beautiful sight of a
mountain spring. Do not go beyond that. Do not scoop and soil water, even
if it is overflowing."
"The Identity of Mind and the Buddha" is given its emotional equiva-
lent in: "I am floating and sinking among the waves indistinguishable from
the mandarine duck or the sea gull."
The "alphabet" verse (Iroha-uta), commonly ascribed to Kobo, is one
of the best examples:
Although fragrant in hue,
(blossoms) are scattered.
For everyone, life is impermanent.
This morning I crossed the outermost limit,
and I am not intoxicated.
This is the Japanese translation in verse of a hymn which had been
transmitted since the days of early Buddhism in India. The original hymn
means that "Whatever is phenomenal is impermanent; their essential qual-
ity is appearance and disappearance; when these (appearance and disap-
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pearance) repose, tranquility is comfort." In the Japanese "alphabet" verse,
these abstract expressions were changed by emotional expressions, which
use as materials colorful and pictorial images such as "gay," "hue," "cross-
ing," "outermost limits," "dreams," "intoxicated," and merely suggest ab-
stract theories behind them.
Thus, to interpret Buddhist ideas in poems, the Japanese people,
using concrete imagery, appealed to sensuous intuition and added the
flavor of emotional moods to general ideas. In the Indian versification of
Buddhist doctrines, on the contrary, the contents are almost always abstract
and general propositions, and the composition is systematic, with well-
defined subject and predicate. It is philosophy disguised in verse-form. For
example, one of the philosophers of Indian Buddhism, Nagarjuna, in the
above mentioned hymn in verse, says: "We preach that dependent causa-
tion is voidness. It is temporary, being dependent (upon something else). It
is the Middle Way itself."51 This metaphysical verse is far from anything
poetic.
It has been frequently suggested that the Japanese people love purity
and undefih;dness,58 and are proud of this fact. In Shinto, "purity" has been
regarded as one of the most important virtues ever since ancient times.
Although almost all peoples love this virtue, what the Japanese mean by
"purity" differs considerably from other peoples' ideas. In Japanese, "purity"
is expressed by various acts and ideas such as frequent bathing, daily
sweeping and dusting, purification ceremony (misogi) , great exorcism
(o-harai), image for redemption (katashiro), dislike of defiledness, absti-
nence (monoimi), tidiness of appearance. All of these are concrete acts,
which appeal to the senses and unsophisticated sentiment. Their aim is not
purity in any metaphysical or religious sense, based on a poignant conscious-
ness of sinfulness. In this sense, the Japanese people are essentially different
from the Indians. The Indians value religious and metaphysical purity
more than sensuous purity. It was one of the ideals of early Buddhism that
the monks who renounced the world should collect thrown-away tatters
and wear them. Though in ragged clothes, they believed that they could
attain spiritual purity. The clothes were called Pamsukiilika ("Funzoe" in
Japanese, meaning "lavatory clothes"): "They are thrown away and not
unlike lavatory clothes. And furthermore, they belong to no one. Therefore,
they are called 'lavatory clothes.' "59 To the Japanese, however, it is unbear-
able to wear such clothes. The Japanese clergymen kept the word "Funzoe,"
but its meaning was changed to signify neat and tidy clothes. Dagen
emphasized the duty to clean the body.60 And, although Buddhism has
shaped one of the main currents of Japanese culture in the past, the
common people are rather inclined to consider that the temples and clergy-
men are impure. This view is deep-rooted, perhaps owing to the fact that
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the Japanese people have been less apt to value spiritual and religious
purity than sensuous and aesthetic refinement. And this corresponds to one
of the characteristics of Japanese ways of thinking, that is, lack of conscious-
ness of the universal.
The traditional tendency still prevails even among most advanced
scientists of the present day Japan. Hideki Yukawa, a physicist, who is the
only Nobel Prize winner of Japan, says that the rather extreme use of
abstract concepts in physics in recent years seems to be very intimately
related to the neglect of intuition for the sake of abstraction in scientific
thinking. "However far we go away from the world of daily life, abstraction
cannot work by itself, but is to be accompanied by intuition or imagina-
tion." He advocates that for the rejuvenation of fundamental physics a
better position should be given to intuition or to "the sense of beauty."6!
Tendency to Avoid Complex Ideas
Among the Eastern peoples, while the Indians were rather inclined to
attach importance to the universal, the Japanese emphasized the individual.
This difference in the way of thinking is revealed in various fields of
thinking of the two peoples.
The best illustration of this fact is supplied by the poetical expression
of objects. In Sanskrit, the cloud (megha) is often called jalada or ambuda
(water giver), the bird vihamga (flyer in the air), the elephant matamga
(meditative walker), the lotus ambuja (the flower which grows out of
water). All of these are compound words, formed out of two words. And
the fact that the last added word is derived from the root of a verb gives an
abstract character to this compound word. The concrete and phenomenal
meaning is brought about on the basis of this abstract meaning of the words
from which the compound is made. As shown by these examples, the
Indians loved abstract expression. But, in the Japanese language, the same
things are expressed by words whose origin is obscure, at least to the
consciousness of their users, and consequently, whose abstract meanings
have been lost; examples are kuma (cloud), tori (bird), zo (elephant),
hasu (lotus).
The Japanese language is, generally speaking, very poor in imaginative
words based on abstract and universal ideas. By associating concrete and
particular objects and qualities with abstract ideas, and by suffusing them
with figurative suggestions of the ideas ultimately to be expressed, the
Japanese writer inspires particular and emotional moods. The use
of "Makura-kotoba" (literally, "pillow words") in tanka and other literary
works offers revealing examples.
'With these bows of catalpa, we have made up our mind to shoot Om)
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enemies and to expect not to return from this battle. So we write down the
names of those who will certainly join (iru) the dead."
"My mother very often smoothed down my black-as-a-crow hair
(nubatama-no-kuro-kami), but certainly she never dreamt that the day
would come when this hair would be cut off (on my becoming a nun)."
The "association word," which is used quite often in literary works, is
another example of this characteristic.
Consequently, the imaginative power of the Japanese people, ever
since ancient times, has been limited to, and has rarely gone beyond the
concrete and intuitive world of nature. "The ancient Japanese," says Dr.
Tsuda, "are generally poor in imaginative power, the power to shape
elaborate fantasy."G2 And this tendency, we may say, runs through Japanese
literature to the present day. Accordingly, the Japanese people have never
developed titanic myths. In this, they are like the Chinese. "Among our
people, who have not formed the idea of God with a human personality, it
was only natural that the stories of the Gods have not been developed."63 In
this respect, Japanese literature is less profound and not so imaginative as
Indian literature.
The characteristic way of thinking pointed out here determined the
form of assimilation of Buddhism, too. The Buddhist sutras had never been
translated into Japanese before the Meiji Restoration (1868). This means
that the complicated Buddhist thought of the Indians has hardly penetrated
as a whole into the life and thought of the Japanese people.
The lack of imagination was revealed in the process of transformation
of the Jodo religion (the sect of the Pure Land of Amitiibha).
The nembutsu ("Keeping the Buddha in mind") practiced by the Japanese
is different from the nembutsu preached in India. In the latter case, for
example, in early Buddhism and in the Great Sukhiivattvyiiha-siitra and
the Amitiiyurdhyiina-siitra, it chiefly consists in thinking of the Buddha,
recalling his sublime features. The Amit1ibha, created by the imagination
of the Indians, had extraordinarily gigantic features.64
"The body of Buddha Amitayus is a hundred thousand million times
as bright as the color of the Jambiinada gold of the heavenly abode of
Yama; the height of that Buddha is six hundred thousand niyutas of ko!is
of yojanas as innumerable as are the sands of the river Ganges.
"The white twist of hair between the eyebrows all turning to the
right, is just like the five Sumeru Mountains. The eyes of Buddha are like
the water of the four great oceans; the blue and the white are quite distinct.
All the roots of hair of his body issue forth brilliant rays like the Sumeru
Mountains. The halo of that Buddha is like a hundred millions of the
Great Chiliocosmus; in that halo there are Buddhas miraculously created,
to the number of a million of niyutas of ko!is as innumerable as the sands
NON-RATIONALISTIC TENDENCIES 559
of the Ganges; each of these Buddhas has for attendants a great assembly of
countless Bodhisattvas who are also miraculously created.
"Buddha Amitayus has eighty-four thousand signs of perfection, each
sign is possessed of eighty-four minor marks of excellence, each mark has
eighty-four thousand rays, each ray extends so far as to shine over the
worlds of the ten quarters, whereby Buddha embraces and protects all the
beings who think upon him and does not exclude (anyone of them)."
Thus, the nembutsu of the Indians was to contemplate these gigantic
features of the Buddha by vivid imaginative power. The nembutsu
preached by the Chinese, for example, by Master Tendai Chih-i,
(538-597), had the same character. But, being transplanted onto Japanese
soil, it was changed to the invocation of Amitabha following the teaching
of Shan-tao of China.
Even in Japan, the clergyman Genshin (Bishop Enshin, 1°72-1132),
preached that the nembutsu consists in contemplating the features of the
Buddha (Shikisokan.) Genshin said: "The novice cannot practice the disci-
pline of contemplation of the profound (esoteric). ... The various siitras
preach the merit of (contemplation of) the features of the Buddha. There-
fore, now is the time to practice this discipline." His nembutsu, however,
went a step further toward the nembutsu as an invocation of Amitabha. He
especially emphasized the importance of the nembutsu on the deathbed.
"Even a man of lowest rank, if he practices Ju-nen which is the repetition
of the name of Amitabha ten times, can be reborn in the Pure Land of
Amitabha." His interpretation of Ju-nen differs from that of the Jodo cult
in China. According to Tao-ch'ue (562-645) in China, "To recall the whole
features or the partial features of Amitabha, to contemplate them in ref-
erence to objects on that occasion, during ten moments of thought with no
intervention of other ideas-this I call Ju-nen." But, according to Genshin,
"The so-called Ju-nen, although variously interpreted, is to repeat ten
times, with heart and soul, 'Oh! save me, thou Amitabha!' "65
The nembutsu as an invocation of the Amitabha by oral recitation of
his name acquired its absolute significance in Honen (1133-1212), the
founder of the Jodo sect. It was not easy for the unimaginative Japanese to
contemplate, as preached by siitras, the features of Amitabha, created by
the imagination of the Indians. Honen perceived this difficulty. "Even if
you try to contemplate the features of Amitabha, it will be difficult for you
to visualize them as clearly as flowers and fruits of cherry, plum, peach, and
damson."66 Therefore, he prohibited the nembutsu as contemplation of the
features of Amitabha. "Nowadays, the devotees should not practice con-
templation. Even if you try to contemplate the features of Amitabha, it will
be difficult to visualize its image as sculptured by Unkei or Kokei (masters
of sculpture)." Therefore, according to Honen, 'The Original Vow of Birth
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in the Pure Land of Amitabha cannot be accomplished by such varied dis-
ciplines as, for example, image-making, tower-erecting, etc., but by the sole
discipline of the repetition of the name of Amitabha, because the Original
Vow is pledged to receive far and wide the whole mass of people." It was
for these reasons that he turned to rely on the nembutsu of Shan-tao of
China.
In "the Panegyric of the Birth in Pure Land" (Ojo-Raisange) of
Shan-tao, we find the following dialogue. "Question: You do not allow
contemplation, but exhort only invocation. Why, and with what intention,
do you rely on such a practice?
"Answer: Now, all the people are obstructed by heavy burdens. Their
mind is too coarse-grained to contemplate a subtle object (that is, Ami-
tabha). Furthermore, their spirit is always oscillating in mid-air. Hence,
sympathizing with their inability to attain their contemplation, the Great
Sage (Buddha) exhorts the exclusive invocation of his name. It is ow-
ing to the easiness of invocation that the people can go to be born in the
Pure Land of Amitabha only through the continuous practice of this
discipline."67
Shinran (1173-1262) followed this standpoint of Shan-tao and Ho-
nen. He thought it was inconceivable for us, ordinary men, to contemplate
the features of Amitabha. "0 deadly sinner! Invoke Amitabha alone! He is
taking hold of us. Though our eyes of flesh cannot clearly see him owing to
our sins, yet is his mercy constantly present to illuminate our minds."68
The dancing and singing monk Ippen (1239-1289) said, "We should
not try to see the Amitabha, except through invocation of him. Invocation
is truly seeing Amitabha itself. The Amitabha seen by the eyes of flesh is
not the true Amitabha."69
This difference between the Indian and the Japanese nembutsu illus-
trates how the Indian mentality, with its overflowing imagination and love
of subtle introspective analysis, differs from that of the Japanese who are
more inclined to depend mainly on concrete symbols.
In this sense of concreteness lies the difference between the Japanese
Pure Land cult and the Indian bhakti religion. The first, having never
been given to wanton imagination, could not develop frantic or ecstatic
rituals. (Although such a tendency was not absent, it was regarded as an
exceptional phenomenon and rejected by the Pure Land cult in general.)
The characteristic way of thinking, which we pointed out in the
process of transformation of the Pure Land cult, can also be recognized in
the case of zazen (dhyiina, to sit in contemplation). The Indians,
in samiidhi, silent meditation and abstraction of thought, kept an image or
idea in mind; for example, they imagined that the universe is like space, or
that it is larger than space, or that, on the contrary, it is smaller than a grain
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of rice, or that the soul is as large as a thumb. This type of discipline had
been practiced in Buddhism as well as in Brahminism, since the days of the
philosophers of the Upanishads. It was to keep the Buddha or truth in
mind or to recall the Past Life. It may be called the Zazen as contemplation
of features.70
In the Japanese Zen sect, however, Zazen aims at detachment from
discursive knowledge, regardless of whether the latter is in the form of the
deliberation of catechetic questions assigned by master, or in the form of
endeavoring to do away with conceptualization. What Dagen adopted as
his motto was the precept: "Practice only sitting."
Japanese philosophy in the past has been influenced by this tendency
to shun theoretical argument. The learning of exegesis and interpretation
was enjoyed as ornamental literature in China, but the Japanese scholars
endeavored to grasp only what they could utilize in that learning for
practical understanding.
Examples of this characteristic inclination of concreteness can be
found in the process of the Japanese assimilation of Buddhism. The com-
mentary on siitras by Prince Shatoku of Japan is not pedantic at all. It is
brief and to the point. But, the Chinese reference book which Prince
Shatoku made use of, the commentary of Master Chia-hsiang, Chi-tsang
(54~623) of China, mentions many meanings in the interpretation of just
one word. We cannot recognize, and the author does not try even to
demonstrate, which of these meanings is the correct one. Therefore, so far
as the purpose of clear exposition is concerned, the Commentary of Prince
Shatoku is superior, as Fujaku (17°7-1781) had pointed out.71 Of course,
we cannot find this characteristic in all of the commentaries written by
Japanese Buddhists. But, compared with the general tendency of the Chi-
nese commentaries, the majority of the Japanese commentaries are rather
succinct summaries. The Japanese not only studied the scholastic doctrines
of the Vijftaptimiitratiisiddhi or Abhidharmakosa in great detail, but also
they wrote on them many commentaries which are brief and to the point.
It seems that the study of Confucianism in Japan showed the same
tendency. The positivist scholars in the 18th and 19th centuries, in the
Ch'ing period, who devoted their life to the exact philological study of
Chinese classics, had never tried to summarize its results and to expose
their essentials. But, the Japanese Confucians of the Archaist (Kogaku)
school, inferior to the Chinese in the exactitude of their philological study,
were very skilled in summarizing the results of their study and leaving
them to posterity.72
Thus, most Japanese scholars concentrated their energies on arriving
promptly at a conclusion. Their attitude may be called practical. In the
past, they were, on the whole, rather weak in critical observation -of nature
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and its logical reconstruction. One cause of this attitude may be found in
the fact that the Japanese generally disliked complicated, structural think-
ing and valued practical things above all.
The tendency to avoid complicated, structural thinking was revealed
also in the system of the Buddhist doctrines in Japan. In the critical
classification of various sects according to their doctrines, the Chinese
arranged them hierarchically, for example, by the five periods and the eight
categories of Sakyamuni's teaching, or by the five and ten divisions of
Buddhism of the Hua-yen school. The Japanese, on the contrary, simply
distinguished doctrines of their own sect, on the one hand, from those of
other sects, on the other. The Shingon sect calls itself the "esoteric school"
and all other sects "exoteric schools." The Zen sect summarizes other sects
under the name of "doctrinaire sects." The Pure Land sects contrast their
own school of "the immediate salvation by faith in Amitabha" with the
other ordinary schools of "the way of holiness by the process of practice."
The complicated and hierarchical classification of the Chinese has never
been adopted by the Japanese Buddhists. (Although a type of simple
classification had already also appeared in China, we must point out that
the Japanese especially prefer to classify things by simple types.)
It has been said that the Japanese people are adept in imitation and
sterile in invention. They are apt not to try to understand a foreign culture
through an abstract study of the general principles and structure. They
import precipitately only those parts which can be put into practical use.
How abundant, in fact, Japanese culture in the past was in such superficial
imitations!
The originality of Japanese Buddhism has frequently been asserted by
Japanese scholars. But it means chiefly that the Japanese simplified the
Buddhism of the Continent and popularized it. It rarely criticized Con-
tinental Buddhism in its principles and structure.
The practical character of Japanese Buddhism is also frequently em-
phasized. It is true that, owing to its simplification, its disciplines could be
practiced with ease by common people, and that it penetrated into their
everyday life. But there was the danger of sacrificing theory for practice.
For example, Dagen said, "Buddhists should not discuss the relative merits
of various doctrines or the relative profundity of various tenets. It is
sufficient for them to know the truthfulness of disciplines."73
The Japanese people, because of their aversion to complicated, struc-
tural thinking, are inclined to reject the "doctrine of expediency," one of
the most characteristic doctrines of Buddhism. Buddhism's original stand-
point of "Preach according to each man's nature" permits clergymen to
preach different doctrines to different persons-that is, to preach a doctrine
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suitable to each person. Eminent Buddhists in India were not worried
about contradictions among the different doctrines adopted for "expedi-
ency." Chinese Buddhists conspicuously preserved this expedient stand-
point in contrast to the Japanese Buddhists; for example, Hanen, Shinran,
and Nichiren rejected this doctrine as too complicated. They preached the
same simple and consistent doctrine to all. Furthermore, Dagen explained
why he opposed the doctrine of expediency. "If a man asks about the
essence of the doctrine and disciplines, certainly monks should answer by
truth. They should not answer by false expediency, considering that his
caliber is not sufficient, or that the truth cannot be understood by this
uninitiated and unlearned man. The true meaning of the precepts of
Bodhisattva is that, if the man of calibre of 'the Smaller Vehicle' asks about
the Way of 'the Smaller Vehicle,' they should answer by the Way of 'the
Greater Vehicle.' It is the same with the precepts for salvation, laid down by
the Buddha during his life. The false doctrine of expediency is really not
useful. The final (ultimate) true doctrine alone is useful. Accordingly, they
should answer only by truth, without considering whether it will be under-
stood by the questioner or not."74
Dagen's rejection of expediency in the name of the one simple truth
for all, can be discerned plainly in Nichiren also. All sutras, except the
Hokke Sutra, preach the doctrine of expediency, and, therefore, must be
rejected, he asserted. "In the Hokke Sutra, it is preached in the beginning
that 'the Exalted One will certainly preach the truth, after he taught the
various doctrines for a long time,' and then, that 'There exist neither two
doctrines nor three doctrines. The doctrine of expediency of the Buddha
must be rejected.' And also that 'Rejecting expediency in earnest,' or 'Thou
shalt not believe in any of the hymns of other sutras.' Therefore, since the
Good Law that 'There exists only one vehicle of the Buddha' is the Great
Law which can accomplish the salvation of the mass of the people, the
sutras other than the Hokke Sutra have no use at all."75
Characteristically, most Japanese Buddhists were single-minded. This
may have some relation to the fact that the Japanese, as mentioned already,
valued the virtue of honesty interpreted as simple truthfulness and loyalty.
The special emphasis put on this virtue by Buddhists and common people
in Japan, is, for one thing, associated with their aversion to complicated
thinking in human relations.
Already in the Tokugawa period, Nakamoto Tominaga, defining the
spiritual characteristics of the Japanese, said, borrowing the words of the
Analects of Confucius, that they were honest, did not stick to complicated
etiquette, and valued straightforwardness.76 And Kanzan Matsumiya
(1686-1780) said, "In our country, the Japanese people are simple and
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honest," and "The teaching of the gods" is "the doctrine of simplicity and
honesty."77
Fondness for Simple Symbolic Expressions
Traditionally, the Japanese have been inclined to dislike fanciful, com-
plicated expressions and to take to simple and naive expressions. The
Japanese language, as pointed out already, is deficient in words expressing
prolix and abstract conceptions. Consequently, even to this day, they use
Chinese words, in most cases, to express abstract ideas.
In art, also, this tendency can be discerned clearly. The Japanese are
very fond of the impromptu short verse, like the haiku and tanka. In the
history of Japanese poetry, the long verse (choka) is reduced to a short one
(tanka), and then to astill shorter one (haiku). The extremely short form
of artistic expression is characteristically Japanese and the like of it cannot
be found elsewhere. Moreover, long verse-forms like epic poetry have never
prospered in Japan. Not to mention the cases of Greek and Teutonic
peoples, the Indians produced an epic of more than one hundred thousand
verses, the Mahiibhiirata. Such an achievement would be hardly conceiv-
able in the case of the Japanese. In Japanese literature, lyric poems and
scenery sketches have been highly developed, but poems of grand style,
with dramatic plots full of twists and turns, have made only a poor start.
Not only in poetry but also in architecture, we can recognize the
characteristic love of simplicity. The Japanese imported various formative
arts from Indian Buddhism, indirectly through the hands of Chinese and
Koreans. As seen in the magnificent splendor of golden Buddhist altars and
mural paintings of temples, the complicated sculptures of transoms, the
fantastic statue of the Goddess of Mercy (Avalokitesvara) with a thousand
arms, the square diagram of figures (Mal).qala) with its intricate and delicate
composition-all of them had, in general, a very elaborate structure. But,
such an art could hardly penetrate into the life of the common people. The
Japanese could not abandon the simple and unpainted wooden architecture
of ancient style, in many shrines as well as in the Great Shrine of Ise. And,
even in the architecture of Buddhist temples, the various sects of the
Kamakura period turned to a rather simple style. Also, in the
Zen-inHuenced taste of the tea-ceremony house, we can discern a naive
simplicity. The Japanese grave-marker (sotoba), which is a symbolic imita-
tion of the gigantic cairn of the Indian people (stupa), is nothing but a
very small wooden tablet.
This simplicity, however, does not always mean the obliteration of all
complexity. In some cases, especially under the inHuence of the Zen cult,
the Japanese endeavored to infuse unlimited complexity into this simpli-
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city. This tendency emerged especially in such arts as architecture, draw-
ing, and poetry. For example, the void of empty spaces or of silent pauses is
often not devoid, in fact, of important meaning. Even in the etiquette and
conversation of everyday life, silence can be a very positive expression at
times. This ideal fusion of the complex and the simple was realized by the
Chinese people, who loved complicated thinking and whose spiritual life
was greatly influenced by the Zen cult. When introduced into Japan,
however, this, too, was altered by greater simplincation.
Thus, the Japanese people, in general averse to forms of complicated
thinking, have not been apt to think or imagine objects in relation to a
universal structure. For example, in India, as well as in China, the worship
of stars prospered, and myths and legends concerning them were numerous.
The Chinese worshipped the Stars of the Cowboy (Altair) and of the
Weaver (Vega). But the primitive Shinto in Japan, although it contained
many and various folk religions as in the case of other peoples, did not
worship stars.78 When the Japanese imported the Chinese worship of stars,
the star of the Weaver was identined with the Japanese Goddess of the
Weaver (Ame-no-tanabatahime-no-kami), and its worship was transformed
into the Festival of the Weaver (Tanabata-matsuri). In short, stars were not
holy and austere gods for the Japanese. They were lovely and intimate
heroes and heroines of familiar legends. The Japanese could not produce
the sublime metaphorical expression of Kant, who wondered at both "the
moral law within and the starry heavens above."
Thus, because complicated symbols were not used by the Japanese in
their thinking, the philosophical theories of Indian and Chinese Buddhism
were too profound, abstruse, and complicated to penetrate into the life of
the common people in Japan. Consequently, they had to be simplined.
The Japanese, in assimilating Buddhism, did not depend upon its
philosophical doctrines. Of course, the clergymen of large temples were
engaged in philosophical debates and wrote a great number of books. The
common people, however, demanded concrete and empirical clues rather
than philosophical theories. Although they extolled the Lotus (Hokke)
Sutra and the SuvaT1;zaprabhii~a-siUra (Sutra of Golden Splendor), they
could not understand their philosophical theories. They valued only the
incidental contents of sutras, that is, their magical elements. The same
attitude persists to this day.
In fact, Japanese Buddhism simplined doctrines, separating them from
the study of philosophical theories, and transcended scholastic systems of
doctrines. The Buddhist sects of the Nara period (710-784), which, as a
whole, introduced and studied the Chinese doctrines, could not be propa-
gated among common people. The Tendai and Shingon sects, introduced
at the beginning of the Heian period (in the ninth century), followed, in
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the main, the doctrines of the Chinese sects of the same name. The T endai
sect, however, experienced an original development as time passed. This
sect, developing the theory of the "Truth of All Beings" on the basis of the
Lotus Siitra, divided this siitra into two parts-the first fourteen chapters
(Shakumon, Section on Incarnation), relating to the purpose of the Bud-
dha's earthly life and various teachings, and the following fourteen chapters
(Hanmon, Section on the Eternal Buddha), relating to the final revelation
of the Buddha as the eternal one. The discipline of the contemplation of
truth through these two gates (Man) was called Shikan (the tranquility
and contemplation of mind). But the new Tendai school of the Kamakura
period went a step further. In its critical classification of doctrines of
various sects, it relied on the fourfold criteria, and asserted that the first
three criteria-( I) the doctrines delivered before the Lotus (Hokke) Siitra
(Nizen), (2) the doctrines delivered in Shakumon, (3) the doctrines de-
livered in Honmon-should be "discarded." Then, and only then, the last
and the true criterion-the contemplation of the absolute truth (Kan)-
arises. This standpoint clearly values practice based on non-discursive
wisdom abov~ complicated, theoretical wisdom.
In Japan, Pure Land Buddhism also developed in the sole direction of
belief in, and reliance on Amitabha. The Pure Land Buddhism which has
been prevalent in China up to this day is conflated with Zen Buddhism
and other various forms of faith. In Japan, however, the faith in, and
reliance on Amitabha has been preserved in a purer form.
The devotional faith in Pure Land became prevalent in the Kamakura
period (1185-1333). But even before that-in fact, throughout the Heian
period-the devotees of this cult were numerous.19 But, it was Honen who
advocated the doctrine of invocation of the Pure Land of Amitabha C]odo-
nembutsu) on theoretical ground, detaching it from other doctrines. Honen
preached that the period of degeneration and extinction of the Buddha-
law (Mappo) has come. Men cannot attain higher perception (Satori) by
various disciplines. They shall be given salvation only through faith in
Amitabha. Renounce the spirit of self-relying disciplines; shut the gate of
silent meditation and cultivation of virtues; ignore all of the devices; throw
away all knowledge; and concentrate on the one discipline of invocation of
the Buddha.80 Thus, Honen's admonition to "renounce, shut, ignore, and
throwaway" is one of the most famous assertions in the history of Japanese
Buddhism. Rejecting all the other doctrines, he chose the doctrine of ]odo-
nembutsu (The Choice of Nembutsu as the Original Vow of the Buddha).
The disciples of Honen went further in the direction of simplification
of the Pure Land cult. One of them advocated the following extreme
doctrine: "Saint Honen repeated the name of the Buddha (nembutsu)
seventy thousand times a day, but such verbal repetition is only an external
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expediency. There exists a true interior meaning unknown to ordinary
men. What I call true is this: If you penetrate into, and believe in, the
Original Vow of Amitabha, and repeat his name only once, you can go, at
once, to be born in the Pure Land of Amitabha. Thus, the practice of the
Pure Land cult will be accomplished. You can go to the Pure Land, if you
invoke the Buddha only once. You need not invoke his name many times.
And the ultimate meaning is to penetrate into, and believe in, the Original
VOW."81 There appeared some who went so far as to say: ''Those who want
to repeat invocations do not, in fact, believe in the Vow of the Buddha."82
In the direction of simplification, Shinran, too, went further than
Honen. According to him, invocation of the name of Amitabha, that is,
"Oh, save me, thou Amitabha!" (Namuamidabutsu), is the essence and idol
of the fundamental siitra, the Larger Sukhiivativyuha-st1tra. To understand
the words or sentences of this siitra, is not so important. The consummation
of faith consists in the invocation of Amitabha. Hanen advocated that the
name of Amitabha should be repeated sixty thousand times a day, but
Shinran rejected this doctrine as meaningless. Although he inherited the
terms of the pure and exclusive discipline, he changed the meaning com-
pletely. "You should believe, with an exclusive, pure, and sincere heart, in
the Original Vow that we can go to be born in the Pure Land of Amitabha
if we say 'Namuamidabutsu' only once. This discipline can be called the
pure and exclusive discipline."83 ''The exclusive heart referred to in the
Commentary (the Sanzengi of Zenda) is nothing but the single heart. It
states that we should not have two hearts. The exclusive discipline referred
to is nothing but a single discipline. It expresses that we should not have
two disciplines."84
Thus, the doctrine of one-time-nembutsu reached its climax
in Shinran. Although it had been embraced by many devotees of the Pure
Land cult before him, it was Shinran that gave it a theoretical expression.8s
Since then, Ippen, the founder of the Ji sect, advocated the nembutsu,
too. According to a legend, he, on his deathbed, "burnt down, with his own
hands, the books in his possession, and said that all the holy doctrines of
the whole life of the Buddha were reduced to nembutsu."86 Rennyo, too,
valued "the image of Amitabha more than his statue, his name more than
his image."8T
Then, in the Japanese Pure Land cult, the invocation of "Namuamida-
butsu" had a central significance. On this point, it was quite different from
the nembutsu practiced by the Chinese. When the Chinese Buddhist
clergymen greet each other, saying, "Amitofo" (Amitabha), it has only an
external significance.8s
As the Pure Land cult was simplified in the direction of nembutsu,
the doctrine of the Tendai sect, which embraced the teaching of the Lotus
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(Hokke) Siitra, was simplified in the direction of "Daimoku" (the heading
of the siitra).
In the Japanese T endai sect, it was considered difficult for common
people to understand the philosophical theories of the Lotus Siitra. Dengyo
is said to have preached: "For ordinary men, who are born among the
extremely inferior men of the lowest status in the period of degeneration
and extinction of the Buddha-law, it is vain to endeavor to pretend to be an
ascetic figure that is fresh and unobscured by nature. The men of superior
disposition and wisdom should practice disciplines and acquire merits. For
those of inferior disposition and wisdom, the Buddha has bequeathed the
panacea that summarizes the holy teaching of all his life-the five words of
Myo-ho-ren-ge-kyo (the Siitra of the Lotus of the Good Law). Therefore,
this heading was preached and propagated far and wide among the multi-
tude of all spheres of existence during the last five hundred years of the
period of degeneration and extinction of the Buddha-law." Thus, according
to Dengyo, the panacea for salvation of the common people is not the
philosophical theories of the Lotus (Hokke) Siitra, but its heading of five
words, Myo-ho-ren-ge-kyo. Then, before the appearance of Nichiren, in
the new TeIidai doctrine of the Kamakura period, it was preached that, to
attain salvation, it was sufficient to practice only the invocation of the
heading of the Lotus Siitra, and not any troublesome contemplation-for
example, the simultaneous contemplation from the viewpoints of "void,"
"fictions," and "middle," or the contemplation of the three thousand
spheres in one thought. "If you repeat Namumyohorengekyo on your
deathbed, you can, by virtue of the Three Powers of the Good Law, attain
the state of the enlightened mind and deliver yourself from the burden of
birth and death."89 "The contemplation of the three thousand spheres in
one thought, on your deathbed, is nothing but the invocation of the Siitra
of the Good Law (Myo-ho-ren-ge-kyo). Myo corresponds to one thought,
Ho to the three thousand spheres; therefore, these two are synonymous
with the three thousand spheres in one thought. On your deathbed, you
should just repeat Myo-ho-ren-ge-kyo with your whole heart."9o And, in
fact, the devotees, who repeated only this heading, were already numerous
in the Heian period.91
It was Nichiren, however, that pushed this doctrine to its "logical"
conclusion. "In the Hokke Siitra," he said, "you should consider that the
reading of the whole eight volumes, or one volume, or one chapter, or one
hymn, or one sentence can have no more value than the reading of one
heading."92 "This siitra, I think, states that the assignment of one heading
or one hymn is sufficient as a duty of the devotee, and decides that the time
of its practice must be the time when you rejoice wholeheartedly in the
doctrine. Generally speaking, the gigantic treasury of Buddhist scriptures
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of eighty thousand volumes or the vast sutra of eight volumes (Hokke
Sutra) exists only to preach these five words.... Only by the repetition
of Namumyohorengekyo, can you atone for all your sins and have all
blessings."93 Pushing the argument to the extreme, regardless of the histori-
cal connection of the various doctrines, we can say that the religion of
Nichiren, so far as the love of simplicity is concerned, is nothing but the
replacement of the name of Amitabha by the heading of the Hokke Sutra.
Nichiren said: "The saying of 'Embrace only this sutra' (which is preached
in the Hokke Sutra), does not mean a study of the whole sutra. It means
simply that we should embrace only the heading, with no intervention of
other sentences.',g4 Clearly this was not the original use of the sutra. The
simplification that the invocation of the heading is sufficient for salvation
has never been adopted in other countries. And, with this simplification,
the sect of exclusive faith in the Hokke Sutra was established, a phenome-
non also unknown in other countries.
Thus, the devotees of Nembutsu as well as of the "Heading" have
relied on the simple symbol of faith. Then, we must consider the case of
the Zen cult. Eisai (1141-1215), who introduced the Rinzai Zen sect,
brought the various cults into his Zen cult. But Dagen (1200-1253), who
introduced the Sata Zen sect, taught repeatedly to "endeavor exclusively to
sit in meditation (dhyiina, zazen)." He said, "The study and practice of the
doctrine of the Zen cult is the freedom from the burden of body and soul
(shin-jin-datsuraku). Incense burning, adoration, nembutsu, confession,
sutra-reading are unnecessary. It is necessary only to sit in meditation."95
Once a man asked Dagen if the devotees of Zazen might practice the
discipline of magical formulae of the Shingon sect and also that of tran-
quility and contemplation of mind of the Tendai sect. He answered:
'When I asked my Master about the true secrets, while I was in China, he
said he had never heard that the Great Masters of all ages and all countries,
who had transmitted the Buddha-seal, had practiced those disciplines. In
fact, if you don't concentrate yourself in one discipline, you can never
attain even one wisdom."96
Therefore, according to Dagen, the idle study of doctrines was mean-
ingless. "It is the same in the case of sutras. In spite of their immensity, we
should believe in and devote ourselves to one hymn or one sentence. We
cannot understand the eighty thousand (doctrines)."91 "Erudition and ex-
tensive reading are unattainable for us. We must renounce this design
resolutely. We should concentrate ourselves in one discipl.ine only, learn
the views and usages, and follow the practices of the predecessors, with no
pretention of being a teacher or a leader."98
Dagen preached that clergymen should themselves concentrate on
only one discipline with their whole body and soul. "Even men Qf the
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world should not practice many disciplines simultaneously if they wish to
be adept in any of them. Rather they should practice only one discipline so
as to be more adept in it than other people. . .. If they want to practise
the various disciplines of the vast Buddha-doctrine, they cannot accomplish
any of them. Even when they concentrate on one discipline, its accomplish-
ment during their life is difficult for those of poor disposition by nature.
Hence, the devotees should endeavor to concentrate on one discipline
exclusively."99 When Eja, one of his disciples, asked him what discipline
among the Buddha-laws he should practice wholeheartedly, Dagen
answered: "Although it must be decided according to each man's nature
and disposition, it is Contemplation that has been transmitted and practiced
exclusively from ancient masters. This discipline can conform to all kinds
of nature and be practiced by all sorts of dispositions." Thus, he was
opposed to one of the traditional doctrines of Buddhism, the doctrine that
preaching must conform to the nature of each different person (Taiki-
seppa).
On this point the Zen cult advocated by Dagen is diametrically
opposed to tqat of the Chinese. In Chinese Buddhism, practically only the
Zen cult prevailed after the Sung period, but it practiced various disciplines
including the Pure Land cult and the esoteric cult of the Shingon sect, and
occasionally the disciplines of Early Indian Buddhism (Vinaya-pitaka) also.
To Dagen, however, this eclecticism was psychologically unbearable. So he
simplified Buddhism in the direction of only one discipline of Contempla-
tion.
Although Dagen objected to the loud repetition of nembutsu by the
multitude of the devotees of the Pure Land Buddhism, comparing it to the
voice of frogs, he sympathized completely with the exclusiveness of their
disciplines. Kiiamidabutsu, who had been a famous scholar of the exoteric
and esoteric teachings, retiring from the world and living in a hermitage on
Mt. Kaya, devoted himself to nembutsu. When, one day, a clergyman of
the esoteric school visited him and asked him about the esoteric doctrines,
he said: "I have forgotten everything. I do not remember a word."loo Dagen
admired the thoroughness of this discipline, and therefore, agreed with the
devotees of the Japanese Pure Land Buddhism, with respect to reliance on
simple symbolic expression.
It has been frequently pointed out that the Zen cult exerted an
enormous influence on the Bushida (Way of Warriors) culture of the
samurais. The extreme simplicity and frugality of life and deeds of Zen
priests might have captured the imagination of samurais, warriors of the up-
per class who risked their life on the battlefield where scholastic doctrines
of Buddhism were of no use. The sincerity of the simple doctrines "we do
not value words" (Fu-ryu-mon-ji) or "We point to the human mind di-
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rectly" (fiki-shi-nin-shin) appealed to them. The spiritual training of the
Zen sect, which can control the human mind completely through the very
simplicity of the training, could well be practiced by the samurais. In the
Chinese Zen cult, no accounts report that Zen clergymen taught warriors
readiness for death. However, such accounts abound in Japan after the
simplification of the Zen cult.
Furthermore, the Zen cult exerted a great influence on various aes-
thetic aspects of Japanese culture, for example, in architecture, painting, the
seventeen-syllable verse (Haiku), flower arrangement, the tea-ceremony,
etc. This influence was also largely due to the fact that the Zen cult in
Japan had wholly abandoned complexity and prolixity and contained an
impressive significance in its relaxed silence.
The simplification of complicated doctrines can be recognized also in
the various old sects of Buddhism, early introduced into Japan. The idealis-
tic philosophy of the Hosso sect was too difficult and complicated to be
understood by common people. Therefore, Jokei (II55-1213) advocated
that ignorant people, who could not understand the doctrines of idealism,
should, at least, repeat always the Praise, transmitted and taught by
Three Great Sages: "The devotee of the Mahayana contemplates that the
contents of all objects are nothing but the creation of mind, and then he
effaces his own views as he does with external objects. That is to say, he
contemplates and understands fully that nothing exists but the content of
ideas created by himself. Thus, remaining within himself, he knows that
external objects are non-existent, and furthermore, that the cognizing
subject is non-existent. Then he can attain, for the first time, the state of
liberty, free from everything."lOl In the Kegon sect, too, Myoe (1173-1232)
taught that, in the case of common believers, it was not necessary to
understand the doctrines, but to repeat "Homage to the Three Jewels and
the Mind of Enlightenment. May my prayer come to be realized to perfec-
tion here as well as hereafter," or "Alas, the Three Jewels! Save me in my
after-life."102
The cult of Maitreya, which prospered in the Kamakura period,
taught the same doctrines as the Pure Land Buddhism under the influence
of the faith in Amitabha. "If we practice the vow of abstention only for a
moment, we can have superior happiness in our after-life, and if we invoke
the name of Maitreya just once, we can go to be born in his Pure Land in
some life or other. Its practice is very easy and its virtue is most great. Only
by virtue of the Original Vow of the Benevolent Lord we can share its
merits. This pleases all the Great Sages and it is craved by all ordinary
men."103 "According to the teaching of the Ascent Siitra, it is very easy to
be born in the Paradise of Maitreya (Tu~ita). If we crave this ascent only
for a moment, and if we practice invocation just once, we can attain our
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cherished desire."lo4 And in the Heian period and thereafter, there had
been many devotees who had faith in K~itigarbha-Bodhisattvaand repeated
only his name.105 The faith in the dhiirm;ii, especially Komyo-shingon-
dharm;Zi (Spell of Splendor) or Hokyoin-dharm;zi (Spell of the Jewelled
Casket Seal), was propagated among the common people. And, so far as the
way of thinking is concerned, the creed of itinerant priests (Shugen-do)
was a development in this direction of simplification, too. "The itinerant
priests, though they have En-no-Gyoja (En the Ascetic, c. 800) and Joz6-
kisho as their predecessors, are only the devotees of one dhara1;li."106 The
understanding of the whole content of Shingon-dhiira1;li was not demanded.
It was sufficient for them to repeat any of those dhara1;lis.
The tendency to fondness for simple symbols appeared in the process
of adoption of Buddhist ideas by Japanese Shintoists in ancient and
medieval times. It has been already mentioned that the moral ideas of
Shinto were influenced by Buddhism. Shinto, in the process of its develop-
ment as religion, advanced from the cleanness of the body to the idea of
cleanness of spirit. This "internal cleanness" was expressed by moral virtues
of "sincerity" and "honesty."lo1 The virtues of gods of Shinto were admired
through the;e virtues. But we can find these terms in the Buddhist siitras.
Besides, the benevolence and wisdom, admired as virtues of gods, are, of
course, Buddhist terms. Therefore, it is not too much to say that almost all
of the terms of the central virtues of medieval Shinto were derived from
Buddhist siitras. It must be pointed out, however, that Shintoists never
adopted the doctrines of Buddhism indiscriminately. Only the virtues,
which had originally existed as germs in Shinto, were brought to definite
consciousness and expression by the help of Buddhist philosophy. The
Shintoists did not take in the speculative, schematized, and generalized
classifications of virtues of the Indian Buddhism, such as the Four Noble
Truths, the Eight Right Ways, the Twelve Nidanas, the Six Paramitas.
They took in directly those virtues which happened to appear congenial to
Shinto. Consequently, they hardly endeavored to interpret the relations
among these virtues systematically and speculatively.
We have tried to demonstrate that through the process of assimilation
of Buddhism many Japanese people are inclined to give direction to their
practice through very simple symbols. This tendency reappeared, it seems,
in the introduction of Christianity from the period of the Civil Wars to the
beginning of the Tokugawa period in the 17th century. The Japanese
Christians devoted themselves to such simple symbols of Christianity as the
cross. The trampling of the holy image (Fumi-e) sufficed, on this psycho-
logical ground, as a loyalty test at the time of the Christian Inquisition in
Japan.
We may say that religion is always Simplified when it is popularized.
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In the West, Christianity was simplified, for example, by making the sign
of the cross, or by repetition of abbreviated passages of the Bible. In India,
too, the Bhakti sects developed the same thought. Tulsidas (c. 1550), the
author of the Hindi version of Ramayana, went so far as to say that the
name of the Lord is greater than the Lord himself. Therefore, it may be
safely said that simplification is common to the popularization of all reli-
gions. The Japanese religions, however, preached that it is sufficient to rely
on simple symbolic expressions. This remarkable characteristic may corre-
spond to the fact that Buddhism was more popularized in Japan than in
other countries.
This tendency of thinking persists to this day. If we look back to the
trend of Japanese thought in recent years, we can realize that the complete
reliance upon simple symbols has been one of the most deep-rooted atti-
tudes of the Japanese people.
Lack of Knowledge Concerning the Objective Order
Since the Japanese people for the most part tend to make little of
objects unless they are related to familiar human relations, they do not
study things enough in their objective or impersonal relations.
This tendency can be discerned in linguistic expressions of the Japa-
nese. In the first place, the original Japanese language, as already men-
tioned, was not adequate for exact objective statements. Of course, this
does not mean that the foundation for the recognition of the objective
order is totally lacking in Japanese forms of expression. As one of the
foundations, which can be used as a basis for such cognition, we may
mention the distinction between the noun and the adjective in Japanese.
The ancient Indian and the Chinese languages did not have such a strict
distinction. In these languages, therefore, we can distinguish nouns (sub-
stantives) and adjectives (attributes) only through words in phrases or
through context. These languages, so far as linguistic expression is con-
cerned, do not distinguish very clearly between the judgment of classifica-
tion and that of attribution. In Japanese, however, nouns are indeclinable
and are distinguished from adjectives, which are declinable words. There-
fore, we can recognize at once the distinction between the individual-
substantive and the universal-attributive. On this point, Japanese resembles
the Western languages, and, like them, it attracts our attention to the order
or laws of the objective world of nature.
The Japanese people, however, in their characteristic way of thinking,
are inclined to grasp this order or law in relation to human relations rather
than as a law of objective things. This tendency has been strengthened
especially through the non-logical character of the Japanese language.
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Consequently, the thinking of the Japanese people has not been developed
in an objective and logical direction. Rather the social rank of the person
addressed and the concrete description of individuality have been empha-
sized. From the oldest times, the spiritual life of the Japanese has been
concentrated chieRy in morals and art, not in objective knowledge. While
works of literature and history in Japanese are many and excellent, scien-
tific books in Japanese until very recently have been few. In theoretical and
literary matters, the Japanese people thought and wrote mostly in the
Chinese language.
This neglect of objective cognition is reRected in the usage of the
Japanese language. In the original Japanese language, there is no word that
expresses the object as opposed to the subject. The word "mono" may mean
a person as subject as well as a thing as object. In such a situation, it cannot
be expected that the word "shiru" (to know) will be employed to denote the
cognition of objects as existing apart from knowing subjects. In other
words, the emphasis is put rather on the understanding of inner experiences
and on the feelings or mutual understanding among men, as shown by the
usage of "Nasake-o-shiru" (to understand the feeling) and of "Hito-to-
shiri-au" (to u~derstandeach other). ChieRy directed toward the expression
of human relations, the pure Japanese language has no word corresponding
to impersonal or purely objective "knowledge" or "cognition."lo8 Largely as
the result of Western inRuence have the Japanese people attained any
degree of scientific self-consciousness and objective perception-that is, the
perception of things as distinguished from perceiving subjects.
This characteristic appears also in the syntax. In the Indo-European
languages, the nominative case of a noun, in the neutral singular, takes the
same form as the accusative or objective. This is explained as follows:
originally, the neutral nouns were not used as subject and consequently did
not have the subjective form. Then, when they came to be used as subject,
the independent subjective form was not created, and, the objective form
was used as subject. Perhaps, in ancient times, objective things were not
personified and consequently were not used as subject. And while the
Indo-European languages passed this stage early, the Japanese language
has not completely emerged from it yet. In Japanese sentences, the subject
is, in most cases, a human being or personified subject of action. And, in
customary usage, the composition of the passive voice is rare-that is,
objective things or the object of action are rarely used as subject.
The Japanese people, in general, do not give objective representation
to the self as the subject of action. In Japanese, "mizukara" (self) is not a
noun, but an adverb, that is, it is not perceived as an abstract conception.
The word "onore" (self) is often used as noun, but it is rare that it is used
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as subject. The Japanese have therefore never used words which mean
self-for example, "ware," "anare," "mizukara"-as philosophical terms, as
in the languages of other civilized peoples. To express the self-examination
common in Buddhist philosophy, the Japanese relied on such Chinese
terms as "ga" or "gaga" (self), used in the Chinese version of siitras.
Thus, the Japanese people have seldom confronted objective reality as
sharply distinguished from knowing subjects. This attitude may be called
their common way of thinking. It is often said that they are practical and
adept in techniques of action, but that they are rather weak in studying the
objective basis of their practical action because they are too anxious to
accomplish the action. It is partially owing to this characteristic that they
have been inclined, for centuries, to follow foreign ideas with an uncritical
mind.
Although it has been mentioned already, it is worthwhile to repeat
that the Japanese in general have not traditionally given enough considera-
tion to the importance of theoretical reasoning. Owing to the neglect of
abstract reasoning they have been used to depending chiefly upon the
senses. Frois, who came to Japan as a Christian missionary in the sixteenth
century, said that the common people in Japan "will accept nothing but the
concrete demonstration which can be seen by eyes and taken by hands."lo9
In the history of technology also the Japanese people have valued and
still value intuitive perception (Kan) more than scientific inferences based
on postulational thinking. They were apt to rely on the dexterity of artisans
rather than on exact calculation by machines. For example, the proper
temperature of hot water in which a forged sword (katana) was immersed
was kept in absolute secrecy by swordsmiths, who cut off the arms of men
who had tried to steal this secret. Thus, this temperature has been trans-
mitted from master to disciple, as a secret which must be understood only
through intuition.
On account of this situation, the natural sciences have almost never
been established on the foundation of traditional Japanese thinking. Even
in Japan, some pioneers were aware of this fact. For example, Kakan Shiba
(1747-1818), who cultivated Western methods of realistic painting and
precise engravings of the globe, said: 'The people of this country don't like
to investigate the laws of universe. . . . They are shallow-minded and
shortsighted."
The natural sciences were begun in Japan only in modern times
through the introduction of sciences from Holland (Ran-gaku). And these
sciences were not understood theoretically from fundamental principles,
but were introduced rather from the standpoint of utility. Moreover, the
importance of natural sciences was hardly recognized. Norinaga Motoori
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(1763-1828), admitting that "the learning of the country called Holland"
was universal science, common to all countries, still asserted "the supe-
riority of the Emperor's Land."
In Japan, the science of cognition of nature had no mathematical
foundation. Yukichi Fukuzawa (1834-19°1), who popularized modern
Western ideas in Japan, said, "Comparing the Confucianism of the East
with the ideas of Western civilization, we find that two things are lacking
in the East. The first is, among material things, mathematics. The second
is, among immaterial things, the independent spirit." What he called
"mathematics" seems to be modern mathematical physics,uo Although not
limited to Japan only, the neglect of scientific method seems to have
affected the way of thinking of the Japanese people for a longer period in
the modern era than other peoples of the world's leading nations. The
Japanese of the past for a long time were inclined to neglect the rational
perception of laws of the objective world of nature.
In general, the Japanese have not studied scientifically the language
which they use every day. Before 1868 (the Restoration of Meiji), they had
no standard system of grammar. During the preceding Tokugawa period,
the Japanese language was not included in the curriculum. In India, the
case is diametrically opposite, and grammar was taught regularly. It seems
that in Greece and Rome also, people received an education in the grammar
of their own language, although to a lesser extent than in India.
The way of thinking used to acquire knowledge, not by objective
methodology, but through human relationships, can be seen in the process
of introducing Indian logic. This has been discussed already. (What has
been pointed out here cursorily has been admitted by many as one of the
characteristics of the ways of thinking of the Japanese. However, in the
process of the introduction of Buddhist thought there seems to be no easy
way of finding the causes contributing to this very feature. It seems to be
due to the fact that, as Buddhist culture in China had little to do with
sciences, there occurred no need to modify Indian Buddhist logic when it
was imported into Japan. The relationship between Indian Buddhism and
science should be investigated independently.)
CHAPTER 37 PROBLEM OF'
SHAMANISM
The weakness of the critical spirit of the Japanese allowed the persis~
ence of old ideologies that should have been abolished or modified by
radical social changes. Although we have seen many social changes in the
course of history, these changes have not reached the remote villages. In
out-of-the-way corners, therefore, there persist, or occasionally crop out
anew, the most primitive ways of living and thinking, of which Shamanism
is one. Shamanism, as it is well known, was prevalent in the Asiatic conti-
nent as a religious superstition which endowed certain individuals with the
gift of wielding magical power and of communicating with evil spirits.
Shamanism also entered into the ancient Japanese religion.
Before the introduction of modern ideas and culture from the conti-
nent, mediums occupied a central position in the Japanese religious world.
Since the mediums were always descendants of powerful gods, they could,
it was generally believed, exorcise evil spirits by themselves, because it was
believed, they had inherited divine powers. Hence these mediums, or those
families certain members of which could be qualified as mediums, were
revered by the community. They belonged to a special, honorable class,
and common people managed their affairs in accordance with oracles, or
the advice of the mediums. In this connection, we may suppose that charms
and divinations, or something of the sort, were popular among the Japanese
from time immemorial.
Now let us inquire into what modification Buddhism underwent
during its first introduction into Japan under the influence of such a
peculiar religious form as Shamanism. Orthodox Buddhism repudiates all
of these shamanistic tendencies. Early Buddhism denied the spiritual pow-
ers peculiar to the Brahmins who were in charge of exorcism and sacred
rites. This ban was also placed on magic and like matters. It was further-
more urged that one must not believe in dream-reading, palmistry, horo-
scopes, and divination from the cries of birds and beasts.1 On the other
hand, Buddhism could not be propagated among the lower classes of the
Japanese people, which preserved, without radical changes, the old shaman-
istic tendency. In the case of the propagation of Christianity in the Occi-
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dent, the new religion brought about a great revolution in European
society. In Japan, at every critical moment when the ruling classes had lost
their control over the peasantry, the primitive or shamanistic trends, which
lay hidden from earliest times, came to the fore.
Let us, then, consider the problem historically. First, at the time when
Buddhism was introduced into Japan, it had to have, in order to be diffused
among the common people, a shamanistic character, since the shamanistic
religious modes were then influential. The Ritsu sect, having preserved
the manners of Conservative Buddhism, had little influence over the Japa-
nese. This sect did not meet with great favor among the people; however,
some other sects of Buddhism did meet with approval among the populace,
because they made concessions to the shamanistic tendency to a consider-
able degree.
The most striking phenomenon in Buddhism as it was introduced into
Japan was that there were relatively many nuns in proportion to priests.
This may have been due to the fact that great importance was attached to
nuns, paralleling the importance of female mediums who had particular
qualifications !o serve the gods.2
As a new religion, Buddhism was compelled to meet the popular
requirement that it should be effective in exorcism. The Japanese type of
Buddhism was largely one of prayer and exorcism. It mainly aimed at
praying for benefits and wealth in this world and the next, in the interest
of the state as well as of individuals. Even the reading of siitras was
considered to have an exorcistic significance, so that the most philosophic
Buddhist schools could not be secure in their positions unless they com-
promised with this tendency. Although Ekan, who came to Japan in 625
(he was born in Korea, and studied Buddhism in China), introduced the
doctrine of the Sanron sect, members of which reasoned always with
extreme logical accuracy, it is said that he himself prayed for rain on the
occasion of a long drought, and when he obtained a heavy rain, Empress
Suiko, who reigned in 593-629, appreciated very much his service and
appointed him a bishop. Nevertheless, the philosophic sects of Sanron
(Three Treatises) and Hoss6 (Idealism) were ultimately not diffused
among the Japanese. Sects which sought to spread all over the country had
to adopt shamanistic or magical interpretations of Buddhism.
If we look at the course of diffusion of Buddhism, we note that the
new religion was, in the first place, accepted by the nobility to meet its
requirements in the mid-sixth century. The nobility at that time con-
structed many temples for the purpose of praying for the prosperity and
permanency of their aristocratic life. Prayers were addressed to Sakyamuni
for recovery from sickness and long life, to AvalokiteSvara for protection
from evil, and also to the other Bodhisattvas: Bhai~ajya-guru, Maitreya,
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The Four God-kings, etc. From the Suiko period on, there were erected
many statues of AvalokiteSvara. As for siitras, the SuvaT1}aprabhii~a Siltra
(Siitra of Golden Splendor), the SaddharmapU1;uJarika or Hokke (Lotus)
Siitra (especially the 25th Chapter on AvalokiteSvara), Ninno-prajiiii-
piiramitii Siitra (Siitra of the Perfect Wisdom of Benevolent Kings), the
Bhai~ajyaguru Siitra, and so on, were recited; but this was for the main
purpose of supplication, for health, long life, and recovery, since the siitras
were believed to be pregnant with magical power. After the centralization
of political power in Japan, there was a vigorous advocacy of the principle
that Buddhism should have as its object the protection of the state, the
tranquility of the Imperial Court, and the wealth of the people. This was
based upon the popular belief that the State should be guarded, that
people's lives should become easier by the miraculous virtue which might
be given in reciting and copying siitras and treating monks and nuns with
dinners, etc.
It was almost the same in the Heian period (after 784), excepting that
the esoteric school then was more popular than the earlier schools of
Buddhism. About the 7th and the 8th centuries, as far as we know now,
one hundred and thirty-seven scriptures of esoteric teaching were imported,
including such fundamental scriptures of that type as the Mahiivairocana-
siitra (The Great Sun Siitra), the Kongochokyo (The Diamond Head
Siitra), Susiddhi-sutra (The Siitra of Perfection).
Apart from Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, gods, and spirits mentioned in the
above scriptures, there were, as objects of worship, the bodhisattvas of
esoteric lineage: Kannon with Eleven Faces, Kannon with Nine Faces,
Kannon with a Thousand Hands, Amoghapasa, Kannon with Horse-head,
Beautiful-sight Kannon, Vajragarbha (Bodhisattva), Peacock-King (Ma-
hiimiiguri) , five powerful Bodhisattvas, and so forth. Buddhistic morality
sometimes manifested itself in the decree of liquor prohibition and in
forbidding the taking of all animal life, but they were invoked only under
the particular circumstances of drought, deluge, indisposition of His Maj-
esty, and other national calamities. This was, after all, an application in the
Buddhist mould of the theocratic way of thinking peculiar to Japanese
antiquity. Various Buddhistic services in the Court were of the same
magical signi6cance as Shinto rituals. They bore just the same meaning as
the rituals of Shinto puri6cation in their motives and purposes.
It is noteworthy that, in Japan, the Imperial family and the nobility
were closely associated with esoteric schools. The instances when the
members of the Imperial family and Court nobility became devout believers
are too many to be enumerated in detail. These converts believed solely
in the esoteric teaching, including not only the Shingon sect but also the
Tendai sect. So many instances of the conversion of the governing-class
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members to esoteric sects had never been seen either in India or in China.
This is why we have offered the hypothesis that shamanistic and theocratic
tendencies were disguised in the Buddhist forms of the time.
A characteristic of Japanese Buddhism, subsequently, was the over-
whelming predominance of Shingon esoterics over the religious world, at
least before the Restoration.3 Unlike the other Buddhist schools, the eso-
teric schools are recognized as the ones which deal with magic and divina-
tion forbidden by orthodox Buddhism.4 Although Shingon esotericism
originated in India and then was transmitted to China, there remains little
trace of it extant in these countries, whereas in Japan esoteric rituals and
manners persist even now. The esoteric doctrine, though it had its source
in China, was so highly developed in Japan that it came to be almost a new
and nearly original one in its content. The Tendai sect, although it was in
opposition to the Shingon sect, had, from the beginning, adopted the
esoteric teaching,S whose tenets had grown rapidly upon the sect, in the 9th
century, after Master Jikaku (Ennin, 784-864) and Master ChisM (En-
chin, 814-891).6 As for esoteric studies, two scholastic lineages were
formed, namc:;ly, "The esoterics of the Toji sect (Tomitsu)," handed down
in the To (Eastern) Temple of the Shingon sect, and "The esoterics of the
Tendai sect (Taimitsu)," transmitted in the Tendai sect. The former
adopted the doctrine of the Kegon sect and the latter went by the doctrine
of the Tendai sect.
These two lineages were divided into the legitimate line and collateral
line, respectively; and furthermore, various interpretations of esoterics arose
in each legitimate line. Shingo 0-1004) and Eison (I20I-129o)-these
two scholars, though they had been reared in the "Tomitsu" school, inter-
preted the esoterics by the idealism of the Hosso sect. Their interpretation
has been called "Esoterics of the Hosso sect (Somitsu)." By the doctrine of
the Kegon sect as well, Koben (1173-1232), of the Kegon sect, gave a new
interpretation of it, which is "the esoterics of the Kegon sect (Gonmitsu)."
Moreover these esoteric schools exerted an influence upon the Zen sect.
For example, Eisai (II4I-121 5) founded "the esoterics of the Zen sect
(Zenmitsu)" by adopting "Taimitsu." Benni (1202-1280) introduced
"Tomitsu" into the doctrine of the Zen sect. The esoteric rituals have been
held also in the Rinzai sect. Dagen (1200-1253) persistently repudiated all
of these esoteric interpretations, but, after the time of Jakin Keizan (the
founder of Soji Temple), the esoteric rituals were adopted by the S6t6 sect
so that its order might be able to propagate the teaching all over the
country. In general, the esoteric modifications of Zen by secret transmission
became popular from the Muromachi period (1336-1573) onwards.
At the mid-Tokugawa period (ca. 1750) however, Hakuin (1685-
1768) inaugurated reforms in the Rinzai sect so as to eliminate the esoteric
I
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elements of the teaching. Moreover, since Menzan and Manzen of the
Sota sect advocated returning to the spirit of Dagen, the magical factors in
the teaching had been growing weaker, yet were never abolished. All
things considered, the magical or esoteric factors that were in reality alien
to the essence of Zen supported the Zen sect in Japan. As collateral lines of
esoterics, there are two major ways of ascetic practice of "Shugendo"-
Shingon Ascetic Practice on the part of "Taimitsu," and Tendai Ascetic
Practice on the part of "Tomitsu." Further, there exists in Mt. Hiei a
discipline, as distinguished from the above-mentioned, of making pilgrim-
ages to sacred peaks.
The Buddhism that was popular among the common people took the
same course of development. Everywhere various magical formulae were
recited. In former days-during the reign of the Empress Kaken (718-770)
in the Nara period-there were constructed innumerable pagodas called
the "Million Pagodas" to which printed prayers (Dhiirm;iis) were
consigned.1 From the Kamakura period on, common people began to be-
lieve in magical formulae, to copy prayers (Dhiirm;iis) and consign them to
"Towers for siitras" or "Towers for the repose of souls/'S which were
erected everywhere at that time. Especially in the Kamakura period itself,
Benzaiten (Sarasvat'i, Goddess of Beauty and Happiness) was evoked and
deified as a god of wealth at Enoshima, Itsukushima, Chikubushima, Ama-
kawa, Minomo, Seburiyama, and so on. "Step once in this sacred place,"
claims a "Noh" song, "and you will have inexhaustible wealth in this
world, and then will you be rewarded with a secure position in the other
world, which you will never lose."9 Dakiniten (Diikini) , Daikokuten
(Mahiikiila), and the like, who are Hindu gods of wealth, also became
objects of worship, and, as is well known, the worship of Fudo (Acala) and
Shoten (Ga'/;'leSa) is widespread even today among many Japanese believers.
Thus esoteric devotion penetrated the daily life of the Japanese people.
If you read some literary works before the Restoration, you will find there
that the Buddhistic conceptions are mainly esoteric.
The esoteric schools gave a primary place to prayers. In order to
acquire the superior effects of these prayers, ascetic disciplines of retirement
in forests were required. Gyasom (1054-1135), an ascetic famous for prayer
in the Heian period, "did not spend a night in his private room after he
entered the priesthood, but stayed in the main building of the temple for
several nights on end so as to pay homage to Maitreya. . . . In those days,
he made his pilgrimages to all of the sacred places-the secluded places in
Mt. Omine, Mt. Katsuragi, and so forth, which are famous for their esoteric
effectiveness. Thus he devoted his life for more than fifty years."lO
A striking feature of Japanese esoterics was their mystical account of
the life of the famous priest, Kiikai (founder of the Shingon sect). Such a
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view had nothing with to do earlier esoterics in the continent. Kiikai died
at Kongo-buji Temple at Mt. Koya on March 21St, 835 A.D. But the
believers in the Shingon sect say: "He just then entered into meditation
(samiidhi) looking for the time of the descent of Maitreya the Buddha.
Kiikai did not die. He is still alive today." So, at a fixed time, a properly
qualified high priest comes and changes Kiikai's gown in the inner sanc-
tuary, where Kiikai is supposed to be still staying in meditation. What is
the condition of Kiikai the great teacher of Buddhism now? It is a great
secret that laity should not talk about.
Since such a mystical view has been maintained only in Japan, we
cannot help thinking that it sprang solely from the way of thinking
peculiar to the Japanese people who have generally made much of magical
conceptions and the spiritual prestige of particular individuals, to which
we have already referred.
In looking over "Kamakura Buddhism," we find in the first place that
the doctrine of Nichiren preserved most of the former Buddhistic elements.
Though he persistently denounced the Shingon esotericism, his teaching
was much the same as it, as far as the aim of prayers was concerned. He
placed great'emphasis upon the superiority of prayers in terms of the
Hokke siitra over those in the other sects.ll "If all the people will only
recite 'Homage to the Siitra of the Lotus of the Good Law' in chorus," he
said, "They will see that branches won't toss about in the wind and clouds
won't burst in a downpour of rain. Then there will be a return to the
Golden Age. There will be revealed the Cause of immortality of man and
the creation of all things. Moreover, thanks to a promise of 'peace and
tranquility in this life,' they will escape an accursed misfortune and will
acquire the means of prolonging life."12
This thought of Nichiren's had something of the very quality of the
Lotus Siitra itself that promoted esoteric ideas like this one on every page.
This fact enabled his doctrine to be easily disseminated among the people
used to the shamanistic oracular practice. There are many controversies
among Nichiren's followers on the significance of prayers in his doctrine,
but, in fact, many of them prayed, fascinated in an auto-suggested mood
induced by repetitive reciting of "Adoration to the Lotus Siitra." Besides,
Nichiren identified himself with the Visi~ta-diritra Bodhisattva predicated
in the Lotus (Hokke) Siitra. This daring claim was likely to be supported
by the Japanese way of thinking which is prone to grant charismatic
prestige to particular individuals. Moreover, when we consider that there is
no trace either in Indian or in Chinese Buddhism of such a religious
custom as reciting in chorus or demonstrating by beating fan-shaped drums,
we are compelled to suppose some impact of Shamanism on the doctrine of
Nichiren.
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On the continent, from the beginning, the Zen sect did not approve of
prayers. In Japan, also, for some time after the introduction of Zen, there
was no praying, except in special cases. Daryu Rankei (1213-1278), Funei
Gottan (d. 1276), Shanen Daikyu (1215-1289), Sogen Shigen (1226-
1286), and also Dagen, scarcely offered any prayers. Even their patrons
never forced the Zen priests to pray for any benefit, before the reign of
Tokiyori and Tokimune Hoja. This tradition, however, was broken down
by the Japanese who were in the habit of seeking help through prayers. In
the meanwhile, the Rinzai Zen sect of Eisai and his successors began to ac-
quire a strong tinge of esotericism, including prayer. From the time of Toki-
yori Haja (1227-1263) and Tokimune Haja (1215-1284) onwards, the
nobility, patrons of the Zen sect, assailed priests with demands for prayers
whenever they worried themselves even over trivialities. Thus the temples
of the Zen sect were going to be a sort of seminary of prayers.23 Dagen, the
introducer of the Sata sect, having repudiated magic or exorcism, could
hardly be supported by the generality; whereas, after his death, the order of
the sect became influential all over the country. This sudden change can
only be explained by the fact that Jakin Keizan (1268-1325), his spiritual
descendant, adopted the esoteric ceremonies.
The Pure Land CJado) teaching, as opposed to the other sects, de-
nounced magic or exorcism originally, asserting that looking to such magi-
cal resources was against the original vow of Amitabha Buddha. There is
nevertheless no denying that the Japanese teaching of the Pure Land had
some coloring of magical practice. We have already pointed out that the
Chinese teaching itself was likely to be partly esoteric in later periods,
because its principal idol was called "Amida," which was an exotic and
shortened phoneme of the original symbol "Amitabha," the "Buddha of
Eternal Life."
This trend was carried over into the Japanese teaching of Buddhism.
For example, the "Nembutsu" (to praise the name of Amitabha), prevalent
among the Japanese common people, was noticeably shamanistic. In the
mid-Heian period, Saint Kuya (died 972) initiated the "Odori-Nembutsu,"
that is, dancing to the drum or going into the street and reciting
"Nembutsu" or hymns in Japanese. The practice enjoyed general popu-
larity at that time. By the power of "Nembutsu," it was said, Kuya con-
quered venomous serpents and beasts and repulsed robbers. And this monk
was applauded by people everywhere.14 As evidenced in the writings of
Kanezane Fujiwara (Kuja, also Ensha, 1149-1207), it was also because of
Honen's magical powers that Hanen converted Kanezane Fujiwara to his
sect.15
The Jado or Pure Land sect, founded by Hanen (Genku, 1133-1212),
itself acquired an esoteric coloring later. Shagei (1341-1420), the founder
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of the Jodo sect in the Kanto Area, worked mysteries named "mysteries to
be initiated through fivefold means." Even nowadays the priests of the Jodo
sect recite their hymns in Sanskrit, saying, "the principal magical prayer of
Amitiibha, the Perfect One." This is the same as the prayer used in the
Shingon sect. This enigmatic formula transmitted in an unintelligible
transcription runs as follows: "I will devote my life to Buddha, Law, and
Order. I will devote my life to the Holy Tathiigiita (The Perfect One) of
Eternal Life, the honorable Enlightened One. Om, the Immortal, the
Immortal Life, the Immortal Appearance, the Immortal Mother's Womb,
the Immortal Power." After this enumeration, it concludes with the prayer:
"Perish all Karmas one by one, sviihii." This certainly is a magical forIl}ula.
Aside from the original vow of the teaching, the sect has been considerably
esoteric in its practice.
In the Kamakura period (1185-1333) there was another promoter of
"Odori-Nembutsu" (Invocation to Amitiibha Dancing). It was Saint Ippen
(1239-1289), the founder of the Ji sect. "The Mirror of Nomori" referred
to him as follows: A priest, named Ippen, misunderstood the doctrine of
Nembutsu, taking 'dancing-ecstasy' for the high command to dance. The
orthodox performance of N embutsu lay for him in dancing and keeping
time with the hands and feet. Furthermore, inspired by the utterance to the
effect that a simple mind will enter easily the Pure Land of Amitiibha, he
became naked and, without a stitch of clothing upon his body, pretended
that one should reject all artificiality. In a sort of mad frenzy he condemned
anyone he ever hated. And yet all people, high and low, Hocked to be the
first ones in his audience and were loud in praise of his conduct, as in a
prosperous market.
Although the episode remains to be confirmed, there can be no doubt
that "Odori-Nembutsu" was popular with the contemporaries of Ippen.
Down to the Tokugawa Shogunate a religious custom of bowl-beating was
soon to be in practice. Now we have to remember that "Shaman," from
which the word "Shamanism" is derived, means a dancing man. We shall,
then be justified in saying that it was into such an "Odori-Nembutsu"
(dancing to the name of Buddha) that the teaching of Pure Land was
modified in terms of Shamanism in Japan.
Against these shamanistic or magical tendencies a gallant resistance
was put up by the Jodo sect. It stood by its view that no permission should
be given to look to exorcism or prayers, or to choose a lucky day or lucky
star.16 Nevertheless, another form of Shamanism was sought by its be-
lievers. (The most outstanding was Hijihomon, especially Okura-monto, of
the Jodo-shin sect.) "Odori-Nembutsu" was sometimes performed by some
of the believers, in spite of a strict decree against it. There appeared, in the
Ashikaga period (1336-1573), a heretic view that praying to Amitiibha
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would cure any disease. It was in the same line of mystical thinking as the
custom of drinking water from the Pope's bathtub.
To recognize a magical power in the human voice is common among
primitive people. Indian Buddhism, especially its esotericism from the
seventh and eighth centuries on, developed a similar line of thought. But,
in Japan, all religious sects have been unwittingly governed by this magical
thinking.
The Japanese have, since ancient times, been disposed to regard
funeral services as of great importance, and nowadays a funeral is of
important significance to Buddhism itself. The Japanese funeral was a
surprise to Europeans who came over at the beginning of the modern era.
Yet, originally, Buddhist monks were never in charge of any funeral for
secular devotees. Buddhists in India expected no salvation of the dead from
funeral services which were held by Brahmins. It was a common attitude of
the leaders of the original Buddhism to "jeer and scoff at the magical
formulae recited by Briihmins."17 (The original scripture of Buddhism tells
us that the Buddha himself forbade monks to participate in a funeral.)
Another source says that one could go to Heaven after his death, thanks,
not to a funeral, but to his virtue. At any rate, monks did not want to
bother about such secular ceremonies as funeral services.
Yet, as time went on after the entrance of Buddhism into Japan,
the general public believed Buddhism, because of its metaphysical
character, to have a bearing upon the phenomenon of death, and have
some influence on the repose of souls. Then, at some date after the Heian
period, some clergymen appeared who took charge of funeral services for
secular persons in order to ameliorate the financial condition of temples.
Finally, the Tokugawa Shogunate bound all the people to Buddhist tem-
ples so that people might obey strictly the decree of the Prohibition of
Christianity. As a consequence, every person in Japan has had a connection
with the Buddhist temple, and that connection has been chiefly through
funeral services. Thus a funeral comes to be taken for one of the most
important of Buddhist ceremonies nowadays. (The great temples in Nara,
however, stick to the old Buddhist tradition, and do not participate in
funerals of laymen at present. It is the same with great Chinese temples.)
So it may be a bitter irony that the actual Buddhist circles in Japan count as
their most essential social function what the monks of original Buddhism
jeered at as nonsense. [Such a change may have occurred in other worId-
religions also. The subject requires further comparative study.]
But, the change met the social needs of people, for thus the Japanese
people enjoyed the magical effects of Buddhism as well. These effects are
produced by reciting the sutras in melodious classical Chinese, the meaning
of which common people cannot understand. Not only the Indians but also
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the Chinese were able to understand the import of siitras in their mother
tongue. In Japan, however, classical Chinese, foreign to the Japanese, does
not convey any meaning except to learned persons. Yet in actual Buddhist
services the long words of classical Chinese fascinate all the participants by
its sheer melodiousness without giving them any understanding.
The last question to be asked is whether or not there is any relation
between Shamanism and Confucianism in Japan. The Japanese did not
always adopt Chinese thoughts as they were. The time-honored religious
modes of Japan repudiated not only the idea of change of imperial dynasty,
but also the Chinese custom of religious service and Chinese ideas of the
gods, including the supreme Heaven. The Japanese, however, noticed
some affinities with the Chinese trichotomy of the divine (God of Heaven,
gods of earth, and ghosts of men) in the Chou Li, and with the differentia-
tion between prayer and retribution in the Li Chi (the Book of Rituals).
Especially the this-worldly character of Confucianism based upon the
family system met with favor among the Japanese people.18
The greatest foe, however, of Chinese Confucianism was the shaman-
istic tendency in Japan. Japanese Confucianists, although they originally
denounced magic or exorcism, could not reject wholly the Japanese habit
of thinking, in a way oriented towards Shamanism. Some of the Japanese
Confucian scholars, for example, Sorai Ogyii modified considerably the
fundamental attitude of Confucius of keeping silent about supernatural
gods, when Ogyii said, "There is evidence that Confucius himself approved
the existence of spiritual beings. So, whoever denies spiritual beings does
not believe in Confucius."19 We, however, find in The Analects of Confu-
cius the following sentence: "The subjects on which the Master did not
talk, were extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual
beings." According to the interpretation of the Chinese scholar, it means
that Confucius did not talk about anything beyond our sensory perception.
But Ogyii explained the same sentence as follows: "Confucius, though a
saint, was a man as well. Presumably he could not help being interested in
ghost tales. Indeed, in everyday talks, he must have referred, from time to
time, to the existence of ghosts. But he did not encourage such a reference
as a precept."20
As for studies of Chinese classics, more energy was devoted to the
study of the Book of Changes than to the study of the Book of Rituals. This
may have some connection with the above-mentioned tendency.
From the Heian period onwards, not only Buddhism but Shinto
adopted the Chinese dualistic principle of positive and negative. It was a
magical teaching by which one could master the art of divination, hydro-
maney, anthroposcopy, astrology, etc. It included a doctrine of the positive
and the negative, and also of the five elements. In China, the teachers,
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having deified "T'ien-i," "T'ai-po," "God of Mt. T'aishan" and s6 forth,
held the festivals of "One's Star," "Fatal Destiny," "Three Cycles," and, at
the same time, were in charge of magical practice. Chinese Dualism,
though a magical teaching, had a theoretical construction, nevertheless.
Having been introduced into Japan, however, the teaching lost its coherent
doctrine of the positive and the negative. With no reference to doctrinal
consideration, many Japanese, high and low, monastic and secular, believed
in the magical aspect of its teaching.21 Chinese Dualism, then, was nothing
but a superstition in Japan. And yet its influence upon Japanese customs
can still be discerned in the popular belief in fatalism as well as in the habit
of avoiding an ominous direction. Hence, while we recognize the impact of
Shamanism upon Chinese thought, we must also admit that it was not so
strong as its influence on Buddhism in Japan.
Such shamanistic or magical tendencies will, with the diffusion of
scientific knowledge, disappear sooner or later. A fuller investigation is
required concerning the problem of the post-war growth of heretical reli-
gions of this sort.
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56 According to Max Weber, there is a reason, significant for spiritual
history, for the fact that cities made progress in their particular fashion
in the West. First, the western cities are a cooperative society formed
by the pact (social contract) based on voluntary will. A city in the West
was, in the beginning, created as a defensive body, the principle of
which is that it should be defended by self-fortification and by the
whole city itself. Everywhere, except in the West, a monarch's army
preceded the coming into being of cities. In the West, however, the
coming into existence of an army to be led under the orders of a soldier-
monarch or the separation of soldiers and the means of war, was only
effected in modern times, but in Asia it existed from the very beginning.
Some say that the reason is that in East Asia, Egypt, West Asia, India,
or China, the river-improvement problem was of grave concern for the
nation; therefore a powerful monarchy and bureaucracy were bound to
appear. The second reason is said to be that in East Asian societies, ec-
NOTES TO PAGES 35 TO 41 595
cIesiastical institutions were established which monopolized magical
tricks and exercised a ruling power.
'57 Max Weber, Aufsiitze zur Religionssoziologie, 1,2'52.
'58 "Although the extent to which social influence under certain economical
and political conditions affected religious ethics was fairly grave in some
isolated cases, the characteristic of such ethics is basically given by the
role of religion. Before anything else it primarily depends on the con-
tents of a religious message or God's testament. In any religion the
needs of the class which instructs the society in its teaching count
greatly, and on the other hand, once the type of religion is fixed it would
exercise a great influence over various types of ways of living." (Max
Weber, "Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligion," Aufsiitze zur Religions-
sozio logie, I, 240-241.) As for the reason why the caste-system was
established in India, Weber explains: "Originally the union of the
creative caste-orthodoxy with the doctrine of karma or the theodicee
peculiar to the Brahmins, was a direct product of the rational and
ethical thinking, and it is not that of economical I condition' of any sort.
And it is not until this thought-product came to be unified with the
traditional social order, with the thought of transmigration (sa1]1siira) as
an intermediary, that such an order emerged and ruled over the thinking
and aspirations of the people in question and to produce a firm basic
religious and social establishment of every low professional group and
the mean classes." (Hinduismus und Buddhismus, 13 I.)
'59 Tetsur6 Watsuji, Homerosu Hihan (Homeric Criticism), 40.
60 Even in a language, the vocabulary, phrases, and idioms used in that
language are most liable to change, whereas grammatical rules or ways of
expressions are comparatively hard to change. Even when a fairly large
number of foreign words are adopted, it is quite rare that the grammatical
system should come to be affected by foreign countries. Accordingly, a
grammar is preserved for a long time and so the vitality of tradition in
grammar is comparatively strong. Hashimoto Shinkichi Hakase Chosaku-
shu (Collected Works of Hashimoto Shinkichi), I, 348ff. Kokugo to
Dento (National Language and Tradition).
PART I: WAYS OF THINKING IN INDIA
Chapter I
Greek translation of the Bhagavadgttii by Demetrios Galanos from the
Sanskrit (Athens: 1848): rlu il, e,oo'II"Eoo<O/I P.EXOS, p.'TarppaooO"ooa EK TOO
{Jpaxp.a/l'Kov.
Latin translation: Bhagavad-Gitii, textum recensuit adnotationes eri-
ticus et interpretationem Latinam adiecit, Aug. Guil. von Schlegel. Editio
altera auctior et emendatior cura Christiani Lasseni (Bonn: 1846).
Latin translation of the Pali Dhammapada by V. Fausboll: Dham-
mapadam, ex trihus codicihus hauniensihus Palice edidit, Latine vertit,
excerptis ex commentario Palico notisque illustravit (Hauniae: 18'5'5).
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In the following I shall often use these two books, which are so
representative of Indian thought and culture, as a key to the comparative
study of ways of thinking.
2 I quoted from the text edited by Yensho Kanakura in his Indo Seishin
Bunka no Kenkyu (Study of the Spirit of Indian Culture), 297ff. The
collection seems to have been written in its original form by a Buddhist
before the loth century. Its content was so excellent that other religions
plundered whole sentences from it and each maintained respectively that
it had been written by someone belonging to his own religion. The book,
which was inherited by Brahmanic schools, contains later additions, so
that the small books of Buddhists and Jains are worth studying.
3 The same sentence~ can be seen in early Buddhist canons, early Jain
canons, the Mahiibhiirata, and Brahmanic sacred books, hence may be
seen as pan-Indian thought. But so~etimes they have been influenced by
the common cultural pattern of the age in which they were written, so
that we must be careful to compare them with various thoughts in later
ages.
Chapter 2
1 In modern English, the adjective modifier is called "predicative", e.g.,
"He grows old." "He goes mad." "The dream will come true." Cf. O. Jes-
persen, The Philosophy of Grammar (New York: 1924), 131-132. In
Sanskrit this predicative is often expressed by an abstract noun.
2 To denote "as ---" the instrumental is used generally, but sometimes
the dative and the locative are used in Sanskrit; e.g., "vrtaviin mitrat-
viiya urpo nrpam." (Kathiis., 38, 153) (The king chose a king as his
friend.), "patitve vrta~." Nala, 5, 16 (chosen as a groom.) J. S. Speyer,
Vedische und Sanskrit-Syntax (Strassburg: 1896), 36. What is ex-
pressed by the dative and locative seems to have a purpose-idea. Speyer,
op.cit., sec. 24. .
3 Cf. "The Small Sukhiivativyuha," ed. by Ryosaburo Sakaki in his
Bongogaku ("Sanskrit Grammar"), 251.
4 When we discuss the problem of "the individual,'" we should keep in
mind that the term "individual" is not always clear, and very often
logical confusion occurs. When we say: "Socrates is human," the subject
term denotes a particular individual and the predicate term designates
some property the individual is asserted to have. In this case the term
"individual" means "an individual human being," whereas the logical
meaning of the term is fairly different. "It should be made clear . . .
that the word 'individual' is used to refer J;lot only to persons, but to
any thing-such as a country, a city, or in fact to anything of which a
property can be meaningfully predicated." Irving M. Copi, Introduction
to Logic, second edition. (New York: Macmillan, 1961),3°3-3°4, This
is the meaning of the term "individual" in the logical sense.
5 The literal meaning of antya-vise~a is "the final or ultimate particular."
The Vaise~ika Philosophy, According to tile Dasapadiirthasiistra, trans-
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lated into English by H. Ui and edited by F. W. Thomas. (London:
Royal Asiatic Society, 1917),37,67,
6 Gaurinath Sastri, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning (Calcutta:
Sanskrit College, 1959), 136-14°' However, even in classic Western
logic the singular or the individual was not always discussed. "A simple
example is found in the customary illustration that is given of the
Aristotelian syllogism: All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore,
Socrates is mortal. I do not believe a single instance can be found in
genuine Aristotelian writings in which a singular (which by its nature is
an instance of severalty) appears as the minor premise in a rationally
demonstrative syllogism." John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960),95.
7 Tarka-samgraha of Anna1]1bhatta, edited by Y. V. Athalye (Poona: The
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 193°),76.
8 D. M. Datta in Philosophy and Culture: East and West, edited by
Charles A. Moore, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1962), 571.
9 Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I (photomechanical reprint), (The
Hague: Mouton & Co., 1958), 79f; II (1958), 34-35; d. 40, 267' In
the West also we find a similar concept: hacceitas (thisness) in the
philosophy of Duns Scotus.
10 Ibid., I, 2Q4f., 554f. Dharmakirti's assertion is not a strange one. In con-
temporary America also we find a similar theory: "In actual experience,
there is never any such isolated singular object or event; an object or
event is always a special part, phase, or aspect, of an environing ex-
perienced world-a situation. The singular object stands out conspicu-
ously because of its especially focal and crucial position at a given time in
determination of some problem of use or enjoyment which the total
complex environment presents." Dewey, op.cit., 67. An individual situa-
tion is indivisible and unduplicable. Distinctions and relations are in-
stituted within a situation; they are recurrent and repeatable in dif-
ferent situations. (Ibid., 68.)
I I "Such qualities as are designated by 'distressing,' 'cheerful,' etc. are
general, while the quality of distress and cheer that marks an existent
situation is not general but is unique and inexpressible in words." (Ibid.,
70.)
12 Cf. also John Dewey's distinction between "having" and "knowing."
Experience and Nature (Open Court, Lasalle, Illinois, Carus Lectures,
1925). [Dewey asserted that knowing requires more than having an
immediate experience, against British sensationalists or Cartesian intui-
tionists. According to him, having an experience may indicate that a
thing exists, but does not give us knowledge of what exists. Later we
come to know what it is by experimental thinking, not by a priori
reasoning. "Knowledge by acquaintance" is distinguished from "knowl-
edge by description" by William James who himself shows an almost
mystical preference for immediacy. But Dewey differed from James
in this respect.-Editor's note.] The similarity between the thought
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of Dhannakirti and that of Kant was already pointed out by Stcherbat-
sky, op.cit., passim.
13 This point is still problematic. "Indian philosophers had a whole cate-
gory of inherence (samavaya) and the Indian logicians continuously
distinguished between a judgment of inherence and a judgment of
relation." (Comment by Dr. Daya Krishna.)
14 Naoshiro Tsuji, Veda oyobi Burahumana no Shiso (Thoughts in the
Vedas and BrahmaI]as), Iwanami Koza Toyo Shiso (lwanami Lectures on
Oriental Thought), 61.
15 Brhad. Up., VI, 2, 1-16, translated by Robert E. Hume (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2d ed., 1931), 263; Chand. Up. V, 3-10; Jaim. Br.
I, 45-46. Thanks are especially due to Dr. Walter H. Maurer for his
scholarly help in translating this obscure passage.
16 Schayer, Ausgewiihlte Kapitel aus dem Prasannapada, Einleitung,
p. XXII. W. Ruben, Indische und Griechische Metaphysik, 561f. Cf.
Zeitschrift fur Indologie und Iranistik (Leipzig: 1931), VIII, 147-227.
17 Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosophie, herausgegeben
von Michelet, 162.
Chapter 3
pamada = socordia, appamada = vigilantia, Dhp., 2If.: vera = iracun-
dia, avera = placabilitas, Dhp., 5.
2 Yoga-sutra II, 30. This is taken up in the Kurma-puralJa. It is also
adopted by Vivekananda as one of the "rajayoga" practices. Cf.
Romain Rolland, La vie de Vivekananda II, 66.
3 In Pali, "palJatipata veramalJi, adinnadanii veramalJi, kamesu miccha-
ciirii veramalJi, musiiviidii veramalJi." In Buddhist Sanskrit, "priilJiiti-
piitiid virati1;I" adattiidiiniid virati1;I" kamamithyiiciiriid virati1;I" musiiviidiit
prativirati1;I,." (Mahiivyutpatti, XCII). The Jains say, "hitpsii-anrta-steya-
abrahma-parigrahebhyo viratir vratam" ("Refraining from violence,
falsehood, stealing, non-chastity, and possessions is the Vow"). (Tat-
tviirthiidhigamasutra, VII, I).
4 B-g-veda, X, 129.
5 Brhad. Up., IV, 5, 15·
6 Ibid., III, 8, 8.
7 Kiithaka Up., V, 14. Cf. Svet. Up., VI, 14; MUlJ4. Up., II, 2, 10;
Bhag. G., XV, 6.
8 Udana,I,lo,9.
9 This salutation verse of the Madhyamaka-karikii; d. Madhyamaka-vrtti,
ed. by Louis de la Vallee Poussin, 3-4- Such an expression can also
be found in the SaddharmapulJ4arika-sutra, "He (who enters into the
awakening of faith) finds that all Dhannas are non-destructive, non-
productive, non-restrictive, non-resolutive, non-gloomy, and non-
bright." (Edited by Wogihara and Tsuchida, 127, line 10.) Cf.
Madhyamaka-kiirika, XVI, 5; Mahiiyiina-sutriilankara, VI, I.
)0 Cf. Taisho, XXIV, 1018 c; VI, 380 b; V, 888 b; VI, 170 b; 569 b, 505 b,
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987 c; XXV, 579-580 a. Siilistamba-sutra (Poussin, Theorie des
douze causes, 75); Madhyamaka-vrtti, 569, etc.
I I Candrakrrti says, "As to Prafityasamutpiida, though we can express end-
less negative predicates, here we adopt only eight negations, because
these eight can reject all objections." (Madhyamaka-vrtti, I I, 4).
PiIigala also gives the same meaning. T aisho, XXX, I C.
12 "Paramiirtha" is translated as "sheng-i" ("surpassing all things") in the
Chinese translation of the Buddhist canon.
13 Mii1J4ukya-kiirikii, II, 32. This verse is often quoted in many books.
Amrtabindu-Up., 10; Tripuriitiipini-Up., 10; Avadhuta-Up., 8; Atma-
Up., 31; Vidvanmanoraiijani on Vediintasiira, ed. by Jacob, 135:
Siirhkhyapravacanabhii~ya, ed. by R. Garbe, 22, line 6; 28, line I I;
122, line 7; 159, line 8.
14 "If the oneness of Atman were grasped, all expressions (vyavahiira)
like 'bondage,' 'emancipation' and so on would come to the end."
(Samkara; Brahma-sutra-bhii~a, I, 2, 6. I, 18 I, line 4. AnSS.)
15 "As to this a learned man says, 'I am the faculty of seeing, purity, un-
changeable essence. In me there is no bondage and no emancipation.'''
(Vediintasiira, § 210, ed. by Bohtlingk) d. Vivekacut}.iima1Ji, 503.
16 baddho mukta iti vyakhya gur:ato me, na vastutaJ:.t, gur:asya mayamiil-
atvan na me mok~o na bandhanam. (Bhiigavatapurii1Ja, XI, I I, I) na
bandho 'sti na mok~o 'sti nabandho 'sti na bandhanam, aprabodhad
idaJ11 duJ:.tkhaJ11 prabodhat pravilryate. (Yogaviisi~tha, IV, 38, 22.)
17 Ayiira1iga, I, 5, 6, 4·
18 E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, I, 661; P. Deussen, Allgemeine
Geschichte der Philosophie, II, I, p. 74.
19 Ibid., I, I, p. 695; Deussen, op.cit., II, I, p. 83.
20 Zeller, op.cit., I, I, p. 458; d. p. 521
21 Ibid., I, 2, p. 973; Deussen, op.cit., II, I, p. I 17.
22 Zeller, op.cit., II, I, p. 808; Deussen, op.cit., II, I, p. 278.
23 Zeller, op.cit., 11,2, p. 448; Deussen, op.cit., II, I, p. 354.
24 Takashi Ide, Shijin Tetsugakusha (Poet-Philosophers), 238, 244. [The
Eleatics, of course, did discuss Non-Being, but only in order to reject
it.-Editor's note.]
25 Mii1J4Ukya-kiirikii, II, 12.
26 Ibid., II, 19; nirgU1Jo 'pi hy ajo 'vyakto bhagaviin prakrte1;t para1;t,
svamiiyiigu1Jam iiviSya biidhyabiidhakatiit]l gata1;t-Bhiigavatapurii1Ja, VII,
1,6 (ed. by Burnou£).
27 Parallel passages showing the attitude of grasping the absolute nega-
tively can be found in works of different religions. Examples are
abundantly shown, for example, in Vidhushekhara Bhattacharyya, The
Agamasiistra of GauLjapiida (University of Calcutta, 1943). [Cf.
Maimonides' view (Moreh Nebuchim) that we can say only what God
is not.-Editor's note.]
28 This story is quoted by Samkara in his Brahma-sutra-bhiisya, III, 2, 17.
Its origin seems to be certain Upani~ads which have been lost.
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29 Dhp., 268.
30 M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature (University of Calcutta,
1927), I, 184.
3 I Atharva-veda, XI, 4, 2 I.
32 Anguttara-nikaya, III, 129; I, 282.
33 Samyutta-nikaya, V, 153.
Chapter 4
I Speyer, Vedische und Sanskrit-Syntax, § 2.
2 Greek translation of Bhag. G. by Demetrios Galanos, and Latin transla-
tion of Bhag. G. by A. W. von Schlegel; d. fn. I to ch. I, above.
3 Madhyamaka-karika, XXIII, 10-1 I.
4 Madhyamaka-vrtti, 10, line 7.
5 E.g., sarva~ sarva1]'t na janati sarvajno nasti kaScana. (Nala, 20, 6)
(Not everybody does know everything, nobody is omniscient.) naiva
sarva iva yasa~ saknoti sa1]'tya1]'ttum. (Satapatha-Brahma1;Ul, XIV, I, 1,6);
cf. Smpkara, BS., I, 28, lines 4-5; 275, line 2; 6°4, line I. (AnSS).
6 Izum Shimmura, Gengogaku Josetsu (Introduction to Linguistics), 48-
149·
7 The same phenomenon and process can be seen in Semitic languages,
descendants of Arabian languages. Such pronouns show that the num-
bers for three or four things in South-Asian and Polynesian languages
are inclined to change into the plural form of the numerals three or four.
d. Shimmura, op.cit., 150.
8 Cf. G. Biihler. Indische Paliiographie, 8of.
9 Bmgsch Pascha, Aus dem Morgenlande, Reclam 3 I 5I. In ancient times
one-half of a certain amount of corn was called "Malter," one-24th was
called "Scheffel" and one-384th was called "Metze." Cf. M. Werthei-
mer, Ober das Denken der Naturvolker, I. Zahlen und Zahlgebilde. Drei
Abhandlungen zur Gestalttheorie, 133.
10 Such properties as two-ness, three-ness, etc. correspond to classes of
classes in modern logic. Cf. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Materials for the
Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic. Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 40 (Harvard
University Press, 195 I), 77f; S. Bhattacharya in Philosophy: East and
West (October 1961).
I I Wertheimer,op.cit., 106£.
12 Gaugapada on Samkhya-karika, verse 2.
13 Samkara, Brahma-sutra-bhii$ya I, 3, 28; d. Richard Garbe, The Philoso-
phy of Ancient India (Chicago: The Open Court), 36.
14 Nyayabindu, II 17. Simsapa is the name of a tree.
15 Nyayabindu-tika, 26, lines I2ff.
16 Vakyapadiya, III, 1,32.
Chapter 5
I The monistic view that the Highest Self appears in manifold forms is
held also by the Vi~I;lu sect of Hinduism. They teach that "NarayaI;la,
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who is the highest Self and the Self of all, reveals himself in multiple
ways." iitmanii 'tmiinam anekadhii vyiihyiivasthitaJ:t, Samkara on Brahma-
sutra, II, 2,42; SBE, XXXIV, 440.
2 Brhad. Up., IV, 4, 6; The Principal Upani~ads, edited by S. Radhakrish-
nan (London: 1953),273.
3 Chiind. Up., III, 14,4; (SBE), Sacred Books of the East 1,48.
4 Chiind. Up., VI, 9,1-2; SBE, I, 101; d. Maitri-Up., VI, 22.
5 Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge
University Press, 1932), I, 429.
6 Moritz Winternitz, Geschichte der indischen Litteratur, Bd. III.
7 Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, IV, Indian
Pluralism (Cambridge University Press, 1949), 362.
8 A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Edited by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
and Charles A. Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957),
p.xxv.
9 Suttanipiita, 648; SBE, X, pt. II, p. I 15; d. Suttanipiita, 610; 61 X.
10 Vinaya, Culla-vagga, IX, I, 4; SBE, XX, 304.
I I Mutt4. Up., III, 2, 8; Radhakrishna~. Op.cit., 691.
12 Madhyamaka-Kiirikii, 18,5.
13 Harold E. McCarthy's review of Rama Kanta Tripathi, Spinoza in the
Light of the Vedanta (Banaras: Banaras Hindu University, 1957), in
Philosophy East and West, XI, 4 (January 1962), 261-265.
14 E.g., viniibhavasantam ev' idarp., (Suttanipiita, 805); d. sabbarp. idarp.
calarp. iti pekkhiimano, (Theragiithii, I I 10); idarp. sarvarp. vijiiiipti-
miitrakam, (Trimsikii, v. 17).
15 E.g., sarvam idam, (Bhag. G., II, 17; VII, 7); idam, (Bhag. G., III, 38).
Schlegel translates the word "idam" by "universum." svapniidivac cedarp.
dra~~avyam, (Sankara ad BS. II, 2, 28).
16 E.g., ta~i sarvii~i, (Bhag. G. IV, 5, hosce universos). Cf. sabbe, (Dham-
mapada, 129; 130).
17 'lI"aPTa. XWp'L Ka.l ovah p.ip... Plato, Crat. 402 A.
18 ws a'll"aPTWP TWP a.lu01/rwp ael p.OPTWP. Aristotle, Metaph., I, 6. 987 a 33.
19 ra. 'lI"a.pO' opii O.6s, a.VTOS ovx OpWp..POS. (God sees all things, himself un-
seen.) As this Greek quotation shows, it is commonly observed in some of
the Indo-European languages that a subject in the nominative neuter
plural form takes the verb in the singular. In the ~g-Veda, we can find
some cases of this usage. See Harushige Kozu, Hikaku Gengogaku (Com-
parative Linguistics), 261-262. As to this usage in the Classical Sanskrit,
see Speyer, Vedische und Sanskrit-Syntax, 75, § 243, Anm. x. In Prakrit,
"atthi" (= Sanskrit asti) can follow the subject of any gender and num-
ber and "aS1" (= Sanskrit lisit), the subject of either the singular or the
plural number. See Woolner, Introduction to Prakrit, 53.
20 b 1raPT< £vxa.p,ureLre. (In everything give thanks.)
2 I Ep ro Bp Ka.l 1rcIP ••• ZePoq,ap1/p '" v1roTlO.uOa., q,~u,p 0 Oiosq,pauTos. ("Xeno-
phanes thought that Being is one and all," it is said by Theophrastus.)
Simplicius ad. Phys. 22, 26D.
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22 E.g., Omnia, quae sunt, vel in se, vel in alio sunt. (Everything exists
either in itself or in other things.) Spinoza, Ethica, Axiomata 1.
23 Megasthenes, Fragments, 41.
24 See Kau~. Up., I, 4i Brhad. Up., IV, 3, 22; IV, 4, 23; Tait. Up., II, 9.
25 Brhad. Up., IV, 4, 22; Radhakrishnan, op.cit., 279; d. Kau~. Up.,
III,8.
26 Chand. Up., IV, 14,3; SBE, I, 67.
27 See Brahmasutra, IV, I, 13-15.
Chapter 6
I It has been the practice since the ~g-Veda to use the past participle in-
stead of the finite verb. Even in the oldest Gathas of the Jain Scripture,
this tendency is found. (H. Jacobi, Sacred Books of the East (SBE),
XXII,72n.)
2 In the ApabhrarhSa language, perfect, imperfect, and aorist are seldom
found and the past tense is expressed by a past participle.
3 However, there is no such example in the ~g-Veda. It can be first found
in the BrahmaJ?as. Delbriick, Altindische Syntax, 295.
4 Speyer, Vedische und Sanskrit-Syntax (Strassburg: 1896), 67.
5 The sentence which begins with "yad" corresponds to such an infinitive
form. Speyer, op.cit., 87, § 279, b.
6 "vr~ala, upalabdhu1?f, tarhi vayam iihutii1;£." (Mudriirii~asa, III [127,
6]) ="__, so bin ich hier befohlen, urn gescholten zu werden."
Speyer, op.cit., 67.
7 Cf. "ekii prasuyate miitii dvitiyii viik prasuyate." (Pancatantra, ed.
Jivanananda Vidyasagara [Calcutta: 1872], IV, 6.) In the case when
the word idrsa (such) modifies adjective, this remains as an adjective.
Speyer,op.cit., § 148, Anm. cf. § 132.
8 Stenzel states, in his Die Philosophie der Sprache, 74f., that such a dif-
ference is based upon the difference of emphasis upon the subject and
predicate.
9 Speyer, op.cit., 82-83.
10 Speyer, op.cit., § 69.
I I "bhiiva utpatti1;£ sattii vii. (Ratnaprabhii ad Brahmasutra, II, 2, 3)
12 For example: Sarhkara ad BS., II, 16, line 9. (AnSS.); Chung-Iun
(Treatise on the "Middle" Doctrine) 15, 5; d. Commentaries by
Candrakirti on the 13,3 & 5; 15,8 of Chung-Iun.
13 Brhad. Up., III, 8, 8-11.
14 Brhad. Up., III, 9, 26; IV, 2, 4i IV, 4, 22; IV, 5, 15, d. II, 3, 6.
15 Brhad. Up., IV, 4,25.
16 Seiichi Hatano, Kirisutokyo no Kigen (The Origin of Christianity),
199-200.
17 Dhammapada, 150.
18 Tait. Up., III, Ii Tattviirthiidhigama-sutra, V, 29.
19 ~a4bhavavikara bhavantiti Var~yayaniJ.1, jayate'sti vipariJ?amate vardhate'
pra~iyate vinasyaati. (Nirukta, I, 2. p. 29, edited by L. Sarup.)
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20 Viikyap., III, 1,36.
21 Sarhkara BS., I, 1,2.
22 In the seventh chapter of the Madhyamaka-Kiirikii, the theory which
claims utpiida-sthiti-bhanga is refuted. Formerly, in the 'Ts~ng-i-a-han'
(Chinese version of the Ekottariigama-sutra in the Tripi~aka) XII
(TaishO, II, 607 c), it is explained that there are three characteristics by
which the conditioned elements are formed, namely, appearance,
change, and elimination. The Abhidharma-jiiiina-prasthiina, vol. 3
(Taisho, XXVI, 780 c) also explains the same theory.
23 Madhyamaka-kiirikii, XV, 5. Also see the commentary of Candrakirti
upon MK., XIII, 3,5, XV, 8.
24 This is explained in the Mahiivibhii~ii, 39, the Nyayiinusiira, 13, the
Abhidharma-kosa, 5 (the Chinese translation by Hsiian-tsang), etc.
25 Romain Rolland, La vie de Ramakrishna, 22-24-
26 Albert Schweitzer, Das Christentum und die Weltreligionen (Munich:
1925), 34. Translated by Joanna Powers, Christianity and the Reli-
gions of the World (New York: Henry Holt, 1939).
27 Harushige K6zu, Hikaku Gengogaku (Comparative Linguistics), 256-
257·
28 praesens, imperfectum, futumm, perfectum, aoristum. In the Latin lan-
guage aoristum is lacking, but plusquamperfectum and futumm exactum
are added.
29 Speyer, op.cit., 53-55.
30 It is improper to say that aorist should be interpreted as indefinite past
tense. See K6zu, op.cit., 263, note I.
31 PaI,lini, III, 3,135.
32 In order to make up for it, the following three combinations are usually
used: past participle passive + asa (abhut) , past participle passive +
bhavi?yati, and past participle passive + bhavet. Speyer, op.cit., 62.
In order to show the meaning of past perfect, one may use perfect,
imperfect, or past participle active. Ibid., § 18 I.
33 Ibid·,5I.
34 E.g., Nyiiyabindufikii, 24, line II. Sarhkara on the Brahma-siitra, I, 604,
line 10 (Anandrasma Sanskrit Series).
35 Ibid., 25, line II.
36 Ibid., 15. We do not minimize the fact that there are some exceptions,
e.g., vise~a!ta-viSe~ya-bhiiva (Vediintasiira, 168 f).
37 Sarhkara, op.cit., I, 603, line 3.
38 Ibid., I, 604, line 8.
39 In the Greek translation of the Bhagavat-gHii by Demetrios Galanos,
yoga is translated as theoria.
40 Brhad. Up., IV, 4, 23.
41 Dhammapada, 223. Also see ibid., XVII Kodhavagga (Chapter on An-
ger).
42 Ibid., 5.
43 Ayiiranga, I, 3: 1,2.
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44 Prasnottararatnamiilikii, 20.
45 Ibid., 7.
46 Ibid., 6. Such thought is found in the theory of twelve links of
causality explained in Buddhism.
47 Ibid., 14·
48 Brhad. Up., V, 2. Such a thought process is noticed in the explanation
of the theory of "two paths and five fire-offerings" that those who are
devotional to Brahma with offerings of religious service and pure prac-
tice, are able to proceed to the pitr-yiina or the path leading to heaven.
49 Suttanipiita, 102.
50 Sathyutta-Nikiiya, I, 18 Catha.
51 Prasnottararatnamiilikii, 13, 16, 17,26.
52 Ayiiranga, 1,2: 2, I.
53 Ibid., I, 6: 3,2.
54 Ibid., I, 4: 4, I.
55 Bhaskara, Brahmasutrabhii~ya, 206, 209.
Chapter 7
I Speyer, Vedische und Sanskrit-Syntax, 67.
2 Ibid., 66.
3 Ibid., 75, 243, Anm. 3.
4 Ibid., 63.
5 Ibid., 74.
6 na tva1]1 socitu1]1 arhasi (Bhag. G., II, 27) =no te lugere oportet =
You need not be sad.
Here the subject "you" is expressed in the nominative case in the
sense of kartr (agent), while it is expressed in the objective case in
Greek and Latin.
7 In the Vaise~ika philosophy, iitman is counted as one of the substances
(dravya). There is no passage in the Nyiiyasutra where iitman is de-
fined as a substance (dravya). But as it often refers to the qualities
(gutza) which are inherent (samaviiya) in iitman, .it may be understood
that the perception of iitman as a substance is recognized by the Siitra
itself.
8 According to Samkara's description, Bhartrprapafica was of the following
opinion about iitman: The substance iitman has two characteristics, viz.
oneness (ekatva) and manifoldness (niiniitva). For example, oxen have
identity through their essence (go-dravyatii) , and at the same time are
distinct from each other through different characteristics such as hang-
ing flesh of neck, etc. Just as there is oneness and diversity within a
large visible thing, similarly it should be known that in an indivisible,
formless substance like space, there exist oneness and manyness side by
side. Because, this (rule) is experienced everywhere without exception,
the case is the same with iitman, which involves differentiation as in
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seeing, etc., on the one hand, and identity on the other hand. $arhkara
on Brhad. Up., IV, 3, 24-30; AnSS., 622.
This opinion is summarized in a syllogism by Anandajiiana:
"(Proposition) What is discussed here (atman) is differentiated and
undifferentiated at the same time.
(Reason) Because it is a substance (vastu).
(Example) As in the case of the ox."
Anandajiiana on $arhkara's Brhad. Up. Bha~ya, 622.
This syllogism can be applied to Brahman, too, and hence Brahman
is concluded to be one and the same, though it is differentiated and
undifferentiated at the same time. [The Indian syllogism in three or
five members is based on analogy and induction as well as on deduc-
tion.-Editor's note.]
9 The intention of the author is not to assert that the investigation of the
"real self" was not launched in Western philosophy. Kant admitted
the existence of the real self (das eigentliche Selbst). In the visible
world, according to Kant, it is nothing but the intellect (Intelligenz),
and human beings are merely its phenomena (Erscheinungen). Grundle-
gung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, herausgegeben von Karl Vorlander, 88.
Also he distinguishes "the real self" from simple phenomena in the
thought of its being the will (Wille) of the intellect. Ibid., 91. How-
ever, the concept of "das eigentliche Selbst" had no .further develop-
ment in Kant's philosophy. As for the comparatively less frequent
discussions on the self as a philosophical concept in Western philoso-
phies, see Eisler, Worterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe, s. v. Selbst.
Also see Hegel, Enzyklopiidie, § 40) Zusatz, § 408. [Fichte, Schelling,
and Schopenhauer show the influence of Indian philosophy in their con-
cern for the transcendental Ego and Will.-Editor's note.]
10 Suttanipata, 22), 367, 466, 469, 777, 8°9, 922. Dhammapada, 367,
Theragatha, 7 I 7.
I I "One who has no idea of 'mine' and 'others'-he has no suffering from
the notion: 'I do not have this or that,' because of the absence of 'mine-
ness' (mamatta) with him." SN. 9)1; cf. 809.
12 Especially, d. Brhad. Up., iii, ): I; iv, 4,22.
13 Mamaiya-maitp. jahai = mamayita-matitp. jahati. (Ayiirmiga, I, 2: 6, 2)
I4 Pravacanasiira, II, 108; Yensh6 Kanakura, Indo Seishin-bunka no Kenkyu
(Studies on the Mind and Culture of India). 287.
I) Suttanipiita, 8o), 806.
16 "People in the world, including deities, think what is non-atman as
iitman, and are attached to its name and form." anatani attamiinam-
niyitthatp. niimarupasmi~, Suttanipata, 23 I, 76 I.
17 Theragiithii, )7),11)0; cf. 766.
18 Samyutta-Nikiiya, III, 86 G; AN. II, 34 G; SN. I, 200 G.
19 SN., 1,13 G; d. Suttanipata, 231; 761.
20 Theragatha, I 16o, I 16 I.
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21 Ibid., 497.
22 Attano kiccakiiri, Theragiithii, 729.
23 Theragiithii, 249, 250, 289, 587, 1097. SN., I, 34 G, 55 G, 57 G,
70 G, 102 G.
24 Attiina~ gaveseti, Vinaya, Mahavagga, I, 13: p. 23. d. attaiiiiu, AN.,
IV, 113; DN., III, 252.
25 Chiind. Up., VIII, I, I. cf. MahiiniiriiyalJa-Up. X, 7.
26 SN. I, 6G.
27 AN. II, 21 G; SN. I, 71££; 57 G; 89; 154 G; Dhammapada, 66, 157,
327,355,379,653; Theragiithii, I41, 1005·
28 "0 indeed, (a wife) loves her husband not because she loves him, but
because she loves iitman. (A husband) loves 'his wife not because he
loves her, but because he loves iitman." Brhad. Up., II, 4; IV, 5.
29 Ayiiranga, 25, line 27. cf. 13, line 12; 20, line 2of. (herausgegeben von
W. Schubring).
30 Ibid., 44, line 20.
31 Ibid., 13, line 26; 15, line 25; 34, line 30.
32 E.g. Manusmrti, XII, 19.
33 Prasnottaramiilikii,XX~
34 Dhammapada, 16o.
Chapter 8
As an exceptional case, the expression, "ego et rex meus" (I and my
lord), which Cardinal Wolsey always used in official documents, seems
arrogant.
2 For example, tiim svabhi1J khiidayed riijii. (The king may cause dogs
to bite that woman.) In Buddhist writings some examples can be found,
e.g. tadrupiin yajiiiin na svaya~ yajati na parair yiijayati. (Bodhi-
sattvabhumi, 118, line 4)
3 Mrs. Rhys Davids, The Will to Peace, 85.
4 Generally, bhaviin, tatrabhaviin, bhagaviin are used as honorific words.
Deva is used for a king, iirya for an honorable trader and others, iiryii
for a lady, iiryaputra for an honorable husband, iiyu~man for a master
by his driver, etc. Speyer, Sanskrit Syntax, 195-196.
5 Tva~kiira~ niimadheya~ ca jye~thiinii~ parivarjayet. MBh. XII (1932),
25. W. Hopkins, "The social and military position of the ruling caste
in ancient India," Journal of the American Oriental Society, XIII
(1888), 75n.
6 Fick, Die soziale Gliederung im nordostlichen Indien zu Buddha's Zeit,
54·
7 For instance, see Suttanipiita, 206.
8 See Fragments of Megasthenes, 33.
9 The Indians of the Maurya Dynasty had an idea that the Indian people
had neither been invaded by other people, nor had assailed the latter,
except that they had been invaded by Herakles, Dionysos, and the
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Macedonians. Fragments of Megasthenes, 46. [The recent invasion of
Goa by India shocked many Easterners as well as Westerners.-Editor's
note].
10 According to Megasthenes there was no slave in India (oouMs) in
those days. "In India's land there are the following noticeable facts:
All Indians are free people; none of them are slaves; among Lace-
demonians, Helots are slaves and do work as slaves; on the contrary,
among the Indian people other nations are not slaves, to say nothing
of the slaves of Indians themselves." Arrianon, Indike, 10 = fr. XXVI.
"He (Megasthenes) states that no Indian hires slaves. Onesikritos ex-
plains that it is peculiar to the Indians who live in Mousikanos."
Athenaeus, IV, 153 =fr. XXVIII.
11 Speyer, Vedische und Sanskrit-Syntax, 75, sec. 246.
12 Udiina, VI, 6.
13 For instance, vippaq,iveei appaJ;lam; "kirp. esa jaJ;lo karissai? esa se parali-
riime, jlio logammi itthio" (SuyagatJarp.ga, I, 5: 4, 4). I observe for my-
self, "What do these men do? In this world women are the best
pleasure."
14 For instance, df$tvemarp. svajanarp. . . . yuyutsurp. samupasthitarp. (see-
ing my own kinsfolk here . . . that have drawn near eager to fight)
(Bhag. G., I, 28) = visa ista cognatorum turba, qui proeliabundi hoc
progressi sunt,
15 Eine Menge Menschen sind getOtet. (Many people are killed.) Ein Heer
Soldaten marschierten nach Frankreich. (A group of soldiers marched
on France.) But, the following expressions are also used: Das Heer ist
versammelt; es war viel V olk da, etc.
16 For instance, etiin na hantum icchiimi (Bhag. G., I, 35); kiimakiimi
(II, 70); yuddhakiimiin (I, 22).
17 To cite some examples, yiin eva hatvii na jijivi$iimalJ (Bhag. G., II, 6) =
quibus caesis vivere nos non invat = ous 'Y&.p .qp.eis &.veMVTES o{lIe ,,,,.tp.eBa
r",ijs; cikir$ur lokasamgraham (III, 25) =procurans generis humani com-
modum = fJolJMp.evos v'II"ooe''Yp.a 'YEfluBa, 'TW KOtTP.'l'; mumuk$ubhilJ (IV.
15) =emancipationem affectantibus =",lAO' 'Tij &.'II"aoelo.; yogasya jijiiii-
sulJ, (VI, 44) =devotionem cognoscendi studiosus, 0 p.ev vvv "',AWl' K'T7/tTa
Ko.l 7111' Beplo.v.
18 If one addresses himself to another, he may also use the expression
"icchiimi jivet bhaviin" ("I hope you may live"). (Speyer, Sanskrit
Syntax, 263; d. PaJ;lini 3:3, 160).
19 Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, edited by
Michelet, 162-163.
19a Cf. H. Nakamura, "The Vedanta as Noticed in Medieval Jain Litera-
ture," Indological Studies in Honor of W. Norman Brown (New Haven:
American Oriental Society, 1962), 186-194. The Jains illustrate the
pluralistic tendencies of a minority of Indian thinkers.
20 Vaise$ika-sutra, 3: 2, 14f.
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21 Jayanta, a Nyaya scholar (ca. 900 A.D.), quotes the following verse to
express the idea of the Self held by the Upavar~a school:
tatra pratyak~am iitmiinam Aupavar~ii~ prapedire
aha1]tpratyayagamyatviit svayuthyii api kecana
"Now, the men of the Upavar~a school understand the Self by
immediate perception. For the Self can be known by the notion of the
ego. Some men of our school hold the same view." Then, Jayanta pro-
ceeds to explain the notion of the ego (aha1]tpratyaya) as follows: "This
notion of the ego is within us. Some kinds of notion of the ego are in
close connection (adhikara1,ta) with the body; e.g. 'I get fat' or 'I get
thin.' And some other kinds of it are in close connection with the know-
ing agent (jiiiitr); 'I know' or 'I remember.''' Jayanta's Nyiiya-miiiijaii,
Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, X, 429.
22 Samkara, Brahma-sutra-bhii~ya, I, I, I (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series,
I, I I, line 9; 28, line If.); SBE (Sacred Books of the East), edited by
Friedrich Max Muller (Oxford), XXXIV, 5, 14. Ibid., I, line 4; I, 75,
line 9; 69, line 10; 75, line 10£.); 37; 34; 37. II, 3, 7. II, 15-16.
XXXVIII, 14-15. II, 3, 38. XXXVIII, 51.
23 Sarvasiddhiintasamgraha, VIII, 37; A. B. Keith, The Karma-Mimamsii,
71.
24 Samkara on BS., I, I, I (AnSS. I, 28, line If.); SBE., XXXIV, 14.
25 AnSS., I, 14, 75, line 9; SBE., XXXIV, 37.
26 AnSS., II, 3, 7, 15-16; SBE., XXXVIII, 14-15. cf. III, 2, 22; II, 224,
line 9).
27 AnSS., I, I, line I; I, II, line I; SBE., XXXIV, 5.
28 AnSS., I, 1,4, I, 69, line IOi SBE., XXXIV, 34.
29 AnSS., II, 3, 38; SBE., XXXVIII, 5I.
30 AnSS., I, I, 4, 75, line I of.); SBE., XXXIV, 37.
3 I Kau~. Up., I, 6; SBE. I, 279.
32 Kaus. Up., I, 2; AnSS., I, 275.
33 Kenneth W. Morgan (ed.), The Path of the Buddha: Buddhism In-
terpreted by Buddhists (New York: Ronald Press, 1956),95.
34 Maurice Wintemitz, A History of Indian Literature (University of
Calcutta, 1933), II, 373.
35 William Theodore de Bary (ed.), Sources of Indian Tradition (Co-
lumbia University Press, 1959), 199££.
36 Mahiibhiirata, Anusasana-parvan, I 16, 38.
37 D. M. Datta, op.cit., 572.
38 Prasnottararatnamiilikii, 5.
39 Ibid., 12.
40 Ibid., 14, 18; "karu1Jii," "diik~i1,tya," and "maitri" are taught as the most
desirable things.
41 Ibid., 21.
42 Dhammapada, 5; SBE, 10, pt. 1,5.
43 Suttanipiita, 149; SBE, 10, pt. II, 25.
44 Dhammapada, 43; SBE, 10, pt. I, 15.
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45 Huston Smith, The Religions of Man (New· York: Mentor Book,
The New American Library, 1961), 116.
46 Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, translated
by R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton (New York: Doubleday
Anchor Books, 1954), 225-226.
47 According to Koso Hokken Den (Record of Travel of High Priest
Fa-hien), a Chinese pilgrim to India at the time of Candragupta of the
Gupta dynasty, the tradition of the social policy based on the Buddha's
teaching of benevolence was still surviving, in the country of Magadha.
[The Hebrew "rachmunis" (mercy and .kindness) antedates Christian
mercy and charity.-Editor's Note.]
48 Vincent A. Smith, Early History of India (Oxford: 1924), 313n. I.
49 Romain Rolland, Prophets of the New India, translated by E. F.
Malcolm-Smith, (London: 1930),453.
Chapter 9
1 Speyer, Vedische und Sanskrit-Syntax, 75; § 169.
2 Bhagavadgitii: or The Lord's Song, translated by L. D. Barnett, (Lon-
don: 1905),96.
3 Siimkhya-Kiirikii, No. 64. Cf. Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte det
Philosophie, 1,3, p. 462.
4 Cf. Viikyapadiya, 1,52,125,128; PUI"lyaraja's Comm. ad ibid.
5 Calcutta-Bairiit Edict.
6 Anguttara-Nikaya, IV, 163; Piili Text Society (PTS): ed., The Books
of the Gradual Sayings, IV, I I I.
7 A Japanese Buddhist scholar, Kai-jyo (1750-1805), who held a critical
view of the Mahayana Buddhism, though he himself was a Mahayana
Buddhist, pointed out the pretension of "the Buddha's discourse" made
by the Indian Buddhists saying: "The so-called 'the Buddha's discourse'
is not what Sakyamuni taught directly, but nevertheless, it is the
teaching of the enlightened one. All of the Buddha's teaching is on
morals and it is not on the art of recording. The ancient followers of
the enlightened one called what they understood by their own studies
'the Buddha's saying.' 'The Buddha's saying' in this case means what
was intended to be taught by the Buddha. Because it is in compliance
with the Buddha's intention, they label their own works 'the Buddha's
saying' or 'the Buddha's discourse.''' Kaijo, GokyoshO Chohiroku (Per-
sonal Annotations on the Treatise on Five Doctrines), quoted in Sensho
Murakami, Daijo Bussetsuron Hihan (Criticism of the claim that the
Mahayana is the authentic teaching of the Buddha), 116f.
8 The idea of Buddhas in the past appears in the Gathas of the Suttanipiita.
And as we can tell from the Nigiili-Siigar Edict, King Asoka twice en-
larged the Stiipa of Konakamana, one of the Seven Buddhas in the
Past.
9 iitmanii 'tmiinam abhi samvive§a (Viij. Sa1ph., XXXII, II); cf. para-
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miitmiinam adhisatiwi17esa pra17iSati brahmai17a bha17atity artha1:z. (Ma-
hidhara's Comm. on ibid.); sam17isaty iitmanii 'tmiinam (Mii1;uJ,ukya-
Up., 12); d. iitmai17a sam17isaty iitmanii svenaiva sva1']'! piiramiirthikam
iitmiinam, (Sarnkara's Comm. on ibid.)
10 Dhammapada, 288; SBE (Sacred Books of the East), X, pt. I, 70.
I I Ayiiranga, I, 2: 1,2; SBE, XXII, 16.
12 Ibid., I, 3: 3,4. (Schubring, 16, line I I.); XXII, 33·
13 There are many sects and schools within Brahmanism. But among the
members of a sect or of a school no sufficient sense of unity prevails, for
members of the sect or the school seldom act as a unit.
14 According to the stories written in Ceylon, the first compilation of the
Buddhist texts was made at Rajagrha just after the death of the Buddha.
At that time, the texts of precepts were compiled chiefly by Upali.
And from him the collection of the books of precepts (Vinaya-pi~aka)
was transmitted in turn through the hands of Dasaka, Sogaka, Siggava,
and Moggaliputta Tissa until the time of King Asoka. Each one of
those five transmitters was said to be the head of the Samgha of his
days. The story corresponding to this one in the legends of Ceylon can
be found in some of the Chinese translations of the Buddhist texts.
But, it should be noted, those five men were only the masters of pre-
cepts, and they did not take part in the handing down of the Buddhist
doctrines. Besides, they were not the heads to rule over all the Buddhist
Samghas. They were no more than the heads of the Vibhajya-vadin
Samgha in the Theravada school.
15 Vinaya, Cullavagga, XI, I, 9; SBE, XX, 378. At the time of the com-
pilation of the Buddhist texts held at VaiSali, the Vajjians promul-
gated the ten new theses. But their theses were judged unlawful and
rejected. Cf. Ibid., Cullavagga XII.
16 Hakuju Ui, Indo-tetsugaku Kenkyu (Studies in Indian philosophy),
II, I85f.
17 Cf. Satapathabriihmarm, XI, 5, 7, I.
18 Brhad. Up., I, 4, 14; SBE, XV, 89. There are many cases of the identi-
fication of satya and dharma. Cf. Chiind. Up., VII, 2, I; VII, 7, I;
Tait. Up., I, II, I.
19 Mahiiniiriiyatta-Up., XXI, 2.
20 Ibid., XXII, I.
21 sreyorupa (Brhad. Up., 1,4,14).
22 Cf. VaiSe~ika-Sutra, I, 2. The Vaise~ika asserted: As there are good
evidences in the Vedas, a man can reach the celestial sphere and
receive blessings by the faithful performance of the religious works.
(Ibid., I, I, 3; X, 2, 9). But, at this stalZe, the deliverance of his soul
is not yet attained. "(It) results from the knowledge of the essence
(tattva-jniina) of the Predicables, Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus,
Species, and Combination by their resemblances and differences."
(Ibid., I, I, 4; The Sacred Books of the Hindus, VI, 9.) Ascension of
the soul is produced by one kind of Dharma (dharma17iSe~a), the low
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Dharma (aparo dharma1.t) , and the deliverance of the soul is produced
by another kind of Dharma, the high Dharma (para dharma1.t); d.
Candrakanta's Comm. on ibid. I, I, 2. The Vaise~ika called the whole
system of their doctrines "the Dharma" and they made their quest of
truth in this system. (Ibid., I, I, I.)
23 Atharva-Veda, XVIII, 3, I.
24 Brhad.-Up., 1,5,23; SBE, XV, 98.
25 dhamme suddhe nitie siisae (Ayaranga 1,4, I, I); SBE, XXII, 36.
26 AN. I, 286; PTS.: The Books of the Gradual Sayings, I, 264; d. The
Chinese version of the Samyuktiigama, vol. 30.
27 E.g. S.N., Mahiipadiinasutta.
28 Cf. supra.
29 The Pillar Edict, VII.
30 King Khiiravela Inscriptions. A "Cakravartin" means in the political
context the ruler who has conquered all enemies around his nation.
31 It can be learned from the words inscribed on the coins issued by those
kings.
32 pathyatara (Prasnottararatnamiilikii, 4).
33 Quoted in Albert Schweitzer, Das Christentum und die Weltreligionen
(1924),29.
34 F. S. C. Northrop, The Taming of the Nations (New York: Macmillan,
1953)·
35 [One of the most important problems from the standpoint of improving
mutual understanding and communication between Indian and West-
ern thought is the status of logic as a universal science, rather than as a
peculiar feature of Western "postulational thinking" as Northrop puts
it, in sharp contrast with the "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum" of
the whole Oriental way of thinking. It is true that the indeterminate
nature of Absolute Being in that school-only one of many in India-
that scorns the principle of contradiction, can lead only to a kind of
mysticism which, though not absent from Western thought, is attractive
to so many Indian thinkers. Have they despaired of the possibility of
solving the enormous social and cultural problems of their vast country
with its many peoples, and languages, poverty, illiteracy, internal and
external political relations, etc. by means of intelligence and scientific
methods? In any case, it is logically possible to discuss the principle of
contradiction as a linguistic syntactical rule rather than as an ontological
law (as Aristotle did) without lapsing into a mystical renunciation of
all logic. Cf. J. F. Staal, "Negation and the Law of Contradiction in
Indian Thought: A Comparative Study," Bulletin of the School of
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, XXV, pt. 1 (1962),
52-71. Agreeing with Staal's conclusion that "no language can func-
tion without a logical structure which is implicit in it" (71), I should
think that the problem for comparative East-West studies is to do the
research that will make explicit the logical structures of the diverse
languages and compare them in a meta-language. Such a research
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project calls for the collaboration of philosophical linguists and logicians.
-Editor's note.]
36 divmh mayam na saddahe, Ayaranga, I, 8, 8, 24; (edited by Schubring),
40, line 5.
37 T attvarthasraddhanatp. samyagdarsanam, T attvarthadhigama-sutra, I, 2;
d. Yogasastra I, 17; Sarvadarsana-samgraha III, line 155f.
38 Brahmasutra-bhasya, II, 143, line 9. (AnSS.) But this definition is the
word of the purvapak$in. In another place, Samkara states: "the mental
conception (pratyaya) called faith (sraddha) is the attribute (dharma)
of the mind (manas) or soul." Cf. ibid., II, 144, line 4. And it should
be noted that in some cases Samkara uses pratyaya to mean confidence
or trust; e.g. aSraddadhiina1J = apratyayavanto, (Samkara's Commentary
on Prasna-Up., II, 3).
39 Brahmasutra-bha$ya, 11,144, line 8.
40 Vedantasara, 23.
4 I The faithful observance of the doctrines given by the teachers of the
school is called sraddha; d. Samkara on BS., I, 524, line 6.
42 sraddha-purvakarma, Samkara on BS., II, 144, line 10; religious works
(sacrifices, etc.) which depend on faith, SBE., XXXVIII, 108.
43 Sanlkara on Prasna-Up., VI, 4.
44 astikyabuddhi, ibid., I, 2.
45 It is difficult to find in the Western languages the terms exactly equiva-
lent to prasada. Cf. pasanno buddhasasane (Dhp., 368).
Buddhae praeceptis sedatus (Fausbs:;ll's translation).
Who is calm in the doctrine of Buddha (Max Muller's transla-
tion).
Both Fausbs:;ll's and Muller's translations fail to convey the full
meaning of prasada.
46 In the Theragatha, 370, the man who puts faith in his teacher's words
is called bhattima. This is the only case of the reference to bhakti that
can be found in all the Gathas of the Buddhist scriptures of the early
days.
47 Cf. Prasnottararatnamalika, 3.
48 Cf. ibid., 10.
49 Cf. ibid., 4.
50 Dhammapada, 28; SBE, X, pt. I, 10. Cf. Mahabharata, 12. 15 I. I I.
5 I This problem still needs consideration. "The question is: Is there really
anything in India which is regarded as ultimately and genuinely ab-
surd?" I refer to a people that continuously emphasized the manifold-
ness of truth and evolved in Jain logic the doctrine of sevenfold judg-
ment (Saptabhanglnaya). See in this connection P. T. Raju's article
on the four-fold negation, Review of Metaphysics, VII, 4 (June 1954),
694-713. Archie J. Bahm in Philosophy East and West, VII, Nos. 3
and 4 (October 1957 and January 1958), 127-13°. [Dr. Daya
Krishna's comment.]
52 Masson-Oursel, La Philosophie Comparee, 40.
NOTES TO PAGES II? TO 121
53 The cases in Japan are in marked contrast to those in India. In the
Kojiki and the Nihonshoki, both prominent models of ancient Japanese
chronicles, the history of the Emperor's dynasty was the central concern
and many myths and legends were told to strengthen its authenticity.
54 Chavaka-Jiitaka, III, 27f .
55 Apastamha-Dharma-Sutra, 1. 2. 8. 8; Gautama-Dharma-Sutra, 2. 21;
Vi~1;tll-smrti, 28. 12; The Laws of Manu, 2. 198.
56 Siimanna-phala-suttanta in the Dirgha-Nikiiya and in the Chinese ver-
sion of the Dirgha-Nikiiya.
57 It is about King Bimbisara of Magadha. Cf. Suttanipiita, 409 f.
58 Taisho, IV, 582 b-c.
59 Taisho I, 497 band 795 c; II, 808 c.
60 Taisho, I, 497 b, 795 c; also 108 a, 279 a; II, 609 b, 624 a, 679 b;
XXIV, 237 a.
61 Cf. Calcutta-Bairiit Edict.
62 It is true that ancient Indian religious bodies did not have political
influence upon the outside world as did the bodies of Christianity and
Mohammedanism. But their independent authority was by no means
submissive to external power.
63 King Baladitya of the Gupta dynasty was dissatisfied with his low
position in the Buddhist Sarilgha. But the Buddhists dared not violate the
old mle of the Sarilgha to make an exception in his favor.
64 Cf. Vinaya, suttavihhanga, IV, 159-160; Anguttara-Nikiiya, V, 81-83;
Taisho, XXIV, 786 c.
65 Taisho, 11,777 a-b.
66 The Lotus Sutra, Chapter of Sukha-vihiira-parivarta, U. Wogiwara and
K. Tsuchida, ed., 235.
67 Taisho, XVII, 294 c-295 a.
68 Cf. Buddhacarita, 9. 19f; Taisho, III, 749 a.
69 "Every fifteenth and last day of a month, the king (of Kucha) discusses
national affairs with the ministers, consults the learned priests and then
promulgates the decrees." Travel Records of Hsiian-Tsang, vol. I.
70 Taisho, XXXI, 858 a-c. Cf. Also Taisho, X, 714 b.
71 The Brahmajiila-sutra, pt. 2. Taisho, XXIV, 1008 C.
72 Mahiihl1iirata, 12. 242. 9.
73 Mii1;ttf-ukya-Kiirikii, 2. 37. Cf. Paramaha1?1sa-Upani~ad; Paramaha1?1sa-
parivriijaka-Upani~ad.
74 Tetsuro Watsuji, Homerosu-hihan (Textual Criticism of Homer), 41-42;
Tetsuro Watsuji, "Polisu-no-keisei (Formation of the Polis)" in Jo-setsu,
I, 26f. The Indian religion also differs from the Japanese insofar as the
Japanese stress individual ethical organizations rather than the universal
law.
75 The founder of the Maurya dynasty, King Candragupta, who beat back
the Greek forces from northwest India, is often referred to in later Indian
books. But these do not praise him as the hero who defended the nation
against foreign invasions.
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76 In India, there remain many records of donations inscribed on monuments.
Judging from these, few donations were made to secular state powers while
many were made to religious bodies. The Indian idea of the nation
differs a great deal from the Japanese notion and also from the Roman
idea of "patria."
77 [The Chinese Communists' invasion of India in the fall of 1962 had the
temporary value of uniting the Hindus with the Mohammedans of
Pakistan for a common defense.-Editor's note.]
78 [Increased urbanization in time is likely to produce profound changes in
India's caste system.-Editor's note.]
79 "I place strong faith in the pure Enlightened One who is born of pure
stock." The opening part of the Mahiivamsa.
80 Max Weber treated this problem by introducing the concept of "Gen-
tilcharisma" ("prestige of gentility"). His study is worthy of praise, but
this concept is not enough to explain the relationship between the way of
thinking of a people and the rise of a caste system in India. Cf. Max
Weber, Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie, I, 268; Max Weber, Hindu-
ismus und Buddhismus, 129.
8 I In the oldest Gathas of the early Buddhists, the holy scriptures of the
Jains and the Asoka Edicts, "piiJ;la (priiJ;la)" is used to mean "living being."
82 V. Fausbpll, in his Latin translation of the Dhammapada, translated
these words as "animans" or "animalis."
83 Cf. Prasnottararatnamiilikii, 22; the Asoka Edicts.
84 In the West, too, some philosophers have held that the subject of ethical
conduct is not to be limited to man. But, as we see in Kant's idea of man's
rational essence ("verniinftige Wesen"), they in fact focussed attention
on the problem of man and ignored the consideration of living beings.
Cf. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, herausgegeben von
Karl Vorlander, 28f; 52f. (Kant's Metaphysics of Morals).
85' Dhammapada, 130; Ayiirmiga, I. 2. 3· 4.
86 Dhammapada, 132 and 4°5', Ayiiranga, 16 and 35'.
87 Mahiihhiirata, 13. I 13. 6. The great rites, as recorded in the ancient
Vedas, required animal sacrifice. On this account. Buddhists and Jains
deplored the feats of Brahmanism. The idea of animal protection appears
in the Brahma~ic texts of the last stage of the Vedic age. In the
Upani~ads, it is stated that "non-harming" is to be praised just as much
as offering to the priests. And in another text, it is decreed not to kill a
living being at the place other than the site of rites. Cf. Chiindogya-
Upani~ad, 3.17.4; 8. 15'.
88 Brahma-siitra-bhii~ya, I. I. I.
89 Tattviirthiidhigamasiitra, II, 23-24. The problem of classifying creatures
is dealt with fully in Santisiiri's; Jtvaviyiira. (Cf. Wintemitz, A His-
tory of Indian Literature, II [Calcutta: 1933], 35'4')
90 Hemacandra, Adhidhiinacintiimarzi, 21-22.
91 Davvasamgaha, 12; Sarviirthasiddhi.
92 T attviirthiidhigamasiitra, II, 32f.
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93 Cf. Aitareya-Upani~ad, 5. 13; Brahma-sutra, 3. I. 21; Mahiibhiirata, 12,
3 I 2. 5; The Laws of Manu, I. 43-46. In the Chiindogya-Upani~ad,
creatures are classified into three groups-viviparous, oviparous, and
genninative; while there is no reference to beings produced out of mois-
ture. The Brahma-sutra interprets this assertion by saying that these
latter beings are included in the group of genninative beings.
94 Cf. many commentary works on the Brahma-sutra, 3. I. 21. In a medical
book, Susruta-samhitii, these four groups are recognized for the classifica-
tion of animals (jangama) and, as examples, genninative beings, frogs,
and fireflies are mentioned. (Cf. Guha, ]iviitman, 55.)
95 Brahma-sutra, 2. 3. 16.
96 Mahiibharata, 12. 184. 17.
97 Sanskrit "manu~ya," like English "man," is etymologically connected with
the root of "manU-to think.
98 Aitareya-Ara~yaka, 2. 3. 2.
99 Majjhima-Nikiiya, 129.
100 Butsui-shoko-tenshi-setsu-obO-kyo (A siitra expounding the kingly laws of
Buddhism), TaishO, XV, 125 b-e.
101 The ]ains, too, teach that man's life is very precious and that it is highly
significant to be born a man. Cf. Winternitz, op.cit., II, 466.
102 Chiindogya-Upani~ad,5.10.7-8.
103 PraSastapada, Padiirthadharmasamgraha, § 39, dharmalk~a~a.
104 The Laws of Manu, 12.95.96.
1°5 Anguttara-Nikiiya, II, 5I G.
106 Suttanipiita, 284.
1°7 Cf. ibid., 299.
108 The Lotus Siitra and the Larger Sukhiivati-vyuha hold that their teachings
are proper for the period of Mappo-the days of decadence. Cf. The
Lotus Siitra, chapter of Sukha-vihiira-parivarta1J; larger Sukhiivati-vyuha,
finis.
1°9 Mahiibhiirata, I. I. 269.
110 Ibid., I. I. 256.
I I I The ancient Indians, too, knew full well of this perversion. To a question
why The Laws of Manu has, contrary to the fact, the name of Manu as
the author, an interpreter answeled: "Every teacher consciously makes
use of this measure to present his own ideas, that is, in the guise of the
teachings of the great predecessors." Cf. KullukabhaHa on Manu, I, 4.
I 12 Dhammapada, 260; The Laws of Manu, 2. 156; Prasnottaratnamiilikii,
4·
113 The Laws of Manu, 2.121. Cf. Dhammapada, 109.
114 Cf. Paramartha's Commentary on the Mahiiyiina-samparigraha. Taisho,
XXXI, 157 b. Vasubandhu's translation does not contain a sentence which
corresponds to this part. This sentence therefore was probably added by
Paramartha, the translator.
I I 5 Indians are by no means unskilled in logic; they have developed math-
ematics and grammar and other studies based on scientific methods. How-
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ever, still it cannot be denied that the blind acceptance of the authority
of the scriptures forms a dominant character of traditional Indian ways of
thinking.
116 City-states as developed in the West did not appear in India. The Indian
cities could not act unitedly as a political organization, either to make
treaties with other cities or to exercise proper jurisdiction over the in-
habitants. This condition of the Indian cities is another reason for the
slow emergence of liberal thought in India.
I 17 The word "nomothetical" here does not imply the meaning of laws of
natural science, as in the philosophy of Heinrich Rickert, but simply uni-
versalistic.
I 18 Biographical details are minimal even in the cases of religious leaders who
died relatively recently. Ten years or so after their death, they are treated
as incarnations of the gods. In pamphlets commemorating their founders
published by the religious schools established in the nineteenth and the
twentieth centuries, no dates of birth and death are mentioned.
I 19 There are some works of topography in the PuraJ].a texts.
120 "The religious tendency of the Indian districts where Buddhism spread
and secured a strong footing shows a very remarkable bent toward the
impersonal and the universal, of alienation from the visible and the
tangible, and of submergence and dissolution into the infinite." H.
Oldenberg, Aus dem alten Indien, 14-15.
121 Ibid., 99.
Chapter 10
I Aizgab Kaliizgab, Paiicala ramatziyab (Kasikii on PaJ].ini, I, 2, 52).
2 When a clear expression of "A as B" is required, they express B in the
instrumental case, e.g. "dautyena gacchati." (He goes as a messenger.)
(dautya < diita) Mostly, however, the instrumental case is shown by
"-tvena" (-tva, a suffix making the abstract noun).
3 Kathaf11- so 'nusiHo bruvita (Chand. Up., V, 3, 4) ="wie konnte er
sagen, er ware ausgelernt." Cf. Speyer, Vedische und Sanskrit-Syntax,
56, § 186,94, § 293.
4 Speyer, op.cit., 84, § 271.
5 Sometimes a sentence starts with an indirect narration but changes into
direct narration on the way. Sometimes both kinds of narration are
used side by side. Such examples are observed in the Mahiibharata
and the Ramiiyatza. Speyer, op.cit., 92, § 288.
6 On this point, Latin is similar to Sanskrit.
7 For example, "evaf11- rna kaniyaf11-sam eva vadhat krtva" (5. Br. III, 6, 3,
8) is translated by Speyer into "nachdem er mich kleiner gemacht
hatte, als dass ich getroffen werden konnte."
8 Harushige K6zu, Hikaku-gengo-gaku (Comparative Linguistics), 308,
n. I.
9 Maitrayatzi-Samhitii 2, 3, 6; Delbriick, Altindische Syntax, 4 I; Speyer,
op.cit., § 258.
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10 Speyer, op.cit., 81-82.
I I Speyer": op.cit., § 66; M. Wintemitz, A History of Indian Literature,
II, 52; H. Oldenberg, Buddha, 211.
12 Ch'u-san-tsang-chi-chi-hsu, VIII (Preface to the Selections from the
Mahiiprajniipiiramitiisutra). He also says: "(In Indian scriptures) when
a subject has been described and another subject is going to be ex-
plained, they repeat the same sentences used for the previous subject
before entering into the new subject. While (in China) the whole
(repetition) is omitted." (Ibid.)
13 I<:ogatsuin Jinrei, Kyogyoshinsho Kogi (Lectures on Shinran's Teachings,
Practice, Faith, and Attainment) (Bukkyo Taikei Edition), 367.
14 This tendency is prominent in Jain scriptures of a little later date such as
"Ovavaiya," and in inscriptions of c. 2nd century A.D. kept in Buddhist
cave temples.
15 Coins of Spalirises, a Parthian king, have the following inscriptions:
"fJau,J\EW$ daEJ\</>oii ~7raJ\,p,uov" on one side, and "maharajabhrata dhra-
miasa Spalirisasa" on the other. Sten Konow, Kharoshthi Inscriptions,
Introduction, xli. Likewise, some coins of the King Azes have the follow-
ing inscription: "fJau,J\iws fJau,J\iwv I'E"YaJ\OV '.Arov;" "maharajasa (or raja-
tirajasa) mahatasa Ayasa." Sten Konow, op.cit., xxxix. Coins of King
Maues are of a similar inscription to those of Azes. Rapson, Indian Coins,
Plate I, no. 15.
16 H. Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfiinge des Bud-
dhismus, 49, Anm.
17 A. C. Woolner, Introduction to Prakrit, 12.
18 At the beginning of the Karpuramanjari, a stage-director asks his as-
sistant why Prakrit and not Sanskrit is used in the drama, and receives
the following answer: "Sanskrit verses sound stiff, but Prakrit verses
sound smooth. The difference between both languages is like the dif-
ference between a man and a woman."
19 Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, History of Indian and Indonesian Art;
Japanese translation by Chikyo Yamamoto, Indo oyobi Tonan Ajiya
Bijutsu-shi, 40.
20 Romain Rolland, La vie de Ramakrishna (Paris: 1929),31.
21 Ta-chih-tu-lun (Mahiiprajfiiipiiramitii-siitra), (Commentary on the Su-
preme Wisdom), V.
22 Hua-yen-wu-chiao-chang of Fa-tsang (Kwanno Edition), Part b-2, 48 b.
(Treatise on the Five Doctrines of the Hua-yen school).
23 Rolland, op.cit., 56.
24 Tominaga Nakamoto, Shutsujo-kogo (Discourse After Meditation), Pt. I,
Chapter 8, linzu (Miraculous Power).
25 Ibid.
26 "Heretics of those days, too, preached doctrines by means of fantasy."
"In the Tripitaka, there are lots of illustrations of fantasy. It is because
Indians have many experiences of fantasy in their life and they are
fond of it." "Heretics called it illusion (maya), while Buddhists called
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it miraculous faculty (abhijfu'i). In reality, both are one and the same."
"Illustrations such as a poppy-seed and Mt. Sumeru, the net of Indra
are also beloved by the people." Ibid., Chapter 8.
27 Okina-no-fumi (Letters of an Old Man) in ibid., Ch. 14.
28 "And those doctrines of moral causality, of Hell and Paradise, were
originally from other religions (outside of Buddhism). They were be-
loved by Indians." Ibid., Chapter 8.
29 Ta-chih-tu-lun, op.cit., I (Taisho, XXV, 58 b).
30 Ibid., XCIV (Taisho, XXV, 717 b); d. XXXVII (Taisho, XXV. 332 a).
31 Cf. "Megasthenes" (by O. Stein), in Pauly-Wissowa's Realenzyklopiidie.
32 J. W. McCrindle, Ancient India, Introduction, 18-21.
33 Ibid., 20.
34 Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosophie, hrsg. von
Michelet, 154.
35 Kern, Manual of Indian Buddhism, 57.
36 SaIilkaraon BS., III, 2, 21 (11,217, lines 5ff).
37 Cf. Hiriyanna, "Prapaiicavilayaviida, a Doctrine of Pre-SaIilkara Ve-
danta," Journal of Oriental Research Madras, I (1927), 109ff.
38 Max Weber, Aufsiitze zur Religionssoziologie, I, Vorbemerkung, 4.
39 The Pao-hang-wang-cheng-lun (Ratniivali) (A Treatise on the Proper
Conduct of a King) attributed to Nagarjuna is typical.
40 An ascetic of the Yoga lies on a floor covered with projecting nails, and
by such exercise, tries to accomplish the subjugation of the body to the
control of his will. As for the control of the mind, we find it stated:
"With the indefatigable effort required to drain off the ocean by scoop-
ing up its water with the cusp of a leaf, the control of the mind
should be accomplished." MiitteJukyii-Kiirikii, III, 41.
41 Judging from the old giithiis, Buddhists too in the earliest period of their
history encouraged their followers to lead an austere life of mortification.
42 Sarvasiddhiintasamgraha, III, 12.
43 M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, II, 452.
44 Cf. Chandogya-Up., VI.
45 Megasthenes, The Fragments, 41.
46 Cf. M. Winternitz, op.cit., 1,16; 17; 366.
47 Cf. H. Keyserling, Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen, frnis.
48 Cf. H. Oldenberg, Aus dem alten Indien, 93.
49 In India, there is no uniform system of marking historical eras. Their
method of determining historical periods differs according to time and
place. According to one historian, there are more than twenty ways of
marking eras in India. This fact presents a great contrast to the uniform
adoption in the West of the Christian era. Cf. V. A. Smith, The Early
History of India (1957), 20.
50 H. Oldenberg, Buddha, 385.
5 I Cf. Paiicatantra, Hitopadda and Buddhist Jiitaka tales. ]ains also have
what they call Jiitakas.
52 H. Oldenberg, Aus dem alten Indien, 107.
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53 Cf. Hsiian-tsang's translation of tattva as Bodhisatt17abhumi, 212, line
12; 37, 39. Tatt17a is used also to mean the order of nature. Cf.
Viikyapadiya III, 3, 3; Nala XVI, 38 (tatt17ena hi mamiica~17a); Saura-
Puriitza, a. 4 (in Gonda, Sanskrit Reader, 65, line 3), bruhi me tatt17ata~.
54 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp
Smith, 97.
55 Megasthenes, The Fragments, 4 I.
56 Cf. Winternitz, op.cit., 111,542.
57 The influence of the Greek sciences upon Indian sciences remains to be
clarified by future studies.
58 Cf. G. Misch, Der Weg in die Philosophie, passim.
59 Cf. Yiijna17alkya-smrti, I, 3 I o. The scholars of the Nyaya also ac-
cepted as true Kautilya's system of classification. Cf. Jacobi, Sitzung-
sberichte der Preussischen Akademie (191 1),733.
60 Siitra on the Stages of Bodhisattvahood, III; Siitra on the Moral Pre-
cepts of Bodhisattvahood, IV; Treatise on the Stages of the Yogaciirin,
XV, XXXVIII; Records on the Western Lands in the Tang Period, II.
6 I It should be remembered here that the Chinese Buddhists in some cases
managed to translate these Sanskrit terms as "art of language," "art of
logic," "art of internal doctrines" or the like. In their practical way of
thinking, Buddhists understand learning as one of the arts. Cf. Hakuju
Oi, Indo-tetsugaku Kenkyu (Study of Indian Philosophy), IV, 46 a f.
62 Piiyiisi-suttanta, in Dighanikaya No. 23. The same story can be found
in the Jain Siitra, Riiyapasetzaijja; d. Winternitz, A History of Indian
Literature, II, 455f.
63 For example, there is a famous classic story about the debate between
Sarhkara and Max:tganamisra where the latter's conversion is supposed to
have taken place after defeat in the debate. Also, Sarhkara is supposed
to have spread Vedanta in the four comers of India by defeating his ad-
versaries in open debate. (Sarhkara-digvijaya, etc.)
Chapter II
I The ancient Indians had advanced skill in numerical calculation, but
they made no effort toward a theoretical understanding of the logical
problems of mathematics. They gave no demonstrations. For instance,
the Pythagorean theorem was understood by the intuitive grasp of the
figure without resorting to demonstration, in contrast to the Greeks.
2 Cf. Bg-Veda, 10.71; 10. 125.
3 In the field of the Prakrit, however, there emerged many grammarians,
one after another.
4 Gaurinath Sastri, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning (Calcutta:
Sanskrit College, 1959); David Seyfert Ruegg, Contribution a l'histoire
de la Philosophie Linguistique Indienne (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1959).
5 Cf. D. H. H. Ingalls, "The Comparison of Indian and Western Philoso-
phy," Journal of Oriental Research (Madras: 1954), XXII, I-I I.
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6 Ryo Kuroda, Yuishiki Shinrigaku (Psychology of "Mind-only") (1944),
Introduction.
7 Ibid., 253.
Chapter 12
I Hegel, V orlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, edited by
Michelet, 144.
2 F. C. Conybeare, Philostratus, the Life of Apollonius of Tyana (London:
19 17), 1,196- 197,
3 There are the examples also in the Piili books, e.g.: atha ce patthayas'i,
pavassa deva (Suttanipiita 18-19); devo ca vassati, devo ca galagaliiyati
(Theragiithii, 189); deve vassante katamena udakam gaccheya (Mi-
lindapanha, 57).
4 E.g., Manu, IV, 38; kiile caiva1]'t pravar~ati (Suva";zaprabhiisa XII,
v.61).
5 "... alors que chaque phenomene naturel etait tenu pour Ie resultat de
l'activite de quelque genie, (lEI signifiait 'Ie dieu, Ie genie pleut'; en fait,
Homere n'a pas (lEI seulement mais deux fois (lEI a'lf.pa Zuh. Le latin a
Jove to,!nate, etc. L'expression vedique viito viiti, 'Ie vent vente,' est plus
caracteristique encore. Ce ne sont donc pas des impersonneIs qui expri-
ment les phenomenes naturels, mais troisU:me personnes dont Ie sujet,
qui est un genie plus ou moins vaguement con~, n'est pas indique avec
precision." (A. Meillet, Introduction Ii l'etude comparative des langues
indo-europeennes, 212-213.) Cf. Shinkichi Sudo, Ronrigaku Kayo
(Outlines of Logic), 154.
6 Cf. supra, Chapter 7, section on Subjective Comprehension of Personality
as Revealed in Philosophy.
7 When Galanos means Absolute Being, he writes OEO$ with capitals.
8 From ancient times, many Indians take the names of such gods as
SariJ.kara or Vi~I)u as their family or personal names. This custom of
naming people after gods is hardly found either in the West or in China
or Japan.
9 Brhad. Up., I, I, I; SBE, XV, 74.
10 Cf. Ideishi, Jodai Shina ni okeru Shinwa oyobi Setsuwa (Myths and
Legends in Ancient China) in Iwanami Koza, Toyo Shicho (Eastern
Thoughts),21.
1 I H. Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfiinge des Bud-
dhismus, 25.
12 Cf. Miidhava, Sarvadarsana-samgraha, Chapter on RaseSvara.
13 Huston Smith, The Religions of Man (New York: The New American
Library, 1961), 25f.; Heinrich Zimmer, The Philosophies of India
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1951).
14 Brhad. Up., III, 7; SBE, XV, 136.
I 5 Cf. Dhammapada, 189. There is an elaborate study on this familiar ex-
pression of Indian Buddhism in Hakuju Ui, Indo-tetsugaku Kenkyu,
op.cit., III, 353.
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16 E.g. Dhammapada, 286-287.
17 Suttanipiita, 440; SBE, X, pt. II, 70.
18 Ayiiranga, herausgegeben von W. Schubring, 27, I. 28; SBE, XXII, 54.
19 Ibid., I I.
20 Ibid., 3.
21 Miidhava, The Sarva-Darsana-Smngraha or Review of the Different Sys-
tems of Hindu Philosophy, translated by E. B. Cowell, 22. Especially
in Buddhism they assume that "all is pain and pain (sarvam duhkham)."
Cf. ibid., 15.
22 Prasnottararatnamiilikii, 3.
23 Dhammapada, 150; SBE, X, pt. I, 42.
24 The Laws of Manu, 6. 76 I.
25 Kiiyassa viaviia (=vyavapiida) , Ayiiranga, 32, line 20; dehabheya
(= 0__ bheda), ibid., 40, line 2. Cf. ibid., 37, line 18.
26 Sakkayass' uparodhana (Suttanipiita, 761); sakkiiyass' nirodha (SN. III,
86G).
27 Cf. Ayiiranga, 12; Suttanipiita, 220, 367, 466, 469, 494, 777, 922;
Theragiithii,7 1 7'
28 In contrast to the Chinese Christians, the Indian Christians have a
strong inclination to transcend secular affairs. But this will be treated
in later chapters.
29 Jinnosuke Sano, Indo oyobi Indojin (India and Indians), 253.
30 Dhammapada, 146; SBE, X, pt. I, 41.
31 Megasthenes, The Fragments, 41.
32 Sankyo Yoron (Essentials of the Three Schools: Confucianism, Taoism,
Buddhism), in Nihon Jurin Sosho (Series on Japanese Confucianism),
Kaisetsubu, II, 7.
33· Pauly-Wissowa, Realenzyklopiidie, s. v. Megasthenes, 3 I 9-320.
The Chinese word "t'a" has its etymological origin in thupa or
thuba, the Prakrit forms of stupa. And what the Japanese mean by
"to" (tower) at present refers to the modified forms of the original
Indian Stupas.
34 In the Epics, especially in the Bhagavadgitii, or in the Mahayana texts,
there are passages which show that some philosophers disregarded the
system of rewards and punishments of Karma and sought to value
goodness for its own sake, thus encouraging the observance of morality
in order to realize absolute goodness in this life. This ethic of inherent
goodness assumes intrinsic values of conduct that are not necessarily
dependent on the concept of God.
35 Seiichi Hatano, Kirisutokyo no Kigen (Origin of Christianity), 214.
36 Cf. H. Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfiinge des
Buddhismus, 146.
Chapter 13
1 Sutta-nipiita, 89 I.
2 Ibid., 844-845.
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3 Ibid., 837, 845·
4 Ibid., 842f., 855, 860.
5 Ibid., 880-88 I, 905-906.
6 E.g. Ta-sa-che-ni-eh'in-tzu-so-shu-ehing; Ta-p'an-nie-p'an-ehing; Chinese
versions of the Mahiiparinirvii~a-sutra.
7 Mii~4ukyakarika, 3-1 7.
8 Vitariigastuti, 30 (Sarvadarsana-samgraha, III, line 409).
9 Rock Edict, Chapter I 2.
10 Rama Shankar T ripathi, "Religious toleration under the Imperial Guptas,"
Indian Historical Quarterly, 1939, 1-12.
I I Romain Rolland, La vie de Ramakrishna, 93.
12 Ibid., 186.
13 Romain Rolland, La vie de Vivekiinanda, I, 47-48.
14 Ibid., II, I 10.
15 Max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus,
12I.
16 Abraham Kaplan, The New World of Philosophy (New York: Ran-
domHouse, 1961),207.
17 Charles, Morris, "Comparative Strength of Life-Ideals in Eastern and
Western Cultures," Essays in East-West Philosophy, edited by Charles A.
Moore (Honolulu; University of Hawaii Press, 195 1),353-37°.
18 H. Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfiinge des Bud-
dhismus, 3·
19 Arrianos, V, 4,7,
20 Ibid., IX, 12.
Chapter 14
I Tsu-lin Mei, "Chinese Grammar and the Linguistic Movement in Phi-
losophy," Review of Metaphysics, XIV, 3 (March 1961), 463-492.
The relations of Chinese language and thought are discussed in the fol-
lowing: T. Watters, Essays on the Chinese Language (Shanghai: 1899);
M. Granet, "Quelques Particularites de la Langue et de la Pensee
Chinoises," Revue Philosophique (1920); Derk Bodde, "Types of Chi-
nese Categorical Thinking," Journal of American Oriental Society, LIX
(1939), 200f.
Chapter 15
I Levy-Bruhl, Les fonctions mentales dans les societes inferieures, ch. V,
I 87ff.
2 M. Granet, "Quelques particularites de la langue et de la penree
chinoises," Revue philosophique (1920), 126. Cf. also Granet, La
pensee chinoise (Paris: 1934).
3 Stenzel, Die Philosophie der Sprache, 50-5 I.
4 Cf. B. Karlgren, Philology and Ancient China (Oslo: 1926). [Editor's
note.]
5 Many Chinese mystical chants (dhiirii~is) were attempts to repeat the
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sounds of the original Sanskrit texts (d. e.g., chien-chih-fan-tsan =
GaJ}.9Istotra), hut there was no consistent way of doing this, especially
with different Chinese dialects.
5a M. Granet, op.cit., 103-104.
6 Cf. San-lun-hsuan-i (Profound Doctrines of the San-Iun Sect), edited
hy Y. Kanakura in Iwanami Bunko edition, 19; in other edition, yu-
shun instead of kan-shun.
7 Yoshio Takeuchi, Shina Shiso-shi (Intellectual History of China), 263.
Arthur F. Wright, Buddhism in Chinese History (Stanford, 1959),
47·
8 Takeuchi, op.cit., 264.
9 E.g., Jen-t'ien-yen-mu (Giving Men and Gods the Eyes for Seeing the
Truth), IV. (Taisho XLVIII, 323 c.)
10 A passage in the Ta-chih-tu-lun (Maha-prajiliipiiramita-siistra) (A Chi-
nese Translation of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Supreme Wisdom,) III,
is often mentioned as the source. But such an expression was not usual
in India.
II Ta-ch'eng-hsuan-lun, III. (TaishO, XLV, 35 h). [Chinese Commentary
on Mahayana's Profound Doctrines.]
12 Kojiro Yoshikawa, Shinajin no Koten to sono Seikatsu (The Classics of
the Chinese and Their Way of Life), 201.
13 Chia-hsun-kuei-hsin-pien (Chapter on Taking One's Mind Back to the
Original Principles of Family Instruction) hy Yen Chih-tui, in Kuang-
hung-ming-chi (Collection of Works on Diffusion of Knowledge,
Philosophical and Religious, i.e. Buddhist, Confucian, and Taoist), III.
14 K. Yoshikawa, op.cit., 32.
15 So CMn-ti San-tsang (Chinese name of the Indian monk Paramartha)
translated "truth" and "reality" hy the same word.
16 In the system of San Chiao, the third division in the system of Three
Divisions delivered hy Kuang-tung (Vinaya Master of the Wei dynasty),
the fourth in the System of Four Divisions of the T'ien-t'ai Buddhist
sect, and the fifth in the System of Five Divisions of Buddhism of the
Hua-yen Buddhist sect, all three are called the "Perfectly Rounded
Doctrine."
17 R Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, I, Aht. I: 661, 695, 458,
pI, 973; II, Aht. I: 808; II, Aht. 2, 448. Paul Deussen, Allgemeine
Geschichte deT Philosophie, II, Abt. I: 74,83,117,278,354,
18 Maticandra, Dasapadiirthasastra, translated into Chinese hy Hsiian-
tsang. Here "t'i" does not mean "body" but a Sanskrit suffix "-tva,"
designating a universal or abstract quality.
19 Sung-kao-seng-chuan (Biographies of the High Priests of the Sung Pe-
riod), V: (Taisho, L, 732 a.)
20 Cf. Ch'an-yuan-chu-chuan-chi-tu-hsu (An Introduction to an An-
thology on the Rise of Zen) edited by H. Oi, 136f.
21 Taisho, XLV, 793 C.
22 Fu-chou-tsao-shan-yiian-cheng-ch'an-shih-yu-lu (Recorded Sayings of Zen
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Master Fu-chau-tsaa-shan-yuan-cheng) (TaishO, XLVII, 527 a); Jen-
t'ien-yen-mu, III (Taisho, XLVIII, 316 b).
23 Lac.cit.
24 Yun-chau-tung-shan-wu-pen-ch'an-shih-yu-lu (Recorded Sayings of Zen
Master Yun-chau-tung-shan-wu-pen) , (TaishO, XLVII, 515 a); Jen-
t'ien-yen-mu, III (Taisho, XLVIII, 321 a); Ha-ku-ch'e (Unified Rec-
ords of Zen Schools) I, Second series, XVI, fasc. 2.
25 Although the words "man and woman," (yang and yin), cannot be
taken in a literal sense, yet the author preferred them.
26 Tung-shang-ku-ch'e (Records of the Tung School) I. Manji edition of
Tripi~ika, Second series, XVI, fasc. 2.
27 Jen-t'ien-yen-mu (Giving Men and Gods the Eyes for Seeing the Truth),
VI.
28 Chung-hua-chuan-hsin-ti-ch'an-men-shih-tzu-ch'eng-hsi-t'u (Diagram of
Transmission of the Heart of Zen Doctrines in China), edited by H. Ui,
188f.
29 For example, d. genealogies transmitted in the monasteries of the
Vedanta schools.
.
Chapter 16
I Stenzel, Die Philasaphie der Sprache, 76. "The Chinese are not in-
terested in 'carrying,' since 'carrying' is not something that gentlemen
do. Chinese writing is not done by laborers, but only by gentlemen!"
-Comment by Dr. Homer H. Dubs.
2 Li Chi (Book of Rites), Part I and Part 2.
3 Hsun-tzu, Chapter on "Rectification of Names"; d. Yoshio Takeuchi,
Shina Shiso-shi (Intellectual History of China), 12. Cf. H. H. Dubs,
translation of The Works of Hsuntze. (London: 1928).
4 Cf. Kojiro Yoshikawa, Shinajin no Katen to' sana Seikatsu (Chinese
Classicsand Way of Life), 73-81.
5 Chi-tsang, Erh-ti-i (Theory of Double Truth), I (Taisho, XLV, 82 c,
83 b); Chung-lun-shu (Summary of the Middle Doctrine Treatise),
Taisho, XLV, 49 a, 973; Fo-tsu-tung-chi (Genealogy of the Buddhist
Patriarchs), VI. (Taisho, XLIX, 178 c.)
6 Especially in the works of Chih-i (538-597), founder of the T'ien-t'ai
school.
7 J. S. Speyer, Vedische und Sanskrit-Syntax, 9 I.
8 "But it is difficult to determine what in Chinese is a 'sentence,' since
there is no punctuation in classical Chinese. Do not English 'sentences'
change their subjects in compound sentences?"-Comment by Dr.
Homer H. Dubs.
9 Cf. Giei Honda, Hakekyo Ron (Essays on the Lotus Siitra), 287-288.
10 H. Maspero, "Notes sur la Logique de Mo-tseu et de son Ecole," Taung-
Pao (1927), 29. Maspero says that the school of Mo-tzii had a true
dialectic. But we have too little information about the school of Mo-
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tzu, and it did not last long enough to leave any discernible influence
on Chinese thought.
II Mo-tzu, No. 45. Mo-tzu (ca. 479-381 B.C.) was the founder of the
Mohist school, famous for its logic and critical social philosophy. Cf.
Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, translated by Derk
Bodde (Princeton: 1953), 1I, 12, 53, 147, 150, 160-1, 203, 220,
4°9,492,495-6, 518,613,614,651,693.
12 Hsii.-kao-tseng-chuan (Further Biographies of Buddhist High Priests),
24; ibid., I I. Cf. Hiroshi Yamazaki, Shina Chusei Bukkyo no Tenkai.
(The Development of Chinese Buddhism in the Medieval Period),
72Iff,727·
13 Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufssiitze zur Religionssoziologie, 1,416.
14 The author and editor are indebted to Dr. Homer H. Dubs for his help-
ful critical comments here as well as in other parts of this revised
edition.
15 YQshio Mikami, The Development of Mathematics in China and Japan
(New York: Chelsea Publishing Company, 1913), passim.
16 Ibid., 56-61. Cf. also Joseph Needham's recent work on the history of
Chinese Sciences. [Editor's note.]
17 Cf. Yoshikawa, op.cit., 136-141.
18 Takeuchi, op.cit., 292.
19 Liu-tsu-tan-ching (Platform Siitra of the Sixth Zen Patriarch).
20 Ching-te-chuan-teng-lu (Records of the Transmission of the Lamp of
Enlightenment), XXVIII. (Taisho, LI, 443 c.)
21 Daijo Tokiwa, Shina Bukkyo-no Kenkyu (A Study on Chinese Bud-
dhism), III, I °9-1 10.
22 Henri Maspero, "Notes sur la logique de Mo,tseu et de son ecole,"
Toung-Pao (1927),12.
23 Hu Shih, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China
(Shanghai: 1922),83,95,
24 Cf. Hakuju Oi, Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyu (Studies in Indian Philosophy),
VI, 72££, 94ff.
25 Cf. Shoko Watanabe, Inmyo Ronsho Myotosho Kaidai (Exposition of the
Commentary on Indian .Logic) in the series Kokuyaku Issaikyo,
Ronshobu, XVIII.
26 Taisho, XLIV, 115 b; LXXI, 451f. Cf. Hakuju Ui, Bukkyo Rond
Gaku (Buddhist Logic), 321, 323; Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyu (Studies
on Indian Philosophy), V, 104££; Koyo Sakaino, Bukkyo Rond Gaku
(Buddist Logic).
27 Cf. his explanation about sapak~e sattvam "the determinate character-
istics of being in similar cases," (in his Commentary on the Nyiiya-
praveSaka), I. (Taisho, XLIV, 105 a).
28 Cf. Hakuju Ui, Bukkyo Romi Gaku (Buddhist Logic), 365.
29 Ting Pin was one of them. (Cf. Shoko Watanabe, op.cit., XVIII, 4).
30 "Proof consists of one reason and two illustrations." (Commentary on
the Nyayapravesaka, op.cit., 106 c).
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31 Hakuju Ui, Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyu, II, 478f.; Sensho Murakami,
Bukkyo Ronri Gaku (Buddhist Logic), 37, 88f.
32 K'uei-ehi's Commentary on Indian Buddhist Logic, I. (TaishO, 101 c, and
LXVIII, 212 a.)
33 Hakuju Ui, Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyu, V, 105; Bukkyo Ronri Gaku, 345·
34 Cf. Hakuju Ui, Zenshu-shi Kenkyu (A Study on the History of Zen
Sects),3ff.
35 Tun-wu-yao-m~n (Essentials of Sudden Enlightenment), edited by
Hakuju Ui (in Iwanami Bunko edition, 44-47).
36 Ch'uan-hsin-fa-yao (Essence of the Transmission of the Dharma), edited
by Hakuju Ui (in Iwanami Bunko edition, 20).
37 Sayings of the Zen Master Lin-chi (Rinzai) (TaishO, XLVII, 497 a);
Giving Men and Gods the Eyes For Seeing the Truth (ibid., XLVII,
300f).
38 Records of the Transmission of the Lamp of Enlightenment, VI. (Taisho,
LI, 246 a.)
39 Hakugen Ichikawa, Zen no Kihonteki Seikaku (The Fundamental
Character of Zen), 49f.
40 Cheng-tao Ko (Praises on the Confirmed State of Enlightenment).
4 I The attitude of avoiding any fixed dogmas and continuing to try practi-
cal experiments can be noticed in American pragmatism. The last word
of William James was: "There is no conclusion. What has concluded,
. that we might conclude in regard to it? There are no fortunes to be
told, and there is no advice to be given.-Farewell!" In the last
words of so many Zen masters we find similar sayings. Van Meter Ames
says, "This last word is a Zen word!" Zen and American Thought
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1962), 140.
42 Takeuchi, op.cit., 299.
43 T'sung-Yung Lu (Record of Calmness of Mind and Enlightenment).
Chapter 17
I Kojiro Yoshikawa, Shinajin no Koten to sono Scikatsu (Chinese Classics
and Way of Life), 70.
2 Arthur F. Wright, Buddhism in Chinese History, 47.
3 Pi-yen-lu (Zen Sayings), Chapter 12. English translation and edited
with Commentary by R. D. M. Shaw, The Blue Cliff Records: The
Hekigan Roku, containing 100 Stories of Zen Masters of Ancient China
(London: Michael Joseph, 1961).
4 Madhyamaka siistra, XXII, I 5.
5 Transmission of the Lamp, X (Taisho, LI, 274 b).
6 Its equivalent is not found in either the dictionary of Buddhist technical
terms, the Mahiivyutpatti (Unrai Ogiwara, Bonkan Jiten) or the Index
to the Lankiivatiira-sutra (compiled by Daisetz T. Suzuki, Ryogakyo
Sakuin), the companion volume to the translation of this siitra.
6a Wu-m~n-kuan (Gateless Gate), Chapter 3.
7 Transmission of the Lamp, VIII. (Taisho, LI, 255 a.)
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8 Pi-yen-Iu, Chapter 46.
9 Yoshikawa, op.cit., 20. The characteristics of Chinese historiography are
made clear in the light of individual studies, in Confucian Personalities,
edited by Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1962).
10 Tanaka; Watsuji; Jugaku [tr.]: Girisha Seishin-no Yoso (Characteristics
of Creek Thought and Culture), (Tokyo: Iwanami), 27.
I I Masson-oursel, La Philosophie Comparee, 19.
12 Cf. Kikuya Nagasawa, Shinagaku Nyumon-sho Ryakukai (Brief Ex-
planation of Introduction to Sinology), 43f.
13 Biographies of Bodhisattvas Asvagho~a, Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, and Vasu-
bandhu.
14 Only Asokiivadiina (in the Divyiivadiina) remains at present.
15 Biographies of Asoka by various Japanese writers.
16 Daijo Tokiwa, Shina Buk'kyo no Kenkyu (A Study on Chinese Bud-
dhism), III, 76 and 8If.
17 Tomojiro Hayashiya, Kyoroku Kenkyu (A Study on the Catalogues of
Siitras), I, I3f. Cf. Daijo Tokiwa, Yakkyo Soroku (A Study of all the
Catalogues of Siitras in Chinese Translations).
Chapter 18
I Sakae Takeda, "Hiyu ni Tsuite" ("On Metaphors"), Kangakukai Zasshi
(Journal of the Chinese Classic Studies), X, No. I.
2. Cf. Homer H. Dubs, translator, The Works of Hsuntze (Lendon: 1928),
and also Dubs' book on Hsuntze, The Moulder of Confucianism (Lon-
don: 1927).
3 Kojiro Yoshikawa, Shinajin no Koten to sana Seikatsu (Chinese Classics
and Way of Life), 27.
4 Ibid., 39-40.
5 Ibid., 46.
6 Sakichi Tsuda, Shina Shiso to Nippon (Chinese Intellectual History and
Japan), (Tokyo: 1938),29-30.
7 Sueo CoW, Shina Bunka to Shinagalm no Kigen (Chinese Culture and
the Origin of Chinese Studies), 376f.
8 The Lotus Siitra, ch. III on Parables.
9 Hui-chao's Exposition of the Treatise on "Consciousness Only." (Taisho,
XLIII, 671 b). Cf. Madhyiintavibhiiga-tikii, edited by S. Yamaguchi, 2f.
10 San-lun-hsuan-i (Profound Doctrines of the San-Iun Sect), ed. by
E. Kanakura, I 57.
II Official Collected Works of Pai-chang-ch'ing-kuei, VI. Cf. Dagen, Shuryo
Shingi (in Eihei Shingi). Rules Governing the Zen Order (in Rules
of the Eihei Zen Temple).
12. Sun-lun-hsuan-i, 170.
13 Ibid., II9, I25f.
14 Mo-ho-chih-kuan (On the Profound State of Quiescence), I, No. I
(Taisho, XLVI, I).
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15 Platfonn Siitra of the Sixth Patrian;:h, d. Hakuju Ui, Daini Zenshu-
shi Kenkyu (Studies on the History of Zen Buddhism), II, 164.
16 Tetsubun Miyasaka, Zen ni okeru Ningen Keisei (Fonnation of Human
Character in Zen), 148f.
17 Cf. Tarkajvala, Commentary on the Madhyamaka-hrdaya, VIII, 47.
18 Cf. Anthology on the Rise of Zen, (edited by Hakuju Ui), 36.
19 Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (Doubleday
Anchor Books, 1962), 160f. Cf. David S. Nivison, "Protest against
Conventions and Conventions of Protest," in The Confucian Persuasion
(Stanford University Press, 1960), edited by Arthur F. Wright, 177-
201.
20 Max Weber, Konfuzianismus und Taoismus (1924), 292.
21 Ibid., 291-292.
22 Ibid., 436.
23 Joseph R. Levenson, "Ill Wind in the Well-Field: The Erosion of the
Confucian Ground of Controversy"; Tse-tsung Chow, "The Anti-
Confucian Movement in Early Republican China," in Wright, op.cit.,
268-3 12.
24 Sokichi Tsuda, Rongo to Koshi no Shiso (The Analects and Thoughts of
Confucius), 309-311.
25 Cf. T'ien-t'ai Ssu-chiao-yi (Four Doctrines of the T'ien-t'ai School), I.
Chapter 19
1 Li Ho (honorific name, Ch'ang chi). His poems are criticized as "un-
canny and tricky" and therefore difficult to understand.
2 Kanbun Taikei, IV, 6. (Series of Texts of Chinese Literature, Selected
Poems of the T'ang Period.)
3 Shutsujo Kogo (Monologue after Meditation), ch. 8. Jinzu (On Divine
or Miraculous Power).
4 Ibid., ch. 24. Sankyo (Three Schools: Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism).
5 Tao-an's Introduction to a Catalog of Annotated Texts, VIII; Introduc-
tion to the Abridged Chinese Version of the. Mahaprajnaparamita
sutra, I.
6 Anthology on the Rise of Zen, edited by Hakuju Ui, I, 83.
7 Max Weber, KonfuzianismusundTaoismus, 432.
8 Ibid., 239.
9 Max Weber (in his book Hinduismus und Buddhismus, 290) called
Chinese Buddhism "Buchreligion" (Religion of Books).
10 The Zen sect also has such characteristics as it esteems highly the
Lmikiivatiira Siitra, the Prajniipiiramitii H rdaya Sutra, the Vajracchedikii
Sutra, and the Yuan-chueh (Enlightenment) Sutra among many
siitras.
lITaisho, XXXVII, 1 c.
12 Shomangyo Kenshiisho (Exposition of the srlmiiliidevlsimhiinanda-siitra)
I, (Nihon Daizo Kyo, Hodohu, V, 8). Japanese Tripi~aka, Vaipulya sec-
tion.
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13 Kogaku Fuse, Hokke Gensan Kaidai, (Kokuyaku Issaikyo, Kyoshobu,
IV, 3). (Explanation of the Profound Lotus Doctrine.)
14 Profound Doctrines of the San Lun (Three Treatises School), edited
byY. Kanakura, 174f.
15 Profound Treatise on the Mahayana, V. (Taisho, XLV, 73 c.)
16 Great Exposition of Indian Buddhist Logic (A Commentary on the
Nyaya-praveSaka), I. (Taisho, XLIV, 92 a, 92 b.)
17 Profound Doctrines of the Avatamsaka Siitra. (Taisho, XXXV, 107 b.)
18 Ibid., 12 I f.
19 Cf. Biographies of the Sung High Priests, III, Life of Man-Yiieh.
20 Cf. Max Weber, Konfuzianismusund Taoismus, 415.
21 Maha Chih-kuan (On the Profound State of Quiescence), III, Part 2.
(Taisho, XLVI, 31 c.)
22 Daijo Tokiwa, Shina Bukkyo no Kenkyu, III, II 5-116. (Studies on
Chinese Buddhism.)
Chapter 20
1 Kojiro Yoshikawa, Shinajin no Koten to sana Seikatsu (Chinese Classics
and Way of Life), 89-94.
2 Although the term "five periods" was not used, Tsung-mi also systema-
tized a similar scheme of classification (On the Rise of Zen), II 6f.
However, he did not criticize the method of classification but only its
interpretation (Profound Doctrines of the San-lun [Three Treatises]
School), edited by Y. Kanakura.
3 The third chapter of the Avatathsaka-sutra states that the Buddha
preached it in the Hall of Truth of Universal Light. The Chinese
version of the Buddhavatamsaka-sutra in 60 vols., Chapter 3.
4 Explanations of the Teaching of the Buddhavatamsaka-sutra, IV
(Taisho, XLV, 584 a).
5 Chi-ts'ang divided all abhidharma into "general" and "detailed," another
example of a classification (Profound Doctrines of the San-lun School,
133). He also showed the difference between the standpoints of the
Chung-lun and the Pai-lun (Ibid., 153).
6 Sokichi Tsuda, Shina Shiso to Nippon (Chinese Thought and Japan), 25.
7 Ibid., 10.
8 ShOichi Kuno in Toyo Gakuho (Oriental Studies), XXV, 582.
9 Kan-hun-min-chi (Supplementary Collection of Epistles), III. Cf. A. F.
Wright, The Confucian Persuasion, 6-7.
lOYuan-jen-lun (A Treatise on the Origin of Man), Chapter 2.
II Maha Chih-kuan, VI, pt. I (Taisho, XLVI, 77 a-b).
12 Fa-hua-i-chi (Explanations on the Teachings of the Lotus Siitra), V
(Taisho, XXXIII, 635 a).
13 Fa-hua-wen-chu (Literal Word for Word Explanations of the Sentences
in the Lotus Siitra), VI, pt. 1 (Taisho, XXXIV, 81 b).
14 Fa-hua-i-su (Commentary on the Lotus Siitra) VII (Taisho, XXXIV,
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546 c). On Chi-tsang (549-623), cf. Fung Yu-Ian, A History of
Chinese Philosophy (Princeton; 1953), II, 293f.
15 Fa-hua-i-chi, V (Taisho, XXXIII, 635 c).
16 Fa-hua-wen-chu, VI, pt. I (Taisho, XXXIV, 82 b).
17 Fa-hua-i-su, VII (Taisho, XXXIV, 547 c).
Chapter 21
I This problem is discussed by Tsu-lin Mei, "Chinese Grammar and the
Linguistic Movement in Philosophy," The Review of Metaphysics, XIV,
3, (March 1961 ), 483f.
2 Suttanipata (An Indian Buddhist scripture in Pali), 770.
3 The Chinese version of the Arthavargiya-sutra.
4 Wan-li, Introduction to Chinese Grammar, in the Japanese translation
Chugoku Bunpogaku Shotan, Chapter 6. Cf. ShO Saito, T etsugaku
Dokuhon (Introduction to Philosophy), 76-77.
5 Kojiro Yoshikawa, Shinajin no Koten to sono Seikatsu, 2I.
6 Masson-Oursel, La Philosophie Comparee, I 18.
7 Ching-te-ch'uan-teng-lu (Transmission of the Lamp of Enlightenment),
III. (TaishO, LI, 255 a).
8 Madhya~tavibhagatika, 29; "There is nothing to be taken away; there
is nothing to be added. When one sees reality as it is, one can surely
attain deliverance." Buddhagotra-sastra, IV, ch. 10. (Taisho, XXXI,
312). Similar expressions can be found also in Madhyamaka-sastra,
25-3; Catu1;tsatika, XV, 350 (p. 513); Matzq.ukya-Karika, III, 38.
9 Wing-tsit Chan, "Transfonnation of Buddhism in China," in Philosophy
East and West, VII, 3 and 4 (October 1957-January 1958), 1°7-116.
10 Analects, XI, 12. "'I do not say that the society as we know it is the
whole,' wrote John Dewey, 'but I do emphatically suggest that it is
the widest and richest manifestation of the whole accessible to our
observation.' The statement would have suited Confucius perfectly."
Huston Smith, The Religions of Man (The New American Library,
1961 ),176.
I I Many such positivistic thoughts can be found in the teachings of Con-
fucius.
12 Sokichi Tsuda, Shina Shiso to Nippon, 1 1-12.
13 Taisho, L, 323 a-b; LV, 95 a.
14 Ibid., L, 324 c.
15 Ibid., 325 a.
16 His miraculous powers are mentioned in Biographies of High Priests of
Liang Period (5°2-556), IX, (TaishO, L, 383 b), and also in Tsin Shu
(Chin Dynasty Records), XCV, which is one of the authoritative his-
torical records of China. It is unusual that a record of a person who is
not a Chinese is mentioned in the authoritative history of China.
17 Tomojiro Hayashiya, Kyoroku Kenkyu (Studies of Catalogues of Buddhist
Siitras), Part 1,338.
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18 In the early periods of Chinese Buddhism, mIssIOnaries from An-hsi
(Persia) mainly introduced Hinayana Buddhism and missionaries from
Yiieh-ehih mainly Mahayana Buddhism. However, in later periods, only
Mahayana Buddhism spread and was followed in China. The following
opinion is widely recognized as the reason why Mahayana Buddhism
spread especially in the northern direction of India.
Asvagho~a was invited by King Kani~ka and introduced Mahayana
Buddhism into Yiieh-ehih country. It was this Mahayana Buddhism
that was introduced into China. However, Hinayana Buddhism, es-
pecially Sarvastivada, was influential in Yiieh-ehih at that time ac-
cording to modern researches on inscriptions. There is no mention of
Mahayana Buddhism among inscriptions of the Yiieh-chih period dis-
covered in the modern age. (Cf. Sten Konow, Kharoshthi Inscriptions,
passim.) It is also recognized by modern studies that Mahayanistic
thought cannot be found in the writings of Asvagho~a. The author of
Discourses on Awakening of the Faith, translated from the Chinese
by D. T. Suzuki (Chicago: Open Court, 1900) must be distinguished
from Asvagho~a, the teacher of King Kal).ishka. According to an original
Sanskrit manuscript which was discovered by Rahula Sankrtyayana in
Tibet, Asvagho~a was regarded as a Sarvastivadin (Journal of the Bihar
and Orissa Research Society, XXI [1935], 8 n). Therefore, it must
not be understood that Mahayana Buddhism was introduced into China
because it was influential in Yiieh-chih, but I have interpreted it to
mean that the specific tendency of the ways of thinking of the Chinese
was the reason for the choice of Mahayana Buddhism as their re-
ligion.
19 Biographies of priests who possessed such mystical and miraculous pow-
ers are found in The Biographies of High Priests.
20 Taisho, XLVI, 1°9 b.
21 Cf. Taiken Kimura, Shina Bukkya Jijo (Some Information on Chinese
Buddhism); Shukyo Kenkyu (Journal of Religious Studies) (1924),
119; Shinyii Kichijo, Shina Mikkya no Genjo ni tsuite, (On the Present
State of Esoteric Buddhism in China); Chiigoku Bukkyo no Genjo (The
Present State of Affairs in Chinese Buddhism), Nikkwa Bukkyo
Kenkyukai Nenpo, (Annual Publications of the Chinese and Japanese
Buddhist Research Society, first year).
22 In the Chinese versions of the siitras, there are many technical phrases
and words of Taoism which cannot be found either in the original
Sanskrit texts or in the Tibetan translations. Cf. Sokichi Tsuda, Shina
Bukkya no Kenkyu (Study on Chinese Buddhism), 37-40, 85f.
23 De Groot, Religious Systems in China, translated into Japanese by
K. Shimizu H. Oginome, Chugoku Shukya Seido, I, 69.
24 Ibid., 116.
25 Tan-Iuan preferred the Chinese term for Tathagata to the one for
Amita, and used it frequently.
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26 Zenryii Tsukamoto, "Shina ni okeru Muryaju-butsu to Amida-butsu,"
Shukya Kenkyu (1940), 1047. ("Amida Buddha and Amitayus Bud-
dha").
27 Taisho, XL, 835 c.
28 Ibid., XLVI, 134 b.
29 Translated by Hakuji Ui, 110.
30 A praise of P'ang to the 42nd rule of Pi-yen-chi; cf. The Blue Cliff
Records.
31 Cf. Hakuju Oi, Zenshu-shi Kenkyu, preface, 3.
32 De Groot, op.cit., Chugoku Shukya Seido, I, 218f.
33 Essentials ofSudden Enlightenment, 86.
34 Quoted from Forke, Geschichte der neueren chinesischen Philosophie,
190. Cf. J. P. Bruce, translator, The Philosophy of Human Nature,
by Chu Hsi (same as Chu Tzu), (London: 1922).
35 This phrase is mentioned as the words of Ch'en P'ien in the Spring and
Autumn Annals Transmitted in the Family of Mr. Lu. Yoshio Takeuchi,
Shina Shisa-shi, 83.
36 Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (New York:
Doubleday Anchor Book, 1962), 30. Cf. Fung Yu-lan, Chuang Tzu,
A New 'Selected Translation' with an Exposition of the Philosophy of
Kuo Hsiang (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1933).
37 Takeuchi,op.cit., 175. The following phrase. has been conveyed as the
words of Yang Wang Sun in the Records of the Former Han Dynasty,
LXVII.
38 TaishO, L, 514 c-515 a. Although he was a descendant of a naturalized.
man, this fact did not influence the form of his thought.
39 A similar attitude can be noticed in Walt Whitman also. Cf. Van Meter
Ames, Zen and American Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1962),97-1°5.
40 Keida Ito, Dagen Zenji Kenkyu (A Study of Zen Master Dagen), I,
117·
41 De Groot, op.cit., 4.
42 Ibid., 5.
43 Kiyoko Takeda, Ajia no Kirisuto-kyo to Kyasan-shugi (Christianity and
Communism in Asia), Shisa no Kagaku (Science of Thought, July
1949)·
44 Cf. Arthur F. Wright, Buddhism in Chinese History, op.cit., 119.
44a Fung Yu-lan amply demonstrates in his History of Chinese Philosophy,
2 Volumes, translated by D. Bodde, (Princeton: 1953), that China did
possess metaphysics. Whether or how far the Chinese developed meta-
physics or not depends upon what one calls metaphysics. Cf. Yoshikawa,
op.cit., 70.
45 Sakichi Tsuda, Shina Shisa to Nippon (Chinese Thought and Japan), 8.
46 Yoshikawa, op.cit., 24-25.
47 San-lun-hsuan-i: "The confrontation of subject and object will be
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48 Yuan-jen-Iun (A Treatise on the Origin of Man), Chapter 1.
49 San-Iun-hsiian-i, op.cit., 24. Sh6b6 Genzo (Essence of Buddhist Teach-
ing), Shizen Biku (Four Meditative Practices of a Zen Monk).
50 Wan-shan-t'ung-kuei-chi (Book of Myriad Good Things Leading to the
Same Goal), Part 1. (Taisho, XLVIII, 987 c.)
51 Alfred Forke, Geschichte der neueren chinesischen Philosophie, 201.
52 Masson-Oursel, Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale (1912), 820.
53 Ta-ch'eng-hsuan-Iun (Essentials of Mahayana). (Taish6, XLV, 15 a.)
There are many similar statements mentioned in the writings of Chi-
tsang.
54 Daito Shimaji, Nippon Bukkyo Kyogaku-shi (Historical Study of Teach-
ings in Japanese Buddhism), 233. According to a work written by
Ryohen, (a scholar of the Hosso sect in the Kamakura period), there
was only one temple which belonged to the Hosso sect (the school of
the Vijfiaptimatrata) in China at that time. In modem China, it is re-
markable that the philosophy of the Vijfiaptimiitrata has been revived.
This tendency originates from the fact that the necessity for a philosophi-
cal study of Buddhism has been recognized.
55 Ch'an-yuan-chu-chuan-chi-tu-hsu (Diagram of Hereditary Transmission
of Zen from Master to Disciple), edited by Hakuju Ui, 205.
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1 Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese Theory and Practice," Philosophy and Cul-
ture East and West, edited by Charles A. Moore, (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1962),92.
2 Analects, IX, 25.
3 Frederick W. Mote, "Confucian Eremitism in the Yiian period." The
Confucian Persuasion, edited by Arthur F. Wright (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1960), 202ff. Also, d. Wing-tsit Chan, op.cit., 93.
4 Wan-shan-t'ung-kuei-chi (Book of Myriad Good Things Leading to the
Same Goal), pt. 2 (TaishO, XLVIII, 987 c).
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Thought), 97.
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History of Chinese Buddhism), 51 f, 98£; Idem, Shina Bukkyo Jiin no
Kinyu Jigyo (Monetary Activities of Buddhist Temples in China),
Otani Gakuh6 (Journal of Otani University), 14-1; Idem, Todai JUn
No Shakai Jigyo (Social Activities of Temples in the Tang Dynasty),
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Chusei Bukkyo no T enkai (Development of Buddhism in the Medieval
Ages of China), 677f.
10 Yoshio Takeuchi, Shina Shis6shi (History of Chinese Thought),·82.
I I Hsi-ming (Western Epigram).
12 This theory is the seventh theory of Shih-pu-erh-men (Ten Gates of Non-
Duality) in the T'ien-t'ai school. Cf. Taisho, XXXIII, 918 b; XLVI, 704;
718 a.
13 For example, this thought can be found in the Hsin;-hsin-ming (Epigrams
of Faith). Again it is mentioned in the Cheng-tao-ko (Songs of Enlight-
enment): "One nature covers completely all natures, and one doctrine
includes all doctrines. One moon is reflected on the water of any place
and all reflections of the moon are namely one moon. True bodies of vari-
ous Buddhas enter into the body of man and the body of man is identi-
cal with that of the Tathagata."
. 14 Santiiniintarasiddhi, edited by T. Stcherbatsky. Only the Tibetan transla-
tion of this text exists at present. Cf. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I,
52 lf.
15 Eihei Koroku (Discourses at the Eihei Temple), VIII. Cf. Daij6 Tokiwa,
Shina Bitkkyo no Kenkyu (Study of Chinese Buddhism), III, 99-100.
16 Hui-yi.i.an (334-416), the South Chinese founder of the Pure Land prac-
tice of the White Lotus Society, never left the Lu-shan Mountain during
his life time. The eighth patriarch of the same society, Lien-ch'ih, also
confined himself to the mountain.
17 Op.cit., 20. Cf. ibid., 240.
18 This thought is derived from the words in the 19th chapter of the Lao-tzii
"chueh-hsueh wu-yu" ("banish cleverness and .all desire for gain").
19 Kenseiki (Biography of Dogen written by Priest Kensei), I. Dai Nippon
Bukkyo Zenshu (Works of Japanese Buddhism), CXV, 544- Similar
teachings can be found also in the H6ky6ki (a Treatise written in the
H6kyo Era in the Kamakura period).
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gentsia at the time. It is also very probable that the author of the T'ang-
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2 I The Lao-tzii, XVI.
22 The Chuang-tzii.
23 The Lieh-tzii.
24 Takeuchi, op.cit., 82.
25 Ibid., 85f.
26 In the Biographies of High Priests there are many mentions of priests
who mastered the practice of meditation.
27 Chi-tsang attached great significance to the fact that in China the charac-
ter Kuan was added to the title of Chun-Iun written by Nagarjuna.
Namely, the Chinese used to designate Chun-Iun as Chun-kuan-Iun.
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ings on the Origin of Zen), 156.
29 Ching-te ch'uan-teng lu (Transmission of Religious Lamps), VIII; ibid.,
VI; Pi-yen lu (The Blue Cliff Records), Chapter 44.
30 Tun-wu ju-tao-yao-men lun (Essentials of Sudden Enlightenment), 8.
31 Chan-yuan-chu-chuan-chi-tu-hsu, 14f.
32 Tun-wu ju-tao-yao-men lun, 13 I.
33 Ch'uan-hsin-fa-yao (Transmission of the Enlightenment), 20.
34 Ibid., 8.
35 Cf. Tun-wu ju-tao-yao-men lun, part 1, p. 8.
36 Cf. Ching-te ch'uan-teng lu, VII.
37 Wing-tsit Chan in Philosophy East and West, VII, 3-4, (October 1957-
January 1958), 113.
38 Cf. Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, East Asia: The Great
Tradition (Boston: 1958), 171ff.
39 Cf. Mo-ho-chih-kuan, II, Part I. (TaishO, XLVI, 12 b.)
40 The Platform Sutra by Hui-neng, the Sixth Patriarch, edited by Ha-
kuju Ui: Daini Zenshu-shi Kenkyu (Studies on the History of Zen
Buddhism), II, 147-148..
41 Ibid., 125.
42 E.g., Book of Myriad Good Things Leading to the Same Final Goal,
Part I. (Taisho, XLVIII, 967 a.) This thought is also prominently men-
tioned in Collection of Pure Land Letters. (Taisho, XLVIII, 966 b.)
43 Ibid.
44 Tun-wu ju-tao-yao-men lun, 60.
45 Cf. R. F. Johnston, Buddhist China (London: 1913).
46 Cf. Daijo Tokiwa, Shina Bukkyo no Kenkyu (Studies in Chinese Bud-
dhism) III, 108.
47 Of course, there are some exceptions concerning this tendency of the
Chinese Buddhist sects. Cf. ibid., III, 91.
48 Ibid., 76.
49 For particulars, refer to Enjo Inaba, Shina Bukkyo no Genseito sono
Yurai (The Present State of Affairs in Chinese Buddhism and its Ori-
gin), Mujinto, XXIII, No. I.
50 Cf. Chikuso Nihitsu, ("Two Letters at the Bamboo Window" by Yiin-
lu), and the thesis of Enjo Inaba, loc.cit.
51 According to the travel records of Daijo Tokiwa (op.cit., III, 109):
"When I visited famous temples in southern China, many of the head
priests were absent. It se~ms that they went to the South Sea Islands to
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52 The Chinese word "Tao" has been used by most or all Chinese philo-
sophic or religious schools. Each school has its own "way" of belief; e.g.,
there is the "Confucian Way," CJu-tao) etc. Huston Smith mentions
three senses of the word tao: (1) the way of ultimate reality; (2) the
way of the universe; (3) the way man sqould order his life. This helps
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ton Smith, The Religions of Man (Mentor Book, the New American
Library, 1961), 184f.
5'3 Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (New York:
Doubleday Anchor Book, 1962), 48ff.
54 According to Chan-jan, the way to govern the family and save people is
also mentioned in the Veda scriptures. [Mo-ho-chih-kuan, X, Part I,
(Taisho, XLVI, 134 b); Commentary on this work, X, Part 2 (Taisho,
440 b).] Cf. Shobogenzo, Shizenbiku (Four Meditative Practices of the
Zen Monk).
55 Cf. Waley, op.cit., 62f.
56 Wu-wai's preface to reprint of Chan-yuan-chu-chuan-chi-tu-hsu (OrigIns
of the Rise of Zen). Wu-wai lived in the early part of 14th century,
Yiian dynasty: Kasante Zengensen wo Kokusuru Jo, 16r.
57 En-ryo-roku, pt. 2. Ch'uan-hsin-fa-yao (Transmission of the Essentials of
the Heart of Enlightenment); Den-shin-ho-yo, edited by Hakuju Ui, 65.
58 Present-day Chinese Pure Land teachings regard the idea of concentra-
tion in the Smaller Sukhiivafivyuha-sutra as concentration as the One
Practice,. and they also regard this idea as the same as the idea of
Tathata-samadhi (concentration on thusness) in the Mahiiyiina-srad-
dhotpiida-siistra). [Genmyo Hayashi, Shina Genkon no Jodo Kyogi (Pure
Land Teaching in Present-day China), Nikka Bukkyo Kenkyu-kai
Nempo (Annual Publication of the Association for Chinese and Japanese
Buddhist Studies), 1st year, 9).]
59 Tao-hsiian asserted this. (TaishO, XLV, 833 b).
60 Ch'an-yuan-chu-chuan-chi-tu-hsii. I I.
61 Ibid., 35.
62 This idea of the Chinese is mentioned by Enjo Inaba in detail in the
Mujinto ("Infinite Light") (1918), 7f. On this point, a striking differ-
ence can be seen between the Chinese and the Japanese ways of
thinking.
63 Needless to say, this thought can be found in the doctrine of the Lii
(precepts) sect. Also Fa-tsang of the Hua-yen sect said that the "excel-
lent behavior of all Bodhisattvas is based on the pure precepts." (Taisho,
XXII, 602 c.)
64 One reason why Chinese Buddhism does not degenerate even ~t present
is based on the fact that most of the temples are situated in mountains
or valleys far away from villages or towns. However, it can also be
thought that the ways of thinking of the Chinese would not cause the
degeneration of Buddhism.
65 This fact is mentioned in detail in Taiken Kimura, Shina Bukkyo Jijo
(The State of Affairs in Chinese Buddhism), Shukyo Kenkyii (Religious
Studies) (1924), 117, and Yiisho Tokushi, Koji Bukkyo ni Tsuite (On
the Layman's Buddhism), Nikka Bukkyo Kenkyii-kai Nempo, 1st
year, 20.
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1 Der Weg in die Philosophie, by Georg Misch, states that Greek phi-
losophy is physical (physisch), Indian philosophy is metaphysical (meta-
physisch), and Chinese philosophy is ethical (ethisch).
2 Taisho, LIV, 220 a.
3 Taisho, LIV, 251 C.
4 It cannot be said that this idea cannot be found in Indian thought, e.g.,
Chand. Up. V. 10. 7. However, the thought of the Indians in the later
periods is generally metaphysical and both animals and men were in-
cluded in the concept of "living beings."
5 Taisho, XXII, 602 c.
6 Chiisei Suzuki: Bukkyo no Gonsetsu Kairitsu ga Sodai no Minshu Sei-
katsu ni Oyoboshitaru Eikyo ni Tsuite (On the In~uence of the Bud-
dhist Precept "Abstaining from Killing" upon Public Life in the
Sung Dynasty), Shiikyo Kenkyii, III, No. I.
7 Siigara-niigariija~duhitii-tat strindriyam antarhita1p. puru~endriya1p. ca
priidurbhiita1p. bodhisattvabhiita1p. c'iitmiina1p. samdarsayati. (Saddh. P.
277')
8 Hajime Nakamura, Shakuson no Kotoba (Words of the Siikyamuni
Buddha), 198f.
9 Hua-yen-ching (the Avatamsaka Siitra, translated in the Chin dynasty
by Sik~iinanda),L. (Taisho, IX, 717 b.)
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13 Hua-yen-ching, LXXV. (Taisho, X, 408 b.)
14 Hua-yen-ching, LVI. (Taisho, IX, 756 c.)
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16 Mo-ho-chih-kuan, IV, Part 1. (Taisho, XLVI, 41 c.)
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Mang (8-22 A.D.) was Confucianism required of all courtiers. Even
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beliefs. (Comment of Dr. Homer H. Dubs.)
18 Taisho,L,361b.
19 Shutsujo Kogo, XIV, Kai (precepts).
20 Sokichi Tsuda, Rongo to Koshi no Shiso (The Analects and Thoughts of
Confucius),297£·
21 Senkuro Hiroike Shina Bunten (Chinese grammar), 125f.
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the social position of the dead.
24 Cf. Li Chi for details.
25 Yang Shu-ta, K6t6 Kokubunp6 (Advanced Studies of Chinese Grammar),
4 12f.
26 Mo-ho-chih-k'uan, V, Part I; Taish6,XLVI, 68 c.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 This phrase was quoted in the Commentary on the T'ien-t'ai's FouT
Divisions of Buddha's Teaching by Ti-k'uan, I, Part I, 19 a, as the words
of Chan-fan.
30 Digha-Nikiiya, III, 19 I.
31 The Chinese Version of the Dirghagama-siHra, XI.
32 Yoshio Takeuchi, Shina Shis8 shi, 268.
33 Cf. Kuan-wu-liang-shou-ching-shu (Commentary on the Larger Sukh1i-
vativyiiha Siitra), Part 2. (TaishO, XXXVII, 186 b.) Hui-yiian called
Buddhism itself the "Buddhist family" in his commentary.
34 Ti-k'uan's Commentary 1,35 b.
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36 Ti-k'uan's Commentary, I, 19 b.
37 Ibid., 11,5 a.
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texts: Itivuttaka 106 Githa-AN, I, 132 G; SN, I, 178.G. (It also
states here that one has to respect one's elder brother. Dhammapada, 332;
SN, 1,178 G; Suttanipatavv. 98,124,262; DN, III, 191f.
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the Mahayana siitras translated into Chinese, gratitude to the parents
is stated in the Chinese version of the Saddharmasmrtyupasthiina-sutra,
LXI, and the Ta-ch'eng-pen-sheng-hsin-ch'ih-k'uang-ching, II.
39 Besides these, there are some siitras which discuss filial piety, such as
the Hsiao-Tzu-ching (Taish6, XVI, 708) and the Fu-mu-en nan-pao-
ching (Taish6, XVI, 778-779). These siitras, however, are very short
and not well-organized.
40 Max Weber, Das antike Judentum, 150.
41 Ibid., 158.
42 Hsing-li-ta-ch'iian (A Treatise on Nature and Principle), XII, Part 6.
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43 Tsung-mi, Yii-lan-pen-ching-shu (A Commentary on the Ullambana-
siitra), (Taisho, XXXIX, 512 b).
44 Cf. Arthur F. Wright, Buddhism in Chinese History, 105
45 Fully discussed by Tang Chiin-i in Philosophy East and West, XI, 4
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46 Yoshikawa,op.cit., 1°5-106.
47 Sokichi Tsuda, Shina Shiso to Nippon, 18-19.
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51 Zenryii Tsukamoto, Shina Bukkyo-shi Kenkyu (A Study on the History
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dhism), III, 97-98; Ryoshii Michibata, Gaisetsu Shina Bukkyo-shi (Gen-
eral Outline of the History of Chinese Buddhism), 74f; Hiroshi Yama-
zaki, Shina Chusei Bul~kyo-no Tenkai (The Development of Chinese
Buddhism in the Medieval Age), 129f. Cf. Enichi6cho, Shina Bukkyo-ni
Okeru Kokka Ishiki (National Sentiments in Chinese Buddhism). Toho
Gakuho (Series of Oriental Studies), XI, NO.3.
53 The Imperial version of the Po-chang ch'ing-kuei (Monastic Rules insti-
tuted by Master Po-ch'ing). (Taisho, XLVIII, 1112 c.)
54 The problem has been treated by Arthur F. Wright, Buddhism in Chi-
nese History, 41££., 60££.
55 Tao-hsuan called Bodhiruci who came from India "Chinese Bodhiruci."
(Taisho L, 470 b, 470 c.)
56 Eg., Ch'an-yiian-chu-chiian-chi-tu-hsii (Collection of Sayings on the
Origin of Zen), I, 29, 83.
57 Ibid., V.
58 Arthur F. Wright, "Fu-I and the Rejection of Buddhism," Journal of
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59 Ibid., 44.
60 Mo-ho-chih-k'uan, VI, Part 2. (Taisho, XLVI, 80 a.)
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Chapter 24
I The ideogram T'ien is derived from the letter Ta by adding a line on the
top. Ta is a hieroglyphic which originally meant man. Therefore, one
may imagine that this ideogram T'ien indicates the sky which is above
man.
2 Kojir6 Yoshikawa, Chinese Classics and Way of Life, 9.
3 Ibid., 18. Cf. Masson-Oursel, "Etude de Logique Comparee," Revue Phi-
losophique (1917), 67.
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10 This is stated in the chapter San-hua-pin of the Maha-prajnaparamitii-
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40 1.)
1 1 This thought is derived from the phrase in a version of the Prajfiapara-
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quoted in the Collected Works of Ho-Tse Shen-hui, found at Tung-
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also in the Ta-ch'eng yao-yu (Taisho, LXXXV, 1206 a.)
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15 The Wu-men-kuan, Chapter 19.
16 The Ching-te ch'uan-teng lu, X. (Taisho, LI, 275 a.)
17 Another poem also expresses the same state of mind: Cf. Hakuju Ui:
Daini Zenshii.~shi Kenkyu, 450.
18 The Cheng-tao-ko.
19 The W u-men-kuan, Chapter 19.
20 The Pi-yen chi, Chapter 6.
21 The Ching-te ch'uan-teng lu, X. (Taisho, LI, 277 c.)
22 Ibid., XI. (Taisho, LI, 284 b.)
23 Ibid., XVII. (Taisho, LI, 337 a.)
24 Kojiro Yoshikawa, Chinese Classics and View of Life, 28.
25 Masaaki Matsumoto, Gi Shin ni okeru Mu no Shiso no Seikaku (The
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in Shigaku Zasshi (Journal of History) 1940.
26 Derk Bodde, "Dominant Ideas in the Formation of Chinese Culture,"
Journal of American Oriental Society, LXII (1942),299,
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28 The Suva,,:taprabhii$a, XXXVIII, Chapter 13.
29 Biographies of High Priests, III. (Taisho, L, 341 a.)
Chapter 25
1 Kojiro Yoshikawa, Chinese Classics and Way of Life, 31-32.
2 Ibid., 33.
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5 Taislto, XLVII, 426 a. Cf. Kyogyoshinsha, III, Part 2.
6 The Analects of Confucius, II.
7 Cf. Yoshikawa, op.cit., 33-36.
8 Cf. The San-lun ltsuan-i (edited by YenshO Kanakura, 23).
9 The Mo-lto-cltilt-kuan VI, Palt I. (Taislto, XLVI, 77 a, b.)
10 Ibid., 78 c. The thought of Yen Chih-T'ui is fully discussed by Al-
bert E. Dien in Confucian Personalities, edited by Arthur F. WIight and
Denis Twitchett (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962),43-64.
I I The Hung-min-clti, VI, VII. (Tais1t6, LII, 411-49 a.)
12 This is based upon the Yuan-jen-lun. In the Cltan-yuan-cltu-cltuan-clti-
tu-ltsu written by the same author (Tsung-mi), Taoism 'and Con-
fucianism are completed ignored. (Edited by Hakuju Ui, in Iwanami
Bunko,5 If.)
13 The Tun-wu-ju-tao-yao-men lun, (edited by Hakuju Ui), 94.
14' Kyoda Ito, Dagen Zenji Kenkyu, (Studies on Dogen Zenji), I, 65f. How-
ever, according to Dagen, his master Ju-ching admonished him by say-
ing "those who insist on the oneness of the three religions are those who
destroy the holy teaching of the Buddha." (Shoba Genzo, Shohojisso.)
Nevertheless, the analects of Ju-ching acknowledged the authority of
Confucianism and Taoism, and furthermore, the phrases and words were
quoted from the Analects of Confucius and Lao-tzu-clting in his writ-
ings. (Ito, op.cit., I, 32f. 69f.)
15 Wan Cltilt-ltsin (translated by Shizuhiko Tomita: Sltina Shukya Sltiso-
slti (History of Religious Thoughts in China), 220.
16 The Hung-min-clti, VI. (Taisho, LII, 39 a.)
17 Daijo Tokiwa, Shina ni okeru Bukkyo to Jukyo Dokyo (Buddhism, Con-
fucianism, and Taoism in China), 201.
18 The Fu-cltiao-p'ien, Part 2. (Taisho, LII, 657 a.)
19 Ibid. (Taislto, LII, 660 a.)
20 Tokiwa, op.cit., 401.
21 Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese Theory and Practice," in Pltilosoplty and Cul-
ture/East and West, edited by Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: Uni-
versity of Hawaii Press, 1962),92.
22 P'ei-hsiu; preface to the Ch'im-yuan-chu-chuan-chi-tu-hsu-hsu, 4.
23 Ibid., Part I, 33.
24 "Concerning three sects of practical teaching and three sects of doctrinal
teaching." Cf. ibid., Part I.
25 Cf. ibid., 91,5 I.
26 Cf. ibid., 7of.
27 GaueJapada (Mattt!ukya Karika, Chapter 4) and Bhartrhari of India ad-
vance the same thought. Hegel and Dilthey interpreted it from the his-
toIical standpoint.
28 Chu-fang-men-jen-san-wett-yu-lu, Part 2. (Tun-wu-yao-men) , 94.
29 Ch'an-yuan-chu-chuan-chi-tu-hsu, 114.
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30 Ibid., 18.
31 Chuan-hsin-fa-yao (Essentials of Truth in the Transmission of Mind),
38f.
32 Hsin-hsin-ming.
33 Ii: is said that the Chinese version of the Saddharma-puv4arika-sittra was
frequently used in examinations for government officials in the' North-
ern Sung dynasty. .
34 Edwin G. Pulleyblank, "Neo-Confucianism in T'ang Intellectual Life,"
in The Confucian Persuasion, edited by Arthur F. Wright, 92.
35 Fu-chiao-p'ien, Part 1. (Taisho, LII, 649 a, 649 b.)
36 Sun-ch'o, Yii-tao-lun, Hung-ming-chi, III. (TaishO, LII, 17 a.)
37 Hung-ming-chi, VII. (TaishO, LII, 45 C-46 b.)
38 Ibid., VI. (Taisho, LII, 38 C-39 a.)
39 Tan-chin-wen-chi, XIX. (Taisho, LII, 748 a.)
40 San-chiao-p'ing-hsin-lun, Part 1. (Taisho, LII, 781 c.)
41 Shutsujo Kogo XXIV. Sankyo.
42 P'o-hsich-lun, Part 1 (Taisho, XXXII, 478 c); Fo-tsu-t'ung-chi, IV
(Taisho, XLIX, 166 c); ibid., XXXV (Taisho, XLIX, 333 b-c).
43 Cf. Hung-ming-chi, VI. (Taisho, LII, 42 c.)
44 Cf. ibid.,VII. (Taisho, LII, 46 a.)
45 Cf. ibid., III. (TaishO, LII, 17 a.)
46 Mo-ho-chih-kuan, III, Part 2. (Taisho, XLVI, 31 b.)
47 Shutsujo Kyogo, Chapter XXIV. Sankyo.
48 SarvadarsanasaIpgraha; Sarvasiddhantasalpgraha, etc.
49 Yiieh Fei's biography and his mythologizing are discussed fully by Hell·
mut Wilhelm in Wright, Confucian Personalities, 146-161.
50 The features of Kuan Yii, a composite hero, discussed by Robert
Ruhlmann in Wright, The Confucian Persuasion, I 73ff.
51 Present day Chinese call both Taoist and Buddhist temples, "Miao"
(temple shrine). Daijo Tokiwa, Shina Bukkyo no Kenkyu (Study of
Chinese Buddhism), III, IIef. Cf. "A Report by E. Inaba," Mujinto
(19 18),10f.
PART ill
Chapter 26
1 Max Weber, Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie, II, 316.
2 Lamaism was introduced into Europe, too. As a result of the conquest of
Russia proper by the "Golden Horde," i.e., the Buddhist kings of Tartary,
Buddhism was propagated there and is thus still alive in European Russia.
Among the Kalmuks in the basin of the Volga River, there are some people
who call themselves Buddhists. Cf. 1. A. Waddell, The Buddhism. of
Tibet or Lamaism (London: 1895),9.
3 Due to the lack of opportunities to see the original texts of Tibetan works,
and the fact that not many studies have been made along this line, it is
rather difficult to carry out a complete study of Tibetan ways of thinking. '
Tibetology in Japan has been making some progress during the last two
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decades. But most scholars consider it subsidiary to their main field of
concern which is Indology or Buddhology. Such being the case, the
following study consists of but a brief survey.
4 L. A. Waddell, "Lamaism," in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,
Edited by James Hastings (Edinburgh: 1940), VII, 784 a.
5 Ibid., 785b.
6 tiisu pu~kari1Ji~u samantiic caturdisam catviiri sopiiniini. The Smaller
Sukhiivati-vyuha-sutra, 4, edited by F. Max Muller and Bunyiu
Nanjio (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883). rdsin de dag gi phyogs bshi
kun na them skas bshi bshi yod de.
7 Translations from Chinese into Tibetan were made in ancient times.
Cf. Shuki Yoshimura, The Denkar-ma. An Oldest Catalogue of the
Tibetan Buddhist Canons with Introductory Notes (Kyoto: Ryukoku
University, 1950), Introduction, 7. Cf. Charles Bell, The Religion of
Tibet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931),26.
Chapter 27
I Charles Bell, The Religion of Tibet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931),
9 0 -91.
2 Ibid., 90.
3 Hisashi Sato, Kodai Chibetto-shi Kenkyu (Studies in the History of
Ancient Tibet), II (Kyoto: 1959), 783.
4 Jiro Kawakita, The Japanese Journal of Ethnology, XIX, I (1955) and
3-4 (1956).
5 The Tibetan version of Niigiinanda. Cf. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya,
bhota-priikasa. A Tibetan Chrestomathy (University of Calcutta, 1939),
40. In Tibetan also there are some words meaning a prostitute, e.g.
b-phyonma, smad-~tson-ma, etc., but the translator did not use such a
word.
6 Cf. the preceding "Ways of Thinking in China."
7 Shiiki Yoshimura in Ryukoku Daigaku Ronshu, 355 (1957), 91ff.
8 Sato, op.cit., 79 If. .
9 J. F. Rock, The Na-khi Niiga Cult and Related Ceremonies. Serie
Orientale, IV. Roma Is. M.E.O. (Rome: 1952),5.
10 Sato, op. cit., I, 760.
I I Ibid.
12 Giuseppe Tucci, The Tombs of the Tibetan Kings. Serie Orientale, I
(Rome: 1950).
13 Catub-sataka, XII, 25. (Bhotaprakiisa, 175.)
14 Sato, op.cit., I, 16o. .
I 5 rgyal po mihi lha shes pa / li tsa byi (Licchavi) rnams rigs su byun.
(Deb-gter-snon-po. Sato, op.cit., I, 2 I8.)
16 Taisho Tripitaka, XXXII, 231 a-c.
Chapter 28
I Shinko Mochizuki, Bukkyo Daijiten (Dictionary of Buddhism), (Tokyo,
1935),3612 C.
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2 TaishoTripitaka, LI, 977.
3 Hisashi Sat6 Kodai Chibetto-shi Kenkyu (Studies in the History of
Ancient Tibet), II, 76 I.
4 Ibid.
5 Charles Bell, The Religion of Tibet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931),
13-14. About this poem, cf. A. H. Francke, Encyclopedia of Religion
and Ethics, VIII, 75-78.
6 Jane Caston Mahler, The Westerners Among the Figurines of the Tang
Dynasty of China. Serie Orientale Roma. X (Roma: Is. M.E.O., 1959),
149·
7 Edward Conze, Vajracchedikii Prajiiiipiiramitii (Roma: Is. M.E.O.,
1957),29. Cf. 42.
8 Byan chub sems dap1J dnos po la mi gnas par sbyin pa sbyin no.
9 Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, Bhora-prakiisa (University of Calcutta,
1939),132.
10 The Tibetan version of the Samantamukha-parivarta of the Lotus
Sutra.
I I Udiinavarga, XIII, 7 (Bhattacharya, op.cit., 76.)
12 Cf. my ~rticle on the Smaller Sukhavatr-vyiiha Siitra in Hirosato Iwai
Commemoration Volume (Tokyo: 1963), Section 40.
13 Sat6, op. cit., II, 760.
14 L. A. Waddell in Encyclopedia of Religions and Ethics, VII, 789.
15 Paiicakrama I, 57. Shinten Sakai, Chibetto Mikkyo Kyori no Kenkyu
(Studies in Tibetan Esoteric Teachings) (Koyasan: 1956), 132f, 186.
16 Ibid., 63.
17 Hakuyii Hadano in Tohoku Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyu Nenpo (Pro-
ceedings of the Faculty of Letters, T6hoku University, Sendai, NO.9,
1958), 33-36. .
18 Sakai, op.cit., 45.
19 Ibid., 149-15°.
20 Mochizuki, op.cit., 3615.
21 Bell, op.cit., 90.
22 A. Wayman, Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXXVIII, I
(January-March 1958),86.
23 Hadano, op.cit., 37-38.
24 Ibid., 38-39.
25 Ibid., 59.
26 Ibid., 49-50.
27 Bell, op.cit., 41.
28 Hadano, op.cit., 60-67., cf. Sakai, op.cit., 27, 38.
29 Ibid., 73·
30 Nagananda I I. (Bhotaprakiisa, 59')
3 I Hadano, op.cit., 78-79.
32 Niipi Maithunadharma sarvasa1J (Saddharmaputt4arika-sutra), edited
by Wogihara (Tokyo: 1935),373, line 7.
33 Gyem-pal;d chos med do.
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34 Jitsugyo Kai, Shukya Kenkyu (Journal of Studies in Religion), New
Series 4, No.6, p. 141ff.
35' Waddell, op.cit., 31. Cf. Koeppen, Die Religion de Buddha (185'9)
II, 71.
Chapter 29
I Giuseppe Tucci, The Tombs of the Tibetan Kings. Serie Orientale
Roma, I (Roma: 195'0), 16,36,91. Also Minor Buddhist Texts, pt. II,
(Rome: 195'8),40.
2 Ibid., 77 n. 37.
3 Gnam gyi chos dan mtshuns par ni baka1; btsan teo (Ibid., 91.)
4 Ibid., 97.
5' Chos rgya cher thugs su chud nas. (Ibid., 101.)
6 Charles Bell, The Religions of Tibet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931),
45'·
7 Paiica-krama, I, 70. (Shinten Sakai, Chiketto Mikkya Kyori no Kenkyu
[Studies in Tibetan Esoteric Teachings], 188.)
8 In some texts the appellation bcom ladan 1;das (bhagavat) is added to de
bshin gsegs pa (tathagata).
9 Hakuyii Hadano in Tohoku Dargaku Bumgakubu Kenkyu Nenpa
(Proceedings of the Faculty of Letters, Fohoku University), 40.
10 Bell, op.cit., 84.
I I T6kwan Tada, Chibetto (Tibet), 2-3.
12 Ibid., 5'.
13 J. N. Ganhar and P. N. Ganhar, Buddhism in Kashmir and Ladakh (New
Delhi: 195'6), 192-193.
14 H. Hadano, Zogai Chibetto Seiten Mokoruku Hensan ni Tsuite (On
the Compilation of a Catalogue of Tibetan Works on Buddhism), Bunka
(July 1944), 465'.
15' Tada, op.cit., 27-29.
16 Hadano,op.cit., 13.
17 L. A. Waddell, in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, VII, 787 b.
18 Ibid., 788 a.
19 Helmut Hoffmann, Mi-Ia Ras-pa. Sieben Legenden (Munich: 195'0,) 18.
20 H. Hadano, Bunka, XIX, I (195'5'), 46f.
21 Gadjin M. Nagao, Chibetto Bukkyo Kenkyu (Studies in Tibetan
Buddhism) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 195'4),39.
22 Tada, op.cit., 3-4.
23 Bunkyo Aoki, Chibetto-yuki (Record of a Journey in Tibet), 105'. He
calls himself an "avatara" (Waddell, op.cit., 242.)
24 Aoki, op.cit., 247ff.
25 Bell, op.cit., 181.
26 Tada, op.cit., 24. In the case of the Dalai Lama, Tibetans treat his dead
body with very great care. (Bunkyo Aoki, op,cit., 343ff.)
27 G. Tucci, Preliminary Report on Two Scientific Expeditions in Nepal.
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Materials for the Study of Nepalese History and Culture, I. Serie
Orientale (Rome: 1956),34.
28 The late Rev. Chiken Sumita, a high priest of the Higashi-Honganji
Temple, Japan, said, as one of his dying wishes, that the recitation of
scripture should be perfonned in front of the Buddha's image-an
exceptional thing for Japan.
29 Tada, op.cit., 26.
30 Yokichi Takayama (translator), Chibetto-Tanken-ki (Record of the Ex-
pedition to Tibet), 73ff.
31 Tada, op.cit., 89; Aoki, op.cit., 192, 326.
32 R. O. Meisezahl, "Die Tibetischen Handschriften und Drucke des
Linden-Museums in Stuttgart," Tribus, Zetschrift fUr Ethnologie und
ihre Nachbarwissenschaften. N. F. VII (1957) 8f.
33 Sarat Chanda Das, A Tibetan-English Dictionary (Calcutta: 1902),
1002 a.
34 Aoki,op.cit., 169.
35 Hadano, BunkaXXI, 6 (December 1957), 7.
The Buddha discouraged monks from having relationships with
women. In ascripture of Early Buddhism the following passage illustrates
the Buddha's attitude toward women:
Ananda (a disciple) asked the Buddha, "How are we to conduct
ourselves, 0 Lord, with regard to women?"
"Don't see them, Ananda."
"But if we do see them, what are we to do?"
"Do not speak to them."
"But if they do speak to us, then what are we to do?"
"Keep wide awake, Ananda."
From T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha
(London: Oxford University Press, 1910), pt. II, 154. (T. W. Rhys
Davids, editor, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, III.)
36 Bell, op.cit., 6-7. .
37 Bu-ston's History of Indian Buddhism, edited by Dalai Lama the Thir-
teenth, 126 a.
Chapter 30
1 Bunkyo Aoki, Chibetto-¥iiki (Record of a Journey in Tibet), 253, and
according to his personal instruction.
2 Early Buddhism in India made a careful distinction between spiritual and
worldly authority. Buddhist monasteries in India kept aloof from tem-
poral involvements. But the Tibetan monasteries from the beginning
were involved in a secular struggle for political paramountcy. To this
end they allied themselves with various temporal authorities in their
competition for power. In this struggle, the Yellow Sect, assisted by the
Mongols, emerged victorious, with the result that the leader of that sect,
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the Dalai Lama, came to assume both religious and civil authority.
Kenneth Ch'en, "Transformations in Buddhism in Tibet," Philosophy
East and West, VII, 3 and 4, (October 1957 and January 1958), 117-
123.
3 H. A. Jiischke, Tibetan Grammar (New York: 1954),35-36.
4 Vidhushekkara Bhattacharya, Bhotaprakiisa, I I 5.
5 Personal instruction to the author by Rev. Bsod-nams rgyamtsho, the
Tibetan Lama.
6 Bhattacharya, op.cit., 139,464.
7 Ibid., 204, 464.
8 T. Tada, op.cit., 118.
9 Ibid., 80, (d. Tohoku Catalogue, No. 360).
10 Tokwan Tada, Chiketto (Tibet), 80.
II The above is according to the reports of Reverend Aoki and Tada. It
seems quite opposite to the report of Ekai Kawaguchi referred to in the
previous section. A common way of thinking in both reports, which su-
perficially contradi~t each other, is the belief in religious charisma. There-
fore it may be said that there is a consistent way of thinking in spite
of the different forms of each idea due to historical and geographical
conditions.
Chapter 31
I Tokwan Tada, Chibetto (Tibet), 168ff. Helmut Hoffman, Quellen Zur
.Geschichte der tibetischen Bon-Religion. (Akademie der Wissenschaften
und der Literatur. Abhandlungen der Geistes und sozialwissenschaft-
lichen Klasse, 1950, no. 4') The etymological meaning of "bon" is not
clear (p. 137). The Bon religion exists in southwestern China and Nepal
also. Cf. J. F. Rock, The Na-khi Niiga Cult and Related Ceremonies,
passim; Giuseppe Tucci, Preliminary Report on Two Scientific Expedi-
tions in Nepal (Materials for the History of Nepalese History and Cul-
ture, I. Serie Orientale, Roma, X. Is. M.E.O., 1956),28-29.
2 According to Bunkyo Aoki's information, who guided this lama.
3 Susumu Yamaguchi, Chibettogo no Keito (Tibetan Language), 33-35.
(Contained in the Iwanami Koza, 'Toyo-shicho.")
4 According to Reverend Tada's information, the Bhadracaryii-pratlidhiina,
the Maiijusri-paramiirthaniimasamgiti, the Sitiitapatriidhiiratli (Tohoku,
Nos. 1095, 4377; 360; 593) are most often used for ceremony, but
the Saddharmaputl4arika is scarcely recited.
5 Bunkyo Aoki, Chibetto-yuki (Record of a Journey in Tibet), 334-
6 Tada, op.cit., 39; cf. Aoki, op.cit., 270.
7 The following is according to Reverend Aoki's instruction.
8 Giuseppe Tucci, Tombs of the Tibetan Kings, 52f.
9 R. Nebesky de Wojkowitz, "State Oracle of Tibet," The Modern Review,
(December 1950),479-480.
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Chapter 32
I The Mahiivyutpatti, edited by Ry6zaburo Sakaki, No. 859. (Chinese
equivalent to this Sanskrit is: "bringing about (?)-numberless-Bud-
dha's land-adornment-vow.")
2 E.g., a Tibetan sentence: "Valti gcen-po thams-cad bod-kyis bsad" can be
translated in two ways: (I) "Tibetans killed all my brothers." (2) "All
my brothers were killed by Tibetans." The copula "yin-pa" is here to be
supplied.
3 Cf. T ensen Yamagami, Bukkyo-ronri no Kenkyu to Chibetto-zokyij (Stud-
ies on Buddhist Logic and the Tibetan Tripi~aka), The Wayushi
(1908), XII.
4 Tibetan lama-students are required to study the five courses in the mon-
astery, which require twenty years; the first three years are devoted to
studies in logic. Tokwan Tada, Chibetto (Tibet), 3 Iff.
5 According to Reverend Tada's information, Tibetan studies in logic are
based upon the Pramiivaviirttika alone, while the Nyiiyabindu and the
PramiivaviniScaya are scarcely studied.
6 The following is according to Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I
(193 2),38,57,58.
7 Ibid., 46. This is to be compared with the fact that Japanese and Chi-
nese Buddhists had never maintained logic to be a secular science, but
rather a study ancillary to theology.
8 According to Reverend Tada's instructions, students are required to learn
by heart a short commentary of Haribhadra on the Abhisamayiilankiira
(Tohoku Catalogue No. 3793). It maintained an authority almost
equivalent to the holy scriptures. Haribhadra belonged to the line of
Bhavya (Bhavaviveka), but his idea of sunyatii is different from Bhav-
ya's and rather nearer to that of Candrakirti.
9 The texts which are often read in Tibet are more or less systematic.
Cf. Shiiki Yoshimura, Tibetan Buddhistology: The Basic Original Texts
of Historical Lamaism (Kyoto: 1953), 5.
10 G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, II, 9,21-2,52-65.
I I Ekai Kawaguchi, Nihon-Bukkyo to Chibetto-Bukkyo tono Busshin-kwan
no Siji ni tsuite (On the difference of the Concept of Buddha in Japanese
and Tibetan Buddhism), Gendai-Bukkyo (March 1928),31.
Chapter 33
lOwing to the spread of Buddhism, Sanskrit terms also found their way
into Japanese. In the Man'yoshii collection of ancient poems (c. 8th cen-
tury), for example, such terms as to (stupa, pagoda) and Baramon
(Brahmin) are found, and the word Siikya appears in the Bussokuseki
poems (Buddha-Paduka = footprints of Buddha). Other words gradually
came to be used, but their number was never considerable.
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2 Shinkichi Hashimoto, Kokugogaku Gairon (Survey of the Japanese lan-
guage), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1946),91.
3 Ibid., 98.
4 Ibid., 101.
5 Daito Shimaji, Nihon Bukkyo Kyogakushi (History of Doctrines of Japa-
nese Buddhism), (Tokyo: Meiji Shoin, 1935), 2.
6 Kanzan Matsumiya, Sankyo Yoron (1760), Essential Outlines of Three
Religions [Shintoism, Confucianism, Buddhism] in Nihon Jurin Sosho,
(Series of Confucian Works in Japan), Kaisetsubu (Expository Section)
11,7·
7 "The Japanese gradually took over most of Chinese civilization but reso-
lutely refused to accept rhymed tonal poetry, civil service examinations,
footbinding, and a number of other particular Chinese features." A. L.
Kroeber, Anthropology (New York: 1948), 416. On the influence of
Chinese thought upon the Japanese, cf. Sources of the Japanese Tradi-
tion, compiled by Ryiisaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, Donald
Keene, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1958), 54ff.
8 Cited in Taijo Tamamuro, Nihon Bukkyoshi Gaisetsu (An Outline of
Japanese Buddhism) (Tokyo: Risosha, 1942), 41. Cf. E. O. Reischauer
and J. K. Fairbank, East Asia, The Great Tradition (Boston: 1960),495:
'With the Chinese writing system, the Japanese naturally adopted Chi-
nese ways of thinking. Among these, Buddhism and the Chinese concept
of centralized government. . . ."
9 Teikichi Kida in Rekishi Chiri (History and Geography), XL, no. 2, 96f.
10 Kogatsuin Jinrei (1749-1817), Kyogyoshinsho Kogi (Lectures on Shin-
ran's Teaching of Practice, Faith, Attainment) in the Bukkyo Taikei edi-
tion (Great Systems of Buddhism), 1334. Cf. the English translation of
the original work of Shinran by K6sho Yamamoto (Tokyo: Karinbunko,
1958).
11 For example, cf. Tetsuro Watsuji, Nihon Seishinshi Kenkyu (Studies in
the Intellectual History of Japan), (Tokyo: 1953),348-349.
12 Ten learned monks from the Tendai and Hoss6 sects took part in the
religious debates held in a palace of the Imperial court of Japan. The
Hoss6 school won and became the chief of the Six Sects of that time.
Chapter 34
1 Naoichi Miyaji, Jingi-shi Taikei (Great Outlines of the History of Shin-
toism), 6, 9.
2 Y6kyoku, Taisha (A Noh Song entitled "The Great Shrine").
3 Flikyo Hyakusl1u Kosetsu (Lecture on the "Wild Winds Eight-Hundred
Fold"), in Genchi Kat6, Shinto no Shukyo Hattatsushiteki Kenkyu (A
Study in the Religious Development of Shintoism), 935.
4 Cf. Doctrine of Tranquillity, I, Part 1. (Taisho, XLVI, 1 c.) Eun Mayeda,
Proceedings of Philosophical Institute, Tetsugakukan Kogiroku (Shigaku
Zasshi, 1923,373-374), (Journal of Philosophic Studies.)
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5 Kaimokusho, part 2: "Awakening to the Troth," by Nichiren. (Tokyo:
International Buddhist Society, 1941).
6 See Chapter 18, 7th giithii: Saddharma-pu~~arika-siitra (edited by Unrai
Ogiwara), 251, line 25; A~!asahasrika (d. Unrai Ogiwara), 51, line
15; 572, lines 2-3; 666, line 7; etc.
7 Shob8genzo, Shoho-jisso (Dagen's Essentials of the Troe Law), section
on "The Troe Nature of the Law."
8 See "Profound Doctrine of the Lotus Siitra," VIII, Part 2. (TaishO,
XXXIII, 783 b.)
9 Shobi5genzo, section on "Life and Death."
10 Ibid., Bussho. Section on "The Buddha-Nature."
I I Shasekishu, X, Part I.
12 This sentence was composed in China based upon such sentences as
"In the milk there is the cream; in sentient beings there is the Buddha
nature," and "If you have the desire to seek, you will find," in Maha
prajiia-paramitra-siitra, XXVIII. (Taisho, XII, 532 a, 533 b.)
13 Shobogenzo, Bussha.
14 Kegon-siitra, XXXVIII, chapter on the Ten Stages (Taisha, X, 194 a,
533 a).
15 Bonbun Daihokobutsu-kegonkyo jujibon (edited by Ryiiko Kondo), 98.
16 Shobogenzo, Sangaiyuishin. (The Three Realms-Desire, Material
Forms, Immaterial Forms-in Mind.)
17 Ibid., Sokushin Zebutsu. (The Mind as the Buddha.)
18 Ibid., Butsukojoji. (Manifesting the Buddha-nature.)
19 Ibid., U ji. (The Reality of Time.)
20 Ibid., Setsushin Setsucho. (Expounding the Mind is Expounding the
Buddha-nature.)
21 Ibid., Hossh5. (The Nature of the Dharma.)
22 Ibid., Setsushin Setsush5.
23 Ibid., Sanjiishichihon Bodaibunpo. (Chapter 37 on Steps to Enlighten-
ment.)
24 Yasusada Hiyane, Nihon Shukyoshi, 828-829. (History of Japanese
Religions.)
25 Gomo jigi (Explanations of Terms in the Mencius), 1,3.
26 Dojimon (Children's Questions), II, 39.
27 Junsei Iwahashi, Sorai Kenkyu, 449. On Chu-tsu's Li and Ch'i, d. Fung
Yu-Ian, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, edited and translated
from the Chinese by D. Bodde, (New York: 1961),296-3°3.
28 Cf. Yaichi Haga, Kokuminsei JUTOn, 91ff. (Ten Lectures on the National
Character.)
29 R. H. Blyth, Cultural East, I (1947), 45.
30 Man'yoshu, III, 3 I 8.
31 Ibid.,VI,9 19·
32 Ibid., V, 822.
33 Ibid., V, 824.
34 Theragiithii, 537, 538, 540, 544, 545·
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35 Emperor Kazan (Eiga Monogatari, Mihatenu Yume). (Tales of
Splendor, Futile Dreams.)
36 Emperor Kazan (Zoku Kokinshu, Shakukyoka). (Supplementary
Ancient and Modern Collection, In Praise of Buddha.)
37 Shobogenza, Hotsumujoshin. (Manifestation of the Supreme Mind.)
38 Nichiren also wrote a book named Samoku Jobutsu Kuketsu. (Attaining
of Buddhahood even by shrubs.)
39 This verse (gatha) is not found in the Siitra on Intermediate Existence
(Antarabhava-sutra). Perhaps someone composed this verse based upon
this siitra.
40 Daijo Tokiwa, Nihon Bukkya no Kenkyu, 107ff. (Study of Japanese
Buddhism.)
41 Hakujo Ui, Bukkya Hanron (An Outline of Buddhism), II, 337.
42 See supra, Part I, Chapter 9.
43 Yaichi Haga, Kokuminsei Juran (Ten Lectures on the National Charac-
ter),70.
44 Ibid., 65-67.
45 Ryochii Shioiri, Dengya Daishi to Hokkekya (Master Dengyo and the
Lotus Siitra), (in Nihon Bukkya no Rekishi to Rinen [History and Con-
cepts of Japanese Buddhism], compiled by Seiichiro Ono and Shinsho
Hanayama), I 17ff.
46 See Hokke Shuku (Excellency of the Lotus Siitra), by Saicho, II;
Dengya Daishi Zenshu (Complete Works of Master Dengya), II, 265-
266,280.
47 Sokushin Jobutsugi Shiki (Personal Remarks on the Doctrine of Becoming
Buddha while One Is Living), [Tendaishii Sosho (Collected Writings
of the Tendai Sect), Annen Senshii (Works of Annen)], II, 210.
48 These words in Bodai Shinron (Treatise on the Bodhi mind) are said to
have been written by Nagarjuna.
49 Myaichime Cohenji (Reply to a woman Myaichi).
50 Jushiki Kanja KudenshO (Oral Teachings on the Consecration of a New
Appointment),
5 I Shasekishu ("Collection of Sands and Pebbles"-Anecdotes), II, Part I.
52 "The Sacred Mountain" here is a Japanese equivalent for Crdhrakuta.
See Jimyo Hokke Mondosho (Questions and Answers on Keeping the
Lotus Siitra); Toki dono Cohenji (Reply to Esquire Toki) , etc.
53 Honen Shonin Cyajo Ezu (Explanations and Pictures Illustrating the Acts
of St. Hanen), 26.
54 Cf. Yuishinsho Mon-i (Essentials of the Book of Faith).
55 ShabOgenza Zuimonki (Gleanings of the Sayings of Master Dagen), II.
Tsunoda, Keene, and De Bary, Sources of Japanese Tradition, 254-255.
Dagen refers here to Kukai's assertion of the identity of mind and body,
and the possibility of achieving liberation "in the body" in this life.
56 ShobOgenza, op.cit., chapter on Bussho (Buddha-nature).
57 Roankyo (Lit. "Ass-Saddle Bridge"-Random Sayings, by Zen Priest
Shi5san Suzuki), last part, 71.
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58 Soan Zakki (Miscellanies in a Hennitage, by Echii), Part 11,26.
59 Shinto Gobusho (Five Major Works of Shintoism), in Kokushi Taikei
(Great Series of Japanese History), VII, 3I.
60 Hikosan Shugen Saihi Injin Kuketsushu (Oral Teachings of Esoteric
Shugen Practice in Mt. Hiko), Part 1, in Japanese Scriptures of Bud-
dhism, Section· on Shugen (Nihondaizokyo, Shugenshoshobu, Part 2,533,
549.)
61 Masatomo Manba, Nihon Jukyoron (Essays on Japanese Confucian-
ism),89·
62 Taiheiki (Chronicle of the Muromachi Period), XVI.
63 Genkoshakusho (Historiography of Japanese Buddhism), XIII.
64 ShobOgenzo, op.cit., chapter on Sanjiishichihon Bodaibumpo (37 chapters
on Enlightenment Stages). .
65 Shutsujo Kogo (Monologue after Meditation), XXV, Zatsu.
66 Ayaranga, herausgegeben von W. Schubring, I, 27, I, 28f.
67 Ibid., I, I, 6, 2 (p. 5, line 8).
68 Shobogenzo, op.cit., chapter on Shoji (Life and death).
69 Yaichi Haga, op.cit., 9 1-116.
70 Man'yoshu (Collection of Myriad Leaves), VIII (1959).
71 Ibid., XX (4468).
72 Cf. Ichiro Hori, Inton Shiso ni okeru Ningensei enD Shibo ("Search for
Humanity in a Life of Seclusion"), Teiyu Rinri, Nos. 7-8 (1947).
73 In Tamakatsuma, X, Motoori Norinaga Zenshu (Collected Works of
Norinaga Motoori), IV, 236. See also Tsunetsugu Muraoka, Motoori
Norinaga (1928), 430ff. Motoori's judgment on the Shih Ching is based,
of course, on the moralizing interpretation of the songs in that book
given by the Confucianists.
74 See Junsei Iwahashi, Sorai Kenkyii (Study on Sorai Ogyii), 433.
75 Ibid., 331f.
76 See, e.g., Motoori Norinaga, Genji Monogatari Tama-no-ogushi (Jewels
of the Comb [i.e. Commentary] on the Tale of Genji), in Motoori
N orinaga Zenshu, V, I 13 5ff.
77 In Bendo (The Practice of the Way), Nihon Jurin Sosho, Ronben-bu, 14.
78 In Dazai's Keizai-roku (Essays on Economy), I, fol. 10.
79 In Seigaku Mondo (Questions and Answers on Religious Scholarship), 3,
quoted in Inoue Tetsujiro, Nihon Kogakuha no Tetsugaku (Philosophy
in the Japanese Classical Study School), 693.
80 Ibid., quoted in Inoue, op.cit., 698.
8 I Gakttsoku (Rules for Study), 7, quoted in Iwahashi, op.cit., 23 I.
82 Okina Mondo (Questions and Answers with an Elder), I, a, Toju Sensei
Zenshu (Collected Works of Master Toju), III, 76.
83 Kodo-taii (Outline of the Ancient Way), 3, Hirata Atsutane Zenshu
(Collected Works of Atsutane Hirata), VIII, 69.
84 See the various versions of his works written in Kana characters, Jiun
Sonja Zenshu (Collected Works of Master Jiun)' III.
85 From the Genji Monogatari (Tale of Genji), quoted in Yasusada Hiyane,
Nihon Shukyo-shi (History of Japanese Religion), 410.
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86 From the Eiga Monogatari, quoted in Hiyane, op.cit., 41o.
87 Shaseki-shu, III b, edited by Ebara Taizo, 106.
88 Kofukuji-sojo (Submitted Documents of the Kofuku Temple), in Dai-
Nippon Bukkyo Zensho (The Great Collection of Japanese Buddhist
Works) CXXIV, 107.
89 Honen Shonin Gyojo-ezu, XXI, in Jodo-shu Zensho, XVI, 240.
90 ShOgu Mondo-sho (Questions and Answers on the Wise and Foolish), in
Showa Shinshu Nichiren ShOnin Imon-zenshu, I, 474.
91 Fujiwara Arifusa, Nomori no Kagami (Mirror of a Field-Watcher), II, in
Gunsho-ruiju, 2nd ed., XXI, 263.
92 See Master Butsujo Kokushi, Daibai-zan Yawa (Night Tales [i.e. Infor-
mal Sermons] in Mt. Daibai) in Zenmon Hogo-shu, II, 603f.
93 Honen Shonin Gyojo-ezu, XXII, in Jodo-shu Zensho, XVI, 20.
94 In his letter to Kingo Shijo, in Showa Shinshu Nichiren Shonin Imon-
zenshu, II, 1407.
95 In Shugen Shimpi Gyoho Fuju-shu (Collection of Amulets in Esoteric
Shugen Practices)' VII, N ihon Dai-zokyo, Shugen Shosho-bu, II, 10 I.
(Section of Commentary on Shugen's Works.)
96 Nembutsu Myogi-shu (Collections of Nomenclatures of Invocation to
Amitabha), II, in Jodo-shu Zensho (Collected Works of Jodo Sect), X,
376.
97 In his letter to Kingo Shijo, in Showa Shinshu Nichiren ShOnin Imon-
zenshu, I, 866.
98 At the end of his play, Sonezaki Shinju, in Kindai Nihon Bungaku
Taikei (Great Series of Modern Japanese Literature), VI, 247f.
99 Jakumetsu-iraku in Japanese.
100 Shibun-ritsu (B<?oks of Discipline in Four Sections), XXIII (TaishO, XXII,
153 a); see also Shibun-ritsu Sampan Fuketsu Gyoji-shO Jo (ibid., XL,
2 a).
101 Bassui Zenji Hogo (Buddhist Teachings of Zen Master Bassui) edited by
D. T. Suzuki, 5 I.
102 A Bodhisattva is a future Buddha who wants to save all livinK beings.
103 Shugi-washo (Books on Religious Doctrines), X.
104 Kosho Bosatsu Kyokun Chomon-shu (Collection of Lectures by Kosho
Bodhisattva), in Kokubun Toho Bukkyo Sosho (Collection of Japanese
Buddhist Books), Hogo-bu (Section on Sayings), 99-100.
1°5 Nissaggiya-pacittiya, 18-20; 23; 28; Pacittiya, 10-1 I. Cf. H. Nakamura,
in Nihon Rekishi (Japanese History) (November-December 1949).
106 Hakujo Ui, Zenshu-sl1i Kenkyu (A Study on the History of the Zen
Sect), 3ff. (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1939).
1°7 Eisai (I 14 I - 1215) was the founder of the Rinzai sect of Zen Buddhism
in 119I.
108 Taisho, LXXX, 7 b.
109 Ibid., 12 a.
110 Soto Kyokai Shushogi, 22. Cf. Gleanings from Soto-Zen, edited by Ernest
Shikaku Hunt (Honolulu: Soto Mission, 1960),27.
I I I H. Nakamura, Jihi (Benevolence) (Kyoto: 1956), passim.
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I 12 The Seventeen-Article Constitution attributed to Prince Shotoku, X.
113 See Yaichi Haga, Kokuminsei Juran (Ten Lectures on the National Char-
acter), 257.
I 14 The only parallel to this may be found in some ancient Indian coun-
tries to the west of the Ganges, as we are told in Fa-hsien's Fa-kuo-chi
(Travel Records of the Buddhist Countries), and HSiian-tsang's Hsi-yii-
chi (Travel Records of the Western Lands), II.
115 See Masaharu Anesaki, Kirishitan Hakugai-shi-chu no Jimbutsu-jiseki
(History of Christian Persecutions: Persons and Their Acts). 476£.
II 6 See Tokan Tada, Chibetto (Tibet), II 3ff.; Bunkyo Aoki, Chibetto Yuki
(Travel in Tibet), 165ff.
I 17 In his ajo-taiyo-sho (An Outline of How to be Reborn into the Pure
Land), ShOwa Shinshu Honen Shonin Zenshu (Collected Works of
Saint Honen), 61£.
118 Honen ShOnin Gyojo Ezu (Illustrations of the Acts of Saint Honen),
XXI, in Showa Shinshu Honen Shonin Zenshu, XVI, 241.
119 See Ichiro Hori, "Shinko no H eizonsei ni tsuite" (On the Co-existence of
Different Faiths) in Rinri, No. 543 (October 1948).
120 See Shinsho Hanayama, Hokke-gisho no Kenkyu (Studies on the Com-
mentary'on the Lotus Siitra) 664ff. This doctrine is called The Teach-
ing of Manzen Doki.
121 Ibid.,II7f.
122 Ibid., 46o.
123 In his Jushichi-jo no Kempa (The Seventeen-Article Constitution).
124 In the Kyokijikoku-sho (A Treatise on the Teaching, the Propensity, the
Time, and the Country), Showa Shinshu Nichiren Shonin Imon-zenshu,
1,45°.
125 The Ryojin Hisho, a poetical work ascribed to Emperor Go-Shirakawa
(I 127-1192). In Nihon Koten-zensho (Collection of Japanese Ancient
Works), II, 71f.
126 See his Keiransh1iyo-shu, quoted in Taijo Tamamuro, Nihon Bukkyo-s1li
Gaisetsu (Outline History of Japanese Buddhism), 221.
127 In his Go-bunshO 3, 10; see also ibid., 2, 3; in Kochu Rennyo Shonin
O-fumi Zenshu, 56ff.; d. 24ff.
128 In the Sekihei-kaho (Disciplines of the Monastery at the Sekihei Moun-
tain), quoted in Motosue Ishida, Edo-jidai Bungaku Kosetsu, 14.
129 In the Kokiji-kitei (The Regulations of the Kokiji Temple), Article No.
13, quoted in Daijo Tokiwa, Nihon Bukkyo no Kenkyu (Studies of Japa-
nese Buddhism), 526.
130 In the chapter on Emperor Yomei in the Nihonshoki (Chronicles of
Japan).
131 See Zennosuke Tsuji, Nihon Bukkyo-shi no Kenkyu (Studies on the His-
tory of Japanese Buddhism), 96.
132 Ibid., 56.
133 In the ami Daifukuji-monjo (Documents of the Daifuku Temple in ami),
quoted in Tsuji, op.cit., 175.
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134 See Yasusada Hiyane, op.cit., 634.
135 See Kanshi Kagamishima, Chusei-bukkyoto no Jingikan to sono Bunka
(Concept of God among Medieval Buddhists and Their Culture), in
Shukya-kenkyu (1940), 813.
136 Shoku-nihonk6ki (Continued Chronicles of Japan), V, As~hi Shimbun-
sha, editor, 94.
137 In his preface to a poem in Man'yoshu (Collection of Myriad Leaves),
V, in Kokka Taikei (Great Series of Japan), II, 156.
138 Edo-bungaku-kenkyu (Studies in the Literature of the Edo Period), 14.
139 Fuju Fuse-ha (Non-receiving, Non-giving School). This branch of the
Nichiren sect, founded in 1595 by the bonze Nichia, was forbidden to-
gether with the Christian religion in 1614.
140 Kitabatake Chikafusa (1293-1354), in his Jinnoshotaki (A History of
the Legitimate Line of the Divine Emperors), bk. 1, Gunsho-ruiju,
XXIX, 1.
14 1 Quoted in Hiyane, op.cit., 679f.
142 This material has been quoted from Genchi Kata, Shinto no shukyo-
hattatushi-teki Kenkyii (Studies on Shintoism from the Viewpoint of
Historical Development), 95of., and Hiyane, op.cit., 816ff.
143 From Prince Shatoku's Seventeen-Article Constitution.
144 See his Shomangya-gisho, ch. Ichijo; cf. Shinsha Hanayama, Nihon no
Bukkya (Japanese Buddhism), 202ff.
145 Eihei-shingi (Rules of the Eihei Temple), Bendo-ho, Dagen Zenji Shingi,
edited by Dashii Okubo, 43.
146 Kyagyoshinsho, op.cit., Chapter 2, Taisho Shinshu Daizakyo, CXXXIII,
591 a.
147 Honzon Mondo-sho (Questions and Answers on the Main Buddha),
Showa Shinshu Nichiren Shonin Imonzenshu, op.cit., II, 1721f.
148 In his Letter to the Nun Kubo, ibid., II, 1768.
149 Daito Shimaji, Tendai Kyogaku-shi (History of Tendai Theology), 492.
150 Sado-gosho (Letters from Sado), Showa Shinshu Nichiren Shonin Imon-
zenshu, op.cit., I, 842.
151 In the Kyakijikoku-sha, and the Shogu Mondo-sM, ShOwa Shinshu Nichi-
ren Shanin Imon-zenshu, I, 447f. and 579f. In his two volume work,
Senji-sM (Considerations on the Times), Nichiren elaborates on how
other sects are not fit for his time; see Showa Shinshu Nichiren Shonin
Imon-zenshu, I, 1189-1241.
152 Honcho-jinja-ko (Discourses on Japanese Shrines), quoted in Masatomo
Bamba, Nihon Jukyo-shi (History of Japanese Confucianism), I03ff.
153 In the preface to the HonchO-jinja-ko, Razan Sensei Bunshu, II, 118.
154 Razan Bu!!shu (Collected Essays of Razan), LVI.
155 Okina Mondo (Dialogues with an Elder), III, Toju Sensei Zenshu (Col-
lected Works of Master Toju) , III, 248.
156 Ibid., 251.
157 In his Miwa Monogatari (Tales of the Miwa Shrine), VII, Banzan
Zenshu (Collected Works of Banzan)' V, 67. Elsewhere he says:
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"If Chinese sages should corne to Japan they would subscribe to Shinto
which has been our traditional Way." (Banzan Zenshu, I, 12.)
158 Quoted in Hiyane, op.cit., 943.
159 See Sabur5 Ienaga, Chusei Bukkyoshiso-shi Kenkyu (Studies on the His-
tory of Medieval Buddhist Thought), 104, and Iwahashi, op.cit., 301.
160 Jindai-Kuketsu (Oral Tradition on the Divine Age), quoted in Hiyane,
op.cit., 660.
161 Kokuiko (Discourses on the Genuine Thought of Japan), Kamo Mabuchi
Zenshu (Collected Works of Kamo Mabuchi), X, 368.
162 Okina no Fumi (Letters of an Elderly Man), Chapter 6.
163 Ibid., Chapter I.
164 We do not contend that the Japanese thinkers mentioned above did
not ever admit the universality of the Way. Banzan Kumazawa, for in-
stance, said: "The Way is the Way of all gods, heaven and earth. It is
.universally valid throughout the whole world, China, and Japan."
Shugi-washo (Book of Righteousness and Harmony), Chapter I I,
Banzan Zenshu, I, 286.
165 In colloquial Japanese, "sum" (to do).
166 See B. Spuler, Die Goldene Horde (Leipzig: 1943), and also Die Mon-
golen in Iran (Berlin: 195 5).
167 At the rededication of a famous Buddhist temple in October 1958, the
numerous sake barrels piled up as offerings in front of the temple and
the booths advertising various brands of whisky certainly were in con-
trast to the original teaching of the Buddha.
168 Yaichi Haga, op.cit., 12I.
169 In the Ryojiri Hisho (a collection of popular songs), II, I c., 1°4.
170 Hojoki (The Private Papers of Kamo no Ch5mei of the Ten-Foot-Square-
Hut), Iwanami Bunko edition, 61f.
171 In the introduction to the Iwanami Bunko edition of the Hojoki; 4.
172 Tsurezuregusa, Chapter 10 (Nihon Koten-Bungaku Taikei, XXX, 97).
173 See Yaichi Haga, op.cit., 126ff.
174 Man'yoshu, No. 3846.
175 See Otoo Fujii, Edo Bungaku Kenkyu (A Study of Literature in the Edo
Era),7off.
176 Ibid.,108ff.
177 Kensho-jobutsu-gan-hOsho (An Advertisement of the Pill for Becoming a
Buddha), in Zenmon-hogo-shu (Collection of Zen Buddhist Teachings),
II,239f.
178 Hyakuhatchoki (a pun on the three religions, each represented by a rea-
son, in Japanese Ti, which also stands for a distance of about Y14 of a
mile).
179 See Motosue Ishida, Edojidai Bungaku Kosetsu (A Survey of Literature
in the Edo Era), 9.
180 See Haga, op.cit., Kokuminsei Juran (Ten Essays on the National Char-
acter), 142ff.
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181 See, for instance, H. Keyserling, Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen (Travel
Diary of a Philosopher), 583.
Chapter 35
1 Izuru Shimmura, Gengogaku Josetsu (Introduction to Linguistics)
(Tokyo: Kabundo, 1923), 172.
2 Nyoja Zenji Goroku (Analects of Zen Master Ju-ching), I (Taisha,
XLVIII, 121 c).
3 This can be seen in Sanskrit and German, for example.
4 In his novel, Deutsche Liebe, Max Muller relates the story of the pure
love of· a noble youth for a princess. The princess speaks to the youth
as follows:
"We were close friends as children; and surely this relation be-
tween us has not changed. Then, I cannot say 'Sie' when I speak to you,
as to a stranger. But it's not right for me to use the ~amiliar word 'du,'
so .the only thing we can do is to talk in English. [In English] Do you
understand me?"
Morimine Sagara, translator, Ai wa Eien ni (Love Is Everlasting),
33. This is the same problem we have in Japanese.
5 Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan (1925), 78-79.
6 A very similar phenomenon occurs in languages structurally close to Japa-
nese, such as Mongolian and Manchurian.
7 Cf.Makura-no-sashi, 21, in which the plural form kodomo-domo (chil-
dren + plural) is used.
8 Is there not some relevance to this in the usage in Japanese dialect of
ware ("I") in the sense of "you"? I wish specialists would instruct me
on this point.
9 Doshii okubo, editor, Dagen Zenshi Shingi (Rules Ordained by Master
Dagen), (Iwanami Bunko series), 95.
10 Dhammapada in Pali, No. 288.
I I Ibid., No. 160
12 Ibid., Nos. 236, 238, 380.
13 Ayaranga, I. 3· 3· 4·
14 Prince Shotoku's Seventeen-Article Constitution, 2.
15 Tetsura Watsuji, Sanna Shisa To Sona Denta (The Idea of Reverence for
the Emperor and Its Tradition), 94.
16 Fujiwara Teika, in his Eika Taigai (Principles of Poetic Composition),
says: "There is no master of waka (Japanese poetry). We learn from
older poems alone. Who, having steeped himself in the old style and
learned words from our predecessors, will not be able to write poetry?"
17 The "pillow-wold" (makura-kotoba) chihayabum (greatly powerful) was
prefixed both to kami (god) and uji (clan). This may be because the
uji-no-kami (clan head) was originally a god. There are a good many
questions concerning the ujigami (clan deity) which should be dis-
cussed further, but I cannot go into them here. Cf. E. O. Reischauer
and J. K. Fairbank, East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston: 1958),
469-471.
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18 Cf. Naoichi Miyachi, Jingishi Taikei (Outline of the History of the
Deities), 24. "There are cases where the ujigami is not an ancestral god,
as for example, the Isonokami Shrine of the Mononobe clan. Then, too,
there are ujigami who were ancestral gods, two important examples of
which are the worship of Amenokoyane-no-mikoto by the Nakatomi clan
at the Hiraoka Shrine in Kawachi province, and the worship of Futotama-
no-mikoto by the Imibe clan at the Futotama Shrine in Yamato prov-
ince" (ibid., 25). Many points in connection with the clan system must
unfortunately be omitted. Cf. Reischauer and Fairbank, op.cit., 474.
19 Tetsuro Watsuji, op.cit., Sonno Shiso To Sono Dento (Reverence to the
Emperor and Its Tradition), 46-47.
20 Kokuminsei JUTOn, op.cit., 5Iff. [Reischauer and Fairbank (op.cit., 540,
628) insist on the subordination of the family in Japan to the clan and
to the State.-Editor's note.]
21 Man'yoshu, XVIII.
22 Gempei Seisuiki, XXI (Record of the Rise and Fall of the Minamoto and
Taira clans, 857-1185).
23 Ushiuma (Cows and Horses), Suhajikami (Vinegar Leaves).
24 Sandai Jitsuroku (Annals of the Reigns of the Three Emperors), under
the 16th'day of the loth month of the second year of Jokan (860 A.D.).
25 Kaom Nakada, "Waga Taiko ni Tochi no Sonraku Kyoyusei ya Kazoku
Kyosansei ga atta ka" ("Did Ancient Japan Have an Equal Division of
Land Use and a Communal Family System?"), in the law-journal
Horitsu Shimpo, No. 737 (July 1947).
26 Based on a lecture delivered by Professor Takeyoshi Kawashima at the
first conference of the Oriental Culture Institute (Toyo Bunka Kenkyu-
kai), November 8, 1947.
27 I am indebted to Professor Nobom Niida for facts on the adoption of
children in recent China.
28 Masatomo Bamba, Nihon Jukyo-TOn (A Study on Confucianism in
Japan), 134, 188.
29 For example, the custom of kaneoya practiced in the vicinity of the city
of Mishima in Shizuoka prefecture and in part of the Izu peninsula.
Kaneoya (also known as kanaoya) means "the tooth-blackening parent."
The name takes its origin from the fact that, at a wedding, someone was
named kaneoya and presented the new bride with. a tooth-blackening
implement. (Takeyoshi Kawashima, Toshitaka Shiomi, "Kaneoya ni
tsuite," in Minzokugaku Kenkyu, XII, No. 1,33££.)
30 One also finds such sentiments as "although the Perfect One desires to
enter Nirvi'iJ;la, a father cannot bear to cast his son into the flames and
turn his back on him." Shinsho Hanayama, Hokke Gisho no Kenkyu
(Studies on the Commentary on the Lotus Siitra), 480.
3 I Kyodaisho (Treatise on Proper Brotherly Attitudes).
32 Hyoeshi-dono Gohenji (Reply to Mr. Hyoeshi).
33 "One forgets his own body and soul, placing himself in the home of
Buddha; one relies on Buddha and follows him. Then, one uses no bodily
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strength, nor exercises power of mind, but separates from birth and death,
and becomes a Buddha."-ShobO Genzo (Essence of Buddhism) by
Dogen.
34 "With the Christian persecution of the Tokugawa period, the household
Buddhist shrine spread throughout the country. Ikko CJodo Shin sect)
believers call it the naibutsu (interior Buddha), which they worship in a
thoroughgoing manner. At the morning and the evening services, the
religious sentiments of the children are nurtured, and their character
trained. In the Ikko sect in particular the image of Buddha or the Holy
Name is central and the ceremonies honoring ancestral spirits are an
accretion due to the racial characteristics of the faith of Japan." Quoted
from Daijo Tokiwa, Shina Bukkyo no Kenkyu (A Study of Chinese
Buddhism) (Tokyo: 1943), III, 80.
35 "Home Buddhist chapels (butsudan) are peculiar to Japan, and are
gener~lly not found in China or Korea. They are an expression of the
ancestor-worship of the Japanese race. . . . I have not investigated every
part of China, but, from my own casual observation, I never saw a home
chapel centered about the Buddha. From late reports we learn that there
are Buddhist altars in the gardens of middle- and upper-class homes in
Shansi and Meng-ehiang. Whether these have the Same significance as
the Japanese butsudan is yet to be investigated. I believe that the home
Buddhist chapel centering about the Buddha may be a peculiarly Japa-
nese phenomenon." Daijo Tokiwa, Nihon Bukkyo no Kenkyu (A Study
of Japanese Buddhism), 61-62. "Since there is nothing corresponding
to them in Korea, it is probably safe to assert that they are absent from
the Korean tradition. [In China] in the homes of the gentry there are,
of course, rooms in which the ancestors are worshiped, the question
being whether such places are centered about the statue of the Buddha.
Wherever you go, for instance, in niches at entrances, there are Taoist
images, and there are also statues of Kuan-yin at appropriate spots in the
house; but are they not quite apart from the worship of ancestral spirits?"
(Ibid., 80-81). The Chinese "butsudan" is a home altar, above which
hangs a large colored triptych of the Buddha, the Law, and the Priest-
hood; on a table in front are offered cakes, fruit, and vegetables, but meat
and fish are strictly prohibited. Here altars are adorned with a doban (a
part of banner used in Buddhist ceremonies). Cf. de Groot, Religious
Systems of China (Leyden: 1892), 6 vols. (Chugoku Shukyo Seido,
translated by Kinzaburo Shimizu and Hakudo Oginome), I, 123. "In
Tibet, even the poorest households have butsudan, which are the center
of the religious ceremonies of the family. Butsudan are placed in guest
rooms." (Tokan Tada, Chibetto [Tibet] in Iwanami Shinsho, 59). How-
ever, in Tibet, too, they appear to have no special connection with
ancestor-worship.
36 Tannisho. English versions: The Tannisho (Tract on Deploring the
Heterodoxies): An Important Textbook of Shin Buddhism founded by
Shinran (1173-1262), translated by Tosui Imadate (Kyoto: Eastern
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Buddhist Society, 1928); Tannisho: A Tract Deploring Heresies of
Faith (Kyoto: Higashi Honganji, 1961), in commemoration of the
700th anniversary of Shinran's death (1262).
37 Cf. Taij6 Tamamuro, Nihon Bukkyo-shi Gaisetsu (Outline of the His-
tory of Japanese Buddhism), 194-
38 Yoshiharu Scott Matsumoto, "Contemporary Japan: The Individual and
the Group," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society. New
Series, L, Part 1 (January 1960).
39 Ibid., 38.
40 Ibid., 60.
41 E. O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1950), 86.
41a Cf. H. Nakamura, "Basic Features of the Legal, Political, and Economic
Thought of Japan" in Charles A. Moore, editor, Philosophy and Culture
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1962), 631-646.
42 The first article of the Injunctions reads as follows: "Harmony is precious;
obedience is to be most honored. Men all have their particular interests,
and there are few enlightened ones among them. Consequently they
may disobey their lords and parents, and quarrel with the neighboring
villages: But when those above are harmonious and those below are well
disposed, and there is accord in their discussions, then matters progress
spontaneously. If this is the case, what is there which will not succeed?"
43 Masatomo Bamba, op.cit., 83.
44 Ibid., 226-227.
45 Under the first day, hinoe tora of the 2nd month, spring, 2nd year of the
reign of the Empress Suiko (594 A.D.).
46 "In the Kaimokusho it is said: 'Those of all sentient beings who must be
respected are three, namely, master, teacher, and parent.' I say, these three
occur in Confucianism, both orthodox and heterodox. The purpose of this
book KaimokusluJ is to reveal the master-parent-teacher doctrine in Bud-
dhism. Although the teaching of master-parent-teacher indeed does ap-
pear among Confucians and pagans, yet, when the Buddhist doctrine of
master-parent-teacher is revealed, all these become as retainers, pupils,
and children. Therefore it is proper that the highest expression of the
master-parent-teacher doctrine be found among Buddhists. It may be
asked, what is the nature of this Buddhist doctrine of master-parent-
teacher that you talk about: I answer, that is a further question, which I
propose to deal with in due course." Nitch6, Kaimokusho Shikemmon
(Private Comments on the Awakening to the Truth) No. I, in
Nichirenshu Shugaku Zensho (Complete Works on the Religious
Studies of the Nichiren Sect), CMshi Gosho Kemmonshu (Comments
on Nichiren's Works by Rev. CM) No. I, p. 191. There is also a work by
Nichiren called Shushishin Gosho (Writings on Master-Teacher-Parent)'
On the question of the master-teacher-parent doctrine in the Nichiren
sect, see, for example, Chi6 Yamakawa, Hokke Shisoshijo no Nichiren
Shonin (Saint Nichiren in the History of Hokke Thought), 643ff.
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47 He further says: "In my OpInIOn, there are three authorities for the
Japanese from the Emperor down to the masses of the people. These are
first, parents; second, teachers; third, service of the lord." Shimoyama
Goshosoku (A Reply to the Constable of Shimoyama).
48 In the judaijusho (Chapter of the Ten Vows) of the Shoman Siitra, there
is this text: "From this day until enlightenment, in the various situations
where veneration and respects are due, do not be arrogant." The Shoman-
gyo Hokutsu comments, "Parents and teachers are to be venerated, elder
brothers and sisters are to be respected." (Taisho, XXXVII, 22 a.) How-
ever, Prince ShOtoku in his commentary Shoman-gyo Gisho (I, 14 b) says,
"three categories are to be venerated, those of tne rank of elder brother
are to be respected." In other words, whereas the Shoman-gyo Hokutsu
lists only "parents and teachers" among those to be venerated, Prince
Shotoku mentions three, adding "sovereign" to the traditional two.
(ShinshO Hanayama, Shoman-gyo Gisho no Kenkyu, 431.)
Myokii comments" 'Three categories are to be venerated' means
sovereign, parent and teacher...." (Nihon Bukkyo Zensho edition,
Complete Works On Japanese Buddhism, I I b.)
Gyonen, citing the text of Myoku, says, "The sovereign and the
other two categories are all to be venerated; all those of the rank of
elder brother are to be respected" (Shogenki VI, in Nihon Bukkyo
Zensho edition, 6 b). (Shinsho Hanayama, op.cit., 468, note 217.)
49 Hoonjo (A Treatise on Reciprocation).
50 Hagakurekikigaki (Comments on the Way of the Samurai) No. 2
(Iwanami Bunko edition, 114).
51 Tetsubun Miyazaka, Zen ni okeru Ningen Keisei (Formation of Man in
Zen), 210, 221.
52 Hakuon Saigusa, Miura Baien no Tetsugaku (Miura Baien's Philosophy),
530. See also 30 I, 5 I 7.
53 Masaharu Anesaki, Kirishitan Hakugaishichu no Jimbutsu Jiseki (Acts
of Persons in the History of the Persecution of Christianity), 479. Also
Kirishitan Dendo no Kohai (Rise and Fall of Christian Missions), 789ff.
54 Anesaki, Kirishitan DendO no Kohai, 778.
55 Ibid., 782ff. However, not all apostates from Christianity took their
stand on the basis of the morality of rank. For example, the Hakirishitan
of Suzuki Shosan does not bring up morality of rank but criticizes Chris-
tianity in a rational manner. However, such an attitude is quite excep-
tional in the T okugawa period. See also Seiyo Kibun (Records of the
West), III.
56 Kemmyo Nakazawa, Shijo no Shinran (Shinran as a Historical Person).
This work of pure scholarship has been refuted by Bunsho Yamada in his
Shinshushiko (Historical Studies on the Shin Sect), but the fact remains
that there are no materials which constitute positive proof that Shiran
was the son of Arinori Hino.
57 Sado Gokanki Sho (Sojourn in Sado).
58 Honzon Mondo Sho (Questions and Answers on the Principal Buddha).
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59 Similar assertions are found elsewhere in the works of Nichiren.
"Nichiren, in this incarnation, was born a poor and lowly man; he came
forth from a family of CaI.lcJala" (SaM Gosho). "He who is 'born of a
poor and lowly family' (prophesied in the Hatsunaion Siitra) is I."
Kaimokusho (Awakening to the Truth), II.
60 Kokubun Toho Bukkyo Sosho (Series of Buddhist Works in Japanese);
Denkibu (Section on Biography), Part 1,432.
61 Zennosuke Tsuji, Nihon Bunka to Bukkyo (Japanese Culture and Bud-
dhism), 56; Sh6son Miyamoto, ChUM Shiso oyobi sono Hattatsu (The
Thought of the Middle Path and Its Development). Cf. Tsunoda,
Keene, De Bary, editors. Sources of Japanese Tradition, 273f.
62 "Now, Great Nippon is the land of the gods. The gods come out from
Paradise and assume the fonn of local manifestations of the Buddha.
Naturally this should be the land where the Law of Buddha is most
widespread." (Sakahoko.)
63 Gessui Gosho (Epistle of Nichiren).
64 Hojo Tokimune ni Atom Sho (Message Addressed to the Regent Toki-
mune).
65 Kanke Bunso, III (Kitano Bunso, II, 24 in Kita-no-shi) (Collected Writ-
ings of'Michizane Sugawara [845-903], in Records of Kitano Shrine).
66 Sazan Kan (Reminiscences in Late Years) (1748-1827), Fuyu no
Hikage, I, in Nihon Jurin Sosho, Kaisetsu-bu (Japanese Series of Con-
fucian Writings), II, 9-10.
67 Komo Toki, Synopses of Lectures on Mencius, I, in Yoshida Shoin Zenshu
(Collected Works of Yoshida Shoin), II, 263.
68 This account is based principally on the Joagon-kyo (Siitra of Long Dis-
courses), XXII. (Seki-kyo, Honnen-bon, XII.) But similar notices are
scattered through various scriptural texts. Joagon-kyo, VI. Shoen-kyo
(Taisho, I, 37-38); Pali Digha-Nikaya, III, 91-94; Dairutan-kyo, VI
(TaishO, I, 308); Kise-kyo, X (Taisho, I, 362-363); Kise Inpon-kyo, X
(Taisho, I, 417); Butsuhongyoju-kyo (Biography of the Buddha), IV
(Taisho, III, 672 c); Shibunritsu, XXXI (Taisho, XXII, 779); Shosho-
chiron (Explanations of Things to be Known) (Taishi5, XXXII, 23 I a);
Shukomakadai-kyo (Siitra of the Elected King) (Taisho, III, 933). Cf.
Sources of Indian Tradition, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 13 If.
69 Kusha-ron, XII, 14 a (Chinese Buddhist Exegesis of Dharma). Cf. Sir
Charles Eliot, Hinduism and Buddhism in 3 volumes, and Japanese Bud-
dhism (London: 1935).
70 Cf. the Mahii-parinibbiina suttanta (Mahii-parinirvii1,'la-sutra) and the
various Chinese scriptures corresponding to it.
71 Jinno Shi5to-ki (On the Legitimate Succession of the Emperor), I; d.
Tsunoda, Keene, De Bary, Sources of Japanese Tradition, 279.
72 Shutsujo-shogo (Critical Aspersions on Buddhism), by Atsutane Hirata.
73 Cf. Konkomyo Saisho-a-kyo, I (TaishO, XVI, 406 a); VI (Taisho, XVI,
432 b). Cf. also Konkomyo-kyo, II (Taisho, XVI, 344 b, c). The corre-
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spondence between the Nihon shoki and these siitras was pointed out
by Kenko Fujii, "Kimmei-ki no Bukkyo Denrai no Kiji ni tsuite" (On a
Passage on the Advent of Buddhism in the Reign of Emperor Kimmei)
in Shigaku Zasshi (Journal of Historical Science), XXXVI, 653-656.
In passing, it should be noted that the passage of the Kimmei-ki (6th
year, 9th month) which relates that Paikche built a 16-foot statue of
the Buddha and presented it to the Emperor is a reproduction of the
text of the Kudara Hongi (Hiroshi Ikeuchi, Nihon lodaishi no Ichi
Kenkyu [A Study on the History Ancient Japan], 325).
74 Sten Konow, Kharo~thi Inscriptions (Calcutta: 1929).
75 Tamamuro, op.cit., 4.
76 Shoku Nihongi (Chronicles of Japan, Continued), 17.
77 Tamamuro, op.cit., 17.
78 Nihon Daizo-kyo, Hodabushosho, III, 2-4. (Japanese Tripiraka Collection
of Buddhist Vaipulya Writings.)
79 Kairitsu Denraiki (A.D. 830), in Dai Nihon Bukkyo Zensho, 105. (In-
troduction of Vinaya, 830 A.D., in "Collected Works of Japanese Bud-
dhism.")
80 The Eight Rules among the Sange Gakusho Shiki (Rules for Students
of Mt. Hiei). Further, in the Kenkairon Engi we find the phrase "exalt
Buddhism and protect the state," and in the Rokusho Hoto Gammon,
"establish and hold firmly to Buddhism and safeguard the state."
81 Shoku Nihon-koki, IV, 2nd year of Showa (A.D. 835), 1st month, letter
of Kiikai to the Emperor.
82 Sandai litsuroku (Records of Reigns of the Three Emperors), XLI,
Reign of Emperor Yozei, 6th year of Genkei (A.D. 882), 5th month,
14th day.
83 Shoku Nihon-kaki, XII, 9th year of Showa (A.D. 842), 12th month,
17th day.
84 Sandai litsuroku, VII, Reign of Emperor Seiwa, 5th year of ,okan (A.D.
863), 9th month, 6th day.
85 Sandai litsuroku, VII, Reign of Emperor Seiwa, 8th year of ,okan (A.D.
866), 6th month, 2 I st day.
86 Sandai litsuroku, XI, Reign of Emperor Seiwa, 7th year of ,okan (A.D.
865), 7th month, 19th day.
87 Sandai litsuroku, XII, Reign of Emperor Seiwa, 8th year of 'akan
(A.D. 866), 5th month, 29th day. Further, the following passage occurs
in a letter addressed to the Emperor by Bishop Henjo; "When the sun of
Buddhism is again at its height, the Imperial dignity will be safeguarded,
the virtue of the Imperial House long endure, and the State will be
peaceful and safe." Sandai litsuroku, XLVII, 1st year of Ninna (A.D.
885), 3rd month.
88 The pagoda of Eisai in the Kennin Temple, Higashiyama, Kyoto, is called
Kazen gokoku-in ("Exalt Zen, protect the nation").
89 Kyodo Ito, Dogen Zenji Kenkyu (Study on the Zen Master Dagen), I,
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90 Kangyo Hachiman Sho (Nichiren's Remonstrances Against the State's
Attitude to Religion).
9 I Rissho Ankoku Ron. However, the first of these quotes appears as the
words of a guest addressed to the host.. For an English translation of
parts of this first great work of Nichiren, d. Arthur Lloyd, The Creed
of Half Japan.
92 Ongikuden (Rendition of the Esoteric Oral Doctrine), at the end.
93 Ofumi (Epistles), 2:10; d. also 2:6, 3:10, 3:13, 4:1 and Jogai Ofumi
CYiish9 Tokushi, Rennyo Shonin Ofumi Zenshii 48, 72). Rennyo's Com-
plete Epistles.
94 Rennyo ShOnin Coichidaiki Kikigaki (Notes on Rennyo's Life), at the
end.
95 This has been pointed out by Yukifusa Hattori. (Kokudo, I, 91.) Shin-
ran noto (Notes on Shiman), XXXII, 2 I I.
96 Hokke-kyo (Lotus Siitra), Anrakugy6 section. A similar view is expressed
in the Shob6nenjo-kyo, L (Taisho, 294 c-295 a).
97 Based on Kazuo Higo, Nihon Kokka Shiso (The Concept of the Japanese
Nation), 78-79.
98 Taiheiki (historical novel based on the "Great Peace"-really on the
Civil Wars), XXI. .
99 The Eighty Volume Kegon, XXVIII. (TaishO, X, 152 a-c; LIX, 3 I 2 a.)
100 Based on Yasusada Hiyane, Nihon Shiikyo-shi (The History of Japanese
Religions), 648 .. Moreover, Takeshige, SOI). of Kikuchi Taketoki, is said
to have had the same concept (ibid., 648-649).
101 But Jiun did not necessarily attempt to have Buddhists accept intact all
the social ranks of Japanese society. Thus, in the same Kokiji kitei (K6ki
Temple Rules), he warns that "the adopted sons of the nobility should
not seek public office." Cf. Daij6 Tokiwa, Nihon Bukkyo nO Kenkyii
(History of Japanese Buddhism), 526ff.
102 When Chinese political thought was brought to ancient Japan, the Japa-
nese ruling class, in order to govern the land, established the Taih6 code
in imitation of the Tang system. This code, however, differed from the
Tang Model, in that it embodied considerations of social policy. In
China, land was distributed to each family in proportion to the labor
capacity of each. In accordance with the Taih6 'code, however, equal
shares of land were allotted to boys of no labor capacity and even to girls.
The huge income of the national treasury was spent for the welfare of the
people and their cultural institutions. Cf. Tetsur6 Watsuji, "Asuka Nara
Jidai no Seijiteki Ris6" (Political Ideals of the Asuka and Nara Periods),
in his Nihon Seishinshi Kenkyii (Intellectual History of Japan).
103 Dengyo Daishi ZenshiiCCollected Works of Dengy6), IV, 719.
104 Toshiiyo, in Honen Shonin Zenshii (Collected Works of Saint H6nen),
edited by S. Mochizuki, 528.
105 Tannisho (Tracts Deploring Heterodoxies).
106 Ibid.
107 Shoshinge ("Hymn of True Faith"). Cf. The Shoshin Ge: The Catha
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of True Faith in the Nembutsu, translated under the direction of Daien
Fugen (Kyoto: 1961).
108 By the term shinshu Shinran meant the tradition of Pure Land Buddhism
from Indian masters up to Honen, recorded in the Kosawasan (Hymns
Extolling the High Priests) and the Jodo-monruiju-sho (Anthology of
Scriptural Passages Relevant to Pure Land).
109 The "Easy Way"- stands in contrast to the "Difficult Way" and means
the teaching of Pure Land Buddhism (or especially the Shin-shu teach-
ing, in this context), which was thought by its followers to be the
easiest and shortest road to salvation. Another's strength (or External
Power) refers to the Original Vow of Amida (Amitiibha) Buddha, rely-
ing on which we are sure of our final salvation and enlightenment.
1loIn the beginning of the T annisho.
I I 1 Chio Yamakawa, Hokke-shiso-shi-jo no Nichiren ShOnin (Saint Nichiren
in the History of the Lotus Philosophy), 55 I.
I I 2 Visi~~acarita Bodhisattva, to whom Sakyamuni entrusted the propagation
of the Lotus Sutra in the future world.
113 In a letter of the year 1278.
114 According to T'ien-t'ai, all living beings, including holy persons, are di-
vided into ten groups, each of them having its own sphere.
I 15 Fa-hua-hsuan-i (the Profound Teachings of the Lotus Sutra), VII
(Taisho, XXXIII, 771).
116 Fa-hua-i-shu (Commentary on the Lotus Sutra), X (Taisho, XXXIV,
599)·
I 17 Jushiki-kanjo-kuden-sho (Oral Teachings on a Consecration).
118 Nichiren's Letter to 6ta Kingo, San-dai-hiho-rinsho no Koto (On Inherit-
ing the Three Great Esoteric Practices).
119 Shobo Genzo Zuimonki (Gleanings of Master Dogen's Sayings), II, edited
byT. Watsuji (Tokyo: Iwanami), 34.
120 Ibid., I, 20.
121 Ibid., I, 12.
122 Shabo Genzo (Subtleties of the Doctrine), chapter on Bendowa, the sixth
disputation.
123 Shobo Genzo Zuimonki, VI, 104.
124 Ju-ching-ho~shang-yu-lu(Collected Works of Master Ju-ching), (TaishO,
XLVIII,130- I 31).
125 Ju-ching-ch'an-shih-hsu-yu-lu (Collected Works of Master Ju-ching,
Continued) (Taisho, XLVIII, 135 a.).
126 Daijo Tokiwa, Shina-bukkyo no Kenkyu (A Study of Chinese Buddhism),
III,82.
127 At the end of the Gaijasho (Correction of Heresy).
128 Jodo-homon-genryu-sho (Transmission of Pure Land Teaching), in Jodo-
shu Zensho (Complete Works of the Jodo Sect), 15,594.
129 Shinran, Shujisho (On Desires).
130 E.g., Mo-ho-chih-kuan (A Tendai Work on Great Meditation), (Taisho,
XLVI,33·)
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131 Dait6 Shimaji, Tendai-kyogaku-shi (A History of Tendai Philosophy),
468.
132 According to D. Shimaji, Shinran wrote the Kyo-gyo-shin-sho in the prov-
ince of Hitachi under the influence of Buddhism in the Kant6 District
which had established the special tradition of the doctrine, practice, and
illumination. Shinran added faith to the above-mentioned three.
133 Nikka-Bukkyo-Kenkyukai-Nempo (Annual Publication of the Japanese-
Chinese Association of Buddhist Studies), the first year, 9.
134 This sentence is also cited in the KyogyoshinshO, III, I.
135 Shobo Genzo, chapter on Sanjiishichi-hon Bodaibunpo (The 37 Constitu-
ents of Wisdom).
136 Ibid., chapter on Bendowa (Practice of the Way).
137 Ibid., chapter on Shoji (Life and Death).
138 Tun-yu-yao-men (Essentials of Immediate Enlightenment), edited by
H. Ui, (Tokyo: Iwanami), 61.
139 ShobO Genzo, chapter on Keisei-sanshoku (Natural Scenery). This pas-
sage is often recited as the Vow of Joyo Daishi (Dogen).
140 Ching-te-chuan-teng-lu (Transmission of the Lamps of Religion), XIV.
141 Shabo Genzo Zuimonki, III.
142 Roankyo '(literally, Ass-saddle Bridge), II, § 70.
143 Fumoto no Kusawake (Climbing at the Foot of a Mountain), in Zen-
mon-hogo-shu (Collected Works of Zen Masters), II, 545.
144 Shishin-gohon-sho (A Treatise on Four Faiths and Five Stages of Prac-
titioners).
145 Niike-gosho (Reply to Esquire Niike).
146 Himegoze Gohenji (Reply to Lady Hime).
147 Daito Shimaji, Nihon-bukkyo Kyogaku-shi (History of Japanese Buddhist
Theology),6.
148 Soshitsujikyo-sho (Commentary on the Susiddhikara Siitra), in Dainihon
Bukkyo Zensho (Complete Works of Japanese Buddhism), XLIII, 268.
149 KyakuhaibOki (Notes in Oblivion) in Taiz6 Ebara (1894-1948), Myoe
Shonin (Saint Myoe), 25.
150 Mujinto (Infinite Light), (1918), 7f.
151 Rokujo Gakuha (Bulletin of the Rokujo), (1917), 166.
152 The Chinese version of the Mahiiparinirvij);ta-sutra, XXXVI. (Taisho, XII,
575 c.)
153 Shoson Miyamoto, Chudo Shiso oyobi sono Hattatsu (The Concept of
the Middle Path and its Development], 68.
154 "When a man is satisfied only believing the words of the Buddha and
neglecting.his own efforts to seek after truth, his faith is superficial and
of no avail for him." Zengenshosenshutojo (ch'an-yiian-chu-ehiian-chi-
tu-hsii), edited by Hakuju Ui, 35.
155 Chio Yamakawa, op.cit., 355.
156 Ibid., 652.
157 Kazen Gokoku Ron, Preface.
158 Shabo Genzo, chapter on Kenbutsu (Seeing the Buddha).
159 Ibid., chapter on Bukkya (Buddhism).
160 Ibid., chapter on Bukkyo (Buddhist Siitras).
161· ShabO Genza Zuimonki, IV.
162 See supra, Chapter 16.
163 In the Hakyaki (Hakyo Memoirs) the words of Dagen's master Ju-ehing
are said to be as follows: "Besides Kasyapa MataIiga, our master Bodhi-
dharma came from the west to China to initiate us in the doctrines and
the practices of Buddhism. This is the reason for the words 'kya-ge-
betsu-den.' There cannot be two different teachings of the Buddha. Be-
fore our master came to this country of the East, there had been only
the practice and no proper teacher to control it. The advent of our mas-
ter to this country is comparable to the coronation of a king in a certain
country. All the land, all the treasures and all the people are under the
command of the king." This may not be, however, a faithful rendition
of the words of Ju-ching. In the record of his sayings, there is no sen-
tence expressing such an idea. On the contrary, we can find in it words
like "to practice true Zen, one does not think about the masters." And
we should be reminded of the fact that he criticized severely the propo-
sition of the founding master Bodhidharma: "Nothing can be called
holy" saying "He [Bodhidharma] created it only to violate it himself."
It is very probable, therefore, that the above quotation, the authority of
which Dagen attributed to his master, are the words of Dagen himself.
Even if it is a faithful quotation of the words of his master Ju-ehing,
it is very significant (exhibiting the Japanese inclination to worship au-
thority) that Dagen selected this paragraph among many other sayings
of his master and attached particular importance to it.
164 ShabO Genza, chapter on Shizenbiku (A Monk Practicing the Four Medi-
tations).
165 Ha-on Jo (On Gratitude).
166 Myoichime Gohenji (Reply to a Woman Myaichi).
167 Sokichi Tsuda, Shina Shis6 to Nihon (Chinese Philosophies and Japan),
43-66.
168 Benmei (Discussions on Names), I, the section on Zenrya sansoku (Three
articles in goodness).
169 Tetsura Watsuji, Sonna Shisa to sono Denta (Reverence for the Emperor
and its Tradition), 230.
170 Uiyamabumi (First Climbing of a Mountain), in Motoori Norinaga
Zenshu (Collected Works of Norinaga Motoori), edited by Haei Mo-
toori, IV, 607.
171 It is wrong to assume that none of the Japanese in the past took a criti-
cal attitude to established authority. I treated this subject in my recent
work Kinsei Nihon ni okeru Hihanteki Seishin no IchikOsatsu (A Study
of the Critical Spirit in Modem Japan-Various Problems of Japanese
Thought, 1949). Here, at least, we can say that the Japanese in the
past were wanting in the spirit of criticism.
172 In the article of the Goseibai Shikimoku (Penal Law), customary law
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which had been established prior to Yoritomo is frequently referred to as
"established at the time of the great Shogun (i.e. Yoritomo)"; this would
seem to be an example of the same situation. Seijiro Takigawa, "Nihon
Horitsu Shiso no Tokushitsu" (Special Characteristics of Japanese Legal
Thought), (Iwanami K8za, Toyo Shicho), 48-49' Cf. also Tsunoda,
Keene, and De Bary, Sources of Japanese Tradition, 340-343.
173 Kokuminsei Juron ("Ten Essays on the National Character"), 31-32.
174 Ibid',34-
175 "Raja rajyam" (Kau~ilya, Arthasastra, edited by R. Shama Sastry, 2nd
edition, 325).
176 Ibid., 33-34.
177 Kojiki, Chapter I.
178 Ibid., 21.
179 Tetsuro Watsuji, Sonno Shis8 to sono Dento (Emperor Worship and Its
Tradition), 59ft For comparable ideas in India, cf. my book, Shukyo
to Shakai Rinri (Religious and Social Ethics), (Tokyo: 1959), 286-326.
180 Ibid., 49-51.
181 Ibid., 67.
I 82 Cf. N a~atomi-barai (a kind of spell).
183 Emperor Shomu, Edict on the construction of the Great Buddha, loth
month, 743.
184 However, in the very understanding of the content of the term "revolu-
tion" (kakumei, ko-ming,) there appears to have been a change in the
course of time. For example, in the Kakumei Kammon (Considerations
on Revolution) of Kiyoyuki Miyoshi (Gunsho ruiju, zatsu, Collection
of Various Works and Miscellanies), the sense of Kakumei appears to be
understood merely as "great change."
185 See various Zuihitsu (Essays) by Japanese writers (refer to the Nihon
Zuihitsu Sakuin (Index to Japanese Essays) and the Un tsa tsu by a
Ming author, etc.). Moku Kondo, Shina Gakugei-daijiten (Dictionary of
Chinese Sciences and Arts).
186 Kanke Ikai (Family Administrations of Michizane Sugawara). But, as
this passage does not occur in old manuscripts of, this work, it would
seem to be later interpolation. (Cf. Kitano Bunso, VIII, 138, in Kitano
shi, edited by the curator of the Kitano shrine.)
187 K8dokan ki Jutsugi (Commentary on the Chronicle of the Kodokan [school
of Mito]). Contrary to general supposition, there were Confucianists
who recognized and advocated the doctrines of "change of surname"
(viz. dynasty) and "overturning of the mandate"; one, for example, was
Totsuan Ohashi; Shigeki Toyama, Osei Fukko no Imi (Significance of the
Restoration of Imperial Government), Shiso, V (1947), 33. However,
he was exceptional.
188 Yukinari Iwahashi, Sorai Kenkyu, (Studies on Sorai), 444ft
189 Miwa Monogatari (Tales at the Miwa Shrine), Part I (Banzan Zenshu
[Collected Works of Banzan], V, 2 I 8 and 222).
190 Tetsuro Watsuji, op.cit., 235-236.
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191 To Yamada suggested that the oldest example is from the Lu-shih-ch'un-
chiu (A Compendium of Various Schools of Philosophy, written under
the direction of Lu in the 3rd century B.C.).
192 Komosakki (Notes on Confucius and Mencius), IV; Yoshida Shain
Zenshii (Collected Works of Shain Yoshida), II, 462.
193 Kojiki, Preface.
194 In Volume LXI of Shabo Netijo Kyo (Siitra of Meditation on the True
. Teaching), there is a discussion of the four benevolences of one's mother,
one's father, the Tathagata (Buddha), and teachers of the dharma, but
the benevolence of the ruler is not mentioned.
195 Sandai Jitsuroku (Records of the Reigns of the Three Emperors), VI.
Moreover, in the text under the date 865, 7th month, 19th day, there
is the phrase, "the world of the four benevolences is the whole of man-
kind." (Ibid., XI.)
196 Gempei Seisuiki (Records of the Rise and Fall of the Minamoto and
Taira Clans), VI. Cf. also Volume II of Heike Monogatari.
196a Takuan Zenshu (Collected Works of Takuan), Vol. 5: Tokaiyawa
(Records of Takuan's Buddhist Teachings), last part.
197 Shinran said (Kyogyoshinsho, Part 2) that "the doctrine of devotion is the
imperial order of the call in the original vow;" again (ibid., Part 3), he
says the expression "a desire for birth" (in the Daimuryoju kyo), i.e.,
the desire for rebirth in the Pure Land, means "the Imperial Order of
the Tathagata calling all sentient beings." Probably his use of the ex-
pression "Imperial edict" enabled the Japanese to understand better.
198 Cf. Kaimokusho (The Awakening to the Truth), (Tokyo: 1941), Part II.
199 However, Nichiren did not regard the Emperor as absolutely divine be-
cause of his secular rank. In his view, religious authority stood above
the authority of the Emperor. Even the Emperor, if he transgressed the
law, would go to Hell. "Because of the bad karma of having despised
the Buddha Sakyamuni and having neglected the Lotus Siitra . . . the
retired Emperor of Oki in the 82nd generation and also the retired Em-
peror of Sado . . . ended their lives in these islands, being dethroned
by force. Because their spirits were wicked, they went down to Hell."
(Reply to Sister Myaha.)
200 Hoonsho (Treatise on Reciprocation of Benevolence).
201 Soryu Daiwajo Suiji (Instructions by Great Master S6ryii), Part 2.
Jiunsonja Zenshu (Collected Works of Master Jiun), XIII, 655.
202 Shobo Shuyo-kyo (Siitra of Essentials of Doctrines). (Taisho, XVII,
516a.)
203 Shabo Nenjo-kyo, LV. (Taisha, XVII, 324 a.)
204 DaijoHonshO Shinji kan-gyo, II. (Taisho, III, 298 a.)
205 Zatsuhozokyo (Siitra of Miscellaneous Treasure Stores), VIII. (Taisha,
IV, 485 b-c.)
206 Tang translation of the Kegon (Avatmhsaka) siitra, LXVI (Taisho, X,
355 b); Volume XI of the 40-Volume Kegon has the following passage:
"He commanded that all should desist from the Ten Evil Ways, and per-
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fect themselves-the practice of the Ten Goods, just as did King
Cakravarti." (Taisha, X, 712 c.)
207 Also, "His birth faIling on a sacred day, he was molded by the -influence
of the Ten Virtues"-Sandai Jitsuroku, VI, paragraph under the date
862, 10th month of the reign of Emperor Seiwa.
208 Many former Japanese classical scholars explained such conceptions as
"the Emperor of the Ten Virtues" as being applied to the Emperor on
the basis of the Buddhist conception that a man who has kept the com-
mandments of the Ten Virtues in a past life is reborn in present life
as ruler of the land. Probably, Japanese classical scholars have inter-
preted the matter in the following way. Tokuno Oda, Bukkya Daijiten
(Great Dictionary of Buddhism), 922 a; Kokubungaku Junishu Butsugo
Kaishaku [Explanation of Buddhist Terms in 12 books of Japanese lit-
erature], 85). But literal expressions of this thesis are not to be found in
Buddhist texts. Indeed, it is very often maintained in Buddhist texts that
if a man does good he will be reborn in Heaven; and also there ap-
pears, although rarely, the thesis that one is born as ruler in this life
because of merit accumulated in a past life. The Reverend Oda cites
only the fqIIowing examples, one quoted from the Judaikakya (Siitra of
the Bodhi Tree) in VolumeLII of Haen Shurin (Woods of Jewels in
the Religious Garden): "How can one be reborn in Heaven? By practic-
ing the Ten Virtues one is reborn in Heaven. How can one assume the
human state? By observing the Five Injunctions one assumes the hu-
man state"; and another, quoted from Make-bikuni-kyo (Siitra of a
Demon Edifying a Nun) in Part 1 of Bensharon (Inquiry on Righteous-
ness): "The Five Injunctions are the root of the human; the Ten Vir-
tues are the root of the Heaven." In these it is not stated that through a
cultivation of the Ten Virtues one is born an emperor. The foregoing
interpretation resulted in the Japanese concept of the Emperor which
identifies the notion of tenna (Ruler of Heaven) with that of tenshi
(Son of Heaven) and was influenced by the Chinese idea of Tien-Tzii
(Son of Heaven).
209 Cf. Shinran's Kotaishi Shotoku Hasan (A Eulogy of the Imperial Prince
Shotoku).
210 Y. Haga, op.cit., 42.
211 Jikkunsha (Ten Instructions), Chapter 6. Cf. Eiga Monogatari (Tales of
Prosperity), Chapter on Hana yama ("Flowers and Mountains").
212 Cited in Genpei Seisuiki (Rise and Fall of the Minamoto and Taira
Clans), VIII, as a poem by the Lord of the Engi period, whereas in
Jikkunsha, op.cit., Chapter 5, as one by Prince Takaoka, Cf. Yokyoku,
Hachi-no-ki (Miniature Plant in a Pot).
21 3 Various similar poems by Emperors are collected in Mizumaro Ishida,
Rekidai Tenna Gyosei ni Haisuru Goshinka (Faith of Emperors Revealed
in their Poems), ("Nihon Kyogaku Kenkyiijo Kenkyii Hokoku," No.8).
2 I4 Sandai Jitsuroku, II.
215 Zoku Nihon Koki (Records of Japan, Continued), IX, S; v. the 9th year
of the Showa period, in the reign of Emperor Ninmei.
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216 Monno Kotei Gaiki (Anecdotes of Emperor Monno), in Zoku Gunsho
Ruiju (Collection of Various Works, Continued), Part VIII, Chapter I,
CXC, 44; d. Nanzen-ji-shi (History of the Nanzen Temple), 4 I.
217 Kudensho (Treatises Transmitted Orally), by Kakunyo (1270-1351),
Kyoto, Shinshu Shogyo Zensho (Complete Collection of the True Pure
Land Sect), III. Kokyo Shoin. 4th ed. Showa, 16 (1941), 9. The "Perfect
One" is the English translation of '7athiigata" which means the Bud-
dha "thus come."
218 Tannisho (Tracts Deploring Heterodoxies), traditionally ascribed to
Yuien, a disciple of Shinran. Ibid., II, 776.
21 9 .Kudensho, 9.
220 Cf. Tannisho, Kudensho, and Gaijasho (Treatise on Converting False
Views), by Kakunyo.
221 Gaijasho, III, 84.
222 Senkoji monjo (Documents of the Senko Temple) (T. Tamamuro, op.cit.,
321); n.b.-the book is Nihon Bukkyoshi Gaisetsu (Outline of Japanese
Buddhist History)-79, note 22.
223 Cf. Kyogyoshinsho (St. Shinran's major work, Teaching, Practice, Faith,
and Confirmation).
224 "In Akao, situated on the upper reaches of the Sho-gawa in Etchii
(Toyama prefecture), there remains an organization of a group of faith-
ful which suggests the times of Rennyo." "In this village, a matter
which has greatly impressed me is the fact that in each community there
is a dojo (sacred hall). Whereover there are as many as 20 households,
there is a stately dojo. A dojo is not a temple. Although the eaves are
higher than those of ordinary houses, and the interior is entirely in the
style of a temple, there is no professional priest. Middle- and upper-class
families of this village take charge in turn, and when necessary hold me-
morial services without a priest, and also perform funerals. Sometimes
priests are invited to preach, but ordinarily there is none there; it is
merely· a place of worship for the community. In winter, since it is im-
possible to communicate with other settlements, the people of the com-'
munity like to assemble here and talk together about their religion. This
is the 'meeting of the doj6' frequently mentioned in the Ofumi ("Letters")
of Rennyo."-Daijo Tokiwa, Nihon Bukkyo no Kenkyu (Studies in Japa-
nese Buddhism), 229.
225 Cf. Shaseki-shu (Collection of Sundry Reports), I, b: "The followers
of Jodo think lightly of the Shinto gods." But as a contrary example
there is the fact that Saint Ippen and others also showed respect for
various gods and Buddhas.
226 Cf. Rennyo, Ofumi (Shinshii Shogyo Zensho III, 402-5 I 8).
227 Dogen maintained that such an attitude was derived from his teacher,
Ju-ching (Nyojo); "The sentence, 'The Three Religions have one end,'
is inferior to the talk of a little boy. (People who talk this way) are a
group who would destroy Buddhism. There are many such people. They
either appear as religious leaders of men and demi-gods, or become
teachers of emperors. The present time (the Sung Dynasty) is a time
of decline of Buddhism as religious teachers and Buddhas of old fore-
warned." Dagen (1200-1253), Shab6-genza (Essence of Buddhism),
"Shohajissa (True Nature of all dharmas)" Iwanami Bunko edition, II,
24 0 •
228 When we look at the collected sayings of Ju-ching, we find that he
recognizes the authority of Confucianism and Taoism also and quotes
from the Lun ¥u, the Lao Tzu, etc. Keido Ito, Dagen Zenji Kenkyu
(A Study on Zen Master Dagen) Chapter I, 32f£., 69f£.
229 It is commonly considered that Dagen's religion is a faithful continua-
tion of its Chinese counterpart. But the fact that the thought of the
Shobagenza coincides with the teachings of Ju-ching, as recorded in the
Hakyoki (Record of Treasury Salutations), does not justify this opinion.
[No. 1796 of Iwanami Bunko.] The Hokyaki is a work by Dagen, not
by Ju-ching. Hence, it is to be feared that in the sayings of Ju,-ching
quoted there, Dagen's wishful interpretations have probably been added.
If we are to understand the thought of Ju-ching, we must in any case
study his own. collected sayings; but it is to be regretted that there is
yet no study of the content of his thought beyond the bibliographical
study of the collected sayings by Keida Ito.
230 The emphasis on doctrinal lineage appears also in the Tang Dynasty,
China, and becomes strong with the Sung. But it is a much stronger
tendency in Japan than in China.
231 Daita Shimaji, Tendai Kyogakushi (A History of Tendai theology), 466.
232 "In ancient India also, sutras and siistras were studied together; and in
early times in China, the three schools were not separated, hence they
must have had deep understanding." Accordingly, the priest Eisai
(1141-1215) of the Kennin Temple "studied religious law and observed
ceremonial rules, studied, and practiced Tendai, Shingon, and Zen alike,
and also recommended to others the practice of Nembutsu." (Shaseki-
shu, X, Part 2, Kenninji Hongan Soja no Koto [Anecdotes of the Abbot
of Kennin Temple].) "Many examples can be found in the Kao-seng-
chuan (Biographies of High Priests) of monks of different sects living
together in one and the same temple in China."
233 The Jado sect usually called Zen the "School of the Sacred Way (Shada-
mon)," on the other hand, Hakuin vigorously attacked the Jado sect.
Hakuin was a Zen master, whose full name was Hakuin Ekaku (1685-
1768).
234 Daija Tokiwa, Shina-bukkyo no Kenkyu (A Study of Chinese Buddhism),
III,76.
235 Kanzan Matsumiya (1686-1780), Sankyo ¥aron (Introduction to the Es-
sentials of the Three Teachings) (in Nihon Jurin Sosha [Series of Japa-
nese Confucian Works]), 3.
236 Okina no Fumi (Letters of an Elderly Man) by Nakamoto Tominaga
(1715-1746), written in 1738,section 16.
237 Yoshio Mikami, The Development of Mathematics in China and Japan
(New York: Chelsea Publishing Company, 1913),324.
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233 Ibid., 161.
239 Sankyo ¥oron (Outline of the Three Teachings), in Nihon Jurin Sosho
(Series of Japanese Confucian Works), 2.
240 Kodo Taii (Essence of the Ancient Way) Hirata Atsutane Zenshu (Col-
lected Works of Atsutane Hirata), VII, 62 a.
241 A poem by Sakimori included in Volume XX of the Man'yoshu (My-
riad Leaves) (Sakimori-a soldier defending the frontier).
242 This idea appears particularly in the epic poem Mahiibharata and in -in-
scriptions on stone.
243 Cf. for example the Bhagavadgttii.
244 Hagakure (Iwanami Bunko edition, 114), sometimes called Hagakure
Kikigaki, a book on the way of the samurai, is a book dictated by Ya-
mamoto Tsunemoto (1649-1716) and written down by his disciple
Tashiro Tsuramoto (1710-1776) and edited and annotated by Tetsuro
Watsuji and Tesshi Furukawa.
24) Max Weber, Hinduismus und Buddhismus, 300.
246 Nihon Saikyoshi (History of Japanese Catholicism), (Taiyodo edi-
tion), 37.
247 Jogai Ofumi (by Rennyo-a supplementary group of his collection bf
letters, etc.); p. 30 of Rennyo Shonin Ofumi Zenshu (Collected Works
of Saint Rennyo) edited by Yiisho Tokushi. However, there is some
doubt as to whether Rennyo himself wrote this letter.
248 The Fuda Mya6---the god of fire-is mentioned in the Sanskrit Buddhist
scriptures only in the Sik$asamuccaya and the Guhyasamiijatantra, by
the name acala. Cf. acala in Kanyaku T aisho Bonwa Daijiten (Sanskrit-
Japanese Dictionary with reference to Chinese Terms), edited by Un-
rai Ogiwara.
249 Daija Tokiwa, Shina Bukkyo no Kenkyu (Studies in Chinese Buddhism),
III, 83: "I want to add, that in spite of the fact that the Bodhisattva
Kuan-yiri is worshipped everywhere even in Taoist Kuan and Miao, one
can nowhere find images of the god of fire (Fuda Myaa) . ... Since I
do not recall seeing one example, in spite of the fact that I investigated
relatively widely on foot, I assume that the worship of this god did not
"occur.
250 Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653-1724), Kaheiji Osaga Ikutama Shinj~
(Double Suicide by Kaheiji and Osaga): "When we hear the phrase,
'The name of Amida is actually a sharp sword,' we understand that even
the dagger of qeath (suicide) is Amida's means (of helping us enter the
Pure Land)."
2)1 Cf. Tsugen Zenji Zenshu (Collected Works of Zen Master Tsugen),
III, 5)if.; Keido Ito, Dagen Zenji Kenkyfj, (Study of Zen Master Dagen),
I, 363fF.
2)2 Roankyo (Asses Bridge), Part I, in Zemmon Hogo Shu (Collection of
Holy Sayings of the Zen Sect), I, 289.
253 Bammin Tokuyu (Significance of All Vocations), (Zemmon Hogo Shu,
III, )26).
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254 In regard to this problem the Hung Min,g Chi (Collected Essays on Bud-
dhism) provides excellent material. See 18 I-I 82. Tetsuro Watsuji, Ni-
hon Rinri Shiso-shi (A History of Ethical Thoughts in Japan), Iwanami
Shoten, 1952,2 volumes.
255 The term shojo (lesser vehicle) is a translation of the Sanskrit Hinayiina.
Sometimes the word is translated geretsujo (ignoble vehicle), gejo (lower
vehicle), gejohO (the doctrine of the lower vehicle). Cf. Bodhisattvab-
humi, 223, Line 2 (Taisho, XXX, 531 b); Madhyiinta-vibhiigatikii, 216,
line 8; 255, line 18 (Kanzo-taishO-bon, Chinese-Tibetan parallel edition,
104, 128); Mahiivyutpatti (Sasaki. edition, 186, 1253). The term
Hinayiina is very seldom used in Sanskrit original texts now in existence;
nevertheless, Chinese and Japanese Buddhists are fond of using the in-
vidious term shOjo to refer to traditionalistic, conservative Buddhism.
256 "Japan is a pure Mahayanist country, and is the country which has real-
ized the Mahayana most perfectly" (Nichiren, JisshO-shO [Commentary of
Ten Chapters]). Also, according to tradition, Shinran in his 19th year
went to the Mausoleum of Prince Shotoku in Kawachi (Osaka area) to
worship, and in a dream Prince Sh6toku appeared to him, pronouncing
a giithii (verse) containing the line, "Japan is the country most suited
to Mahayana." Goten Ryokii, Takada Shinran ShOnin Shotoden (True
Biography of Saint Shinranvat Takada), Chapter I, Shinaga ShOtoku-
taishi-byo Mukoku Rokku Kimon (The Six Phrases in the Dream at the
Mausoleum of Prince Sh6toku at Shinaga), Shinshii Zensho (Complete
Works of the Shin Sect), Shidenbu (Section on Historical Lineage),
337. Again in Hokii, Jogu-taishi shiiiki (Anecdotes of Prince Sh6toku),
the eulogy "Hiketsu ni iwaku, Gobyo Sekimei no koto (Account of the
mausoleum inscription, according to the Secret Teaching [Hiketsu])';
. contains the line "the virtuous country most suited to the Mahayana."
Dainihon Bukky6 Zensho (Complete Works of Japanese Buddhism),
CXII,I42 •
257 Shoson Miyamoto, Chiid6 Shis6 oyobi sono Hattatsu (The Idea of the
"Middle Way" and its Development), 888-889.
258 Prince Sh6toku has at times used for the word "bosatsu" (bodhisattva)
the modified translation "Gishi." (Shinsho Hanayama, Sh6mangy Gisho
no Kenkyii [Study on the Commentary on Srimiiliidevisimhaniida-
sutra], 432-433.) In spite of the fact that the usual translation for the
term bosatsu is taishi or kaiji, he used the translation gishi (literally,
"man of righteousness"); this is probably to be understood as due to his
interest in emphasizing especially the idea that the conduct of the
Bodhisattva is to be realized throughout man's concrete moral life.
259 Shinsho Hanayama, Hokke Gisho no Kenkyii (Study on the Commen-
tary on the Saddharma-pU1;uf.arika-siitra) , 469.
260 Yuimagyo Gisho (Commentary on the Vimalakirti-nirdeSa-siitra), in Dai
Nihon Bukkyo Zensho, ed., 141 a.
261 Hokkye Gisho, Dainihon Bukkyo Zensho, ed., 4 b.
262 Ibid., 28 a. Further similar expressions may be found at random in many
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places. "Every good action in the Six Spheres can lead man to become
Buddha." (Ibid., 5 a.) "Every [good] action is a cause leading to the
effect of Buddhahood (becoming Buddha). (Ibid., 34 a.) "Even those
good actions which are of a purely secular mode occupy the religious
status of the One Vehicle (viz. are on the highest religious plane)."
(Ibid., 28 b.) Cf. Shinsho Hanayama, Hokke Gisho no Kenkyu, 469,
489.
263 The clause which appears in the ShOmangyo (Srimiilii-devisimhaniida-
sutra) is commonly interpreted to read: "[The Buddhas and Bodhisat-
tvas] enjoy especially distinguished reverence and support from all liv-
ing beings." But Prince ShOtoku insisted that the word order should be
changed to read: "[The Buddhas and Bodhisattvas] are caused to offer
reverence and support for all especially distinguished living beings."
Shinsho Hanayama, ShOmangyo Gisho no Jogu-o-sen ni kansuru Kenkyu
(Study of Prince ShOtoku's Commentary of the Srimala Siitra), (Tokyo:
1944),434-437). It goes without saying that this is a strained interpre-
tation of the text, as he has read into the passage his own idea of altruism
toward all living beings.
264 In regard to the clause in the Sukhavihiiraparillarta (XIII of Sanskrit edi-
tion of the Lotus Siitra), "always fond of zazen (sitting in meditation):'
he makes the criticism, "If one is always fond of zazen, leaving this world
to go and stay in the mountains, how will one have any time to propagate
this siitra throughout the world"; and he explains the meaning of the
siitra as being that "one should not associate with Hinayana Zen masters
who are always fond of zazen." (Shinsho Hanayama, op.cit., 437; also
Shinsho Hanayama, Shotoku Taishi Gyosei Hokke Gisho no Kenkyu,
386-387.) Also d. Shinsho Hanayama, Nippon Bukkyo no Engen
(Sources of Japanese Buddhism), 917-935 in Bukkyogaku no Shomondai
(Problems of Buddhist Studies), Iwanami, 1935.
265 Saburo lenaga, Chusei Bukkyo Shinsoshi Kenkyu (Studies in the History
of Medieval Buddhist Thought, (Kyoto: Hozkan, 1947),23-27.
266 Ibid., 78.
267 Anrakushu (Treatise on the Pure Land, by a Sui Buddhist of the Jodo
School, Tao-ch'o), Doshaku, 562-645, Part 1.
268 Mattosho (A Treatise on the Diminishing Lamp), by Shinran. Cf. be-
ginning of Shujisho (On Desires), by Kakunyo.
269 This sentence is also quoted in Kyogyoshinsho (by Shinran), III, Part 2.
270 In the Gutokusho (A Treatise by an Idiot), by Shinran, Part I (Shinran,
Shinshu Shogy Zenshl"i II, 460, Shuso-bu, Section on the Founder),
there is the passage, "The moment of the wholehearted belief in the
original vow is the ending of (the ordinary) life (which is the terminal
point) of the former invocation (of Amida, that which is proper to this
earlier, ordinary life). (The principle that) one obtains right now a re-
birth (in the Pure Land) is (what is meant by) the immediate rebirth
(which is the beginning point) of the later invocation (of Amida-the
nembutsu practiced in the new, recreated religious life)." This passage is
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quoted in Book III B of the Rokuyasho (A Treatise on Six Essentials, by
Zonkaku, great-great-grandson of Shinran [1290-1373]), a commentary
on Shinran's Kyagyasl1insa (Shinshu Shogyo Zenshu), 111,301, with the
remark, "In regard to the principle of the realization of ~he true result
(life) in the ordinary life, this passage makes evident the effect of (the
principal that) the horizontal enlightenment is sudden." [Shinran argues
that for the religious man who has attained salvation by achieving nem-
butsu with utterly sincere faith in the original vow-at which point his
ordinary mind is cut away by the power of the vow and emptied, so that
his calling upon Amida is identical with Amida's own continual calling of
his own name, whereupon Amida's Pure Land Life enters into him-for
such a man the ordinary life in this world and the life in the Pure Land
are not two but one, and further that this pure life is not an other-
worldly existence here and now but identical with this life. It is Shinran
in principle that the zennen (former invocation) and the gonen (later
invocation) (note the special senses of "former" and "later") constitute
one and the same event in the individual's psychological and religious
life. The metaphor describing enlightenment as Shinran conceives it is
here geometrical (just as his notion of the identity of zennen and gonen
is mathematical-a limiting point of two series).
The vertical direction from the "ordinary" to the "pure" life-called
Jiu-cha-is gradual and difficult, dependent on one's own strength; it
supposes the pure life to be separate from the "ordinary" one, whereas the
horizontal direction called Ocho ("horizontal enlightenment") shows the
opposition between easy-going resting on faith and the sudden merging
of the two "lives." Shinran calls these "two kinds of truth." Professor Abe
here objects that if this were true, there would be no difference between
Zen and Shin Buddhism-actually for Shinran, from the point of view
of Amida the two lives are one; but from the point of view of man, they
are utterly separate; he is hopelessly sinful-and just because he has an
extreme consciousness of his sinfulness, Amida's love can help him, hence
Shinran uses the expression "The two (lives) are one, and one (man) is
two (lives)." Also the phrase bonna soku bodai: "Defilements (kle'sa)
are identical with bodhi" and fudan bonno toku nehan: "Without stop-
ping defilements one achieves Nirval).a"-this doctrine is called Shojoju
no kurai. This is the position from which Sokutokuajo (immediate attain-
ment of Rebirth in Pure Land) is possible-also called Metsudo
(Nirval).a). Shinran says, Amida promises to help even good men, how
much more so bad men! This is the point at which, due to· Amida's
promise and faith in it, one is guaranteed rebirth. In this sense one has
it already and at the same time not yet.-D. Nivison.
271 Zonkaku, Jodo Shinyo Sha (Essentials of Pure Land), Part I, (Taisho
LXXXIII, 761 b).
272 Ojaronchu (Commentary on the Rebirth Verses in the Commentary on
the Endless Life), by Doman (476-542), Shinshil Shagyo Zensho, I,
Sangyo Shichi-so Bu, section on the Three Siitras and Seven Masters,
3 1 9.
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273 Sh6shinge (Poems of True Faith), Kyogyoshinsho (Shinshu Shogyo
Zensho 2, Shuso Bu, 44)'
274 Shoshin-nembutsuge Kikigaki (Notes on the Poems of True Faith), Part I,
Shinshu Zensho (Complete Works of the Shin Sect), Supplement,
VIII, 247; Shoshin Nembutsuge Karohen (Fireside Comments on the
Poems of True Faith), Part II, in ibid., 119; Shoshin Nembutsuge Hoeiki
(Annotations on the Poems of True Faith), Part II, in ibid.; 25.
275 Goichidaiki Kikigaki (Notes on Biography), by Rennyo (1415-1499);
Shinshu Shoguyo Zensho 3, Ressobu (Section on Chief Abbots), 582.
276 Kyogyoshinsho, Part I (Shinshu ShOgyo Zensho 2, Shusobu, 2). Cf. also
]odoron (Treatise on the Pure Land) quoted in Part III of Kyogyoshinsho
(ibid., 66). The two eko (Parinamana-"merit-transference") are also re-
ferred to in GutokushO, Part II (Shinshu ShOgyo Zensho), ibid., 475.
277 Cf. Kanji Naito "Shukyo to Keizai Rinri, ]odo Shin-shu to Omi Shonin"
(Religion and Business Ethics-Jado-shin sect and the Omi merchants).
Cf. Slwkai Gaku (the annual report of the Japan Sociological Asso-
ciation),8 (1941), 243-286.
278 But perhaps we cannot say that National Master Daita emphasized a life
within the bonds of social morality. Razan Hayashi bitterly criticized
Daito's mode of monkhood as destructive of social morality. Tetsujira
Inoue, Nihon Shushi-gakuha no Tetsugaku (The Philosophy of the
Chu Hsi School in Japan), 73ff. But it seems that his way of living to-
gether with beggars and other unattached elements was somewhat dif-
ferent from the way of life of Zen monks in China.
279 Roankyo, Part 1,107, in Zenmon-hogoshu.
280 Piitimokkha (Rules of Discipline), 48-51, in the Vinaya.
281 Roankyo, Part I, 101.
282 A typical example of this way is the famous story of self-sacrifice of
Prince Vessantara transmitted in Southern Buddhist countries (Jataka,
547).
283 The phrase shazai ("giving up property") which occurs in the chapter
"Shaju shabo (Holding the Right Teaching)" of the Shomangyo is in-
terpreted by the Master Chia-hsiang (Chi-tsang) in the Shomangyo
hokutsu ("Jewelled Cave of the grlmata Siitra) as meaning "to give to
others everything except one's own body and life-country, castle, wife,
and children" (TaishO, XXVII, 36 b-e); but Prince Sh6toku's commen-
tary interprets it as "things other than one's own body" (Part I, 36 b),
deleting the phrase "to give country, castle, wife, and children to
others." (Shinsha Hanayama, Shomangyo Gisho no Kenkyu, 432.)
Probably the interpretation of the Hakutsu transmits the Indian idea
faithfully.
284 "No teaching of dharma, when understood according to the proper sense,
is at variance with the jisso (the real aspect). When popular books of
secular thought, and political proverbs, and precepts about daily work
are taught, all are in accord with the true dharma." This text is famous,
and has been highly esteemed in Japan and China, but the original
text is merely as follows:
"He should remain mindful and not forget the dharma which he
will preach. Popular secular utterances-whether proverbs or mystic
fonnulas---ought all to be explained in accordance with the true mean-
ing of dharma."
In this phrase "precepts about daily work" does not occur. (Kem-
Nanj6 edition, 372; Ogiwara-Tsuchida edition, 315.)
285 Ryagon-kya Chasuisho (Commentary on the SiiraIigama-Siitra, by Ch'ang-
shui) I, last part. Taisho, XXXIX. According to tradition, Ch'ang-shui
died in Taihei 9 (A;D. 1029), was a Kegon Buddhist of the Sung
dynasty.
286 For example, in the Muehu-mondO-shu (Questions and Answers in
Dreams) by National Master Mus6 Kokushi, a Kamakura Zen master, we
read: "This (i.e. Ch'ang-shui's thought) has the same sense as the
argument in the Hokke-kya (Lotus Siitra) that vocations also are all in
accord with the jisso" (Real Aspect). Mus6 (1275-1351) was a brother of
Ashikagu Takauji; Tadayoshi asked MusO questions, and this book con-
tains 93 such questions, with Mus6's answers. Cf. Iwanumi Bunko edi-
tion, p. 19.
287 Shui Waka Shu (Collection of Gleanings of Poems), XX. The above
poem is also quoted in Nichiren's Minobusan Gosha (Niehiren-shonin
Zenshu), II (Heirakuji Shoten: 1931),840.
288 Devadatta-parivarta (Chapter of Devadatta), Chapter 13.
289 Gyaki-bosatsu-den (The Life of Gyaki Bosatsu, a monk in Nara, 668-749
A.D.) in Zoku Gunsho ruiju (Collection of Various Works, Continued),
CCIV, Chapter 8, last part.
290 Ritsuon Gyoji-monben (Questions and Answers on Disciplines), Nihon
Daizokya, Kairitsu-shOsho, III, 493.
291 Shabogenza (by D6gen), Jinzii (Miracles), Chapter 25.
292 Ibid., BendOwa (Sennons on the Practice of the Way), Chapter I.
293 Loe.cit.
294 Eihei Shitsuehu Kikigaki (Notes on Esoteric Practice in the Eihei
Temple). Cf. Hanji Akiyama, Dagen no Kenkyu (Studies on Dagen),
281.
295 Kanjin Honzon Sha (Treatise on Meditation on the Principal Buddha,
by Nichiren), Nichiren Shonin Zenshu (Collected Works of Saint
Nichiren), I, 342.
296 Hokke-shu nai Buppo Ketsumyaku (Transmission of Buddhism in the
Lotus Sect), ibid., VI, 2728.
297 Ressei Zenshu (Collected Writings of Japanese Emperors) Shinkishu,
last part, 430.
298 Ketsujo-shu ("Connecting Ropes").
299 Roankyo, last part, 41 (by ShOsan Suzuki). Moreover in the Banmin
Tokuya by Sh6san Suzuki, we read as follows: "In Buddhist scripture we
are told that if we enter deeply into the secular world there will be noth-
ing lacking in our withdrawal from the world. This passage means that
through the secular law one may become a buddha. Thus, then, the secu-
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lar law is the Buddhist law. In the Kegon doctrine we are told that ~The
Buddhist law is not different from the secular law; the secular law is not
different from the Buddhist law.' If one does not accept the truth that in
the secular law itself one may attain buddhahood, then he is not one who
fully understands the meaning of Buddhism. It is my prayer that the sec-
ular law and the Buddhist law be made one." [Zenmon Hogo-shu, op.cit.,
last part, 526.]
300 Shosan, Suzuki, Roankyo (op.cit., p. 337); Bammin Tokuyo 5 (Ibid.,
536f£.).
301 Yasen-kanwa (Leisure Talks in a Night Boat); Orategama.
302 Shobogenzo Keiteki (NB. one of the best commentaries on Shabo Genzo of
Dagen, by Fusan Soei, following lectures of Bokuzan Nishiari. Date of
the lectures is Meiji 32 or A.D. 1900. Bendowa, op.cit., Ch. I, p. 153.
303 Yasusada Hiyane, Nihon Shukyoshi (A History of Japanese Religions),
825·
304 H. Nakamura, Kinsei Nihon ni okeTU Hihan-teki Seishin no Ichi-
kosatsu (Inquiry into the Critical Spirit in Modem Japan) Tokyo:
Sanseido, 1949), 58f.
305 Shobogenzo, "Jikuimbun" (Letters to the Kitchen), p. 119 of Iwanami
edition.
306 Zuih6 Menzan (d. 1769), Jujiki Gokan Kummo (Instructions to Meditate
in Five Ways before Dieting), 3. [Among the Hebrews, it is also sinful to
waste food.-Editor's note].
307 Rennyo Sl10nin Goicl1idaiki Kikigaki (Notes on the Biography of Saint
Rennyo), Part 2. (Sl1insl1u Shagyo Zensho, III, Ressobu, 61 I.)
308 Tetsugen, "Ke-en no Silo" (A Book of Edification), Tetsugen Zenji Keji
Hogo (Buddhist Teachings of Zen Master Tetsugen), Iwanami Bunko
edition, 50. Tetsugen D6ko (163°-1682) belonged to the 6baku sect.
309 "KuTusl1ima Ko ni taisuru Tetsugen no Kyumei Konseisl1o." (A letter of
Tetsugen to the daimyii Kurushima asking him to save men's lives),
in ibid., 77.
310 Gomojigi (Gloss on the Mencius), by Jinsai Ito, I, 15.
311 Ibid., I, 3.
312 Rongo Kogi (The Original Meaning of the Confucian Analects) by Jinsai
Ito, V. Also d. Kojiro Yoshikawa, Sl1inajin no Katen to sana Seikatsu, 154.
313 Sorai Ogyu (1666-1728), Bemmei (Discussion on Names), last part,
"Sei Jo Sai Sl1icl1isoku," (The Seven Principles of Nature, Feeling, and
Talent).
314 Sorai Ogyu, T omonsl1o, (Answers to Questions) Part I, in Nil10n Rinri
Illen (Compendium of Japanese Ethics), VI, 153.
315 Sorai Ogyu, Rongo Cha (Studies on the Confucian Analects), Junsei
Iwanashi, Sorai Kenkyu, 300.
316 Ibid., 446ff.
317 [Witness Japan's recent advances in industry, experimental scierices, and
technology. However, by skipping over the centuries which Europe took
to evolve a "scientific outlook," Japan has to face the educational.problem
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of preparing the minds of its people to adapt to the technological age.
With the highest literacy in all Asia, Japan's prospects are very good.-
Editor's note.]
318 Tetsuro Watsuji, Sakoku (Seclusion in the Country), 34I.
319 Kyogyoshinsho, Part III, end. (Shinshu Shogyo Zensho, Shusobu, II, 80.)
320 Cf. prophesies about monks in the final period of the dharma in various·
Buddhist sacred texts.
321 Cf. the works of Kumarajiva and various entries in the Hung Ming Chi.
322 Daibutchonyorai Mitsuin Shusho Ryogi Shobosatsu Mangyo-shuryo-
gonkyo, VII. (Taisho, XIX, 134ff.) Sengen Sempi Kanzeonbosatsu Da-
rani jin jugyo (Magical Formula of Thousand-Headed and Thousand-
Armed AvalokiteSvara)-Beppon, Taisho Nilakanthii-tharani, 1057, XX,
94 a. Also, there is an Essay on Magic in Volume 60 of Hoon Jurin. In
this essay there is a spell for purging oneself of the sins of indulging the
passions and of the "Five spicy things." The idea here of atonement being
effected through magical rites is not essentially different from Brahman-
ism.
323 Sanzengi (A Treatise on Good Acts Achieved in Non-meditative State of
Mind, Set Forth in the Amitayur-Dhyana-Siitra), more precisely,
Kangyo Shoshu Bun Sanzengi, IV, (Taisho, XXXVII, 270 c). In the
Honen-shonin Gyojo Ezu (Portraits Illustrating the Career of St. Honen),
Chapter 22, we read, "Do not maintain a saintly external appearance
while keeping a deceitful mind within. Rather, regardless of what is
external or internal, manifest or hidden, always maintain true sincerity."
Shinko Mochizuki, Honen-shonin Zenshu, 897.
324 Kyogyoshinsho, III, Part 2. (Taisho, V. 83,601 c.) Shinran's Gutokusho,
Part 2 (Shinshu Shogyo Zensho Shusobu, II, 464). The phrase "a saintly
appearance" as discussed in detail is Shinran's Yuishin-shomon-i (Pur-
port of Mind-Only Treatise), 25ff. (Shinshu Shogyo Zensho, II, Shu-
sobu, II, 635.) The phrase is interpreted by Honen, in the section en-
titled San-shin Shaku (Explanations on Three Minds) of his Senjaku-
hongan-nembutsu-shu (Treatise on the Invocation to Amitabha, Based
upon Selected Original Vows), Shinshu Shogyo Zensho, I, Sangyo
Shichisabu, 957, as recommending that we maintain saintliness both
within and without.
325 Hitan Jukkai Wasan CJ~panese Poems of Lamentation, by Shinran).
(Taisho, V. 83, 667 c.)
326 "The Biography of Saint Honen" in the Daigo Temple edition.
327 Tannisho (by Yuien), Chapter 3 (Shinshu Shogyo Zensho, II, 775); also,
Kudensho (A Treatise on Oral Tradition, by Kakunyo), Chapter 19.
Shinshu Shogyo Zensho,III, Ressobu, 32.
328 Saburo Ienaga, Chusei-bukkyo Shiso-shi Kenkyu (Studies on the History
of Medieval Buddhist Thought), 67; 13-22.
329 Wago Tomku (Works in Japanese, by Honen), IV (Taisho, V. 83,
218 c).
"Since we have heard that the original vow rejects not even a bad man,
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we should understand then how much more [Amida] rejoices in a good
man." (Ibid., 227 b.)
330 Totaigisho (A Treatise on the Essential Body, by Nichiren) (Nichiren
Shonin Zenshu, II, 1102). Further, in regard to the fact that Nichiren
called himself "mukai no so" (the monk who recognizes no law), cf.
Saburo Ienaga, op.cit., 75.
331 Sho-hokke-daimoku Sho (A Treatise on the Invocation of the Title of the
Lotus Siitra, by Nichiren), Nichiren Shonin Zenshu, I, 489.
332 Gessui no Gosho (A Treatise on Menses, by Nichiren), ibid., II, 871.
333 Shabo Genzo, (Dogen), Chapter 9, "Keisei Sanshoku" (the sound of
brooks and the hue of mountains), Iwanami Bunko edition, I, 145. The
same phrase is used also in the loyo Daishi [i.e., Dogen] Hotsugan-mon.
(Prayer by Master Dogen). Cf. also Chapter 2 of Soto-kyokai Shushogi
(Practice and Enlightenment in the Soto Sect). Cf. Gleanings from Soto-
Zen, edited by Ernest Shinkaku Hunt, (Honolulu: Soto Mission, 1960),
20.
334 Shabo Genzo, Chapter 92, "Shoji" (Life and Death), Iwanami edition,
111,240 •
335 Cf. Soto-kyokai Shushogi, Chapter 3.
336 lu-ching Ho-shang [Chinese Zen monk, teacher of Dagen] yu-Iu, (Col-
lected Works of Ju-ching), last part. (TaisM, 48, 131 c.)
337 Kinkaiwaka-shu, zatsu (Miscellaneous Collection of Golden Poems).
Waka-shii is ordinarily divided into sections for the seasons-zatsu sec-
tion contains those not thus classifiable.
338 Junsei Iwahashi, op.cit., Sorai Kenkyu (Studies on Sorai Ogyii), 280.
339 Tetsuro Watsuji, op.cit., Sakoku, 341, 353,474,477,
340 Here I quote Master Jiun's own explanations as they appear-the luzen
Kaiso (Aspects of the Ten Admonitions), also called luzen Kana Hogo.
(Sermons in Japanese on the Ten Admonitions). This book was dedi-
cated by Jiun Sonja to Emperor Go-momozono in the 28th day of the 1st
month of 1774. In other books of Jiun Sonja, also, there appear almost
the same explanations. Jiun Sonja (17 I 8-1 804 A.D.), buddhist scholar,
wrote a Sanskrit grammar-using shittan or Sanskrit letters-included in
his Bongaku Shinryo (Compendium of Sanskrit Studies).
341 The following writings exist by Master Jiun himself, which deal solely
with the Ten Admonitions: luzen Kaiso (Aspects of the Ten Admoni-
tions), otherwise called luzen-kai Kana Hogo (Religious Teachings in
kana on the Ten Admonitions); luzen-ryaku hogo (Informal [i.e. kana]
teachings on the Ten Admonitions); luzenkai Gohogo (Religious Teach-
ings on the Ten Admonitions); Hitotonaru Michi (The Way of Char-
acter: The Way to Become a Fine Man). Also, there exists the Hito-
tonaru Michi Zuikoki (Records of Followers of Those Previously
Mentioned), a record by Jiun's disciples of his religious teachings. (All
of these are collected in Volume XIII of the liun Sonja Zenshu.) In
his other writings, also, Jiun Sonja always emphasizes the 10 Admoni-
tions.
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342 Genchi Kato, Shinto no Shukyo-hattatsushi-teki Kenkyu (Study of
Shinto from the Point of View of the History of Religious Development),
874·
343 Tetsuro Watsuji, Sonno-shiso to sono Denta (The Idea of Reverence for
the Emperor [sonna jai, one of the slogans of the Meiji Restoration-
"expel foreigners"] and its Tradition), 103.
344 Genchi Kato, op.cit., 1295.
345 Jodoronchu (Commentary on the Treatise on Pure Land, by T'an-
luan). Jodoron (Treatise on Pure Land) was written by Vasubandhu-
the "Chu" (commentary) is more important for Japanese Buddhism:
"Honesty is called uprightness; through honesty is engendered a mind
capable of compassion for all living creatures." Also in the chapter on
"expedients" in the Hokekyo, "Among the many Bodhisattvas (the
Buddha) is honest and discards expedients, teaching only the highest
troth," i.e. among bosatsu (bodhisattva), as opposed to shomon (Sravakas,
those who emphasize orthodox teaching) and engaku (pratyekabuddhas,
those who emphasize practical teaching)-the bodhisattva emphasizes
both.
346 "The mi?d that has resolved to maintain honesty and discard expediency,
is essentially good and upright, and since this is so, things are as they
are." (Yokyoku) (Kentaro Sanari, Makiginu, Yokyoku Taikan, IV, 2808,
Meiji Shoin, 1931.)
347 Kyagyoshinsho, III, Part I.
348 Dogen: "The word ko (ancient) in the term kobutsu (ancient or eternal
Buddha) is identical with ko in shin ko (new and old); and yet also it
transcends time. [The Kobutsu] is pure and upright eternally," Shabo
Genzo, Chapter 44, "kobutsu shin (Mind of Ancient Buddhas),"
Iwanami Bunko edition, II, 177. Shojiki ("honesty") here differs from
"the virtue of shojiki" in meaning, yet there is some connection between
the usages.
349 Nichimyo ShOnin Gosho (A Letter to Saint Nichimyo, by Nichiren),
Nichiren ShOnin Zenshu, 952ff.
350 Kangyo-hachiman-sha (A Treatise to Admonish the God Hachiman),
ibid., III, 1328.
351 Homon Mosarubekiyano Koto (How to Deliver Sermons, by Nichiren).
352 "In the notion shOjiki (honesty) there is what is superficial and what is
profound. If we do not pervert true principles, maintain our duty, stand
correctly in the way of the Five Social Virtues, accord with the natural
order of things and have no selfish heart, this is the secular notion of
shOjiki. This is the way to advance from the superficial into the profound.
But, also, from the standpoint of Buddhism the notion of shojiki is this,
if all ordinary phenomenal law is recognized as illusory and artificial, and
the essential truth (dharmakiiya) is accepted as given by the natural true
self, that is genuine honesty (shojiki)," Bammin tokuyo, by Shosan Su-
zuki.
353 The expression "In an honest head a god resides" (i.e. God defends the
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right) appears to be a rather ancient proverb. It has been accepted also
by Buddhists-HIn the vow of the God Hachiman there are the words
'I will make the head of an honest man my home and I will not reside in
the heart of a sycophant,' etc." (Nichiren, Kangyo-hachiman-sho, Nichiren
Shanin Zenshu, III, 1328.) "Among all people, high and low, it is said
that 'The great Bodhisattva Hachiman resides in an honest head. But he
does.not make his home elsewhere,' etc." (Homon mOsarubekiyo no Koto.)
354 But there is the saying, HA lie is sometimes expedient" (e.g. a white lie).
355 Yoshio Takeuchi, Eki to Chuya no Kenkyu (Studies on the Book of
Changes and the Doctrine of the Mean), 325fF.
356 Kojiki den (Commentary on the Kojiki, Record of Ancient Matters),
Chapter 2, edited by Motoori, I, 15ofF., in Motoori Norinaga Zenshu
(Collected Works of Motoori, 1730-1801). Cf. DeBary, Keene, Tsunoda,
editors, Source of The Japanese Tradition (New York: 1958), 23f.
357 HLet us inquire what is the meaning of the word 'kami' as used of old in
the language of our country: First of all, the various gods of heaven and
earth which appear in the Kojiki (Record of Ancient Matters) and the
Nihonshoki (History of Japan) were called kami and also the spirits
residing in the shrines dedicated to these deities. Further, it was the
ancient usage to apply the word to men, needless to say, and to birds,
beasts, plants, trees, seas, mountains and anything else whatever, if that
thing were out of the ordinary and had some distinctive virtue, or was to
be revered or feared. The criterion of distinction was not that the thing
or person should be honorable or good or meritorious; anything partic-
ularly august and dreadful, even something bad or strange, was called
kami. Among those kami which are human, it goes without saying that
the most august emperors of each generation, are all kami; thus in the
anthology Manyoshu (Collection of Myriad Leaves) and other ancient
poetry, they are called 'most high gods,' for they are far removed from,
more honored by and against the ordinary people. So, in every successive
age from antiquity to the present there have been human beings who are
kami. Also, although they are not widely popular, each state, each prov-
ince, each village and each family has its respective human kami; now
many, even of the kami of 'the Age of Gods,' were men of that time; that
age is called the 'Age of the Gods,' because the men of that age were all
godlike." Kodo Daii (Outline of the Ancient Way), Hirata Atsutane
Zenshu, VII, 37.
358 For example, such a phrase in the Bomma-kyo (Brahmajala-sutra) is
quoted by Shinran in VI, Part 2, of the KyogyoshinshO, but, of course, it
was never practiced.
359 The political power of the religious organization in Japan did not by any
means extend as far as that of the Roman Pope in the Middle Ages.
360 According to Volume 9 of the Ta Tang Hsiyu-chi (Daita Saiiki-ki,
Travel Records of Hsiian-tsang), King Biiliiditya in the state of Ma-
gadha, when he became a monk, was obliged to occupy the last seat
among the monks, and for this reason was highly dissatisfied. But the
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Buddhist church did not go out of its way to break the traditional rules
by giving him special honor. His seat was situated just above that of
the novices who had not received their vows.
361 Shobogenzo Zuimonki (Notes on Dagen's teachings on various occasions,
by his disciple Ejo), V, 81, in Iwanami Bunko edition.
362 In the year 1250 A.D., the retired Emperor Gosaga (1220-1272), hear-
ing of Dagen's honorable character, presented him with a purple robe.
Dagen declined the gift two or three times, but when the Imperial
messenger had come a third time to the Eiheiji Temple in Echizen, there
was nothing he could do but accept it. Nevertheless, to the end of his
life he never used it. The following poem is said to have been written
by him on this occasion:
Though the valley below the Eiheiji is not deep.
I am profoundly honored to receive the Emperor's command.
But I would be laughed out by monkeys and cranes.
If I, a mere old man, were to wear this purple robe.
Dogenzenji Gyojo Zensho, (Collected Works on the Acts of
Master Dagen), 115,555.
From this also we can see that he had no interest in riches and honor.
363 Shin Sarugaku-ki (New Critical Essays on Sarugaku, a vulgar form of
dialogue), by Fujiwara-no-Akihira (989-1066)-(Latter Heian-reigns
of Goichija, Gosujaku, Goreizei, 1016-1068 A.D.)-in Gunsho ruiju
(An Assortment of Writings) ..
364 T. Tamamuro, Nippon Bukkyo Shi Gaisetsu (Outline History of Japa-
nese Buddhism), 87-88.
365 Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1536-1598), in collusion with the widow (Nyo-
shunni) of Kasa (i.e. Kennyo), abbot of the Honganji, deposed his eldest
son (Kyanyo or Kaju) and installed the widow's own son Gunnyo or
Kasho) as an abbot. Ieyasu Tokugawa subsequently re-established Kyanyo
as an abbot of a temple-the Higashi Honganji-splitting the sect.
366 Max Weber, Aufsatze zur Religionssozioligie, II, 288.
367 Tsurezuregusa (Gleanings from My Leisure Hours), Part 1 by Kenka
Yoshida (1283-135° A.D.)-of a family which hereditarily served in
the Yoshida Shrine.
368 "There are countless comical varieties of daruma (the figure of Bud-
hidharma, the founder of Zen Buddhism): figures moulded or carved in
almost every kind of material, and ranging in size from the tiny metal
daruma, half-an-inch long, designed for a pouch-clasp, to the big wooden
daruma, two or three feet high, which the Japanese tobacconist has
adopted for a shop-sign. Thus profanely does popular art deride the holy
legend of the nine years meditation." Lafcadio Hearn, A Japanese Mis-
cellany (Little Brown, 1901): Studies Here and There, Otokichi's
Daruma. People of Southern Asia criticize severely the attitude of some
Japanese who use the figure of the Great Buddha for a profanely com-
mercial purpose.
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369 Yoshiharu Scott Matsumoto, "Contemporary Japan. The Individual and
the Group," loc.cit., 3 I.
370 Y. Haga, Kokumin-sei Juron (Ten Lectures on the Japanese National
Character), 140ft
371 Cf. Tetsuro Watsuji, Zoku Nihon Seishin-shi Kenkyu (A Study of the
Intellectual History of Japan), Part 2, 47, 49-50.
372 Christianity under the Goths in the 4th Century had already penetrated
among the Gennans. But Christianity as transplanted into the Gennan
world did not subsequently, in the 5th and 8th centuries, flourish very
vigorously. In Japan, on the contrary, in the two and a half centuries
after the introduction of Buddhism, such great scholars appeared as
SaichO and Kiikai. (Ibid., 76-78.)
Chapter 36
I Genko-Shakusho (History of Buddhism in Japan). XXX.
2 !zuru Shinmura, Gengo-gaku Josetsu (Introduction to Linguistics), 182.
3 Tetsuro Watsuji (1889-1960), Zoku Nihon Seishin-shi Kenkyu (Sup-
plement to Research in Japanese Intellectual History), 397.
4 Takashi Ide (1892-), Shijin Tetsugakusha (Poet-Philosophers), 317.
5 The number of Chinese characters current in daily use was reduced in
1962 by the Ministry of Education of the Japanese Government to 1,850.
These are called Toyo Kanji.
6 Yoshio Yamada (1873-1960), Inmyo yori idetaru Tsuyugo (Popular
Words originally from Hindu Buddhist logic) in the journal Geirin,
III,22f. .
7 Nevertheless Dr. Kanae Sakuma (1888- ) maintains that the Japa-
nese language contains combinations of words which perfonn the func-
tion of the relative pronoun; d. "Kyuchakugo no Mondai" (The Problem
of Agglutinative Languages), Kokugo-Kokubun (October 1938).
8 Tokaidochii Hizakurige (A Humorous Travel Diary on the Tokaido Road,
by Jippensha Ikkyii), Nippon Meicho Zenshu, XXII, 10 I.
9 Nyiiyabindufika, 3, line I I. Tscherbatsky translated this line as: "[The
act of cognition] has made him (= man) reach the object (i.e. reach it
by his cognition)." ..
IO J. S. Speyer, Vedische und Sanskrit-Syntax, § 287.
I I Cf. Rev. Kusaka, Bando Shinpon kyo-gyo-shin-sho (Collected annotations
to Shinran's works called Kyo-gyo-shin-sho based on the Bando texts),
I03·
I2 Chikuro Hiroike, Shina Bunten (Chinese Grammar), 67. Cf. Y. Endo,
Kunten Shiryo to Kunten-go no kenkyu (A Study on Kunten Material
and Words), (Japanese Literature Association, I952).
I3 Shobogenzo (Subtleties of The True Doctrine, by Dogen), chapter en-
titled Gyobutsu Igi (High Demeanor of the Practice of Buddhas).
I4 "cittamatram idam yad idarp. traidhatukam", Dasabhumika-sutra, edited
by J. Rahder, 49.
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15 Shobogenzo, Sangai Yuishin (The Three Worlds of "Mind Only").
16 Two entrances and four practices; the two entrances (ni nyu) are the
two courses of entry into enlightenment (i.e., the priesthood), namely,
through contemplation (ri) and practice (gyo); the four practices of
gyo are (I) righting of wrongs, (2) acceptance of the given, or resigna-
tion, (3) seeking nothing, (4) following dharma.
17 Bendo (Pursuit of the Way), by Sorai Ogyii.
18 Tomonsho (Answers to Questions), Book I, in Nihon Rinri Ihen (Col-
lected Ethical Works of Japan), VI, 153.
19 Ibid., 156.
20 Nyugaku Mondo (Questions and Answers on Introduction to Study).
21 Seiichi Funabashi (1904- ), "Language and Future of the Japanese
People,"OrientjWest, VI,9 (September 1961 ), 35.
22 Naobi no Mitama (The Holy Spirit).
23 Ibid.
24 Sokichi Tsuda (1873-1961), Shina Shiso to Nihon (Chinese Thought
and Japan), 37.
25 In the Tetsugen Zenji Kajihogo (Discourse of doctrine in phonetic writing
by the Zen master Tetsugen), his disciple has written a postscript in
which he says, "Since the Zen sect was introduced into this country,
there have been few other men who have in this fashion presented the
essence of it in the Japanese language. The Shaseki-shu by the Zen
master Mujii and the Muchu Mondo-shu (Dialogue in a dream) by
the master Mus6 are about the only good books there are; although there
are many others, few of them are worth mentioning."
26 ShobOgenzo (Subtleties of the True Doctrine), chapter on Bussho (Bud-
dha Nature).
27 Ibid., chapter on Shoji (Life and Death).
28 Muchu Mondo-shu (Collection of Questions and Answers). In Tsunoda,
De Bary, Keene, eds., Sources of the Japanese Tradition (New York:
1958),261, a briefer translation is cited.
29 Daigi-roku (Record of Great Doubts), Part 2. Ekiken Zenshu, II, 156f.
30 Bemmei (Critical Study of Terms: 17 paragraphs on Heaven, destiny,
God and spirits).
3 I He was mentioned as iruman-not actually the man's name-from the
Portuguese irmiio, a lay preacher.
32 Razan Sensei Bunshu (Collected Writings of Hayashi Razan), Chap-
ter 56.
33 Uiyamabumi (Motoori Norinaga Zenshu, Collected Works of Norinaga
Motoori), IV, 601.
34 Eiichi, Matsushima, Kinsei Nihon no Gakumonron no Ichi-seikaku (A
Characteristic of Discussions about Learning in Early Modern Japan),
Shiso, No. 276 (Advice to Beginners).
35 The first four of the five volumes of Kakuken's Inmyo-sho (Commentary
on Formal Logic) were made in preparation for the Jion meeting. Ennen
wrote at the postscript of his work Ichi-in-ishi (One Line of Reasoning
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and Four Types of Contradiction): "I have copied this work so that the
Jion meeting of this year will be finished without trouble by the merit
of copying."
36 Jakuhyo Koya (Utaawase to Inmyo, Lyrical Arrangement and Logic),
Misshu Gakuho (Journal of Esoteric Buddhism), June 1920, No. 84.
37 Yat krta1]Z tad anityam dma1]Z yathii ghatadir iti.
Yan nitya1]Z tad akrtakam dnta1]Z yathakasiidir iti. (Sankarasvamin's
N yiiyapravdaka.)
38 K. Kishigami, Goto Inmyo Nisshoriron Kachu (Commentary on the In-
quiry into Correct Reasoning, with Annotations), 1888. K. Kira, Kanchu
Inmyo Nisshoriron-sho (Commentary on the Inquiry into Correct Rea-
soning, with Annotations), II, 9; III, 4.
39 A Buddhist commented as follows: "As for Buddhist logic, one who is
proficient in using ornate expressions skillfully can win in a debate even
if his assertion is wrong. On the other hand, one who is awkward in
expression is defeated even if his assertion is reasonable. So in Buddhist
logic clever people win, whereas dull ones lose, and truths are difficult
to defend." (Inmyo Inu-sanshi, 3 b.)
40 Daito.Shimaji, Nihon Bukkyo Kyogaku-shi (History of Buddhist Doctrine
in Japan), 23 1,282.
41 Having pointed out the fact that in ancient Japan the scholarship of
Buddhist logic flourished greatly, Echo (1780-1862) at the end of the
Tokugawa period said: "Nowadays people who make it their business
to debate with others have not come to know even the names of the
three members of the syllogism (-the two propositions and conclu-
sion). It argues the decline of Buddhist scholarship." (Inmyo Inu-sanshi),
4 b.
42 Eshin Sozu Zenshu (Complete Works of Abbot Eshin), V, 284.
43 These materials have been drawn from Tokujo Oya's article in Mujinto,
XXI (1916), 937.
44 This work is a commentary by Jion (Tz'u-en) on Sankarasvamin's Intro-
duction to Logic (Nyiiyapravdaka).
45 Hakuju Ui, Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyu (Studies in Indian Philosophy),
1,255, 26 5.
46 H. Saegusa, Miura Baien no Tetsugaku (Philosophy of Baien Miura),
2°4-2°9. Tsunoda, DeBary, Keene, editors, Sources of the Japanese Tra-
dition, 489.
47 Hakuju Ui, Bukkyo Ronrigaku (Essays on Buddhist Logical Works), 168.
48 Heike Monogatari (Tale of the House of Taira). Yoshio Yamada has
mentioned an abundance of other materials, in Geirin, III, Nos.
I, 2. Cf, also Inmyo Inu-sanshi (A Treatise on Indian Buddhist Logic),
19. But this tenn seems not to have been so important in original In-
dian Buddhist logic.
49 Tetsuro Watsuji, Zoku Nihon Seishin-shi Kenkyu (Research in Japanese
Intellectual History, continued), 393.
50 E.g., Shikishimano Yamatogokoroo Hitotowaba Asahini-niou Yamazakura-
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bana. (When one asks about the mind of Japan, / O! it is cherry blos-
soms, / Fragrant in the sunshine!)
5 I Yaichi Haga, Kokuminsei Juron (Ten Essays on the National Charac-
ter), 21 I.
52 Toganoo Myoeshonin Ikun (Last Word of Saint Myoe at Toganoo), in
Kokubun ToM Bukkyo Sosho (Collected Japanese Buddhist Works, in
Japanese), Hogo-bu, 57.
53 Shobogenzo Zuimonki, II, Iwanarni Bunko edition, 37-38.
54 Kichijozan Eiheiji Shuryo Shingi (Rules of the Buildings of the Eihei
Monastery).
55 Roankyo, Part 2, No. 62.
56 E.g., Heijoshinze-do, Makotoshiku Hotokeno Michio Tazunureba Tada
Yonotsuneno Kokoro Narikeri (When we seek for the Way of Buddha
earnestly, we find that it is simply the ordinary mind in the world),
Zoku Kokinshu, Chapter 8.
57 Churon (The Madhyamaka-siistra, Treatise of the Middle Path),
24,18.
58 Cf. Haga, op.cit., 182-204. Gino Tanaka, Shinto Gairon (Outline of
Shintoism), 80.
59 DaiMshakukyo (The Chinese Version of the Maha-ratnakii~a-siitra),
CXIV. (Taisho, XI, 646 c.)
60 Shobogenzo, chapter on Senmen (Face Washing).
61 Hideki Yukawa, "Intuition and Abstraction in Scientific Thinking,"
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, II, 2
(March 1962), 94-97. Reprinted in Basic Problems of Philosophy,
edited by Philip P. Wiener et al. (New York: Prentice-Hall, third edi-
tion, 1963).
62 Jindai shi no Kenkyu (Study on the History of Ancient Japan), 593.
63 Ibid., 595.
64 Kanmuryoju-kyo (Siitra of Meditation on the Amitayus Buddha).
65 Taijo Tamamuro, Nihon Bukkyo-shi Gaisetsu (Outline History of Japa-
nese Buddhism), 107.
66 Shinko Mochizuki (editor), Honen ShOnin Zenshu (Collected Works of
Saint Honen) , 531.
67 Taish,o, XLVII, 439 a. This is also quoted in the Kyogyoshinsho (Shinran's
Teaching, Practice, Faith, and Attainment), Part 2. .
68 Shoshinge (Poems of the True Faith).
69 Ippen Shonin Goroku (Collected Sayings of Saint Ippen).
70 Cf. Daimuryoju-kyo (Great Siitra of the Pure Land), Part I.
71 Tetsuro Watsuji, Zoku Nihon Seishin-shi Kenkyu (Supplementary
Studies of Japanese History of Ideas), 88-89; 1°3-1°4. .
72 Kojiro Yoshikawa, Gakumon no Katachi (Forms of Scholarship), in Sekai,
May 1946.
73 ShobOgenzo, Bendowa (Practices of the Way).
74 Shobogenzo Zuimonki (Gleanings of the Master Dagen's True Words)
(Iwanami Bunko edition), VI, 108.
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75 Nyosetsu ShugyoshO (Treatise on Ordained Practices). Cf. Myoichini
Gozen Gohenji (Reply to Buddhist Sister Myoichi).
76 Shutsujyokogo (Monologue after Meditation), Chapter 8, Jinzu (Section
on Miraculous Powers).
77 Sankyo Yoron (Essential Outlines of the Three Religions), 2.
78 Cf. Yasusada Hiyane, Nihon Shukyo Shi (History of Japanese Religions),
248,400.
79 Saburo Iyenaga, Chusei Bukkyo Shiso-shi Kenkyu (A Study on Buddhist
Thoughts in the Medieval Age), 42.
80 Cf. Rissho Ankokuron (Nichiren's Treatise on the Establishment of the
True Faith for the Safety and Welfare of the Nation).
81 Kangotoroku (Collected Sayings of Saint Honen, in Chinese), X, Ho-
kuetsu ni Tsukawasu Sho (A Letter sent to People in the Northern
Province). (Taisho, LXXXIII, 169 b.)
82 Sh6kaku, Yuishinsho (A Treatise on Pure Faith). (Taisho, LXXXIII,
915 b.)
83 Mattosho (A Treatise on the Diminishing Lamp of Religion), last part.
84 Kyogyoshinsho, Part 2.
85 Iyenaga, op.cit., 34.
86 Ippen Shonin Goroku (Collected Sayings of Saint Ippen).
87 Rennyo Shiinin Goichidaiki Kikigaki, No. 69.
88 Daij6 Tokiwa, Nihon no Bukkyo (Buddhism in Japan), 43.
89 Shuzenji Soden Kubetsu (Oral Tradition of the Transmission at Shuzen
Temple), I. (Dengyo Daishi Zenshu [Collected Works of Master
Dengy6], III, 666.) But this book was actually not written by Saich6.
90 Ibid., II. (Dengyo Daishi Zenshu, III, 679.)
91 Iyenaga, op.cit., 95.
92 Gassui Gosho (A Letter on Menses).
93 ShOgu Mondo Sho, Part 2.
94 Shishin Gohon Sho.
95 Cf. Shobogenzo, Gyoji (Demeanor), b.
96 Ibid., Bendowa.
97 Ibid., Bukkyo (Buddhism).
98 ShObogenzo Zuimonki, I, 14.
99 Ibid., I, 20, 2 I.
100 Ibid., II, 41.
101 Daito Shimaji, Nihonbukkyo Kyogakushi (History of Buddhist Doctrine
in Japan), 224.
102 Ibid., 366.
103 Miroku Koshiki (Rules on the Rites for Maitreya Buddha). (Taisho,
LXXXIV, 889 a.)
104 Shaseki Shu, Chapter 2, Part 2.
105 Iyenaga, op.cit., 42.
106 Shin Sarugaku-ki (Gunshoruiju, IX, 348).
107 Cf. supra, Chapter 34.
108 Watsuji, op.cit.; Zoku Nihon Seishinshi Kenkyu, 405, 411-412.
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109 Frois, Japanese History, 449. Iyenaga, op.cit.; Chusei Bukkyo Shisoshi
Kenkyu, 142.
110 Masao Maruyama, Fukuzawa ni okeru Jitsugaku no Tenkai (The De-
velopment of Realistic Philosophy in Yukichi Fukuzawa), Toyo Bunka
Kenkyu (Studies on Eastern Culture), NO·3, 7.
Chapter 37
I E.g., Suttanipiita, 927.
2 Ryonin Sekiguchi, Waga Kuni ni Okeru Bukkyo-Juyo ni tsuiteno ichi
Kosatsu ("An Observation on the Introduction of Buddhism into Japan"),
in the quarterly Shukyo Kenkyu, IV, 2 I off.
3 "The practice of Shingon and Tendai are fittest for Japan." Keiranshu-
yoshu (Collection of Fallen Leaves due to the Storm in a Valley), IX
(Taisho, LXXVI, 539.
4 Cf. Shugenshiyoben (Nihon Daizokyo, Shugendo Shosho), III, 7.
5 Master Dengyo himself introduced Esoteric Buddhism. Daito Shimaji,
Tendai Kyogakushi (History of Tendai Doctrine), 260f.
6 Ibid., 345.
7 Some of them have been preserved in the Horyii Temple.
8 Taijo Tamamuro, Nihon Bukkyoshi Gaisetsu (Historical Outline of Japa-
'nese Buddhism), 278, 279.
9 Yokyoku (Noh-recitation), Enoshima.
10 Kokonchomonshu (Collection of Famous Stories, Ancient and Con-
temporary).
I I Cf. KitoshO (A Treatise on Prayer).
12 Nyosetsu-shugyosho (A Treatise on the Practice as Enjoined by Scrip-
tures).
13 Tamamuro, op.cit., 192.
14 Eulogy to Kuya, in Zoku Gunshoruiju, VIII.
15 Tokujo aya, "Some doubts on Kanezane Fujiwara's Faith," and Junen-
gokuraku-ioshu (An Anthology on Rebirth in the Pure Land Through
Invocation Ten Times), Shirin, IX, 26.
16 This aim is expressed in the chapter H oben-keshin-do (the land magically
produced as an expediency), of Shinran's Kyogyoshinsho. Shundai Dazai
said words to the same effect. Se:gaku Mondo (Questions and Answers
on Holy Scholarship), in Nihon Rinri Ihen, compiled by Tetsujiro
Inouye and Yoshimaru Kaniye, VI, 292.
17 Sat]1yutta-nikiiya, edited by the Pali Text Society (London), IV, 118.
18 Naoichi Miyaji, Jingishi Taikei (System of the History of the Shinto
Gods),37'
19 Benmei (Discussion on Names), Part 2, in Nihon Rinri Ihen, VI, 84.
20 K6jiro Yoshikawa, Shinajin no Koten to sono Seikatsu, 156.
21 Rei Saito, achO-jidai no Onmyodo (The Way of Positive and Negative in
the Court Period), 39.
Abhidharma-kosa: 263, 307, 340,
544, 561
Abhidharma literature: 13,154
Abhidharma-mahiivibhii~iiSiistra: 222
Abhisamayiilankiira: 340
Abolition of Buddhism: see Haibutsu
Kishaku
"Above Form": 541
Absolute: 12, 53, 56, 71, III, 159,
278; being, 108; Deus, 56
Abstract Universal: 537, 538
Accentuated husband: 303
Adoption: 420
Adoration of the Lotus Siitra: see
Nammyo-horenge-kyo
Advaita: see Non-dualist
Affectionate devotion: see Bhakti
Age of Civil Wars: see Sengoku pe-
riod
Age of Warring States: see Chan-kuo
Ahi1psa: 52, I03
Aizen Myoo: 379; see also Japanese
Shingon sect
Ajatasatru, King of Magadha: I 18
Ajlvikas: 50
Ajftiina: 167
Akbar the Great: 171
Akirameru: 430
Ak~ara: 54, 76
Alayavijftiina: 183
.Alexander the Great: 120
Aliizgana: 261
All-each-every; see Sarva
INDEX
All existences are impermanent: see
Sabbe saizkhiirii anicca
Amaterasu Omikami: 396, 397, 468;
see also emperor worship; Shinto
Amitabha-Buddha: I 15, 20I, 238,
285, 325, 456, 476, 515, 558,
559, 566, 567; see also Pure
Land Buddhism; Pure Land of
Amitabha
Amitayur Buddha: see Amitabha
Buddha
Amitiiyur-dhyana Sutra: 253
Anabhidhya: 52
An Account of Hundred and Eight
Cho: 405
Anacoluthon: 535
Analects of Confucius: 188, 196,
2°7, 214,418, 51 I, 586
Analytic: 13; judgements, 65, 150
Ananda: 202
Aniitman: 90, 9 I, 124; see also
Atman
Ancestor festival and memorial serv-
ices: 424, 425
Ancestral tablets: 304
Ancient books of Japanese history:
553
Ancient Chronicle: see Kojiki
Anezaki, M.: 384
Anguttara-nikiiya: 110
An-hui: 250
Ankokuji: 442
Annen: 364; see also Tendai sect
Another's Strength: see Tariki
An Shih-kao: 226, 236
Anthology on the Arts of Governing
the State: see Keikoku-shii
Antiquarianism: 4 I 6
Anukampa: 426
Anumiina: 2 I I
Anuttara-Samyaksa1J1bodhi: 367
Aoki, Reverend Bunyiu: 303, 334
Aparigraha: 52
Apollonius of Tyana: 157
Apramiida: 52
Arai, Hakuseki: 432
Aranyaka: 125
Aristotle: 56,71,85,339; see also
Greek philosophy
Artha Siistra: 65, 133, 149
Amni, Uddalaka: 143
Ary~deva: 2 I °
Asanga: I 54~ see also Mahayana
Buddhism
Ashikaga, Takauji: 390, 446, 470
Asoka, King: 105, 109, 110, 115,
II 8, I 19, 120, 170; see also
Maurya Dynasty
Asteya: 52
Asubha: 61
Asura: see Demons
Atman: 54, 67, 77, 108, 124: mean-
ing of, 89: as self, 90, 91, 08.
90, 101, III, 170: see also
Aniitman
Atmaviitla: 10 I, 170: see also Atman,
Aniitman
Attributive compound: see Bahuvr'ihi
Augustine, St.: 99 I
Avalokitdvara: 102, 264, 320: see
also Bodhisattva
Avata1itsaka Siitra: 201, 228, 220.
353, 412, 446, 457; see also
Kegon sect
Avatiira: 101, 102
Avyiikrta: I 55
Avyiipiida: 52
Awaremi: see Anukampa
INDEX
Badhva: 57
Bahuvr'ihi: 61,135,336
Bakufu: 449; see also Shogun
Bash6: 372
Bell, Charles: 300, 317
"Below Form": see Ch'i
Benevolence: 27, 520
Bergson, Henri: 104, 105
Bhagavadgitii: 26, 4 I, 108, II 6, 134,
144
Bhai~ajyaguru: 202
Bhakti: 306
Bhaktic Buddhism: I I 5
Bhartrhari: 65,78, 108, 154
Bhartrprapafica: 89
Bhaskara: 85
Bhiiva: 84, 233
Bhik$u: 306, 497
Bhik$un'i: 306, 497
Biographies of the Nine Patriarchs of
the T'ien T'ai School: see T'ien
T'ai Chiu T su Chuan
Bizarre Stories: see Ugetsu Monoga-
tari
Bkalf-gdams-pa sect: 299
Bkalf-rgyud-pa sect: 299
Bliss: see Hsi
Bodde, D.: 281
Bodhidharma: 105, 210. <;'07, ;~7:
see also Chinese Buddhism; Zen
Buddhism
Bodhisattva: 26, 54, 275, 284
Bodhisattva King: 273
Bodhisattva Samadhi: 26 I
Bon: Bon reli~ion. 333, ~ 34: festival,
424; "o-bon," 424: Siitra of, 424:
see also Ancestor festival and me-
morial services
Book of Changes: see I Ching
Book of Filial Piety: see Hsiao Ching
Book of History: see Shu Ching
BOok of Mencius: 473
Book of Odes: see Shih Ching
Book of Poetry: see Shih Ching
Bradley, F. H.: 70
INDEX
Brahmacarya: 52
Brahmajiila Sutra: 257
Brahman: 49, 57, 67, 99, 158; see
also Absolute; Atman; Self
BrahmaI,la: 132
Brahmin: 84; see also caste
Brotherly respect: 27
Buddha: 47, 110, 126, 284,291
Buddha, the Law, and the Brother-
hood: see Three Treasures
Buddhabhadra: 226, 262
Buddha's religion: 299
Buddhiivatamsaka Sutra: see Hua-
yen-ching
Buddhism: I 1,21,22,102,103,108,
114, 266, 287, 345, 349, 380,
39 1, 394, 4 15, 421 , 430, 4 82,
483, 496, 497, 529, 561; see
also Chinese Buddhism; Early
Buddhist; Esoteric Buddhism;
Hinayana Buddhism; Mahayana
Buddhism; Tantric Buddhism
Buddhist Logic: 4; in China, 191,
192; in Tibet, 338, 339; Inmyo,
543, 544, 546, 547, 548, 549,
550; see also Dignaga; Nyaya
School
Bumo-onju-kyo: 421
Bunan, Shid6: 382
Burdett, Sir H.: 105
. Burning, the sun: see Tapana
Bushid6: 43°,467,491,492; Samu-
rai class, 493, 570
Bu-ston-rin-po-ehe: 317, 339
Caitanya: 511
Cakravarti: see universal monarch
Calvinists: 172
Candragupta, King: 307
Caste: 122, 123
Category of differentiation: see Vi-
~ajya
The Central State, Middle Kingdom,
or the Supreme Country: see
Chung-kuo
Chan, W. T.: 247
Chang-jung: 287; see also Taoism
Ch'ang-shui Tsu-hsiian: 504
Chan-kuo: 249
Chao-chou: 194, 280
Chao-yiing: 269
Chastity: see brahmacarya
Chatterjee, S. K.: 42
Ch'eng ching: I16
Cheng Hsiian: 215,226
Cheng I-eh'uan: 267
Ch'eng-kuan: 215
Ch'eng Ming-tao: 179
Ch'i: 541
Chia: 268; chia-feng, 268
Chia-hsiang, Master: 15, 45 I
Chia-hsiang Ta-shih Chi-tsang: 429
Chi-ch'ien: 226
Ch'i-ch'ung: 288
Chien-ehen: see Ganjin
Chih-i: 210, 215, 223, 227, 230,
231, 237, 252, 266, 275, 287,
292; see also Saddharmapurz4a-
r'ika Sutra; T'ien-t'ai sect
Chih-yen: 228
Chih-yiian: 287
Chikamatsu, Monzaemon: 379
Chi-ku: 205
Chinese Buddhism: relation with In-
dian Buddhism, 220, 221, 236,
237, 238; relation to Japanese
Zen, 354, 355,4°8
Chinese moral code: 420
Chinese script: 345, 400
Ch'ing-ching-fa-hsing-ching: 275
Ching Te Chuan T'eng Lu: 201
Ching-wan: 225
Chin-hsin-p'ien: see Book of Mencius
Chin-kuang-ming: 282
Chishin: see Ippen
Ch'i-sung: 287
Chi-tsang: 209,210,215,222,231,
241,266, 278, 279, 286; see also
San-Iun sect
Chogen: 390
Chanin: 35
Chos-khaIi Palace of Lhasa: 331
Chou Tun-yi: 184
Christian: adherents in India, 163
Christianity: 20, 243, 392, 432
Chronicles of Japan: see Nihonshoki
Chuang-tzu: 15,240,241,248,250,
266, 275, 278, 286, 415, 496;
see also Lao-tzu; Taoism
Chu Chih: 198
Chu She Lun: 222
Chu She Lun Chi: 222
Chu Hsi: 195, 215, 396, 512, 54 1;
see also Confucianism
Chu-ko-k'ung-ming: 369
Ch'un Ch'iu: 17,206
Chung-hsia: 274
Chung-hua: 274
Chung-kuan Lun: 222; see also Na-
garjuna; San-lun sect
Chung-kuo: 274
Chung-lun: 245; see also Nagarjuna
Chung Yung: 271, 375
Chun-nan-tzu: 235
Chu-tzu: 24 I, 244
Civitas: 35
Clan system: 4 I 7
Clans: Genji and Heike, 429; see also
Clan system
Classic of Changes: see I Ching
Classic of Documents: see Shu Ching
Classic of Songs: see Shih Ching
Commentary on the Introduction of
Buddhist Logic: see Nisshori-
ron-sha
Commentary on the $rlmala Siitra:
see Shamangya Gisho
Communism: 208,270
Compassion: see Anukampa; Karu!lii
Compendium of Teachings Concern-
ing Paradise and Purgatory: see
6jo-Yoshu
The Complete Library of the Four
Treasures: see Ssu k'u Ch'iian
Shu TzungMu
INDEX
Complicated structural thinking,
teridency to avoid: 562;
simpli£cation of, 571
Concept: see Gainen
Concept of diversity: see Prapaiica
Confucius: 188, 206, 207, 240, 256,
277, 282, 5II, 586, passim
Confucianism: I I, 16, 26, 236, 249,
266, 287, 361, 374, 380, 397,
408, 4 15, 4 18, 4 27, 428, 435,
471, 474, 496, 537, 54 1, 542,
561; see also Neo-Confucianism
Consciousness: as ego, 100; logical,
535; see also Vijiiiina
Constructed objects: see Vikalpa-
vi$aya
Coomaraswamy, Ananda K.: 136
Critique of Pure Reason: 3 I
Critique on Knowledge: see Pramii1;a-
viirttika
Cultural lag: 3
Cultural multiplicity: 40 I
Culture: . identity of Western with
world culture, 23, 24; Japanese,
571; unity of Western, 23, 24
Daigo, Emperor: 480
Daijo Honso Shinji Kangya: 475
Daijokishinron: see Mahiiyiina-srad-
dhotpada Sastra
Daimuryoju-kyo: see Sukhavativyuha
Sutra
Dai Nippon: 434
Dalai-lama: 308, 320, 321, 322, 327,
33 2; 5th, 336, 339; 13th, 334;
seeking of, 335; see also Lamaism
Dana: 426
Dar-pa-chen, King: 307
DarSana: 148
Datta, Dr. D. M.: 46
Dazai, Shundai: 27, 374, 375, 398,
512
De anima: I 55
De Groot, J. J. M.: 242
Demons: 284
INDEX
Dengyo Daishi: see Saich6
Dependent origination: see Pratitya-
samutpada
Depth: see Fukasa
Descartes, Rene: 99
Desire: see Kama
Deussen, Paul: 29, 30, 144
Devayana: 49, 50; see also Upani?ads
Devotion to one's lord: 490; see also
Bushido
Dewey, John: 26
Dge-J.1dun-grub: 299, 308; see also
Dalai-lama; Lamaism; Tantric
Buddhism; Tibetan
Dge-lugs-pa sect: 299, 339; see also
Lamaism; Esoteric Buddhism;
Tantric Buddhism
Dge-slon: 306
Dhammapada: 41,77, I I I, 165
Dhiirat1"i: 572
Dharma: 112,113,114,115,118,
119, 121, 125, 126, 167, 195,
255,256; see also Buddhism
Dharmakiiya: 273, 279; Dharmakaya
school, 334, 341
Dharmakirti: 17, 65, 150, 155, 191,
250, 338, 339, 549; see also
Buddhist logic
Dharmapala: 154
Dharmarak?a: 226, 438
Dharmatii: 77
Dharmottara: 65, 339
Dhyiina-meditation: 334
Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate:
184
Dialectics: I 5°
Diamond Sutra: see Vajracchedikii
Sutra
Differentiating notions: see Vikalpa
Dignaga: 155, 19 1, 338, 339, 549;
see also Buddhist logic
Discipline: see Vinaya
Discussion: see Rongi
Distinction between singular and
plural: 41 I
Divine sage: see Shinsei
Doctrine, Practice, Faith and Attain-
ment: see KyogyoshinshO
The Doctrine of the Mean: see
Chung Yung
Dagen: 242, 248, 249, 348, 35 1,
35 2, 353, 354, 356, 358, 359,
366, 367, 370, 371, 382, 394,
395, 4 1I, 4 12, 452, 453, 454,
457, 458, 462, 463, 505, 506,
516, 536, 537, 540, 54 1, 554,
562, 563, 569, 570; see also Zen
Doseii goshoko setsu: 420
Dran-sron: 306
Dmanta: 144
Duke of Chou: 206, 29 I
Dynamic way of thinking: 354
Early Buddhism: 54, 69, 83, 84, 90,
91
East-West dichotomy: 12
Echu: 367
Eckhart, Meister: 14, 550; see also
German language
Edict of Emperor Kotoku: 427
Eight Negations: 55
Eighteenth vow: 385; see also Pure
Land Buddhism
Eihei Shingi: 506
Eisai: 442, 462, 502; see also Rinzai
Zen
Ekayana: see One Great Vehicle
Elucidation of Rules of Discipline:
see Kenkairon
Empedocles: 56; see also Greek phi-
losophy
Emperor worship: 467,475,476,481
Endonkai: 4 I 5
English language: 75
Enkaku: 385
Enlightenment: 285; see also Satori
Ennin: 390, 442, 459; see also T'ien-
t'ai sect
Enshin: 559; see Eshin
Erh Shih Ssu Shih: J 99
Erh Ti I: 2J5
Erigena, Scotus: 56
Escapism: J9
Eshin: 346, 395, 547
Esoteric Buddhism: 263, 308, 3J2,
334, 335, 34 J, 378, 580; see
also Japanese Esoteric Tendai;
Vajrayana Mysticism
Essential being: see .Atman
Eta: 428
Eternal damnation: 384
Ethica: J 55
Ethics: J5; Protestant, 20, 2J; Chi-
nese, 248, 249; sexual, 263; Bud-
dhist, 3JO, 3J J
European Scholastics: J4J
E~cellent: see Slaghya
Expediency: 54J; rejection of, 562,
563
Explanatory Lamp for the Commen-
tary on the Introduction to Bud-
dhist Logic: see Inmyo Ronsho
Myotosho
Fabian: 432, 542
Fa Hsiang School: 209
Fa Hua Ching: see Sadd~armapu1J-
t},arika Sutra
Fa Hua Ching Chuan Chi: 201, 222
Fa Hua Hsiian Tsan: 222
Faith: see Sraddha
Fa-k'uang: 250
Fa-kuo: 273
"Family Instructions" by Yen Chih-
t'ui: see Yen-shih chia-hsiin
Family or home: see Chia
Fan Chung-yen: 276
Fang-wang-ehing: see Brahmajala
Sutra
Fa-tsang: 20J, 2J5, 223, 23'5, 257,
260;' see also Chinese Buddhism;
Kegon sect
Fa-yiin: 231
Feng-kuei Tzung-mi: 182
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb: 99
INDEX
Field-Watch Mirror: see Nomori
Kagami
Filial piety: 27, 264, 269, 421, 422
First principle: see T'ai-chi
Five Books of Shintoism: 519
The Five Classics: see Wu Ching
Five Deadly Sins: 285
Five groups: see Paiica-skandha~
Fondness for simple symbols: 572
Foreign papers: see Gaisho
"Forged sutras": 212
Form of poetry discussion: see Uta-
awase
Fortresses: see Puras
Fo Tsu T'ung Chi: 201
Fo-t'u-eh'eng: 236, 250
Four Books: 213
Four-stage theory of world history:
127
Fresco of St. Gensei: 404
Friend: see suhrd
Fu-i: 274
Fujaku: 221
Fuji, Otoo: 392
Fujita, Toko: 471,472; see also Con-
fucianism'
Fujiwara clan: 524
Fujiwaxa, Yorinaga: 527
Fukasa: 533 '
Fu-kuo: 183
Fukuzawa, Yukichi: 576
Funeral services: 585; see also Ances-
tor festival and memorial services
Fung, Yu-Ian: 242
Gainen: 532
Gaisho: 420
Gandhi, Mahatma: 84, 106 .
Gagda: see Shoten
Ganjin: 376
Gateless Gate: see W u-men-kuan
Generation hierarchy: 302; see also
Polyandry in Tibet; Polygamy
Genghis Khan: 327
Genko Shakusho: 532
INDEX
Genkii: see Honen
Gensei, Saint: 371
Genshin: see Enshin or Eshin
German language: 75
Gikai, Tettsii: 506
Glan-dar-ma, King: 299
Gleanings From Leisure Hours, or
Grasses of Idleness: see Tsure-
zure-gusa
Gnosis: see Knowledge
God: see Kami
Godaigo, Emperor: 446
God of Allah: 288
God of Love: see Aizen Myoo
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von: 144,
550; see also German language
Goho-shijiron: 447
Goikun ShOsoku: 444
Gokokuji: 442
Golden Annals of Mongolia: 307
The Golden Radiance Siitra: see Su-
var!%aprabhii~aSutra
Golden Splendor Siitra: see Chin-
kuang-ming
Gongen-sama: 467; see also emperor
worship; Shogun
Gosala, Makkhali: 5°
Go-Sanjo, Emperor: 390
Gotama the Buddha: see Sakyamuni
the Buddha
Gozokusho: 433
Gradation of natural age: 303; see also
Polyandry in Tibet; Polygamy
Granet, M.: 7, 177, 178
Gray, gray hair: see Palita
Great Commentary on Logic: see In-
myo Daisho
Great Incarnate Deity of the Eastern
Light: see Gongen-sama
Great Japan: see Dai Nippon
Great Practice, The: 3 I4
Great Sun: see Mahavairocana
Greater Vehicle: see Mahayana Bud-
dhism
Greek civilization: 428
Greek philosophy: 55, 56, 70, 78, 83
Grotius, Hugo: 114
Guhyaraja: 320
Gukansho: 396
GUJ?avarman: 283
Gus-pa: 305
Gyoki: 504
Haga, Yaichi: 4°2,417,467,480
Haibutsu Kishaku: 385
Haiku: 356
Hakuchi: 424
Hakuin, Zenji: 395, 404, 435, 508;
see also Rinzai Zen
Hanazono, Emperor: 507
Han Fei: 206
Hanju Panegyric: 495
Harakiri: 490; see also Bushido
Haribhadra: 340
Harmony: 27
Hatani, Ryotai: 460
Hayagdva: 314
Hayashi, Razen: 396; see also Shinto
Heart Sutra: see Prajfiiipiiramitii-
hrdaya Sutra
Heaven: 236, 243, 271, 277; T'ien-
tao, 277
Heaven-Emperor: see Tenno
Heaven of Confucianism: 288
Hebrew civilization: 4
Hedin: 323
Hegel, Georg W. F.: 12, 13, 30, 50,
57,7°,98,99,146,147,157
Heian period: 345, 347, 384, 387,
389, 5°0
Hekigan Roku: see Pi Yen Lu
Hemacandra: 170
Heraclitus: 71, 95; see also Greek phi-
losophy
Hetu-vidyii: 211
Hinayana Buddhism: 141, 267, 363,
370; precepts of, 415,437,497
Hio, Keizan: 536
Hirata, Atsutane: 375,398,437,466,
490, 522, 537; see also Shinto
History of Japanese Buddhism: see
Genko Shakusho
Hitopadesa: 146
Hobbes, Thomas: 96
Hoki-hongi: 368; see also Shinto
Hokke Siitra: see Saddharmapu1;ftJ,a-
r'ika Sutra
The Holy Lineage: see Gozokusho
Homeric Epics: 158
Honen: 365, 376, 386, 388, 443,
445, 450, 455, 482, 500, 515,
540, 559, 566, 583; see also Jap-
anese Pure Land Buddhism; Jodo
Shin sect; Pure Land Buddhism
Honesty, Japanese: 51 9, 520
Honji-suijaku-setsu: 389; see also He-
ian Period; Japanese Buddhism;
Shinto
Honkaku-hOmon: 351; see also Nichi-
ren sect
Honmon: 566; see also Saddharma-
pu1;ft}.ar'ika Sutra
Hojiso-yomonsho: 548
Honorifics: 40 9, 552
Hori, Keizan: 373,
Hosso sect: 385,571
Hphags-pa: 307
Hsi: 116
Hsiao: 191; see also logic
Hsiao: see filial piety
Hsiao Ching: 163, 422
Hsi-yu-chi: 18o
Hsiian-tsang: 181, 191, 202, 205,
226, 234
Hsiin-tzu: 186, 206, 277; see also
Confucianism
Huai-hai: 265
Huan, Emperor: 226
Huang-po: 193
Huan hsiian, Emperor: 272
Hua-yen Ching: 223, 261
Hua Yen Ching Chuan Chi: 201
Hua-yen sect: see Kegon sect
Hua-yen-wu-chiao-chang: 215; see
also Fa-tsang
INDEX
Hu-hai: 254
Hui-chao: 209
Hui-hai: 193,241,279,290,357
Hui-hung: 291
Hui-lien: 288
Hui-wen: 187
Hui-yiian: 272
Hung-wan religion: 294
Ichinen-sanzen: 462
I Ching: 181, 183, 188,206,355,
438; see also Confucianism
Ignorance: see Ajiiiina
Ignorance of the Chinese language:
347
Ihai, Japanese: see ancestral tablets
Illusion: see mayii
Illustrated Biography of Shinran: see
Shinran Den'e
Imagination: see Samjiiii
Imbe, Masamichi: 398
Imitation, adept in, and sterile in in-
vention: 562
Immediate Buddhahood: see Soku-
shin-johutsu
Imperial Edict, A.D. 757: 418
Imperial Preceptor of the Yuen: 327
Imperial Rescript of November, 836:
39 1
Impersonal judgments: 7
Impurity: see Asuhha
Inaba, Enjo: 459
Incarnate God: see Gongen-sama
Incarnation: see Avatiira .
Indian logic: 65, 149, 150; see also
Logic
Individual: 12,45,46,47,410,411
Individualist: see Vyaktiviidin
Indra, a thunder-god: 64
Indrabhiiti: 3 19; see also Tantric
Buddhism
The Inextinguishable Lamp of the
Sect: see Shumon Mujintoron·
Inference: see anumiina
INDEX
Infinitesimal: see Su~ma
Inka: 485; see also Zen Buddhism
Inmyo Daisho: 549
Inmyo Ronsho Myotosho: 546
Inmyo Ronsho ShisQi Ryakuchu-
shaku: 547
Inmyo Soja Himitsusho: 548
Inmyo Zuigenki: 544
Inner-worldly activity: 20
Introduction to Logic: see Nyaya-
pra17eSaka
Introspective sciences: 154
Intuitive: 13; intuition of self, 98, 99;
perception, 575
Ippen: 540, 560, 584; see also Pure
Land Buddhism
Irrationalistic: 16, 17
Ishida, Baigan: 392
Isvara, "Supervisor": 57, 167
Itinerant Sage Ippen: see Ippen
Ito, Jinsai: 355,435,511,512; see
also Confucianism
Izanagi: 468; see also Amaterasu Omi-
kami; emperor worship; Shinto
Izanami: 468; see also Amaterasu
Omikami; emperor worship;
Shinto
Jain: 42, 55, 83, 85, 1I2, 1I3, 162,
17°
Jain, King Amoghavar~a: 42
Japanese Esoteric Tendai: 459
Japanese Pure Land Buddhism: 381,
387, 4 15, 423, 443, 45 1, 455,
456, 499, 500; difference be-
tween Indian bhakti religion
560, 566, 583; see also Yiizii
Nembutsu sect
Japanese Shingon sect: 364, 441;
ShohOritsu sect, 478, 579, 580;
see also Kiikai
J1itakas of Buddhism: 98
Jati17adin: see universalist
Jen: see Benevolence
Jen Tao-lin: 273
Jikaku: see Ennin
Jina: 47,264
Jinno Shotoki: 435; see also emperor
worship; Shinto
Jiun: 388; see also Ritsu sect
Jiiiipaka hetu: see ratio cognoscendi
Jodo sect: see Japanese Pure Land
Buddhism
Jodo Shin sect: 19, 347, 359, 365,
366, 376, 388, 482, 483, 501 ,
510, 520; see also Japanese Pure
Land Buddhism; Pure Land
Buddhism; Shinran
Ju-ching: see Nyojo Tendo
Jogyo: 451
Junwa, Emperor: 481
Justification of Adopting Sons: see Yo-
shibensho; see also Yoshi-benben
Ju-zen-ho-go: 263
Kaccayana, Pakudha: 50
Kaibara, Ekken: 512, 541
KaimokushO: 428; see also Nichiren
Kaitokudo school: 521
Kajo Daishi Kichizo: see Chia-hsiang
T a-shih Chi-tsang
Kakinomoto-no-Hitomaro: 539
Kakunyo: 455; see also Jodo Shin sect
K1ilacakra: 341
KalhaI,la: 145
K1ilid1isa: 144
Kalpa: 137
Kama: 58
Kamakura: 346, 394, 450; Buddhism
Of,483, 540, 566, 582
Kamalasila: 314
Kama Sutra: 65, 1 33
Kameyama, Emperor: 481
Kami: 522; see also Shinto
Kamo, Mabuchi: 398, 466
Kamo-no-Chomei: 371,4°3
Kan, Sazan: 435
Kanazoshi: 391
K'ang-seng-hui: 236
Kani~ka, King: 171
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Kant, Immanuel: 30, 31, 147, 149,
150, 192, 550; see also German
language
Kiiraka hetu: see Ratio essendi
Karlgren's terminology: 178
Karma: 70, 109, 161,240
Karutzii: 334, 381
Kasyapa, Kumara: 202
Katyayana: I 53
Kiivya: 134
Kawaguchi, Masaaki: 34 I
Kazan, Emperor: 480
Kegon sect: 182,245,279,387,449,
542, 571
Kegon Siitra: see Avatamsaka Sutra
Keijijo-gaku: 541
Keikoku-shU: 539
Kenkairon: 44 I
Kenko: 372, 4'03, 526; see also
Tsure-zure-gusa
Kenko-Shakusho: 476
KenshO-jyobutsu: 464; see also Zen
Buddhism
Kern, Hendrik: 140
Ke-sar Saga: 309
Kharavela, King: I 15, 170
Khri-sron-lde-btsan, King: 307, 308,
3 16
Kikuchi, Taketoki: 446
Kimkara: 191,201
Kimmei, Emperor: 27, 438
Kitabatake, Chikafusa: 437; see also
emperor worship; Shinto
Klda: 70 .
Knowledge: problem of, 14
Koan: 198, 205, 21 I; see also Rinzai
Zen; Zen Buddhism
Koben: see Myoe, Saint
Kobo Daishi: see Kiikai
Kogo Shui: 39 I
Kogyo, Master: 459
Kojiki: 390, 427, 468, 474
Kokan, Shiren: 476, 477, 532; see
also Rinzai Zen
INDEX
Kokutai: 435, 436, 446, 473
K'o-lo-chieh: 250
Kongo-kyo:310,3I4,462
Konkomyo-kyo: see Suvar1,taprabhii~a
Su'tra
Konkomyo SaishO-o-kyo: 438
Konko sect: 394
Konyo: 444
Kosai, Jokakubo: 456; see also Jodo
sect
Ko-yi: 15, 238, 286
Kozen-gokoku-ron: 442, 462
Kritik der reinen Vernuft: see Cri-
tique of Pure Reason
Kmla: 138
K~atul: 137
K~atriya: 49; see also Caste
Kuan-yin: 252, 264
Kublai Khan, King: 307, 327
K'uei-chi: 222
Ku-huan: 287
Kiikai: 364,378,389,39°,441,499;
see also Japanese Shingon sect
Kumarajiva: 187, 188, 226
Kumarila school: 99
Kumazawa, Banzan: 381, 397, 420,
472, 491; see also Confucianism
Kung: 45, 286
Kung-an: see Koan
K'ung-fu-tzu: 29 I; see Confucius
Kunten Pukka: 536
Kural: 42
Kuroda, Ryo: 154, 155
Kurozumi sect: 394
Kurushima, Yoshihiro: 488
Kusunoki, Masashige: 369, 445
Kyo-ge-betsu-den: 463
Kyogenki: 418
KyagyoshinshO: 456; see also Shin
sect; Shinran
Kyoshu: 461
Lack of clear distinction of number:
4 II
INDBX
Lama, fifth Great: 339
Lamaism: 297, 298, 299, 308, 317;
see also Tantric Buddhism; Ti-
betan
Lao-tzii: 15,236,240,248,252, 256,
266, 275, 277, 278, 286, 4 15,
496, 5 I I; see also Chuang-tzii;
Taoism
Lao-tzu-hsi-sheng-ching: 292
Lao-tzu-hua-hu-ching: 292
Large and rough: see Sthula
Laws of Manu, The: 126
"Laws of Thought": 4
Learning of the Mind: 392
Legalist school: 2 I 2
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: 488,
55°
Lenin, Nicolai: 208
Lesser Vehicle: see Hinayana Bud-
dhism
A Letter Written by the Late Chief
Abbot: see Goikun ShOsoku
Lha Hgro-ba~i Mgon-po: 320
Li: 179, 244, 264, 537, 54 1
Li: see propriety
Liao-yin: see Ratio cognoscendi
Licchavi clan: 307
Li Chang-ehi: 217
Li Chi: 206
Life and death, problem of: 541
The limitless storehouse: see Wu-
chin-tsang
Lin-chi: 193; see also Rinzai Zen
Lineage: 422
Ling, Emperor: 226
Linga: 315
Li Ssu: 206
Li Shih-Ch'ien: 291
Li P'ing-shan: 288
Li T'ai-po: 218
Lieh-tzii: 252
Logic: rules of, 4; formal, 8, 16;
Mohist, 2 I I; logical relevance,
lack of, 539; in China, 55 I; see
also Buddhist logic
7°1
Logos: 8
Lokaraksa: 226
Lotus Stltra: see Saddharmapuru}.arika
Sutra
Love: of nature, 355
Lovers' double suicide: see Shinju
Luther, Martin: 1°4,455
Madhava: 67, 128, 162
Madhyamaka-kiirikii: 186, 340
Madhyamaka-sastra: see Chung Kuan
Lun
Madhyamakiivatiira: 340
Madhyamika school: 61; see also Na-
garjuna; Sunyatii
Magadha, King of: 120
Mahiibhiirata: 121, 127, 139, 143
Mahiiparinirviifla Sutra: 352
Mahara~~ianlyrics: 135
Mahiisadhana: see The Great Practice
Mahii-vaipulyabuddha-avatamsaka Su-
tra: 223
Mahiivairocana, 202
Mahiivamsa: 145
Mahavira: 19, 113, 168; see also Jain
Mahayana Buddhism: 15, 20; Bud-
dhists of India: III, 112, 119;
Precepts: see Endonkai
Mahiiyiina-sraddhotpiida Siistra: 351
Maitreyanatha: 154, 340; see also
Mahayana Buddhism
Maim Upani~ad: 108
Makura-kotoba: 557
Makura no Sashi: 356
Mii1;'u}.ukya-kiirikii: 170
Manifested Knowledge: 339
Mafijusn: 57,201,320
Man'yoshu: 370, 404
Mao Tze-tung: 208
Mar-pa: 299, 319; see also Lamaism
Marx, K.: 208
Masson-Oursel, P.: I 17
Materialistic: 15
Materiality: see Rupa
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Matsumiya, Kanzan: 165, 347, 487,
490
Maurya Dynasty: 120, 121; see also
Asoka, King
Maya: 56, 57
Means: see Upiiya
Medieval Comedies: see Kyogenki
Meditation: see Samiidhi
Mediums: 577
Megasthenes: 71, 96, 98, 139, 143,
147, 165
Meiji Restoration in 1868: 322, 346,
377, 43 1
Mencius: 206, 277, 470, 47 1, 473;
see also Confucianism
Meng-hao-jan: 251
Mercy of the Perfect One: 421; see
also Tathagata
Mikuni-damashji: 375
MimariJ.sa school: 99, 149
Minamoto-no-Sametomo: 5 I 7
Minamoto-no-Yoshinaka: 470
Minamoto-no-Yoshimoto: 470
Minowa, Shiisai: 427
Ming Emperor: 226
Ming-ti, Emperor: 438
Misch, G.: 148
Misogi sect: 394
Mito school: 435, 471, 521; see also
Confucianism
Miura, Baien: 346, 432, 549
Miura, Chikukei: 512
Miwa, Shiisai: 420
Miyake, Shosai: 420
Moderation, virtue of: 142
Mo Ho Chih Kuan: 215
Mok~a: 70
Mondo: 544; see also Rinzai Zen
Monk: see Bhik~u
Monk-Emperor: 523
Monk-Prince: 523
Mori, Shoken: 447
Morphological study of language: 153
Morris, Charles: 26
INDEX
Motoori, Norinaga: 373, 398, 466,
522, 539, 542; see also Shinto
Mo-tzu: 189, 190, 194, 249, 277
Muni: 57
Murasaki, Lady: 408; see also Tale
of Genji
Muso Kokushi: 382, 404; see also
Rinzai sect
Myocho: 502; see also Rinzai Zen
Myoe, Saint: 387, 459, 553
Myo-ho-ren-ge-kyo: 568; see also Ni-
chiren sect; Saddharmapu1;tq.ar'ika
SiUra
Myo-hon-sho: 547
Myriad Leaves: see Man'yoshu
Niigiirjuna (ca. A.D. 150-250): 55,
61, 70, 139, 187, 197, 245,
340, 556; see also Madhyamika
school; Sunyatii
Nagarjuna (I oth century): 3 I 9
Nakae, Toju: 375,397,418; see also
Confucianism
Nakazawa, Doni: 392
Na-khi tribes: 305; see also Polyandry
in Tibet; Polygamy
Name of the Buddha: see Nembutsu
Names: general, 186; particular, 186
Nammyoh6renge-kyo: 365, 379; see
also Nichiren; Nichiren sect
Nan-chos: see Orthodox religion
Nan-ch'iian: 280
National Master Daito: see Myocho
Natural sciences: Indian, 160
N iitya-siistra: 65
Navya-nyaya school: 63
Naya, theory of: 168
Nembutsu: 444, 445, 456, 461 , 540,
558, 559, 566, 567; one-time,
567; see also Honen; Pure Land
Buddhism; Shinran
Neo-Confucianism: 190, 244
Neo-Platonists: I4
N eti neti: 54
Neutral: see Avyiikrta
INDEX
Newton, Isaac: 488
Nichiren: 28, 35i, 364, 367, 377,
379, 387, 395, 396, 422, 428,
429, 433, 435, 443, 45 1, 45 2,
458, 461, 462, 464, 476, 5°0,
506, 507, 511 , 516, 520, 540,
563, 568, 582; see also Nichiren
sect
Nichiren Daishonin Chugasan: 433
Nichiren sect: 351, 359, 388, 442,
458,483,511; see also Saddhar-
mapurrtf,arika Sutra
Nihonshoki: 390, 427, 428, 43 8, 469,
474
Ninno-hannya-kyo: 445
Ninomiya, Sontoku: 348, 508
NinshO Bodhisattva: see Ryokan
Nishiari, Bokuzan: 508
Nishikawa, Joken: 430
NisshOri-ron-sho: 546
Nitta, Kunimitsu: 396
Nomad Kagami: 377
Non-atman: see Anatman
Non-attachment: see Anabhidhya
Non-dualist: 167
Non-idleness: see Apramada
Non-perishable: see A~ara
Non-property: see Aparigraha
N on-Receiving-and-Non-Giving sect:
393
"Non-self" theory: 108; see also Anat-
man
Non-theft: see Asteya
Non-violence: see Ahitnsa
Non-wrath: see Avyapiida
Northrop, F. S. C.: 26, I I 5
Nostalgic conservatism: 17, 18
Nothingness: 15, see also Sunyatii;
voidness; wu
Not so, not so: see Neti neti
Novalis: 550
Nuns: see Bhi~uni
Nyayamukha: 191, 338, 549
Nyayiinusiira-siistra: see Shun Cheng
Li Lun
Nyayapravesaka: 191, 223, 338, 549
Nyaya school: 133, 148, 149, 338;
see also Buddhist logic; Logic
Nyojo Tendo: 242, 251, 408, 454,
51 7
Nyoraishi: 405
Objective: 15
Oda, Nobunaga: 427
Of the Secret Account of the Trans-
mission of Logic: see Inmyo Soja
Himitsusho
Ogyii, Sorai: 27, 355, 373, 398, 465,
476, 512, 537, 542, 586; see
also Confucianism
Djo Raisange; 560
Djo Yashu: 346; see also Genshin
Okakura, Tenshin: 29
Oldenberg, H.: 128, 145, 172
Older Tang Annals: 309
Omniscient: 339
One Great Vehicle, The: 280, 387
One Hundred Verse Treatise: 210
Onko (Jiun Sonja): 375, 478, 518,
5 I 9; see also Ritsu sect
On the Profound Quiescence: see Mo
Ho Chih Kuan
Oriental: meaning of, 12
The Origin of Buddhist Logic: see
Inmya Zuigenki
Orthodox religion: 299
Dtomo Tabito: 362; see also Man'yo-
shu
Dtomo-no-Yakamochi: 418; see also
Man'yashu
Padmasarpbhava: 308
Paikche: 438
Palita: 47
Panca-skandhii"1J: 9 I
Pancatantra; 146
The Panegyric of the Birth in Pure
Land: see Djo-Raisange
PaI).ini: 80, 153
Pao-ching San-mei-k'0: 184
Paranw-dharnw: 103
Paramananda: 314
Paramartha: 191,226,239
Paramarthatii, 55
Pariah: see Eta
Paricumbana: 262
Paritziima: 337
Parivriijaka: 85
Parmenides: 56; see also Greek phi-
losophy
Pasenadi, King: II8
Passion: see Kanw
Passivity: 18
Pataiijali: 153
Piitimokkha: 146
Paul, St.: 77, 461
Piiyiisi-suttanta: 150
P'eng-meng: 252
Perfection of wisdom: see Prajniipii-
ramitii
Period of the Warring States: 212
Phallic symbol: see linga
Phenomenal Absolute: 350; see also
Absolute
Philosophy: see darsana
Pillow Books: see Makura no Soshi
Pillow words: see Makura-kotoba
Pityyiina: 49, 50; see also Upani~ads
Pity: see Anukampa
Pi Yen Lu: 2 II; see also Zen Bud-
dhism
Plato: 14, 48, 56, 71, 533; see also
Greek philosophy; Neo-Platonists
Plotinus: 14
Polis: 35, 36, 120, 21 3
Polyandry in Tibet: 302, 303
Polygamy: 304
Pope, Alexander: 22
Po-shan: 503
Positive determination: 499
Possessive compound: see Bahuvrihi
Postulational: 13
Potala Palace: 298, 320, 332
Prabhakara school: 99
Prabodhacandrodaya: 50
INDEX
Prajna: 55, 287, 520
Prajniipiiramitii: 340, 446
Prajiiiipiiramitiihrdaya Sutra: 54, 55,
237
Pramiinabhuta: see Manifested
Knowledge
Pramii1;lasamuccaya: 549; see also
Buddhist logic
Pramii1;laviirttika: 338, 340; see also
Buddhist logic; Dharmakirti
Prapanca: 70, 168
Prapanca-vilaya: 140
Prasiida: I I 6
PraSnottararatnamiilikii: 42
Pratttyasamutpiida: 55, 77
Pratyak~a: 21 1,338
Pratyekabuddha, one who attains self-
complacent enlightenment: see
Enkaku
Precepts: see Sila
A Primer of Logic: see Nyiiyamukha
Propriety: 27
Psychology of "Mind-only": 154
Psychology of reflection: 154
P'u-hua: 509
Pu-kuang: 222
PuraJ;las: 98,101,137,140
Puras: 36
Pure consciousness: see Vijnapti-
miitratii
Pure Great Vehicle, The: 387
Pure Land Buddhism: 238,253,256,
278, 290, 3 II, 365; see also
Japanese Pure Land Buddhism;
Jodo Shin sect
Pure Land of Amitabha: 332, passim
Pure Land of AvalokiteSvara: 33 I
Pure Land sect: see Pure Land Bud-
dhism
Pureness: see Suci
Pure Realm, The: 325
Pure Realm Teachings: 376
Purity: Japanese love of, 556; reli-
gious and metaphysical, 556
Purity: see Subha
INDEX
Purity, Chinese: see Ch'eng ching
PUTU$a: 67, 108
Pythagoras: 56
Questions and answers: see Mondo
Rai, Ram Mohan: 171
Riijatara1Jgi1Ji: 145
Ramakrishna: 79, 104, 171; order,
171
Riimiiyatul: 121, 143
Ratio cognoscendi: 192
Ratio essendi: 192
Rationalistic: 16,17; of Christianity,
20
Reason: see Risei
Record of Rituals: see Li Chi
Record of the Genealogy of Buddhist
Patriarchs: see Fo Tsu T'ung
Chi
Record of the Legitimate Succession
of the Divine Emperors: see
Jinno Shoto-ki
Record of the Transmission of the
Avatamsaka Siitra: see Hua Yen
Ching Chuan Chi
Record of the Transmission of the
Lamp: see Ching T~·Chuan
T'eng Lu
Record of the Transmission of the
Lotus Siitra: see Fa Hua Ching
Chuan Chi
Records of 35 Histories: see San-wu
Li-chi
Records of Travel in Western Re-
gions: see Hsi-yu-chi
Red Hat sect: 299, 308; see also Eso-
teric Buddhism; Tantric Bud-
dhism
Redemption of the wicked: 51 5, 5 I 6;
see also Honen; Jodo Shin sect;
Pure Land Buddhism; Shinran
Red Face Country: 305
Reduplication in the Japanese lan-
guage: 410
Regulations of Life at the Eiheiji
Temple Order: see Eihei Shingi
Reischauer, E. 0.: 426
Relational judgements: 8
Religious Debates of Owa: 348
Religious self-reflection: 516
Rennyo: 27,388,443,456,482,5°1;
see also True Pure Land sect
Restoration of Kunten: see Kunten
Fukka
Revisionist sect: 394
~g Veda: 53,67,84
Rickert, Heinrich: 200
Righteousness: 27
Right-seeing: see Samyagdar§ana
Rinzai Zen: 382, 462; see also Zen
Buddhism
Risei: 532
Rissha Ankokuran: 442; see also
Nichiren
Ritsu sect: 376,381,459
Rolland, Romain: 79, 105, 138
Rongi: 544
Ronshii: 461
Rupa: 54
Round doctrine: 181
~$i: 306
Russell, Bertrand: 12
Rwa, the Translator: 32 5
Ryojin Hisho: 402
Ryonin: 412; see also Yiizii Nembutsu
Ryokan: 357, 369
Sabari-pa: 3 I 9
Sabbe sankhiirii aniccii: 76
SaddharmapU'!:uJ.arika Siitra: I 10, 137,
143, 190, 209, 229, 290, 35 1,
352, 359, 367, 386, 387, 39 1,
395, 396, 443, 445, 461 , 464,
476, 483, 498, 503, 504, 5 I I,
520, 563, 566, 568, 569; see also
Nichiren sect; Tendai sect
Sage: see ~$i; Sheng-jen
Saich6: 363,364,387,389,39°,415,
434, 44 1, 449, 461 , 468, 499,
546; see also Tendai sect
Saigyo: 371
Saimei, Emperor: 424
Saiva: 42
Sakknyaditthi: 9 I
Sakta school: 264
Sakuntala: 144
Sakyamuni, Gotama: see Sakyamuni
the Buddha
Sakyamuni the Buddha: 26, 110,
114, 168, 202, 240, 256,
266, 275, passim
Samiidhi: 287, 302
Samantabhadra: 202
Sambhoga kaya Buddha: 202, 341
Samgha: 69, 103, 258; see also Sam-
gha, Buddhist
Samgha, Buddhist: I I I, I 12, 120
Samhitas of the Veda: 58
Samjiiii: 54, 55
Samkara: 15,42, 55, 57,68,78,99,
100,101,116, 124,140
Smnkhya:67, 108, 133,292
Samsiira: 109, 16 I, 162, 164
Samsknra: 54,91
Samyagdarsana: I 16
SaJ].~ilya:68,90
Safijaya: 168
Sanjusan-kahon-saho: 546
Sanju-shichika no Hamon: 484
San-kuo: 226
San-lun sect: 18o, 245
Sanskrit: 44,47, 61, 62, 63, 70, 73,
74, 751 82, 83, 87, 88, 94, 97,
107,130,131; grammar, 48,153
Saiis-rgyas-kyi-chos: see Buddha's
religion
Santirak~ita: 308
San-wu Li-chi: 235
Saraha: 319
Sarva: 70
Sarvajfiii: see omniscient
Sarvastivada school: 78; Sarvastivadin,
50, 52; see also Sunyatii
INDEX
Sa-skya dynasty: 327; sect, 299
Satori: 421; see also Enlightenment
Satsuma Clan: 415
Satya: 52, 1°3, 146,444
Schiller, Johann C. F. von: 550
School of Li: 355 .
School of World Buddhism: 529
Schools of Buddhism in China: 221
Schopenhauer, Arthur: 26, I 15, 144
Schweitzer, Albert: 17, 79
Sde-dge edition: 338
Searching out the ancient ways: see
chi-ku
Section on Incarnation: see Shakumon
Section on the Eternal Buddha: see
Honmon
Sects based on particular Abhidharma
treatises: see Ronshii
The Sects Established on the Au-
thority of Specific Siitras: see
Kyoshii
Segaki ceremony: 323
Seimei, King: 438
Seishonagon, Lady: 526; see also
Makura no S6shi
Seiwa, Emperor: 481
Seki, Kowa: 488
Sekimon shingaku: see learning of the
mind
Self, the: 89, 90, 91; objective repre-
sentation to, 574, 575; highest
self, 100, 10 I; true self, 68; uni-
versal self, 9'9; see also Atman,
Brahman
Senart, E.: 138
Seng-hsiang: 201
Sengoku period: 384
Seng-yu: 20 I
Sensation: see Pratyak~a; Vedanii
Seven schools: 22 I
Seventeen syllable poem: see Haiku
Sexual relations: 378
Shakumon: 566; see also Saddharma-
pu!'q,arika Sutra
Shamanism: 333
INDEX
Shamanistic or magical interpreta-
tions of Buddhism: 578
Shame-consciousness: 5 I 8
Shan-tao: 253, 28 5, 377, 386, 450,
500, 514; see also Pure Land
BuddlJ.ism
Sheng-jen: 281
Sheng-tsung-shih-chu+lun: 234
Shen-tao: 252
Sheng-yin: see ratio essendi
Shibata, Kyiio: 392
Shih, Emperor: 272
Shih Ching: 178, 206, 373
Shih-fan: 287
Shih-Io: 250
Shih Tao-an: 133
Shimaji, Daito: 484
Shimin: 35
Shingon Esoteric Buddhism: see
Vajrayana mysticism .
Shinji-kwan-kyo: 422
Shinju: 379
Shinran: 348, 386, 394, 415, 424,
433, 444, 445, 450, 455, 456,
461, 476, 482, 500, 501, 513,
514, 515, 520, 540, 560, 567;
see also Honen; Japanese Pure
Land Buddhism; Jodo Shin sect
Shinran Den'e: 433
Shinsei: 473
Shinsen Shoji-roku: 4 I 8
Shinshu: see Jodo Shin sect
Shinto: 35°,355,367,391,393,396,
487; see also Shrine Shinto
ShOgei: 583
Shogun: 449,467
Shogunate government: see Bakufu
ShOmangyo Gisho: 222; see also Sh6-
toku Taishi
Shaman: 284, 385
ShOmu Tenno: 480; rescript of, 439
Short Account of the Real Essence of
the Predicate: see Hojiso-yomon-
shO
Short Commentaries on the Four
Types of Contradiction in Logic:
see Inmyo Ronsho Shisoi Ryaku-
chushaku
Short Commentary on Logic: see Myo
Hon-shO
ShOten: 379
ShOtoku Taishi: 28, 222, 386, 387,
394, 4 12, 4 13, 421 , 427, 429,
479,498,561
Shrine Shinto: 394,423; see also
Shinto
Shuchiin, Shugei: 505; see also Shin-
gon sect
Shu Ching: 206, 373
Shugen sect: 378
Shugo-kokkai-sho: 441
Shumon Mujintoron: 416, 477
Shun Cheng Li Lun: 222
Shunjob6: see ChOgen
Sikhs: 122
Sila: 287,44 1
Sincerity: see Satya
Sin-consciousness: lack of, 5 I 8
Slaghya: 47
Smith, Huston: 12
Smith, Vincent A.: 105
Social morality: 414
Social welfare: 504
Sokushin Jobutsu: 363, 364
Solid: see Sthira
Songs of Meditation called Jeweled
Mirror: see Pao-ching San-mei-
k'o
Soseki: see Muso Kokushi
soul: see Puru~a
Soul of our country, th~: see Mikuni-
damashii
Sovereign, question of: 429
Sozoku-kaie no Ichinengi: 378; see
also Pure Land Buddhism
Specific "facts": 400
Sphota: 154
Spinoza: 70; see also Ethica
Spirit of Japan, The: see Yamato-
gokoro
Spirits residing in all things: 350
Spiritual: 15
Spring and Autumn Annals: see
Ch'un Ch'iu
Spring and Autumn Period: 212
Sraddhii: II 5, II6
Sriivaka, an ascetic of Hinayana Bud-
dhism: see Shomon
SrOI'1-btsan-sgam-po, King: 299, 304,
307, 308
Ssu K'u Ch'iian Shu Tzung Mu: 200
Ssu-ma-ch'ien: 235
Ssu-man Tan: 235
State: see Kokutai
Static way of thinking: 354
Stcherbatsky, Th.: 339
Stenzel, Julius: ·177
Sthira: 47
Sthula: 54
Stri-riijya: 304; see also Polyandry in
Tibet
Study of what is above form, the: see
Keijijo-gaku
Stupa: 165
Subha: 61
Subjective: 15
Substance: 12,13,46
Sud: 47
Sudra: 96; see also caste
Suhrd: 48
Suiko, Empress: 345, 422, 439
Sukhiivativyuha Sutra: 368, 386,
424; see also Amitabha-Buddha;
Pure Land Buddhism; Pure Land
of Amitabha
Sukraniti Siistra: 136
Su~ma: 54
Sun-ch'o: 287
. Sung-hsiieh: see Sung Learning
Sung Learning: 244
Sun God of Japan: 430
Sun Goddess: see Amaterasu
Omikami
INDEX
Sunyam:45,54,55,7°,77,340
Supreme Existence: 58
Supreme Ruler: 243
Susanono Mikoto: 468; see also Ama-
terasu Omikami; Emperor wor-
ship; Shinto
Sutra copying: 224,345
Sutra of Infinite Life: see Sukhiivati-
yuha
Sutra of Meditation of the Real As-
pect of Mind of the Mahayana:
see Daijo Honso Shinji-kan-gyo
Sutra of Paternal Benefits: see Bumo-
onju-kyo
Sutra of Pure Practice: see Ch'ing-
ching-fa-hsing-ching
Sutra of the Lotus of the Good Law:
see M yo-ho-ren-ge-kyo
Sutra of the Perfect Wisdom of
Benign Kings: see Ninno-
hannya-kyo
Sutra on Insight into the Heart of
Things: see Shinji-kwan-kyo
Sutra on the Transmigration of Lao-
tzu: see Lao-tzu-huachu-ching
Sutra on the Western Travel of Lao-
tzu: see Lao-tzu-hsi-sheng-ching
Su Tung-p'o: 280, 352
Suvar1Japrabhii~a Sutra:.437, 438, 445
Suzuki, Shosan: 367, 382, 388, 432,
45 8, 495, 502, 507, 509, 520,
554; see also Zen Buddhism
Svabhiiva-kiiya: 312
Svala~a~:46
Syllogism: 8, 534; of Indian logic,
545
Synthetic: 13, 14; judgments, 65,
15°
Ta Ch'eng Hsiian Lun: 215
Tachikawa sect: 378; see also Esoteric
Buddhism
Tada, Reverend Tokan: 340
Ta-hui: 354, 503
T'ai-chi: 244
INDEX
Taiheiki: 446
Taika, political refonn of: 439, 470
Taimitsu: see Japanese Esoteric
Tendai
Taira-no-Kiyomori: 475
Taira-no-Masakado: 470
Taira-no-Shigemori: 475
Takasumi, Senge: 350
Takuan: 475, 495, 507; see also
Rinzai Zen
Tale of Daibutsu, The: 392
Tale of Genji, The: 373, 408; see also
Murasaki, Lady
Tale of Gion, The: 392
Tale of Ise, The: 373
Tale of Kiyomizu, The: 392
Tale of Kiyomizu Continued, The:
39 2
Tales in Easy Japanese: see Kanazoshi
Tama: 361
Tang: code- of, 4 I 9, 420; penal and
administration codes, 419;
-annotations of, 420
Tang civilization: 345
Tangyur: 307
Tan-hsia: 256, 457
Tanka: 555
Tannish6: 455; see also Shinran
Tan-tao: 250
Tantric Buddhism: 95,313,319
T'an-yao: 201
Tao: 27, 255,541, passim; see also
Confucianism; Taoism
Tao-an: 203, 219
Tao-ch'o: 500,501; see also Pure
Land Buddhism
Tao-ch'ue: 559
Taoism: 236,244,287,361,415,
passim
Tao-wu, Emperor: 223,273
Tao Yiian-ming: 220
Tapana: 48
T ariki: 45 I; see also Japanese Pure
Land Buddhism; Jodo Shin sect
Tathagata: 27, 58, 114, 147, 256,
284
Tathata: see Tathagata
Tattva: see Tathagata
Tauler, Johann: 14
Teaching transmitted without scrip-
tures: see kyo-ge-betsu-den
Temmu, Emperor: 423
Temple of the Original Vow: 422; see
Jodo Shin sect; Shinran
Ten Commandments of the Old Tes-.
tament: 53, 43 2
Tendai sect: 186,229,25°,279,284,
35 1, 359, 44 1, 456, 461 , 484,
568; see also Japanese Esoteric
T endai; Saddharmapu1J4arika
Sutra; Saicho
Ten evil deeds: 285
Ten goods: 478, 519
Tenkei: 412
Tenno: 465
Tensho-Daijin: see Sun God of Japan
T ertullian: I 7
Testing: see hsiao
Tetsugen: 51 I; see Zen Buddhism
Theoria: 83, 150
Theragatha: 127
The thing in itself: see Svalak~a~a
Thittila, U.: 103
Thon-mi-saJ!lbho~a: 308
Three-Fold Seven-Point Gates to the
Law: see Sanju-shichika no
Homon
Three holy sounds: 3 I 2
Three Kingdoms Period: see San-kuo
Three Treasures: 394
T'i: see Brotherly respect
Tibetan: Tripi~aka, 42; Tantric Bud-
dhism, 312
T'ien: see Heaven
T'ien-p'ien: 252
T'ien T'ai Chiu Tsu Chuan: 201
Tien-t'ai sect: see Tendai sect
Todaiji, the: 440
To give: see Dana
710
Tokugawa: 346,368,391,392,416,
418,427,486, 525
To laugh: see Warai
Tolerance: 18,19
Tominaga, Nakamoto: 138,219,265,
29 1, 346, 370, 398,487
Torei, Zen priest: 416,477
To resign oneself to: see akirameru
Tosho Migongen: see Gongen-sama
Toyotomi, Hideyoshi: 494
T ozaki, Masaaki: 2 I 8
Treatise for Protecting the Domain of
the Country: see Shugo-kokkai-
sho
Treatise on Family Adoption System:
see Yoshi-benben; see also Yoshi-
bensho
Treatise on Filial Piety: 418; see also
Confuciani,m; Hsiao
Treatise on Protecting the Nation by
Spreading Buddhism: see K8zen-
gokokuron
Treatise on the Application of Bud-
dhism to Politics: see GoM-
shigiron
The Treatise on Thirty-Three Fal-
lacies: see Sanjusan-kahon-
saM
A Treatise to Enlighten People: see
Kaimokusho
A Treatise to Establish Righteousness
and to Make the Country Peace-
ful: see Rissho Ankokuron
Trimsika: 340; see also Vasubandhu
Trisvabhava-nirdesa: 340; see also
Mind-only theory
Trgla: 84
True Body: see Dharmakaya
True Pure Land sect: see Jodo Shin
sect
True Way, the: 398
True Word sect: see Japanese Shin-
gon sect
Truth: see Satya
Ts'ao-shan pen-chi: 183
INDEX
Tson-kha-pa: 308, 313, 318, 320,
334, 340; see also Esoteric Bud-
dhism; Lamaism; Yellow Caps
sect
Tsuda, Sokichi: 22, 25, 558
Tsugen, Jakurei: 495
Tsukiyomi-no-Mikoto: 468
Tsung-kao: 287
Tsung-mi: 230, 244, 256, 260, 287
T'sung Yung Lu: 21 I
Tu-Fu: 281
Tung Chung-shu: 188,249,282
Tung-shan: 183
Tu~ita Heaven of Maitreya: 332
Tutelary deity: see Ujigami
Twenty-four Dynastic Histories up to
the Manchu Dynasty: see Erh
Shih Ssu Shih
Tz'u-en: 191, 192
Tzure-zure-gusa: 372, 403, 376
Uddalaka: 68, 148
Ugetsu Monogatari: 471
U jigami: 417; see also Shinto
Ullambana ceremony: 270; see also
Ancestor festival and memo-
rial services
Ullambana Sutra: 270
Understanding: see Vijiiana
Unity of the three religions: 391
Universal Being: 67
Universal monarch: 478
Universal "reason": 400
Universalist: 45
U pamitibhavaprapaiicakatha: 5°
Upani~ads: 26,49, 50, 54, 57, 58, 67,
68,71,76,77,83,84,91, 102,
I 16, 126; see also Brahmanism;
Hinduism
Upavar~a: 98,99, 100
Upaya: 169
Upayahrdaya: i 9 1
Urabe, Kanetomo: 393
Utaawase: 544
U ttari-manussa-dhamma: 198
INDEX
Vaise~ika: 17,67,98, 113,126,148,
293; philosophy of, 45, 50
V aise~ika Sutra: see Slleng-tsung-shih-
cllu-i-lun
Vaiglava: 42
Vajracchedikii Prajiiiipiiramitii Sutra:
see Kongo-kyo
Vajrayana Mysticism: 169
Vallabha: 68
Varsyayal).i: 78
Vasubandhu: 154,2°9, 339, 340; see
also Abhidllarma-kosa; Maha-
yana Buddhism
Vedanii: 54
Vedanta: 55,115,149,17°; Advaita,
67
Vedas: 67, 117
Veda Scripture: 90
Vernunft: see risei
Vidyii: 148
Vijiiiina: 54, 67
Vijiiaptimiitratii: 245
Vikalpa: 70, 170
Vikalpa-vi~aya: 65
Vimiilakirtinirdda Sutra, on a wealthy
gentleman: 57, 137, 253, 354;
see also Yuima-kyo
Vimsatikii: 340; see also Vasubandhu
Vinaya: 441
Vinaya sect: see Ritsu sect
Vinaya-pitaka: 52, 198, 229, 265
Vi~ajya: 72
Vivekananda: 104, 106, 171
Volition: see Samskiira
Voidness: 15; see also Nothingness;
Sunyatii; Wu
Voltaire: 16, 19,26,208
von Humboldt, Wilhelm: 6, 26, 144
von Keyserling, Count H.: 26,145
von Schlegel, August Wilhelm: 26,
45, 144
von Schlegel, Friedrich: 26, 144
Vyaktiviidin: 45
Wang I-chih: 281
Wang-pi: 278
Wang Yang-ming, school of: 418,
427; see also Neo-Confucianism
Wan-sung: 195
Warai: 533
Watsuji, Tetsuro: 551
Way of Emperors: 396
Way of Japan: 398
Way of the Gods: see Shinto
Way of the warrior, the: see Bushido
Way of Ways, the: 398
Weber, Max: 14, 16, 17,20,21,25,
35, 21 3, 220, 269, 297, 492,
526, passim
Wertheimer, Max: 63
Wei Yuan-sung: 273
Weltanschauungslehre: see world-
concepts
Wen, Emperor: 283
West and East, Hongwanji Temples
of: 525; see also Jodo Shin sect;
Shinran
Whitehead, A. N.: 70
Wisdom: see Prajiiii
Wolff, Christian: 16, 26, 550; see
also German language
World-concepts: 293
Worship of Acalanatha: 494, 495
Worship of Pitr and of Preta: 269
Wu: 286; see also Nothingness; Sun-
yatii; Voidness
Wu, Emperor: 272, 507; see also
"Bodhisattva King"
Wu-tsung, Emperor: 225
Wu Ching: 206, 213, 243, 244; see
also CIl'un Ch'iu; I Ching; Li
Chi; Shih Ching; Shu Ching
Wu-chin-tsang: 250
Wu-men-kuan: 357
Xenophanes: 56
Xenophon: 90
Yagiu Tajima-no-Kami: 495
Yajfiavalkya: 54, 161
Yamada, Yoshio: 403
Yamaga, Soko: 435,493,512; see also
Confucianism
Yamagata Shiinan: 27
Yamanoue-no-Okura: 391, 552; see
also Man'yoshi'
Yamato-gokoro: 375
Yamazaki, Ansai: 435,466,472,477;
see also Confucianism
Yang-ehu: 277; see also Taoism
Yang Hsiung: 241
Yang Jen-shan: 456
Yang-tzu: 248
Yao-shan: 353
Yasomitra: 263
Yellow Hat sect: see Dge-ltdun-grub
Yen Chih-t'ui: 181, 230, 287, 291
Yen-huei: 29l
Yen-shih chia-hsiin: 18o
Yin-ming cheng-li-men-lun: see Nya-
yamukha
Yin-ming-ju-cheng-li-lun: see Nyaya-
pralleSaka
Yi: see Righteousness
Yoga: 83; discipline, 52, 154, 256
Yoro Code: 419,420; commentary on,
420
Yoshi-benben: 420
INDEX
Yoshi-benshO: 420
Yoshida, Shain: 436, 473
Yiian chiao: see Round doctrine
Yiieh: see Harmony
Yuge-no-Dokyo: 470
Yuima-kyo: 462
Yukawa, Hideki: 557
Yiin-eh'i-chu-hung: 290
Yiizii Nembutsu sect: 412; see also
N embutsu; Japanese Pure Land
Buddhism; Ryonin
Yiiryaku, Emperor: 384
Zazen: 252, 453, 560, 561, 569; see
also Zen Buddhism
Zen Buddhism: 179, 180, 183, 184,
190, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197,
198, 205, 21 I, 235, 239, 240,
254, 278, 279, 284, 290, 35 1,
353, 366, 367, 377, 387, 395,
408, 435, 45 2, 453, 454, 457,
45 8, 464, 484, 485, 495, 502,
503, 509, 516, 561 , 569, 570,
571, 583; see also Rinzai Zen
Zendo: see Shan-tao
Zenju: 440
Zuiho, Menzan: 509; see also Rinzai
Zen
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